Russia s New Direction

Transcription

1 Russia s New Direction An Update to The New Dissidents: Human Rights Defenders and Counterterrorism in Russia The New Dissidents, 24pp, published March 2005 Fifteen years since the fall of the Soviet Union, civil liberties are eroding rapidly in Vladimir Putin s Russia. At the same time that rising authoritarianism has put its democratic institutions and civil society in jeopardy, Russia has assumed a leadership role in both the Group of Eight (G8) and the Council of Europe, two institutions defined by their members economic strength and democratic values. Russia s prominent role in these two important intergovernmental organizations has brought its continuing violations of human rights, disrespect for the rule of law, and undermining of democratic institutions into the spotlight. As early as 2001, President Putin s government had begun to justify its tightening of restrictions on critics of Russian policies in Chechnya as necessary in the fight against terrorism. But in the last year, the Russian government has boldly increased its efforts to weaken and control all independent organizations involved in promoting democracy and human rights throughout the country. A new law signed by President Putin in January that regulates nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is expected to interfere with and even force human rights groups to end their operations. With television, regional governments, and parliament all firmly under the control of the executive branch, human rights organizations are among the final independent voices left in Russia, making them attractive targets for the Putin administration. Meanwhile, hopes that the judicial system would provide a check on the government s power to stifle dissent have faded as political interests unmistakably influenced judgments in both civil and criminal cases against human rights defenders in the last year. Recommendations Russia s new role in the G8 and the Council of Europe provide a critical opportunity for its partners in those organizations to demand that it change this course. Democratic nations, including the United States, other G8 governments, and members of the Council of Europe, should jointly: Support measures to promote Russia s adherence to rule of law through independence of the judiciary; Seek freedom of all forms of media in Russia, especially television, which reaches more Russians than print or Internet-based media; Demonstrate support for Russia s independent civil society organizations by engaging in open dialogue with them, highlighting their work, and strongly protesting any attempts to silence them; Demonstrate their own commitment to international human rights standards and obligations. This will prevent mixed messages and reverse the current context in which their credibility to press for improvements in Russia is severely undermined. The NGO Law On January 10, 2006, President Putin signed the Federal Law On Amendment of Selected Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation. Implementation of the law poses serious obstacles to the work of some

2 People who question the policies of our government are increasingly targeted. People who work for human rights are increasingly under attack. Ludmilla Alexeeva, chairperson of the Moscow Helsinki Group Russian NGOs as well as foreign human rights organizations operating in Russia. Restrictions on the activities of independent NGOs in Russia makes it easier for the government to hide its human rights violations and evade accountability for flouting international law. Although the draft law had wide support among Russian legislators when it was introduced in November 2005, it drew severe criticism from Russian human rights leaders and much of the international community, including governments and civil society organizations focused on Russia. In response to this international outcry, some changes were made to soften the language of the November draft. However, serious restrictions remain in the law as passed and signed. It contains many vague provisions that invite government abuse. This is especially troubling given the government s intent to impede and silence independent human rights monitors. One serious problem with the new law is its onerous document and reporting requirements. Representatives of Russian and foreign NGOs operating in Russia are concerned that producing adequate responses to the voluminous document requests permitted by the law will tie up their resources, making it impossible for staff to carry out their human rights work. They are also concerned that its detailed reporting requirements about the programmatic uses of foreign funding could lead to the elimination of programs that are undesirable to the government, and possibly to the closure of these organizations altogether. The law could be used to target those organizations that are most critical of the government, just as tax and administrative laws are already being selectively applied to impede the work of some NGOs. Given the erosion of judicial independence and respect for the rule of law in recent years, any abuses of the NGO law by the Russian government will be difficult to remedy through the court system. While the Putin government has said that the intended purpose of the law is to stabilize civil society and fight terrorism, instead it is likely to contribute to greater insecurity and violations of human rights by weakening organizations that act as a critical check on such abuses. Instead of systematically removing checks on executive power in the name of promoting security, the government should uphold basic rights of freedom of expression, assembly and association, as guaranteed in the Russian constitution and international human rights treaties. Defamation of Defenders In January 2006, a documentary shown on government television falsely accused four internationally respected human rights organizations of accepting funds from British secret service agents. It was one of the government s most brazen uses of state-controlled media to damage the reputation of human rights defenders in the eyes of the general public since the fall of the Soviet Union. Those attacked were the Moscow Helsinki Group, the Center for Democracy and Human Rights, the Eurasia Foundation, and the Nizhny Novgorod-based Committee against Torture. All of the organizations rejected the accusations as baseless slurs, pointing out that funds

3 Ludmilla Alexeeva, chairperson of the Moscow Helsinki Group and recipient of Human Rights First s 2005 human rights award. Her group was among those accused of working with British spies. they have received from the British government have all come through legal, transparent channels. But with no access to television, the most easily accessible form of media in Russia, they have not had adequate opportunity to refute the accusations in Russian public media. The accusations have had a detrimental impact on the work of human rights defenders across Russia. Government agencies that were cooperating with local human rights defenders on important reform projects have rescinded their offers of support and sponsorship to avoid being tainted by the accusations. And those who work in human rights organizations have been warned by strangers of the possibility of retribution. In conjunction with the new NGO law, damaging accusations of espionage or other similar crimes could provide the government with a pretext to close down these vital organizations. The accusations are also consistent with a now wellestablished practice by the Putin government to deflect criticism by tarnishing the public image of its critics. For example, on January 31, President Putin accused some NGOs of working for foreign puppet masters, and in a February 7 speech to leaders of Russia s Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the KGB, he demanded that the agency protect society from any attempts by foreign states to use these organizations for interfering in Russia s internal affairs. President Putin has repeatedly called into question the motives of U.S. and other foreign officials, including most recently Vice President Dick Cheney, who have criticized the deterioration of human rights and democracy in Russia characterizing such criticism as based on self-interest and hostility toward Russia. Political Influence on the Judicial System In the last year, several legal cases against human rights defenders in Russia have served to demonstrate expanded political influence over judicial processes, signaling a deterioration in respect for the rule of law in Russia in order to advance the political goals of the government and silence the voices of independent critics. The Trepashkin Case Mikhail Trepashkin, a Russian defense lawyer and former FSB agent, was part of an independent commission investigating a 1999 bombing that killed more than a hundred civilians, an incident that contributed to the commencement of the second Chechen war. As part of the investigation, Mr. Trepashkin uncovered evidence suggesting government complicity in the bombing. In October 2003, a few days before he was to present the evidence in court, he was arrested by police who claimed to have found a gun in the trunk of his car. He was imprisoned and thereby prevented from presenting the evidence gathered against the government. In May 2004, Mr. Trepashkin was found guilty of divulging state secrets and received a four- year sentence. In April 2005, he was found guilty of gun possession, and another year was added to his sentence. That conviction, however, was later overturned.

4 Mikhail Trepashkin, Russian defense lawyer and former FSB agent Mr. Trepashkin was transferred to a prison outside Moscow, and his lawyers subsequently filed a request for his parole. To their surprise, it was granted, and since the government did not file an appeal within the specified ten days, he was released in August. He returned to his home in Moscow, and held a press conference describing the conditions of his detention and confirming his intention to continue his human rights activities. The next day, the prosecutor s office filed its appeal of the grant of parole. The court granted the appeal, even though it was not filed within the prescribed time limit. A group of twenty men arrested Mr. Trepashkin at his home on September 18, without identifying themselves or providing an arrest warrant. Mr. Trepashkin was again detained on the basis of a flawed judicial process. He remains in custody today despite failing health due to his severe, chronic asthma. The Dmitrievsky Case Using the need to safeguard national security as a pretext, the Putin government has applied laws intended to control religious extremism against those who work daily to prevent it through their non-violent activities. No case exemplifies the mounting pressures exerted on Russian human rights organizations better than the multifaceted persecution endured by the Russian- Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS). RCFS is a human rights organization based in the city of Nizhny Novgorod, about 250 miles east of Moscow, which reports on human rights violations occurring in Chechnya. RCFS members in Chechnya have suffered physical attacks for many years, and several members have been killed. But beginning in 2005 the Putin government sharply escalated its legal and media campaign against the organization as a whole. The government campaign to discredit and ultimately close the organization has included the use of tax and administrative challenges and the criminal investigation and prosecution of Stanislav Dmitrievsky, its managing director, under these misapplied counter-extremism laws. On January 20, 2005, the FSB summoned Mr. Dmitrievsky to its Nizhny Novgorod office for questioning. The FSB interrogated Mr. Dmitrievsky about his political beliefs and activities, including his views on official Russian policy toward Chechnya. The agents also asked him to discuss two articles published almost a year earlier in Pravozaschita, a small human rights newspaper of which he is editor-in-chief. The articles in question appeared in the March and April-May 2004 issues of Pravozaschita. The first article was written by Akhmed Zakayev, a former representative of Chechnya to Moscow. In it, Zakayev addressed the Russian public, urging them not to vote for President Putin during his re-election campaign that year. The second article was written by now-deceased separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, who appealed to the European Parliament to classify the conflict in Chechnya as genocide. 1 Both also called for peace in Chechnya. At first, the FSB claimed that by allowing publication of the two articles, Mr. Dmitrievsky, as editor-in-chief, may have violated Article 280 of the Russian Criminal Code, which bans public calls to carry out extremist activity

5 Stanislav Dmitrievsky, managing director, Russian-Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS) and threats to Russia s constitutional order. A criminal investigation was opened, although no charges were filed. Six months later, however, after publicly announcing that there was no case against Mr. Dmitrievsky, the prosecutor s office charged him with inciting hatred or enmity on the basis of ethnicity and religion under Article 282 of the Criminal Code. To explain Mr. Dmitrievsky s prosecution under Article 282, a Nizhny Novgorod prosecutor, Konstantin Moiseyev, stated that the Maskhadov and Zakayev articles displayed a tendency to reflect negatively on the policy of the Russian president and soldiers of the Russian forces. 2 Yet the provision under which Mr. Dmitrievsky was charged and tried is intended to curb hatred directed against ethnic or national groups, not non-violent expression or other activities against the government. The protracted investigative process, and the weak basis for the prosecution, gave the impression that the government was searching for any way to bring charges against Mr. Dmitrievsky. Capitalizing on a climate of shock and fear after the September 2004 Beslan school attack, and responding to public demands for justice for the extremists who responsible for it, the government targeted Mr. Dmitrievsky. By prosecuting him, the government sought to achieve two related goals: making an example of him and his organization, and satisfying the public appetite for prosecutions after Beslan. On February 3, 2006, despite the absence of any credible evidence against him, the court convicted Mr. Dmitrievsky. He was given four years probation with a two-year suspended sentence, under which he faces the risk of immediate imprisonment at any time. Furthermore, as a consequence of his conviction, Mr. Dmitrievsky can no longer legally manage the activities of the RCFS or serve as editor of Pravozaschita under the NGO law signed on January 10. His prosecution is a striking example of how the government is using counter-extremism laws to silence its non-violent critics rather than addressing the growing nationalist and racist violence across the country. 3 In fact, Mr. Dmitrievsky s prosecution was commenced on the heels of a case in which Article 282 had been used to convict Yuri Samodurov and Ludmila Vasilovskaya, the director and curator of the Sakharov Museum and Public Center, in late March These cases are already having a wide impact. On January 25, 2006, Svetlana Gannushkina, chairperson of the Civil Assistance Committee, whose parent organization is the renowned Memorial, was summoned to the prosecutor s office in Moscow to discuss her activities in monitoring trials of Muslims and others accused of extremism. Memorial later received a written warning that solicitation of expert opinions from Muslim religious leaders could result in prosecution under the counter-extremism laws. The Badalov Case Civil counter-extremism laws may also be used to close down organizations reporting on the conflict in Chechnya. In July 2004, the prosecutor s office in Ingushetia brought a civil action against the Chechen Committee for National Salvation (CCNS) for violating the post-september 11, 2001 law On Countering

6 Ruslan Badalov, head of the Chechen Committee for National Salvation (CCNS) Extremist Activities. The accusations against CCNS were based on press releases and statements put out by the organization describing serious human rights abuses committed by Russian government forces in the Northern Caucasus region. One piece of evidence considered by the Nazran, Ingushetia court in September 2004 was an expert opinion by the Independent Council of Legal Expertise, a renowned group of prominent Russian lawyers. The Independent Council reviewed the press releases at the request of Ruslan Badalov, the head of the CCNS and found them to be free of extremist content. On October 25, the court found that CCNS had not violated the Law on Countering Extremist Activities and dismissed the case against the organization. The prosecutor s office appealed to the Supreme Court of Ingushetia. On February 3, 2005, when hearings were set to commence, Mr. Badalov received word that his mother had died. His lawyer immediately went to the court and requested a continuance so that Mr. Badalov could attend his mother s funeral, and the court granted it. However, on February 10, while Mr. Badalov was still away, the court went ahead with the hearings without notifying CCNS, Mr. Badalov, or his attorney violating basic procedural protections. In its decision, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court s decision based on what appears to be a misapplication of the law, and remanded the case for new proceedings. On April 27, 2005, the date on which a new set of hearings at the Nazran court was due to begin, the court instead issued a postponement, the first of many that have ensued. According to Mr. Badalov, it was the support and concern shown by the international community that prevented the swift closure of the organization. On March 27, 2006, Mr. Badalov s lawyer received notice that hearings would recommence, but no final decision has been reached. A new expert opinion again states that no evidence of extremist content was found in the press releases. However, in response to several other questions including concerning the possibility that the press releases incited national hatred the expert issued no conclusions. Even if the Nazran court once again dismisses this case, the FSB and prosecutor s office may initiate a criminal prosecution against Mr. Badalov on the basis of the same law that was used to convict Mr. Dmitrievsky. Russia s Changing Role Under Vladimir Putin, Russia is playing an expanded role in economic and democratic development well beyond its borders. It has, for example, aggressively reasserted its influence in the countries of the former Soviet Union. One striking example is the increased alliance between the Russian Government and the Government of Uzbekistan even after the massacre of hundreds of

7 It s not too late for Russia to find a new direction. innocent civilians protesting in Andizhan. Rather than expressing concern about this incident, the Russian government expressed solidarity with the Karimov Government in Uzbekistan. This seriously undermined efforts by other European governments and the United States to challenge the excessive use of force by the Karimov government in Andizhan. Conversely in shutting down gas supplies to the Ukraine, Russia also sent a strong signal that it can and in fact will flex its economic muscles in order to retain its influence over its neighbors when they dare to demonstrate independence from Moscow. With Russia s role in the region becoming more important, it is all the more critical for leaders of the G8 and the Council of Europe to press the Russian government to respect democracy and human rights, both at home and in the broader region of the former Soviet Union. these actions is to silence those who work for human rights and for a more open, democratic future. But it is not yet too late for Russia to find a new direction. The leaders of the democratic world should take advantage of the opportunity presented by Russia s partnership in the Group of Eight and the Council of Europe to press for reforms. These countries should work together to send a unified, consistent, and clear message that they support Russia s independent civil society and strongly oppose any attempts to silence it. Ultimately, the common objective of a world free from the threat of terrorism must not be used as an excuse to curtail international human rights obligations. Conclusion The recent decline in respect for human rights in President Putin s Russia poses grave dangers for the future. The government is tightening controls on independent organizations through new legislation and the misuse of counter-extremism laws. The effect of

8 Mission The New Dissidents: Human Rights Defenders and Counteterrorism in Russia and this update, Russia s New Direction, are available for free in PDF format at Bound copies of The New Dissidents are available for $15 each, plus shipping, and can be ordered online or by contacting or Pubs@humanrightsfirst.org. Human Rights First is a leading human rights advocacy organization based in New York City and Washington, DC. Since 1978, we have worked in the United States and abroad to create a secure and humane world advancing justice, human dignity, and respect for the rule of law. All of our activities are supported by private contributions. We accept no government funds. Other reports in the Human Rights Defenders and Counteterrorism series are also available at Complementary copy with a donation of $250 or more by contacting the Development Department at or Members@humanrightsfirst.org. Footnotes 1. The two articles have been reprinted in English by Prima-News: Why Dmitrievsky is in the Dock, available at 2. Steven Lee Myers, Russia Hounds Human Rights Group That Gets U.S. Help, New York Times, September 18, For more information on the growing problem of nationalist and racist violence, see Human Rights First, St. Petersburg: Racism Capital of Russia, New York, Yuri Samodurov and Ludmila Vasilovskaya, the director and curator of the Sakharov Museum and Public Center, were both convicted of inciting ethnic and religious hatred under Article 282 on March 29, The provocative exhibit Caution/Religion aimed to examine religion in modern Russia. One of the works was the face of Jesus imposed on a Coca-Cola logo next to the words This is my blood. The exhibition provoked vandalism from alleged members of the Movement for the Russian Renewal of the Fatherland and the exhibition was forced to close after being open for only four days. Headquarters 333 Seventh Avenue 13 th Floor New York, NY Tel: Fax: Washington D.C. Office 100 Maryland Avenue, N.E. Suite 500 Washington, DC Tel: Fax: