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1 Economic Conditions and Presidential Elections Abstract One of the more robust ndings over the last 50 years in research on elections has been the importance of macroeconomic conditions on voting in U.S. presidential elections. An important contribution to that literature was made by Steven Weatherford in a 1978 article demonstrating that working class voters are more sensitive to economic conditions than are middle class voters in their vote choice. Weatherford's result was based on the 1956 through 1960 elections. We replicate Weatherford's result for 1960, and show that the substantive nding is extremely sensitive to the denition of class. When using occupation groups as the measure of class, we are able to essentially replicate Weatherford's result. However, using income as the measure of class we do not nd any evidence to support the same nding for We then extend the analysis to cover the period 1956 thru 1996 using both an income-based measure of class and an occupation-based measure of class. We show that there does not appear to be a clear pattern distinguishing levels of economic voting between working-class and middle-class voters; though using the occupation-based measure working class voters appear more sensitive to the economy in recent elections. Finally, we oer a new theory of economic voting. We propose that voters vote based on the economic performance of their economic reference group - rather than on their own personal nances or on the state of the national economy. Jonathan Nagler University of California, Riverside Jennifer R. Niemann University of California, Riverside This paper is available at: papers97/nagle97b.html August 21, 1997 Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August, 1997, Washington, DC. We thank Stephen Weatherford for being extremely helpful in clarifying the data analysis in an article he wrote 20 years ago. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. The authors may be reached at: nagler@wizard.ucr.edu and jniemann@wizard.ucr.edu, respectively.

2 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Introduction One of the more robust ndings over the last 50 years in research on elections has been the importance of macroeconomic conditions on voting in U.S. presidential elections. Numerous studies (Kiewiet 1983, Kinder & Kiewiet 1979, Erikson, Jr. & McIver 1989, Fair 1978, Hibbs 1982, Lewis- Beck & Rice 1992) have shown that aggregate rates of change in unemployment, personal income, and ination have a large eect on the vote for the incumbent. Yet few studies have attempted to distinguish whom this eect is most pronounced on. Welch and Hibbing have looked at dierent responses by men and women to economic perceptions. But Weatherford (1978) is the only scholar who has explicitly looked at the economic voting hypothesis disaggregated by class. Yet this is the most natural division of voters for the question at hand. We know that rich and middle-class voters can aord to worry about things other than the economy. It is primarily the poor for whom life is nasty, brutish, and short. The rich can aord to be more concerned about non-economic issues such as abortion and the environment. The voters on the edge economically ought to worry most about falling o that edge. And this suggests that they ought to worry most about the expected economic impact of dierent candidates. This brings us to our central question in this paper: do poor voters and rich voters give the economy similar weight in their voting decision? There is evidence that the rich and poor consider dierent aspects of the economy, such as ination and unemployment (Hibbs 1982). But there is very little available evidence that bears directly on the question of whether the rich and poor weight the economy dierently relative to other factors such as issues and party identication (Weatherford 1978). This is what Weatherford found for the presidential election of He disaggregated the sample of respondents based on class as dened by occupation: labeling one set of respondents working-class and another set of respondents as middle-class. He then utilized two questions measuring respondents' economic perceptions { roughly retrospective and current views of their personal nances { to create an index of economic perceptions. He then estimated a simple model postulating that the respondent's presidential vote was a function of their party-identication (as measured by vote during the previous election), and the index of economic perceptions. While all

3 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, respondents were less likely to vote for the incumbent if they felt the economy was doing poorly, the standardized coecient for economic perceptions was twice as large for working-class respondents as for middle-class respondents. In this paper we demonstrate that Weatherford's result was extremely sensitive to the measure of class. When we re-specify Weatherford's model using respondent's position in the income distribution rather than an occupational measure of class and re-estimate Weatherford's model for 1960, the result does not hold. Using an income based criteria for determining class, there is no evidence that lower class voters weighed the economy more heavily than middle or upper class voters in After examining the stability of the result for one election year with respect to model speci- cation, we estimate several models disaggregated by income-based measures of class for the years 1952 through We use retrospective evaluations of personal nance as one measure of respondents' economic views for 1956 through And as question availability is not entirely constant over that time, we use two dierent measures of respondents' view of the national economy, rather than their personal nances: retrospective evaluations of business conditions for 1968 through 1980, and retrospective evaluations of the national economy for 1980 through Since the relevant comparisons for us are the within-year comparisons across groups, the lack of consistent questionwording over time is not a serious problem. We nd conrmation for the Weatherford result that working-class voters are economic voters to a larger extent than are middle-class voters in only the years 1968 and In 1956, 1992, and 1996 the estimated eect is larger for middle-class voters than for working-class voters. After doing this, we note that we think neither personal nancial conditions nor national economic conditions are the `right' measure of the economy that voters look at. It is a robust result that the vote for the incumbent party increases when the economy is good, and decreases when the economy is bad. But it remains an open theoretical question as to why this happens at the micro-level. There is a large literature on the question of whether voters are `sociotropic' voters (i.e., basing their economic judgements on the state of the national economy) or `pocketbook' voters (i.e., basing their economic judgements on the state of their own nances).

4 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Yet we think the \pocketbook" versus \sociotropic" debate has essentially precluded more subtle, and ultimately more sensible, alternative micro-motivations. And we argue that there is a more sensible, and sensibly self-interested, model for voters to follow. What really should matter to voters is how their `economic reference group' is doing. Put simply: it is not very meaningful information to an automobile assembly line worker that the national economy is growing at 4% a year and national unemployment is down - if the number of automobile manufacturing jobs is dropping and real wages for blue-collar workers are at for the tenth year in a row. Other groups are perhaps even better examples of the point: farmers and Southern California aerospace workers are people who are well aware how their sector is doing, regardless of the rest of the economy. Thus we argue that rather than being limited to a \sociotropic" or \pocketbook" voting debate, we should allow for voters to vote based on the \sector-specic" economic circumstances of their own economic reference group. Consider a voter who wanted to blame the government and who is not that sophisticated, but: got information about the economy from peers; or, felt that the relevant `systemic' pressure on his or her salary was economic performance of his or her sector. Such a voter might hold the government accountable for the economic performance of: 1) workers in the same industry; 2) similarly educated workers; 3) workers at a similar skill level; or 4) workers at a similar income level. We think this is a more satisfactory answer to the question of how `sophisticated' voters are. 1 2 Weatherford Replication In his original work, Weatherford disaggregated the data by middle and working class using the Centers occupational status variable available in the panel study data. 2 This variable was based upon Richard Centers' work on dening social classes (Centers 1949). Centers denes class by occupational groups. He asserts that occupational groups function much like interest groups. These occupational groups can be aggregated into broader denitions of social classes. The Centers measure places respondents in ten occupational categories (see Appendix A for a listing of categories). Using these categories, Weatherford dened unskilled and semi-skilled workers, skilled manual la-

5 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, bor, and farm tenants and laborers as the working class. White collar workers, small business owners, professionals, large business owners, and farm owners and managers were dened as middle class. We assume Weatherford treated the unclassied category as missing data. Weatherford used an index combining respondents' evaluation of their current nancial conditions and retrospective personal nances as the measure for respondents' perceptions of economic conditions. 3 We estimate the eects of each economic perception variable separately, as well as reporting results we obtained when we computed Weatherford's index. This change in specication should not change the substantive results. We expect to nd that economic conditions will aect the vote intention of the working class more than it will aect the middle class. And testing the impact of each measure separately allows us to extend the analysis into additional elections in a more comparable manner. We then have three specications (one with each economic perception variable), each to be estimated over the two groups of respondents (working and middle class) separately. We expect that the coecients of the economic variables will be larger in absolute value for the working class than for the middle class for both economic measures. Each individual economic perception variable is coded so that negative responses have high values. Thus as our dependent variable is reported vote for the incumbent, we expect to see negative coecients on these variables. In Table 1 we report our attempt to replicate Weatherford's result using his index of economic perceptions. We are not able to get the same exact same results Weatherford did. Our estimate of the standardized coecient for the economic index for working class respondents is.071, whereas Weatherford estimated.157. However, our estimate for this coecient for working class respondents is approximately twice what our estimate for middle class respondents is; and this is what Weatherford found and what was the basis for his conclusion. Since the dierence in magnitude of the coecients could be the result of a dierent choice of scale for the dependent variable, it is this ratio of the coecients that is most important. Thus this result is consistent with Weatherford's estimates. 4 And so both his result and our's suggests that working class voters are more sensitive to economic conditions than are middle class voters, when inclusion in the working class is based on respondents' occupation.

6 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, [Table 1 Here] To test for sensitivity with regards to measures of economic perceptions, we estimated the model using each measure of economic perceptions separately. For both measures of economic perceptions (current nances and retrospective nances), the coecients for the working class respondents are larger, in absolute value, than the corresponding coecients for the middle class. Using the separate economic measures, we nd the estimated standardized coecients to be ve times larger for the working class than for the middle class with either measure. In addition, the coecients for the middle class are not statistically signicant at any traditional level for either measure of economic perceptions, while the working class coecients are all signicant at 0.05 or better. Thus these ndings also support Weatherford's contention that working class voters are more sensitive to the economy than are middle class voters. [Table 2 Here] 3 Measures of Class Now we test to see if the result Weatherford obtained in 1960 is sensitive to choice of model specication. Our major test here is to determine if the choice of the Centers occupation based class measure over alternative measures of class, such as income, aects the result. We compute a new class variable based on self-reported family income. The bottom 54% of respondents are categorized as working-class, the upper 46% are categorized as middle-class. (This compares to the Centers Class variable: which categorizes 46% of respondents as working-class, and 54% of respondents as middle-class.) We also create an additional occupation-based measure of class. While the NES supplied Centers measure may be a useful occupation based measure of class, it is problematic for our purposes. The disadvantage to using the NES supplied Centers occupational status measure to separate respondents into a working class group and a middle class group is that only the Panel Study includes this measure. It is not included in any of the NES Annual Surveys since then. Therefore, in order to replicate this work in later years, we needed to create a comparable variable

7 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, using the annual survey data. We chose to recode the question about respondent's occupation to create a similar occupational status measure, which we (hopefully) label `Almost-Centers'. The rst step in creating the Almost-Centers measure was to convert the 49 category NES head-of-household occupation variable into the 10 categories dened by the Centers' occupational status measure. All occupations coded in the professional and technical sub-group by NES were coded as professionals in the Almost-Centers measure. Occupations coded as large business owners and small business owners by NES were coded the same in the Almost-Centers measure. Respondents coded as managers, ocials, or proprietors, and occupations coded in the clerical and sales sub-group by NES were all recoded to white collar. All occupations in the skilled workers and semi-skilled workers NES sub-groups were recoded to the comparable categories (skilled workers or semi-skilled workers). NES coded farm laborers were coded as farm tenants and laborers. Respondents coded by NES as other laborers or unskilled labor were coded as unskilled manual workers. The NES groups farmers and farm managers were coded as farm owners and managers in the Almost-Centers measure. All respondents coded as unemployed, students, retired, or housewives by NES were recoded as unclassied. There were three NES categories from the occupation variable that did not convert easily to a Centers category. First, farm owners and tenants are two dierent categories in the Centers measure. Second, there is no specic category for the occupational sub-group for service workers that NES denes. Third, NES occupation categories include an option for business owners without specifying the size of the buiness. These respondents temporarily retained the original NES coding. When the occupational groups are recoded into class groups, these categories will also be recoded. After creating the Almost-Centers' variable, we created a dummy variable for the middle class following Weatherford's method. All occupations coded unskilled workers, semi-skilled workers, skilled manual labor, or farm tenants and laborers were coded as working class. White collar workers, small business owners, professionals, large business owners, and farm owners and managers were coded as middle class. We treat the unclassied category as missing data. From this framework, the two of the three `problem' categories were recoded. Business owners, regardless of the size of the business, were coded as middle class. Therefore, the unspecied business owners were

8 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, also coded as middle class. We determined that occupations in the service workers category are more similar to working class occupations than middle class. 5 Thus, they were coded as working class. The farm owners and tenants presented a more dicult problem. The Centers' measure puts farm owners in the middle class and farm tenants in the working class. As the NES data exists, there is no way to determine what proportion of these respondents fall into which category. Therefore, we were forced to treat farm owners and tenants as missing data. In Table 3A we present the level of agreement between our alternate middle-class variable based on occupation and a middle-class variable based on the actual Centers variable in the NES dataset used by Weatherford. To do this comparison we computed our occupation measure using respondents' occupation as reported in the 1958 wave of the panel as this is what the NES-computed Centers measure is based on. 96.8% of respondents are categorized the same by the two measures. Our Almost-Centers based measure puts approximately 3% fewer respondents in the middle class category than does the NES-computed Centers measure. [Table 3A Here] In Table 3B we show the match between our income based measure of class (using the 1958 responses) and the Centers measure. Notice that there is remarkably little consistency. Only 54.5% of the respondents classied as working class by the Centers occupation measure are classied as working class by the income based measures. Of workers classied by the Centers measure as middle class, 67.2% of these are classied as middle class by the income based measure. All told, only 60.5% of respondents are classied as being in the same group by both means in Table 3B. This suggests a large problem with the occupation basd measure of class. Admittedly the income based measure contains error: respondents may not truthfully report their income. But this large amount of disagreement suggests a more substantive dierence between the two measures. And if we are measuring sensitivity to the economy, and the theory at hand is that respondents with low income will be most sensitive to change, then we think that favoring the income based measure makes sense. [Table 3B Here]

9 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, We estimate the basic model using each of our three measures of economic perceptions with respondents classied as working class or middle class using rst the Almost-Centers measure (computed based on 1960 occupations), then the economic based measure. Not surprisingly, we get very similar results using the Almost-Centers Measure as we do with the Centers measure. We report the results using the Almost-Centers measure in Table 4. The coecients for the economic variable are again larger for working class respondents than for middle class respondents. [Table 4 Here] Next we disaggregated the sample into working class and middle class respondents using our income based measure of class. We get completely dierent results using the income based class measure! In Table 5 we report results with respondents stratied based on income. Here the coecient for the eect of respondents' view of current nances is larger for middle class respondents than for working class respondents. The coecient for respondents' retrospective nances is signicant and correctly signed for middle class respondents, and insignicant and even incorrectly signed for working class respondents. And the coecients for the index variable are almost identical across the two groups. We think this shows that the Weatherford results are very sensitive to the measure of class. [Table 5 Here] Of course in addition to testing the sensitivity of any nding based on model specication, it is a good idea to test the sensitivity to any result to the choice of elections. Would we observe the same result in years other than 1960? To test this we proceed below to estimate a similar model for the years 1956 thru Weatherford Replication - Extending the Analysis to More Years For the replication, we specied the dependent variable as the respondent's vote for president. A vote for the incumbent party is coded 1; vote for the challenger is 0. The primary independent variable is the respondent's subjective perception of the economy. We used two measures of the respondent's view of the economy: respondent's retrospective perception of personal nances, and

10 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, respondent's retrospective perception of the national economy. The latter is not directly available prior to However, a question on retrospective evaluations of business conditions is available from 1968 thru We used this question as the measure of the respondent's view of the national economy for the elections from We believe that the questions are measuring the same underlying concept. 6 We stratied voters based upon their total family income. There are several advantages to using this measure. First, the information is available each year in the NES annual les. Second, total family income takes into consideration both the respondent's income, and the income of the head of household (if the respondent is not head of household). This avoids the problem of identifying which household member's income is signicant in determining economic class. Finally, there should be a high correlation between economic class placement based on occupation and the denition used here. Occupations that are generally associated with the middle class are very likely to have higher incomes than those considered working class. The family income question asks the respondent to estimate his/her yearly family income within a given range. To determine the class division, the frequencies for each range were calculated. The working class is dened as the bottom third of the income distribution. The format of the responses made it impossible to dene exactly one-third of the distribution. The division was made as close to the 50 th percentile as possible. The middle class is dened as the top half of the income distribution. In addition to economic perceptions, we included measures of party identication. We included two dummy variables: the rst variable was coded 1 if the respondent identied with the Democratic party, coded 0 if not; the second variable was coded 1 if the respondent identied him/herself with the Republican party, coded 0 if not. Those who indicated no partisan leaning were the omitted category. Table 6 reports the estimated logit coecients and standard errors for the two groups for each of the 11 elections. So we report 22 estimated coecients for personal nances, and compare them pair-wise. In only 1964 and 1972 do we see support for the hypothesis that working

11 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, class voters are more sensitive to the economy than are middle class voters. In those years the coecients for perceptions of personal nances for the working class are at least twice as large as the corresponding coecients for the middle class. However, note that in 1972 the coecients for respondents' evaluation of national economic conditions are almost identical. In 1956 we see that it is the middle class who appear to be more sensitive to changes in perceptions of personal nances than are the working class. [Table 6 Here] The results reported in Table 7 are calculated in a manner identical to Table 6, except that here respondents are classied as belonging to the working class or middle class based on the head of household's occupation. 7 This yields much dierent results. Here the working class respondents do appear to be much more sensitive than middle class respondents to personal nances in 1956, 1960, 1976, and 1988 thru [Table 7 Here] We have a bit of a paradox. How voters respond to their perceptions of their own nances and the national economy does not appear to be sensitive to their standing in the income distribution, while it does appear to be sensitive to their occupation. If we believe that the reason for a dierential response would be a dierent sensitivity to economic pain, this is an odd nding. 5 Alternative Theory The argument in favor of pocketbook voting has always rested on slightly shaky theoretical ground. As Kiewiet and Rivers argued (Kiewiet & Rivers 1985), a voter who receives a large inheritance from a dead relative { and hence observes an increase in personal fortune { should not necessarily be expected to reward the incumbent for his or her relative's demise. Similarly, a voter who experiences expected life-cycle increases in income should not necessarily attribute those rewards to the government. Yet the alternative theory in the literature, the sociotropic theory of voting, does not postulate voter altruism in suggesting that voters look at the state of the national economy. Rather the sociotropic theory postulates that the voter believes that the state of \the national

12 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, economy" is the best predictor of how: 1) the voter's pocketbook will fare in the future, or 2) how good a job the incumbent is doing at handling the economy. But of course the primary reason for a voter to care about how good a job the incumbent is doing at handling the economy is because it suggests what inuence the incumbent is likely to have on the voter's pocketbook in the future. 8 Thus the real question should not be whether voter's are sociotropic or pocketbook voters; but the real question is: what evidence does a voter look to as the best predictor of how well the economy will be managed towards the voter's interests? The typical voter probably is not going to have access to a large macro-economic forecasting model. So the criteria we should apply in searching for evidence a voter can use is that the evidence be: 1) readily available, 2) easily interpretable, and 3) that it actually predict how the voter will fare in the future. The state of the national economy fullls these criteria only if we make several assumptions. The crucial assumption is that an improving national economy implies that all person's pocketbooks will be improving. Of course if the national economy is improving it follows that on average person's pocketbooks will be improving; but a voter might want a better indicator. In particular, voters could be aware that the \national economy" could be doing very well, while they could be doing very badly. If this is the case, then the national economy no longer fullls the third condition above, and the voter needs an alternative economic indicator to use. Even a relatively unsophisticated voter might notice that the problem with the national economy is that their economic class or occupation group might move dierently than the national economy. As pointed out above: such evidence could be readily apparent if the voter is in a large and visible economic sector such as the auto industry. We need only assume that the voter has access to public measures of aggregate economic performance (GNP, unemployment, etc.), and that the voter knows the condition of his or her own economic sector for the incongruity to be apparent. The rst condition is readily fullled from standard news sources. The second condition could be met two ways. First, if the voters in a visible sector such as autos, the state of the sector will be available via the news media. This will be especially true for geographically concentrated sectors. Second, we know that people form information networks with peers from work { so there is alot of opportunity to acquire information about one's industry via personal contact. 9

13 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, A plausible substitute for the national economy is some measure of how the voter's economic class or occupation group is doing. The rst question then is: what is the voter's economic reference group? First, the voter could use workers in the same industry (i.e., automotive workers, aero-space workers, etc). Second, the voter could use workers in the same occupation: clerks, accountants, welders, assembly-line workers, etc.. Third, the voter could use workers with the same education level. While workers at equivalent education levels may work in dierent industries, these workers are all substitutes for one another, conditional on some training. A high-school graduate in sector X could switch to being a high-school graduate in sector Y if sector X declines. The groups above are chosen on a rather obvious basis. There is some belief that the return to education has increased in the economy (or, that the wages of the poorly educated have fallen in real terms). Thus education levels are one potentially appropriate economic reference group. However, since education's primary inuence on wages is through occupation choice, occupation becomes a more proximate reference group. Estimating models using these groups is part of an ongoing research program. 6 Discussion We have shown that when using income as a measure of class, there is no discernible tendency of working class voters to weigh the economy more heavily than middle class voters. Using occupation as a measure of class, in some presidential elections (including the most recent ones) working class voters do appear to wiegh their perceptions of their personal nances more heavily than do middle class voters. We know alot about the aggregate eect of the economy on elections. Understanding more about how it works at the micro level is important. We suggest that using measures of economic performance more closely tied to economic reference groups of voters will yield a better understanding of the mechanism by which economic performance aects elections.

14 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Appendix Centers Occupational Status Groups Large Business Owners Professional Small Business Owners White Collar Skilled Manual Workers Semi-Skilled Manual Workers Unskilled Manual Workers Farm Owners and Managers Farm Tenants and Laborers Unclassied Almost-Centers' Occupational Groups Professional Large Business Owners Small Business Owners White Collar Skilled Workers Semi-Skilled Workers Farm Tenants and Laborers Unskilled Manual Workers Farmers and Farm Managers Farm Owners and Tenants Service Workers Business Owners (size unknown) Unclassied

15 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Notes 1. We do not know if Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal ((1993)) have put to rest the theory that voters can distinguish between government induced shock and exogenous shocks to the economy. But we treat voters as blaming or crediting government for performance of the economy. 2. The panel survey included the Centers occupational status variable as a separate variable (V502). 3. See Weatherford, page 923, footnote 3, for a description of the index. We computed the index as follows: index = 2 if ((personal-nance-current == 1) AND (personal-nance-retrospective == 1)); index = 1 if ((personal-nance-current == 1) AND (personal-nance-retrospective == 5)); index = 1 if ((personal-nance-current == 1) AND (personal-nance-retrospective == 3)); index = 1 if ((personal-nance-current == 3) AND (personal-nance-retrospective == 5)); index = 0 if ((personal-nance-current == 3) AND (personal-nance-retrospective == 3)); index = -1 if ((personal-nance-current == 5) AND (personal-nance-retrospective == 1)); index = -1 if ((personal-nance-current == 3) AND (personal-nance-retrospective == 1)); index = -1 if ((personal-nance-current == 5) AND (personal-nance-retrospective == 3)); index = -2 if ((personal-nance-current == 5) AND (personal-nance-retrospective == 5)). We believe that Weatherford's published work has two numbers transposed in the table, otherwise the above coding scheme would yield a perfect match. 4. However, Weatherford reported a signicant estimate for the coecient for middle class respondents; our estimate was not signicant at traditional levels. 5. Over seventy percent of respondents coded as service workers report an income below the median. Also, the Centers class variable codes nearly ninety percent of service workers as working class. 6. To test this belief, we compared responses to these questions in a year when both are available: In that year, the correlation for the responses to the questions is Using respondents' occupation yielded similar results. 8. See Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) for a discussion of this. 9. Voters could choose to distinguish between the national economy and their own economic group for one of two reasons. First, the voter could simply think that economic performance of their economic group is the best measure of intent by the incumbent towards their group. Thus the voter could explicitly recognize that dierent parties favor dierent groups of voters. Or, second, the voter could just be unsophisticated about government - but sophisticated about economics enough to notice that some groups of workers are doing well while others are doing badly, and simply view the dierent parties as having dierent histories of eects on the economy. We do not attempt to distinguish between these two reasons here as they have identical behavioral implications for this work.

16 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, References References Alesina, Alberto, John Londregan & Howard Rosenthal \A Model of the Political Economy of the United States." American Political Science Review 87:12{33. Centers, Richard The Psychology of Social Classes: A Study of Class Consciousness. Princeton University Press. Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright Jr. & John P. McIver \Political parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy in the United States." The American Political Science Review 83:729{750. Fair, Ray C \The Eect of Economic Events on Votes for President." The Review of Economics and Statistics 60:159{173. Hibbs, Douglas A \The Dynamics of Political Support for American Presidents Among Occupational and Partisan Groups." American Journal of Political Science 26:312{332. Kiewiet, D. Roderick Macroeconomics & Micropolitics : the Electoral Eects of Economic Issues. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. Kiewiet, D. Roderick & Douglas Rivers \The Economic Basis of Reagan's Appeal." The New Direction in American Politics: Chubb, John E. and Paul E. Peterson 999:The Brookings Institution, 1985, p. 69{90. Kinder, Donald R. & D. Roderick Kiewiet \Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Voting." American Journal of Political Science 23:495{527. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. & Tom W. Rice Forecasting Elections. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. Weatherford, Stephen M \Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: Class Dierences in the Political Response to Recession." American Journal of Political Science 22:917{939.

17 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Table 1: Replication of Weatherford's Results a Dependent Variables: Vote for Incumbent for President Constant Unstandardized Standardized Weatherford Coecients Coecients results b Working Middle Working Middle Working Middle Class Class Class Class Class Class (.033) (.033) Party-ID ???? (Vote-56) (.043) (.040) Index of Finances (.016) (.015) (29.4) (6.9) Number of Obs R Root MSE a Table entries are the coecients for the variables indicated. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Class is dened by the Centers' measure. Observations include voters and the preferences of non-voters. The party identication measure is the respondent's vote in the 1956 presidential election. b Values taken from Table 4 (pg. 930) of the Weatherford article; standardized coecients, F-statistics in parenthesis. p <.05 p <.10

18 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Table 2: Replication of Weatherford's Results a Alternative Measures of Economic Perceptions Dependent Variables: Vote for Incumbent for President Constant Unstandardized Standardized Coecients Coecients Working Middle Working Middle Class Class Class Class (.053) (.048) Party-ID (Vote-56) (.042) (.040) Current Finances (.014) (.014) Number of Obs R Root MSE Constant (.055) (.049) Party-ID (Vote-56) (.042) (.041) Retrospective Finances (.014) (.014) Number of Obs R Root MSE a Table entries are the coecients for the variables indicated. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Class is dened by the Centers' measure. Observations include voters and the preferences of non-voters. The party identication measure is the respondent's vote in the 1956 presidential election. p <.05 p <.10

19 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Table 3A: 2X2 Table of Weatherford's Class Variable and the Almost-Centers' Variable a Almost Centers' Actual Centers' Working Class Middle Class Total Working Class (94.24) ( 5.76) (100.00) Middle Class (0.37 ) (99.63) (100.00) Total (49.38) (50.62) a Table entries are the number of respondents in each category. The numbers in parentheses are the frequencies. Table 3B: 2X2 Table of Center's Class Variable and the Income Based Class Variable a Income Based Actual Centers' Working Class Middle Class Total Working Class (54.53) (45.47) (100.00) Middle Class (32.77) (67.23) (100.00) Total (44.37) (55.63) a Table entries are the number of respondents in each category. The numbers in paretheses are the frequencies.

20 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Table 4: Replication Using Three Economic Measures - Almost-Centers Class Measure a Unstandardized Standardized Coecients Coecients Working Class Middle Class Working Class Middle Class Party Identication (.049) (.046) Current Finances (.015) (.015) Party Identication (.048) (.046) Retrospective Finances (.017) (.016) Party Identication (.049) (.046) Index of Finances (.019) (.017) a Table entries are coecients for the variables indicated. The standard errors are given in parentheses. Class is dened by our Almost-Centers measure. Observations include voters and the preferences of non-voters. The party identication measure is the respondent's vote in the 1956 presidential election. p <.05 p <.10

21 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Table 5: Replication Using Three Economic Measures - Income Based Class Measure a Unstandardized Standardized Coecients Coecients Working Class Middle Class Working Class Middle Class Party Identication (.046) (-.037) Current Finances (.015) (.012) Party Identication (.046) (.036) Retrospective Finances (.016) (.013) Party Identication (.046) (.037) Index of Finances (.018) (.014) a Table entries are coecients for the variables indicated. The standard errors are given in parentheses. Class is based on family income. Observations include voters and the preferences of non-voters. The party identication measure is the respondent's vote in the 1956 presidential election. p <.05 p <.10

22 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Table 6: Eect of Evaluations of Economic Conditions on Vote for Incumbent, Income-based Class Measure a Evaluation of Evaluation of National Personal Finances Economic Conditions Working Middle Working Middle Class Class Class Class { { { { (.052) (.066) { { { { (.094) (.084) { { { { (.078) (.078) (.074) (.067) (.079) (.076) (.095) (.085) (.107) (.090) (.072) (.059) (.067) (.058) (.076) (.069) (.120) (.136) (.077) (.074) (.083) (.079) (.087) (.074) (.101) (.086) (.072) (.055) (.103) (.079) (.089) (.077) (.130) (.108) a Table entries are estimated logit coecients from a model where the dependent variables is the respondent's reported vote for the candidate of the incumbent party. The independent variables are the respondent's partyidentication and evaluation of personal nances or of national economic conditions. Class is based on family income. b For 1968, 1972, and 1976 respondents' opinions of national economic conditions are measured by their response to national business conditions. p <.05 p <.10

23 nagler, niemann - apsa97.tex; August 21, Table 7: Eect of Evaluations of Economic Conditions on Vote for Incumbent, HoH Occupation-based Class Measure a Evaluation of Evaluation of National Personal Finances Economic Conditions Working Middle Working Middle Class Class Class Class { { { { (.083) (.121) { { { { (.099) (.105) { { { { (.093) (.085) (.069) (.079) (.076) (.088) (.189) (.091) (.097) (.101) (.069) (.062) (.066) (.059) (.090) (.075) (.156) (.128) (.084) (.081) (.100) (.087) (.116) (.079) (.139) (.093) (.123) (.083) (.177) (.122) (.091) (.073) (.132) (.102) a Table entries are estimated logit coecients from a model where the dependent variables is the respondent's reported vote for the candidate of the incumbent party. The independent variables are the respondent's partyidentication and evaluation of personal nances or of national economic conditions. Class is based on the Almost-Centers occupation measure for Head-of-Household. b For 1968, 1972, and 1976 respondents' opinions of national economic conditions are measured by their response to national business conditions. p <.05 p <.10

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