Social Constructivism and International Relations

Transcription

1 Social Constructivism and International Relations Philosophy and the Social Sciences Jack Jenkins Explain and critique constructivist approaches to the study of international relations.

2 Explain and critique constructivist approaches to the study of international relations. Social constructivism has been an influential approach to international relations since the late 1980s. It has grown quickly over the past few decades to constitute a viable alternative to the dominant rationalist theories of international relations, realism and liberalism. International relations has transformed itself since the end of the Cold War, so that newer concepts like constructivism and the Copenhagen School s concept of securitization have been given consideration. It offers alternative understandings to a number of issues in international relations, for example the meaning of anarchy and the balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest, and the prospects for change in world politics, 1 however, it is less a theory of International Relations or security than a broader social theory. The popularity of constructivist thought within the social sciences continues to grow. Here, I will outline the main tenets of constructivist thought, describe some of the major themes from the works of one of constructivism s main contributors, Alexander Wendt, describe the divide between the two constructivist frameworks, namely conventional and critical constructivism, and explore some of the critiques that have been aimed at constructivism. Social constructivism, or simply constructivism, gives great importance to ideas, identity, and interaction in the international system. Kratochwil (1991) writes that constructivism reveals how the human world is not simply given and/or natural but that, on the contrary, the human world is one of artifice; that is constructed through 1 Ted Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, 1998, Vol.23, issue 1, pp , (p.172) 2

3 the actions of the actors themselves. 2 Adler (1997) defines constructivism as the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world. 3 According to Agius (2013), Constructivism puts into context the actions, beliefs, and interests of actors and understands that the world they inhabit has been created by them and impacts on them. 4 Essentially, constructivism argues that ideas and realities of security can be socially constructed, the result of an intersubjective consensus that is capable of being altered by the actions of government over time. 5 As a result, human agency is given more importance than it is in rationalist theories of International Relations, since the actions of states and societies can potentially transform relationships between particular states, changing them from enemies to friends. 6 Constructivism argues that the world is social and not purely material, so that ideational forces, which are often overlooked by rationalist approaches in favour of material forces, are a key part of the theory. Constructivism aims to understand how a consensus about a particular idea comes to be, and therefore how an idea comes to be taken as fact. Socially constructed ideas that are held to be true are referred to as inter-subjective beliefs. These inter-subjective concepts are social facts that can t exist without material objects or the subjective thoughts of individuals. Social structures can either reinforce or undermine peaceful relations 2 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study, in Karin M. Fierke and Knud E. Jørgensen (Eds.), Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p Emanuel Adler, Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, European Journal of International Relations, 1997, vol.3, issue 3, pp , (p.322) 4 Christine Agius, Social Constructivism In: Alan Collins (Ed.) Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2013), pp , (p.88) 5 Michael Sheehan, International Security: An Analytical Survey (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p.26 6 Ibid., p.26 3

4 depending on how interactions between agents and structures create a common social reality. 7 Identity is a key part of constructivism because it determines what our interests are, and it is these interests that determine how we act. Alexander Wendt, a key contributor to constructivist theory, says, Identities are the basis of interests. 8 Interests determine what goals actors pursue and therefore how they will behave, so identity, as the determiner of these interests, is crucial to constructivism. Rationalist approaches to security like neorealism or neoliberalism see identity as either given or of negligible importance to security. Neo-realists believe that the anarchic world system, i.e. the absence of an authority above the state, as well as the importance of the distribution of material capabilities, is the key to understanding state behaviour. 9 In this view, goals are unchanging and are simply given to states as a result of this anarchy. They may cooperate in order to secure these goals, but it is still assumed that they have material interests and that they only cooperate for their own self-interest. In the neoliberal view, state interests are also defined in material terms. For constructivists, however, interests are acquired through interaction. As Hopf (1998) says, Meaningful behaviour, or action, is only possible within an inter-subjective social context, in which actors develop their relations with, and understandings of, others through the media of norms and practices. 10 A group s social interactions shape its core values, and therefore give it its identity. It is these identities that determine whether relations between states will be friendly or hostile. 7 Michael Smith, International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.29 8 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics International Organization, 1992, vol.46, issue 2, pp , (p.397) 9 Agius 2013, p Hopf 1998, p.173 4

5 As previously stated, identities determine interests, and these interests determine how we act. Hopf (1998) writes A state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice. 11 State political leaders designate other states as friend or enemy and approach them as such on the basis of conceptions of identity. 12 This sheds light on why one state can view another state as an enemy or as a threat. For example, the United States does not see Britain s nuclear arsenal as a threat, but saw the prospect of Iraq possessing nuclear weapons as a grave threat to its security, to the extent that it saw military intervention and regime change as necessary. The American perception of Iraq as an enemy was not a material relation, but a social one. According to Wendt (1999), this can be explained by shared understandings. 13 As previously explained, identity comes about through interaction, and is made up of beliefs. These beliefs are shared understandings of the world. Agius (2013) says, Collective meanings and shared knowledge constitute how we understand the world and respond to it. 14 Culture is not considered in rationalist security assessments, however it has a role to play in the constructivist view as it gives meaning to shared experiences and actions. The UK shares many beliefs and ideas with the United States, and also has a liberal democratic identity. Iraq, however, has a radically different political system to the US and the UK, and has a very different culture. Unlike the UK, it has very few shared understandings with the United States. This ties in with the statement from Hopf quoted previously, as the US understood Iraq according to the identity that it 11 Ibid., p Matt McDonald, Constructivism In: Paul D. Williams (Ed.) Security Studies: An Introduction, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: CUP, 1999) p Agius 2013, p.93 5

6 attributed to it, in this case as an enemy, and reproduced its own identity as a great power by intervening militarily. There are social, cultural and historical factors that encourage particular forms of meaning to be given to different actors and their intentions. 15 According to constructivists like Wendt, shared understandings and the identities that they give rise to explain why a state like Iraq, with a very different culture to the United States, was attributed the identity of enemy or threat by the US, while other states that have shared understandings with the US are attributed identities like ally. The above case of the Iraq War suggests that a security issue is socially constructed, rather than simply becoming a security issue when certain criteria are met. Our own identity and the identities that we give to others are dependent on norms, which Katzenstein (1996) defines as collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity. 16 Farrell (2002) says Norms are inter-subjective in that they are beliefs rooted in and reproduced through social practice. 17 They are constructed by actors who have strong ideas about appropriate or desirable behaviour. Identity and norms play a key role in constructing a state as a threat, as political leaders can point to instances where a state did not follow generally accepted ways of behaving. For example in 2002, before the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush gave a speech in which he outlined a number of violations of rules and norms by the Iraqi regime. In his speech, he said that the regime was seeking nuclear weapons, that it had 15 McDonald 2008, p Peter Katzenstein, Alternative Perspectives on National Security In: Peter Katzenstein (Ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) p.5 17 Theo Farrell, Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program, International Studies Review, 2002, vol.7, issue 3, pp.49-73, (p.49) 6

7 sheltered and supported terrorists, and had practiced terror against its own people. 18 Generally held expectations of appropriate behaviour were violated, and this allowed the Iraqi regime to be constructed as a threat by American political leaders. Norms are very important in determining how a state sees itself, giving it its identity, and also in determining how a state sees another, depending on how close the other state s norms are to its own. A well-known quote from Wendt (1992) is Anarchy is what states make of it. 19 McDonald (2008) says that rationalist theories of International Relations hold that state interests and actions are determined by the structure of the international system itself and its central feature: anarchy. 20 According to the rationalist view, anarchy produces a self-help world. Agius (2013) says, The lack of a power above the state means that the logic of self-help produces competition in the international system, creating security dilemmas and problematizing the possibilities for collective action. However, by saying that anarchy is what states make of it, Wendt offers a different, constructivist view of looking at anarchy. Wendt describes self-help and power politics, which are seen in the rationalist view as inevitable products of an anarchic world, as institutions, not essential features of anarchy. 21 Wendt (1992) gives his own definition of institutions: An institution is a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules and norms, but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors socialization to and participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors ideas about how the world works Transcript: George Bush s Speech on Iraq, (The Guardian 2002) < [Accessed 24 April 2014] 19 Wendt 1992, p McDonald 2008, p Wendt 1992, p Ibid., p.399 7

8 Self-help is, in Wendt s view, just one of these institutions. He writes, Self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy. 23 Self-help and power politics are not inevitable consequences of anarchy. Rather, such a structure is constituted by the actions and practices of actors, whose identities and interests have a role to play. 24 Anarchy is not a given feature of the international system but, as Agius (2013) says, It is an idea that states buy into, and, because they buy into it and understand the world as anarchic, they act accordingly. 25 The anarchic world system has been constructed by actors who believe it to be the case. McDonald (2013) says, Agents, (in this case states) can influence the content and effects of a particular structure (in this case anarchy) through the way they act. 26 That agents and structures are mutually constituted further reinforces the constructivist view that the international system is not simply given but is made up of social interaction. Structures such as anarchy and self-help are socially constructed and not simply given, and because of this, change is possible. The view that anarchy encourages selfhelp is one of a number of different cultures of anarchy proposed by Wendt, and anarchy does not necessarily have to lead to such a system. Through their actions, states can maintain this culture of anarchy or disrupt it, since anarchy is what states make of it. Wendt (1999) argues that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure at the macro-level, based on what kind of roles enemy, rival, and friend dominate the system. 27 He characterises these structures as Hobbesian, Lockean, and 23 Ibid., p Agius 2013, p Ibid., p McDonald 2008, p Wendt 1999, p.246 8

9 Kantian respectively. He says that only the Hobbesian structure is a truly self-help system. 28 In the Hobbesian culture of anarchy, survival depends solely on military power. As a result, Security is a deeply competitive, zero-sum affair, and security dilemmas are particularly acute not because of the nature of weapons, but because of the intentions attributed to others. 29 While the Hobbesian culture has characterised the international system over time, Wendt sees the Lockean culture dominating since the Treaty of Westphalia, when the modern system of states came into being. 30 In the Lockean culture, states view other states as rivals, but violence is restrained. While war is accepted and states reserve and periodically exercise the right to use violence to advance their interests, and war could be just as common as in the Hobbesian culture of anarchy, it is limited in that it is rare for states to be killed. 31 When wars of conquest do occur, for example World War II and the Gulf War, it tends to spur collective action by other states to restore the status quo. Wendt (1999) says that since Lockean culture has come to dominate politics for the past three centuries, Hobbesianism has occasionally reared its head, but each time has been beaten back down by status quo states. 32 In contrast to the Hobbesian and Lockean cultures, the Kantian culture is based on a role structure of friendship. Cooperation is favoured over force and violence in matters of security. On the Kantian culture, Wendt (1999) writes: Friendship is a role structure within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules: (1) disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war 28 Ibid., p Ibid., p Agius 2013, p Wendt 1999, p Ibid., p.297 9

10 (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid). 33 These rules are independent and equally necessary, and friendship exists when states expect each other to observe both rules. However, friendship only concerns national security, and not other issue areas. On this point, Wendt (1999) says, Non-violence and mutual aid impose limits on how other issue areas can be handled, but within those limits friends may have considerable conflict. 34 Importantly, friendship is temporally open-ended, in which respect it is qualitatively different from being allies. 35 Alliances are seen as temporary agreements within a rivalry, and allies expect there to come a time when they will revert to a condition in which war between them is an option. 36 Friendship, on the other hand, comes with the expectation that the relationship will continue. Identity again has a prominent role in these three cultures of anarchy. In the Hobbesian culture, states believe themselves to be enemies, and act accordingly by competing with each other militarily. In the Lockean culture, states are allowed to act as rivals because violence is restrained, and they are not in fear of immediate death. The Kantian culture of friendship is possible when states perceive each other to be friends. Each state s interest is a part of the other s interest too. Wendt introduces three levels of cultural internalisation to illustrate the constitutive effect of culture on identity: coercion, interest and legitimacy. 37 The first degree of internalisation is based on coercion, and Wendt (1999) says that when a cultural norm has been internalised only to this degree, an actor knows what the norm is, but complies only 33 Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p Agius 2013 p.97 10

11 because he is forced to, directly or by the threat of certain, immediate punishment that would force him. 38 On the second level, there is a lack of an immediate threat of death, and there is a temporal space where actors are free from direct and immediate coercion. Actors have a meaningful choice, and a shared identity begins to form. Second-degree internalisation exists when actors obey cultural norms not because they think the norms are legitimate (the Third-degree case), but because they think it is in their self-interest. 39 On the third level of internalisation, states believe in the norm and internalise it as legitimate, so they want to follow the norm. Regarding this level of internalisation, Wendt (1999) says, To say that a norm is legitimate is to say that an actor fully accepts its claims on himself, which means appropriating as a subjectively held identity the role in which they have been positioned by the generalised Other. 40 Actors identify with others expectations, relating to them as a part of themselves. It is only with this degree of internalisation that a norm really constructs agents. Prior to this point, their identities and interests are exogenous to it. 41 Actors have a stake in the norm that they did not have before, because it is constitutive of their identity. Actors behaviour is interested but not self-interested, and the quality of compliance will be high. 42 These degrees of cultural internalisation are important because according to Wendt, Each culture of anarchy is multiply realisable. 43 That is, Hobbesian cultures can be generated by deeply shared ideas, and Kantian cultures by only weakly shared 38 Wendt 1999 p Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p

12 ones. 44 Shared ideas may not lead to cooperation. It is possible to have a Hobbesian culture in which actors share the idea that war is good, and a Kantian culture in which actors only weakly share ideas about security cooperation. Wendt maintains that there is no such thing as a logic of anarchy. Wendt (1999) says, What gives anarchy meaning are the kinds of people who live there and the structure of relationships. 45 This point again reflects the constructivist view that the most important structures are made of ideational forces, and not material forces, since Ideas determine the meaning and content of power, the strategies by which states pursue their interests, and interests themselves. 46 It is not that anarchic systems have no structure or logic, but rather that these are a function of social structures, and not anarchy. As Agius (2013) says, Structural change occurs when actors redefine who they are and what they want. Unlike in rationalist theories of international relations, there is the possibility for change, and Wendt s three cultures of anarchy explain how this change might occur. There are two camps into which constructivists are divided conventional constructivists and critical constructivists. McDonald (2008) writes conventional constructivism is closer to traditional theories of International Relations such as realism and liberalism in suggesting the possibility of depicting a world external to the analyst a world out there to be discovered and described objectively. 47 It is a less radical widening approach, locating itself within a traditional, narrow definition of security studies in which the task was to take the hard case of national, military state-centric security, but to explain it through ideational rather than material 44 Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p McDonald 2008, p.62 12

13 factors. 48 Conventional constructivists tend to accept key aspects of neorealist systemic theorising, such as the centrality of the state and the importance of a scientific or positivist approach to comprehend phenomena. 49 Alexander Wendt, some of whose work I have already outlined, falls into this category. Wendt, for example, accepts a number of neorealist tenets, such as states being the main actors in the international system, and he has a particular scientific understanding of phenomena. 50 Conventional constructivists are centrally concerned with finding out how national identity helps determine the context of a state s interests and therefore the way it will act in international politics. 51 This is clear to see in Wendt s work. Positivism vs. post-positivism is a very divisive issue within International Relations, where positivists believe that science is an epistemically privileged discourse through which we can gain a progressively truer understanding of the world, and post-positivists do not recognise a privileged epistemic status for science in explaining the world out there. 52 Conventional constructivism relies heavily on positivism, and Wendt (1999) declares himself a positivist by saying, When it comes to the epistemology of social inquiry, I am a strong believer in science a pluralistic science to be sure, in which there is a significant role for Understanding, but science just the same. I am a positivist. 53 For conventional constructivists, identity is something to be discovered or unearthed through analysis. It is believed that analysis can give us a true picture of the world. As McDonald (2008) says, the conventional constructivist approach takes identities to be relatively stable, enabling the analyst to explore why states act the 48 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p Agius 2013, p Ibid., p McDonald 2008, p Wendt 1999, p Ibid., p.39 13

14 way they do in ways that suggest a causal relationship between identity and interests. 54 Critical constructivism branched off in the late 1990s. For critical constructivists, the central concern in exploring the relationship between security and identity is to outline how narratives of national identity become dominant in a particular context. 55 Buzan and Hansen (2009) say that critical constructivism distinguished itself from conventional constructivism by analysing discourses and the linkages between the historical and discursive constitution of identities on the one hand and security policies on the other. 56 Critical constructivists find the reliance of conventional constructivism on positivism to be problematic. Agius (2013) says that they question the power of discourse, language, reality, and meaning, adopting a more cautious approach to truth claims and power relations. 57 While conventional constructivists take identity to be relatively stable, critical constructivists problematize identity more, preferring to see identity as more complex than stable, less solid and given, and more reliant on power and representation. 58 McDonald (2008) says that for critical constructivists, the study of identity becomes the study of different representations that compete with others to provide realistic accounts of who a particular group is and how that group should act. 59 For example, an analyst trying to define a nation s national identity risks privileging some narratives of identity and marginalising others. On this point Agius (2013) says that only taking into account dominant interpretations of national identity, and not voices that have been silenced, is 54 McDonald 2008, p Ibid., p Buzan and Hansen 2009, p Agius 2013, p Ibid., p McDonald 2008, p.62 14

15 dangerous as it privileges one construction of identity over possible others, such as sub-national groups. 60 For instance, an attempt at defining Welsh national identity risks only taking into account the dominant interpretations, and excluding other, newer constructions of identity, for example the identity of the numerous second and third generation Welsh-Bangladeshis. McDonald (2008) notes that such a position is consistent with post-positivist epistemology, in which it becomes impossible for the analyst to stand outside the world he or she is attempting to describe. 61 Critical constructivists believe that identity is a much more complex than conventional constructivists present it, arguing that it is more reliant on power and representation and not stable. As explained, there is disagreement even between different camps of constructivists. However, constructivism s main criticisms come from rationalist and poststructuralist commenters. Wendt s three cultures of anarchy have been criticised for seeming to be separate worlds of their own and limited to these three images of enemy, rival and friend. 62 Another criticism levied against Wendt is that he fails to account for uncertainty. As previously explained, Wendt tries to show that anarchy has no logic but only three different ideational cultures, namely the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures of anarchy, which depend on the level of compliance of actors to certain behavioural norms. However, Copeland (2012) asks, If the other is acting cooperatively, how is one to know whether this reflects its peaceful character, or is just a façade masking aggressive desires? 63 He essentially argues that Wendt fails to 60 Agius 2013, p McDonald 2013, p Agius 2013, p Dale Copeland, The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay, International Security, 2000, vol.25, issue 2, pp , (p.189) 15

16 account for the possibility of deception. Copeland also criticises the different degrees of internalisation of the three cultures, saying that: What drives behaviour at the lower levels of internalisation is precisely what is not shared between actors their private incentives to comply for short-term selfish reasons. This suggests that the neorealist and neoliberal paradigms, both of which emphasise the role of uncertainty when internalisation is low or non-existent, remain strong competitors to constructivism in explaining changing levels of cooperation through history. 64 A related criticism from rationalists is that we cannot test constructivist claims empirically due to norms, values, and identities all being things that we cannot see. Because we cannot test empirically, we can have no evidence about cooperation being sincere or not. Stephen Krasner (2000) also doubts the power of norms, saying, Rules and norms can be longstanding and widely recognised but also frequently violated, and that Norms have endured but they have not always had much impact on the actual behaviour of states. 65 We cannot prove that norms affect the behaviour of states. Agius (2013) also raises the point that we cannot know which norms are in play in a given situation. 66 In conclusion, the rise of constructivism is an example of the broadening of international relations and security studies since the end of the Cold War. Its focus on identity and ideational forces presents a challenge to the long-established rationalist theories of international relations and their focus on material forces. Constructivism allows us to understand how actors construct threats at certain times. It broadens the study of international relations by allowing us to explore cultural sources of constructed threats, like political speeches, and not just material sources. Rationalist 64 Copeland 2006, p Stephen D. Krasner, Wars, Hotel Fires, and Plane Crashes, Review of International Studies, 2000, vol.26, issue 1, pp , (p.134) 66 Agius 2013, p

17 theories had contended that the anarchical world system provided the logic that states must prioritise security and power. Although criticised, Alexander Wendt s discussion of anarchy and his contention that there is in fact no given logic of anarchy, and that if the international system is anarchic then it is because states make it that way, left open the possibility for fundamental change in the international system. Constructivism s focus on social interaction as the source of state identity means that through interaction states can build new identities by adopting new norms, establishing new shared understandings, and moving towards a new system of cooperation. For constructivists, we construct the world, and because of this we can construct a new one where past enemies can become friends and it is equally possible that friends can become enemies. However, as explained, there are two different camps within constructivism that disagree on certain points, and both these camps disagree on many issues with rationalist thinkers. While there are some agreements between constructivists and rationalists, particularly with conventional constructivists like Wendt who accept many rationalist tenets, a number of criticisms have been levied against constructivism. Many constructivists believe that the emphasis they give to ideational forces like identity, norms, and values gives us new understanding of issues that rationalist approaches could not. However, rationalists question the power of these forces, and remain sceptical about constructivism and the possibility of change in the international system. Despite the criticisms aimed at the theory, the popularity of constructivism has continued to rise. It gives us an alternative way of viewing issues of security, and a more sophisticated understanding of international politics. Because constructivism offers an alternative to the rationalist view of the anarchical world system, and a possible way out of it, it will continue to gain 17

18 followers and will likely continue to divide opinion amongst both constructivists and rationalists for some time. 18

19 References Adler, Emanuel, Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, European Journal of International Relations, 1997, vol.3, issue 3, pp Agius, Christine, Social Constructivism In: Alan Collins (Ed.) Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2013), pp Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Copeland, Dale, The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay, International Security, 2000, vol.25, issue 2, pp Farrell, Theo, Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program, International Studies Review, 2002, vol.7, issue 3, pp Hopf, Ted, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, 1998, Vol.23, issue 1, pp Katzenstein, Peter, Alternative Perspectives on National Security In: Peter Katzenstein (Ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Krasner, Stephen, Wars, Hotel Fires, and Plane Crashes, Review of International Studies, 2000, vol.26, issue 1, pp Kratochwil, Friedrich, Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study, in Karin M. Fierke and Knud E. Jørgensen (Eds.), Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001). McDonald, Matt, Constructivism In: Paul D. Williams (Ed.) Security Studies: An Introduction, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008). Sheehan, Michael, International Security: An Analytical Survey (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005). Smith, Michael, International Security: Politics, Policy, Prospects (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Transcript: George Bush s Speech on Iraq, (The Guardian 2002) < [Accessed 24 April 2014]. Wendt, Alexander, Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics International Organization, 1992, vol.46, issue 2, pp Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: CUP, 1999). 19