Mapping the Political Discourse of Globalisation and European Integration in the UK and Ireland Empirically. Nicola Smith and Colin Hay

Transcription

1 Mapping the Political Discourse of Globalisation and European Integration in the UK and Ireland Empirically Nicola Smith and Colin Hay Department of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham Edgbaston Birmingham B15 2TT, UK Work in progress please do not cite without the express permission of the authors

2 Mapping the Political Discourse of Globalisation and European Integration in the UK and Ireland Empirically Nicola Smith and Colin Hay Introduction In recent years there has been growing interest in the role of discourses of globalisation and European integration in shaping political outcomes. As a variety of authors have suggested, these discourses may play a powerful causal role in determining the trajectory of policy change and, as such, should be treated as objects of enquiry in their own right. Yet, whilst much recent scholarship has pointed to the need for systematic empirical analysis of policy-making discourses, little such analysis has yet been undertaken. Our aim in this paper is to contribute to this task, by mapping contemporary appeals to globalisation and European integration in two EU states: Britain and the Irish Republic. We present the initial findings of a survey of elite political attitudes to globalisation and European integration in the UK and Ireland (known as the PAGE Project). 1 The analysis and interpretation of this survey data is backed by a series of interviews in both countries and a discourse analysis of key speeches and policy statements. Building upon, extending and updating earlier work (see, especially, Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay and Smith 2005; Smith 2005), we develop a theoretical schema for the classification and mapping of a range of different 1 We would like to thank the ESRC for funding this research (project grant RES ). We are also extremely grateful to the Members of Parliament Project Team, David Baker, Andrew Gamble and David Seawright, for their collaboration and support. Finally, we would like to thank Akrivi Andreou for the invaluable help she has provided with this research. 2

3 discourses of globalisation and European integration. These we categorise in terms of the contingent or inevitable character attributed to the process in question and the positive, open-ended or negative connotations it is seen to entail. What becomes apparent is the highly strategic ways in which such discourses are used, the articulation of which depends greatly upon the context in which they are deployed and the audience for which they are intended. Globalisation, European integration and their discursive construction The trajectory of European models of capitalism is the subject of significant academic debate. It is often argued that processes of globalisation and/or European integration have served to undermine distinctive national models within Europe. Heightened economic integration and interdependence are seen to have shifted the balance of power from states to markets. Governments, it is argued (not least by themselves), must increasingly prioritise economic performance rather than the social welfare of their citizens, internalising the imperatives of competitiveness and relegating the significance of all other legitimate calls on government attention (Jessop 1994; Strange 1996; Cerny 1997; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001). There is considerable controversy as to the extent, nature and impact of globalisation. Yet the vast majority of accounts treat it as a set of principally economic, but above all material, processes and practices (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 147). European integration is itself often presented as being a response to and/or sub-set of this wider process of globalisation (see for example Rhodes 1997; Held et al. 1999; Breslin and Higgott 2000). However, when unpacked and exposed to empirical scrutiny, the globalisation orthodoxy has been shown to be far less watertight than is conventionally assumed. For, as recent ESRC-funded research using gravity models reveals, by all but the most inexacting of definitions of globalisation (in which regionalisation and globalisation are synonymous), European economies have experienced a net deglobalisation over the past four decades (Hay 2004). Geographical proximity is becoming more rather than less important to their trading and investment relations. The pace of intra-regional integration clearly outstrips that of inter-regional integration and has done for several decades. Moreover, the relative disparity between these rates, though invariably destined to fall at some point in the future, is at the present time still growing. In such a context, the term globalisation is in fact an ever more inaccurate 3

4 description of the economic interdependence of the economies which comprise the European economic space. And it has never been as especially good one. The disparity between claims made about globalisation and the evidence for such claims invites the question as to why globalisation is so widely invoked politically. As a variety of authors have suggested, globalisation s real power may lie not so much in its material reality but in its discursive construction. Whether or not globalisation exists in real terms, the power of the idea of globalisation is considerable. Though this is often seen, at least in conventional accounts, as a somewhat iconoclastic and dangerously idealist claim, a moment s reflection reveals this to be rather less surprising than might be assumed. For actors behaviour and the way they orient themselves towards the context they inhabit is never a simple and unmediated reflection of that context itself. Contexts do not present us with an open book; they do not reveal themselves to us in their rich complexity; and they do not tell us how to behave in order to maximise any given utility we may be in interested in maximising. They must be interpreted. Consequently, our behaviour is given not by the structural or strategic configuration of the context we negotiate but by the ideas (however accurate, however inaccurate, however bizarre) we come to hold about it. Accordingly, whether globalisation is a useful or accurate description or not, the idea of globalisation is likely to have an effect insofar as it is an idea through which actors orient themselves and their strategies towards their environment. In short, the idea of globalisation is likely to have an effect whether or not that idea corresponds to a given set of empirical realities simply insofar as it is used. To identify a discourse of globalisation is, then, to identify an (ideational) effect; to identify many (as we do in this paper), is to identify multiple effects. The most basic assumption on which this paper is premised, then, is a very simple and empirical - one. It is that the context in which policy-makers now find themselves has increasingly come to be interpreted through the lens of globalisation. Indeed, the competitive imperatives of globalisation are widely seen to set limits on what is possible in policy-making terms. Crucially, and if the logic of the preceding paragraph is valid, this discursive construction may in itself create material effects indeed, it must do so (though such effects may be more or less significant). In acting as if globalisation were 4

5 a material reality, policy-makers may actually be creating the very outcomes they attribute to globalisation itself (see for example Hay and Marsh 2000; Watson 2001). This suggests that the political discourse of globalisation (as opposed to the material reality of globalisation) should be treated as an important object of enquiry in its own right. However, whilst a great deal of research has pointed to the importance of such an approach (Blyth 2002; Verdun 2002; Hay, Watson and Wincott 2003; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004), little sustained analysis has been undertaken to-date. It is certainly tempting to forgive this glaring oversight on the grounds that this more ideational approach to globalisation is still relatively new but we cannot go on offering up this increasingly lame excuse for ever. Whilst authors have plausibly suggested that ideas about globalisation may be important, their work raises important questions about both how and why such discourses are used. Indeed, the very concept of globalisation discourse needs to be unpacked. As Rosamond (1999) notes, there is no single unifying discourse of globalisation; rather, the concept is used in different ways within different contexts. Moreover, in some contexts it is European integration rather than globalisation that is appealed to as an external economic imperative (Hay and Rosamond 2002). This highlights the need to map contemporary appeals to globalisation and European integration and to consider the contexts in which these various appeals are made. In particular, rigorous cross-country analysis would provide the opportunity to examine whether particular discursive configurations are conserved between different national contexts and, within the same national context, between political parties, between civil servants and elected officials and so forth. Such research would in turn provide the conditions to explore the circumstances under which particular discourses are adopted. Detailed differences between countries such as their electoral and party systems, their policy legacies, their cultural traditions and, indeed, their exposure to the international economy could all play a crucial role in shaping the ways in which specific discourses are adopted. 5

6 Political discourse in the UK and Ireland Our aim in the PAGE project was to examine in detail discourses of globalisation and European integration through the systematic comparative analysis of two country cases: the UK and Ireland. The UK and Ireland are particularly well matched for the purposes of comparative analysis. This is not least because of their common legacy (Daly and Yeates 2003), both economically (with the Republic effectively behaving as an economic sub-region of the UK long after political independence was achieved in 1921) and institutionally (with Ireland s state structures inherited in large part from the British method of government) (see for example Brunt 1988; Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh 1988; Breen, Hannan, Rottman and Whelan 1990; Bradley 2000). Whilst economic, political and cultural ties between the UK and Ireland have loosened or at least changed their form considerably in recent decades, significant structural similarities remain. These include: high levels of trade openness; success in attracting disproportionately high levels of foreign direct investment (particularly from the US); membership of the European Union (both since 1973); flexible labour market regimes; a shared tradition of liberal welfare regimes; and of course the English language. Comparative analysis of the UK and Ireland can thus shed considerable light on the circumstances under which two countries, despite their ostensible common origins and structural similarities, have developed along different paths (Daly and Yeates 2003). Whilst Britain and Ireland are often classified as liberal market economies (see for example (Hall and Soskice 2001), this broad categorisation serves to mask significant differences in their policy trajectories. For example, since 1987 Irish macro-economic policy has been guided by social partnership agreements between the government and key social and economic interests. This stands in stark contrast to the British system of free-collective bargaining (and, indeed, Ireland s own tradition of voluntarism) (see for example Roche 1994; Cradden 1999). Yet, whilst important differences between the two countries exist, certain common tendencies are also apparent. In particular, there has been a discernible shift towards a more market-oriented approach in both the UK and Ireland in recent years. This is evident in a variety of policy areas, ranging from the privatisation of state-owned companies to the marketisation of pensions (Allen 2000; Ó Riain and O'Connell 2000; 6

7 Kirby 2002). Certainly it is important not to overstate the extent of such similarities, for the dynamics behind these developments (such as their timing) have differed greatly between the two countries. Nevertheless, certain common tendencies which are, indeed, evident in countries across Europe (OECD 2001) are apparent in the UK and Ireland. It is often assumed that such developments are no more than a response to the competitive imperatives of globalisation and/or European integration. Yet, as we have outlined above, such imperatives may be more discursive than substantive and even if the constraints are real in some sense, it is in the interpretation of such constraints that policy trajectories are forged. It is certainly the case that, in both the UK and Ireland, discourses of competitiveness have come to dominate. In both countries, the concept of competitiveness has become both a guiding principle of social and economic policy and a means to de-politicise these policies through the appeal, in essence, to a simple logic of no alternative. In both countries, moreover, this emphasis upon competitiveness has been articulated in terms of the discourse of globalisation. Indeed, the public policy choices facing both the UK and Ireland are consistently situated and presented by elite political actors in terms of the challenges of globalisation (Hay and Smith 2004). Yet, as Hay and Rosamond (2002) note, in other contexts it is European integration rather than globalisation that is presented as the principal (or, at least, the more immediate) external economic imperative. Our aim in the PAGE Project was thus to survey and map contemporary appeals to globalization and European integration in the UK and Ireland. The project, though a substantial empirical exercise in its own right, was consciously designed as a pilot study for a larger, multi-country and multilanguage comparative project. Methods In order to map policy-makers attitudes to globalisation and European integration, we employed both qualitative and quantitative methods and techniques. Our qualitative analysis involved, first, the discourse analysis of key policy documents and, second, semi-structured interviews with senior policy-makers from both countries. Regarding the former, we undertook the detailed discourse analysis of over one hundred official documents including White Papers, ministerial speeches, records of parliamentary 7

8 debates and party political manifestoes. Regarding the latter, we undertook thirty-five interviews with parliamentarians and senior civil servants from both countries. These were semi-structured and open, rather than structured and closed, in order to allow interviewees to elaborate on their attitudes and beliefs regarding globalisation and European integration. Interviewees were offered complete anonymity and confidentiality, although most interviewees gave their permission for the discussions to be taped and transcribed (on the understanding that the text would then be anonymised). Both sets of data were then coded and analysed using QSR NVivo. Building upon, extending and updating an earlier discussion (Hay and Rosamond 2002), we categorised the discourses in terms of the contingent or inevitable character attributed to the process in question and the positive, open-ended or negative connotations it was seen to entail. This provided the framework through which we could identify and assess (using a simple number of hits methodology) whether certain discourses were prevalent and whether they were more likely to be used in certain contexts than others. Our quantitative research consisted of an attitudinal survey of parliamentarians and civil servants from the UK and Ireland. Our methodology here closely reflected that of the Members of Parliament Project in order to ensure compatibility between the two projects. 2 As with the MPP, data was acquired through the distribution of postal survey consisting of closed questions with identical answer formats ( strongly agree, agree, neither, or strongly ). The questionnaire comprised 37 questions 3 that, through our earlier qualitative analysis, had been carefully selected to reflect a range of perspectives regarding globalisation and European integration. The questionnaire was sent to all Members of Parliament in the UK and to all Members of the Dail in Ireland. It was also sent to five hundred senior and middle-ranking British civil servants (who were randomly selected using the British Civil Service Yearbook) and five hundred senior and middle-ranking Irish civil servants (who were randomly selected using the Irish Administration Yearbook and Diary). 2 Founded by Andrew Gamble (Sheffield) and David Baker (Warwick), the Members of Parliament Project (MPP) has explored MPs attitudes towards European integration in the UK (Project Grants R , R , R , R ). 3 Some of these contained sub-questions. 8

9 One of the difficulties we faced was that postal surveys, despite their many advantages, tend to be associated with low response rate. This was a particular challenge in our case given the timing of the questionnaire (just after a British general election and during parliamentarians summer recess in both parliaments), 4 survey fatigue (with many politicians receiving questionnaires on a weekly or even daily basis) and the fact that the UK Labour Party now instructs all of its MPs not to fill in any questionnaire (see also Baker, Gamble, Ludlam and Seawright 2001). In order to maximise the response rate, we adopted a number of strategies. These included: guaranteeing respondents anonymity and confidentiality (not least through the use of a coded postcard so that respondents could be identified separately from their questionnaires); 5 gaining endorsements (in the form of open letters send to all potential civil servant respondents) for the project from the heads of the British and Irish civil services; and raising awareness of the survey prior to its undertaking (for example by sending out a leaflet outlining the project s aims and scope to potential respondents). The survey was conducted by way of three separate mailings and the offices of all non-respondents were also contacted via telephone and/or to confirm that they would not be participating if no response were forthcoming. The survey responses were then coded and analysed using the data entry and data analysis techniques available in the Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Overall, we received 657 completed questionnaires from the total of 1812 possible responses, giving an overall return rate of 36.2 per cent (see table 1). This can be considered a good response rate for surveys of this kind. Regarding parliamentarians, we received 268 completed questionnaires from the total of 812 possible participants, translating into a response rate of 33 per cent. Of these, 202 were from British MPs (a response rate of 31.4 per cent) 6 and 66 were from Irish TDs (a response rate of 39.8 per 4 Due to the British general election, the original time frame for the collection of primary data was, with the ESRC s support, extended. 5 This method, which is designed to limit follow-up costs whilst ensuring anonymity, had already been used with considerable success by the MPP team. Overall, 85.1 per cent of completers returned the coded postcard. This, in turn, allowed us to run tests for the representiveness of the survey sample that responded. 6 As Baker et al. (1998) note, this is considered to be a good return for Westminster MPs by commercial postal survey managers. 9

10 cent). Regarding civil servants, we received 388 completed questionnaires out of the total of 1,000 possible participants (a response rate of 38.8 per cent), of which 168 were from British civil servants (a response rate of 33.6 per cent) and 220 were Irish civil servants (a response rate of 44.0 per cent). While the response rates varied depending on factors such as political party and gender, the overall distribution of responses can be seen as broadly representative (see table 2). 7 Table 1: Response rates Total sample size Number of responses Response rate Total civil servants British civil servants Irish civil servants Total parliamentarians British MPs Conservative Democratic Unionist Independent Labour (UK) Liberal Democrat Plaid Cymru Respect Scottish National Sinn Fein (UK) SDLP Ulster Unionist Speaker and deputies Irish TDs Fianna Fail Fine Gael Labour Party (Ireland) For example, while the main Irish party, Fianna Fail, was under-represented in our survey by 6.7 per cent, this disparity is not of a sufficient scale to undermine the reliability of the overall findings (see also Baker et al. 1998). 10

11 Progressive Democrats Green Party Sinn Fein (Ireland) Socialist Party Independent Ceann Comhairle Total response rate Table 2: Representiveness As % total sample As % respondents¹ Difference British civil servants Gender Male Female Irish civil servants Male Female British MPs Political party Conservative Democratic Unionist Independent Labour (UK) Liberal Democrat Plaid Cymru Respect Scottish National Sinn Fein (UK) SDLP Ulster Unionist Speaker and deputies Gender Male Female

12 Irish TDs Political party Fianna Fail Fine Gael Labour Party (Ireland) Progressive Democrats Green Party Sinn Fein (Ireland) Socialist Party Independent Ceann Comhairle Gender Male Female ¹ These figures exclude respondents who chose not to identify themselves in terms of political party and/or gender. Results Our discourse analysis of official documents and supplementary interviews revealed some interesting results. As noted above, the material was coded and analysed via QSR NVivo in order to assess whether certain discourses were prevalent and whether they were more likely to be used in certain contexts than others. For both countries, we found that globalisation is frequently invoked as an external source of non-negotiable economic imperatives that must be internalised (discourse 1 - see table 3). However, such appeals by no means exhausted British and Irish globalisation discourse; instead they tended to be confined to domestic political discourse in both cases. When addressing international audiences, British government ministers frequently appealed to globalisation as a political project that should be defended (discourse 4) or be made defensible (discourse 5), whereas Irish government ministers tended to present globalisation as irreversible but nevertheless subject to political influence (discourse 2). In contrast to globalisation, European integration is rarely (if ever) characterised as a non-negotiable external constraint within British domestic political discourse; rather, British ministers have instead emphasised discourse 4 (European integration as a political project that must be defended). Irish domestic discourse is rather more 12

13 complex, with European integration being articulated in terms of discourse 1 (a nonnegotiable external constraint), discourse 2 (as inevitable but amenable to national influence) and discourse 4 (as a political project that must be defended) alike. However, when addressing international (and, more specifically, European) audiences, both British and Irish policy-makers tended to articulate European integration as a political project that must be made defensible (discourse 5) (for a detailed discussion of these findings see Hay and Smith 2005). Table 3: Discourses of globalisation and European integration Globalisation/European Character of Globalisation/European integration as globalisation/european integration as unambiguously positive integration contingent upon unambiguously negative political choices Inevitable/inexorable process (non- globalisation/european globalisation/european globalisation/european negotiable) integration as a non- integration as inevitable integration as threat of negotiable external but a process whose homogenisation economic constraint content is amenable to political influence Contingent process or tendency to which globalisation/european globalisation/european globalisation/european counter-tendencies integration as a political integration as a political integration as a political might be mobilised project which should be project which must be project which must be defended made defensible resisted Our qualitative analysis thus highlighted how articulations of both globalisation and European integration vary greatly depending upon the context in which they are deployed and the audience for which they are intended. Yet such variable appeals may suggest less confusion and incoherence so much as the strategic and rhetorical deployment of these discourses. Part of the rationale behind the postal questionnaire was thus to examine whether there was a disparity between the public articulation of globalisation and European integration (the interactive dimension of discourse) and 13

14 policy-makers attitudes (the ideational dimension of discourse). 8 As such, our approach to the postal survey contained both inductive and deductive elements. Deductively, we explored the extent to which our (earlier) qualitative attempts to map elite discourses corresponded with the exhibited distribution of elite political attitudes. At the same time, however, and perhaps more importantly, we examined (more inductively) whether and, if so, what distinct patterns were apparent in the raw data itself (for a sample of the data see pp.12-17). The results of the postal survey suggest, unremarkably perhaps, that globalisation is seen, at heart, as an economic phenomenon. Nearly all respondents (99.2 per cent British, 97.5 per cent Irish) strongly agreed/agreed that globalisation represents the integration of world markets, and nearly all respondents strongly agreed/agreed that the dynamics behind globalisation are primarily economic (99.2 per cent British and 99.6 per cent Irish). That having been said, a significant majority of respondents also understood the term globalisation to refer to the spread of technology (77.2 per cent British and 70.0 per cent Irish), although far fewer defined it in terms of the erosion of national sovereignty (26.9 per cent British 28.0 per cent Irish), the spread of liberal democracy (21.2 per cent British and 23.8 per cent Irish) or governance by international institutions (27.6 per cent British and 30.5 per cent Irish). If globalisation was seen as primarily economic, it was also and perhaps more significantly regarded as a largely inexorable force. For example, nearly three quarters of respondents (72.0 per cent British and 74.0 per cent Irish) strongly agreed/agreed that the anti-globalisation movement seeks to reverse the irreversible. This is a very interesting and potentially important finding since it demonstrates the prevalence of a particular conception of globalisation (as a largely non-negotiable external economic constraint) often labelled radical or hyperglobalist in both the UK and Ireland. Such a discourse has frequently been assumed to inform elite political opinion, but very little evidence in support of this claim has been offered until now. Moreover, while a small minority (9.5 per cent British and 5.1 per cent Irish) felt that globalisation is being 8 This borrows from Schmidt s distinction between the ideational dimension of discourse (i.e. the ideas and beliefs about the necessity and appropriateness of a particular policy program) and the interactive dimension of discourse (i.e. the process through which policy elites co-ordinate the construction of the policy program and communicate it to the general public ) (2001: ). 14

15 regulated effectively and a significant majority (57.6 per cent British and 70.7 per cent Irish) felt that globalisation should be regulated more effectively, less than half (40.9 per cent British and 38.8 per cent Irish) felt that globalisation can be regulated effectively. This rather reinforces the association between globalisation, on the one hand, and perceptions of political fatalism on the other, that have been reported from analyses of public discourse of globalisation (see for instance Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay 2007). Yet, while discourse 1 (globalisation as a non-negotiable external economic constraint) was certainly predominant, many instances of discourse 2 (globalisation as inevitable but amenable to domestic influence) and discourse 5 (globalisation as a political project that must be made defensible) were also recorded. Nearly all respondents (91.5 per cent British and 95.1 per cent Irish) felt that the developed countries have a responsibility to ensure that the benefits of globalisation are more equally distributed. A substantial majority of respondents (73.8 per cent British and 66.3 per cent Irish) felt that their country should play a greater role on the international stage in shaping the process of globalisation. However, while the majority of British respondents (67.2 per cent) did feel that their country was already influential in shaping the process of globalisation, only 29.3 per cent of Irish respondents felt the same about Ireland. This can undoubtedly be attributed to the significant difference in influence and profile on an international stage of the British and Irish governments respectively. Yet it is interesting to note the high proportion of British respondents who felt that globalisation could not be regulated effectively yet who also felt that their government bore a responsibility towards the developing world for the distributional asymmetries or globalisation and/or felt that their government was influential in shaping the trajectory of globalisation. Not for the first or last time, there are some interestingly contradictory responses here which warrant further and closer analysis. In normative terms, globalisation was primarily seen as positive rather than negative. The majority of respondents (74.6 per cent) strongly agreed or agreed that for their country the benefits of globalisation outweigh the costs, reinforcing the hold of the hyperglobalist conception on elite opinion. That said, British policy-makers were noticeably more enthusiastic than their Irish counterparts about globalisation s overall benefits (78.1 per cent compared to 69.9 per cent) and also its impact on quality of life 15

16 in their country (65.2 per cent compared to 48.4 per cent). However, interestingly, Irish respondents were more positive than British ones about globalisation s impact on their country s economic prosperity (92.2 per cent compared to 86.4 per cent), employment (83.6 per cent compared to 61.1 per cent) and international profile (76.2 per cent compared to 70.3 per cent). This is a new and intriguing finding, suggesting the powerful influence in the UK of a general positive disposition towards globalisation that is only loosely connected to a series of clear policy benefits and empirical claims. 9 In terms of who benefits from globalisation, the bulk of respondents strongly agreed/agreed that it benefits their country s firms (83.5 per cent British and 83.5 per cent Irish), although fewer felt it to benefit their country s workers (54.7 per cent British and 70.0 per cent Irish). Moreover, globalisation was overwhelmingly seen to benefit the affluent (87.7 per cent British and 91.0 per cent Irish) rather than the poor (36.9 per cent British and 25.5 per cent Irish). Interestingly, though, and perhaps oddly, very few respondents saw globalisation as a threat to social justice in their country (16.3 per cent British and 25.8 per cent Irish). Nor was globalisation perceived as a significant threat to democracy (11.0 per cent British and 15.4 per cent Irish), national identity (14.4 per cent British and 27.8 per cent Irish), national sovereignty (20.8 per cent British and 23.0 per cent Irish) or national security (19.3 per cent British and 16.3 per cent Irish). Again, there are a range of interesting contradictions here which warrant a more detailed and fine-grained analysis. However, a sizeable proportion of respondents did see globalisation as a threat to the autonomy of domestic policy-makers (52.7 per cent British and 57.0 per cent Irish). In terms of specific policy effects, most respondents identified globalisation as a force for convergence in labour market policy (77.0 per cent British and 78.0 per cent Irish), monetary policy (70.6 per cent British and 78.5 per cent Irish) and in levels of corporate taxation (67.1 per cent British and 66.9 per cent Irish). Less than half associated it with convergence in terms of education policy (42.3 per cent British and 48.1 per cent Irish), immigration policy (43.2 per cent British and 50.4 per cent Irish) or personal taxation (39.7 per cent British and 39.8 per cent Irish). Other respondents tended to see it as 9 While enthusiasm towards the overall benefits of globalisation did not seem to be affected by age or gender, rank did appear to play a role (in that politicians and civil servants of the higher ranks were invariably more positive about globalisation than their more junior counterparts). 16

17 having no effect rather than as a source for divergence. Again, this suggests the prevalence of a view of globalisation that accords quite closely with the so-called hyperglobalist thesis. Yet in contrast to what much of the academic literature might lead us to expect (Ohmae 1990; Scharpf 1991; Kurzer 1993; Gray 1996; Cerny 1997), globalisation was not associated with the end of social democracy and the ascendancy of free-market capitalism. Quite the contrary: only a small minority of respondents associated globalisation with downward pressure on social expenditure (16.8 per cent British and 14.1 per cent Irish). 10 Instead, it was felt in particular to heighten the need for increased public investment in skills (88.0 per cent British and 90.0 per cent Irish) and increased R&D expenditure (86.6 per cent British and 86.3 per cent Irish). Although a noticeable proportion did associate globalisation with downward pressure on corporate taxation (43.2 per cent British and 49.2 per cent Irish), an even larger proportion felt that it increased rather than diminished the need for environmental regulation (51.7 per cent British and 57.9 per cent Irish). Turning to European integration, the majority of respondents saw European integration as being a net positive rather than negative process. Predictably, the highest proportion was amongst Irish rather than British policy-makers. Whereas 88.3 per cent of Irish respondents strongly agreed/agreed that the benefits of European integration outweigh the costs for their country, the British figure was 72.0 per cent (although this is still surprisingly high given the Britain s reputation for euro-scepticism). 11 As with globalisation, Irish policy-makers were more enthusiastic than their British counterparts about European integration s impact on economic prosperity (94.6 per cent compared to 74.6 per cent), employment (91.6 per cent compared to 68.9 per cent), quality of life (68.3 per cent compared to 61.2 per cent) and international profile (78.3 per compared to 54.7 per cent). Irish policy-makers were also more likely than British ones to 10 Not surprisingly, of the British parliamentarians it was Conservatives MPs rather than Labour MPs who were more likely to associate globalisation with downward pressure on social expenditure. Of the Irish parliamentarians, Fine Gael TDs were the most likely to strongly agree/agree with such a claim, although the vast majority of Fine Gael TDs strongly d/d (see appendix). Other factors such as gender, age or rank did not seem to play a significant role in policy-makers responses to this issue. 11 It is interesting to speculate on whether posing such a question in the context of a series of questions about globalisation has had any (positive) impact on the responses received, in comparison to those collected by the earlier MPP project. 17

18 emphasise the benefits of European integration for their country s firms (92.6 per cent compared to 78.4 per cent), workers (86.2 per cent compared to 70.0 per cent) and the affluent (89.2 per cent compared to 60.3 per cent), although the British were slightly more likely than the Irish to feel that European integration benefited the poor (48.9 per cent compared to 48.3 per cent). Yet (as with globalisation), only a small proportion of respondents regarded European integration as a threat to social justice in their country (14.7 per cent British, 6.9 per cent Irish). Nor was European integration seen as a significant threat to democracy (27.3 per cent British, 13.4 per cent Irish), national identity (23.6 per cent British, 19.9 Irish) or national security (17.7 per cent British, 14.0 per cent Irish). 12 However, as with globalisation, European integration was regarded as a threat to the autonomy of domestic policy-makers - by 63.2 per cent of British respondents and 62.3 per cent of Irish respondents. In particular, European integration was identified as a source of convergence in labour market policy (85.6 per cent British, 92.3 per cent Irish), monetary policy (83.9 per cent British, 94.1 per cent Irish), immigration policy (72.1 per cent British, 68.5 per cent Irish) and corporate taxation (68.7 per cent British, 61.6 per cent Irish). The fact that these figures were rather higher than the comparable responses for globalisation suggests that European integration may be seen as more of an external pressure on policy than globalisation. Again, though, this was not in turn seen to translate into downward pressure on social expenditure (10.7 per cent British, 7.4 per cent Irish). Instead, European integration was seen to increase the need for greater public investment in skills (74.1 per cent British, 87.5 per cent Irish), greater R&D expenditure (71.2 per cent British, 82.8 per cent Irish) and greater environmental regulation (64.1 per cent British, 83.5 per cent Irish). The imperatives of European integration, it would seem, are not so very different in the minds of elite political actors in the UK and Ireland as those of globalisation. 12 While gender, age and rank did not seem to significantly affect normative attitudes towards European integration, civil servants were more enthusiastic than parliamentarians. Political allegiance also played a major role: for example, 74.2 per cent strongly of Conservative MPs d/d that the benefits of European integration outweigh the costs, compared to the 96.0 per cent Liberal Democrat MPs who strongly agreed/agreed to this statement. 18

19 Finally, in terms of the relationship between globalisation and European integration, the majority of respondents (71.0 per cent British and 72.2 per cent Irish) strongly agreed/agreed that latter is being pursued independently of the former. Yet globalisation was also seen by many (60.0 per cent British and 78.5 per cent Irish) to make European integration more important for their country, and the majority of respondents (71.5 per cent British and 84.7 per cent Irish) also felt that the EU should play a greater role in shaping the process of globalisation. Conclusion Our aim in this paper has been a self-consciously (if uncharacteristically!) modest one, namely to outline our approach to, and methodology for the analysis of, the role of ideas about globalisation and European integration in contemporary public policy. In addition we have sought to describe, in outline form, some of the general and preliminary findings of the comparative mapping exercise that we are still engaged in of elite political attitudes to globalisation and European integration in the UK and Ireland. Our analysis continues and it is important to emphasise that the results presented in this paper are merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg. They relate only to aggregate responses to particular questions. We have simply not yet had the opportunity to engage in the more thorough mapping and cross-tabulation of patterns of responses to different questions that is still the principal empirical challenge of this project. That having been said, our preliminary findings are interesting and suggestive in a number of respects. First, whilst there are significant differences (in both senses of the term) between UK and Irish responses and between the responses of civil servants and elected politicians, it is the similarities in responses that are the most striking feature of the evidence we have thus far assembled. Second, even this most preliminary of analyses provides seemingly powerful confirmation of the hold that a particular understanding of globalisation conventionally labelled the hyperglobalisation thesis has over elite political discourse in the Anglophone world. Third, and relatedly, it is the hold of the hyperglobalisation thesis over elite political attitudes towards globalisation that is largely responsible for the attitudinal similarities between the two cases that we have here reported. It will be interesting to see whether such similarities give way to differences as our analysis moves from a consideration of aggregate 19

20 responses to single questions, to a more detailed and differentiated mapping of patterns in the responses to different questions. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly of all, our analysis reveals a range of seeming tensions and contradictions in the elite political discourse of both globalisation and European integration. These seem to be particularly acute when respondents are asked to express normative and political judgements about the benefits of globalisation and European integration, the distributional asymmetries associated with each, and the responsibility for such distribution asymmetries. Respondents who regard globalisation to be both benign and beneficial and, indeed, something of an inexorable logic nonetheless seem to associate it with the proliferation of a range of distributional asymmetries, domestically and between the developed and developing worlds, for which they seem to hold western governments responsible. Such seemingly conflicting views need to be dissected further, but these preliminary findings would seem to indicate the potential frailty of the hyperglobalisation thesis to which elite political actors would otherwise seem committed when confronted with its distributive consequences. References Allen, K. (2000) The Celtic Tiger: The Myth of Social Partnership in Ireland, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Baker, D., Gamble, A., et al. (2001) 'Attitudes of Labour Parliamentarians', ESRC End of Award Report: R Baker, D., Gamble, A., et al. (1998) 'Mapping changes in British parliamentarians' attitudes to European integration', ESRC End of Award Report: R Blyth, M. (2002) Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bradley, J. (2000) The Irish economy in comparative perspective, Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality, Nolan, B., O'Connell, P. and Whelan, C. T. (Ed^Eds), Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Breen, R., Hannan, D., et al. (1990) Understanding Contemporary Ireland: State, Class and Development in the Republic of Ireland, Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. Breslin, S. and Higgott, R. (2000) 'Studying regions: learning from the old, constructing the new', New Political Economy, 5,(3): Brunt, B. (1988) The Republic of Ireland, London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd. Cerny, P. G. (1997) 'Paradoxes of the competition state: the dynamics of political globalisation', Government and Opposition, 32,(2): Cradden, T. (1999) Social partnership in Ireland: against the trend, Political Issues in Ireland Today, Collins, N. (Ed^Eds), Manchester: Manchester University Press. 20

21 Daly, M. and Yeates, N. (2003) 'Common origins, different paths: adaptation and change in social security in Britain and Ireland', Policy & Politics, 31,(1): Gray, J. (1996) After Social Democracy, London: Demos. Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D., Eds. (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hay, C. (2004) 'Common trajectories, variable paces, divergent outcomes? Models of European capitalism under conditions of complex economic interdependence', Review of International Political Economy, 11,(2): Hay, C. (2007) Politics, Cambridge: Polity. Hay, C. and Marsh, D. (2000) Introduction: demystifying globalisation, Demystifying Globalisation, Hay, C. and Marsh, D. (Eds), London: Macmillan. Hay, C. and Rosamond, B. (2002) 'Globalisation, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives', Journal of European Public Policy, 9,(2): Hay, C. and Smith, N. J. (2005) 'Horses for courses? The political discourse of globalisation and European integration in the UK and Ireland', West European Politics, 28,(1): Hay, C. and Smith, N. J.-A. (2004) 'Third Way political economy, globalisation and economic compulsion: a comparative analysis of the UK and Ireland', Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, March Hay, C., Watson, M., et al. (2003) 'Executive summary: globalisation, European integration and the "European social model"', ESRC Project Grant L Held, D., McGrew, A., et al. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Jessop, B. (1994) The transition to post-fordism and the Schumpetarian workfare state, Towards a Post-fordist Welfare State?, Burrows, R. and Loader, B. (Ed^Eds), London: Routledge. Kennedy, K. A., Giblin, T., et al. (1988) The Economic Development of Ireland in the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge. Kirby, P. (2002) The Celtic Tiger in Distress: Growth and Inequality in Ireland, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Kurzer, P. (1993) Business and Banking: Political Change and Economic Integration in Western Europe, New York: Cornell University Press. Ó Riain, S. and O'Connell, P. (2000) The role of the state in growth and welfare, Bust to Boom? The Irish Experience of Growth and Inequality, Nolan, B., O'Connell, P. and Whelan, C. T. (Ed^Eds), Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. OECD (2001) OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform in Ireland, Paris: OECD. Ohmae, K. (1990) The Borderless Word: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, London: Collins. Rhodes, M. (1997) The welfare state: internal challenges, external constraints, Developments in West European Politics, Rhodes, M., Heywood, P. and Wright, V. (Ed^Eds), London: Macmillan. Roche, W. K. (1994) Pay determination, the state and the politics of industrial relations, Irish Industrial Relations in Practice, Murphy, T. V. and Roche, W. K. (Ed^Eds), Dublin: Oak Tree Press. Rosamond, B. (1999) 'Discourses of globalisation and the social construction of European identities', Journal of European Public Policy, 6,(4): Scharpf, F. W. (1991) Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy, New York: Cornell University Press. 21

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23 Appendix: Selected survey data For [country], the benefits of globalisation outweigh the costs agree Agree Neither Disagree British civil servants 33.7% 49.4% 9.6% 7.2% 0.0% Irish civil servants 22.1% 47.9% 18.4% 10.1% 1.4% British parliamentarians 30.0% 44.0% 16.5% 8.0% 1.5% Conservative 43.5% 40.3% 11.3% 4.8% 0.0% Labour 25.5% 44.3% 17.9% 9.4% 2.8% Liberal Democrat 24.0% 52.0% 20.0% 4.0% 0.0% Irish parliamentarians 18.8% 50.0% 14.1% 14.1% 3.1% Fianna Fail 32.0% 40.0% 16.0% 12.0% 0.0% Fine Gael 13.3% 53.3% 6.7% 20.0% 6.7% Labour 18.2% 45.5% 27.3% 9.1% 0.0% Globalisation has a positive impact on economic prosperity in [country] agree Agree Neither Disagree British civil servants 34.9% 56.0% 4.8% 4.2% 0.0% Irish civil servants 31.5% 61.6% 3.7% 2.3%.9% British parliamentarians 31.0% 51.5% 9.0% 7.0% 1.5% Conservative 45.2% 43.5% 6.5% 4.8% 0.0% Labour 26.4% 52.8% 11.3% 6.6% 2.8% Liberal Democrat 24.0% 64.0% 4.0% 8.0% 0.0% Irish parliamentarians 25.4% 63.5% 7.9% 1.6% 1.6% Fianna Fail 37.5% 54.2%.0% 4.2% 4.2% Fine Gael 13.3% 86.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Labour 27.3% 63.6% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 23