The Economics of Institutions. Semestre de Otoño de 2008 Universidad de San Andrés. Mariano Tommasi

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1 The Economics of Institutions Semestre de Otoño de 2008 Universidad de San Andrés Mariano Tommasi MAIN BACKGROUND BOOKS FOR THIS CLASS: (Longer list of related readings at the end) Menard, Claude and Shirley, Mary (2005) Handbook of New Institutional Economics Springer Verlag. Aoki, Masahiko (2001) Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. MIT Greif, Avner (2006) Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Cambridge University Knight, Jack, and Itai Sened (1998) Explaining Social Institutions. The University of Michigan Dixit, Avinash (2004) Lawlessnes and Economics. Alternatives Modes of Governance. Princeton University

2 INTRODUCTION Coase, Ronald (1937) The Nature of the Firm Economica, November Coase, Ronald (1960) The Problem of Social Cost Journal of Law and Economics 3(1): Menard, Claude and Shirley, Mary (2005) Handbook of New Institutional Economics Springer Verlag. Introduction by Menard and Shirley and chapters 1 (North), 2 (Coase) and 3 (Williamson). North, Douglass (1991) Institutions, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Available in JSTOR Williamson, Oliver (2000) New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, Journal of Economic Literature, Available in JSTOR. Weingast, Barry (2002) Rational Choice Institutionalism in Katznelson and Milner Political Science. State of the Discipline. Norton Pierson, Paul and Theda Skocpol (2002) Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science in Katznelson and Milner Political Science. State of the Discipline. Norton. Hall and Soskice (2001) Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism in Hall and Soskice Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT Shirley, Mary (2005) Institutions and Development in Menard and Shirley (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics Springer Verlag. Acemoglu Johnson and Robinson (2005) Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth in Aghion and Durlauf Handbook of Economic Growth North- Holland. Sabel, Charles (1994) Learning by Monitoring. The Institutions of Economic Development in Smelser and Swedberg Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton University Williamson, Oliver (2000) Economic Institutions and Development: A View from the Bottom in Olson and Kahkonen A Not-So Dismal Science. A Broader View of Economies and Societies. Oxford University Bardhan, Pranab (2000) The Nature of Institutional Impediments to Economic Development in Olson and Kahkonen A Not-So Dismal Science. A Broader View of Economies and Societies. Oxford University

3 Weingast, North and Wallis (2006) A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History NBER Working Paper No A QUICK REVIEW OF REPEATED GAMES Mailath and Samuelson (2006) Repeated Games and Reputations. Oxford University Osborne (2004) Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford. ch. 14 and ch. 15. McCarty and Meirowitz (2007) Political Game Theory, Cambridge. Ch. 9 Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) Game Theory, MIT Ch. 5 REPEATED GAMES AND INSTITUTIONS Aoki, Masahiko (2001) Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. MIT (Especially chapters 1, 7 and 9) Calvert, R. (1995) Rational Actors, Equilibrium and Social Institutions in Knight and Sened Explaining Social Institutions. University of Michigan Calvert, Randall (1995) The Rational Choice Theory of Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication in Banks and Hanushek (eds.) Modern Political Economy. Cambridge University Greif, Avner Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies. Journal of Political Economy 102: Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weingast Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. Journal of Political Economy 102: Greif, Avner (2006) Endogenous Institutions and Game-Theoretic Analysisi chapter 5 in his Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Cambridge University Dixit, Avinash On Modes of Economic Governance. Econometrica 71: CONTRACTS / AGENCY Salanie, Bernard (1997) Moral Hazard ch 5 in his The Economics of Contracts. A Primer. MIT

4 Gibbons, Robert (1998) Incentives in Organizations Journal of Economic Perspectives Fall Miller, Gary (2005) Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms in Menard, and Shirley (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics Springer Verlag. Masten, Scott (2000) Contractual Choice in Boukaert and De Geest Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol III: The Regulation of Contracts. Pages Edward Elgar Publishing. Bendor, Glazer and Hammond (2001) Theories of Delegation American Political Science Review 4: Besley, T (2007) Principled Agents. The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford University Tommasi, M and F. Weinschelbaum (2007) Principal Agent Contracts under the Threat of Insurance Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 163(3): Pearce and Stacchetti (1998) The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency Games and Economic Behavior 23(1): Lafontaine, Francine (1992) Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2. (Summer), pp Available at JSTOR. Bengt Holmstrom; Paul Milgrom (1991) Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, pp Available at JSTOR THEORY OF THE FIRM / CONTROL RIGHTS Grossman, S, and O. Hart (1986) The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration Journal of Political Economy Hart and Moore (1990) Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm Journal of Political Economy Hart, Oliver (1995) Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: Klein, Benjamin and Kevin M. Murphy Vertical Integration as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement. American Economic Review 87: Halonen, M (2002) Reputation and the Allocation of Ownership The Economic Journal. Volume 112 Issue 481 Page 539 July

5 Tadelis, Steve (2002) Complexity, Flexibility, and the Make-or-Buy Decision American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings, May: Klein, Peter 2005 The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies ch 17 in Menard, and Shirley (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics Cremer, Jacques, Luis Garicano, Andrea Prat Language and the Theory of the Firm. Forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Economics 122:1. Nelson, Richard (1991) Why Do Firms Differ, and How Does It Matter? Strategic Management Journal 12: Gibbons, Robert 2001 Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games in Cook Trust in Society. Rusesell Sage Foundation. Holmstrom, Bengt (1999) The firm as a subeconomy, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 15: Available from JLEO. Kosacoff, Bernardo (2000) Corporate Strategies under Structural Adjustment in Argentina. Responses by Industrial Firms to a New Set of Uncertainties. St. Martin s Apreda, Rodolfo (2005) Corporate Governance en la Argentina en su libro Mercado de Capitales, Administraciòn de Portafolios y Corporate Governance. Editorial La Ley. ORGANIZATIONS Gibbons, Robert (2000) Why Organizations Are Such a Mess (and What an Economist Might Do About It) Mimeo, MIT Sloan School. Simon, Herbert (1991) Organizations and Markets Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(2). Richter, Rudolf (2007) The Market as Organization Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 163(3): Milgrom and Roberts (1990) Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity in Alt and Shepsle Perspectives on Positive Political Economy Cambridge University Kreps, David (1990) Corporate Culture and Economic Theory in Alt and Shepsle Perspectives on Positive Political Economy Cambridge University Gibbons, Robert (2003) Team Theory, Garbage Cans, and Real Organizations: Some History and Prospects of Economic Research on Decision-Making in Organizations. Industrial and Corporate Change 12:

6 Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole (1997) Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. Journal of Political Economy 105:1-29. Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy (1999). Informal Authority in Organizations. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: Rotemberg, Julio (1993) Power in Profit-Maximizing Organizations. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 2: Rousseau, Denise M. (1995) Psychological Contracts in Organizations. Sage Publications. Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece (1991) Strategic Management and Economics Strategic Management Journal 12: Pisano, Gary, Amy Shuen and David Teece (1997) Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), Menard, Claude (2005) A New Institutional Approach to Organization Chapter 12 in Menard and Shirley (2005) Handbook of New Institutional Economics Springer Verlag. Garicano, Luis (2000) Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp Available at JSTOR. Prendergast. C. (1999) The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, Lazear, Edward (1995) Personnel Economics. MIT Guillén, Mauro (2000) Business Groups in Emerging Market Economies: A Resource- Based View Academy of Management Journal 43(3): TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS & TRANSACTION COST POLITICS Williamson, Oliver (1985) Transaction Cost Economics, cap 1 en The Economic Institutions of Capitalism Shelanski and Klein (1995) Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11(2): North, Douglass (1990) A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics Journal of Theoretical Politics 2(4). (traducido en Saiegh y Tommasi, 1998) Dixit, Avinash (1996) The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. MIT

7 Acemoglu, Daron (2003) Why Not A Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics. Wogelmuth, M. (1999) Entry Barriers in Politics, or: Why Politics, Like Natural Monopoly, is Not Organized as an Ongoing Market Process? Review of Austrian Economics November, 177. ENDOGENEIZING INSTITUTIONS AND THEORIZING ABOUT THEM Eggertson, Thrainn (2005) Imperfect Institutions. Possibilities and Limits of Reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Miller, Gary (2000) "Rational Choice and Dysfunctional Institutions." Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 13, No. 4, October, Diermeier, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel (2003) Institutionalism as a Methodology Journal of Politics, 15(2): Lohmann. Susanne (2000) Sollbruchstelle: Deep Uncertainty and the Design of Monetary Institutions, International Finance, Vol. 3: Soskice, Bates, and Epstein (1992) Ambition and Constraint: The Stabilizing Role of Institutions Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 8(3): Mantzavinos, C (2001) Individuals, Institutions, and Markets Cambridge University Lohmann Sussane (2003) Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience Cost Theory of Institutional Commitmen Governance 16(1) COOPERATION Tabellini, Guido (2007) The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives, Mimeo, February. Dal Bo, Pedro (2007) Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality Economic Theory, January. Okada, Akira (1996) The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach In W. Gueth et al. (eds.) Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer-Verlag, 1996, Ostrom, Elinor (1998) A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action American Political Science Review 92(1): Bednar, Jenna "Is Full Compliance Possible? Conditions for Shirking with Imperfect Monitoring and Continuous Action Spaces" Journal of Theoretical Politics 18(3):

8 Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action American Political Science Review. 81(1) March Bianco and Bates (1990) Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas American Political Science Review. 84(1). March. Binmore, Ken (2006) Why do people cooperate? Politics Philosophy and Economics. 5 (1): DalBo, Pedro (2005) Cooperation Under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games American Economic Review December. Axelrod, Robert (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi (2008) How Political Institutions Work? Structuring Intertemporal Cooperation Mimeo, Universidad de San Andrés. EMERGENCE AND CHANGE OF INSTITUTIONS Greif and Laitin (2004) A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change American Political Science Review. 98(3) August, pp Pierson, Paul 2004 Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton University Knight, Jack 1992 Institutions and Social Conflict Cambridge U. Press, chapter 2 (pp ) and pp of chapter 5. Knight, Jack (1998) Models, Interpretations and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change in Knight and Sened Explaining Social Institutions. The University of Michigan Sened, Itai (1998) The Emergence of Individual Rights in Knight and Sened Explaining Social Institutions. The University of Michigan Young, Peyton 1998 Individual Strategy and Social Structure. An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton University Sekercioglu, Eser (forthcoming) Institutions as long standing equilibrium: Evolutionary stability and self-enforcement. Mimeo. Department of Political Science. Stony Brook University. Nelson, Richard (1994) The Co-evolution of Technology, Industrial Structure, and Supporting Institutions Industrial and Corporate Change 3(1). Vincent Crawford and Hans Haller, "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games." Econometrica 58 (1990):

9 Sanchez-Page, Santiago and Straub, Stephan (2006) Emergence of Institutions Mimeo, University of Edinburgh. CONSTITUTIONS/ SOCIAL CONTRACTS Calvert, R. and J. Johnson (1999) Interpretation and Coordination in Constitutional Politics," with James Johnson. In Ewa Hauser and Jacek Wasilewski, eds., Lessons in Democracy. University of Rochester Riley, Jonathan (2001) Constitutional Democracy as a Two-Stage Game ch 4 in Ferejohn, Rakove and Riley Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule. Cambridge U Knight, Jack (2001) Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation ch 11 in Ferejohn, Rakove and Riley Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule. Cambridge U Aghion P Bolton (2003) Incomplete Social Contracts Journal of the European Economic Association Okada, Akira, Kenichi Sakakibara and Koichi Suga (1997) The Dynamic Transformation of Political Systems through Social Contract: A Game Theoretic Approach, Social Choice and Welfare 14(1), 1997, LAW / COURTS Hadfield, Gillian (2005) The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments ch 8 in Menard, Claude and Shirley, Mary (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics Springer Verlag. Lazzarini, Miller and Zenger (2004) Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements Journal of Law Economics and Organization 20 (2) Casper, Steven (2001) The Legal Framework for Corporate Governance: The Influence of Corporate Law on Company Strategies in Germany and the U.S. in Hall and Soskice Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2007) Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 23(3): Mailath, George; Stephen Morris, and Andrew Postlewaite (2001) Laws and Authority Mimeo, Yale.

10 Miller, Jonathan (1997) Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and Its Collapse in Argentina, 21 Hastings International and Comparative Law Journal 77. Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi The Supreme Court ch 5 in Spiller and Tommasi The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina. Cambridge University Damaska, Mirjan (1986) The Faces of Justice and State Authority. Yale University Posner, Richard (1990) The Problems of Jurisprudence. Harvard University Kaplow and Shavell (2004) Contracting. Thomson and West Publishers. Kaplow, Louis (2000) General Characteristics of Rules, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. V, pp (Bouckaert & DeGeest, eds.; Edward Elgar, 2000). [WWW] Mui, Vai-Lam (1999) Contracting in the Shadow of a Corrupt Court Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 155: Levine, Ross (2005) Law, Endowments, and Property Rights Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (3): INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS Klein, Benjamin The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships. Revue D Économie Industrielle 92: Hart, Oliver (1995) A Discussion of the Foundations of the Incomplete Contracting Model, ch 4 of his Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford University Press Hviid, Morten (1998) Relational Contracts, Repeated Interaction and Contract Modification European Jounal of Law and Economics 5(2) Hart, O. and J.Moore (1999) Foundations of Incomplete Contracts Review of Economic Studies. 66: Ben-Shahar, Omri (2002) Agreeing to Disagree: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No Tirole, Jean (2007) Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts Mimeo, U of Tolousse and MIT. Anderlini and Felli (2004) Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts Research in Economics Volume 58, Issue 1, March 2004, Pages 3-30

11 Salanie, Bernard (1997) Incomplete Contracts chapter 7 in his The Economics of Contracts. A Primer. MIT Saiegh, S. and M. Tommasi (2000) An Incomplete-Contracts Approach to Intergovernmental Transfer Systems in Latin America. In Burki and Perry Decentralization and Accountability of the Public Sector. World Bank. THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT Weingast and Marshall (1988) The Industrial Organization of Congress : or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets Journal of Political Economy 96 : North, D. and B. Weingast (1989) Constitutions and Commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in XVIIth century England Journal of Economic History 49(4). Tirole, Jean (1994) The Internal Organization of Government Oxford Economic Papers 46 : Hammond (1996) Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 9(2), April. Myerson, Roger (1995) Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, Performance Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(1): Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) The Proper Scope of Government : Theory and Application to Prisons Quarterly Journal of Economics November. Moe, Terry The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy. In D. Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. New York: Cambridge University Prendergast, Canice (2003) The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency, Journal of Political Economy, Available from IDEAS. Dixit, Avinash, (2002) Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp Available at JSTOR. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, and Fehr (2005) Moral Sentiments and Material Interests. The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life. MIT

12 Granovetter, M (1982) The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network theory Revisited. Social Structure and Network Analysis. P.V.Marsden and N.Lin, eds., Beverly Hills: Sage Publications (UMI Books on Demand, Michigan), pp: Granovetter, M (1985) "Economic-Action and Social-Structure - the Problem of Embeddedness." American Journal of Sociology 91: Mailath and Postlewaite (2006) Social Assets PIER Working Paper University of Pennsylvania. Becker, Gary (1974) A Theory of Social Interactions Journal of Political Economy Jackson, Matthew (2007) The Study of Social Networks In Economics,'' in The Missing Links: Formation and Decay of Economic Networks, edited by James E. Rauch; Russell Sage Foundation. Elster, Jon (1989) Social Norms and Economic Theory Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4): INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, SOCIAL CAPITAL, Dasgupta and Serageldin (1999) Social Capital: A Multi-Faceted Perspective Helmke and Levitsky (2006) Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America. John s Hopkins University Tabellini, Guido (2005) Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe CESifo Working Paper Bawn, Kathleen (1999) Constructing Us : Ideology, Coalition Politics, and False Consciousness American Journal of Political Science 43, 2, April. Bednar, Jenna and Scott E. Page "Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior within Multiple Games". Rationality and Society, 19(1): Knack and Keefer (2005) Social Capital, Social Norms and the New Institutional Economics, in Menard, Claude and Mary Shirley (2005) Handbook of New Institutional Economics Springer Verlag. Mantzavinos, C (2001) Informal Institutions in his Individuals, Institutions, and Markets Cambridge University Babb, Sarah and Bruce Carruthers (1999) Economy/Society: Markets, Meanings, and Social Structures. Pine Forge

13 OTHER APPLICATIONS FEDERALISM Inman, R. and D. Rubinfeld (1997) The Political Economy of Federalism in Mueller, Perspectives on Public Choice Cambridge University Weingast, Barry 2005 The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An Institutional Perspective in Menard and Shirley Handbook of New Institutional Economics Springer Verlag. Cremer and Palfrey (1999) "Political Confederation", American Political Science Review, 93, n 1, March. Myerson, Roger 2006 Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1: INTERNATIONAL Gilligan, Michael Transaction Costs Approach to International Institutions Mimeo, New York University. Morrow, James 1994 Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information International Organization 48,3, Horn, Henrik, Maggi, Giovanni and Staiger, Robert W. (2006), "Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts" (December). NBER Working Paper No. W12745 Available at SSRN: Jupille and Snidal 2006 The Choice of International Institutions: Cooperation, Alternatives, and Strategies. Mimeo, Dept of Political Science, U of Colorado. Hungeford, Thomas (1991) GATT: A cooperative equilibrium in a noncooperative trading regime? Journal of International Economics 31: OTHER al-nowaihi and Levine (1994) Can reputation resolve the monetary policy credibility problem? Journal of Monetary Economics 33: Masten, Scott (2006) Authority and Commitment: Why Universities, Like Legislatures, Are Not Organized As Firms Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 15: Wittman, Donald (1995) The Organization of Family Interactions: Minimizing Transaction Costs and Strategic Behavior Paper 588 Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.

14 REFERENCE BOOKS: (secondary) Alt and Shepsle (1990) Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge University Baron, James, and David Kreps (1999) Strategic Human Resources. Frameworks for General Managers. John Wiley and Sons. Binmore, Ken (2000) Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 1: Playing Fair. MIT Bowles, Samuel (2004) Microeconomics. Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution Russell Sage Foundation. Cambell, Joseph (1988) The Power of Myth. Anchor Books Coleman, James (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Dixit, Avinash (1996) The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. MIT Douglass Mary (1987) How Institutions Think. London : Routledge and L. Kegan Paul. Eggertsson, T. (1990) Economic Behavior and Institutions Cambridge University Eggertsson, T. (2005) Imperfect Institutions Cambridge University Elster, Jon (2007) Explaining Social Behavior. More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Elster, Jon (1998) Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge University Ferejohn, Rakove and Riley (2001) Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule. Cambridge University Furubotn and Richter (1998) Institutions and Economic Theory. The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. Michigan University Greenberg, J. (1999). Managing Behavior in Organizations. Prentice-Hall. Hall and Soskice (2001) Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Jackson, Matthew (forthcoming) Social Networks and Economic Networks. Princeton University

15 Milgrom and Roberts (1992) Economics, Organization and Management. Prentice Hall. Mueller, Dennis (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University North, Douglass (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University North, Douglass (2005) Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton University Olson, Mancur (2000) Power and Prosperity. Basic Books. Ostrom, Elinor (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Ostrom, Elinor (2005) Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Ostrom, Elinor and T.K. Ahn (2003) Foundations of Social Capital. Edward Elgar. Posner Eric (2002) Laws and Social Norms. Harvard University Powell and di Maggio 1991 The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. University of Chicago Salanie, Bernard (1997) The Economics of Contracts. A Primer. MIT Scharpf, Fritz (1997) Games Real Actors Play. Actor-centered Institutionalismin Policy Research. Westview Searle, John (1995) The Construction of Social Reality New York. Free Smelser and Swedberg (1994) Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton University Sunstein, Cass (2000) Behavioral Law and Economics. Cambridge University Tungodden, Stern and Kolstad (2003) Toward Pro-Poor Policies. Aid, Institutions and Growth. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Euroè. Williamson, Oliver (1995) Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond. Oxford University Press