Back to the Drawing Board

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2 Challenge of Renewal Pierre Moscovici Back to the Drawing Board Pierre Moscovici This year s presidential and legislative elections handed complete power to the conservative right. The incumbent vol 1.1 progressive politics 7

3 Challenge of Renewal Pierre Moscovici 1 Le Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche is a minor party allied to the French Socialist Party. President, Jacques Chirac was reelected in May, and secured a huge majority in the National Parliament less than two months later. The right, which had been divided for many years, It became impossible for Lionel Jospin to present himself as a figure capable of leading a unified left. managed to form a single party. Supported by the Senate, the High Court, numerous regions, départements, and municipal councils, the President and his government now have five years to act, almost without any real counterweight. In this context, one may ask where is the left? Why has it experienced this setback? And, what must the Party do to recover? Rebuilding the left The left was soundly beaten despite having an acknowledged set of achievements, especially in the economic field, a respected leader, Lionel Jospin, and a theoretically popular party. It now finds itself in the minority, both in parliament and across the country. The key to the left s victory in the 1997 legislative elections was the construction of a new coalition, the gauche plurielle, which brought five parties together. In addition to the Socialist Party and the MRG 1, this coalition included the Communist Party, the Greens, and the nationalist and republican Citizen s Movement of Jean-Pierre Chevènement. The coalition s diversity, the quality of its debates, the breadth of its constituencies, and the opportunity it offered the Prime Minister to build new and balanced syntheses, all helped seduce the voters. Prior to the municipal elections in 2001 the French believed with good reason that the left was plural, and the right divided (although the poor performance of the Socialist Party in these elections should have made us stop and think). But the inversion of the electoral calendar which meant that the presidential election was held a few weeks before the legislatives, when the reverse had initially been foreseen - undermined the coalition. This coalition had already been weakened by the diversity of its component parts, and the consequent lack of internal discipline. Parliamentary elections effectively favour alliances: it is necessary to draw up a pluralist majority in the second round. In contrast, the presidential election is a game of standing out: the little candidates have a single round in which to shine, the final being reserved for the two leading candidates. Given this forceful logic, the presence of candidates from each of the five parties in the coalition, as well as three Trotskyite candidates, was always likely to be dangerous. It turned into a catastrophe. The campaign among the left was very tough, particularly on the part of Jean-Pierre Chevènement. It became impossible for Lionel Jospin to present himself as a figure capable of leading a unified left. At the same time, Jacques Chirac, without running a flamboyant campaign, dominated his camp, unified the right, while the extreme right s candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, capitalised on the rising fear of insecurity. On the evening of 21st April, the first round of the presidential 8 progressive politics vol 1.1

4 President Jacques Chirac and former Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin election, the impossible happened. The left was eliminated from the second round and forced to ask its supporters to vote for the outgoing right-wing President, who was pitted against the extreme right s candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen. It must be understood that, following this disastrous result, the legislative elections only offered the opportunity for minor changes that is to say internally within the left and there was thus little chance of creating a parliamentary majority. The Socialist Party s partners suffered particularly badly. The Communist Party is now faced with a painful reappraisal of its very existence, having fallen below the five per cent mark. The Greens were unable to convert their intellectual strength into a credible electoral force. Jean-Pierre Chevènement s dissident group was also severely punished by the electors, for what seemed to many as their betrayal of common ideals. They failed to win a single seat, and their leader is absent from parliament for the first time in 30 years. For its part, the Socialist Party resisted this trend. It is by far the main opposition party. It won more than 25 per cent of the vote in the first round of the legislative elections. Thus it still represents a significant political force, and is capable of acting as a credible opposition. For this to be effective, however, the Socialist Party will have to respond to three challenges: strategic, sociological, and ideological. Strategically, even if it remains strong, the Socialist Party lacks loyal and credible allies. It has become cut-off from social movements and intellectual debates. It is thus necessary for it to break from its solitude, and think about how a new unity for the left might be created, a successor to the outdated model of the gauche plurielle. Insufficiently representative of French society, aging and introverted, the Socialist Party is in need of fundamental renewal. It must invent new ways of mobilising its members and supporters, and reassess its sociological base: how should it respond to the diverse and sometimes contradictory aspirations of those who are excluded, the middle classes, and the working classes? The Socialist Party, despite having successfully implemented the vast majority of its programme during the 1980s and 1990s, is in need of ideological renewal. The French did not approve of its ideas in It must now develop new software, one that Insufficiently representative of French society, aging and introverted, the Socialist Party is in need of fundamental renewal. responds to the major social, international, and democratic questions of today s society. In short, the left must be rebuilt. Only the Socialist Party can be the architect. Understanding our failure Before acting, we must first understand where we failed, and that requires a great deal of work and an open debate. Here I shall simply indicate some of the paths open to us, but I shall begin by saying what needs vol 1.1 progressive politics 9

5 Challenge of Renewal Pierre Moscovici to be avoided. Firstly, we should reject false explanations, of the sort that claim: we lost because we were not left-wing enough. This diagnosis is false on two accounts. False in relation to our European partners: Lionel Jospin s government was without doubt the most left-wing in Europe. False in itself: we had a realistic leftwing policy, one that combined economic and social voluntarism with wage moderation in the search for a job-rich growth. In five years, France created two million jobs and reduced unemployment by 900,000: we should not forget this. We also have to avoid taking an ideological step backwards: we cannot face the problems of the 21st Century with the solutions of the 1960s! We have seen how Communism works: the Socialist Party should not reinvent it. And we cannot succumb to the attraction of leftism : that would entail giving up social transformation through a confrontation with reality. As head of the government and leader of his camp until the presidential election, Lionel Jospin also became the object of all the criticisms and overstatements. Instead, we must reflect on the main reasons for our defeat. Of course, the electoral campaign of Lionel Jospin was disappointing. But, could it have differed in any substantial way? In essence, the socialist candidate proved the unwritten rule that it is impossible for an incumbent Prime Minister to win the presidential election, to move directly from the Matignon to the Elysée. In France, the Prime Minister is in charge of the difficult dossiers, and must always be the first to address political problems. Under co-habitation it is the Prime Minister who takes the blows, while the President is essentially a mouthpiece who can, through his speeches, satisfy everyone. In sum, if the Prime Minister is the true holder of power, he is also the natural focal point for the unpopularity that accompanies it. The division of the left was a further handicap. As head of the government and leader of his camp until the presidential election, Lionel Jospin also became the object of all the criticisms and overstatements. He was even attacked by his partners. Far from valuing the not inconsiderable achievements of the previous five years, the coalition parties focused on the weaknesses, the things that were missing inevitable elements of any human endeavour. Because of his ethics and sense of responsibility, the Prime Minister did not respond to these attacks had he made the second round, he would only have had to recover these votes in the second round. In sum, the Matignon trap closed on Lionel Jospin: maybe he should have stepped back and recovered his freedom of manoeuvre to fight the campaign, temporarily leaving someone else to take-over. Some people including myself suggested this to him: he took a different route, one which had its own coherence. Aside from these objective conditions which meant the situation would always be delicate, the campaign itself 10 progressive politics vol 1.1

6 was unsuccessful. Lionel Jospin had a lot of experience: he had already led many national campaigns as leader of the Socialist Party both European and legislative. He was an outstanding candidate in the 1995 presidential election, in a situation that was much less favourable than this year s. But in 2002, he never really got going. Why? Over reliance on political communication, or an overly defensive approach, a systematic search for personal confrontation with Jacques Chirac, a lack of homogeneity and coherence in the campaign teams: all have been cited, and all contain an element of truth. In my opinion, however, the principle failure is that the campaign was not thought about early enough or hard enough. It became a simple and logical extension of our success in government. The latter was, in some spontaneous manner, supposed to floor the outgoing President, whom many (rereading the Anglo-Saxon press) believed to have been wholly discredited. This illusion undoubtedly led us to underestimate our opponent, a formidable and seasoned politician. We also neglected certain sociological and psychological aspects of the presidential election: France is structurally more right wing, and presidential elections are a personal, almost carnal, affair between the candidates and the people. In this, Lionel Jospin s electoral defeat, that is to say our electoral defeat and I take my part as one of the leading strategists was due to our overly riskadverse and rational attitude. Beyond the missed presidential campaign and the catastrophic impact of the division of the left, I would also insist upon three factors. Firstly, the left in France find it difficult to stay in power. This was the case after 1963, after 1981, and again after Today s socialists no longer have to answer the question that undid Léon Blum at the start of the century. The fall of communism and the retreat of We have to assess how we might better act in the interests of all, and accept that we have perhaps favoured societal reforms over social aspirations during the past five years. Marxist influence have helped. Revolutionary ideas have declined, and the exercise of power is now totally legitimate. In the 1970s, François Mitterrand was able to gather around him, in the rebuilt Socialist Party of 1971, men and women prepared for the idea of democratic alternation and trained in their approach to governmental responsibilities. This political grouping was effectively in power for 15 years between 1981 and 2002: the socialists are no longer naïve, lacking in experience or competence. Indeed, they contributed a great deal over the years (and particularly between 1997 and 2002) to the modernisation of the French economy and society. This conversion to management was far from painless for a large part of our electorate and a not inconsiderable number of our activists. For many reasons, their s is not completely a culture of responsibility. To start with, the French tradition is primarily based vol 1.1 progressive politics 11

7 Challenge of Renewal Pierre Moscovici 2 See Lionel Jospin, My Vision of Europe and Globalisation, Policy Network, 2002 and Pascal Lamy and Jean Pisani-Ferry, The Europe We Want, Policy Network, on revolution rather than reform. When we exercised power, we disappointed many who legitimately hoped that the balance between social transformation and management would be more dynamic. It is also true that we were unable to explain our plans, to theorise them and thus to mobilise. The same phenomenon albeit to different degrees and in different forms is witnessed each time we fall from power: a certain section of our electorate abandon us, believing a cleavage to have emerged between an elite deprived of ideals and the forsaken people they have betrayed. While it is easy to identify the problem and draw retrospective lessons, it is not so simple to find solutions for the future. Second, the left often seem unable to synthesise the contradictory desires of the French. This inability does not stem from our intellectual shortcomings. It is the result of objective contradictions between the diverse categories groups or classes of the population, some looking for personal autonomy, others suffering from exclusion, or preoccupied with their purchasing power. The 35-hour week nicely illustrates this contradiction. This reform will remain: it is important. Already it has offered new freedom to many workers. But it is also judged by others often the most modest to be a source of lower incomes, and increased uncertainty in the workplace. The socialist electorate is made in the image of French society, it is a fragmented composite. We have to assess how we might better act in the interest of all, and accept that we have perhaps privileged societal reforms over social aspirations during the past five years. Finally, certain attempts at intellectual and policy renewal have been insufficient. Reform of the state; a vision for Europe and for How can we renew our relationship with the public? This is the first question Socialists have to ask. It is also the most difficult. globalisation 2 ; a response to new inequalities and the plight of the working poor ; a reduction of the problems between regions, and solutions to urban problems; the integration of immigrants; a balance between security and liberty: on all these subjects we have made progress. But our thinking must go further. If I have chosen to mention these three points, amongst others, then it is because they help to explain our biggest electoral deficit: the remarkably low turnout or electoral switch-off among the working class witnessed in the first round of the presidential election. How can we renew our relationship with the public? This is the first question Socialists have to ask. It is also the most difficult. Four tasks for the Party To respond to this question, we have to explore four areas. Here, I shall limit myself to identifying the central aspects of each of these. Firstly, the economic and social. French society, like the rest of Europe, is characterised by new inequalities, and our response to these new problems 12 progressive politics vol 1.1

8 has to be ever more individualised. Reduction of income inequalities; returning people to work, and distinguishing between work and welfare; fighting uncertainty; the respective roles of the law, and of contracts, and the relevance of social bargaining in conjunction with the state: on all these points we have to develop new approaches. Socialism must be directed simultaneously at the creation of wealth, the efficiency of production, and equitable redistribution. Justice and equality remain major objectives for us. They are also the necessary conditions for reducing violence in our society. Tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime : Tony Blair s formula is also true for France. We have to develop a security policy that has no weakness, but we must also invest massively in education. We have to build a new urbanism. We should also not hesitate using positive discrimination : equality is not the same as uniformity. And above all, to achieve this we have to defend and develop our public services, while also making them Necessary reforms are either delayed or imposed, and so missed. At the root of all of this is a common cause: the weakening of Parliament, and the decline of representative democracy in France. evolve. In essence, all these measures are concerned with a single fight: the search for a just order. Second, the international. We know that globalisation produces wealth, but also notable inequalities. Its terrible and perverse effects confront us all: terrorism, environmental damage, unequal development, the caprices of financial capitalism and the return of what Keynes used to call the casino economy. To construct a new global order that is more just, we must break the current mould: we must reject en masse the themes of the antiglobalisation movement, as well as the false truths of economic liberalism, and blind faith in the market. That is why we must now reflect on how we might go about setting out new rules of the game, both political and economic. We need to define and pursue the big priorities the development of the poorest countries, the fight against AIDS, the defence of our ecosystem, and the fight against the terrorism. In short, we need to put in place a new global governance. Here Europe can play a major role, maybe even a decisive one. Confronted with the challenge of enlargement, engaged in monetary union, it must make advances in the political field. I am in favour of a Europe that has a genuine democratic dimension, and one that is a genuine political power: a defence policy, a common foreign policy, a common justice and internal security policy, strong ties with the South, a constitution. It appears to me that the construction of a popular Europe, just as populists and conservatives are gaining power, is a challenge common to all social democrats. It deserves our support. Thirdly, the institutional. France has finished at least for the moment with co-habitation. But its political crisis is not over: many French people no longer vote, the extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of vol 1.1 progressive politics 13

9 Challenge of Renewal Pierre Moscovici the executive will lead either to authoritarianism or laissez faire politics, and as a result, public policy suffers. Necessary reforms to the pensions system, or the state, for example are either delayed or imposed, and so missed. At the root of all of this is a common cause: the weakening of Parliament, and the decline of representative democracy in France. This situation should be redressed immediately. Some of my colleagues have, to their credit, pushed for a Sixth Republic to replace the moribund Fifth. The number is not important: what matters is the need for change. We now have to choose between a presidential regime, along American lines, and a truly parliamentary system, inspired by European experiences. Having hesitated for a long time, because I recognise the attachment of the French to the election of the President of the Republic, I now believe that presidentialism is the wrong choice, it over-emphasises the negative traits of our national political culture. Above all, We need to be aware that modernising does not mean importing an ideology from abroad, ignoring the specificities of the French left and relegating the guardians of that tradition to the dustbin of history. A new synthesis has to be built. however, whatever choice we make, we end the deadly ambiguity that undermines our democratic life. Whatever we choose we must return the Parliament s stature and role. Finally, the political. Everything starts with the party, and everything ends with it too. The right managed to unite itself, to its strategic advantage. It is essential for us to respond to this, by fundamentally renewing the Socialist Party. This task is important. We must consolidate our relationship with society by diversifying our recruitment policy, both within the party and with regard to the candidates we select. We must unify the left around the Socialists without destroying the diversity of movements contained within it and hold vibrant debates in a party of activists open to others. Finally, we must find, following Lionel Jospin s departure, a strong and unshakeable leader without creating divisions. Above all, it is necessary to clarify and modernise our ideas. Imprisoned by the constraints of a coalition of the left, we were unable to do this adequately while in government. Lionel Jospin s formula of yes to the market economy, no to the market society opened-up important perspectives: they need to be deepened. I have already mentioned the regressive steps that the Socialist Party has to avoid. It also has to exorcise the temptation of the lowest common denominator and of a tabula rasa. Above all, we need to be aware that modernising does not mean importing an ideology from abroad, ignoring the specificities of the French left and relegating the guardians of that tradition to the dustbin of history. A new synthesis has to be built. Our vision of socialism has to combine equality and efficiency, favour the creation of wealth and encourage social justice, embrace society and respond to individual demands, be resolutely European yet respectful of nations. 14 progressive politics vol 1.1

10 In the French Socialist Party, there is no shortage of people capable of producing and implementing these ideas. Some of them have already made We have to listen to each other, enrich ourselves through our differences, without seeking to impose this or that model on each other. We have to get over the vain quarrels about the old guard and the modernisers. important contributions. The debate must continue being sincere, considered and fundamental. It must resist falling into artificial and meaningless cleavages between a left by definition, out of date for its opponents and a right that is clearly neo-liberal for those who reject it. In short, following a 20 year period during which the left was nearly always in power, we must initiate a new cycle for the left. risks and master them, and work for the longer term, seriously preparing for the next elections in I think that the French Socialists can do this, if they want to. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that this is not an isolated task. The ebbing of the pink tide of 1987, the advance of the right and of the extreme right have affected almost all of Europe, and that is not by chance. That is to say that our work has to be, in large part, a communal effort. Just as I never believed in socialism in one country, so I believe isolated renewal is impossible. Thus we have to develop networks and cooperation. We have to exchange our best and worst practices. We have to listen to each other, enrich ourselves through our differences, without seeking to impose this or that model on each other. We have to get over the vain quarrels about the old guard and the modernisers. We have to build a true party of European socialists from the bottom up, and not just from the top down. If we do this, the left s time will soon come again in Europe. These are all questions that our Congress in 2003 will have to respond to. If it succeeds, then it will found a new party and open a new era. If it fails, then we run the risk, like the Labour Party in the early 1980s, of a long period of opposition. Conclusion Our electoral defeat has been a real trauma. At the same time, it has left us with a clear chance to fight back. If we want to fight back effectively, then we have to act fast, be audacious, take Pierre Moscovici was Minister of European Affairs in the Jospin government and key strategist for the presidential campaign. He is representative of France in the Convention on the Future of Europe. vol 1.1 progressive politics 15