Using Conflict Analysis Method to Analyze Crimea Crisis Between Russia and Ukraine

Transcription

1 Intenational Confeence on Engineeing Management, Engineeing Edcation and Infomation Techlogy (EMEEIT ) Using Conflict Analysis Method to Analyze Cimea Cisis Between Rssia and Ukaine iaojia Jiang*, Lei Yang, Chaol Ma, Mingfei W, Feng Li, Yhi Wei, iaoli Institte of NBC Defence, Beijing, China Institte of NBC Potection, Beijing,, China Taizho Univesity, Taizho,, China * jxj@.com Keywods: conflict analysis method, Cimea cisis. Abstact. In view of the gowing complexity of Cimea Cisis between Rssia and Cimea, on the basis of analyzing the oigin and weighing all the factos, the se of conflict analysis method cold be taken to analyze the stategies that may be taken by both sides and boldly foecast the tends and otcomes. Meanwhile, it also has cetain efeence vale fo stategy game of the simila conflicts. Intodction Cimea pblic voting to join in Rssia, dobt, is a majo stategic and histoic event to the entie intenational commnity. It is bond to be a long-tem stategy game fo Ukaine, Eope and the United States o Rssia. Any mistake o delay in game will have npedictable epecssions of political, ecomic and militay, eslting in ndesiable eslts. In ode to get the otcome in thei favo, the pla can make se of conflict analysis method to achieve a sppoting ole in establishing a majo stategic policy. Basic oy of the Conflict Analysis Method A complete conflict analysis shold consist of conflict mode establishment and conflict stability analysis. ole of the fome is to systematically expess all the infomation elated to the conflict that analysts have obtained, in ode to gasp the whole picte of the conflict; the ole of the latte is to pedict the possible otcome of the conflict based on a conflict model, in ode to povide the basis fo decisions. Conflict Soting Mode. Fo a moment of conflict sitations, all pevios infomation abot this conflict can be abstacted accoding to the following thee aspects, which constittes a conflict soting mode: Pla. main decision makes of the paties to the conflict. Scheme. action that might be taken by the pla in the conflict. A set of soltions selected by the pla constittes a stategy. game stats that each playe chooses a stategy is an otcome of the conflict. Soting Each Otcome of the Game Accoding to i Vales. e ae seveal soting coesponding to the nmbe of the pla. Stability Analysis. Stability Concepts. actal ppose of stability analysis is to detemine the eqilibim soltion of the conflict. As fo the conflict consisting of two pla, if a otcome of the conflict is stable fo the both pla, this otcome is an eqilibim soltion of the conflict. basis of stability concept is the easonable assmptions that the pla will sely choose a moe favoable soltion fo themselves fom two soltions which can case diffeent otcomes. Ths, if the pla may get a moe negative otcome fo themselves by changing thei stategies, the otcome is stable fo the pla. Clealy,. athos - Pblished by Atlantis Pess

2 Intenational Confeence on Engineeing Management, Engineeing Edcation and Infomation Techlogy (EMEEIT ) eqilibim soltion is the most likely otcome of the conflict, becase both sides believe that it wold be impossible to get a moe satisfactoy otcome than this ending. Stability Conditions. Accoding to stability concepts to jdge the stability, yo need to detemine which otcome of the conflict can be impoved nilateally fo each of the pla. When the othe pla didn t change stategies, it means that the playe who has changed stategy can convet the oiginal otcome into a new ending which will be moe favoable fo himself. Unilateal impovement can be abbeviated as UI in this aticle. Based on the pla pefeence to the otcome of conflict and UI of each possible otcome, it is t difficlt to apply the basic concepts of logistics and set theoy to detemine the stability of any possible otcome to the paticla playe. In a simple conflict consisting of two pla, the analyzing steps of the otcome q s stability to the playe A will be shown in Fige. () Reasonable otcome: If B does t change stategy, as A does nilateal impovement fom q, the stategy adopted by A is the best. efoe, a easonable otcome will be stable. Deted by. () Unstable otcomes: A does at least one nilateal impovement fom q, while the B cant make A in a moe advese position than the oiginal by any nilateal impovement. Deted by. () Synchosly esticted otcome: If q is t stable fo both A and B, it can case a moe advese otcome fo one o both when A and B change stategies at the same time fom q. This will estict one o both fom doing fthe impovement. efoe, this otcome is stable. Recoded as '. Test of synchosly esticted otcome can be calclated as follows: otcome q' that both A and B simltaneosly do nilateal impovement fom q = (the otcome that A does nilateal impovement fom q) + (the otcome that B does nilateal impovement fom q) q. If q' is moe negative than q fo A o B, q' is a synchosly esticted otcome. () Sbseqently esticted otcome: B can do nilateal impovement in esponse to A's any nilateal impovement fom q, it will make the new otcome be moe advese than the oiginal fo A. B s nilateal impovement is called tsted esistance. Obviosly, sbseqently esticted otcome is stable fo A. Deted by s. begin Does A has UI fom q? q is easonable fo A q is nstable fo A Does B has UI fom A s UI? Does B s all UI have pioity ove q to A? Give a test to A and B at the same time Does A has othe UI fom q? q is stable fo A as B s esistance Fig.: UI - Unilateal Impovements Applying Conflict Analysis Method to Cimea Cisis Establish Conflict Mode. Pla. On Cimea Cisis isse, Rssia is clealy one of the pla, bt athe playe is special. Ukaine who has ability to peseve itself is the weakest powe in the cente of the cisis. Additionally, fo Eope and the United States, contolling Cimea is eqivalent to embedding a winning wedge in contolling Easia. Eope and the United States cant sit idly by. efoe, hee we have Ukaine who is sppoted by Eope and the United States as the playe.. athos - Pblished by Atlantis Pess

3 Intenational Confeence on Engineeing Management, Engineeing Edcation and Infomation Techlogy (EMEEIT ) Actions. Rssia's actions may be taken as the following thee kinds: Fistly, do t take any militay action, bt only thogh diplomatic negotiations to pt pesse on Ukaine. This can save Cimea Cisis fom escalation. Secondly, seizing Cimea (which may also inclde the soth-easten pat of Ukaine) in a conventional attack. This will be accsed of aggession against Ukaine. Lastly, in the case of sending toop withot damaging the allies, sppot Yankovych as an agent and seve Cimean peninsla and the easten Ukaine as Yankovich s conte positions. actions of Ukaine may be thee kinds: Fistly. Insist Cimea is an inalienable pat of Ukaine and swea to defend. Secondly. Give p the owneship of Cimea nde Rssian militay pesse and admit the independence of Cimea. Lastly. the cisis, sch as attacks on the Rssian Black Sea Fleet which stationed in Cimea. Infomation concening the above isses can be expessed in the fomat of Table. selected scheme by the pla is deted by in the table, convesely deted by. Rssian playe's two schemes constitte fo kinds of stategy, and the Ukaine playe's two schemes only constitte thee kinds of stategy (becase it is njstifiable and impossible to take the stategy that consists of both giving p and escalating simltaneosly). Each otcome is deted by -digit colmn which consists of and.n, convet colmn into decimal nmeal thogh digital eqivalence between decimal and binay digital in ode to facilitate the stability analysis. Table : and stategies pla Rssia Ukaine Sppot Give p Conclsions in decimal epesentation Stategies Otcome Soting. Otcome soting often eqies the pla to get the othe infomation eliably and gives a detailed qalitative and qantitative analysis. Hee, we assme that the pla in the conflict ndestand each othe abot pefeence fo the otcome. On Cimea cisis isse, on the one hand, Rssia detemines to get the owneship of Cimea, and on the othe hand, Rssia has been fll of misgiving de to the difficlties at home and aboad. efoe, Rssia most wants Ukaine to give p the owneship of Cimea athe than makes the cisis escalated. If Ukaine gives p the owneship of Cimea, Rssia wants its militay opeations to be small scale as fa as possible. If Ukaine makes the cisis escalated, Rssia will take the most aggessive action. If Ukaine takes actions which t only defend the teitoial integity of Ukaine bt also don t escalate the cisis, Rssia will take some actions to make Ukaine give p the owneship of Cimea, bt t nnecessaily ange Ukaine who is sppoted by Eope and the United States. On the basis of the analysis, we can dedce Rssian pefeence seqence fo Cimea cisis. As shown in Table. Table : Rssian pefeence seqence fo Cimea cisis pla Rssia Sppot Ukaine Give p Conclsions in decimal epesentation Stategies. athos - Pblished by Atlantis Pess

4 Intenational Confeence on Engineeing Management, Engineeing Edcation and Infomation Techlogy (EMEEIT ) Ukaine also expects to avoid the cisis escalated. If the cisis is escalated, Ukaine expects that Rssia also has a coesponding act of aggession in ode to avoid intenational isolation. efoe () is Ukainian most ndesiable eslts. If the cisis isn t escalated, Ukaine expects that Rssia does t occpy Cimea and sppots agent. If Rssia takes any militay action, Ukaine will have to give p the owneship of Cimea. Howeve if Rssia does t take militay action, Ukaine is willing to safegad national nity and defend teitoial integity. efoe, Ukainian pefeence seqence fo Cimea Cisis is shown in Table. Table : Ukainian pefeence seqence fo Cimea cisis pla Rssia Ukaine Stategies Sppot Give p Conclsions in decimal epesentation Stability Analysis of Conflict. Accoding to the above steps, the eslt of stability analysis of Cimea Cisis is shown in Table. table shows: Table : Stability analysis of Cimea cisis Rssia Stability of the pla s Pefeence seqence Unilateal impovements Ukaine Stability of the pla s Pefeence seqence Unilateal impovements Synthesis Otcome No. Eqilibim soltions E E Otcome,, ae easonable fo Rssia, and otcome,,, ae easonable fo Ukaine. Otcome is sbseqently esticted otcome fo Rssia, so it is stable. In fact, otcome may be nilateally impoved to otcome. Howeve, accoding to Ukainian pefeence seqence, Ukaine can nilateally impove otcome to otcome. Accoding to Rssian pefeence seqence, otcome has lowe pioity than otcome. efoe, since Ukaine is bond to esist, otcome is stable fo Rssia. This esistance is inevitable, becase it stands to eason that Ukaine will nilateally impove otcome to otcome. In pactical cisis, it is shown that Rssia will t elax its actions of sppoting agents in Cimea and easten Ukaine in case of Ukainian admission of Cimea independence, becase Ukaine is likely to go back on its wod withot ackwledging Cimea independence. Similaly we can see that otcome is stable fo Ukaine. Otcome,,,,,,, ae nstable fo Rssia. Sch as otcome, Rssia has two nilateal impovements fom otcome to otcome and otcome which is kwn fom Table. Ukaine can nilateally impove fom to, and otcome has lowe pioity than otcome fo Rssia. efoe, it is neasonable fo Rssia to make a nilateal impovement fom otcome to otcome. athos - Pblished by Atlantis Pess

5 Intenational Confeence on Engineeing Management, Engineeing Edcation and Infomation Techlogy (EMEEIT ). Howeve, Rssia will nilateally impove nhindeed fom otcome to otcome if Rssia want, becase Ukaine has nilateal impovement fom otcome. This shows that otcome is stable fo Rssia. Similaly we can see that otcome,,,,,, ae nstable fo Ukaine. Otcome,,,, ae nstable fo Rssia and Ukaine, so it needs a test of synchosly esticted otcome. Fo example in Table, otcome is nstable fo Rssia and Ukaine, Rssia and Ukaine espectively make a nilateal impovement fom otcome to otcome and otcome. efoe, Rssian stategy shold change () into (), and Ukainian stategy shold change () into (). Ths simltaneosly impoved otcome is (), which is actally otcome. Otcome has pecedence ove otcome fo Rssia and Ukaine, so otcome is still nstable fo Rssia and Ukaine. In othe wods, otcome is t synchosly esticted otcome fo both sides. Similaly we can see that otcome,,, ae t synchosly esticted otcome fo both sides. If an otcome is stable fo all the pla, this otcome is an eqilibim soltion, namely, one possible soltion. All the emaining otcomes ae t the eqilibim soltions. eqilibim soltions ae epesented by E, and then the n-eqilibim soltions ae epesented by. We can see that otcome and otcome ae eqilibim soltions fom last two lines of Table. Conclsions We shold specifically analyze the stats in qo of the cisis to detemine which may be a possible soltion fom two eqilibim soltions. At the beginning of the cisis, Ukaine takes action to pevent the conty fom sepaation inclding intenal chaos and ethnic divisions withot Rssian any action, which is eqivalent to otcome. Otcome is easonable fo Ukaine, and then Rssia will nilateally impove otcome to otcome. Becase otcome is nstable fo Ukaine, it will be nilateally impoved fom otcome to otcome by Ukaine. Otcome is an eqilibim soltion which is the most possible soltion. In othe wods, Rssia will sppot Yankovych as an agent in case of sending toops to ense damage to Rssian allies, then Ukaine give p the owneship of Cimea and admit the independence of Cimea. Refeences [] Ziliang Zhang. Militay Opeations Reseach [M]. Militay Science Pess, Beijing. -. [] Ziliang Zhang. Militay Stategic Opeations Reseach Analysis [M]. Militay Science Pess, Beijing.. [] Decai Wang. Amy NBC Potection Opeations Reseach Analysis [M]. National Defense Univesity Pess, Beijing. -. [] Qiye Cheng. Command Decision Logistics Analysis [M]. Militay Science Pess, Beijing... athos - Pblished by Atlantis Pess