China and Maritime Transformation: History, Strategy and Policy Implications ZHENGYU WU *

Transcription

1 Economic and Political Studies Vol. 1, No. 2, July 2013, China and Maritime Transformation: History, Strategy and Policy Implications ZHENGYU WU * Abstract: This paper seeks to place China s ongoing maritime transformation in a larger context, and thereby clarify the strategic implications of its pursuit of maritime capabilities. It argues that, given their amphibious nature, rimland powers are bound to encounter more challenges in the pursuit of maritime transformation, and more importantly, such pursuits easily backfire and cause undesirable ramifications. This paper examines the underlying mechanism which led to the failed maritime transformation of rimland powers in modern history. Then, based on the strategic lessons from modern history, it examines the strategic challenges concomitant with China s pursuit of maritime capabilities, and contends that, if China hopes to escape similar fate, it has to pay serious attention to three strategic issues. Keywords: maritime transformation, rimland, sea power, geostrategy, China MARITIME TRANSFORMATION STANDS OUT IN history mainly for two reasons. Firstly, history seems to have been very unkind to such transformations. Except for cases from the ancient world, no power has ever succeeded in such a transformation though modern history has witnessed serious attempts at maritime transformation by such prominent great powers as Louis XIV s France, Wilhelm II s Germany, Imperial Russia and then the Soviet Union. Secondly, maritime transformations pursued by modern Great Powers led to much strategic instability without exception. In the cases of Louis XIV and Wilhelm II, both pursuits ended in hegemonic wars. In the cases of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, such efforts led to high tensions and strategic rivalries. In spite of the ominous precedents, the world is now witnessing another vigorous pursuit of maritime transformation in * Zhengyu Wu is from the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China; wuzy@ruc.edu.cn. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments, but any errors or omissions remain the author s responsibility.

2 China and Maritime Transformation 135 the early 21 st century. This time, the protagonist is China which has been primarily a land power throughout modern history. Since the 1980s, with the reform and opening-up policy, China has been shifting its strategic orientation from land to sea, and this shift has so far achieved great successes and caused serious concerns for her maritime neighbors as well as the United States as the leading global maritime power. Today, China s turn towards the sea is very much a reality, as evident in its stunning success in shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, its growing fishing fleet, and its increasingly modern navy. Though maritime transformation is important in and of itself, up to now there has been little scholarship on the subject except for a series of separate case studies. Case studies are indispensible; however, they tell us little if we do not consciously try to extrapolate strategic lessons from the seemingly unique cases. This paper intends to fill this gap by situating China s maritime pursuit within a larger context, thereby making fruitful comparisons between China and the historical precedents. It accepts the premise that geography matters but explores precisely how and under what circumstances it matters, especially in view of China s amphibious nature. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. It first introduces the concepts of heartland, rimland and maritime transformation. After that, it explores the mechanism which led to the failures of rimland powers maritime transformation in history. Then, it discusses China s ongoing maritime transformation and the vigilant responses from its East Asian neighbors and the U.S. Finally, it suggests that China should take three strategic issues into serious consideration. I. Basic Concepts and Theories concerning Maritime Transformation As a strategic concept, maritime transformation is relatively new. Only recently has this concept entered into strategic studies. This means, if one wants to study maritime transformation today, they probably have to start with some basic questions: What does maritime transformation mean? What kinds of countries are qualified to pursue it? By what standards can people decide whether a country is pursuing maritime transformation or not? To answer these questions, we need to first clarify some basic concepts related to maritime transformation.

3 136 Economic and Political Studies 1. Heartland, Rimland and Their Significance Heartland and rimland are twin key concepts of classical geopolitics, proposed respectively by Mackinder (1904) and Spykman (1944). Though not fully introduced here, Mackinder s and Spykman s theoretical frameworks will be outlined so that their strategic implications can be grasped properly. According to Mackinder (1904), the heartland, or the pivot area, is the area of central Eurasia roughly analogous to the Russian Empire and Soviet Union except for its far eastern section. Rimland is a concept championed by Spykman (1944) to describe the maritime fringe of a country or continent; in particular, the densely populated western, southern, and eastern edges of the Eurasian continent. The rimland s defining characteristic is that it is an intermediate region, lying between the heartland and the marginal sea powers, and serves as the amphibious buffer zone between the land powers and sea powers. The principal conflict around which Mackinder s geopolitical framework was constructed is that between sea powers and heartland powers. The shifting balance of power between sea and land, as a result of new material and organizational technologies unleashed by the Industrial Revolution, was the focus of Mackinder. Such developments presented new opportunities for those who were geographically disposed to exploit them (Mackinder, 1904). Of key importance in Mackinder s framework is the heartland concept. The heartland is demographically superior to and has a larger resource base than any other geographic unit. With railroads covering Eurasia, the heartland powers are likely to expand outward and control the Eurasian littoral. They would then possibly have access to the sea on a wide basis while simultaneously having a superior resource base. It is this possibility that puts the sea powers which historically depended on control of the sea for survival into conflict with Eurasian contenders (Mackinder, 1962, 110). Except for the heartland, there are two other categories in Mackinder s geopolitical framework: the inner crescent (the coastland of the Eurasia) and the outer crescent (sea powers). To Mackinder, the inner crescent is subsidiary and has no independent strategic value in contrast to the heartland or a sea power. The key importance of the inner crescent is that by controlling this area, the sea powers can prevent effectively the heartland powers from organizing the entire continent into one single power (Sloan, 1988, 17). In Spykman s studies, the outer crescent is replaced by the offshore continents, and Britain and Japan are seen as offshore islands. The Eurasian littoral (that is, the inner crescent) can be reasonably described as a rimland

4 China and Maritime Transformation 137 because it is linked together by the string of marginal seas that separate it from the oceans (Spykman, 1944, 37). Contrary to the passive role assigned by Mackinder, the rimland in Spykman s framework is composed of actors who are often in opposition to both sea powers and heartland powers. Spykman (1944) held that during the Napoleonic Wars and the two world wars, Britain and Russia were successively lined up together against an intervening rimland power led by Napoleon, Wilhelm II and Hitler. But to Mackinder, the first war was just a duel between Western and Eastern Europe while the two world wars were attempts by Germany to control the heartland (Gerace, 1991). Spykman did not mean to negate the existence of the sea power-heartland conflicts in history which animate Mackinder s geopolitical framework, but he did see their significance in a different way. To Spykman, the sea powerheartland conflicts really exist, but it is no longer the overriding theme as in Mackinder s framework. He argued that There has never really been a simple land power-sea power opposition. The historical alignment has always been in terms of some members of the rimland with Great Britain against some members of the rimland with Russia, or Britain and Russia together against a dominating rimland power (Spykman, 1944, 43). In the post-war years, the rimland concept has largely been ignored by students of strategic studies. Thanks to the dominance of the Cold War in world politics, strategic studies had focused almost exclusively on the heartland while ignoring the strategic value of the rimland. However, compared to the heartland, the rimland could be reasonably regarded as the center of gravity of the Eurasia since the 16 th century. And the most prominent challengers in modern history (Louis XIV and Napoleon s France as well as Wilhelm II and Hitler s Germany) were all rimland powers. 2. A Brief Definition of Maritime Transformation Maritime transformation occurred in ancient and modern times, and could be pursued by both land powers and rimland powers. However, maritime transformation could be regarded as a fuzzy concept; everyone seems to understand it but almost no one has defined it clearly. We have few opportunities to encounter this concept in books or articles on strategy, and the masters of strategy in history have left us no serious discussions of this concept. Today, with the nautical rise of China, more and more China watchers, policy analysts and academics have used this concept in their

5 138 Economic and Political Studies analyses or studies; however, no one has as yet tried to define it precisely, if not authoritatively, and most analysts and academics on the subject so far have mainly treated it as self-evident. In this article, maritime transformation as a geostrategic concept refers to that a state/power, with a continental or coastal geographic location, is shifting its overall strategic orientation and strategic resources from land to sea, thereby transforming itself from purely a land power to a land-sea hybrid power. 1 Whether a state or power is pursuing maritime transformation can be told by two standards: one is the degree of its economic dependence on overseas markets and resources; the other is the structure of its armed forces, especially the size of the navy. One could list many other specific indices to evaluate whether there is occurring maritime transformation, however, the most important dimensions of maritime transformation should be the economic necessity and the concomitant naval forces developed to safeguard these overseas interests. And among the two indicators, the naval dimension is more important. 2 Geography plays an indispensible role in maritime transformation. Maritime transformation as a strategic concept never applies to maritime powers, and throughout history only those continental and coastal states/ powers have geographic qualifications, and thus strategic necessity, to pursue maritime transformation of some kinds. This premise explains why the protagonists of maritime transformation throughout modern history are either land powers or rimland powers. This distinguishing characteristic has so far been ignored or simply dismissed by scholars. In an important sense, this neglect has hindered students of maritime transformation from applying the frameworks of classical geopolitics. 3 1 Except for historical case studies, there has so far been only one anthology focusing on maritime transformation which is edited by three scholars from U.S. Naval War College. Interestingly, most authors in the book treat the concept of maritime transformation as self-evident, and give no precise definition of it. See Erickson, Goldstein, and Lord (2009). 2 It seems that the pursuit of maritime transformation has always been related to the pursuit of power or even hegemony, and the pursuit of wealth is only subservient to this goal. This is especially true for those modern great powers. See Erickson, Goldstein, and Lord (2009). 3 Maritime transformation is essentially a geostrategic concept, and thus one of the most important sources of inspiration should be classical geopolitics. However, few scholars have consciously applied the frameworks of classical geopolitics to the study of maritime transformation. Though almost all the scholars on the subject would agree that geography matters, without theoretical frameworks, scholars can hardly make fruitful comparisons between cases of maritime transformation.

6 China and Maritime Transformation 139 II. Maritime Transformation in History: Balance of Power and Failures of Rimland Powers The concept of maritime transformation has not entered into strategic studies until recently, but as a practice it could be traced as far back as ancient times. Persia, Rome and the Ottomans, to mention the most prominent, unexceptionally pursued maritime transformation at the apogee of their power. This pursuit had generally revealed a continentalist approach to sea power, which stands in marked contrast to that of classic maritime powers in modern Europe. Persia, Rome and the Ottomans had become the dominant land powers before their attempted transformations, and through devoting major resources were subsequently able to build substantial navies. In addition to building up naval forces, Persia, Rome and the Ottomans had achieved command of the Mediterranean or Arabian seas largely by conquering the surrounding land. It is no wonder, therefore, that Mackinder (1962, esp. chaps. 3-4) invoked these examples to illustrate the inherent superiority of land power over sea power. 1. Difference between Heartland and Rimland Powers As the center of naval competition shifted to the Atlantic and beyond during the modern era, a number of great powers such as France, Germany and Russia or the Soviet Union made earnest attempts at maritime transformation in different periods. Unfortunately, no country ever succeeded in maritime transformation in modern history. Though historians have been disposed to lump all those cases together, there actually existed qualitative differences in terms of the reasons for failure between France and Germany as the rimland powers and Imperial Russia or the Soviet Union as the heartland power. For a heartland power, its failure at maritime transformation was mainly, if not exclusively, due to the serious limits inherent in its nautical endowments. In a nutshell, the geographic deficiencies hindered the successful pursuit of maritime transformation (Morris, 1977, 37). In contrast, the rimland powers usually enjoyed better nautical endowments as well as natural and human resources than the heartland powers, and the reasons for their failures were more political and strategic rather than geographic (Spykman, 1944, 43). This distinction has been vividly demonstrated in the cases of maritime transformation throughout modern history. In contravention of Mahan s concept of sea power evolving out of a nation s

7 140 Economic and Political Studies civilian maritime calling, the naval power of the Russian Empire had to be planted and nurtured by an absolutist state which was first of all a great land power, but this had rather mixed and hardly satisfactory results. Besides, the geostrategic position of the heartland made it difficult, if not impossible, for Russia to concentrate its naval forces in one theater. Thus, even with a more powerful navy in aggregate, Russia could not enjoy overwhelming superiority over its local opponent. Compared to a heartland power, the rimland powers such as France and Germany enjoyed better maritime endowments, and their failures at maritime transformation mainly resulted from the European balance of power system. Specifically, France or Germany could be a land power or a sea power, but not both simultaneously. Otherwise it would tip the balance of European power, and thus threaten the survival of other states. That is also why the maritime pursuits of the rimland powers, especially Louis XIV s France and Wilhelm II s Germany, all ended up as hegemonic wars; while the maritime pursuits of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, though causing tensions, did not end in catastrophes Rimland Powers and Balance of Power in Europe All geopolitical frameworks seek to reveal recurring patterns of conflict in history. In Mackinder s worldview, there is only one pattern: the conflict between sea powers and heartland powers. To Spykman, however, there are in fact two patterns: the conflict between sea powers and heartland powers with the rimland divided between them, and that between a rimland power against both sea and heartland powers. It is the dynamic distribution of power within the rimland that determines which pattern prevails. In light of Spykman s theory, we can see why maritime transformations pursued by the rimand powers in history always ended in failure. Throughout modern history, the recurrent failures of the rimland challengers for the European hegemony were mainly attributed to the balance of power mechanism on the continent. The crux of this mechanism was the recurrent interventions by the leading maritime power on the European western flank into the continental balance of power system before a would-be hegemon could unify the region by coercion (Dehio, 1959, 68). For the deficiencies of the navy of Imperial Russian and that of the Soviet Union, please see Daly (1991) and Morris (1977). 5 For this point, please see Dehio (1963), a classical study of modern international history from 1492 to 1945; for French and Germany pursuits of maritime transformation, please see Lynn (1999), and Herwig (1980).

8 China and Maritime Transformation 141 From 1648 to 1945, the leading maritime power on which the survival of Europe s balance of power system depended singly on most occasions was the Great Britain, and thus she has been regarded as the balancer of the European states system. How could this intervention be so indispensible to the balance of power on the continent? The logic is simple. Firstly, there are parallel interests between the leading maritime power and continental powers other than the challengers in maintaining the status quo. Thus, the intervention of the leading maritime power would invariably stimulate other continental powers, especially the leading continental power on the eastern flank, to rise up against the challengers of the status quo (the balance of power) on the continent (Dehio, 1963, 102). Secondly, given its economic, financial and naval supremacy, the leading maritime power in history possessed the necessary capabilities to help its continental allies with naval blockade as well as economic and financial support to maintain their efforts to pursue the war. This is also the essence of British warfare expounded by Sir Basil Liddell Hart (Mearsheimer, 1988, 17). From 1494 to 1945, almost all great powers were European and the European regional system predominated over other regional systems in the world. This fact has misled most IR scholars to regard the logic of balancing mainly based on European experiences as something universal (Waltz, 1979, 128; Mearsheimer, 2001, 156). However, the recurrent emergence of a balancing coalition against a potential hegemon in European history should be more regarded as something unique to the European geopolitical context. This is confirmed by one simple fact: the sovereign states system only survived in Europe throughout modern history, and it is hierarchy instead of anarchy that prevailed in other regions of the world (such as East Asia) in the same period (Kang, 2003). There is indeed an inherent logic of forming a united front against a mutual threat, but the celebrated European balance of power owed less to this logic and more to the sea power on the western edge which has been taken as the balancer. Contemporary IR scholars, especially Kenneth Waltz and his disciples, have been enthusiastic about the automatic conception of the balance of power. However, this enthusiasm is more traceable to their preference for theoretical parsimony rather than to solid historical evidences which theories are supposed to be based on and explain. Historically, European international relations from 1494 to 1945 were in large part the product of a unique regional context that featured intermittent interventions by the leading maritime power to defeat the tendencies towards European unification (Dehio, 1963, 8-9).

9 142 Economic and Political Studies 3. The U.S. Strategy toward Rimland Challengers In accordance with the two patterns of geopolitical struggle proposed by Spykman, the U.S. should be concerned about the possible encirclement of it by rimland powers. Spykman noted that U.S. history has been accompanied by balanced power in Europe and East Asia, with the possibility of encirclement arising only four times. The last was the German-Japanese alliance in World War II, which represented two gigantic empires with huge war potential that could reverse the balance of power across the oceans. While powerful in and of itself, the U.S. could still be irresistibly encircled by a superior force if it were confronted with a united Eurasian rimland (Spykman, 1944, 45). It should be clear from this that the rimland, not the heartland, presented the problem of encirclement for the U.S., and it was possible only with the rise of independent powers within the rimland such as Germany and Japan. To Mackinder, the sea power-heartland conflict in world politics is basically constant, but to Spykman, the central conflict in world politics is essentially variable and depends on the distribution of power in the rimland. While the Axis powers of the rimland during World War II would have left the U.S. encircled, they also presented the same challenge against the Soviet Union with the same encirclement, and this has so far been neglected by most observers. Spykman (1942, 183) noted that, German-Japanese success would have pushed the Soviet Union back behind the Urals and Lake Baikal: The result will be the final removal of all threats to land power in Europe and the Far East that might come from the heartland of the continent. Germany and Japan will then be totally free to devote themselves to their remaining enemies, to break through the European and Asiatic mediterraneans into the Indian Ocean and to begin a pincer movement against the Western Hemisphere. Thus the conditions that threatened the U.S. with encirclement could also threaten the Soviet Union in a world where power was diffused and more than one region of the rimland had great power potential. Spykman s two patterns of geopolitical struggle also explain why the U.S. fought against Japan during World War II. Japan, on the one hand, is geographically similar to Britain as an offshore island and sea power, but is geopolitically different on the other. The U.S. participation in a war to preserve the balance of power against Germany means war in cooperation with the dominant naval power. Participation in a war to preserve the balance of power in Asia in this period in history means war against Japan, against

10 China and Maritime Transformation 143 the dominant naval power, a strategic problem of entirely different nature (Spykman, 1942, 159). The geopolitical difference between the two stems from the fact that a number of states separate Britain from Russia, while Japan is pressed against two mainland powers. The British policy aimed at avoiding the Japanese situation by maintaining a balance in Europe, while there was a balance in the Far East before Japan became a power. The rise of Japanese power and the building of its empire meant the disruption of the balance (Spykman, 1942, 136). Both sea powers, Britain and Japan, lay across the U.S. lines of communication, but their geopolitical meanings to it are totally different. The British policy of balance prevented the emergence of a rimland power in Europe while its navy buffered the U.S. from the European continent. However, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere would mean the final destruction of the balance of power in the transpacific zone. Therefore, despite its geographical similarity to Britain, Japan was the geopolitical equivalent to Germany during the two world wars and that threatened to disrupt the balance of power in East Asia. 4. The Leading Maritime Power as a Natural Balancer Throughout modern history, the supremacy of the leading maritime power was based on two pillars: the balance of power in the core areas of the Eurasia; and the supreme economic, financial and naval power enjoyed by the leading maritime power. These two pillars were closely interconnected. This connection explains exactly why the leading maritime power always had the incentives to intervene in the balance of power on the continent to prevent a continental power from achieving regional supremacy and thereby threatening its spheres of activity. There were two generic motivations for the leading maritime power to intervene intermittently yet regularly into the continental balance of power. The first motivation had much to do with the implicit yet discernible interdependence between the maritime supremacy and the balance of power on the continent. Once a continental power achieved regional supremacy, it would simultaneously be in an excellent position to acquire supremacy in the realm of maritime activities and intercontinental trade. In history, the quest for regional supremacy always led would-be hegemons to seek control over adjacent sources of economic prosperity and centers of maritime activities. Expansion into these areas would bring with it the promise of a quick improvement of the relative wealth standing as well as a significant improvement in maritime capabilities (Dehio, 1963, 25, 60, 76, 90). This

11 144 Economic and Political Studies interdependence is exactly what Mackinder and Spykman tried to emphasize in their works. The second motivation was that the supremacy of the leading maritime power depended largely on its assumption of the principal commercial intermediary role between Europe and other regions such as Asia or the Americas. So once a continental power achieved regional supremacy, it would also attain the capabilities to close the continent to the leading maritime power, and thus would be able to exclude it from the continental market which was essential for its prosperity and well-being (Rostow, 1960, 543). And that would hurt its international status irreversibly. To the leading maritime power, the most dangerous challenger tended to be a great power in the rimland. A rimland challenger was usually an amphibious power with mixed strategic orientations. It was primarily a land power with continental aspirations, but it also made serious efforts to acquire sea power. In essence, a rimland power with great maritime capabilities would pose two kinds of threat to the leading maritime power. Firstly, with great maritime capabilities, a rimland power would pose a direct threat of invasion or defeating the leading maritime power at sea (Spykman, 1944, 45). In the 18 th and 20 th centuries, Louis XIV s France and Wilhelm II s Germany both confronted the Great Britain with such threats. Secondly, with great maritime capabilities, a rimland power would be able to deprive the leading maritime power of its capabilities to intervene effectively into the continental balance of power (Blouet, 1987, 177). This would leave the continental balance of power at the mercy of the potential hegemon. In modern times, the world witnessed four rounds of hegemonic struggles, and two of them had largely to do with maritime transformations pursued by the rimland powers, namely Louis XIV s France and Wilhelm II s Germany. As rimland powers with mixed strategic orientations, both pursued maritime transformations at the apogee of their power, and thus led to the vigilance and then antagonism of the leading maritime power as well as their neighboring powers. III. China s Maritime Transformation and the Power Game in East Asia Like France and Germany in modern history, China, though located on the other side of the Eurasian continent, is also a typical rimland power in geostrategic terms, and thus has the potential to develop its influence on land or/and sea.

12 China and Maritime Transformation China s Ongoing Maritime Transformation In terms of power politics, East Asia was inherently imbalanced with China being the dominant power in the region, and this has been the defining feature of the East Asian regional system. However, the sphere of influence of Imperial China was confined to the continental East Asia and never expanded effectively into littoral seas. There have been various explanations for this conservative attitude towards the seas (Cole, 2010, 3), but the basic reason was simply Imperial China s deficiency in maritime capabilities. China never developed enough maritime capabilities to allow it to expand into maritime East Asia (Cole, 2010, 5), though it boasted of a wealth of maritime heritage. As the last great voyage commanded by the eunuch official Zheng He ended in 1433, the Ming China made a series of conscious decisions to step back from the maritime realm, shifting from a concerted agenda of aggressive navalism to a defensive continental focus. Confronted with the threat of rising foreign naval power in Asia and its internal problems, Qing China eventually purchased ships from abroad. But neither reliable infrastructures nor professional naval forces were developed, which ended up in disasters. 6 This situation continued until the Cold War era. China s naval development was then constrained by the U.S. dominance of the maritime East Asia and later by its domestic policy debacles and the deteriorated relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the People s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was basically a defensive organization whose primary mission is to support the land force (Cole, 2010, 18). In the 21 st century, however, China is found vigorously launching a new round of maritime transformation, and this maritime pursuit is largely attributable to two factors: one is the increasing safety and security of Chinese land borders after the end of the Cold War; and the other is China s spectacular overseas-market-orientated economic development during the last three decades. These two factors have made China s seaward development both possible and, at least seemingly, necessary (Grygiel, 2006, 169). China s ongoing pursuit of maritime transformation not only marks the readjustment of its general strategic orientation from land to sea, but also adds some uncertainty into the East Asian security environments in the early 21 st century. The changing situation makes it difficult to precisely spell out 6 For Chinese naval development in the Ming and Qing dynasties, please refer to Dreyer (2007) and Rawlinson (1967).

13 146 Economic and Political Studies the strategic meaning of China s maritime transformation (Ross, 2009). To make matters worse, the same puzzle seems to have perplexed China s policy elites. Due to the straitjacket of traditional mindset, China s analysts and academics have not so far grasped the strategic ramifications and challenges resulting from such a transformation. From China s perspective, the present global balance of power is seriously tipped in favor of the U.S. and its allies, and this fact alone justifies China s pursuit of maritime capabilities to defend its growing maritime interests against uncertainties (Xu, 2004; Zhang, 2003). 2. Vigilant Responses to China s Maritime Transformation In Spykman s geopolitical framework, two points deserve special attention. Firstly, the problem of encirclement comes from rimland powers, not the heartland. When unbalanced power exists within regions of the rimland (as was the case with Germany and that with Japan during World War II), the U.S. has to consider the possibility of being encircled (Spykman, 1944, 57). Secondly, according to Spykman, important centers of maritime power on the rimland only include the European littoral and the Far Eastern coastland of Euraisa. It is the integration or division of power within these two areas (or in other words, the existence or absence of a dominant power) that bears on U.S. security interests (Spykman, 1944, 45). From the geopolitical perspective, given the characteristic feature of the East Asian regional system with China being the dominant land power, China s pursuit of maritime transformation would enable it to be powerful enough in future to tip the existing balance of power in East Asia (and the littoral seas) which has been dependent on China s deficiency in maritime capabilities (Ross, 1999; 2003). This is the most important implication of China s maritime transformation. Given such a prospect, it is no wonder that China s maritime transformation has caused unfavorable reactions from neighboring states and the global hegemon (the U.S.), and this is becoming more and more evident in recent years (Ross, 2009). China s pursuit of maritime transformation has caused strong reactions from neighboring states, especially those having disputes with China over maritime territorial and economic interests. It is this dynamism that motivates the diplomatic tensions over the Diaoyu and Nansha Islands in the East and South China Seas in recent years. China s typical response to this kind of challenge has been stating unequivocally that China has no intention to challenge the existing order in East Asia and the littoral seas. However, these kinds of statements have not worked as well as expected by

14 China and Maritime Transformation 147 Chinese policymakers, and the reason lies in the perception gap between China and its neighboring states (Wu, 2012). China believes that because of the tremendous military capabilities gap between China and the U.S., its late-coming growth in military (especially naval) power can hardly enable it to challenge the status quo. This suggests that the Chinese leadership approaches the neighboring states fear of its rising power largely in terms of global rather than regional balance of power. Such an approach can hardly reassure China s maritime neighbors because it is the regional rather than global balance of power that remains the focus of attention of these states (Ross, 2006). Two positions on the part of China have made matters worse. On the one hand, China has so far insisted on dealing with neighboring states over maritime disputes in the bilateral rather than multilateral framework. And on the other, China has been staunchly resisting involving any extra-regional powers, especially the U.S., in its disputes with neighboring states. From the American perspective, China, a dominant land power in East Asia which now pursues maritime capabilities, will probably pose two strategic challenges to American hegemony in East Asia and even the world. Firstly, the exponential growth of the PLAN aiming at the establishment of a blue water fleet, combined with the powerful land-based anti-access capabilities, will enable China to undermine the existing strategic stability in East Asia. Secondly, China s area-denial capabilities, which are composed of naval forces and land-based anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, will put into serious doubt U.S. capabilities to intervene effectively into the regional balance of power in East Asia, and this will greatly impact America s bilateral alliance system and thus undermine its strategic credibility in East Asia. 7 In American strategists eyes, without timely offset, the rise of China and its maritime transformation may probably give rise to a closed regional system in the continental and maritime East Asia which is largely exclusive of American political, economic and cultural influences (Lieberthal and Wang, 2012, 22). This scenario is absolutely unacceptable to the U.S. if it still wants to hold its leadseship. Hence the unfavorable or even antagonistic reactions of the U.S., which have been vividly demonstrated in its increasing anxiety or even fears over China s naval modernization programs and its rebalancing policy in South East Asia. To deal with this challenge, two steps on China s side seem essential. 7 For American perspectives on the potential threat of China s sea power, please see Lieberthal and Wang (2012, 22), and Grygiel (2006, 174).

15 148 Economic and Political Studies Firstly, China has to be prepared to accept the U.S. participation in the multilateral institutions dealing with regional security issues. And secondly, China must be prepared to embrace a porous regional order on which the U.S. will enjoy some influence. Given the parallel interests between the U.S. and China s neighboring states, without involving the U.S. as the extra-regional guarantee, China can hardly expect to lessen the tensions along the littorals. History has repeatedly proven that the leading maritime power would never tolerate an order exclusive of its influence in the core regions on the Eurasian continent. That is why the U.S. intervened into Europe and East Asia in the First and Second World Wars, and that means the United States will never accept a China-dominated regional order which is closed to itself (Art, 2005). IV. Three Issues to Be Addressed in China s Maritime Transformation Compared to the rimland powers in modern history, China s ongoing maritime transformation has been mainly motivated by two closely related factors as mentioned above: one is the increasing safety and security of China s land borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the other is China s unprecedented aspirations for overseas markets and resources which are essential to its economic prosperity and national well-being. Although these two factors make it possible and necessary for China to concentrate on a seaward development in the post-cold War era, they have not eliminated once and for all the geopolitical straitjacket imposed by the amphibious nature of the rimland. The geopolitical deficiency does not mean that a rimland power can not pursue sea power, but it does mean that the rimland power has to be fully aware of the limits imposed by the geopolitical structure. In view of the historical lessons, there exist at least three strategic issues which need to be clarified if China hopes to escape the similar failure of the rimland powers in history. 1. The Strategic Balance between Land and Sea States, like individuals, have natural endowments. If a state wants to pursue sea power, it has to consider first of all how much sea power its endowments would permit. This fact also explains why the distribution of sea

16 China and Maritime Transformation 149 power among nations in the world is so uneven. Mahan devoted the entire introductory section of his first influential book to elaborating the elements of sea power, and what he meant by it is simple: nautical endowments largely predetermine how much sea power a nation can enjoy (Mahan, 1980, 25, 28). History has demonstrated more than once that, even if a rimland power achieved superior sea power for the time being, it could hardly sustain it indefinitely. Strategically, the recurrent failures at maritime transformation pursued by rimland powers in history could be largely attributable to the dual pressures from land and sea. Under the rule of Louis XIV, France developed impressive sea power, and thus possessed the capabilities to challenge Britain for command of the sea and overseas interests. However, French sea power, no matter how impressive, cannot ensure the security of its land frontiers, and France had to constantly divert the resources from sea to land. This diversion directly led to its failure in the struggle with Britain (Mahan, 1890, 505, 507). In the times of Wilhelm II, Germany also developed a strong high sea fleet composed of first-rate battleships, but as a hybrid power it could not concentrate on sea power and ignore the antagonism of its land neighbors. Therefore, long before World War I, the outcome of the Anglo-German naval race had already become clear because Germany could not afford to allow the naval race to exhaust its strategic resources (Herwig, 1980, 71). As a rimland power, China also cannot afford to ignore the safety and security of its land frontiers and concentrate all the resources on developing sea power. Therefore, when pursuing maritime transformation, China has to pay close attention to the foreign policies of neighboring great powers, especially Russia, in the foreseeable future. From Spykman s viewpoint, Russia as the heartland power is essentially double-faced in terms of geostrategic orientations. On the one hand, Russia, based on the heartland stronghold, could exert great pressures on neighboring rimland powers by successive expansionary behaviors; on the other hand, if Russia has no intention of expanding outwards, then it would be the most important stronghold to safeguard the peace on the Eurasia continent (Spykman, 1944, 57). It is a common observation that Britain and the U.S. were never in direct conflict with Russia in modern times, and instead were lined up in the Napoleonic Wars and the two world wars against an intervening rimland power. It can be reasonably argued that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing weakening of Russian power, there have emerged some parallel interests between Russia as the heartland power and the U.S. as the leading maritime power today. The overlapping interest of these two geopolitical giants is to prevent the rise of an independent power centre in

17 150 Economic and Political Studies the rimland no matter which side of Eurasia (West Europe or East Asia) it is located on (Gerace, 1991). This is simply because the rise of an independent power centre in the rimland could exert great pressures not only on the U.S. but also on Russia. 2. Strategic Objectives for Sea Power Sea power is essentially an instrument to serve national strategic objectives. No matter what a prominent role sea power could play, it is in essence a means of national strategy. From this perspective, one of the most important challenges for a rimland power in the pursuit of maritime transformation is to set up reasonable strategic objectives about developing sea power. In modern history, due to the global reach capability of sea power, maritime transformations were usually related to the efforts to achieve global influences or hegemony (Modelski, 1987, 54). This means that, if a great power determines to be a world power or even a global hegemon, sea power is essential. But if it just hopes to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and favorable security environments, then overwhelming sea power is not so essential (Xu, 2003). International orders on land and the seas have been guided by two diametrically different principles. The principle prevailing on land is the balance of power, which means no power could enjoy overwhelming supremacy over others indefinitely. In contrast, the principle prevailing on the seas is hegemony, which means the oceans hold only one master. Though many powers in history have developed sea power to some degree, only one power can command the seas at a time (Dehio, 1963, 85). This fact explains why the hegemons in world politics are unexceptionally the leading maritime powers (history has witnessed three in all, namely, the Netherlands, Great Britain and the U.S.). From the outset of modern times, command of the seas has been enjoyed exclusively by the leading maritime powers, or more exactly, the system leaders (Brawley, 1993, 15). Any challenge to this situation has been unexceptionally regarded by the leading maritime power as a challenge against its hegemony or leadership. This also explains why maritime transformations pursued by such prominent rimland powers as Louis XIV s France and Wilhelm II s Germany ultimately ended in hegemonic wars. Based on historical lessons, if a great power wants to become a world power or even a global hegemon, sea power is essential. But if it just wants to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and favorable security

18 China and Maritime Transformation 151 environments, then overwhelming sea power is not so essential. From a historical perspective, sea power has indeed played an indispensible role and contributed much to the prosperity and well-being of modern great powers, especially those with favorable coastlands. However, this role of sea power, especially in terms of its contributions to national economy and wellbeing, is based on particular historical and technological contexts. With the development of modern technology and the ensuing shift of economic growth factors, the role of sea power has been becoming less and less relevant in contemporary times. In fact, given the tremendous transformative role of modern technology in economic growth as well as national prosperity and well-being, we can say more appropriately that it is history that determines the role of sea power, not the other way around (Kennedy, 1983, 6). 3. Strategic Intentions and Naval Force Structure Strictly, there is a big gap between sea power developed for safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and oversea interests and that aimed at challenging the command of the seas exclusively enjoyed by the leading maritime power. In theory and practice, the key indicator differentiating these two kinds of sea power is the naval force structure. Why is it so? Strategically, the naval force structure is probably one of the most important yardsticks by which the strategic intention underlying the maritime transformation pursued by a great power can be measured. Any naval force is composed of different types of warships as well as auxiliaries. By the specific composition of a naval force, policymakers and strategic analysts in other states can interpret correctly the strategic intentions motivating another state s maritime development. This is almost a routine practice in the strategic history of power politics (Gaddis, 2005, 115). With regard to contemporary China, what this means is that China has to design its naval force structure carefully when pursuing maritime transformation. In general, sea power can serve two strategic purposes for China today: one is to extend the strategic depth of off-shore defense in the east, thereby ensuring the safety and security of those most economically dynamic areas and maritime interests; the other is to guard the safety and security of strategic sea lines of communications which are crucial to the economic development, and in this way sustain the current momentum of China s booming economy (Glosny, Saunders, and Ross, 2010). In theory, these strategic purposes have quite different requirements for the naval force, but the common denominator is that both purposes necessitate

19 152 Economic and Political Studies a powerful navy or even an aircraft carrier force commensurate with its perceived missions on the sea. Though land-based military capabilities could complement the naval force effectively in defense of China s east seaboard area, a powerful navy, especially a powerful surface fleet, is indispensible for the safety and security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and overseas interests (Xu, 2004). However, it is clear that, no matter what kind of missions are pursued, these two strategic purposes do not necessarily require China to build up a blue water navy as powerful as that of the U.S. Firstly, to extend the strategic depth of off-shore defense in the east, China does not necessarily need to build a powerful blue water navy, especially one as powerful as that of the U.S. Compared to a costly surface fleet, landbased weapon systems (missiles and airplanes) are not only the same (if not more) effective, but also more cost-efficient in safeguarding China s eastern seaboard. For the sake of defence, a surface fleet will play the role of the tripwire, that is, a threshold above which the party on the defensive will set off more powerful or even nuclear strikes (Wu, 2012). Secondly, to ensure the safety and security of those crucial SLOCs also does not necessarily need a powerful blue water navy on a par with that of the U.S. Most strategic sea lanes of communication in the world are international by nature, while their security is usually taken care of by the international community (including the leading maritime power) as a whole. No power can afford or has the necessity to ensure the safety and security of international SLOCs singlehandedly. If threatened by cutting off its vital SLOCs, China would be on the verge of a large-scale war, and this threat can only emanate from the leading maritime power, and a powerful surface navy could almost do nothing on that occasion (Xu, 2003). V. Conclusions In the coming decades, the rise of China in nautical realms seems irreversible unless it is interrupted by domestic social or economic upheavals or collapse. Given the historical lessons, how to avoid undesirable reverberations and repercussions concomitant to such a rise is a serious challenge faced by both China as a rising power and the U.S. as the existing leading maritime power and the system leader. For China, the major motivation to develop sea power is to safeguard its maritime and overseas interests. However, the Chinese perspectives on these issues are strongly defined by the absolute conception of security which