Ethics of radiological risk governance: justice of justification as a central concern*

Transcription

1 Ethics of radiological risk governance: justice of justification as a central concern* G. Meskens Science and Technology Studies Unit, SCKCEN, B2400 Mol, Belgium and Centre for Ethics and Value Inquiry, Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, University of Ghent, Belgium; gaston.meskens@sckcen.be Abstract Due to the specific character of the radiological risk, judgements on whether the use of nuclear technology would be justified in society have to consider knowledge-related uncertainties and value pluralism. The justice of justification not only informs the right of the potentially affected to participate in decision making, but also implies the responsibility of concerned actors to give account of the way they rationalise their own position, interests, hopes, hypotheses, beliefs, and concerns in knowledge generation and decision making. This paper characterises the evaluation of whether the use of nuclear technology would be justified in society as a complex social problem, and reflects on what it would imply to deal with its complexity fairly. Based on this assessment, the paper proposes reflexivity and intellectual solidarity as ethical attitudes or virtues for all concerned actors, to be understood from a specific ethics of care perspective bound in complexity. Consequently, it argues that there is a need for an interactive understanding of ethics in order to give ethical attitudes or virtues a practical meaning in a sociopolitical context, and draws conclusions for the case of radiological risk governance. Keywords: Ethics; Risk governance; Justification; Complexity 1. INTRODUCTION What do we talk about when we talk about the risk that comes with the use of nuclear energy as an energy technology? In the general case of evaluating a practice or conduct that involves a health risk, we obviously need knowledge about the nature of cause and effect, and the probability that an adverse effect will occur. However, This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. 322

2 similar to the case of many other risk-inherent technologies with a wider impact on society (such as the use of fossil fuels, food preservatives, or genetically modified organisms), assessment of the risk of nuclear energy, in the sense of the evaluation of its acceptability as a possible threat to our health and the environment, is complicated in two ways. First, there is the fact that, in judging whether the risk is acceptable in view of the anticipated benefits, one has to deal with uncertainty due to incomplete and speculative knowledge. Second, there is the fact that evaluations of nuclear risk are also made with reference to the existence of alternative energy technologies, or with reference to more fundamental values such as the value of nature. These will be commented on briefly below 1. In short, the elements of knowledge-related uncertainty, or the epistemic complexity, to take into account can be summarised as follows.. The possibility of a nuclear accident [due to technology failure, human error, force majeure (e.g. the earthquake and tsunami in Fukushima), or a combination of those factors].. The lack of ultimate control of the future behaviour or integrity of a nuclear waste disposal facility.. Due to the stochastic nature of low dose effects and the fact that health effects such as leukaemia and solid cancer can also have other causes, the prediction of radiation health effects at low doses remains a complex endeavour. What is known of low dose effects can be summarised in three steps: 1. There is evidence of health effects below 100 msv, which means that it can be said with certainty that the so-called 100-mSv-threshold hypothesis is false. For an in-depth analysis, see Smeesters (2014). 2. Current understanding of mechanisms and quantitative data on dose and time dose relationships supports the linear-non-threshold (LNT) hypothesis (ICRP, 2005). This insight supports the idea that the LNT hypothesis that was first introduced based on the precautionary principle is the correct hypothesis to maintain. 3. Scientific discussions are ongoing with regard to possible concrete health effects of low doses in concrete situations, such as the scientific discussion on the INWORKS epidemiological study (e.g. Doss, 2015; Leuraud et al., 2015; Richardson et al., 2015), and the scientific discussion on the possibility of thyroid cancer in children in Fukushima (Kageyama, 2015; Tsuda et al., 2016). While serious scientific discussions are taking place, it has to be acknowledged that there is no definite scientific conclusion on the actual manifestation and predictability of these concrete health effects in these concrete situations, which does not mean that specific indications, even if they are preliminary, cannot be used as factors to consider in the evaluation of the acceptability of the concrete risk. 1 These issues are elaborated on in more detail in Meskens (2013). 323

3 Of course, assessment of the risk of nuclear energy is not a pure knowledge problem. Evaluation of whether a nuclear risk would be socially acceptable is also influenced by external value references. These values could serve in favour of or against nuclear energy, and include:. the value of nuclear energy as a low-carbon energy technology in energy policy concerned with climate change;. the fact that nuclear technology can be used to develop nuclear weapons;. the vulnerability of nuclear installations to terrorist attacks;. the value of alternative energy technologies (taking into account the benefits and potential adverse consequences of their use);. the value of nature ( one should not mess around with nature an argument that, in the context of climate change discussions, is now used as well against nuclear energy as in its favour); and. more general values such as sustainability, justice, precaution and freedom (the last in the sense of possibility of self-determination in caring for one s own health or the environment). Last but not least, it is known that evaluations of the acceptability of nuclear risk (taking into account knowledge-related uncertainty and external value references) are particularly complicated as they now unavoidably take place in a sociopolitical context that is marked by controversy around the nuclear issue as such. Also, given that one cannot escape history or make abstraction of it, this controversy is triggered by:. the accidents that happened;. the link with the military context;. the democratic deficit with respect to the way in which nuclear energy has been introduced, and power plant and waste disposal siting has been undertaken in the past (and still undertaken at the present time); and. the fact that nuclear energy policy is associated with neoliberal global strategies of profit and power driven by large corporations and their political supporters. Therefore, taking into account the existence of these external value references and the context of controversy, one has to accept that even if we would all agree on the available knowledge to evaluate a nuclear risk, opinions would probably still differ about its acceptability. In these cases of value pluralism or moral pluralism, science may thus inform us (to a certain extent) about the technical and societal aspects of options, but it cannot always instruct or clarify the choice to make. The above characterisation of the risk of nuclear energy may support the idea that there is no overall evidence that would unequivocally lead to consensus on the unacceptability of the risk of nuclear energy (in view of the potential adverse consequences), nor on its acceptability (in view of its benefit as a low-carbon energy technology). People may have informed valuable and serene opinions in favour of or 324

4 against nuclear energy, but none of the two camps can prove that the other is wrong. As a consequence, as with many other practices that come with a collective health risk, fairness with respect to justifying or rejecting the risk of nuclear energy as such can only relate to how we make sense of it in knowledge generation and decision making. This brings us to a reflection on the idea of fair risk governance and how to understand it from the perspective of ethics. 2. ETHICS, FAIRNESS, AND TRUST: THE IDEA OF FAIR RISK GOVERNANCE What do we talk about when we talk about ethics? Ethics is about being concerned with questions of right and wrong, but there are different levels of thinking about these questions. Philosophy identifies meta-ethics as that discipline or perspective that deals with concepts of right and wrong (What is rightness? What is goodness?). Next to that, philosophers speak of normative ethics as the discipline or perspective that considers the criteria that can be used to evaluate a specific practice or conduct. In that sense, normative ethics thus refers to what ought to be in the absence of evidence that would facilitate straightforward judgement, consensus, and consequent action. That absence of evidence can relate to the knowledge as well as to the values we may want to use to evaluate a specific practice or conduct. Chapter 1 indicated which factors of uncertainty must be taken into account in assessment of the risk of nuclear energy, but also which external value references may be taken into account in that evaluation. Similar to the case of nuclear energy, one may understand that the evaluation of other risky practices may also be influenced by moral pluralism, in the sense that judging whether a practice would eventually be acceptable can also be done with reference to external values. If we thus consider that an evaluation of the acceptability of a risk-inherent practice in general depends on knowledge-based opinions and values-based opinions, we can then construct a simple picture of four distinct cases as presented in Table 1. The table may be oversimplified in the sense that one cannot always separate knowledge from values (in risk evaluation, specific knowledge may influence the importance of specific values, and vice versa as the way it is used in evaluation), but it can be used as a meaningful tool to determine key concepts of fairness of risk assessment and governance, and to understand differences between risky practices in that respect. The context of this text does not allow broad elaboration on Table 1, but it shows primarily that the risks of bungee jumping, mobile phones, or nuclear energy are incomparable, as the evaluation of their acceptability depends in different ways on knowledge and values. The bungee jumper will not ask to see the test procedures of the rope before making a jump. In general, the jumper trusts that these ropes will be safe, but, more importantly, he/she makes the decision to jump on a voluntary basis. Despite the fact that more than one million people die each year in car accidents 325

5 Table 1. Justifying risk mapping the field. Values-based assessment Risk-inherent practice acceptable? Dissent moral pluralism Consent shared values Knowledgebased assessment Uncertainty (incomplete and speculative knowledge) Consent (consensus on evidence ) Adapted from Hisschemo ller and Hoppe (1995). Governance by deliberation Examples Nuclear energy (Fossil fuels) Fairness Caring for intellectual solidarity in dealing with incomplete and speculative knowledge and moral pluralism # Key concepts Precaution Informed consent Transparency Confrontation of rationales Accountability to next generations Governance by negotiation Examples (Fossil fuels) Fairness Caring for intellectual solidarity in dealing with moral pluralism # Key concepts Precaution Informed consent Confrontation of rationales Accountability to next generations Governance by pacification Examples Medical applications of radioactivity Mobile phones Smoking Fairness Caring for intellectual solidarity in dealing with incomplete and speculative knowledge # Key concepts Precaution Informed consent Transparency Confrontation of rationales Governance by simple regulation Examples Traffic Bungee jumping Fairness Caring for intellectual solidarity in our behaviour towards each other # Key concepts Precaution Informed consent Fair play globally, 2 no reasonable person is advocating a global car ban. Similar to bungee jumping, the key concepts of fairness related to taking the risk are precaution, informed consent, and fair play. In the case of driving a car, precaution not only refers to protection measures such as air bags, but also to the value of driving responsibly. In that case, fair play refers to the idea that one can only hope that other drivers also drive responsibly. Evaluation of the risk that comes with smoking or the use of mobile phones is what one could call a semi-structured or moderately structured problem (Hisschemo ller and Hoppe, 1995) that can be handled on the basis of pacification. 2 The World Health Organization Global Status Report on Road Safety 2013 indicates that, worldwide, the total number of road traffic deaths remains unacceptably high at 1.24 million y 1 (WHO, 2015a). 326

6 The reason is that, despite uncertainties that complicate the assessment of those specific risks, 3 people agree to take or allow them on the basis of shared values. Shared values are thus about those situations wherein relevant but incommensurable values may still exist, but in which we also have the feeling that we all accept or allow a specific risky practice in light of a higher shared value. This shared value can be a shared practical benefit (such as in the case of mobile phones), but also a specific freedom of choice to hurt yourself in view of a personal benefit, taking into account that this behaviour should not harm others (such as in the case of smoking). With reference to Table 1, one could say that fairness is thus the way we care for intellectual solidarity in dealing with incomplete and speculative knowledge, and the key concepts of fairness in this sense are precaution, informed consent, transparency (with respect to what we know and do not know, and with respect to how we construct our knowledge), and our joint preparedness to give account of the rationales we use to defend our interests ( stakes ). Due to the uncertainties that complicate the assessment, protection measures are essentially inspired on and supported by the precautionary principle. In the case of mobile phones, this principle translates as the recommendation to use them in a moderate way and the recommendation to limit the use by children. For smoking, it translates as anti-smoking campaigns towards (potential) smokers (with special attention to young people), and as measures to protect those passively involved (the passive smoker). Given the awareness of the addictive character of smoking, additional measures are gradually adopted to assist smokers who want to quit. In a similar sense, evaluating the risk coming with the use of radiation in a medical context can also be called governance by pacification. The value of informed consent remains central and also applies to the close relations of the patient (family members), but essentially all agree that the patient takes the risk of a delayed cancer (due to diagnosis or therapy) in light of a higher benefit (information about a health condition or the hope that the actual cancer will be cured, respectively). In contrast to complex problems that are handled on the basis of pacification, justifying or rejecting nuclear energy seems to be an unstructured problem that will always need deliberation. Not only do we need to deliberate the available knowledge and its interpretation, but deliberation will also need to take into account the various external values that people find relevant to judge this case, and the arguments that they construct on the basis of these values. Therefore, the fairness of evaluation relates to intellectual solidarity in dealing with incomplete and speculative 3 With regard to mobile phone use, the World Health Organization (WHO, 2014) states that The electromagnetic fields produced by mobile phones are classified by the International Agency for Research on Cancer as possibly carcinogenic to humans. With respect to smoking, of course there is the known relation with lung cancer, but the lack of evidence concerns the delayed effect and, especially, the fact that there is contingency in play (there is no evidence, to date, to explain why some individuals appear to be more susceptible than others). In addition, while WHO (2015b) clearly states that tobacco kills up to half of its users, these statistics are not seen to happen in our near social environment. To put it more provocatively, our shared values support the idea that we should protect non-smokers from smokers, but also the idea that we still live in a free and democratic society where people have the right to smoke themselves to death. It is true that the addictive character of smoking is influencing the freedom of choice, but addicted smokers can always decide for themselves to seek medical and social assistance in their attempt to quit smoking. 327

7 knowledge, but also in dealing with moral pluralism. The key criteria are again precaution, informed consent, transparency, and (the preparedness for a) confrontation of rationales, now completed with a sense of accountability towards those who cannot be involved in the evaluation (next generations). In comparison with nuclear energy, the evaluation of the risk that comes with the use of fossil fuels is a complex problem that, in principle, can be treated on the basis of consent on causality. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) states in its Fifth Assessment Report that...human influence on the climate system is clear...and that...warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen.... Despite this evidence of a slowly emerging adverse effect, the assessment of whether concrete draughts or storms can be contributed to human-induced climate change, or what the concrete effect of specific mitigation or adaptation policies would be remains troubled by knowledge-related uncertainty. Therefore, the use of fossil fuels is a complex problem that requires deliberation, and the key concepts of fairness remain the same as for the evaluation of nuclear energy: precaution, informed consent, transparency, confrontation of rationales, and accountability to next generations. The discussion of Table 1 allows three reflections related to ethics, fairness, and trust to be made in relation to risk governance. Obviously, these reflections are based on the author s specific understanding of risk assessment in relation to fairness, and are therefore presented as a list of ideas that are open to discussion. I. The assessment of what is an acceptable health risk for society is not a matter of science; it is a matter of justice. I.a. Health risk is not a mathematical formula: it is a potential harm that you cannot completely know and cannot fully control, but that you eventually want to face in light of a specific benefit. People will accept a risk that they cannot completely know and that they cannot fully control simply when they trust that its justification is marked by fairness. Fairness relates primarily to the value of precaution, but also to the possibility of self-determination ( informed consent ). I.b. Despite the differences between the cases discussed, they can all be characterised in relation to one idea with respect to self-determination: the idea that connecting risk and fairness is about finding ground between ensuring people the right to be protected on one hand, and the right to be responsible themselves on the other hand. The right to be responsible leans thereby on the prime criterion of the right to have information about the risk and the possibility of self-determination based on that information, but one has to consider that, in a society of capable citizens, self-determination with respect to risk taking can have two opposing meanings: it can translate as the right to co-decide in the case of a collective health risk (as in the case of nuclear energy), but also as the freedom to hurt yourself in the case of an individual health risk (as in the case of smoking or bungee jumping). 328

8 I.c. For any health risk that comes with technological, industrial, or medical practices and that has a wider impact on society, the right to be responsible equals the right to co-decide. Enabling this right is a corollary of justice. II. Societal trust in the assessment of what is an (un)acceptable collective health risk for society should be generated by method instead of proof. II.a. With respect to nuclear energy, no scientific or political authority can determine alone whether the risk would be an acceptable collective health risk for society. Good science and engineering, open and transparent communication, and the promises of a responsible safety and security culture would be necessary conditions, but they can never generate societal trust in themselves. The reason is that there will always be essential factors beyond full control: nature, time, human error, misuse of technology, etc. II.b. The fact that people take specific risks in a voluntary way and often based on limited information may not be used as an argument to impose risks on them that might be characterised as comparable or even less dangerous. That principle counts to the extreme. For example: the fact that the risk of developing cancer from smoking may be higher than that from low-level radiation may not be used as an excuse to impose a radiation risk on people; and the fact that a nuclear worker may voluntarily accept an accumulated occupational dose of 20 msv y 1 may not be used as an argument to justify a citizen s dose of 1 msv y 1 originating from a nuclear technology application without asking for his/her informed consent. II.c. Fair risk governance is risk governance of which the method of knowledge generation and decision making is trusted as fair by society. When the method is trusted as fair, that risk governance also has the potential to be effective, as the decision making will also be trusted as fair by those who would have preferred another outcome. III. Dealing with the complexity of risk assessment and justification in a fair way requires new governance methods. III.a. Is fair risk governance with respect to collective health risks as characterised above possible today? In other words, do the methods we use to produce policy supportive knowledge and to make political decisions have the potential to enable the right to co-decide (as a principle of justice) and to generate trust by their method instead of by their potential or promised outcome? The short answer is no. Meskens (2015a) argued in depth why and how the governance methods we use today to make sense of the complexity of assessment and justification of typical collective health risks remain to be driven by the doctrine of scientific truth and the strategies of political positionism and economic profit. As the context of this text does not allow deeper reflection on this general argument, the following reflections are restricted to the case of nuclear energy in the context of energy governance. 329

9 III.b. For the case of nuclear energy in particular, Meskens (2013) argued that, because of the doctrinal working of science and the strategies of political positionism and economic profit, the issue of nuclear energy is now locked in a comfort of polarisation that does not only play in public discourse but that is deeply rooted in the working of science, politics, and the market. As a result, in sharp contrast with the way that fossil fuel energy technologies are now subject of global negotiations driven by the doom of climate change, nuclear energy technology remains to escape a deliberate justification approach as an energy technology on a transnational level. III.c. The question of whether one is in favour of or against nuclear energy remains meaningless if not integrated in a consensus framework for energy governance as such. In principle, that consensus framework is possible, as it would follow three policy principles with which most people would easily agree. These principles are (in this specific order): 1. the policy principle to minimise energy consumption (or thus to maximise energy savings) through democratic deliberation on its practical implementation; 2. the policy principle to maximise renewables through democratic deliberation on its practical implementation; and 3. the policy principle to organise a fair debate on how to produce what cannot be done yet with (1) and (2), and confront fossil fuels and nuclear energy, being the two nasty risk-inherent energy technologies, with each other. Democracy in this sense implies that a society would need to be able to decide on how to produce the rest of its energy required for the future: with nuclear energy, with fossil fuels, or with a combination of both. In line with the reasoning above, a fair method of decision making would, in this context, be a method that would be sensed as fair because of its method by all concerned, regardless of whether the decision making would result in the acceptance or the rejection of the use of nuclear energy or fossil fuels. The fact that we are in a historically evolved situation where nuclear energy and fossil fuels are present while there have never been real democratic debates on their introduction cannot be used as an excuse not to organise this type of debate now. While it is true that, in terms of their adverse effects, nuclear energy and fossil fuels are incomparable, that additional complexity would not prevent a democratic society from making informed and deliberate decisions on them. Although we do not live in a world where politics, science, and the market would be prepared to engage in deliberation that would put policy principles (1) and (2) upfront, and that would take principle (3) seriously, we have the capacity to put that deliberation into practice. Justice with regard to how a specific collective health risk, such as the risk of nuclear energy or fossil fuels, is evaluated in society remains the central ethical principle, and that ethical principle translates in practice as the need for transdisciplinarity and civil society s participation in scientific debate, 330

10 and the need for participation of the potentially affected in democratic decision making. 3. THE BIGGER PICTURE: THE IDEA OF DEALING FAIRLY WITH COMPLEXITY 3.1. A neutral characterisation of complexity (of complex social problems) It has now become trivial to say that we live in a complex world. Industrialisation, technological advancement, population growth, and globalisation have brought new challenges, and the global political agenda is now set by issues that burden both our natural environment and human well-being. Sketching what goes wrong in our world today, the picture does not look very bright: structural poverty; expanding industrialisation and urbanisation, and consequent environmental degradation; spill of precious resources, water, food, and products; adverse manifestations of technological risk; economic exploitation; anticipated overpopulation; and derailed financial markets. All of this adds up to old and new forms of social, political, and religious oppression and conflict, and makes the world a difficult place to live for many people. The stakes are high and the need to take action is manifest. What do we mean when we say that we live in a complex world? Whether we speak of clearly observable unacceptable situations (e.g. extreme poverty), perceived worrisome situations or evolutions (e.g. climate change or population growth), or practices or proposed policy measures with a potential controversial character (e.g. the use of nuclear energy, genetically modified organisms, or a tax on wealth), the idea is that we can characterise them all as complex social problems with the same set of characteristics. If science has a role to play in making sense of these problems, it will typically face the fact that it has to deal with factual uncertainties and unknowns, which implies that its challenge in a sociopolitical context is not the production of credible proofs, but rather the construction of credible hypotheses. Besides, we know that our judgements on situations, evolutions, practices, and proposed policy measures not only rely on available knowledge about them, but that they are first and foremost influenced by how we value them in relation to things we find important (nature, freedom, equality, protection, etc.). Taking that into account, a specific characterisation of complexity of complex social problems is proposed that, the author believes, will support the insight that fair and effective governance is initially not a matter of proper organisation, but essentially that of a fair dealing with its complexity. The complexity of a complex social problem, such as combating climate change, the provision of affordable access to healthy food for all, or evaluation of the possible use of nuclear energy, may in this sense be described with seven characteristics (Table 2). This text does not want to propose a manual, procedure, or instrument to solve complex social problems. Rather, the characterisation of complexity is meant as an incentive and a basis for ethical thinking, as it opens the possibility to reflect on what it would imply to deal fairly with the complexity of those specific social problems, and of the organisation of our society accordingly. The possibility of doing so is in 331

11 Table 2. Seven characteristics of a complex social problem. 1. Diversified impact Individuals and/or groups are affected by the problem in diverse ways (benefit vs adverse consequence, diverse degrees of benefits or adverse consequences). The impact can be economic or related to physical or psychic health, or individual or collective social wellbeing. The character and degree of impact may evolve or vary in a contingent way in time. The impact may also manifest later in time (with the possibility that it manifests after or during several generations). 2. Interdependence The problem is caused and/or influenced by multiple factors (social, economic, technical, natural) and relates itself to other problems. Interdependence can change in time. The context of concern becomes global. 3. The need for a coherent approach (organisational complexity) Due to diversified impact and interdependence, problems need to be tackled together in a coherent, systematic, and holistic approach. This approach needs to take into account the following four additional characteristics of complexity. 4. Relative responsibilities Due to diversified impact, interdependence, and the organisational complexity, responsibility cannot be assigned to one specific actor. Responsibilities are relative in two ways: (1) mutual: the possibility for one actor to take responsibility can depend on whether another actor takes responsibility; and (2) collective: our collective responsibility is relative in the sense that it will need to be handed over to a next collective (a new government, next generations). 5. Knowledge-related uncertainty (knowledge problem) Analysis of the problem is complicated by uncertainty due to speculative, incomplete, or contradictory knowledge, with respect to the character and evolution of impact and interdependence, and with respect to the effects of the coherent and holistic approach. 6. Value pluralism (evaluation problem) Evaluation of diversified impact, interdependence, and organisational complexity, and of subsequent relative responsibilities is complicated due to: the knowledge problem; the existence of different visions based on different specific values and general world views; the existence of different interests of concerned actors; the fact that it is therefore impossible to determine in consensus what would be the real problem or the root of the problem; and the fact that meta-values, such as equality, freedom, and sustainability, cannot be translated unambiguously into practical responsibilities or actions. 7. Relative authorities (authority problem) The authority of actors who evaluate and judge the problem, and rationalise their interests and responsibilities related to it in a future-oriented perspective is relative in two ways. The individual authority of concerned actors is relative in the sense that, due to the knowledge and evaluation problem, authority cannot be demonstrated or enforced purely on the basis of knowledge or judgement. As a consequence, that authority needs to lean on external references (the mandate of the elected politician, the diplomas and experience of the scientific expert, the commercial success of the entrepreneur, the social status of the spiritual leader, the appeal to justice of the activist, etc.). The collective authority of concerned actors who operate within the traditional governing modes of politics, science, and the market is relative, as these governing modes cannot rely on an objective authority of method : the systems of representative democracy (through party politics and elections) and the market both lean on the principle of competition, while science is faced with the fact that it needs to deal with future-oriented hypotheses. As such, concerned actors have the opportunity to reject or question the relevance and credibility of the judgement of other actors, and consequently to question the legitimacy of their authority. 332

12 the fact that the characterisation of complexity in the form of the seven proposed characteristics can be called a neutral characterisation, in the sense that it does not specify wrongdoers and victims as such (which, of course, does not mean there cannot be any). Representing the complexity as a complexity of interpretation enables the responsibility to be described in the face of that complexity as a joint responsibility that is, as such, not divisive, which means that, in principle, it provides the possibility of rapprochement. This joint responsibility in the face of complexity has, at the same time, a binding and a liberating character for all concerned. Regarding the binding character, although nobody is blamed or suspected of reckless behaviour or of escaping responsibility, one could say that the characterisation of complexity is imperative for all concerned. First of all, any reflection on what it would imply to deal fairly with the complexity of the problem at stake would imply the need for each concerned actor to transcend the usual thinking in terms of their own interests, and the preparedness to become confronted with the way he/she rationalises their own interests within the bigger picture. At the same time, due to the knowledge and evaluation problem, every concerned actor would need to acknowledge his/her specific authority problem in making sense of the complexity of that problem, taking into account that not only the way he/she rationalises the problem as such, but also the way he/she rationalises his/her own interests, the interests of others, and the general interest in relation to that problem is simply relative. That relativity is reciprocal, in the sense that nobody can claim higher authority based on a deeper understanding of the problem that would lead to a view on the solution that all others concerned would simply need to accept. This reasoning provides us with the possibility to argue that joint responsibility is not only binding but also liberating: as the authority of all concerned actors is relative in relation to the authority of others, it implies that all actors have the right to participate in making sense of the problem, and the right to co-decide on possible solutions to that problem. The context of this text does not allow deeper reflection on the character of complexity as described above, and on how it can be translated into characteristics of concrete complex social problems such as those referred to above. More important here is the focus on an ethical framework that would follow from the general and neutral characterisation of complexity of complex social problems, and on how that framework can inspire the new governance methods that would, as emphasised previously, enable confrontation of rationales and the right to co-decide in particular Ethics of care for our modern co-existence As said before, ethics is about judging on what ought to be in the absence of evidence that would facilitate straightforward judgement, consensus, and consequent action. However, absence of evidence does, of course, not exclude the possibility of some type of normative reference to assist that judgement. Throughout history, philosophers have tried to formulate specific rationales to defend possible references, and one can distinguish four categories of normative ethical theories in Western philosophy in that sense. Since their emergence at various moments in history, all 333

13 Table 3. Four types of normative reference in Western philosophy normative ethical theories. Western philosophy normative ethical theories Theories that seek reference in universally applicable principles (Kantian) deontology, consequentialism (utilitarianism) Theories that seek reference in evaluating particular situations particularism Theories that seek reference in virtues ( being good ) virtue ethics (Aristoteles) Theories that seek reference in care for human relationships ethics of care Danger/problem Danger: risk of overlooking the particulars of specific situations Danger: risk of self-protective relativism (cultural, social, political) Problem: virtues do not always translate unambiguously into concrete action Problem: works for close relations with known people; unclear how it could work for distant relations with strangers theories have been subject to academic critique with respect to their attempt to universalise their approach. The theories and their critiques are summarised in Table 3. Table 3 can now be used as a backdrop for the formulation of a specific virtue ethics and ethics of care theory that could guide evaluation and action in face of complexity in the context of complex social problems, as characterised above. The idea is that these theories would not face the traditional problems formulated above, as they do not aim to instruct concrete practical action of concerned actors, but rather inspire specific modes of reflective and deliberative interaction among them. The two theory proposals will be discussed briefly below Reflexivity and intellectual solidarity as ethical attitudes or virtues Recalling the previous considerations on what it would imply to deal fairly with the complexity of complex social problems, we could say that the joint responsibility of all concerned can be rephrased as the joint preparedness to adopt a specific responsible attitude or to foster a specific virtue in face of complexity. That responsible attitude or virtue is identical for all concerned actors (be it the scientist, the politician, the engineer, the manager, the entrepreneur, the expert 4, the civil society representative, the activist, or the citizen), and can be described in a three-fold manner. 4 In the context of this text, expert denotes any person with a special expertise compared with others involved. This could be a scientist in an advisory role towards a political authority, or someone who works for a nuclear regulatory commission, but also a medical doctor in relation to a patient. 334

14 1. The preparedness to acknowledge the complexity of complex social problems and the organisation of our society as a whole. 2. (Following 1) The preparedness to acknowledge the imperative character of that complexity, or thus to acknowledge the own authority problem (in addition to the knowledge and evaluation problem) in making sense of that complexity; that preparedness can be reformulated for each concerned actor as the preparedness to see the bigger picture and oneself in it, each with his/her specific interests, hopes, hypotheses, beliefs, and concerns. 3. (Following 2) The preparedness to seek rapprochement with other concerned actors, and this through specific advanced formal interaction methods in research, politics, and education that would enable sense to be made of that complexity. The three-fold preparedness suggested here can be considered as a concession to the complexity as sketched above, and it may be clear that, with these reflections, we now enter the area of ethics. A first simple but powerful insight in that sense is the idea that if nobody has the authority to make sense of a specific problem and of consequent solutions, then concerned actors have nothing other than each other as equal references in deliberating that problem. In his book The Ethical Project, the philosopher Philip Kitcher makes a similar reflection by saying that there are no ethical experts and that, therefore, authority can only be the authority of the conversation among the concerned actors (Kitcher, 2014). From the perspective of normative ethics, we can now (in a metaphorical way) interpret the idea of responsibility towards complexity as if that complexity puts an ethical demand on every concerned actor, in the sense of an appeal to adopt a reflexive attitude in face of that complexity. That reflexive attitude would not only concern the way each actor rationalises the problem as such, but also the way he/she rationalises his/her own interests, the interests of others, and the general interest in relation to that problem. The responsible attitude considered here can thus be described as a reflexive attitude in face of complexity, and, as a concession towards that complexity, that attitude can now also be called an ethical attitude or virtue. However, given that the responsibility as suggested above would also imply rapprochement among concerned actors, one can understand that, in practice, this ethical attitude needs to be adopted in public, and that one needs specific formal interaction methods to make that possible. The joint preparedness for public reflexivity of all concerned actors would enable a dialogue that, unavoidably, will also have a confrontational character, as every actor would need to be prepared to give account of his/her interests, hopes, hypotheses, beliefs, and concerns with respect to the problem at stake. That joint preparedness can be described as a form of intellectual solidarity as, in arguing about observable unacceptable situations (e.g. extreme poverty), perceived worrisome situations or evolutions (e.g. climate change or population growth), or practices or proposed policy measures with a potential controversial character (e.g. the use of nuclear energy, genetically modified organisms, or a tax on wealth), concerned actors would need to be prepared to reflect openly towards each other and towards 335

15 the outside world about the way they not only rationalise the problem as such, but also their own interests, the interests of others, and the general interest in relation to that problem. Similar to understanding reflexivity as an ethical attitude or virtue, one can understand the sense of intellectual solidarity as an ethical attitude or virtue, and one could say that the second should and could be stimulated by the first. In other words, a sense of intellectual solidarity implies reflexivity as an ethical attitude with respect to the own position, interests, hopes, hypotheses, beliefs, and concerns, and this in any formal role or social position (as scientist, politician, engineer, manager, entrepreneur, expert, civil society representative, activist, citizen, etc.). It is important to emphasise that intellectual solidarity is not some high-brow elite form of intellectual cooperation. It simply denotes our joint preparedness to accept the complexity of co-existence in general and of specific complex social problems in particular, and the fact that no one has a privileged position to make sense of it all. Intellectual solidarity, as an ethical commitment, is the joint preparedness to accept that we have no reference other than each other An ethics of care, bound in complexity Section elaborated on the meaning of reflexivity and (a sense of) intellectual solidarity as ethical attitudes or virtues, and on the need to adopt these attitudes or to foster these virtues because of complexity. In addition to that, it is possible to develop an ethical theory on how to deal fairly with the complexity of complex social problems based on the simple insight that we are all bound in that complexity. The idea that we are all in it together informs the view that we should care for our relations with each other, in the sense that we need each other to make sense of complex social problems such as climate change, and to tackle them. In short, the characterisation of complexity as sketched above enables a formulation of an ethics of care that could work for our distant relationships with strangers. The basic idea is that the fact of complexity brings along three new characteristics of modern co-existence that can be named connectedness, vulnerability, and sense of engagement. Their meaning in relation to the complexity of complex social problems can be summarised as follows:. Connectedness. We are connected with each other in complexity. We cannot any longer escape or avoid it. Fair dealing with each other implies fair dealing with the complexity that binds us.. Vulnerability. In complexity, we became intellectually dependent on each other while we face our own and each other s authority problem. We should care for the vulnerability of the ignorant and the confused, but also for that of mandated authority (such as that of the scientific expert, the teacher or the elected political representative ). Last but not least, we should care for the vulnerability of those who cannot be involved in joint reflection and deliberation at all. Obviously, without wanting to make evaluative comparisons between them, these can be identified as the next generations, but also as those among us who are 336

16 Table 4. Intellectual solidarity as an ethical attitude or virtue in an ethics of care framework. Connectedness, vulnerability, and a sense of engagement inspire intellectual solidarity as a joint ethical commitment, in the sense of: Connectedness Vulnerability (Sense of) Engagement The joint preparedness to enable and participate in intellectual confrontation with respect to the ratios we use: to defend our interests, hopes, hypotheses, beliefs, and concerns to relativise our uncertainties and doubts The joint preparedness to recognise that the practical limitations to participation in deliberation cannot be used to question the principle of participation as such The joint preparedness to acknowledge each other s authority problem and the vulnerability of those who cannot participate The joint preparedness to enable and support intellectual emancipation of others with the aim of providing every human being with the possibility of developing reflexivity as an intellectual skill, or thus to develop a (self-)critical sense and to be a (self-)critical actor in society intellectually incapable to join (animals, children, and humans with serious mental disabilities).. (Sense of) Engagement. Our experiences now extend from the local to the global. As intelligent reflective beings, becoming involved in deliberating issues of general societal concern became a new source of meaning and moral motivation for each one of us. We can now connect this ethics of care perspective with the idea of reflexivity, and intellectual solidarity as ethical attitudes or virtues, as elaborated above. Connectedness, vulnerability, and a sense of engagement, identified as new characteristics of co-existence, imply the need to be intellectually solidary with each other in the way we make sense of complexity for social organisation. This can be represented as having a sense for interaction modes that are either confronting or enabling (Table 4) Enabling virtues: intellectual solidarity in democracy, science, and education Moving now from normative ethical thinking to applied ethical thinking, the advanced formal interaction modes to enable reflexivity and a sense of intellectual solidarity referred to above can be given a name and a practical meaning. Taking into account the knowledge problem and the evaluation problem as the central characteristics of the complexity of complex social problems, reflexivity and intellectual solidarity as public ethical attitudes or virtues would need to inspire the method used to generate knowledge about these problems, and the method used to negotiate and make decisions related to them accordingly. So the question becomes, in what way could these virtues inspire the practice of research and decision making? 337

17 With the presentation of virtue ethics as one of the four traditional theories of ethics (of Western philosophy), it was noted that the problem with virtue ethics as a theory of normative reference is that virtues not always translate unambiguously into concrete action. First of all, virtues such as being good, honest, or prudent obviously need to be considered in a practical context or situation in order to understand their practical meaning. However, even then, different virtues can come into conflict with each other, or acting from the perspective of one virtue can be complicated because of the existence of conflicting values to take into account. To give one example, what would it imply for a medical expert to be prudent in advice with respect to mammography campaigns? Would it mean intensifying them in order to detect more breast cancers, or restricting them in order to limit the possibility of false-positive results and the risk of radiation? In the same perspective, it is true that neither reflexivity nor (a sense of) intellectual solidarity can unambiguously inspire concrete action of concerned actors, but they can inspire interaction methods to enable and enforce them as virtues in the interest of meaningful dialogue. The following reasoning may clarify this. The previous section stated that a sense of intellectual solidarity implies reflexivity as an ethical attitude with respect to the own position, interests, hopes, hypotheses, beliefs, and concerns, and this in any formal role or social position (as scientist, engineer, politician, manager, medical doctor, citizen, civil society representative, activist, etc.). However, one may understand that the ability to adopt this attitude requires reflexivity as an intellectual skill, seeing the bigger picture and yourself in it (with your interests, hopes, hypotheses, beliefs, and concerns). The important thing is that reflexivity as an intellectual skill may benefit from solitary reflection, but it cannot be instructed or thought. Neither can it be enforced or stretched in the same way as one can do with transparency in a negotiation or deliberation setting. For all of us, reflexivity as an intellectual skill essentially emerges as an ethical experience in interaction with others. That interaction may be informal, but it may be clear that the meaningful and logical interactions in this sense are to be organised in the formal practices of scientific research, political deliberation, and education. In the interest of keeping this text concise, a brief comment on how this can be understood is given below.. As the challenge of science in making sense of complex social problems is no longer the production of credible proof but the construction of credible hypotheses, reflexivity and intellectual solidarity as ethical attitudes inspire the need to engage in advanced methods that are self-critical and open to visions from outside the traditional disciplines of science. In other words, knowledge to advise policy would need to be generated in a transdisciplinary and inclusive way, or thus as a joint exercise of problem definition and problem solving with input from the natural and social sciences, and the humanities as well as from citizens and informed civil society.. An advanced method of political negotiation and decision making inspired by the ethical attitudes of reflexivity and intellectual solidarity would be a form of 338