Born Free: An assessment of the foundations of political party support of born-free university students in the Eastern Cape

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1 Born Free: An assessment of the foundations of political party support of born-free university students in the Eastern Cape By Dr. Joleen Steyn Kotze Senior Lecturer of Political Science Department of Political and Conflict Studies Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Research Fellow: Centre for African Studies, University of the Free State AND Prof. Gary Prevost Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science Saint John s University/College of St. Benedict Research Fellow: Department of Political and Conflict Studies Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Paper prepared for the International Political Science Association World Congress, Montreal, Cananda, July Abstract South Africa s first truly born-free generation voted for the first time in the 2014 General Elections. Born in 1994, this generation never lived under an institutionalised system of apartheid, but continue to grapple with the legacies of the apartheid system in contemporary South Africa. This paper presents the findings of an empirical survey amongst university students, who constitute the future and aspiring middle-class in democratic South Africa. The survey measured attitudes towards and faith in South Africa s political system and foundations of political party support and political choice from three different universities in the Eastern Cape: Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Rhodes University, and the University of Fort Hare. The Eastern Cape is often considered the birthplace of the ruling African National Congress, and as such, the findings prove significant in that the overall finding was that support for the African National Congress is declining in its heartland, and this could in future result in the erosion of the one-party dominant in South Africa should the middle class grow. Introduction South Africa s first democratic generation has come of age. As South Africa celebrated its twentieth year of democratic rule, youth born in 1994 were able to cast their first vote in the fifth democratic elections. This particular cohort of youth had never lived or experienced the brutal oppression of the apartheid regime, yet they live with the legacies of apartheid commonly constructed as poverty, racialised inequality, and unemployment. They had entered the political system having grown up with democratic rights, and political and civil liberties that their parents and grandparents were never entitled to. This particular generation has also grown up within the political context of a dominant party democratic regime, with the ANC securing an overwhelming portion of the electoral pie for five consecutive elections under the umbrella of societal transformation and a National Democratic Revolution. They were either not yet born or around the age of two or three when the miracle of the South African negotiated settlement earned the country global respect. Also, they would not remember the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that sought to deal with the human rights abuses, atrocities and horrors of South Africa s apartheid past. They constitute the first democratic generation. 1

2 While this cohort of youth had grown up with rights enshrined in what is considered one of the most progressive constitutions inclusive of socio-economic rights on one hand, they had also grown up in a context of deteriorating political efficacy and quality of governance, increasing corruption, political volatility demonstrated with an increase in destructive and violent protests, and a re-racialisation of political society, on the other hand. Although procedurally the South African democracy remains relatively sound, substantive democratisation has been difficult. Disillusionment acted out through destructive and violent protest and labour strikes (often protracted) have become commonplace in the political arena, unemployment has risen with the youth being most likely not to find a job, and the quality of governance and delivery of basic services has deteriorated in a context of corruption, internal factional battles within the ruling ANC, clientism, and patronage. This paper presents findings of an empirical survey conducted amongst university students in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. The Eastern Cape is considered the heartland of the ANC, and many of the great liberation heroes were born and raised in this province. The ANC has maintained a dominant status within province through securing an overwhelming portion of the vote. In the 2014 General Elections, the ANC had secured almost 71 % of vote, while the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance, obtained close to 16 %. The Eastern Cape is also one of the worst performing and poorest provinces in the country, and as such, constitutes a microcosm of party dominance in a democratic setting characterised by diminishing political efficacy, an increase in destructive and violent protests, mediocre service delivery and the entrenchment of patronage through cadre deployment. The paper will first present an overview of the relationship between political institutions, regime performance and the construction of a democratic political culture within the democratisation tradition. This will be followed by an overview of South Africa s political setting and theories of voter behaviour. This is essential, as very often analysis of voter behaviour and foundations of political support are presented through the convenience of the racial prism with too little attention being paid to other factors like ideology and policy considerations. Following this, the paper presents the findings of the empirical survey with a focus on the construction of foundation of political support amongst university students. Consolidating democracy Theoretical proposition and challenges Classic democratic consolidation theory presents a view that emerging democracies are dependent on three factors for successful democratic consolidation. These are: (1) strengthening democratic political institutions, (2) sufficient democratic regime performance to facilitate economic development and sufficient delivery (political efficacy), and (3) the cultivation of a democratic political culture committed to pluralism, multipartyism, political and civil liberties, and universal suffrage (Diamond 1999: 161; Huntington 1996: 258, Linz and Stepan 1996: 77-83, Di Palma 1990: ; Boschi 1990: 230 and Ethier 1990: 17). Collectively, strong political institutions, effective democratic regime performance and the cultivation of a democratic and participant political culture work to generate perceptions of democratic legitimation. Democratisation in this tradition demands an all-encompassing process of socio-political and socio-economic change. This includes constitutional change to create a democratic institutional core, democratic legitimation through attitudinal changes within broader society generated with political efficacy, and, at an elite behavioural level, political actors commit to abide by the new rule of the political game under a constitutional order. Democratic consensus entails a constitutional foundation where all the significant political actors are committed and adhere to the rules, and, no significant financial, human and social resources are spend on attempting to create authoritarian regimes (Schedler 2001:76 77). Also, through political efficacy and delivery, discontent is kept minimum as governments are 2

3 delivering on their mandate through efficient economic development and regime performance. This serves to stabilise the new democratic order by ensuring that no political actor will have a desire to act outside the acceptable limitations on political behaviour, as well as ensure that discontent will not grow to a level where political instability and riots characterise political engagement at mass level. Democratic consensus also entails a politico-cultural aspect in that intrinsic support for the new democratic regime must be generated. This is generally done through elites adhering to the new constitutional rules of the game and limitations on the actions that they are able to take on one hand. On the other hand, political efficacy generates sufficient quality in governance and delivery to the public that cultivates a view that the new democratic government is legitimate. Democratic legitimation is thus facilitated by elites abiding by the new rules limits their power and through political efficacy in dealing with material inequalities. Instrumental support is generated through efficient regime performance to meet socioeconomic demands (Kotze and Steenkamp, 2009: 72). Intrinsic support, interpreted as an inherent commitment to democratic, civil and political liberties, act to sustain the emerging democracy through economic and social crises in order to avoid a re-authoritarianisation of political life. Instrumental support, however, is granted and may be withdrawn according the mood of the times. If citizens evaluate regimes mainly in terms of their capacity to deliver consumable benefits or to rectify material inequalities, they may also succumb the siren song of populist leaders who argue that economic development requires sacrifice of political leaders (Kotze and Steenkamp, 2009: 72). Instrumental legitimation of democracy does not necessarily facilitate intrinsic support. Welzel and Klingemann (2008: 63) observed that people might demonstrate a preference for democracy not necessarily because they are democrats at heart. Rather, Welzel and Klingermann argue that people might hold a belief that democracy might ensure prosperity and rectify socio-economic inequalities through redistributive programmes and policies. Chu, Bratton, Lagos, Shastri, and Tessler (2008: 74) also stress that democratic legitimacy is dependent on the ability of governments to deliver the material and economic goods. In other words, the new democratic order somehow translate into a better qualify of life for the polity reflected in their material welfare and access to economic goods. However, they warn against economic reductionism and hypothesise that the polity s democratic commitment correlates not so much to the market, but to the democratic experience. Therefore, if there is a general sentiment that democracy has not delivered the envisaged change in quality of life, it is difficult to cultivate an intrinsic commitment to democracy and democratic values. Persistent inequality does not create democrats. Diamond (1999: 76) defines regime performance as production of sufficiently positive policy outputs to build broad political legitimacy. It is imperative to note that the policy outputs generated must translate into the general wellbeing of the polity as a whole. Economic regime performance of the emerging democracy, he argues, does not necessarily lead to the democratic transmission of values, but sustaining economic growth and ensuring long-term redistribution will address changes in political culture, class and states structures and civil society that facilitate democratic consolidation in the liberal tradition (Diamond, 1999: 88). Similarly, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheirub, and Limongi (1996: 49) stress the importance of high levels of economic performance of emerging democracies, by positing, Poverty is a trap poverty breeds poverty and dictatorship. Furthermore, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheirub, and Limongi are of the view that democracy can survive in the poorest nations if they manage to generate development, if they reduce inequality. Poor states can have a 3

4 democratic government, but a key element to successful democratic consolidation is political efficacy and delivery to reduce material inequalities. Similar arguments are found in the work Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 2 3) who argued that inadequate and weak economic performance undermines the development of democratic attitudes and behaviours. It therefore seems that instrumental support (generated through political efficacy and sound economic development and growth) will over a period of time lead to the cultivation of intrinsic support for democracy. In assessing democratic development in the Latin American context, Lagos (2001: 141) found that satisfaction with democracy is precarious and particular sensitive to swings in economic conditions. Lagos (2001: ) therefore notes that the Latin American experience demonstrated democracy is suspended somewhere between stability and crisis neither consolidated nor in imminent danger. This is partly due to obstacles in reducing societal inequalities and anorexic political efficacy underpinned by continued patterns of patron-clientism and corruption. Elites are also central in creating the conditions conducive to cultivate intrinsic support for democracy. They must have an innate commitment to the principles of good governance to enhance the quality of democracy (Kotze and Steenkamp, 2009: 1). For many of the world s transitioning states, which is generally found in the non-western and poorer international political economy, the reality is that when democracy arrives, there is an expectation that quality of life will improve, thus creating a better life for all 1. This was also the case in South Africa, as Kotze and Steenkamp (2009: 1) notes: after the establishment of a constitutional state in South Africa in 1994, the new regime obtained the right to restructure the relationships between the state, economy and society. Numerous expectations were raised during this process, with the developmental needs of the population urgently needing to be addressed. These expectations were based on the normative assumption that the government should strive to meet the needs and wants of the population. Indeed, Fukuyama (2013: 5 6) notes that while many new democracies succeed in holding relatively free and fair elections, political efficacy remains a key obstacle to democratic consolidation due to continued patterns of patron-clientism, corruption and ineffective service delivery. For Fukuyama (2013: 6), then the inability to make democracy deliver in terms of shared growth and broadly available public goods has in turn weakened the legitimacy of democratic governments. There is an implied relationship between political efficacy, economic development and growth, and political leadership. Huntington (1996: 361) stresses, economic development makes democracy possible, but political leadership makes it real. Similarly, for Fukuyama (2013: 6) government performance and the quality of state bureaucracies are central to substantive democratisation and consolidation. Continued economic non-performance may affect perceptions of credibility and legitimacy, in that if one group keeps gaining under the new system, this creates the conditions conducive to the emergence of anti-democratic tendencies and impact on political stability (Nelson, 1995: 53). Economic reforms, as difficult as they are, prove essential to demonstrate the commitment of the incoming regime to generate a democratic order. Yet, these reforms may generate further inequalities whereby lower classes become alienated, the middle class becomes impoverished and the wealthy increase their wealth (Nelson, 1995: 53). Therefore, democratic legitimacy is undermined. If identity politics are linked to economic cleavages 1 The term better life for all has been a catch slogan of the ANC s electoral campaigns for the 2004, 2009 and 2014 General Elections. 2 There have been various corruption scandals in South Africa s democratic history. The most current 4

5 and benefits, this may potentially lead to social and political conflict (Haidenus, 1994: 76 77). For this reason Leftwich (2005: 687) posit that economic growth and development can aid in the reduction of political and social instability by providing the polity with greater benefit in social and economic reconstruction, rendering economic development and growth not only moral, but political. Security is generated through the delivering of social and economic goods to the polity. Substantive concerns of democratic consolidation, i.e. the ability to deliver, is political in that it generates the necessary security for democratic consolidation, creating obligations through vested interests of the polity in ensuring political and social delivery through economic development and redistribution: stability and peace has to prevail for democratic consolidation. Intrinsic support for democracy requires the establishment of a strong sense of democratic legitimacy of the new regime. Huntington (1996: 258) argues that legitimacy rests on democratic institutions, processes and procedures, however new democracies are, in effect, in a catch-22 situation: lacking legitimacy they cannot become effective; lacking effectiveness, they cannot develop legitimacy. However, the experiences of the people cannot be limited to the new democratic era, but must be assessed through a period of time that includes the authoritarian regime. Similar assertions are made by Fukuyama (2013: 6) who argues that an effective state is dependent on the historical sequence of state modernisation and the liberalisation of the political space. Inequality remains a major challenge that the democratic regime must overcome, hence, the importance of effective regime performance for the emerging democracy. Vergopoulus (1990: ) observes that the dynamics upon which democracy is focussed is the equalisation of the individual on an abstract level. If some degree of equalisation does not occur, the facilitation of democratic legitimacy becomes difficult and the generation of a liberal democratic civic virtue becomes retarded. The root cause for Vergopoulus (1990: 147) is the conditions of present-day social anorexia in that one may see democratic consolidation on a formal level or in the minimalist tradition, but the sustainability of the liberal democracy or democratic deepening does not occur due to the levels of inequality that still persist in the emerging democracy. Merkel (2004: 45) shares similar sentiments when he posits that unequal resource distribution results in striking gaps between rich and poor or incomes and consistently keeps a part of the population below the bread line, liberal democratic consolidation cannot occur. In this context, political participation that liberal democratic consolidation requires in the generation of a liberal civic virtue is hindered as [political equality] is violated when real political equality cannot be produced anymore because of extreme socio-economic inequality (Merkel 2004: 45). South Africa s elusive consolidation and voter behaviour The South African democracy is at a precarious point in its democratic development. Twenty years after the miracle of 1994, the country still grapples with racialised patterns of poverty and inequality, with the black majority more likely to be poor and unequal than other racial groups. While the transition ushered in a liberal democratic constitutional state, substantive democratisation through effective regime performance and political efficacy to reduce inequality has been less than successful. At a political systemic level, the country remains firmly entrenched in the one-party dominant tradition, although the South Africa evolved from a one-party dominant authoritarian system under National Party rule to a one-party dominant democratic system under ANC rule (Mybergh and Gilliomee, 2010: 175). The ANC has been in power since 1994, and with the political liberation and its associated euphoria, many communities expected the material benefit of democracy through the promise of a better life for all. Given apartheid s legacies and the crippling levels of poverty South Africa faces, democratic regime performance was an absolute necessity to ensure a reduction of a class system based on racial identity and deepening democracy through increased 5

6 equality. Therefore, instrumental support for democracy through political efficacy and democratic legitimation should have created intrinsic support for democracy. The African National Congress faced a dual challenge at the birth of the South African democracy: maintaining the procedural integrity of the South African democracy, whilst engaged in upliftment and poverty reduction in the name of societal transformation. Following a successful negotiated settlement, the ANC sought to create an inclusive political society and as such drove the inauguration of one of the most progressive constitutions in the world in Further to this, the ANC also sought to create a social welfare safety programme catering for the poorest of the poor with approximately 28 % of the South African population drawing government assistance (Gumede, 2010: 16). The provision of clean water, sanitation, electricity and housing were key focus areas for the ANC government in In % of households had access to electricity, and by 2011 this figure increased 73.9, 50.5 % of households had a flush toilet in 1996 compared to 73.4 % households in 2011, and in 2001 only 51.2 % households had a refrigerator compared to 68.4% in 2011 (Census, 2011). By 2011, 77.6 % of South Africans lived in a formal dwelling compared to only 65.1 % in 1996 (Census, 2011). Although there has been some successes and improvement in the delivery of housing and basic services and the creation of a broad social welfare grant system, one hand, there are also stories of failure in education and primary health care. Only 28.9 % of South Africans completed high school and a mere 11.8% of South Africans have a tertiary education qualification. This could potentially impact on the creation of a large middle class to counter radical policy positions and parties. The procedural integrity of South Africa s democracy has been undermined by an increase in corruption 2, a lack of accountability 3, and the undermining of constitutional democratic structures through dubious legislative bills like the Secrecy Bill and the proposal for a Media Tribunal led by the ANC to monitor what the press publishes. At the twenty-year mark of democratisation, the procedural integrity of South Africa s democracy has reached a fragile point. South Africa has also experienced many demonstrations and strikes around substantive issues such as inadequate service delivery, macro-economic policies, increasing unemployment and poverty, unequal wealth distribution, and worryingly high levels of violent crime. Mediocre political efficacy coupled with a perceived lack of equality and continued levels of crippling poverty highlights that regime performance has been somewhat mediocre as well. Measures such as Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment and policies of Affirmative Action and Employment Equity that were meant to address racialised inequality has resulted in the emergence of a black middle class, yet the majority of black South Africans live in conditions of poverty. The subsequent (and perhaps unintended) consequences of unequal wealth redistribution through Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment result in political instability (demonstrated through the increase in service delivery protest action), which can threaten the consolidation of the South African democracy. It is estimated that from February 2 There have been various corruption scandals in South Africa s democratic history. The most current scandal is government spending in excess of R200 million on upgrades to President Zuma s Nkandla homestead which included a swimming pool and an amphitheater. 3 Many municipalities and departments are unable to achieve a clean audit status. The Auditor-General regularly finds evidence of maladminitration, irregular spending, and wasteful expenditure. It has also become common practise for government tenders to be awarded to companies in which government officials have a direct stake and as such are able to unduly benefit. This has now become known as tenderperneurship. Key issues highlighted by the Auditor General includes corruption, poor leadership, and unqualified and incompetent officials who occupy key leadership position (Nombembe, 2012). 6

7 2012 August 2012 an average of protests occurred per month in South Africa, rendering South Africa the protest capital of the world (Alexander, 2012). South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies in the world. While there has been some improvement with regard to basic services and housing, the key issue of inequality has not been sufficiently addressed. Gumede (2010: 2 3) observe: The various indicators and indices confirm that race, gender and spatiality have not been sufficiently redressed. Indeed, as argued by some, little progress has been made in South Africa in so far as eradicating household poverty is concerned the black population are still worse off in all measures of human development, and in relation to the human poverty index. Further, women come out worse than men. Rural areas continue to lower human development indices, which is reminiscent of apartheid South Africa. This suggests that the political history of South Africa, with its formal systemic discrimination of the majority black population by the white minority, must have been deeply entrenched such that its legacy is still very much alive, sixteen years since the attainment of democracy. Also, the findings imply that government has not succeeded in ensuring a more egalitarian society The South African income inequality is said to be the highest in the world [and] is scale and racially related. Yet, in the midst of democratic fragility, the ANC is still able to get a large slice of the electoral pie. The ANC has maintained electoral dominance and has not gotten less than 62 % in all the elections over the last twenty years. However, it is important to note that although the ANC has managed to sustain electoral dominance, this must be measured against voter turnout. Schulz-Herzenberg (2014) noted that voter turnout, when measured against the voting age population, has significantly dropped from 86 % in 1994 to 57 % in Schulz- Herzenberg further stressed that shifts in popular support for opposition parties highlights that voters are becoming more critical of the political parties and that competitive electoral campaigns are also playing an increasingly important role in wooing the electorate. At the same time however, voters who had potentially voted for the ANC protest violently against the lack of delivery and material improvement of their lives, for which they blame the ruling ANC. It would thus seem that instead of punishing the ANC through withholding the vote, social protest has become the means to express dissatisfaction with weak political efficacy, mediocre service delivery and the health and education crises. Due to the historical exclusion of black South Africans from political society, they traditionally had low expectations of government and particular perceptions of who is responsible for what (Garcia-Riverso, 2006: 68). In the midst of weak political efficacy, low expectations do not necessarily affect ANC dominance during elections. This can be attributed to salient perceptions of spheres of responsibility, as Garcia-Rivero (2006: 68) notes: black people distinguish between those responsible or unemployment the business sector seen as primarily responsible and those responsible for housing the government being seen as responsible. Black people feel satisfied with what has been achieved with respect to housing, though they do not feel satisfied with unemployment levels; but as the government is not blamed for that situation, it continues to enjoy the confidence of voters. Voter behaviour and foundations of political party support is a difficult and multi-faceted notion. History, ideology, policy and race all interplay in the political choices that the electorate makes. What further complicates explaining voter behaviour in a South African context is the one-party dominant nature of the political system, where the ruling ANC has claimed a historical mission of liberation and radical transformation to justify its rule and right to govern. The seductiveness of race remains a key explanation for explaining why black South Africans vote for the ANC and other minorities such as Coloured, Indian and White South Africans vote for the Democratic Alliance. There is an obvious empirical basis to the exclusively race based analysis and it is also clear that major South African political parties have at least in part mobilised their constituencies 7

8 based on a racial appeal, but the notion that race is the sole or even primary driver behind South African voting has generated strong objections among other scholars of South African politics over the past twenty years. An early opponent of the primarily race-based analysis was South African political scientist, Robert Mattes, who argued that individual voting choices in the 1994 election could be explained systematically without primary reference to race or ethnic identity (Mattes, 1995). Mattes went on to argue that the voting choices of South Africans of all races could be explained using models that did not rely on race or identity (Mattes, 1995; Mattes and Gouws, 1998). Mattes and other scholars have argued that because race is so highly coordinated with non-racial predictors, it is not difficult to land on race as the explanation and in the process overlook other important factors such as ideology, policy evaluation and economic class which are often at the centre of analysing voting behaviour in Western societies (Friedman, 1999; Habib and Taylor, 2001; Mattes and Piombo, 2001). It seems that the scholars stressing race-based voting behaviour were falling into the trap of not being willing to acknowledge the possibility of rational voting behaviour on the part of the newly enfranchised South African voters. Habib and Naidu (2006: 82) construct the phenomenon of racialised voting as the race census thesis. Furthermore, Habib and Naidu (2006: 83) stresses that the racial census thesis is fundamentally flawed on two principles. First, race is treated as an independent and objective variable and the intrinsic relationship between race and class is somewhat understated. Second, this view prematurely assumes that race is a key driver of voter behaviour without being cognisant of a complicated interplay between race and class factors. Using conventional wisdom, Habib and Naidu (2006: 89) accepts that poorer and working classes would generally support leftist parties whilst their more affluent counterparts would generally vote for parties towards the centre and right. However, Habib and Naidu further note that there seems to be a paradox in the South African context with regard to the accepted conventional wisdom: In South Africa, the effect of this logic would mean tremendous working class support for the ANC while the DA and NNP would benefit from middle-class and upper class vote. In practice the more privileged class vote for the ANC while the disadvantaged tend to vote for white minority parties DA and NNP. Garcia-Rivero (2006: 64) also observed that the support the ANC has shifted somewhat due to the influence of class. Thus, while the ANC constructs itself as a party for the poor, the patterns that emerge in voting trends indicated that the black middle-class tended to vote for and support the ANC. A key driver of party support for the ANC is confidence in the ability of the party to deliver and improve living standards (Garcia-Rivero, 2006: 64 and Habib and Naidoo, 2006: 89). This thus creates the impression that party support for the ANC is more instrumental in nature, and not necessarily intrinsic. To this effect, as Garcia-Rivero (2006: 66 67) noted: ANC closeness is increasingly based on class rather than on racial lines. If affective support is implicitly meant to lead to voting, the governing ANC may find it increasingly difficult to mobilise its racial constituency; black people may be divided between who are already part of the middle to high social strata, and who will demand protection for the new economic status, and those who are unemployed, on low incomes and in the middle to low strata, who will demand services from the state. In analysing the 2009 General Elections in South Africa, Kersting (2009: ) concludes that although race was still an influencing factor in voter behaviour, the primary driver of people voting for a particular party was party affiliation. This is not surprising, as the ANC had claimed the political space of a progressive pro-poor party, although it would also seem that emerging black middle and higher classes vote for the ANC. Further to this, the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance is often constructed as an elitist, white party catering only for the needs of the wealthy minorities. For voters the racial credentials of political 8

9 parties are still important, but not in terms of representing specific racial groups, but rather presenting a multi-racial party inclusive of all South Africans (Garcia-Rivero, 2006: 68). Liberation credentials of a political party also affects voter behaviour, but does not necessarily lead to intrinsic support for a political party. Garcia-Rivero (2006: 66) found that black people who did intrinsically support any political party casted their vote for the ANC justifying this on the basis that the ANC had brought liberation and freedom. Increasingly issue-based voting is combined with party affiliation, and in future people may very well vote according to policy positions and manifestoes political parties present (Kersting, 2009: 130). This is a positive development in analysing voter behaviour for this position assumes that the South African electorate is not merely caught in the cleavages of race and ethnicity when casting their vote, but do in fact engage and base decisions on which party can best address key issues. One also cannot ignore the impact that changing socioeconomic relations (Garcia-Rivero, 2006: 68) and the growth of a multi-racial middle class will have. The interplay between factors such as race, class, and perceptions of representation act collectively to influence voters decisions. A simplistic interpretation of voter behaviour based on race alone can no longer be used as the only reason why a person would vote for a particular party. With the emergence of an increasing multi-racial middle class, socioeconomic status could very well become a more important factor in influencing voting patterns (Garcia-Rivero, 2006: 69). This is a significant development in South African voter behaviour as class concerns dominating over racial identity points to a strengthening of the South African political system. Further to this, it also raises interesting questions about the future patterns of voter behaviour and foundations of political party support, especially in the middle class strata of society. Conceptualising the Middle Class and qualifying the sample The conventional wisdom propagated within the democratisation literature is that a strong and large middle class is an essential factor to facilitate democratic consolidation and reduce societal inequality within the emerging democracy (Garcia-Rivero, Du Toit, and Kotze, 2003: 6). Ndlentyana (2014: 2) advances two democratic benefits. First, middle classes facilitate economic development within the emerging democracy context. In this sense, the skill, education and expertise of the middle class generates and aids innovation and creativity that strengthens the possibility of economic development and growth. Second, middle classes are in a position to sustain democratic stability. Here the middle classes fulfil the role of an economic intermediary as they do not have comparable wealth and resources like the rich (who do not need democracy to protect their interest, and can survive and thrive under authoritarianism), nor do the middle classes possess lower education levels like the lower classes (which are more susceptible to radical and populist rhetoric due to their lack of education and lack of income). It is for this reason that the size of the middle class within the emerging democratic context is often used as a barometer to measure societal inequality (Garcia-Rivero, Du Toit, and Kotze, 2003: 7). While a middle class is central the development and future consolidation of an emerging democracy, conceptualising what constitutes the middle class remains a contested and interesting scholarly debate. What characteristics distinguish the middle class from the high and low societal strata? What about the character and nature of the middle class serve to support democratic consolidation and creating intrinsic support for democracy? Reviewing the works of amongst others Cutright (1963), Jackman (1974), Rubinson and Quilan (1977), Bollen and Jackson (1985), and Muller (1995), Garcia-Rivero, Du Toit, and Kotze (2003: 9) concluded that a relationship between middle class and democracy exits and impacts on democratic stability. However, they also noted economic development is not enough. Only the economic development that increases middle classes (that reduces economic inequalities) positively affects democracy. Southall (2004: 527) however is somewhat critical of the contribution of Garcia, Du Toit and Kotze on the basis that their work ignored 9

10 an important neo-marxist tradition in conceptualising class structure in post-apartheid South Africa. To this effect, Southall (2004: 527) states, in their haste to impose a democratisation perspective upon post-apartheid South Africa, they have dismissed the rich body of neo-marxist thinking which has developed around the struggle for South African liberation. The key area of criticism levelled against Garcia-Rivero, Du Toit and Kotze (2006) by Southall seems to centre on an unstated assumption that class structure of black South Africans were lacking. Also, for Southall (2004: 527) any analysis of the contemporary black middle class necessarily begins from the fact that the national liberation movement has captured control of the machinery of the state, and in doing so, has been able to make fundamental changes to the political and economic terrain. The key question for Southall (2007: 528) is rather whether the ANC will remain a progressive party as it starts to represent more middle class interests, as moral obligations towards the poor are likely to be undermined by rapid enrichment and celebration of black capitalism can invoke class warfare and encourage destabilising inequality. Inevitably, given the racist nature of the apartheid regime, and emerging from a colonial heritage, race and class would be intimately linked. It would also be somewhat idealistic to disregard any form of correlation between race and class in post-apartheid South Africa. This poses a challenge to delimiting middle class structures in a post-apartheid context and how this relates to the foundations of political party support. There are two approaches generally employed when constructing the stratums that inform the middle class structure. These are the Marxist approach or the Weberian approach. While the Marxist approach focus on the relationship of different class strata to the ownership of the means of production, the Weberian approach focuses on social mobility through what is constructed as market resources, including education. Other factors such as occupation and income are also included when attempting to construct classes that characterise a society. Therefore, the middle class has generally been defined along the lines of white-collar, nonmanual professional workers (Ndlentyana, 2014: 4). It was an obvious reality that with the birth of South Africa s democracy, some form of redress through affirmative action and black economic empowerment was necessary in order to grow a multi-racial middle class and reduce societal inequalities. One way to achieve this was to prioritise and create conditions conducive to facilitate access to tertiary institutions. Universities also contribute to the entrenchment of intrinsic democratic support as the culture of democracy, of values of tolerance and the respect for citizen rights have slowly taken root Universities, which were once directly active participants in the racist, apartheid project, have contributed to a new democratic culture (Reddy, 2006: 133). One consistent theme within democratisation literature is the necessity to enlarge the middle class strata and facilitate upward mobility of lower classes in the middle class. It would thus seem that a Weberian approach to analysing class is favoured within the democratisation literature. Education is often constructed as a key vehicle to allow upward mobility and grow the middle class. Following the birth of South Africa s democracy, higher education institutions were tasked to contribute towards economic and socio-political transformation...universities were expected to serve the public good and produce critical citizens for a vibrant democracy (Reddy, 2006: 122). Universities in a post-apartheid context have a transformation mandate: Graduates from both black and white universities have taken jobs in the state, private sector and civil society. They have moved into former white neighbourhoods, their children in the main attending former white schools, and are participating in civil society structures formerly reserved for whites. In the middle class sense, some public spaces in South Africa have become deracialised and universities, in the creation of the emerging black elite, can be held indirectly responsible this social impact (Reddy, 2006: 133). 10

11 However, Ndlentyana (2014: 12) stresses that education is not enough to facilitate upward mobility as working class students face far greater obstacles than their middle class counterparts, including a lack to sufficient funds to complete their studies and learning support. It is for this reason that the South African government has committed R9 billion to the National Students Financial Aid Scheme (Zuma, 2014). This signals that universities will continue to be a major role player in the theatre of transformation of South African society. It is also indicative of a political will to facilitate access to higher education, which in turn facilitates upward mobility and growth of a middle class. METHODOLOGY Research methods and sample South Africa s first democratic generation is colloquially referred to as the Born Frees. This use of the term Born Free is not without controversy. For example, Friedman (2013) argues that the Born Free factor is nothing more than a form of bias as public commentators often perpetuate a view that the ANC will struggle to get the Born Free vote, but these commentators fail to highlight how the Born Free vote will affect opposition political parties. Friedman further argues that the biggest problem with the construction of the Born Free factor is that commentators assume that they are truly free, as they never experienced apartheid realities. For many of the Born Frees, the reality of the legacies of apartheid expressed through racialised poverty and inequality shape their democratic experience of this generation. Therefore, new black voters will often experience very similar realities to those their parents faced two decades ago (Friedman, 2013). Mattes (2011: 3 5) construct the Born Free generation as those who became politically mature (at the age of 16) from 1997 onwards. The Born Free generation for Mattes is thus inclusive of those who lived through and are able to remember the transition, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the birth the new Constitution in For the purposes of this research project we delimited the Born Free generation as people who had grown up exclusively under the democratic order and in the context of ANC dominance. Therefore, the Born Frees are seen as people born in 1990, the year that Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and 1994, the year the South African democracy was inaugurated with its founding elections. In the context of this paper, therefore, the Born Frees are constructed as people who had reached adulthood and matured politically under democratic rule and ANC dominance. As students have the potential to become the future middle class (should they be successful in finding a job), and noting that the cohort of youth aged constitute the first democratic generation, the central concern of the research was to assess the foundations of their political support and what beliefs they hold with regard to South African political life. The sample consisted of two historically black universities, University of Fort Hare and the former Vista University (now part the NMMU), and two historically white universities, (the former University of Port Elizabeth (as a historically Afrikaans university) and Rhodes University (as a former English liberal institution). Table 1: Racial composition of the sample University Black Coloured Indian White NMMU South NMMU Missionvale Rhodes University University of Fort Hare 11

12 Eastern Cape Population 4 It is interesting to note that the sample reflects the traditional dichotomy of black vis-à-vis white universities. While the traditional white university of the former University of Port Elizabeth and Rhodes Universities demonstrate a higher level of integration of black students compared to their white counterparts, the traditional black universities of the former Vista University and University of Fort Hare seems to maintain a predominantly black student body. Table 2: Gender composition of the sample University Male Female Did not answer NMMU South NMMU Missionvale Rhodes University University of Fort Hare Eastern Cape Population Between 2012 and 2013, 931 surveys were collected at the four tertiary institutions. Using research assistants at the different universities, lecturers were asked to allow the research assistants a portion of their lecture time for the students to complete the survey. The students surveys were from various faculties including Faculties of Arts and Humanities, Sciences, Economics and Law. The sample is thus inclusive of future lawyers, journalists, civil servants, architects, accountants, artists and designers, and scientists. As universities also play a central role in upward mobility and transformation, it is worthy to note that it is very likely that of the students sampled, some would have come from the working class strata on financial assistance to complete a tertiary qualification. Table 3: Age distribution of sample University Did not answer NMMU South NMMU Missionvale Rhodes University University of Fort Hare The methodology employed in this study was essentially quantitative in nature. As the purpose of the study was to assess the foundations of political support of the Born Free 4 Data obtained from the Census 2011 data available online at 5 Data obtained from Makiwane and Chimere- Dan (2010). The percentage reflected presents the male- female ration for the age group

13 generation as well as they general perception of race relations in South Africa, the study thus sought to learn something about what the variables of each look like (Kellsted and Whitten, 2009: 104). The survey data, comprising of both closed- and open-ended questions were analysed with the aid of data analysis software. The closed ended questions were analysed using PSPP software to generate descriptive statistics, while the data from openended questions were analysed using Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software. For the purposes of the open-ended questions, a process of in vivo coding was employed to construct the data categories as they had emerged from the data. This allowed one to construct data categories as close as possible to the themes that emerged in the open-ended section of the survey. Further to this, it also allowed the researchers to captures the initial narrative on why this particular sample held the views and ideas they had expressed in relation to the closeended questions. Data Analysis and Findings With only 8.7 % of the South African population holding a tertiary qualification, there is a need to guard against broad generalisation of the results of this particular study. This study focuses predominantly on elites (the aspirant and future middle class of the first democratic generation). We are able to construct university students as an elite group as there is a high correlation between elite status and education, especially at tertiary level, and a stark contrast between education levels of elites and the general public (Kotze and Steenkamp, 2009: 19). Perceptions of the value of the vote and trust in elected officials In 2011 some of the university students sampled in our study would have been in a position to vote for the first time in the Local Government Elections, which essentially elects local municipal leadership. Therefore, we needed to ascertain whether those sampled were registered voters and whether they had voted in the 2011 Local Government Elections. Table 4: Registration status vis-à-vis participation in an election Yes No Did not answer Registered Voter Voted in the last elections What emerges from the correlation between the status as a registered voter and whether a vote had been cast in the last election (had the participant been able to vote) is that approximately 12 % of participants who could potentially have exercised their right to vote in the 2011 Local Government Elections did not do so. In a number of instances those who did not participate in the elections had indicated that they were either too busy. Some had indicated that they were too young to vote, but plan to vote in the 2014 General Elections. What would be valuable to ascertain, however is how this cohort of youth view the value of the vote. To achieve this, we had put a number of statements regarding the value of the vote, trustworthiness of politicians and whether the participatns believe that politicians have their best interests at heart. 13

14 Table 5: Value of the vote and political trust in elected representatives Statement Did not answer Strong Agree Agree Don t Know Disagree Strongly Disagree My vote makes a difference Political parties, when elected, do their best and thus my vote is valuable It the duty of all citizens to vote Voting is a valuable exercise as we elect politicians we can trust and have the best interest of the citizenry at heart Politicians have our best interest at heart The result of the index seeking to measure perceptions of the value of the vote as well as trust in elected officials seems to present contradictory picture. While approximately 63 % of the sample felt that their vote could indeed make a difference, only 48 % felt that politicians generally had their best interest at heart. This is somewhat contradictory considering that when asked whether voting is a valuable exercise as we elect politicians we can trust, almost 60 % of the sample agreed. A positive theme that emerges, however, is that there is sense of a civic duty or responsibility to participate in elections, with 72 % the sample agreeing that they do have a duty to vote in elections. Of course, one also has to be careful, as we do not know whether this sense of responsibility to participate in elections is based on intrinsic support for democracy, or whether it is premised on political parties calling on their voters to go out and vote as their vote is needed. However, it would seem that the perception that there is duty or civic obligation to vote is relatively prevalent amongst the sample, with the Indian/Asian population registering the lowest level of obligation to vote. What is particularly interesting is that both Black and White participants within the sample share similar perceptions with regard to the perceptions that their elected representatives are trustworthy and that politicians have their best interests at heart. Coloured and Indian/Asian participants, although demonstrating comparable levels of a civic duty to vote, demonstrate comparably lower levels of trust and political faith in the motives of politicians Civic obligation to vote Politicians have our best interest at heart Trust in elected representative 14

15 Figure 1: Political trust and civic obligation to vote per racial group A strong sense of a civic obligation to vote is not a surprising finding. Kotze and Steenkamp (2009: 65 66) had also found that South Africans exhibit high levels of support for democracy, especially at the elite level. In the age group up to 29 years of age, the World Values Survey (2009) found that 92.9 % of participants ranked the importance of democracy in the range of 6 10 on a 10-point Lickert scale. Similarly, 83.4 % of participants in the World Values Survey (2009) ranked South Africa as democratic. However, % of participants in the age bracket up to 29 years of age in the World Values Survey (2009) stated that they either had no or very little confidence in political parties. This raises some interesting questions for future research of emerging political culture in South Africa. Gikens and Simeon (1979: 133) found that for most people one view dominates and that the extent that there is agreement on one view it creates a degree of conformity, as people fear that they may be ostracised for holding different opinions than the dominant opinion. Given that public discourse, especially in the build-up to elections, is dominated by the cost of liberation and the price many people had paid for the right to vote, it could be that the first democratic generation had internalised a view that given the cost of liberation, they do have a duty to participate in elections. However, this is subject to further qualitative research being conducted to determine why the first democratic generation exhibits a strong civic duty to vote, but seem to demonstrate comparably lower levels of political trust in elected representatives and the sincerity of politicians in pursuing their agendas. When one compares political trust, the perception that politicians have participants best interests at heart and the sense of duty to vote according to political party choice, one finds a similar trend where participants exhibited a strong sense of duty to vote, but comparably lower levels of political trust in their elected representatives and politicians sincerity in pursuing a public agenda. Both ANC and DA supporters have a strong sense of duty to vote, but in terms of the belief that politicians have their best interest at heart, DA supporters seem to have comparatively less faith in their representatives than ANC supporters. What is also of interest is that participants who had identified the ANC as their preferred party show comparably higher levels of political trust in their representatives than participants who had identified the DA as their preferred political party Civic duty to vote Politicians have our best interest at heart Trust in elected representatives 10 0 ANC DA Figure 2: Political trust and civic obligation per party support 15

16 Political foundations of party support: ANC and DA The build-up to the 2014 South African General Elections was dominated by vast speculation over which political party the first democratic generation would vote for. Similarly, there was also vast speculation that this particular cohort of youth will not necessarily vote ANC, and as such, an unstated assumption that the born frees would rather vote for opposition parties than the ruling ANC dominated public discourse somewhat. This unstated assumption was premised on the view that the liberation credentials and historical transformation mission of the ANC may not necessarily create an emotional obligation to vote for it within the born frees. Similarly, the idea that the ANC had not necessarily delivered on their mandate to create a better life for all, and consequently, the first democratic generation would seek other political alternatives which may be seen as a better alternative in terms of delivering economic and political goods. In measuring why people vote for a particular party, a vast array of factors needs to be considered. These include political socialisation (with parents, peers, churches, and education institutions playing a role in shaping political attitudes), and experiences of the individual (and in our context the democratic experience in particular), amongst others. In attempting to construct the foundations of political party support, we asked participants to pretend that they were eligible to vote in the 2009 General Elections and the 2011 Local Government Elections and if they were eligible to vote, who they had cast their vote for. From here, we then asked participants which political they would vote in the 2014 General Elections (as the survey was conducted in between 2012 and 2013). Average support for ANC and DA between 2009 and ANC DA Figure 3: Average support for the ANC and DA across the sample Support for the ANC in terms of potential votes cast was relatively low 46 % in Similarly, the DA s potential votes were also quite low at 32 % for the 2009 General Elections. What is of interest is that the ANC had higher levels of support at the traditional black universities. Of those who participated in the study at the University of Fort Hare, 65 % indicated that they would have voted for the ANC. However, when asked which political they would vote for in the 2014 General Elections, 51 % indicated that they would vote for the ANC. A similar trend is observed at the NMMU Missionvale campus where 58 % would have voted for the ANC in 2009, but only 45 % would have cast a vote for the ANC in A different scenario emerges in the traditional white universities, where only 31 % and 32 % 16