Collective identity in the European Union

Transcription

1 Collective identity in the European Union 1 Introduction The introduction of the Maastricht Treaty ( ) opened a new episode of the European integration process, which came partly to an end with the failure of the European Constitution in The integration process changed not only from Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus (HOOGHE; MARKS, 2009), but restated again the problem of a democratic deficit (MARQUANT, 1979). Bellamy (2006) claims that the existence of a possible democratic deficit reveals two dimensions of the problem an institutional dimension and a socio-psychological one. The first one concerns the effectiveness of existing arrangements in promoting the responsiveness and accountability of rulers and the latter concerns the question of a European demos. It is this latter socio- -psychological dimension that will be analyzed in this paper. There is a big difference between the past nation-building efforts and the current European identity-building process developed by the European Commission, above all after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 1 The discrepancy becomes visible not only because of the historic distance, but also because of the constitutional shape of the EU - it does not have many aspects of a nation-state. After the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009 the EU could be categorized as a system between a federation and confederation or as a multi-level governance system (HOOGHE; MARKS, 2001). Moreover, the EU does not have a monopoly over 1 There is a definition problem concerning the question of whether the European Union practices nation-building or identity-building. The fact is that the European Union has never claimed to build a European nation and it has always used the term identity-building, even when using some typical nation-building tools of the past. In this paper the author will use the term identity-building. World Tensions 65

2 Adam Holesch the legitimate use of violence, a key criterion in Max Weber s (1946) traditional definition of statehood. Due to the absence of coercion, the process of European integration is nothing less than one of the first experiments in collective identity-building in a multi-level governance system. The EU claims to be going beyond the model of the nation-state by developing its own approach to building a European identity. But even if the EU has been recalling the concept of a post-national approach (HABERMAS, 1998), was never clearly defined how that post-national concept could help to build a European identity. Actually, many scholars claim that the alleged new approach has been built on the past nation-building experiences of the EU Member States (SHORE, 2000; FOSTER, 1991). With the introduction of a common currency, the Euro, part of the EU got its strongest symbolic marker, but empirical data shows that the common currency failed to strengthen a common European identity even before the Euro-crisis (EUROBAROMETER Flash, 2010). Bearing those considerations in mind, this analysis asks the following research question: Which instruments does the EU possess for fostering a European identity? After explaining the problems with the definition of a European identity, this analysis will subsequently examine the main theories of nationalism, looking for insights on how nations are formed and which nation-building tools are seen as crucial in that process. After preparing that conceptual framework, this analysis will take the most important nation-building tools in the framework of European political practice and also of European symbolic activity (WALZER, 1967, p.194). The results of these sections will be finally linked to the future perspectives of a European identity- -building process. 2 European identity Analyzing the academic discussions about identity, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that the existing concept of identity is not only hopelessly vague, but also in a state of a definitional anarchy. The authors draw their own definition, claiming that identities connect with the idea, that a group of people recognizes 66 Tensões Mundiais

3 Collective identity in the European Union fundamental sameness that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves. This feeling is socially constructed, including the construction of an other, which reflects their being different. Moreover, they claim that identity is never complete or totally stable. When analyzing European identity-building, a proper definition is crucial. It is not only difficult to clearly distinguish a European identity from a national identity. Also the mere fact of using the concept of collective European identity brings many risks. Some scholars doubt the existence of such a European identity (SMITH 1993; 1992); others believe that it exists, even though as an additional layer (RISSE, 2010; FLIGSTEIN, 2008). Also the measuring of European identity is problematic. EU survey data do not define which type of European identity is measured, for example, whether it is ethnic or civil identity 2 or a kind of cultural membership (NAGEL, 1999). Furthermore, the strength of that identity is contested. Therefore, if one looks at the primarily or exclusive European identity, then the Eurobarometer data indicates that only an insignificant minority identifies as primarily or exclusively European. But if the European identity is seen as compatible with the national identity, even if people feel more national then European, then the survey data can be interpreted as the majority possessing an European identity (RISSE, 2010). The existence, measurement or strength of a European identity is just one of the problems. The others are the content and the boundaries that constitute such collective identities (BARTH, 1969). Moreover, there is little doubt that few would die for Europe (SMITH, 1995, p.139), but identity is not always fervent and can sometimes be banal (BILLIG, 1995) or expressed as a non-emotional identity (GUIBERNAU, 2011). But is that enough to build a European demos? Some scholars see the kind of identity currently available as a sufficient basis for legitimacy and redistribution politics of the European institutions (SCHMITTER, 2000; 2 That distinction goes back to Kohn (1967 [1944]) and Meinecke s (1970 [1907]) opposing Staatsnation (nation of the state) to Kulturnation (nation of the culture). World Tensions 67

4 Adam Holesch RISSE, 2010). This author claims that the recent European crisis (from 2008 on) shows that in order to improve the functioning of the EU, much more than just an additional identity layer is needed. But does the EU have the instruments to foster such a strong and predominant European collective identity? 3 Theories on nations and nationalism in the European Union context There are at least three ways to see how nations 3 were built: modernism sometimes called constructivism, ethnic-symbolism and perennialist 4. The first two approaches have had a particularly strong impact on each other through cross-fertilizing and constantly improving the state of art. Modernist scholars of nationalism like Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) modified the thinking about national communities. Through the impact of their publications nations were no longer seen as a natural unit, but were once again in the Weberian sense perceived as a modern phenomenon. Despite that common denominator, their approaches differ importantly. Gellner s interpretation of nations and nationalism is strongly sociological and accentuated by the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society, with all its political and, above all, cultural differences. Scholars like Anderson concentrate on media and imagination, while Hobsbawm and Ranger emphasize the invention of tradition. Also other academics have developed important ideas, which did not always finish in a theory. 5 3 The word nation derives from the Latin word nation (to be born) and was used in the Roman Empire to describe in a derogatory manner a community of strangers (GREENFELD, 2001). In the medieval universities the word nation was applied to communities of students who were organized in geographically related areas, which were defined as a nation. The question of when the concepts of nation and people were equated and when the word nation became common property has been discussed among scholars since. 4 One of the perennalists is Hastings (1997), who claims that ethnicity, nationalism and nation-states pre-date the modern period, which goes back to 11th century. 5 Academics like Breuilly (1982) or Tilly (1985) focused on the political implications of nationalism, showing that the state transformed into a kind of power container, which, through interaction within and outside the state, changed its people into a nation. 68 Tensões Mundiais

5 Collective identity in the European Union 3.1 Ernest Gellner and modernization For the anthropologist Ernest Gellner nationalism is a function of modernity (GELLNER, 1964). He defines nationalism as the following: Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (GELLNER, 1983, p.1). If groups that become disadvantaged during the process of industrialization were not culturally homogenous with the ruling group, then they might press for exit. With that, for Gellner, nationalism refers above all to conflict and separation from the majoritarian state. Explaining his famous quote: It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round (1983 [2006]: 54), Gellner emphasizes the fact that nationalists do not follow a big plan and that their actions are based more on coincidence than on calculation. For Gellner two persons are members of the same nation only if they share the same culture and if they recognize each other as belonging to that entity. In order to develop that kind of thinking, they are culturally homogenized through literacy in a standardized vernacular language expressed by a mass-education provided by the state. In his work Gellner did not analyze the European Union; his unique case study was the hypothetical country Ruritania. Nevertheless, many of his ideas were redrawn from the analysis of multinational states like the Ottoman Empire or the Habsburgian Austro-Hungarian Empire. For that reason, according to Gellner, the cultural homogenization through mass-education is linked to the prevention of partition rather than the construction of a new entity, as in the case of the EU. Also modern industrial mobility, which shows the members of a culture its cultural boundaries, is an important aspect of Gellner s theory. Gellner claims that labor migration and bureaucratic employment made the peasants appreciate and love their own form of living, because everything behind the known frontiers was alien. Gellner thus emphasizes the negative impact of mobility, when seen from a modernist point of view. Both aspects of Gellner s thinking, the influence of education and the World Tensions 69

6 Adam Holesch influence of labor mobility, will be analyzed in the context of European identity building. 3.2 Benedict Anderson and the imagined communities Anderson s approach of Imagined communities (1983) is another strong modernist concept. In his theory, Anderson states that members of nations are not able to meet each other in person, and therefore their social cohesion has to be imagined. The nation has become popular due to the primacy of capitalism and its quite coincidental but explosive interaction with new printing possibilities, and the fact that people usually speak different vernacular languages. After the saturation of the elite Latin market, capitalism expanded to the much bigger vernacular market; strengthened by the new Calvinist/Protestant work ethic. The dominant Latin, and the sacred communities which were integrated by it, were then gradually fragmented and pluralized. Within that frame of print capitalism, new different vernacular communication spheres were formed; hence creating imagined communities of co-readers who read the same newspapers, books and journals. The imagined community not only emphasizes common aspects, but also makes past conflicts forgotten, an important point for Anderson, which he borrows from Renan s thinking (1882). In that context, Anderson places importance on history, exploited in particular ways like the creation of Chairs of History at universities at the beginning of the 19 th century. He claims that the second- -generation nationalists started to talk in the name of dead people making some ancient tragedies forgotten, but putting emphasis on the past effort of the nation to stay together. Which points of Anderson s theory could be helpful to define the most important identity-building tools of the EU? The aspect of print capitalism, which formed a common communication sphere, is surely one of the aspects to be put under scrutiny; also in the shape of modern forms of communication, such as broadcasting. In Western nationalism and Eastern nationalism, Anderson (1992) claims that electronic media already exercises a more powerful influence than the print media, which he defines as the natural mother of nationalism. Both types will be analyzed. 70 Tensões Mundiais

7 Collective identity in the European Union 3.3 Hobsbawm and Ranger and the invention of tradition In their epochal work The invention of tradition (1983), Hobsbawm and Ranger claim that since the transformation of the state in modern times has started to destroy old social models, new traditions had to be invented in order to strengthen social cohesion, legitimize new institutions, and introduce and socialize new beliefs, values, and norms. 6 They claim that invented traditions are accumulated in every society and that a detailed tongue of symbolic practice and communication is always available. The first and most powerful traditions are the anthem, the flag, and the personification of the nation in symbol or image. For Hobsbawm and Ranger the main differences between the real old traditions and invented ones are that real practices were specific and strongly binding social exercises, whereas invented traditions are connected to questions of values, rights, or obligations, such as patriotism or duty expressed in standing up when singing an anthem. The other difference has been that invented traditions filled just a small part of the space left by the old traditions, above all in the private sphere. The invented traditions developed much more of an impact in the public sphere, in institutions such as schools, mass media, armed forces, the law, or citizenship. Hobsbawm and Ranger s approach of invented tradition is a rich source for the analysis of the EU, which invented many of their new traditions, without obviously claiming in most cases that they are connected to the past. In the second part of this analysis the author will analyze if the invented European traditions help to construct or strengthen a common European identity. 6 Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983, p.1) define invented traditions as a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition; automatically implying continuity with the past (1983, p.9). World Tensions 71

8 Adam Holesch 3.4 Anthony Smith and the common myth Anthony D. Smith (2009) agrees with the modernist assumption that nations are real and modern phenomena, but he contradicts the instrumentalist view that nations are just a feature or a product of modernity, largely influenced and manipulated by certain elites. Smith is claiming that modern political nationalisms cannot be understood without reference to (these) earlier ethnic ties and memories, and, in some cases, to pre-modern ethnic identities and communities (SMITH, 1996, p.358). According to Smith, those ethnic origins of nations explain why the nationalist movement succeeded in mobilizing people behind its nation-building project. Smith distinguishes between an individual and a collective identity. The individual identity is much weaker, more susceptible to changes, where one can feel different identities in place and time. Collective identities instead are strong and persistent, even if sometimes not felt as strongly by their owners. Due to Smith s enormous number of publications, it is difficult to distinguish clearly the most important national-identity building tools; the terms he uses varied during more than four decades of publishing. The author decided to concentrate on Smith s scheme of the myth-symbol complex like the founding charter, the myth of the golden age and the common memories connected to the own territory (Smith, 1986). 7 Even if Smith gave a clear answer about the possibilities of a European identity claiming that, any attempt to create national or supranational facts is unlikely to be successful on the social and cultural levels (1993, p.134), he did not analyze every instrument he considers important in a nation- -building process. This paper will scrutinize whether his analysis from the beginnings of the 1990s could still be valid two decades later. 7 In other publications, Smith emphasized the following nation-building tools: rituals and ceremonies, political myths and symbols, the arts and history textbooks. 72 Tensões Mundiais

9 Collective identity in the European Union 4 European identity-building tools 4.1 Education and language As Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1990) remind us, mass education is one of the leading technologies for forging national identity. Education policy can not only endorse social values, but also strengthen social mobility. It also helps to maintain political stability (GREEN, 1997). Control over education is considered by some scholars of primary importance for the prospect of legitimizing European institutions (OLSEN, 2002). At the same time, education is a highly sensitive part of every nation-building process; this leads to anxiety in some EU Member states, which consider that the homogenization of education systems would imply the loss of their national identity (BEUKEL, 2001). Accordingly, national governments are historically jealous of their monopoly on education policy. Also for that reason, each member of the EU has a veto and the EU education policy can reflect just the minimal common denominator. The EU can help in the development of quality education in the Member States, but such incentive measures have to be decided by a qualified majority in the Council and co-decision with the European Parliament (Art TFEU, previously Art. 149 TEC). European Treaties do not allow for the harmonization of the content of Member States education systems. With the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU education should have become an important instrument in order to establish something like a European identity. Questions of identity and citizenship were partly addressed through generous funding by the EU s fifth framework program ( ). This development came to an end when, due to globalization trends, the EU gradually turned away from the political goal of creating a European identity and switched towards more economic goals in its education policy. European identity was slowly replaced by concepts like human resources and human capital. Since 1999, publications of the European Commission neglect the identity-creating potential of education and instead focus on the economic value of education (WALKENHORST, 2008). World Tensions 73

10 Adam Holesch The Bologna process is the clearest manifestation of this paradigm change. Education ministers from nearly every European country have created the European Higher Education Space (EHES). The Bologna Process was positioned outside of the EU with clear economic intentions. It should make the EHES more compatible, comparable, competitive and attractive for foreigners from all over the world (EUROPEAN COMISSION, 2003a). But even if Bologna clearly focused on functionalist-economic issues, many of the other EU programs are still based on co-ordination and co-operation, such as exchanges, funding and information. The most popular of the bilateral or multilateral exchange programs between universities has been the Erasmus program (European Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students). The European Commission hoped that it would help to develop something like a European identity (SHORE, 2000) and create an Erasmus generation. Publications on the development of Erasmus confirm that creating support for the EU was, along with economic considerations, central in that project (SIGALAS, 2010). An evaluation of the short-term results is inconclusive. While Fligstein (2008) or King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003) believe that participating in Erasmus increased the European identity of the students and made them more aware and fonder of other cultures; others scholars, such as Sigalas (2010), find that the Erasmus program failed to develop a European self-identity or to strengthen students European pride. Wilson (2011) argues that the Erasmus experience has not made students more pro-european for several reasons. In general, younger citizens of the EU and students in particular, think already of themselves as more European. Students who have taken part in Erasmus seem to be particularly pro-european, an attitude they had already before the exchange. However, there is a problem: all these studies examine just the short-term effects of Erasmus. There are still no studies considering the long-term effects of the program. We think that a line of research on the long- -term effects of the Erasmus exchange would show a growth of European identity. Another aspect of Gellner s approach is that mass-education is given in one vernacular language, which works in that case as a 74 Tensões Mundiais

11 Collective identity in the European Union kind of a social cement. This idea was widely refused by Renan (1882). The French thinker renounced the linguistic bond as an important foundation of the nation. According to his ideas, languages of a territory can change, and more important is the will of the people, considering their past efforts and the present choice to live together, which unites the nation. Nevertheless, many of the traditional nations have been concentrated around the topic of language, a concept developed by philosophers like Herder (1772) or Fichte (1808). When following both German thinkers, in the case of the European Union, language, which usually helped to strengthen the national-self, has the complete opposite effect. There are three main working languages in the European Union (English, French and to some extent German), but the EU functions above all in its framework of 23 official and 6 semi-official languages. Officially, the EU s language policy promotes multilingualism and tries to encourage the EU citizen to speak at least two foreign languages in addition to their mother tongue. There are some initiatives in the education sector. But in general, it could be said that despite all these efforts a large proportion of European citizens cannot communicate with each other. There are some interesting suggestions, such as introducing English as a common second language (HABERMAS, 2011), in order to create a common European public sphere. But if there were a European-wide obligation to have advanced English skills, there are doubts whether people would leave their national public-sphere in order to join the European public sphere mainly operating in a foreign language. 4.2 European citizenship and mobility The idea of mobility in general and of spatial mobility in particular has to be connected in the European context to the concept of a European citizenship. Bauböck (2007, p.453) defines European citizenship as a nested membership in a multilevel polity that operates at member state and union levels. It includes two basic characteristics: democratic representation at the supranational level, expressed through the right for EU citizens to vote in the European Parliament or local elections when living in a foreign World Tensions 75

12 Adam Holesch country; or the internal freedom of movement, connected with the right to settle or work in every EU Member State (with some temporal exceptions). The most salient issue of European citizenship has been the free movement of EU citizens, which started with the Schengen Agreement in 1985 between five of the ten member states of the EU (Benelux + France + Germany). Moreover, Article 45 TFEU gives the workers the right to full mobility. In Europe, the rates of spatial mobility across nation-states are, if compared to the US, low; just 0.3 per cent of the population per year re-locates beyond their home borders (HERM, 2008). According to EUROSTAT, in 2009, 31.9 million foreign citizens lived in the EU-27, and 11.9 million of them were citizens of another EU-27 Member State. When analyzing the influence of mobility on European identity we have to consider the two different ways to be mobile. First, the already well researched part of the so-called Eurostars (FAVELL, 2008), the highly-educated European elite. Second, we have to analyze mobility in the classical economic sense - searching for employment in other countries. Members of both groups can be considered as ambitious individuals, who historically have always left their country in the search for a better life: a key issue of industrialization and formation of the nation-state (WEBER, 1976). Until now the Eurostars have more often been the object of analysis. Even if they are considered in some publications as statistically not significant, they have a very high symbolic value for the European project. They usually develop a European identity (FLIGSTEIN, 2008). On the other hand, there is no clear empirical data on the development of European identity between for example the CEEs the mobile Central Eastern Europeans who have found employment in Britain since the EU Eastern enlargement. If the effects of mass mobility are still unexplored, what about EU citizenship itself? When the Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993, every citizen of an EU Member State automatically became a Citizen of the Union (Article 8). The most salient issue of the EU citizenship was to heighten the sense of belonging of the Union and enhance its legitimacy (COMMISSION REPORT FOR THE REFLECTING GROUP, 2005, p.19-20). 76 Tensões Mundiais

13 Collective identity in the European Union But already the meaning of the term Citizen of the Union is contested. How can we define someone as a citizen or as a member of a state when the EU is not a state in the conventional sense? An additional difficulty of the EU has been that its citizens do not internalize the rights and norms of European citizenship and do not connect them with the European citizenship; rather, they focus on their national citizenship. This situation is connected to other problems of the European citizenship: most of the new rights in Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty already existed or they are so narrow that they have no legal impact. Even if the rights of EU citizenship are clear, what are its duties? Article 8 doesn t state any duties at all. Moreover, the concept of citizenship is subordinate to the framework of the nation-state. The decision of who finally is or isn t a European citizen falls to the nation-state. There is also no neutral European passport. In a nutshell, you cannot be a citizen of the European Union, if you are not a citizen of an EU Member State. Consequently, the role of European citizenship challenges the hegemonic principle of national sovereignty existing in Europe. The value of European citizenship is above all symbolic, connected also to the Schengen Area; it is expressed, for example, when EU citizens pass without any control through customs at European airports. The existence of the so-called Eurostars, also has a highly symbolic character. Both symbolic aspects are without doubt weak nation-building tools of the European Union; but they are closer to the Hobsbawm and Rangers concept of Invented Traditions, created to be a core justification of a European identity to replace the missing common language or culture. 4.3 Communication sphere media Reading a newspaper was for Hegel the substitute for morning prayers. For Anderson (1983) it represents a mass ceremony, with the participant knowing that others members of his imagined community perform this ceremony as well. The newspaper mass ceremony and the past evening news on television were performed daily. However, the 24-hour news channels as well as the internet allow nowadays for a permanent ceremony ; which World Tensions 77

14 Adam Holesch has been usually dressed in a national context. Through that permanency the communication sphere has also become, in the last years, a part of the banal nationalism; working through its permanent repetition in a quite unconscious way (BILLIG, 1995). The question of European media is closely related to the question of a public sphere and of a common language. Some scholars claim that without a common language, a common public sphere cannot exist (GRIMM, 1995). 8 Other studies claim that it does exist, even if that European public sphere is quite small (DIÉZ-MEDRANO, 2009). But still, if there were a common public sphere, there is, apart from some exceptions, no common European media. 9 Even if the European Commission has been aware of the importance of information - Information is a decisive, perhaps the most decisive, factor in European unification... (CEC 1984, p. 2) - many initiatives of the European Commission to establish new media institutions failed or stayed in an embryonic phase (SHORE, 2000). An additional problem is not only that the EU does not have its own European media. Simultaneously, it has also a national media in its back, which protects the nation-state and questions every European identity-building move. There are different national narratives about European integration. Usually the support for the EU integration follows the following pattern: if the opinion of the citizens about the performance of supranational institutions is higher than that of national institutions, then their support for EU integration is greater (SÁNCHEZ CUENCA, 2000). Stronger EU Member States, such as Germany, France and the UK, whose institutions are considered by their citizens as working well, have a critical national media. Knowing the preferences of that national public sphere, the media usually deliver them a eurosceptical narrative. 8 Already John Stewart Mill drew attention to this problem in another context: Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist (MILL, 1861, p. 428). 9 The exceptions are the European news channel Euronews or some Brussels-centric newspapers such as the EU Observer, whose distribution is restricted to cities with EU institutions 78 Tensões Mundiais

15 Collective identity in the European Union Moreover, past nation-building projects have been usually controlled by the national public sphere; and hence have been outside the control of the international community. Only when some extreme positions were taken did the international media and public take interest. But nowadays, multiple actors, such as euro-skeptical media from different countries, governments of nation-states, and international actors, such as the USA, monitor the European identity-building process. In a nutshell, as in the case of language, media is quite counter-productive for the construction of a European identity. 4.4 Invented traditions/symbolism Alongside the concept of invented traditions, Hobsbawm sees political symbols as the successors of the holy icons that were widely used in collective religious practices (HOBSBAWM, 1990, p.71). Hobsbawm connects political symbols to their role in the process of social engineering, which enters into the making of nations (ibid, p.10). 10 Some scholars consider European symbols as arguably important identity-building tools of the European Union, designed and consciously used by European elites to foster the political and institutional legitimacy of the EU (SHORE, 2000; BRUTER, 2005). However, the successful protests over the introduction of EU symbols into the European Constitution not only revealed that symbols are considered problematic by some EU Members, but also that this highlighting of symbols is not that important, given that they were quite easily abandoned by all parties. In addition, the newest European symbol, the Euro, not only divides the EU in the Euro-area and non Euro-area, but it also barely has an impact on the European identity of most Euro-area 10 The most common understanding of the role of symbols is as emblems of group life, which serve primarily as instruments of communication (KLATCH, 1988, p.139). This interpretation is very similar to Emile Durkheim s approach of collective representations (DURKHEIM, 1915, p.232) as a system of symbols by means of which society becomes conscious of itself (DURKHEIM, 1951, p.312). Pierre Bourdieu (1991), for his part, understands symbols as instruments of domination. World Tensions 79

16 Adam Holesch citizens. And this is just one of the problems of the Euro, which was frenetically celebrated as a very important new symbolic marker. A comparison of Euro - area and non Euro - area countries shows that citizens of the Euro countries see the common currency (49%) as more important than the freedom of movement (43%). In comparison, non Euro - area countries mention the Euro half as often (23%) as the freedom of movement (47%) (EUROBAROMETER, August 2010). Moreover, other Eurobarometer data (EUROBAROMETER Flash, September 2010) reveals that the impact of the Euro on Europe s citizens has quite ambivalent effects. Taking into account that the numbers vary in different European countries, it can be affirmed that 67% of citizens in the Euro zone widely supported the Euro, but about 77% of Euro zone citizens also thought that the common currency doesn t have any effect on their feelings of being European at all. 11 It seems that the strongest EU marker is widely accepted in its economic function, but fails to strengthen the common European demos as a national symbol. The other symbol strongly recognized by EU citizens, the European flag, does not divide EU citizens, but has a problem with its exclusivity. Usually the flag has always been shown side by side with the national flag in Member States who are in favor of European integration. A European flag is almost never shown alone in the national context of a Member State. A flag is usually the expression of a banal nationalism in conventional nations, with its permanent flagging or reminding of nationhood (BILLIG, 1995). Banal nationalism, working well on the national level, is quite problematic when practiced on the European level because, in order to be strong, it should be exclusive. When shown together with the national flag, the European flag is just a banal reminder that the European Union is a state of the states and not a state of the people. 11 The 20% of the citizens who gave a positive answer will not be analyzed further, in particular due to the selection effect, which means that they could have already felt European before the introduction of the Euro. 80 Tensões Mundiais

17 Collective identity in the European Union The EU s anthem, Beethoven s Ode to Joy, is only recognized by 36% of EU citizens (EUROBAROMETER, 2005, p.62). Besides that, it is also an anthem without words; thus, it cannot be sung. It is rarely used in the national context, and if so, it is usually played before or after the national anthem. Also the EU-Motto United in Diversity and the Europe-Day are not really known by EU citizens. The European passport, the EU border-sign and drivers licenses/id card are used together with the national documents; and, for this reason, they are not very effective (EUROBAROMETER, 2005, p.62). 4.5 Common EU myth Central in Smith s thinking is the question of the myth. This idea, developed by Malinowski (1926), portrays myth as a charter for legitimization. In the case of the EU, the myth of foundation and the myth of the golden age are highly related. The myth of foundation can be connected not only to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, but also to European national hot-buttons of formal and popular political discourse; to which we can count the peace after the Second World War or the successes of the European integration, such as the economic integration or the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Without doubt, Europe as a continent could find its myth of the golden age in the time of European dominance between ; but this time period is difficult to convert into a positive myth, due to extensive and permanent inner-european wars or the era of colonization. Thus, the success story of European integration is forced to represent Europe s golden age, which is still under construction. But at the same time Eurobarometer data shows that the importance of peace and prosperity after WW2 is losing importance for EU citizens. Hence, that myth is already losing some of its possible impact, even before being fully developed. Collective European memory can hardly unite all European nations. It surely divides, not unifies, Europeans. There has been some attempts from the Francophone parts of the European Commission to develop something like a common European myth by rewriting European history (SHORE, 2000; NAGEL, 1999). But World Tensions 81

18 Adam Holesch those attempts have failed because of the impossibility to find a common European narrative. The European architects have also tried to accentuate a European cultural unity based on a shared ancient civilization. This approach is very close to the family of cultures proposed by Smith, which could work in the long term. Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions, Judeo-Christian ethics, and cultural heritage like Renaissance humanism, rationalism, empiricism, romanticism, and classicism could be seen as parts of a European culture. But how to distinguish these European values from the values existing, for example, in the United States? The EU has to date been unable to give an answer. Furthermore, the EU s social purpose, the myth of the future, which some scholars (HOWE, 1995; LEICESTER, 1996) suggest in order to replace missing common memories cannot really help in the building of a collective-identity. It still has not been shown that a symbol representing the future can be really effective. 5 Conclusions This paper tried to answer the following research question: Which instruments does the EU possess for fostering European identity? Relying on the nation-building tools found in the most important theories on nationalism, the analysis finds the following results. In the sector of education, the EU does not possess many tools; the Erasmus exchange program provides ambiguous results, the Bologna process pursues economic goals, and the rewriting of history books is impossible. The tool of language has been counterproductive, being one of the biggest obstacles for a common public sphere. The tool of mobility and EU citizenship is highly symbolic; the first is dominated by economic issues and the latter focuses on the principles of the nation-state. There is no European media and the salience of European issues in the national media does not improve attitudes towards the EU; national media usually give a negative narrative about the EU. Considering European symbols, the European Union has to share the few identity-building tools it has with the nation-state; and exclusive nation-building tools, 82 Tensões Mundiais

19 Collective identity in the European Union such as the common currency, not only have a stronger economic than symbolic impact, but it also creates new cleavages, as in the case of the division of the EU in EMU and non-emu countries. An instrument, which has been persistently used, is the myth of foundation or the myth of the golden age. But this instrument, instead of becoming stronger, has been getting weaker. Other myths are not available and there are also no common successful European memories. These results show that even if identities are dynamic and could rapidly change due to some critical junctures or external events in the near future, the construction of a common European identity remains a complicated task. Even if the dynamics of identity-building supported the view that the European identity needs time to be developed, the constantly changing container of that identity (boundaries, integration dynamics like the Euro-zone) makes each of those identity formation efforts difficult or even impossible. World Tensions 83