Tuan Guru, community and conflict in Lombok, Indonesia

Transcription

1 Tuan Guru, community and conflict in Lombok, Indonesia Jeremy Kingsley Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2010 Melbourne Law School The University of Melbourne

2 ii To Ria my partner in an adventurous and mischievous life.

3 Abstract Violence is an ongoing issue of concern in Indonesia. Recent periods of political, social and economic instability have seen outbreaks of violence across the archipelago, often between rival religious or ethnic groups. This has also been the case on the eastern Indonesian island of Lombok, which has both an ethnically and religiously diverse population. Lombok s capital, Mataram, and the surrounding area of West Lombok form the focus of the field research for this thesis. Both have a Muslim majority and large Christian and Hindu minority communities. This religious and cultural diversity has at times been a source of tension. This thesis explores two local communities in Mataram and West Lombok, as well as looking more broadly at Mataram during provincial elections. The research examines not only communal and political tensions that arose in these communities, but also how conflict was successfully avoided or resolved. This thesis argues that partnerships between state and non-state actors and institutions are integral to conflict management. This cooperation is of particular importance given the relative weakness of state institutions in Lombok, including the police and courts. Therefore, the value of local communities and non-state actors in conflict avoidance and resolution cannot be underestimated. Local religious leaders, Tuan Guru, are key non-state actors who are essential to conflict management processes in Lombok. Tuan Guru have a high degree of influence in pious Lombok society. This means that they are able to act as social stabilisers and mediators during periods of tension in local communities. This thesis also points to the localised nature of dispute resolution, as highlighted in case studies of conflict avoidance during the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections and dispute resolution in the West Lombok village that I have named Bok. These cases demonstrate that social relationships both within and between communities, adat (customary practices) and local leadership all play vital roles in resolving tensions and protecting citizens from the effects of violence. Of particular importance are good social relations, the absence of which can lead ethnic minorities to become iii

4 marginalised and alienated from the rest of the community. Without strong social relationships, minorities are vulnerable to violence should tensions arise. This thesis demonstrates that conflict management in Mataram and West Lombok, whether it be during local provincial elections or within a local community, is an intricate process. Rather than creating one-size fits all solutions, conflict management in the highly localised context of Lombok draws upon local legal culture(s) that offer a range of social and legal tools. These include drawing upon sources of locally relevant authority, both state and non-state, such as religious leaders, public servants and the police. Working together, these groups can assist in facilitating community solutions to avoid or resolve conflict. The actors involved and approaches used will differ from community-to-community and depend upon the circumstance, but in most cases Tuan Guru are key to the outcome. iv

5 Declaration This is to certify that i. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD, ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used, iii. the thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices. Signed: Dated: v

6 Acknowledgements Writing a doctoral thesis is like the Tour de France. In many ways it is a very individual activity, but without the encouragement, strategic guidance and support of one s riding team, no cyclist can take on the mountains and successfully complete the event. I could not have sustained this four year journey alone. There are many people whose assistance, love, guidance and encouragement has kept me going. Throughout this journey, including my frequent and lengthy travels far from home, one constant has been my family s support. My parents patience and understanding (despite often finding my trajectory in life perplexing) is something that I cherish. Yotti, Ruthie, Ryan and little Daniel your love, support and technical assistance has sustained me. Thanks must also be extended to my larger family, the Gonns, Platts and Pressers. You have all created a warm and laughter-filled world for me. My research was assisted by several university students in Mataram, whose expertise and knowledge I relied upon everyday in Lombok. We learned together and they have seen me at my best and worst. These four fantastic assistants were Zey Sahnan, Herawati, Nurmala Fahriyanti and Muhammad Dimiati. My local sponsor, Bapak H. Asnawi, and the staff and students of the State Islamic University of Mataram made me feel welcome and at home from my first day on campus. Life is about family and friends. In Lombok, I had the privilege of making some wonderful friends, including Lalu Nurtaat, Kartini, Abdul Wahid, Atun Wadatun and Mohammad Abdun Nasir. Your generosity of spirit and friendship during my time in Mataram made life so much easier and more enjoyable. While in Lombok my family in Kampung Lom provided me with a generosity that enriched my experience exponentially. They became my second family. Their joy and tears gave this outsider a glimpse of what Lombok is really about. My principal supervisor, Tim Lindsey, helped me start this crazy venture and has been there every step of the way. Whether it was our meetings in Jakarta or his tough love in Melbourne, his support and mentorship is more than appreciated. My two vi

7 other supervisors, Abdullah Saeed and Michael Feener, have encouraged me along this lengthy journey. I am thankful for their critical feedback and wisdom. During my studies many people at the Asian Law Centre, Centre for Islamic Law and Society and the Melbourne Law School have been there for me too. I would like to make particular mention of Dina Afrianty, Melissa Crouch, Denny Indrayana, Quan Nguyen, Helen Pausacker, Arskal Salim and Kerstin Steiner. Watching these scholars take on their doctoral studies has been an inspiration. The task of completing a thesis is an academic exercise, but with many administrative hurdles. As a consequence, I would also like to thank several staff of the Melbourne Law School Research Office and Asian Law Centre, particularly Kathryn Taylor, Kelly McDermott, Jessica Cotton and Lucy O Brien. They fielded my million and one questions, often asked from thousands of kilometres away. I was financially supported in my doctoral studies and field research by Tim Lindsey s ARC Federation Fellowship for a Doctoral Scholarship, an Endeavour Australia Cheung Kong Fellowship, a Melbourne University Travelling Abroad Scholarship, a Melbourne University Asia Fieldwork Scholarship, a Melbourne Law School Research Support Fund Grant and the Bernard Lustig Scholarship. For this generous support I am grateful. Before leaving for the field, Tim Lindsey told me, almost tauntingly, that Indonesia is addictive. I refused to believe him I was no sentimentalist! This turned out to be one of the many assumptions that was proven wrong while living in Lombok. As it turned out, I was deeply affected. I remember going to the bathroom on the flight from Lombok to Singapore at the end of my field research locking the door and then crying was it joy, relief or sorrow? The answer is that it was a cocktail of these emotions. Whatever the case, Lombok and Indonesia are now part of me. My final note of appreciation is the most important. I am lucky to have met my partner in life, Maria Platt. We have done our doctoral studies in parallel, spending over a year in the field together. From this experience we have come out stronger! Maria, I would not have been able to complete this thesis without you. vii

8 Table of contents Abstract... iii Declaration...v Acknowledgements...vi Table of contents... viii List of tables, figures and illustrations...x Currency...xii Photographs...xii Glossary... xiii Chapter 1 Weak state, strong communities?...1 Situating this research...6 Weak state, strong communities?...12 Interpreting Lombok society and legal structures A view from outside...18 Chaotic harmony in difficult circumstances...26 Conclusion...31 Chapter 2 The troubled transition...33 The law enforcement void...35 Power shifts local...46 Community responses to crime...50 The economics of violence...58 The January riots More than burning tyres...63 Conclusion...72 Chapter 3 Tuan Guru guardians of religious traditions...75 Who are Tuan Guru?...78 The historical emergence of Tuan Guru...94 Locating religion in Lombok...98 Embedded power Guardians of religious traditions The key to social stabilisation Conclusion Chapter 4 Adat, leadership and community Lom Unity in diversity? Adat Lore of the local Local leadership Communal relationships The importance of mutual benefit A time of riots Testing a community s resolve Local security measures Paid ronda and pamswakarsa Conclusion viii

9 Chapter 5 The art of conflict management Avoiding and resolving conflict Case study provincial elections and the power of partnerships Ethnic tensions and political violence in Lombok Political and religious cooperation Implementation of conflict management Case Study Testing times in Bok The pressures of leadership Local political rivalries The temperature continues to rise Powerful negotiations Conclusion Chapter 6 Chaotic harmony The crux of conflict management Bibliography Appendix 1 Court data ix

10 List of tables, figures and illustrations Picture 1.1 An idul fitri parade...3 Picture 1.2 Scaffolding outside the front of Santa Maria Immaculate...4 Picture 1.3 The altar of Santa Maria Immaculate...4 Picture 1.4 Santa Maria Immaculate during renovations...4 Picture 1.5 Hindu celebrations in early Picture 1.6 A joget in Mataram...10 Picture 1.7 Former NTB Governor, Lalu Serinata...28 Picture 2.1 A Mataram police station...37 Picture 2.2 The Magistrates Court in Mataram...43 Picture 2.3 Amphibi post in central Mataram...45 Picture 2.4 A member of pamswakarsa, Satgas...57 Picture 2.5 Governor TGH Bajang and Deputy Governor Badrul Munir...62 Picture 2.6 An anti-violence billboard...70 Picture 3.1 Pondok Pesantren Abhariyah...75 Picture 3.2 TGH Sofwan Hakim...81 Picture 3.3 TGH Mustiadi Abhar...82 Picture 3.4 TGH Abdul Hamid...82 Picture 3.5 TGH Ulul Azmi...83 Picture 3.6 Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim...89 Picture 3.7 TGH Subkhi Sasaki...91 Picture 3.8 A Mataram Mosque Picture 3.9 Pengajian in Memben, East Lombok Picture 3.10 Minaret in Jerneng, West Lombok Picture 3.11 Crowds at an NW Pancor anniversary rally Picture 3.12 TGH Bajang addressing the NW Pancor anniversary Picture 4.1 Komplek Lom Picture 4.2 Komplek Lom Picture 4.3 Kampung Lom Picture 4.4 Kampung Lom Picture 4.5 Common area in Lom Picture 4.6 Multi-purpose area in Lom Picture 4.7 Komplek Cina Lom Picture 4.8 Kampung Lom s musholla Picture 4.9 Kampung Lom resident in Amphibi uniform Picture 4.10 Kampung Lom resident in Lang-Lang uniform Picture 4.11 Amphibi identity card x

11 Picture 4.12 View of Lom from the fields Picture 5.1 Gubernatorial campaign material Picture 5.2 Polling booths in Mataram Picture 5.3 Bajang-Munir Posters Picture 5.4 A sporting tournament in Bok Picture 5.5 Santri at Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim Picture 6.1 A nyongkolan Map 1.1 Indonesia, with Lombok circled...7 Map 1.2 Lombok, with Mataram and West Lombok circled...7 Map 4.1 Lom Table 2.1 Traffic-related matters lodged in the Magistrates Court Mataram Table 3.1 Religious leadership in Bok...81 Table 4.1 NTB government structure xi

12 Currency At the time of undertaking the field research during , one Australian dollar ($AU) equalled approximately 8000 Indonesian Rupiah (Rp). Therefore, this will be the exchange rate used throughout this thesis. Photographs All photographs used in this thesis were taken by the author while undertaking field research in Lombok, Indonesia, in xii

13 Glossary All Indonesian and Sasak words are indicated through the use of italics throughout this thesis, except for place names. Sasak words are further denoted by the letter (S) in this glossary. Words of Arabic origin which are in common usage in the Indonesian language are not denoted with a specific marker. abangan adat agama akidah Aliansi Masyrakat Adat Nasional (AMAN) Amphibi Bahasa Sasak berugaq (S) Bintara Pembina Desa (Babinsa) Babinmaspol Bujak Bupati dakwah dana taktis Departemen Agama Indonesians who are nominally Muslim but also observe aspects of adat and other cultural traditions local custom and social expectations, akin to local rules religion belief, faith National Alliance for Adat Societies the word aman means safety the name of the largest of Lombok s pamswakarsa. Sasak language a traditional pavillion/sitting platform used for socialising military liaison officer in Indonesian villages police liaison officer in Indonesian villages a pamswakarsa that is no longer active in Mataram and West Lombok. Regent, Head of Regency Islamic outreach or missionary activities a discretionary source of government expenditure outside normal accountability and audit requirements (also known as non-budgetar) Ministry of Religious Affairs xiii

14 desa Dharma Wisesa dukun dusun fatwa Fiqh Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB) Hadith Haj halus haram Hezbullah ibadah idul fitri Institut Agama Islam Negeri Mataram (IAIN) jilbab joget jumatan Kabupaten kampung kawin lari Kepala Camat Kepala Desa rural village Hindu pamswakarsa in Lombok traditional healer hamlet non-binding religious opinion of an Islamic scholar or organisation Islamic jurisprudence Forum to Maintain Inter-religious Harmony the prophetic traditions pilgrimage by Muslims to Mecca cultured or refined forbidden according to Islam the Lombok pamswakarsa controlled by NW Anjani religious devotion celebration marking the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan The State Islamic Institute Mataram Islamic head scarf worn by women traditional dance Friday prayers Regency urban village a form of spontaneous elopement head of kecamatan (sub-district) head of rural village xiv

15 Kepala Dusun Kepala Lingkungan Kepala Polda (Kapolda) Kepala RT / RW Kepolisian Republik Indonesia kerukunan kekerasan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat (Kesbanglinmas) Ketua khutbah kitab kuning Kiyai komplek Korps Brigade Mobil (Brimob) kul-kul Lang-Lang Jagad Titi Guna (Lang-Lang) Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia Untuk Keadilan (LBH-Apik) Lembaga Dakwah Majelis Ulama Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) head of hamlet head of residential area Police Chief, Provincial Police neighbourhood leaders the national police social harmony violence, riots Office of National Unity and Community Protection. Essentially local intelligence chair, chief of an organisation sermon delivered during Friday prayers literally yellow books religious texts used at Islamic schools containing commentaries on the Qur an and Islamic law Islamic religious leader and teacher in Java. In Lombok, the word is also used to identify a village-level state-appointed religious official a housing development, typically inhabited by middle-class residents Mobile Brigade, national paramilitary police unit wooden drum which is struck to sound an alarm Mataram-based pamswakarsa Legal Aid Foundation - Indonesian Women s Association for Justice The Muslim Outreach Institute (in Lombok) The Ulama Association (in Lombok) Council of Indonesian Muslims a quasi-state body that oversees religious matters and delivers xv

16 fatwa masjid masyarakat muamalah Muhammadiyah mushawara musholla Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) Negara Hukum nyongkolan (S) ojek Orde Baru pamswakarsa Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) Golkar Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) Pastor mosque Muslim place of public worship society social relationships an Indonesian modernist mass Muslim religious movement consultative community meeting small mosque, no Friday sermon is given at these places of prayer a traditionalist mass Muslim religious movement a local traditionalist mass Muslim movement in Lombok (similar to Nahdlatul Ulama) law-based state traditional Sasak wedding parade motorcycle taxi driver literally New Order, refers to the era when President Soeharto s government administered Indonesia community-operated militia or security groups Crescent Star Party People s Sovereignty Party Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle literally Functional Work Groups Party Prosperous Justice Party National Awakening Party United Development Party Catholic Priest xvi

17 pemuda Penghulu Pendeta Pengadilan Negeri Pengadilan Tinggi pengajian Peraturan Daerah (PerDA) Perlindungan Masyarakat (Linmas) Polisi Daerah (Polda) Polsek pondok pesantren pura Qur an Reformasi ronda Rukun Tetangga (RT) Rukun Warga (RW) santri Sasak Sasak Buda Satgas youth a village-level state appointed religious official Reverend Magistrates Court High Court Qur anic study group Regional Regulations unarmed police auxiliary Provincial Police abbreviation for sectoral police police operating at the sub-district level Islamic boarding school Hindu temple the main religious text of the Islamic faith Reformation the political reform process that brought democracy and decentralisation to Indonesia after the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998 a traditional night watch, usually involving community members guarding their kampung a neighbourhood association that encompasses several streets a governmental unit that encompasses several RT students of a pondok pesantren and religious followers of Tuan Guru ethnic group indigenous to Lombok non-muslim Sasak who adhere to animist and Buddhist beliefs the Lombok pamswakarsa controlled by NW Pancor xvii

18 satpam suku Sunnah Syari ah tabligh akbar Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) tokoh adat tokoh agama tokoh masyarakat Tuan Guru (TGH) ulama umat/ummah Undang-undang Universitas Mataram (UNRAM) upacara ustadz (male)/ustadzah (female) Waktu Lima Walikota warga warung Wetu Telu zikir bersama private security guards literally ethnic group or tribe behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad which acts as a guide for Muslims. Islamic law mass religious meeting Indonesian National Army adat (local customary rules) leader religious leader community leader a Sasak Islamic teacher and leader similar to Kiyai in Java Muslim religious leader the Islamic community statute produced by the national legislature (DPR) The University of Mataram ceremony Muslim religious teacher refers to the orthodox Sasak Muslim majority in Lombok. mayor residents or citizens food stall this is a syncretic Muslim group predominantly found in northern Lombok group prayers xviii

19 Chapter 1 Weak state, strong communities? Research for this thesis commenced with a day of surfing the internet. I was searching for stories of communal violence in Indonesia. What were the issues and where should I undertake my research? I wanted to study the social instability and violence that occurred in the wake of the fall of President Soeharto and his government in However, this topic was simply too large for a doctoral thesis and refinement was necessary. So after several hours of trawling through dozens of articles covering events as varied as the riots in Jakarta and ethnic conflict in Kalimantan, I stumbled across a news report about five days of riots in Mataram and West Lombok that occurred in January These events had seen Chinese and Christian Indonesian residents flee the island for Bali or further afield, along with more than 4000 foreign tourists. During these riots significant property damage and looting also occurred. With this one news clipping my interest was piqued. This is where my research into conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok began. Flash forward just over one year later and I am transfixed while seated in the small office of Pastor Rosarius next to his church, Santa Maria Immaculate, in Mataram. Causing this hypnotic effect were images of flames shooting across the computer screen in front of me. These were images of Santa Maria Immaculate ablaze during the January 2000 riots, when the church was razed by Muslim rioters. 1 It was a potent reminder of the continuing emotional effects of the riots. These five days saw an anarchic and violent reality distant from the core teachings of Islam as understood by many Muslim scholars in Lombok. 2 There is, of course, significant support for the peaceful and non-violent resolution of conflicts within Islamic teaching. 3 1 Field notes, 11 October Interview with TGH Ulul Azmi (Jerneng, West Lombok, 17 December 2007); Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008); Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). TGH means Tuan Guru Hajji. 3 Mohammed Abu-Nimer, A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam (2000) 15 Journal of Law and Religion 217, 219. See also Karl-Wolfgang Troger, Peace and Islam: In Theory and Practice (1990) 1 Islam and Christian Muslim Relations 24; Mohammad Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam Theory and Practice (2003). 1

20 The meaning of the word Islam, which is too often translated quickly by the mere idea of submission but also contains the twofold meaning of peace and wholehearted self-giving. 4 Listening to Pastor Rosarius, however, it was hard to avoid the question of where peace or the humility of submission to God was during the January 2000 riots? The capacity of the symbols of Islam to be mobilised to support communal violence was recognised by the local Islamic religious leaders, Tuan Guru. 5 With their followers (santri), many Tuan Guru sought to provide restitution to their Christian neighbours in the period following the January 2000 riots for what had happened. Several Tuan Guru also told me of their personal shame about these events. They said that the rioters behaviour was against the teachings of Islam, which dictates to Muslims that at the core of their religion s belief is the imperative to strive to be good. 6 This involves seeking to understand people of different backgrounds and religious perspectives. 7 O humankind, God has created you from male and female and made you into diverse nations and tribes so that you may come to know each other Qur an, 49:13. 8 Perhaps naively, I had not realised the extent to which religion can be a force in social issues, but over the past decade the mainstream media has often pointed to its troubling connection with violence. The Qur anic verse above highlights an important religious injunction for Muslims the requirement of respect for plural religious and ethnic realities. One interpretation of the verse, common on Lombok, is that God has 4 Tariq Ramadan, The Messenger the Meanings of the Life of Muhammad (2008) 1. 5 Tuan Guru and their role as socio-religious leaders will be considered in Chapter 3. 6 For an in-depth account of this theological issue, see Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong (2000). 7 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009);. Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 8 Abdullah Yusuf Ali (translator), The Holy Qur an (2000). 2

21 created this diversity among people and that there is, therefore, an obligation to engage with people from various faiths and different backgrounds. It highlights that despite the extreme opinions and the violence sometimes perpetrated by some radical religious groups, at the heart of most religions, including Islam, peaceful coexistence is an important objective. This Qur anic verse has a high level of salience in Lombok s largest city, Mataram, and the surrounding area of West Lombok, because they have a Muslim-majority with large Christian and Hindu minoritycommunities. The symbolism of religious affiliation and ritual can be reflected in communal celebration as seen, for example, in the photograph below. It can also be utilised, however, for the purpose of mobilising communal tensions. Picture 1.1 An idul fitri parade (the Muslim celebration at the conclusion of the fasting month of Ramadan) in Mataram The reconciliation process between religious groups in Lombok has been protracted since the January 2000 riots. For instance, Santa Maria Immaculate only reopened in early 2008, after nearly eight years of restoration work. It is from these difficult and emotional events that this thesis emerges. The research investigates state and nonstate actors and organisations in Lombok involved with avoiding or resolving communal tensions and conflict. 3

22 Picture 1.2 Scaffolding outside the front of Santa Maria Immaculate during renovations in 2007 Picture 1.3 The altar of the church during renovations Picture 1.4 Santa Maria Immaculate during renovations 4

23 In this thesis I seek to develop an understanding of conflict management processes Mataram and West Lombok, a place that has experienced limited communal conflict over the past decade. Much of the literature on Indonesian social tensions have, understandably, explored the worst examples of tragic mob brutality and conflict, with significant deaths and violence reported, for example in Jakarta, Ambon and Poso. 9 In these places, sharp communal and political violence occurred. By comparison, Lombok s January 2000 riots (which will be considered in Chapter 2) were limited to only property damage rather than murders and sexual assaults. In essence, this was an example of a society that, although affected by the broader political and economic instability, did not descend into violence to the same extent as in other parts of Indonesia around this time. I was interested to consider why this was so, given that Lombok is one of Indonesia s poorest provinces; poverty and economic disparities have been widely recognised as important precursors to communal and political violence across Indonesia. 10 To add substance to my analysis of Lombok s conflict management processes, two case studies are used to investigate the management of communal and political tensions and conflict in Lombok (see Chapter 5). The events documented in these case studies occurred during They aim to provide tangible examples of conflict avoidance and resolution in order to answer the key question of this thesis: what are the legal and social mechanisms that have prevented communal violence in Mataram and West Lombok? 9 See Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad (eds), Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective (2002); Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (2004); Kasuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson (ed), Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia (2005); Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia (2006); Charles A. Coppel (ed), Violent Conflicts in Indonesia Analysis, Representation, Resolution (2006); John Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad Religious Violence in Indonesia (2007); Jamie S. Davidson, From Rebellion to Riots Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo (2008). 10 Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser and Menno Pradhan, Local Conflict in Indonesia Measuring Incidence and Identifying Patterns (Presented at the 75 Years of Development Research Conference, Cornell University, 7-9 May 2004) 5; Luca Mancini, Horizontal Inequality and Communal Violence: Evidence from Indonesian Districts (Working Paper No. 22, Centre for Research on Inequity, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford, 2005) 8; Rizal Sukma, Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: Causes and the Quest for Solution in Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson, Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia (2005) 19-20; David Brown and Ian Wilson, Ethnicized Violence in Indonesia: The Betawi Brotherhood Forum in Jakarta (Working Paper No. 145, Asia Research Institute, Murdoch University, 2007) 13. 5

24 The key findings of this research relate to the crucial role of religious leaders, Tuan Guru, in conflict management processes in Lombok as social stabilisers and mediators. Consequently, this thesis is the first comprehensive study of Tuan Guru and their role in conflict management, although their high social status and sociopolitical influence on Lombok affairs has certainly already been covered by a number of scholars. 11 The remainder of this chapter provides an outline of this thesis. The next section considers some basic geographic, social and economic background. Following this, I review weaknesses in state function and practice on the island. I then describe the research methodologies and theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. The final section of Chapter 1 then investigates social tensions and violence in Lombok, while evaluating the mechanisms for conflict management and the economic and social price (effect on the community) of violence over the past decade. The central argument of this thesis will be examined in the following sections, namely that nonstate actors, particularly Tuan Guru, play a vital role in the maintenance of social harmony in Lombok. Situating this research I conducted on over 15 months of field research in Mataram and West Lombok during While in the field, I conducted over 75 in-depth interviews, undertook detailed observational research and reviewed the archives of the Lombok Post over key years of social conflict ( and ). 11 See, for instance, Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977); Judith L. Ecklund, Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979); Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981); Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999); Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000); Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004); John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005); Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006). 6

25 Mataram is the capital city of the province of Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). Along with the island of Sumbawa, Lombok makes up NTB. The island of Lombok is located east of the Indonesian islands of Java and Bali. Mataram is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious city, 12 with a population of over 350, The majority of Mataram s population identify as Sasak, the indigenous ethnic group, who are predominantly Muslim. There are also substantial minorities of Christians (10%) and Hindus (15 20%). 14 In Lombok, sources of social tension include economic disparities and historical animosities, but the era of democracy and decentralisation have also seen the emergence of local political tensions that often coalesce around ethnic and religious fault lines. 15 Map 1.1 Indonesia, with Lombok circled Map 1.2 Lombok, with Mataram and West Lombok circled 12 Fathurrahman Zakaria, Mozaik Budaya Orang Mataram (1998) 9-14; Mustain and Fawaizul Umam, Pluralisme Pendidikan Agama Hubungan Muslim-Hindu di Lombok (2005) See also Badrul Munir, NTB Dalam Mozaik Keindonesiaan, Lombok Post (Mataram), 9 November Badan Pusat Statistik NTB, Mataram Dalam Angka (2008) Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April Hendardi, Republik Pluralis, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 14 August 2007; Abdul Wahid, NTB Plural Perlu Gerakan Harmoni, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August

26 Mataram s residents are heavily involved in religious rituals and organisations. This is reflected in the local government s slogan Mataram Progressive and Religious ( Mataram Maju dan Religius ). 16 Religious places of worship are highly visible in Mataram. According to the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, there are over 1898 places of Muslim worship in Mataram and West Lombok alone. 17 Complementing this are 17 churches, 307 Hindu temples, 10 Buddhist temples and one place of Confuscian worship. 18 The vibrancy of this cultural diversity, and the colour that it brings to Mataram, is seen with the Hindu religious festival, Hari Nyepi. The parade that forms a major part of the Nyepi festivities on Lombok is seen in Picture 1.5 (below). There are two reasons for emphasising Mataram and West Lombok. First, these are the places where the riots of January 2000 took place. Second, these areas are more religiously and ethnically diverse than other parts of Lombok. This leads potentially to more points of communal tension and conflict. Additionally, limiting my research to Mataram and West Lombok ensured a more focused and manageable sphere of research. Picture 1.5 Hindus celebrate, Hari Nyepi, in early This government slogan is discussed in Lalu Agus Fathurrahman, Menuju Masa Depan Peradaban Refleksi Budaya Etnik di NTB (2007) The devout nature of Mataram, and Lombok more broadly, has been discussed in Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999); Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006). 17 Badan Pusat Statistik NTB, Lombok Barat Dalam Angka (2007) 133; Badan Pusat Statistik NTB, Mataram Dalam Angka (2008) Ibid. 8

27 To research the whole of Lombok is difficult because of significant political, cultural and religious diversity. 19 Adat practices, for instance, vary among the Sasak across the island, in fact, Sasak adat varies in each village. 20 An example of this is the traditional Sasak dance party, known as a joget. These events are usually held in local communities to celebrate upcoming weddings or other festive occasions. This cultural practice comes from Bali it is, in fact, part of the Balinese colonial legacy in Lombok, discussed further below. 21 This celebration involves two or three female dancers performing a traditional dance with male members and guests of the community, accompanied by a traditional Sasak orchestra. The beautifully dressed woman dances seductively with male members of the community as seen in Picture 1.6 (below). This tradition is often referred to as seksi dansing (sexy dancing) because of its provocative nature, although, no touching is allowed. At the end of each song the women dancer is paid by the man who has had the privilege of dancing with a beautiful woman. This is a broadly acceptable social activity in West Lombok, 22 however, in East Lombok, which has been less influenced by Balinese practices, many Tuan Guru actively discourage this practice There has been recent scholarship on Lombok that considers the way that the local political elite has sought to create a politicised single cultural identity for the Sasak, but I feel that this overlooks the island s cultural diversity. The following are articles detailing the politicised use of adat, see Leena Avonius, Reforming Adat: Indonesian Indigenous People in the era of Reformasi (2003) 4 The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 123; Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia < at 19 January Ruth Krulfeld, Fatalism in Indonesia: Comparison of Socio-Religious Types on Lombok (1966) 39 Anthropological Quarterly 180, The complex engagement between Balinese and Sasak cultural practices is discussed in David Harnish, Isn t This Nice? It s Just Like Being in Bali: Constructing Balinese Music Culture in Lombok (2005) 14 Ethnomusicology Forum This emphasis upon Mataram and West Lombok means that Sasak minority groups, such as the Sasak Buda and Wetu Telu, will not be considered in great depth. These groups are predominantly found in northern Lombok outside the area covered in this field research. For greater discussion of these groups, see Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981); Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000); Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004); John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005). 23 Field notes, 9 January

28 Picture 1.6 A joget held in Mataram Another example of this cultural and religious diversity can be seen with wedding parades (nyongkolan). Nyongkolan are a popular adat ceremony in Mataram and West Lombok, but in East Lombok they face prohibition, or are at least frowned upon. TGH Humaidi Zaen, a Tuan Guru Lokal 24 from Memben, East Lombok, told me that he had advised his community not to undertake nyongkolan, because these ceremonies were unnecessarily expensive and disruptive to road users as they can cause traffic jams. 25 There are many other differences, within Lombok itself, including linguistic diversity the Sasak language, for example, has at least five dialects. 26 These differences among the Sasak can be linked to many factors, and include the island s geography and long period of colonial occupation. It has also been suggested that this cultural, linguistic and religious particularity dates back to the period even before Balinese imperialism, when Lombok was divided into numerous minor kingdoms. 27 The Balinese controlled Lombok from around 1677, and by 1740, they 24 Tuan Guru can be divided into Tuan Guru Lokal (local Tuan Guru) and Tuan Guru Besar (important Tuan Guru). These categories reflect their spheres of influence and will be discussed in Chapter 3. Put simply, Tuan Guru Besar are important religious leaders with influence across the island, while Tuan Guru Lokal are less significant religious leaders, whose influence tends to be restricted to their own, local communities. 25 Interview with TGH Humaidi Zaen (Memben, East Lombok, 9 August 2008). 26 Mahyuni, Speech Styles and Cultural Consciousness in Sasak Community (2006) Albert Leemann, Internal and External Factors of Socio-Cultural and Socio-Economic Dynamics in Lombok (Nusa Tenggara Barat) (1989)

29 had taken over the whole island. 28 There was, however, continual resistance in eastern Lombok and a major revolt by the Sasak from there in , supported by the Dutch. This rebellion ushered in a Dutch phase of colonial rule. 29 Balinese colonialism of over 200 years had a cultual impact on the island. It was felt more potently in west and northern Lombok, where Balinese control was most entrenched. This led to importation of their cultural practices into these areas to an extent much greater than in other parts of Lombok. Additionally, Lombok s eclectic nature extends to the influence of religious organisations. Muhammad Dimiati, a young religious leader from Mataram, told me something that I had heard several times, namely that different mass Islamic movements are dominant in different parts of Lombok. For instance Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is stronger in West Lombok, while Nahdlatul Wathan (NW), currently split into two rival factions NW Pancor and NW Anjani, are the foremost religious organisations in East Lombok. However, all these groups conduct activities across the island. 30 Despite highlighting the socio-cultural differences, there is fluidity in groupings and affiliations across the island. For instance, in the village I have called Lom 31 in Mataram 32 many of the religiously-active members of the community are affiliated to NW Pancor in East Lombok, and they go there almost every week for Friday prayers rather than attending major mosques nearby. 33 Therefore, my choice of Mataram and West Lombok had a substantive rationale the cultural and political diversity on the island. However, it was also necessary to limit the geographic boundaries of the research, which provided a more manageable area for fieldwork W. Cool, The Dutch in the East An Outline of the Military Operations in Lombock [Lombok], 1894 (1897); Alfons van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, (1980) Robert Cribb, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (1992) Field notes, 9 August Lom is a pseudonym used to protect the anonymity of one of the areas where I undertook research within. This is in compliance with the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee approval for this project. 32 This community is focused upon in Chapter Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 34 The effect of diversity across Lombok on research findings has been noted in Bianca J. Smith, Stealing Women, Stealing Men: Co-creating Cultures of Polygamy in a Pesantren in Eastern Indonesia (2009) 11 Journal of International Women s Studies 189,

30 Weak state, strong communities? My analysis of Lombok involves reflection upon the strengths and weaknesses of national institutions, such as the police and courts. Local affairs are directly affected by the national context. Since declaring independence in 1945, Indonesia has undergone several periods of social and political instability. This includes the transition from the first to second Indonesian President in This event saw hundreds of thousands of Communists (and alleged Communists) murdered in a semisanctioned outbreak of political violence. 35 Another period of instability followed the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and the subsequent collapse of the Soeharto Government in It led to outbreaks of violence across the Indonesian archipelago. 36 Economic and political turmoil during led to serious instability in Lombok. The island confronted a crime wave involving high rates of theft, anti-chinese riots, often out-of-control private militia and community security groups (pamswakarsa), and sporadic periods of politically-motivated conflict between ethnic groups. Underpinning this social instability was a weakening of state institutions. When state institutions failed to function adequately due to the collapse of the Soeharto government, local non-state authority figures and community groups sought to fill the law and order void, specifically in relation to the provision of law enforcement activities. There were many visible examples of this, such as the emergence of large pamswakarsa, including Amphibi and Bujak. 37 The weakness of the Indonesian state and its ineffectiveness in Lombok is dealt within Chapter 2. One of the practical problems caused by state weakness is that, rightly or wrongly, government officials are held in low regard by many people in Lombok. 38 If conflict 35 See Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings of : Studies from Java and Bali (1990); Fathurrahman Zakaria, Geger Gerakan 30 September 1965 Rakyat NTB Melawan Bahaya Merah (2 nd Edition, 2001). 36 For an in-depth exploration of various geographical outbreaks of violence and topics related to this period, see Charles A. Coppel (ed), Violent Conflicts in Indonesia Analysis, Representation, Resolution (2006). 37 John M. MacDougall, Self-reliant Militias (2003) Inside Indonesia < at 8 December This was a common point made to me by informants when discussing perceptions of government officials. For instance, Interview with Herawati (Mataram, 7 October 2007); Interview with Imam (Mataram, 20 October 2007). 12

31 avoidance and dispute resolution partnerships discussed throughout this thesis are to be strong and durable, then it is important that all parties, both state and non-state, are respected and effective. The significant and valued role of non-state leaders will be discussed in Chapters 3 5. One of the reasons for the importance of non-state actors has been the relative ineffectiveness of state actors. There has, for example, been widespread public criticism of government officials in Mataram (see Chapter 2). They are seen as being akin to thieves, with people openly suggesting that many public servants perceive themselves as being above the law. 39 Local politicians have been vocal for many years about the necessity for the provincial bureaucracy to be slimmed down. They feel it to be fat or bloated (gemuk). Public servants, it has been suggested, need to change their attitude and no longer consider themselves to be kings (raja) sitting above the community. 40 During the worst periods of the political transition to democratic governance, and the consequent crime wave in Lombok, people did not go to the police for assistance, but rather to pamswakarsa and non-state leaders, particularly Tuan Guru. 41 The police were not considered to be effective. In fact, in many cases, people perceived that seeking their help would make the situation worse. 42 While I was in the field during , there were no significant reforms to the performance of government departments and law enforcement agencies in Lombok, although TGH Bajang made reforming the provincial public service a priority of his incoming provincial administration. 43 Dahlan Bandu, a senior provincial public servant, felt that the NTB public service was slowly changing, but that the process must be seen as a marathon, rather than a sprint Kinerja Aparat Hukum Patut Dikritik Soge: Banyak Putusan di PN yang Selalu Dicurigai, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 December 1999; Reformasi Birokrasi Menjadi Kunci Perubahan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 November Reformasi, Baru Pada Tatanan Kepala dan Kaki Taqiuddin: Belum Ada Wacana Demokrasi di Birokrasi, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 June 2000; Birokrasi Yang Rigit, Ancam Iklim Democrasi, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 29 June Similar sentiments are also discussed by Denny Indrayana who considers the feudal nature of the implementation of law and behaviour of the Indonesian judiciary which he felt fosters corrupt activities, see Denny: Karakter Hukum Nasional Masih Feodal, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 June Perdamaian Disepakati, Lombok Selatan Aman Kembali, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 9 December Mengapa Kasus Pidana Tidak Dilaporkan ke Polisi?, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 December TGH Bajang, Pre-Inauguration Comments (Speech Delivered at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008). 44 Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007). 13

32 This thesis often emphasises non-state actors. However, when reflecting upon governance reform, it is necessary not to lose sight of the day-to-day realities and problems caused by poor management of government services. For instance, the power grid is unreliable in Lombok. During the wet season power outages are a daily occurrence varying in duration from some minutes to several hours. Various reasons are given for these problems, including the poor maintenance of the power stations/electrical cabling or diversion of electricity to the hotels in Senggigi (a beach resort town close to Mataram), which take too much power from the grid. 45 Whatever the true cause, it is seen locally as a continuing example, among many others, of the state s poor functioning in Lombok. Today the Indonesian state remains weak. Arguably it is strengthening, but, even if so, improvement is inconsistent and varies across the archipelago. 46 In Lombok, there is still a heavy reliance on non-state and local community organisations to fill gaps in government activities, such as health, education and welfare services. This involves a number of community organisations run by Tuan Guru and other community leaders. The state in many ways does not play a significant role within people s lives, or at least not as significant a role as do Tuan Guru, 47 whose socio-religious status and function is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3. This thesis, therefore, considers how non-state players can augment state action and reinforce the Indonesian legal concept of being a law-based state (Negara Hukum) 48 by supporting state institutions in conflict management. As mentioned, these issues of conflict management are investigated through in-depth analysis of local communities and two case studies. In all of these, partnerships between state and non-state actors and institutions are emphasised. Chapter 4 considers the way that local leadership and community relationships operate, particularly focusing on the area of Lom, Mataram, during and subsequent to the January 2000 riots. The two case studies are presented in Chapter 5. The first case study explores how the provincial government prepared for NTB gubernatorial 45 Field notes, 20 December Christian von Luebke, The Political Economy of Local Governance: Findings from an Indonesian Field Study (2009) 45 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 201, Inflasi Tuan Guru (1976) Tempo < at 18 May 2009; Muhammad Noor, Visi kebangsaan TGH Zainudin Abdul Madjid (2004). 48 This legal concept will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 2. 14

33 elections in July These preparations aimed to avoid religious, ethnic or political conflict in the lead up to, and following, the elections. The second of these case studies investigates events in the village of Bok, 49 West Lombok, particularly focusing on how state officials and communal leaders managed to defuse an outbreak of social and political turmoil during July These chapters show how conflict avoidance and dispute resolution mechanisms actually function on the ground. Throughout this thesis the terms state and non-state leadership, actors and organisations are used. When discussing state actors and institutions I refer to three elements. The first are state institutions. These include government departments, police and courts. The second element includes political leaders and public servants. The final element covers legal instruments, such as legislation. 50 When referring to non-state actors and institutions I mean, first, social structures, rules and customary practices or adat (predominantly Sasak adat). 51 The second aspect of the non-state category is leadership communal (tokoh masyarakat) and religious leadership (tokoh agama). 52 This categorisation into state and non-state has become blurred in recent years, as Tuan Guru have become actively involved in provincial and local politics. For instance, TGH Bajang is now the NTB provincial governor, which makes him a state actor, yet he is also a religious leader and head of the non-state religious mass movement, Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor. I have found that this dichtomy of state and non-state remains a useful typology for understanding socio-political affairs in Lombok, even if the elements within them are often blurred and sometimes overlap at their edges. 49 Bok is a pseudonyms used to protect the anonymity of one of the areas where I undertook research within. This is in compliance with the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee approval for this project. 50 For a comprehensive explanation of Indonesia s national legal structures, see Tim Lindsey and Mas Achmad Santosa, The Trajectory of Law Reform in Indonesia: A Short Overview of Legal Systems and Change in Indonesia in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008) In relation to the definition of adat, as a social process and form of local practices and rules, see M.B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia (1978) 50-51; Leena Avonius, Reforming Adat Indonesian Indigenous People in the Era of Reformasi (2003) 4 The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 123, 123; Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) xxxiii; Craig Thorburn, Adat, Conflict and Reconciliation: The Kei Islands, Southeast Maluku in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008) Adat leaders (tokoh adat) are not included in this leadership category because people in Lom and Bok saw these roles as being fulfilled by community and religious leaders. They do not form a discrete category of leadership in these communities. This was confirmed in several interviews: Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008); Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). This was also the situation in other parts of Mataram, see Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008); Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 16 August 2008). 15

34 On the surface, conflict management in Lombok seems to just happen. However, after closer scrutiny I realised that Lombok s chaotic harmony 53 is actually based on a complex series of local relationships, leadership structures and social norms, examples of which are highlighted in the following chapters. These strategies are not perfect or neat one-size-fits-all arrangements, but, rather, complex partnerships based on networks and relationships between neighbours, religious leaders, community figures and state actors. These partnerships are useful in two situations: the first are ad hoc solutions to particular conflicts or potential problems. The second involve ongoing conflict avoidance and dispute resolution processes. Community relationships and the role of local non-state leaders, both of which underpin the findings of this thesis, are explored in Chapter 4. An important aspect of the local security mechanisms emerges not from a group or government agency, but rather residents from different ethnic and religious groups protecting each other in times of communal tension and violence. These social relationships are characterised by regular communication and reliance on one and another. This role of community relationships has been described to me by many informants as an important element of Sasak adat. 54 There are examples of communities in Mataram where relationships were pivotal during difficult times for instance, Kampung Sukaraja Barat in Ampenan. This village is made up of Arab, Chinese and Sasak residents, who worked together during the January 2000 riots to ensure each others protection. The local press reported that community leaders from this kampung cooperated to ensure the security and safe evacuation of those under threat. 55 What will be seen time and again in the case studies is cooperation between state, community and religious leaders to avoid or resolve disputes. How does this occur? A community leader from East Lombok, Faharudin Hamdi, explained to me how, in 53 I use this notion of chaotic harmony to identify the fluid and flexible nature of the maintenance of social harmony in Lombok, which operates in what sometimes seems to be chaotic environment. 54 The importance of communal relationships was discussed by many of the informants. They came from various social and class positions, as well as both community and religious leaders. See Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007); Interview with Pendeta Hasanema (Mataram, 12 December 2007); Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 55 Sukaraja Barat, Miniatur Kerukunan Antar Etnis, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 January

35 general terms, these leaders coordinate their efforts. He said that religious leaders, particularly Tuan Guru, lay the groundwork for conflict resolution through their actions. This is achieved by Tuan Guru visiting protagonists and tailoring their teaching and sermons to facilitate an atmosphere that would create calm amongst the protagonists. State and non-state community leaders then undertake the practical activity of negotiating a resolution of the dispute. They often do this through a community meeting (mushawara). 56 An example of this process and the use of a mushawara is considered in Chapter 5. Conflict avoidance and resolution frameworks are a complex amalgam of activities, communal relationships and leadership. Included in these responses is the use of ritual to bring different ethnic and religious groups together. These activities can be used as a medium for celebrating unity and ties between groups. 57 An example of this is the annual Lombok festival of Perang Topat (war of the rice cakes), which is held in fields just outside Mataram. Youths from Lombok s Sasak and Hindu communities engage in a mock battle against each other. Their weapons are rice cakes, which they throw at each other. This has the affect of turning the sometimes tense relationships between these two groups into a festive game. At the end of the war, the two communities, led by their respective spiritual leaders, hold separate religious ceremonies side-by-side. 58 This reinforces a distinct, but respectful, communal arrangement. Groups celebrating joint activities together have also been considered an important element for maintaining social harmony elsewhere in Indonesia, for example in Manado, North Sulawesi, where events such as wedding feasts or funeral ceremonies based on community and family linkages help create relationships that are later used to manage social tension and resolve disputes. 59 The application of joint activities and festivities cannot be underestimated (examples of this are discussed in Chapter 4). People both working and having fun together often has a powerful unifying effect in Lombok. 56 Field notes, 10 August The importance of these community meetings in Lombok within conflict management and local decision-making was also discussed by Mohammad Koesnoe, Musjawarah Een Wijze van Volksbesluitvorming Adatrecht (1969) Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004) Mustain and Fawaizul Umam, Pluralisme Pendidikan Agama Hubungan Muslim-Hindu di Lombok (2005) Karen P. Kray, Operasi Lilin dan Ketupat: Conflict Prevention in North Sulawesi, Indonesia (MA Thesis, Ohio University, 2006) 7. 17

36 Despite believing that Lombok has, for the most part, been successful in maintaining communal harmony, I do not suggest that it is free of problems. As noted, riots occurred in January 2000 (as is described in Chapter 2). Fights can also arise over the smallest things, for instance, disputes between youth on the basketball court can become inflamed and lead to larger disputes. 60 In Lombok, communal norms precipitate an almost automatic sense of social solidarity. In these conditions, when conflict emerges, villagers often move without question to defend other members of their community, regardless of whether they have acted appropriately or were in fact fully or partially at fault. 61 Interpreting Lombok society and legal structures A view from outside Central to this thesis is an investigation of how to maintain social stability or resolve conflict at a time or in a place where the state is weakened, dysfunctional or simply not functioning. From a legal perspective this is difficult, because law and legal responses to issues normally assume state action. It is expected that a problem will be managed by legal instruments, such as legislation, which authorise the police or courts to act. But what happens if these instruments and institutions are non-existent, irrelevant or greatly weakened by changing local conditions? Due to the weakened state structure in Lombok, my research is at an intersection between the disciplines of law and political science. Essentially, I sought answers that extend beyond traditional legal responses to social tensions and communal conflict. Further to this, interdisciplinary research methods became imperative, because of the need to give depth to Lombok s complex social, political and legal context. 60 Interview with Achand (Mataram, 6 August 2008). 61 Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Mediation Center, Social Conflicts in Lombok (2007). 18

37 This thesis uses the concept of legal culture 62 developed by Lawrence Friedman as its theoretical cornerstone. 63 This notion is best expressed by Friedman himself when he wrote that the legal culture is a general expression for the way the legal system fits into the culture of the general society. 64 When using this theoretical framework law is considered to be courts and state institutions engaging, and being affected by, society and cultural factors (and visa versa). This allows for the study of law not just through the lens of formal written law (textual analysis), commonly known as black-letter law, but also considers the relationship between a society s members and its legal structures and rules, that is, contextual analysis. 65 American legal comparativist, John Merryman, considered that comparative legal studies, or the study of foreign legal systems, needed to be cognisant of context: legal systems have been formed, and are sustained, by the action of historical events, social imperatives and cultural forces law is more than a body of rules. 66 Legal scholars undertaking cross-cultural legal research, such as this, need to move beyond embedded assumptions in order to gain an understanding of a legal culture other than their own. 67 In Lombok, I heard frequently-repeated statements that local leaders, social norms and community rules were more important than the state. For instance, the owner of small local food stall (warung) close to my home told me that to resolve disputes in her kampung (urban village) people went to communal or religious leaders rather than the police or other state players or institutions. 68 Implicit in the concept of legal culture is the need to move beyond undertaking a legal analysis that only considers state- 62 The utility of legal culture came to my attention while undertaking research for my Masters thesis, see Jeremy Kingsley, Subverting the Global and Listening to the Local Reclaiming the Stories With(in) Comparative Legal Studies (LLM Thesis, Melbourne University, 2005). 63 See, for instance, Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development (1969) 24 Rutgers Law Review 11; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply in David Nelken, Comparing Legal Cultures (1997). See also: David Nelken, Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: An Introduction (1995) 4 Social & Legal Studies 435; Jothie Rajah, Policing Religion: Discursive Excursions into Singapore s Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in Penelope Nicholson and Sarah Biddulph, Examining Practice, Interrogating Theory: Comparative Legal Studies in Asia (2008) Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development (1969) 24 Rutgers Law Review 11, Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development in Lawrence M. Friedman and Stewart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences (1969) Pierre Legrand, John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal Studies: A Dialogue (1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 3, Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development (1969) 24 Rutgers Law Review 11, Field notes, 19 June

38 sanctioned laws and institutions. 69 It is essential to understand the intricate sociopolitical realities within which legal systems operate and tailor the analysis accordingly. 70 Therefore, the non-state actors and organisations, as well as adat practices, important in Lombok, should be incorporated into an analysis of the local legal culture(s). These non-state institutions can, depending upon the circumstances, be more potent and relevant than legislation and state institutions. This perspective correlates with observations made by Clifford Geertz, when he researched Bali half a century ago. He asserted that investigating non-state factors is essential in order to comprehend how Indonesian societies function and regulate themselves. 71 My research findings endorse this perspective by investigating the role of both state and non-state actors and institutions in conflict management processes. An example of the complexity of Lombok s legal cultures emerged in the Mataram community of Lom. 72 One of their leaders, Sahnan, told me that during the January 2000 riots several local residents from his urban village, Kampung Lom, had become involved in the disturbances. The kampung leadership and a majority of its members were unhappy with this. When the rioters returned from misbehaving, as Sahnan described it, they were detained by community members. 73 They were then taken to a small empty building at the edge of the community and held until the police came to collect them two or three days later. From there they were then taken to prison where they stayed for a few months until they had cooled down. 74 No formal charges were ever laid against these rioters, nor did they ever appear before a court. Justice was perceived to have been done by combining non-state (local justice in the kampung) with state action (police intervention) to provide an outcome that was supported by many, if not all, Kampung Lom residents. 75 This highlights an overlap in activity of state and non-state actors, while also showing a blurring of authority and 69 What is defined as legal and non-legal spheres is a troublesome, but important element of a legal culture, see Michael King, Comparing Legal Cultures in the Quest for Law s Identity in David Nelken, Comparing Legal Cultures (1997) Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System A Social Science Perspective (1975) Clifford Geertz, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight (2005) 134 Daedalus 56, 58 [Reprinted from (1972) 100 Daedalus 1]. 72 Discussed in Chapter Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 20

39 control. This example also identifies an inherent contradiction within the legal culture of Lombok. The community and police cooperated to provide a justice process, but to suggest it complied with formal legal processes or substantive Indonesian law would be untenable. 76 Roscoe Pound noted that law should not be considered a stand-alone tool, but as an agent for achieving social control. 77 In Lombok, social control emanates from both state and non-state sources. This flexible use of legal culture allows for an exploration of the baggage that exists underneath Lombok s legal cultures. 78 The challenges and complexity of Lombok s legal cultures require robust research methods. But even before implementing these methodologies it is necessary to have an attitude that is open to possibilities and unexpected findings. That is what empathy does it calls us to task...we are all shaken out of our complacency. We are all forced beyond our limited vision. 79 One of the biggest challenges for me while in Lombok was to remain empathetic to try to perceive issues and situations through other people s eyes. This approach allowed me to develop better understandings of several dynamic Lombok communities and slowly comprehend their social, political and economic complexities. An empathetic approach connects to an underpinning methodological framework applied to this research: immersion into the legal culture one is studying. Immersing oneself into another culture requires a process of cultural and linguistic 76 Chapter 2 provides an exploration of the limited court cases that took place as a consequence of these riots. 77 Roscoe Pound, Social Control Through Law (1942) Gunther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Review 411, 441. Pierre Legrand used a similar phrase, cultural baggage, in his article, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111, Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope (2006)

40 acclimatisation. 80 In order to do this, I found it necessary to obtain linguistic competence. Consequently, I undertook three months of intensive Indonesian language training at the University of Mataram at the start of my time in Lombok in early This provided me with basic foundations and was given specificity by the topics to be studied in my research. It provided me with a vocabulary to build on during interviews and casual discussions. Over the first few months in the field I also spent hours talking to neighbours and local shop owners to hone my verbal skills, as well as reading two or three Indonesian language newspapers each day to refine my grammar and vocabulary. Language training was a pragmatic necessity, as not many people in Lombok speak English, but I was also aware that languages open cultural pathways for the researcher, and allow for personal intimacy. Essentially by learning and using Indonesian, I was able to engage in a more personal and direct way with informants. 82 All of the interviews for this thesis were undertaken in Indonesian. This allowed the interviewees to feel comfortable and able to communicate effectively. Qualitative research methods to collect and analyse data are necessary for immersion to be effective. The methodology that I applied is known as modified grounded theory. 83 This is a cyclical approach to the collection of data where each step of the research process is informed by reflecting upon and analysing data that had been previously collected. 84 Findings and theoretical conclusions develop during the research process itself and is a product of continuous interplay between data collection and analysis of that data. 85 This research methodology provides a flexible approach to data collection and processing, which I judged to be appropriate for the circumstances of Lombok and the topics covered The importance and application of immersion for comparative legal research was discussed in Vivian Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law This involved one-on-one classes five hours per day over a four day week. In addition, I undertook at least one hour of homework per day and a few hours over the weekend. 82 The connection between language and culture is discussed in more detail in Michael Wesley, An Australian Strategy for Asian Language Proficiency Report (2009) Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967). 84 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (2006). See also Barney Glaser, The Grounded Theory Perspective: Conceptualization Contrasted with Description (2001). 85 Christina Goulding, Grounded Theory: Some Reflections on Paradigm, Procedures and Misconceptions (Working Paper No. WP006/99, Management Research Centre, University of Wolverhampton, 1999) Ibid 7. 22

41 There are five steps in the modified ground theory research process being used in this thesis. 87 First, the collection and then analysis of data is uncovered through interviews and observational research. Second, codes (labelling and grouping of data) that emerged from the data collected are created, instead of relying on preconceived categories. Third, a further collection of data takes place, combined with the development of theoretical frameworks. Fourth, detailed field notes are kept to articulate the experiences of the researcher to inform the findings. Fifth, literature reviews are undertaken prior to and after fieldwork. This fifth step provides background to the field research to be undertaken and also ensures that the literature used complements findings from the field. This methodological approach does not provide simple answers; the bottom line is that grounded theory will not appeal to the researcher in search of absolute certainties, neatly defined categories and objectively measured explanations. Its appeal is more to those whose view of behaviour allows for process, change and ambiguities. 88 One of the key findings that emerged related to partnerships between state and non-state actors and institutions to avoid or resolve social tensions and communal conflict. These may occur consciously but are sometimes simply matters of subconscious ad hoc cooperation. Several chapters highlight these partnerships through practical examples, which explore the different rationales for their occurrence (see Chapters 4 and 5). These partnerships, which are essentially a process of state officials and institutions cooperating with non-state players (such as Tuan Guru) and their organisations, corresponds to theories developed by John Paul Lederach. 89 His theoretical approaches have informed my perspectives on conflict management. Through an intricate web of relationships these partnerships build off multiple levels of state and non-state relations, from the provincial governor to junior public servants and from Tuan Guru Besar to Tuan Guru Lokal. 90 Consequently, these actors and their 87 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (2006) Christina Goulding, Grounded Theory: Some Reflections on Paradigm, Procedures and Misconceptions (Working Paper No. WP006/99, Management Research Centre, University of Wolverhampton, 1999) John Paul Lederach, Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) These different levels of Tuan Guru are discussed in Chapter 3. 23

42 institutional linkages form webs of connection and action. As Lederach observed, the spider s genius lies in his ability to adapt, reshape, and remake its web of connections within the realities presented in a given space. 91 This allusion to intricate relationships reflects, in many regards, the conflict management frameworks partnerships that I identified in Lombok, which are constantly changing and developing with circumstances. Lederach argued that it was valuable to incorporate non-state actors, especially grassroots leadership, into the processes used to avoid or resolve conflict, rather than merely relying on state actors and institutions. Lederach s approach, therefore, emphasises moving beyond simply structural, or state responses, and acknowledging the utility of non-state players and institutions for conflict management. 92 Essentially it is important to deploy and recognise leadership and institutions that are respected, capable and strongly networked, whether state or non-state. 93 This theoretical approach finds parallels in the strategy taken by NTB bureaucrats to diffuse tensions in the lead up to the 2008 gubernatorial elections, when they incorporated non-state players into their election planning (as is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5). This cooperative approach acknowledged the limitation of provincial state-based institutions with public servants tactically basing their policy response on the capabilities of non-state players. Religious leaders and their organisations were deployed to ensure that provincial election plans were communicated and made effective at the grass-roots in Lombok (and Sumbawa). 94 Provincial authorities contributed training and support through police and bureaucrats, while Tuan Guru and their organisations gave the strategy grounding within the community. 91 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination The Art and Soul of Building Peace (2005) The importance of non-state players and institutions in relation to political affairs and situations of state weakness is also discussed by Robert Bates, When Things Fell Apart State Failure in Late- Century Africa (2008) He was looking at an extremely different socio-political context in Africa, however, he mentions the formative power and potential political role of non-state players. 93 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) Ibid

43 These findings were not anticipated. They were only uncovered through detailed field research that used modified grounded theory. Three methods of data collection were used: in-depth interviews, observational research and archival newspaper analysis. Each of these will be considered in turn. The first technique used was observational research, which involves recording experience of places, events and discussions. These observations were recorded in field notes. 95 This allowed me to learn from circumstances such as in-depth discussions in taxis or events such as watching a protest outside the Attorney- General s Department. Additionally, during the fifteen months of field research over 75 in-depth interviews were conducted. The duration of these interviews varied from 20 minutes to two hours (with the average length being one hour). All of the interviews were electronically recorded and then transcribed. Subsequent to this, thematic analysis of the interview transcripts was undertaken. This kind of analysis involved reading and then re-reading the transcripts for emerging themes and concepts. 96 The transition from theory to practice with interviews requires careful preparation and continual refinement. For instance, after the first three interviews in October 2007, I realised that some subtle changes in approach were necessary. The interview format and type of questions being asked were too structured. 97 In order to allow for informality during the interviews, while still effectively collecting data, I created general interview guidelines. This established a template for interviews that identified several key themes, for instance, the activities of Tuan Guru and local security concerns. Each of these themes had several questions that could potentially be asked. Using these themes and the list of possible questions, each interview could be adapted depending upon the answers given or the general inclination and knowledge of the interviewee For further information on this approach, see Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (2009) See Steinar Kvale, Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (1996); Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research (2000). 97 Field notes, 6 October Field notes, 6 November

44 Challenges occurred not only in preparing and undertaking interviews, but practical obstacles also arose. For instance, in order to arrange an interview with the former governor, Lalu Serinata, it took my assistant, Nurmala, dozens of calls and text messages to his senior staff over a two month period to simply arrange an appointment. 99 The third major source of primary data was the archives of the Lombok Post. This is the largest circulation Indonesian language newspaper published in Lombok. Also for the period of my field research the national newspapers Kompas and Republika were reviewed. This aspect of my research aimed to review how the local media covered social, political and security issues during two periods and The first period considers the months prior and subsequent to the January 2000 riots. The second period mirrors my time in the field and considers more recent perspectives on issues affecting Lombok. This analysis of the print media was made difficult by the fact that the archives were incomplete. In fact, newspapers for most of January 2000 (the month of the Mataram riots) and August to December 2000 were not available at either the Provincial Library or the Mataram Municipal Library. Many reasons were given for the omission of these months. However, it is worth separating these two periods. I am led to believe that the January 2000 period was unavailable for political reasons, that is, because there is still sensitivity within the police and political elite about these riots. By contrast, the public libraries did not hold the later months simply because the local authorities did not have the funds to collect and store the newspapers during this period. This is another example of reduced state function in the period following the fall of President Soeharto in Chaotic harmony in difficult circumstances Why did two or three days of riots in Lombok in 2000 (leading to the evacuation of thousands of foreign tourists) 99 Field notes, 4 January Field notes, 5 July

45 leave almost no fatalities while a short riot in Pontianak a year later claimed some forty lives? 101 This question poses one of the central conundrums that I faced when undertaking my field research. My interest in communal conflict emerged out of the January 2000 riots in Mataram and West Lombok that are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. Churches had been burned to the ground, shops had been looted and thousands of tourists had fled for their lives. 102 I was a little surprised, however, that this violence which had raged for five days seemed to have received almost no academic attention outside Lombok. 103 My initial assessment of the riots was that these events were indicative of a deeply troubled society where legal and social structures had failed. However, while living in Lombok I came to realise that rather than being a failure, the island should be considered a success story. Lombok has remained an essentially stable society, which has its own imperfect and chaotic harmony, despite serious structural impediments. This is a considerable achievement, considering that Lombok s approximately 3.2 million residents are among Indonesia s most economically disadvantaged. Approximately 25% of the population is designated as living in poverty 104 and the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics data has consistently rated NTB in the bottom three provinces on the Human Development Rankings for the period With poverty comes the potential for communal violence based on economic jealousies and distress. 101 Jamie S. Davidson, From Rebellion to Riots Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo (2008) Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April Limited scholarship has been undertaken on these riots. See Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004); John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) Persen Penduduk NTB Miskin, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 August 2007; 1,5 Juta Penduduk NTB Masih Miskin, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 October 2007; Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Nusa Tenggara Barat Dalam Angka 2006/2007 (2008) These are the most recent statistics available Human Development Index (HDI) (2005) Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia < > at 27 May

46 Picture 1.7 The former NTB Governor, Lalu Serinata, in January The former NTB Governor, Lalu Serinata, pictured above, noted that poverty makes people in Lombok susceptible to provocateurs who wish to ferment social tensions and conflict. 106 This usually involves the distribution of money to facilitate participation in demonstrations, although others have also suggested that low levels of education can lead people to move quickly to anger and aggression. 107 One day early in my time in Lombok I witnessed the distribution of money at a demonstration that turned violent outside the Attorney-General s offices in Mataram. Serinata also said that during the January 2000 riots, government sources believed that money was being distributed to people in order to secure their participation in the riots. On this occasion the monetary payment was estimated to be Rp 5000 per person (less than $AU 1). 108 A similar rent a crowd situation was also believed to have occurred during the demonstrations in Bok (see Chapter 5). 106 Ironically Serinata himself was not immune to the allure of money. Within months of our interview he was investigated and then prosecuted for corruption. He was eventually found guilty in June 2009 of using government funds to secure his election to NTB Governor and imprisoned for three years at the end of July See Panca Nugraha, Former Governor Sent to Jail to Serve his Sentence, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 29 July Interview with Lalu Serinata (Mataram, 8 January 2008). 108 Ibid. 28

47 The structural realities of Lombok, therefore, have the potential to lead to devastating violence like experienced elsewhere in Indonesia during the late 1990s and the early part of this century. But this did not eventuate in Given the economic disparities and levels of poverty that exist in Lombok why had there been no Christian or Chinese deaths during the January riots? They had been the targets of the anger and jealousy, but, in fact, the only casualties were among the rioters. 109 TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal, while reminding me of his deep upset over the riots, felt that one positive aspect emerged unlike elsewhere in Indonesia there were no murders or sexual assaults, although there was significant property damage and looting. He said that this represented the values (nilai-nilai) of the Sasak. These values ensured that even in the darkest of times certain moral boundaries were not crossed. 110 Conceptualising Lombok society as a success story is not without problems, prompting three major questions. First, how can any violence be considered a success? As a matter of principle, violence is deplorable and should be condemned. But the avoidance of the worst excesses of violence by a community should also be acknowledged, rather than overlooked. Lombok faced violence during the January riots, but did not descent into total chaos. In fact, it was brought under control relatively quickly (within five days). This point is deserving of recognition. Second, did Lombok during the particular periods selected for this research merely represent an anomalous situation? Mataram is a small city that may have been affected in ways different to larger urban centres, or perhaps it just managed through sheer luck to avoid the trauma experienced elsewhere in Indonesia. This may be correct, but in one of the poorest provinces, and in a city that is ethnically and religiously diverse, one might reasonably expect that tensions would have greater potential for violent outcomes. But this did not occur and it is worth evaluating why not. Third, in the first case study in Chapter 5, about the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections, it is noted that potential political conflict was avoided before, during and immediately after the elections. The logical question which arises is how is it possible 109 Stein Kristiansen, Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, 123; International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) < at 12 October 2006; Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April 2007, Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008). 29

48 to know whether violence would have occurred during this period? There had been serious concerns about ethnic, religious and political tensions leading to violence during the election period. Furthermore, there had been violence and unrest during elections in Lombok during 1999 and Therefore, these fears were based on recent history and led to an assumption that conflict was a strong possibility. In short, the threat of violence was high and consequently political and religious leaders had legitimate reason to worry. 111 All outbreaks of communal violence result in collateral damage. This thesis is premised on remembering that violence, whatever its scale, has a human cost. Even though the January riots were less significant than elsewhere, the community nonetheless paid a high price. In Mataram, the economic conditions deteriorated badly, with the economy plunging in the aftermath of the riots as the tourism industry collapsed. 112 As a consequence, there was an increase in unemployment which saw many families fall into serious financial hardship. Some of these families were then forced to send their children out to work as beggars, thus swelling the number of people panhandling on the streets of Mataram. 113 The local political elite has recognised the high social and economic cost of communal conflict in Lombok. The former NTB governor, Lalu Serinata, said that provincial authorities placed a high premium upon the maintenance of social cohesion in the years following the January 2000 riots. 114 He felt that this was directly connected to economic development on the island. 115 This recognition of the importance of social cohesion was based on Serinata s knowledge of the economic costs of the January 2000 riots, such as the massive drop in tourist arrivals, which 111 Kalla: Pilkada Sumber Konflik, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 June World Bank, Confronting Crisis: Impacts and Responses to the Bali Tragedy (2003) Anak Jalanan Menjamur Pasca Kerusuhan Mataram, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 February Moves to enhance inter-ethnic and inter-religious relationships have been ongoing since at least 1999, see Pergaulan Pribumi dan Etnis Tionghoa Serasi, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 July Interview with Lalu Serinata (Mataram, 8 January 2008). The importance of religious and ethnic diversity and social harmony was also highlighted in a DVD produced by NTB provincial authorities to promote investment and economic development see Humas Setda Provinsi NTB, Profil Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007). 30

49 have still not fully returned to the old levels. 116 Yet, churches still require police protection during major religious festivals. For instance, a protestant church 117 near my home in Mataram required four police officers to be posted outside it during christmas They were there to keep the peace and manage traffic problems outside the church. 118 Thus, the need for managing ethnic and religious relationships remains ongoing. Conclusion Chapter 1 has examined the theory underpinning this thesis, legal culture and consequently provided the social, political, economic, geographic and demographic background to the situation in Mataram and West Lombok. This chapter has also highlighted the interplay between social and legal factors, prioritising contextual lived law, rather than black-letter law. My analysis of conflict management processes therefore moves beyond merely an analysis of police and court function. This emphasis provides for a more comprehensive review of the social and legal mechanisms that are involved in avoiding and resolving communal and political disputes. Developing this background also allows for a clearer understanding of the institutional figures and organisational structures utilised in conflict management processes. This broader approach to legal analysis which emerges from using Lombok s legal culture(s), is prefaced on the notion of state weakness and strong community in Mataram and West Lombok, which is introduced in Chapter 1 and developed further in Chapter 2. The state has never been particularly efficient or strong in Lombok, but during the late 1990s and early part of this century it went through a particularly difficult period. As mentioned, there was an economic downturn in Indonesia brought on by the Asian economic crisis in 1997, and consequently, there was the demise of the authoritarian Soeharto government in This political environment brought 116 Iem Brown (ed), The Territories of Indonesia (2009). There have been faint glimmers of hope for the tourism industry with potential Middle Eastern investment, see Janeman Latul, Officials Throw Lombok Project a Final Lifeline, The Jakarta Globe (Jakarta, Indonesia), 27 January This church is part of the movement, Gereja Protestan di Indonesia Bagian Barat (GPIB), and the church is known locally as GPIB. 118 Field notes, 28 December

50 many budgetary, operational and leadership challenges for state actors and institutions on the island. State weakness in Lombok reflects a situation documented in other parts of Indonesia where it has been suggested that the state often appears to be more of a facade than a daily reality. Clifford Geertz described pre-dutch Bali in these terms. The neighbouring island of Bali, he argued was as a place where the state was often more theatre than practical administration. 119 Many of the gaps created by these weaknesses of state function in Mataram and West Lombok have been filled by non-state religious and community leaders and organisations (see Chapters 3 and 4). Particularly important is the role of the local religious leaders, Tuan Guru, introduced in this chapter and considered in more detail in Chapter 3. Their role in conflict management processes is pivotal to the findings in this thesis. The first chapter has provided the backdrop to this thesis. It has outlined important factors influencing the lives of people on the island. Importantly, Mataram and West Lombok are multi-ethnic and multi-religious areas. This creates cultural richness, but simultaneously presents points of social tension that can explode into violence, as happened during the January 2000 riots. This chapter has also highlighted the significant poverty on the island. In fact, Lombok is one of the most impoverished parts of Indonesia. Thus high levels of poverty can cause problems when money is distributed to people for their participation in protests ( rent a crowd ). Distribution of money provides provocateurs with a method of assembling people to press their claims and allows for situations to become quickly volatile. The second case study, Bok, in Chapter 5 examines this sort of escalation of demonstrations. Context is vital when attempting to understand the points of social tension and issues that need to be monitored in order to avoid and resolve communal and political conflict. Despite Lombok s social and economic problems, the next chapter points to a chaotic harmony formed through partnerships between state and non-state actors and institutions, which will then be examined throughout the remainder of this thesis. 119 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-century Bali (1980). 32

51 Chapter 2 The troubled transition Anything can happen in this country People are suffering, and as long as they suffer like this, nothing is certain. This crisis makes everyone so dizzy. Jamari, an east Javanese farmer, commenting on the political and social state of Indonesia during the late 1990s. 120 Like the rest of Indonesia, Mataram and West Lombok went through a difficult time from the late 1990s to the early part of this century. The troubles emerged out of the Asian economic crisis 121 and collapse of the authoritarian government of President Soeharto. 122 This chapter will consider the various sources of communal tension and the state and non-state responses to this period of political and social instability in Lombok. The turbulent time around the turn of the century was seen as an ujian (test) from Allah, 123 according to Tuan Guru Lokal Ramli, which challenged his community member s ibadah (religious devotion). In this troubled environment, extra effort was required from Tuan Guru and local leaders in Lombok to maintain community calm. Tuan Guru did this, as Ramli explained, by continually reminding their followers of the teachings of the Qur an and Hadith (the prophetic tradition). Especially emphasised were lessons about the maintenance of social harmony. To communicate these messages Ramli offered extra pengajian (religious education classes) at his home every night for years and he often visited people s homes when things were 120 Richard Lloyd Parry, In the Time of Madness Indonesia on the Edge of Chaos (2005) For an explanation of the reasons and nature for the devastating Asian economic crisis, see Thomas Clarke, Haemorrhaging Tigers: The Power of International Financial Markets and the Weaknesses of Asian Modes of Corporate Governance (2000) 8 Corporate Governance 101; George Fane and Ross H. McLeod, Banking Collapse and Restructuring in Indonesia (ANU Economics Working Papers in Trade and Development No. 2, Australian National University, 2001); Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (2002); Benny Tabalujan, Why Indonesian Corporate Governance Failed Conjectures Concerning Legal Culture (2002) 15 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 141, See Jean Gelman Taylor, Indonesia Peoples and Histories (2003) 4; Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia (2005). 123 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 33

52 hard for a family or social tensions became exacerbated. He recalled feeling exhausted by the demands of his community (ummah) during this period. 124 The aim of the chapter is to consider how conflict management processes in Lombok responded to these social pressures and the weakness of state institutions. The start of the chapter will investigate the perceived crime wave, as well as other serious social issues that emerged during the late 1990s. This leads to an analysis of the deficient police, prosecutorial and court responses to these events and the community reaction to this poor functioning of the state. This chapter will then review the economic factors related to communal and political violence. For instance, what sort of financial inducements could encourage people to riot? And what are the potential rationales for the provocateurs distributing largesse to protestors? The final section of this chapter then looks at the outbreak of riots in Mataram and West Lombok during January These riots are an example of what happens when volatile social circumstances are combined with inflamed emotions, ethnic jealousies and provocation about communal conflict elsewhere in Indonesia. This section also explores why the riots did not lead to any murders, assaults or rapes of Indonesian Chinese, the focus of these riots (although, the riots caused significant property damage, including for Indonesian Chinese property owners). 125 The operation of the state does affect people s daily lives in Lombok through simple things such as the provision of electricity and schools. For most people, however, non-state leaders and institutions have played, and continue to play, an equal or greater role. Therefore, state effectiveness can, and should, be supported by non-state players and institutions on the island. Essentially, this thesis shows how state and nonstate actors and institutions often work in partnership to avoid or resolve political and communal conflict. The analysis of state function (or dysfunction) and non-state 124 Ibid. 125 There were reports of serious episodes of violence against Indonesian Chinese during this time elsewhere in Indonesia. See James T. Siegel, Early Thoughts on the Violence of May 13 and 14, 1998 in Jakarta (1998) 66 Indonesia 74; Freek Colombijn and J Thomas Lindblad (eds), Roots of Violence in Indonesia (2002); Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (2004); Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia (2006); Charles A. Coppel (ed), Violent Conflicts in Indonesia Analysis, Representation, Resolution (2006); John Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad Religious Violence in Indonesia (2007). 34

53 responses to it in this chapter provides background to subsequent chapters, and more broadly, conflict management strategies that are used in Mataram and West Lombok. The law enforcement void In this environment of uncertainty, political flux, confusion about lines of authority and a reduced capacity for prompt, coordinated and consistent state responses, longstanding community tensions exacerbated by economic crisis have easily mutated into violence, creating cycles of revenge. 126 The end of Soeharto s 30 years of authoritarian rule, referred to as the New Order period (Orde Baru), and the political instability that followed, led to a time of transition towards democracy and decentralisation, known as Reformasi (Reformation). Authoritarian and centralised governance structures, a trademark of President Soeharto s reign, were deemed no longer appropriate. 127 The ensuing period of instability led many people to feel that their society was descending into lawlessness. These dramatic national events filtered down to affect people s daily lives in Mataram and West Lombok and led to feelings of insecurity both economically and in relation to their personal safety. The Indonesian state, and its leadership, were often unsure of appropriate tactical or policy responses in this rapidly transforming political environment. In addition, governmental re-organisation also pitted institutions against one and another. For instance, the police, previously a branch of the military, became an autonomous civilian-led organisation. 128 The separation of police from the military was, and remains, fraught with tension. A recent example of this type of conflict occurred between members of the military and police in the province of Maluku Tengah in This conflict represented a turf war over who would receive a lucrative 126 Tim Lindsey, The Criminal State: Premanisme and the new Indonesia in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today Challenges of History (2001) Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, Introduction in Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, Indonesia Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (2007) Stein Kristiansen and Lembang Trijono, Authority and Law Enforcement: Local Government Reforms and Security Systems in Indonesia (2005) 27 Contemporary Southeast Asia 236,

54 contract to provide security services to a large local business. 129 I have not heard of similar issues occurring in Lombok, but financial constraints on the island s provincial and local governments, means that institutional rivalries are not an unrealistic concern. As a consequence, policy-makers would be well-advised to consider strategies to prevent these developing. These sorts of rivalries may create points of conflict or they could be drawn into communal or political conflict. Shaky governance reforms and Lombok s economic downturn (due primarily to the collapse of the local tourism industry) combined to create a social situation conducive to criminal activity. These circumstances transpired to induce a crime wave in Lombok, during the late 1990s and the early part of this century, which was marked by high levels of theft. 130 The police response to increases in criminal activity was perceived to be ineffective by the vast majority of the island s residents, and therefore, community security groups (pamswakarsa) took the lead in responding to these events. 131 A non-state response therefore overtook the state in reacting to local social instability. 132 These inadequate institutional responses in many ways reflect the technical difficulties involved for the police in becoming a civilian institution. The transition required modifications to command structures and policing practices. 133 The rules of the game had changed and the Indonesian state infrastructure for law enforcement, led by the national police (Kepolisian Republik Indonesia), simply did not function in a manner that engendered public confidence. 134 One of the major complaints against 129 Kegagalan Pimpinan TNI-Polri, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 9 February Stein Kristiansen, Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 25 October 2007); Interview with Eko (Mataram, 16 November 2007); Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 132 Similar non-state responses to this perceived lawlessness occurred elsewhere in Indonesia, see Tim Lindsey, The Criminal State: Premanisme and the new Indonesia in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today Challenges of History (2001) See Singh Bilveer, Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Indonesia: Change Amidst Continuity (2000) 26 Armed Forces and Society 607, ; Damian Kingsbury, The Reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces (2000) 22 Contemporary Southeast Asia 302, 309; David Jansen, Relations Among Security and Law Enforcement Institutions in Indonesia (2008) 30 Contemporary Southeast Asia 429, For a recent evaluation of the activities of the police and some of their difficulties at a national level, see David Jensen, Snatching Victory (2010) Inside Indonesia < at 20 May Stein Kristiansen, Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat (2003) 18 Sojourn 110,

55 the Indonesian police was, and still is, that their operations do not ensure the safety and security of society. 135 The need for policing tactics to be revised according to the new organisational reality and political environment challenged police personnel. 136 Prior to Reformasi, the police relied heavily on the potent and sharp use of force to instill fear and awe in the community. These symbolic, almost theatrical, shows of violence were applied to assert state power and prestige. 137 The development of new organisational structures and policing tactics reduced police capacity, at least temporarily, as they implemented the operational reforms demanded of them. Additionally, there was significant workplace cultural change in the police force necessary in order to satisfy the demands of the new democratic political order. This led to internal intransigence, and slow reform implementation, as many police officers did not want to change long-held behavioural patterns and practices. 138 Picture 2.1 A police station in Mataram, the front gate emblazoned with the slogan, Police Partners with Society (Polisi Mitra Masyarakat) 135 Makmur Keliat, Polisi Melindungi Siapa?, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 27 May Polri Yang Kini Tunduk Pada Hukum Sipil Tak Lagi Bulan-Bulanan Ibu Tiri, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 August Joshua Barker, State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Soeharto s New Order (1998) 66 Indonesia 7; Joshua Barker, The Tattoo and the Fingerprint: Crime and Security in an Indonesian City (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1999) ; Tim Lindsey, The Criminal State: Premanisme and the new Indonesia in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today Challenges of History (2001) Adrianus Eliasta Meliala, Sensitive Policing: Indonesia s Case (PhD Thesis, University of Queensland, 2004) vi-viii. 37

56 The police s poor performance was a serious concern for many people during the early part of the Reformasi era. The photograph above (Picture 2.1) shows police promotional efforts to create the impression that they are becoming more engaged with the community. However, a most poignant example of police deficiencies occurred during the January 2000 riots in Mataram and West Lombok. Many community leaders told me that they did not see any police during the riots or that the troubles were over by the time the police arrived. 139 Concerns over police operations were also identified by Lombok s political leaders in the weeks before the January 2000 riots. They ominously noted the lack of police presence in areas that were flashpoints of communal and social tension, arguing that police on the island had their resources spread too thinly. This predicament was highlighted in December 1999 when Mataram s mayor, Ruslan, called for additional police to respond to escalating tensions between two Sasak communities in Karang Ganteng and Patemon in the lead up to the Muslim holiday of idul fitri. 140 Police were not entirely ineffective, but there was, and still remains, high levels of public mistrust about their intentions and ability to act effectively. Nevertheless it would be unwise to dismiss the role of police in security arrangements altogether in Lombok. For instance, as things calmed down after the January 2000 riots, Brimob ( Mobile Brigade, the national paramilitary police unit) were brought in from other parts of Indonesia and helped restore a sense of calm and security in Mataram. Brimob represented for many, a reassertion of state authority. 141 Policing in Lombok has arguably improved since the January 2000 riots. It is now more common for the police to take on criminal elements, with major operations taking place regularly in Mataram and West Lombok. 142 However, the news reports about these raids were unclear as to what criminal activities were being targeted. 143 Despite, indications that the law and order situation is improving in Lombok 144 there are still significant fears 139 The riots lasted five days and informants told me that the police were not seen until the third or fourth day see Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 140 Walikota Minta Tambahan Aparat, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 December Besar, Peran Brimob dalam Memulihkan Keamanan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 13 February Polres Lobar Gencarkan Operasi Preman, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 4 March Ibid. 144 Kasus Kriminal di Loteng Menurun, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 October This improved situation was also noted in Stein Kristiansen and Lambang Trijono, Authority and Law 38

57 within the community, fanned by the local media, in relation to violent crime. News reports of lawlessness and trouble, such as armed and violent robberies in Mataram, are frequent in local media. 145 When discussing law enforcement it is worth acknowledging that these issues are as much about social and economic problems as they are about policing capacity. Problems emanating from the economic downturn placed additional pressure on Lombok s economically marginalised population. This pressure encouraged many to move into criminal activity at the same time as state institutions were weakening. Communal conflicts often emerge out of the failure of state institutions during periods of economic and political instability allowing social tensions, economic jealousies and communal rivalries to go unchecked. 146 In the lead-up to the January 2000 riots people were vulnerable to provocateurs who preyed upon the poor to stir up trouble. In addition no effective state intervention was forthcoming to challenge them. 147 This point is further reinforced by Kasmiati, one of Lombok s leading activists, who has written about the intricate connection between economic problems and social volatility in Lombok. 148 Social and economic problems can increase emotional pressures upon people who then have increased potential to act in violent and unpredictable ways. There are many examples of this in Lombok. For instance, there has been a culture of larceny among infamous thievery networks in different parts of Lombok. However, with the economic stresses of the late 1990s, these criminal activities reportedly became more violent, presumably as the economic pressures on those involved increased. 149 More recently the murder of Suranto, the owner of roadside food stall, also highlighted the Enforcement: Local Government Reform and Security Systems in Indonesia (2005) 27 Contemporary Southeast Asia 236, Awas! Perampok Mulai Masuk Kota, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 March This has been examined in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, Making States Work: State Failure and Crisis of Governance (2004). See also Rizal Sukma, Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia: Causes and the Quest for Solution in Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson, Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia (2005) Riyanto Rabbah, 171 Sebuah Catatan in Jeremy Kingsley and Abdul Wahid, Lombok: Menuju Masyarakat Multibudaya Conference Proceedings (2007). 171 is the local term for the January 2000 riots. 148 Kasmiati, Pengembangan Ekonomi dan Stabilitas Sosial: Sebuah Pengalaman in Jeremy Kingsley and Abdul Wahid, Lombok: Menuju Masyarakat Multibudaya Conference Proceedings (2007). 149 John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005)

58 impact of social and economic stresses on daily life in Mataram. For several years, Suranto had given free fried rice to a homeless man known as Dagul, who had a history of mental illness. One night, after a misunderstanding that led Dagul to believe he had to pay for his rice, Dagul turned on Suranto and killed him. 150 This explosion of anger may seem like a solitary act, but it is a symbolic reminder of the intricate connection between law enforcement and socio-economic issues, such as poverty and inadequate mental health services. In fact, any response to crime should not be oversimplified, because even if the police become more effective criminality will not disappear. 151 More holistic answers are necessary ensuring that the problems of economic inequity and social marginalisation are confronted. Economic instability and political transition was making life more difficult on the ground with people struggling financially and feeling their personal safety was being jeopardised in the late 1990s and early part of this century. These social, economic and political circumstances were also affecting individual police officers. The police strategy of resorting to shows of blunt force common in the Soeharto-era were no longer considered appropriate. At the same time, the crime wave during the late 1990s (and during the January 2000 riots) placed significant stress upon individual police officers working in Lombok to act decisively. These pressures were blamed for inappropriate police actions, for instance, a suspected motorbike thief was shot dead when attempting to avoid arrest by fleeing his home. The police officer who shot him confessed his actions and sought to apologise to the victim s wife after complaints were made against the police. 152 Perceptions of widespread police corruption have also destabilised the police and their effectiveness in Mataram and West Lombok. This alleged behaviour leads members of the community to feel that police officers do not have their best interests at heart, and they are, therefore, often unwilling to cooperate with law enforcement. The lack of respect for police due to their notoriously corrupt behaviour is not necessarily 150 Pedagang Nasi Goreng Tewas Dibacok Preman, Saura NTB (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April Research on the connection between social issues and criminal activity has lengthy lineage, see Richard Quinney, The Social Reality of Crime (1970). 152 Petugas Mengaku Menjaga Keamanan Pengakuan Tetannga Amaq Sukasih Sebelum Tragedi Telagawaru, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 May

59 accurate. Contrary to the stereotypes that I heard while undertaking research in the field, not all police personnel are bad eggs, rather police officers are sometimes forced into corrupt patterns of behaviour through necessity. For instance, during the tough economic times of the late 1990s, police did not have proper equipment. In the period immediately before Farouk Muhammad became the provincial police chief (Kapolda NTB) in 2001, officers told him that they often lacked even petrol for their motorbikes. In order to purchase petrol, some police officers engaged in corrupt activities to pay for this basic necessity. Farouk felt that Indonesian police leadership must ensure that police officers have the basics to undertake their responsibilities. 153 This will not necessarily eliminate corruption, but will certainly remove one motivation for it. A lessening of corruption is not only a desirable outcome in itself, but also works to reassure the public that police are looking out for the community, not just themselves. Complex social, economic and political circumstances require multiple responses. As a result, there are a diversity of state players and institutions, other than the police involved in law enforcement and conflict management. 154 An example of another state institution involved in dealing with these issues is Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB or Forum to Maintain Inter-religious Harmony). FKUB NTB provides advice to the provincial government, specifically the NTB Governor and Deputy Governor, on inter-religious and inter-ethnic relationships. 155 FKUB NTB is an initiative of the national Ministry of Religious Affairs (Departemen Agama), of which there are branches in every Indonesian province with a mandate to assist provincial governments to maintain social harmony between religious groups. The aim of the FKUB branches is to assist provincial authorities to prevent communal conflict, avoiding the episodes of violence that followed the fall of President Soeharto Interview with Farouk Muhammad (Mataram, 3 November 2007). 154 Another provincial government department intricately involved with conflict management is Kesbanglinmas (Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat or Office of National Unity and Community Protection). It will be considered in Chapter See Sejuta Pelita Sejuta Harapan Ketua FKUB Berikan Dukungan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 12 July 2007; Digelar, Raker I FKUB NTB, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 September 2007; Peran FKUB Akan Ditingkatkan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 August Interview with Mahfud (Kediri, West Lombok, 5 December 2007). 41

60 An example of FKUB NTB activities in Lombok arose during the controversy over plans to significantly expand a Hindu temple near Mount Rinjani in northern Lombok. The sensitivity of this proposal emerged because local residents were upset by the size of the proposed project the largest temple in Indonesia. FKUB representatives mediated a resolution to this planning controversy, and the plan was withdrawn for further modification (the project is still on hold). 157 One lingering concern about this outcome is that only a withdrawal of the plans for the expansion of the temple and the effective shelving of the project resolved the issue. This does not sound like a compromise, but rather a complete backdown. 158 With instability in the late 1990s and early part of this century came perceptions of the island being confronted by a crime wave, as mentioned. Presumably this should have been reflected in the Mataram court data, but the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram (the Mataram Magistrates Court) had its sights set elsewhere. In fact, it was disproportionately focused on traffic offences. Over 94% of matters filed with the court in 2006 fell into this category. This emphasis on traffic offences seriously overshadows efforts to deal with more serious crimes against property or person. 159 It is hard to know why this imbalance exists, however, this unimpressive performance by police and the judiciary was also reflected in other areas of the criminal justice system, such as detention facilities, with 22 prisoners escaping from a Mataram prison in June Ibid. 158 Concerns about the performance of FKUB NTB have also been made by Badrul Munir, NTB Deputy Governor, in the period immediately preceding his induction to office Peran FKUB Akan Ditingkatkan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 August In 2006, there was a total of 9246 cases brought to the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram with 8743 being traffic offences compared with 503 prosecutions for all other offences see Appendix Pelarian Lapasma Di-deadline Seminggu, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 June

61 Picture 2.2 The Pengadilan Negeri (Magistrates Court) Mataram Table 2.1 Traffic-related matters lodged in the Pengadilan Negeri (the Magistrates Court) Mataram The court data detailed in the graph above (Table 2.1) shows traffic offences lodged for prosecution in the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram during the period 1996 to The data starts during the New Order period immediately before the Asian economic crisis and continues through the early phases of the Reformasi process of decentralisation and democratic transformation. This graph shows a decrease in the capacity of state institutions after the fall of Soeharto and then a steady increase in policing and court activity (at least in relation to traffic offences) as the new 161 The court data was compiled by Jeremy Kingsley and Nurmala Fahriyanti from information provided by the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram. 43

62 governance structures stabilised. The graph suggests that state function started to improve around the year The lowest figures came in 1999, with just under 4000 traffic-related matters lodged, compared to just over 12,000 in This improvement in state function in Lombok is not reflected anywhere else in the court data (see Appendix 1). The court data presents an institutional history that reflects a disproportionate emphasis upon a relatively minor area of law enforcement activity (traffic offences) rather than more serious criminal prosecution priorities, such as theft or assaults. This perception of a court with low levels of performance relative to community expectations that it punish and deter serious crime has also been asserted by legal insiders. The Chief Judge of the Pengadilan Tinggi (High Court) of Mataram, Soerojo, in the early part of the Reformasi period harshly criticised the judicial practices and performance of the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram. 162 The former Chief Justice of the Pengadilan Negeri, Mursidin Zuhdi, strongly disputed the accuracy of these suggestions. 163 Whoever was correct in this debate, the residents of Mataram and West Lombok expected more from its judiciary during a time when the community believed there was a serious crime wave underway. The problem with weak court performance, according to Lombok non-government activists such as Umaiyah, is that courts are integral to obtaining legitimacy and public support for the new democratic governance model. 164 During the New Order period, law enforcers, as mentioned, used sharp displays of deadly force to instill fear in citizens. However, in the post-soeharto democratic era it is vital for state institutions, such as courts, to establish their legitimacy by being efficient and transparent. Therefore, the need for judicial improvement is generally recognised across the Indonesian court system, although court reform processes implemented at the beginning of Reformasi are progressing slowly. 165 Similar demands for an 162 Hakim Harus Konsisten Dengan Tugasnya Soerojo Hakim Tinggi Parbawa Asmadi, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 June Interview with Mursidin Zuhdi (Mataram, 6 November 2007). 164 Perlu, Reformasi Para Hakim di Indonesia, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 April Tim Lindsey and Mas Achmad Santosa, The Trajectory of Law Reform in Indonesia: A Short Overview of Legal Systems and Change in Indonesia in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008)

63 increased competence and performance by the local police in dealing with criminals, such as thieves, have also been made. 166 Inadequate judicial processes and state law enforcement activities have led many local residents to rely upon non-state actors and institutions. As a consequence of the perceived failure of institutions, the main non-state responses to the crime wave in Lombok were pamswakarsa and ronda (night watches). This response to law enforcement deficiencies still remains decidedly evident. It is best reflected in the highly visible Amphibi 167 security post in central Mataram (see Picture 2.4 below), which catches the eye immediately with its bright orange exterior. It is arguably more noticeable than any police station in Mataram (see Picture 2.1) and has a strategic position directly next to Mataram s largest hotel in the city s commercial heart, immediately behind Mataram Mall. Proudly adorning the structure s pinnacle and interior is their logo of two knives cutting across the body of a roaring crocodile. It sends a clear message reinforced by their slogan Amphibi, defenders of the people (Amphibi pembela rakyat). The post is almost empty during the day, other than a few ojeks (motorbike taxi drivers), but every night it comes to life with Amphibi members who maintain a ronda (night watch) for the near-by kampung. 168 Picture 2.3 An Amphibi post in central Mataram 166 Aparat Kepolisian Harus Lebih Profesional Syaiful: Masa Polisi Tidak Dapat Atasi Aksi Pencurian, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 June Amphibi is the largest operational pamswakarsa (militia/community security group) in Lombok. 168 Field notes, 20 August

64 Such community security mechanisms developed as an initiative of the Indonesian military. In late 1998, General Wiranto wanted to replace the top-down military style of authoritarian rule used during the New Order period by empowering community security groups. 169 This state-initiated idea gained strong local support in Lombok. 170 Even in the Reformasi era, where decentralisation has given more power to provinces and local authorities, there is an intricate and on-going connection between national events, ideas and policies on Lombok affairs. Power shifts local With Reformasi came increased provincial and local autonomy. This provided the sub-national authorities, such as those administering NTB, with significantly more legal jurisdiction and control over local purse strings. 171 One of the motivating factors that has provided grounds for political contestation, and sometimes violence, in Lombok has been individuals and groups who have begun to compete for increased social and political status in the new decentralised environment. Local political elites have jockeyed amongst themselves to obtain strategic positions in the newlydeveloping local power hierarchies. 172 Consequently, it has been suggested that ethnic tensions and religious antagonisms are sometimes more about political mobilisation than being genuine statements of communal animosity. The 2000 riots, some have argued, was a political conflict disguised as communal violence, with quarrelling between politicians as the key issue motivating these events Ian Douglas Wilson, Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265, 268; John M. MacDougall, Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2007) ; Kriminalitas Meningkat, Walikota Imbau Aktifkan Ronda, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 13 April Indonesia s transition to democracy has been considered in Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy (2006) In relation to the constitutional and legal challenges of provincial autonomy, see Tim Lindsey, M.B. Hooker, Ross Clarke and Jeremy Kingsley, Sharia Revival in Aceh, in Michael Feener and Mark Cammack (ed), Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia (2007). 172 John Sidel, The Manifold Meanings of Displacement: Explaining Inter-religious Violence, in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed), Conflict, Violence and Displacement in Indonesia (2008) This was noted in passing by many informants, however, a leading local non-government activist told me about this directly. Field notes, 2007 (date withheld to insure anonymity). 46

65 These rumours about the 2000 riots coincided with the political environment in Mataram at the time, which involved fractious political forces and many calls for them to reconcile their differences. 174 Competing factions were struggling to gain political ascendancy and attempts were made to create coalitions between political parties, 175 for example, between Golkar 176 and PDI-P. 177 Political contestation 178 also lead more directly to confrontations, with clashes occurring in the lead up to the national parliamentary elections in between supporters of the political parties, PKB 180 and PPP. 181 The ongoing reality for politicians in Mataram is that they have to continually seek compromises between a multiplicity of political and non-state actors. 182 The quality and skills of local politicians has also been a concern in Lombok. 183 The political transition across Indonesia has been challenging, as many of the skills necessary for the art of governing had been centralised in Jakarta during the New Order period. During Soeharto s time there was a distinct lack of support for developing and fostering local political and bureaucratic leadership capacity at provincial and regency levels. There is even evidence of local politicians in Lombok being punished for attempting to assert too much authority. For example, in 1986 members of the provincial parliament unsuccessfully tried to have a local politician installed as governor over Soeharto s Javanese nominee, Warsito, a former general. Afterwards special closed sessions were held [in the provincial parliament] to punish its members for subversive primordialism in seeking to install a local candidate as 174 Bukan Zamannya Untuk Gontok-gontokan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 28 April Dead Lock, Rapat Penentuan Figur Pimpinan DPRD I NTB, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 September Partai Golongan Karya or Party of the Functional Groups. 177 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle. 178 The issues of political contestation and its potential for causing violence will be discussed further in Chapter Oknum TNI dan Polri Baku Hantam, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 May Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or National Awakening Party. 181 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party. 182 I Ketut Putra Erawan, Tracing the Progress of Local Governments Since Decentralisation in Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, Indonesia Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (2007) Tjok Suthendra Rai, Paradigma Memilih Pemimpin, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 29 July

66 governor and the renegade legislators were dragged into military intelligence headquarters and [their] political careers were ruined. 184 When addressing conflict management in Lombok it is necessary to recognise the fluctuating strength of the state, due to Indonesia s history of intermittent political and economic instability. For instance, in , Indonesia underwent a transfer of power from the first President Soekarno to its second President Soeharto. During this period, a wave of violence spread across the Indonesian archipelago. An estimated 100,000 to 2 million people were killed during this violence with the most common estimate being 500,000 deaths. 185 The violence was focused on eliminating activists or sympathisers of the Communist Party, PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia). 186 This violence also affected Lombok where local memories report 50,000 killings in early This violence stemmed from an attempted communist coup on 30 September 1965 in Jakarta. 188 Even before this time many Muslim activists in Lombok had already begun to fear the growing role of PKI. 189 The political threat of communism was used by some political, community and religious leaders to undertake actions that would more properly be termed communal violence. Mob violence forced most Indonesian Chinese residents out of East Lombok. Many fled to Mataram and West Lombok and have never returned to their former homes on the eastern side of the island. 190 People in Lombok who were connected, directly or even tenuously to PKI, were murdered or expelled to other parts 184 John M. MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) Robert Cribb, How Many Deaths? Problems in the Statistics of Massacre in Indonesia ( ) and East Timor ( ) in Ingrid Wessel & George Wimhofer, Violence in Indonesia (2001) Annie Pohlman, Women and the Indonesian Killings of : Gender Variables and Possible Directions for Research (Paper presented at the 15 th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Canberra, 29 June 2 July 2004) Robert Cribb, Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia in Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings of : Studies from Java and Bali (1990) The debate about the politics surrounding the events of 30 September 1965 is complicated, and although important, is not the domain of this thesis. 189 Fathurrahman Zakaria, Geger Gerakan 30 September 1965 Rakyat NTB Melawan Bahaya Merah (2 nd Edition, 2001) 60-67; This violence during the 1960s meant that there is no longer an Indonesian Chinese community in East Lombok, although there is still a strong presence in Mataram and West Lombok. See John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005)

67 of island. 191 These killings were not just undertaken by the military, but were also in part facilitated by the youth wings of religious organisations, such NU, Muhammadiyah and NW. 192 Christian, Catholic and other religious groups were also involved in the anti-communist actions in Lombok. 193 Religious leaders and their organisations, although usually important for social harmony have, in the past, been accused of participating in conflict. For instance, the events of the mid-1960s show that religious organisations in Lombok have been involved in tragic outbreaks of violence. This cautionary note about the role of religious leaders and organisations needs both historical and social context. Fear of the PKI emerged from many elements of Indonesian society who felt that Communist Party activists and members had cut themselves off from traditional relationships, social structures and community obligations. 194 Therefore, they were perceived to not be protected by normal social frameworks and communal leadership. In fact, PKI members and sympathisers were actually perceived to be challenging these norms. 195 When traditional social roles are based on adat and religious obligations (vital ingredients for personal safety), then cutting oneself off from these structures can create significant vulnerability and social alienation. These traditional structures are discussed in Chapter 4 and the role of this form of social protection cannot be underestimated. Yet Lalu Nurtaat told me that current-day Lombok is significantly different from the mid-1960s, and the role of Tuan Gurus has changed. In many ways their social position is now stronger, and therefore, there is less need for the flexing of organisational muscle. 196 I cautiously agree with this assessment, but suggest that pamswakarsa with political and religious patronage, may have the potential for significant socially disruptive behaviour and violence if not monitored properly Ibid Ibid Fathurrahman Zakaria, Geger Gerakan 30 September 1965 Rakyat NTB Melawan Bahaya Merah (2 nd Edition, 2001) Many of those accused of being communists were merely involved in challenging or not confirming with local power structures, John Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad Religious Violence in Indonesia (2007) And the slightest thing could get one accused of being a Communist Pipit Rochijat and Ben Anderson, Am I PKI or non-pki? (1985) 40 Indonesia 37, 46. In essence, political and economic rivalries were being played out and opponents eliminated under the guise of alleged communist affiliation. 195 David Levine, History and Social Structure in the Study of Contemporary Indonesia (1969) 7 Indonesia 5, Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 28 July 2008). 197 This cautionary note about pamswakarsa is discussed later in this chapter and Chapter 6. 49

68 Community responses to crime Thefts and aggravated burglary were nightly events in many areas in the city [Mataram]. 198 During the late 1990s and early 2000s in Mataram, the tough economic conditions were linked to an outbreak of violent crime, such as shopkeepers being held prisoner during armed robberies. 199 This section will particularly focus on non-state responses to this period of instability. Residents in Mataram and West Lombok did not feel safe and news reports fed these anxieties. 200 Because of the political and economic instability, which led to a weakening of state function, many people felt their only option was self-reliance. There were extreme examples of citizens taking matters into their own hands. 201 The Lombok Post reported in 1999, how ojek drivers became enraged when they discovered thieves trying to steal motorcycles and proceeded to beat-up the robbers who had to flee from the crime scene to save themselves. 202 Thieves caught today are still often beaten, sometimes badly enough to require hospitalisation. In Kampung Enjak-Enjak in Praya, Central Lombok, for example, residents almost beat an alleged thief to death in April This law enforcement vacuum created space for non-state organisations to respond to crime by organising pamswakarsa. 204 In Lombok, membership of these groups is based on religious and ethnic affiliation. 205 The largest community security group is Amphibi. During , Amphibi was estimated to have had a registered 198 Stein Kristiansen and Trijono Lambang, Authority and Law Enforcement: Local Reform and Security Systems in Indonesia (2005) 27 Contemporary Southeast Asia 236, Rumah Dijebol, Pemilik Disekap, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 December See Mataram Tak Aman, Perampokan Merajalela, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 December News reports commonly described criminal acts in great detail, such as home invasions, even cataloguing what was stolen, including mobile phones, money and motorbikes. See Pencurian, Usik Ketentraman Warga Mataram, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 1 December Tim Lindsey, The Criminal State: Premanisme and the new Indonesia in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (eds), Indonesia Today Challenges of History (2001) Perampok Bercadar, Gasak Dua Sepeda Motor Ojek, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 April Pencuri Nyaris Tewas Diamuk Massa, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 April The rise of vigilantism across Indonesia, during the 1990s, has been considered in Joshua Barker, Vigilantes and the State (2006) 50 Social Analysis International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) < at 10 March

69 membership of 220,000 in Lombok. 206 Despite some arguing that pamswakarsa have decreased in significance, in 2007, Amphibi reported that its membership had actually grown to over 350,000 (approximately 10 percent of Lombok s population). 207 This is probably an exaggeration, but regardless of the exact figure, they remain a large group that is still relatively active. Groups of this size are capable of directly challenging the authority of the police in Lombok. 208 Pamswakarsa are perceived to have emerged as a legitimate response to a period of instability and crime wave ; however, many people in Lombok now view these community security groups as no longer having a valid or helpful function. This is because of an improved security situation across the island. This was confirmed by non-government activist, Hardi, who thought that public support no longer exists for these organisations in Mataram and West Lombok. 209 This did not necessarily conform with what I had witnessed they still seemed active in my observation. In Lom, for example, the community has a paid ronda, with local people employed as night guards. Five out of seven of those involved are members of Amphibi (and one of them is simultaneously a member of another pamswakarsa, Lang-Lang). 210 These pamswakarsa are different in many ways from other militia found in Indonesia. They are not as threatening as similar organisations elsewhere, such as Laskar Pembela Islam (the Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defenders Front s militia) or those active in East Timor at the time of the 1999 referendum that ushered in its independence. Part of the reason for the difference is that they were not created to 206 Ibid. 207 Anggota Pam Swakarsa Amphibi Banjiri Kota Praya, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 August Stein Kristiansen, Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, Interview with Hardi (Mataram, 5 December 2007). A similar position was also noted in John M. MacDougall, Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2007) Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007); Interview with Saonah (Mataram, 7 November 2007), Interview with Ciman (Mataram, 8 November 2007), Interview with Jupri (Mataram, 9 November 2007), Interview with Mukhlis (Mataram, 10 November 2007), Interview with Sahari (Mataram, 11 November 2007), Interview with Tumi (Mataram, 12 November 2007). [These are pseudonyms to protect the identity of the members and community that I undertook research within]. 51

70 pursue a political agenda, or at least, not directly. 211 Rather pamswakarsa in Lombok, such as Bujak, 212 Amphibi and Lang-Lang, 213 emerged as a response to Lombok s crime wave. Essentially, they started more like an organised ronda (night-watch). However, many people in Lombok now openly discuss how members of these groups have become akin to guns for hire. 214 Amphibi has several security posts in Mataram still in operation. These include locations such as: Ampenan (just near the beach); central Mataram behind the Mall (see Picture 2.3); Bertais (next to the market), and several other key locations. Some of the posts have become institutionalised, such as the Amphibi post at Beretais market, which has essentially become a satpam (private security guard) post, protecting a commercial site. 215 In this instance, their operation seems to have transformed from that of a community security organisation into a private security service. 216 This situation raises questions as to Amphibi s role, function and ongoing purpose within the security landscape of the island. Are they community security groups or private security contractors? And can these groups remain responsive to the community, while also overseeing the security of commercial enterprises? Tuan Guru have mixed feelings about pamswakarsa. TGH Mustiadi Abhar spoke positively of community-based security activities, such as pamswakarsa, because they created a sense of safety during difficult times. Practical actions like creating or supporting pamswakarsa were sometimes necessary. Having said this, his organisation didn t control or have links to a pamswakarsa. Nor did he think that in Pagutan (on the outskirts of Mataram), where he lived and worked, it was necessary to 211 These other pamswakarsa had overt ideological agendas see Ian Douglas Wilson, Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265, The pamswakarsa, Bujak, is now no longer active in Mataram and West Lombok. 213 Lang-Lang is a pamswakarsa that is limited in operation to Mataram. It remains operational and has close-connections with the Mataram Mayor, Ruslan. 214 International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) < at 11 March This metamorphosis from pamswakarsa to private security contractor has been seen elsewhere in Indonesia. For instance, Brigass (affiliated to political party PDI-P) was directly connected with the private security venture called Brigass Lustrilanang Security. See Ian Douglas Wilson, Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265, Field notes, 15 September This issue of the privatisation of Amphibi activities was also discussed by Lalu Nurtaat who is a Mataram academic and local community leader living nearby this market and transportation hub Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 28 July 2008). 52

71 have such a group. 217 Abhar s support for non-state responses, such pamswakarsa, was not shared by all Tuan Guru. TGH Ahmad Madani felt that security is predominantly the role of government, although this can be aided by community mechanisms, such as a ronda. However, the problem with pamswakarsa, Madani felt, was that these groups often end up fighting each other. 218 They may reduce theft, but other problems can emerge, such as fighting between members of different pamswakarsa. 219 The two Tuan Guru both argue valid points and this identifies the complexity of this issue. Community protection measures, such as night watches and the like, are common across Indonesia. 220 Despite concerns about pamswakarsa, it is not necessary to see them as a problem for the rule of law. There have been examples in Lombok where the Attorney General s department and police have worked closely with pamswakarsa, providing them with training and operational support. 221 Now that the economic and social situation on the island has stabilised and the democratic transition appears to be progressing relatively smoothly there is an important question for Lombok s state and non-state leaders to ponder are pamswakarsa still necessary? One of the negative consequences of pamswakarsa, according to some proponents of Negara Hukum (law-based state), 222 is that these organisations (or at least some of their members) do not always feel bound by state laws. 223 The local prosecutor for East Lombok at the turn of the century, Bambang Subandrio, felt that these groups operated in a manner not conducive to Indonesia 217 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 218 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). 219 Ibid. 220 International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) < at 11 March 2010; Ian Douglas Wilson, Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265, Kaposkamling Membantu Pamswakarsa, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 15 June This concept is discussed within the prism of Reformasi developments by many important Indonesian jurists, including Jimly Asshiddiqie, Cita Negara Hukum Indonesia Kontemporer ( A Contemporary Perspective of the Indonesian Law-based State ) (Speech delivered at the Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Sriwijaya, Palembang, 23 March 2004). 223 Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007). 53

72 being a Negara Hukum. Pamswakarsa members, as he saw it, acted like cowboys, outside the normal standards of society and its rules. 224 It is worth reviewing some of these groups inappropriate actions and considering whether they should still be functioning. In mid-december 1999, over 40 trucks transporting an estimated 2000 Amphibi members from East Lombok raided a Hindu area of Kuranji village, West Lombok, in search of an alleged thief. 225 The raid was not a disciplined affair, resulting in the death of one villager and the serious injury of another. 226 To cap off this inglorious event, one of the hands of the alleged thief, I Gusti Ngurah, was amputated. As the Amphibi trucks headed home they passed by the Beretais Market and did a victory lap, waving the severed hand around. 227 This event caused a flare-up in tensions between the Hindu and Sasak communities and led NTB Governor, Harun Al Rasyid, to convene a meeting with senior government officials, because conflict between these two communities would have been potentially devastating and involved a large number of people. After this meeting the leadership of Amphibi was pressured to meet with a Hindu pamswakarsa, Dharma Wisesa, to discuss how to maintain security and communal harmony. Additionally, Amphibi representatives made a public apology for the behaviour of their members in Kuranji. However, there is no evidence of any of those involved being officially prosecuted for the deaths or injuries emerging out of this raid. 228 Another example of this sort of wild behaviour by pamswakarsa members occurred when the Central Lombok local legislature was raided in late 1999 by 20 truckloads of Bujak members. Apprarently Bujak members involved were angry about the role of money politics in the election of the Central Lombok Bupati (head of the regency). 224 Pamswakarsa Turunkan Drastis Kriminalitas, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 15 December See also Amphibi Punya Hirarki Jelas, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 February Kelompok Massa Hakimi Warga Kuranji, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 December Amphibi Minta Maaf dan Sepakat Kerjasama, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 31 December John M. MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists?: Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2005) Amphibi Minta Maaf dan Sepakat Kerjasama, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 31 December This issue was also covered in other sources John M. MacDougall, Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2007) This story was confirmed by an interviewee who lives close to the Beretais Market Interview with Zaini (Mataram, 16 July 2008). 54

73 Despite the extroadinary nature of this incident, luckily no deaths or injuries were reported. 229 Then in early 2000, it was reported that 200 Amphibi members had run amok through the village of Jenggik in East Lombok, leaving three civilians and two Indonesian soldiers in Mataram s Public Hospital. Once again, they were allegedly hunting for thieves, but they seemed to have caused more trouble than they resolved. 230 This event occurred just days after provincial authorities and Amphibi leaders confirmed that they would work together to improve pamswakarsa activities. 231 People s negative perceptions of pamswakarsa were further played upon by what seemed, as TGH Madani noted earlier, to be an ongoing turf war around the turn of the century between Bujak and Amphibi. 232 There are also allegations that members of Amphibi were involved in the January 2000 riots, although, John MacDougall is unclear as to the extent of pamswakarsa members participation. 233 These events, although ostensibly undertaken to deal with criminals, were themselves essentially criminal activities. These sorts of incidents are not merely of historical interest, but are still occurring. This draws attention to whether pamswakarsa play a productive role or ought to be disbanded. In mid-august 2007, Amphibi members raided a police station in Sekotong, Central Lombok, where a police officer was kidnapped and badly beaten. 234 Senior provincial government official, Dahlan Bandu, felt that many pamswakarsa members still often acted in an undisciplined manner. 235 He reflected that they do not respect the law, they do not respect the police and they do not respect the state. 236 Former NTB Kapolda, Sukandri, said that the actions of pamswakarsa often interfere with police work. Pamswakarsa flood an area with dozens of members, yet this does not mean that they catch the criminals. Instead, it Truk Bujak Serbu DPRD II Loteng, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 24 December Kelompok Amphibi Serang Oknum TBI, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 November Administrasi Amphibi Cukup Teratur, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 November APRI Sesalkan Perang Bujak vs Amphibi, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 April John M. MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007). 235 Dahlan Bandu is a senior public servant, who was in charge of assisting the former NTB governor, Lalu Serinata, with monitoring and managing provincial authority responses to communal and political conflict. His role is discussed in more detail in Chapter Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007). 55

74 often means that they just get in the way of the police trying to perform their duties or even become involved in criminal activities themselves. 237 On the other hand, some local politicians support these groups and endorse efforts to bring pamswakarsa into a closer relationship with state authorities. Former West Lombok Bupati, Iskander, a close associate of former Governor Lalu Serinata, supported residents of his regency joining pamswakarsa. Iskander s argument was that by expanding the membership there could potentially be an improvement in the quality of cadre. 238 Other politicians, such as the then NTB Governor, Harun Al Rasyid, wanted state officials to work more closely with pamswakarsa. He felt that this would not only ensure their operations were undertaken more effectively, but also that provincial authorities would be able to monitor these groups more closely. 239 This issue is still relevant today in Lombok and elsewhere in Indonesia. An April 2010 report by the International Crisis Group called on the Indonesian government to consider a ban on paramilitary training by non-state actors, or at least subject such training to strict regulation and control. 240 From my perspective, engagement is a preferred policy position for state actors in relation to pamswakarsa in Lombok. 241 It allows state law enforcement agencies and other government departments to deal with these influential non-state players, rather than competing with them or forcing them underground. Engagement between state and non-state entities, such as police and pamswakarsa, provides many opportunities for creative law enforcement. However, this process is also is open to problematic political interference. For instance, there will not be opportunities for professional and constructive relationships if political or religious interests use this engagement to merely strengthen the pamswakarsa to which they are affiliated. This is of concern, because over the last decade pamswakarsa have become 237 Kapolda NTB Ditentang Masyarakat dan Dewan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 April 1999; Kelompok Pamswakarsa Saling Bertentangan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 21 December Orang Lobar Boleh Masuk Amphibi atau Bujak, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 16 December A similar position of engaging and working with pamswakarsa was taken by the leadership of the University of Mataram Unram Jalin Kerjasama Dengan Amphibi, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 10 February Gubernur Minta Bupati Bantu Pamswakarsa, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 29 December International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh (2010) < at 22 July An example of how this can be accomplished is considered in Chapter 6. 56

75 politicised, developing close links with different factions of Lombok s political elite. 242 Political connections to pamswakarsa include Lalu Serinata, the former governor, who had strong (albeit informal) connections to Amphibi. 243 The current governor TGH Bajang is linked to Satgas, the militia controlled by NW Pancor (see Picture 2.4 below). 244 Powerful pamswakarsa connections also extend to other leading Tuan Guru. For instance, Amphibi is controlled by TGH Sibaway 245 and Hezbullah by TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid. 246 Picture 2.4 A member of pamswakarsa, Satgas, patrolling the NW Pancor anniversary celebration in 2008 In this chapter, I have shown some of the effects and responses to the social, economic and political instability in Lombok during the late 1990s and early part of this century. The next section considers one of the key rationales motivating political and communal conflict money. The final section investigates the January 2000 riots in Mataram and West Lombok and will highlight many of the issues raised throughout this chapter. 242 These issues are also discussed in Chapter Lalu Serinata s connections were noted by a reliable non-government informant; see Interview with anonymous non-government informant (Mataram, 16 November 2007). 244 SATGAS Hamzanwadi (2009) Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor < at 29 May John M. MacDougall, Self-reliant Militias (2003) Inside Indonesia < on 29 May Nahdlatul Wathan Anjani Website (2009) < at 29 May 2009; Pemuda NW Konvoi Keliling Lombok, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 May

76 The economics of violence One issue underpinning this chapter is that of financial inducements can act as a prelude to political and communal violence in Lombok. Financial inducements for conflict can be seen as a matter of supply and demand. Provocateurs are willing to supply money to potential demonstrators, renting a crowd, to leverage their own political position, enhance their social status and gain greater access to the state treasury. People are willing to accept this money out of necessity, due to high levels of poverty (noted in Chapter 1) that make people susceptible to these inducements. It has been argued that a strong economic environment provides the foundations for political and social stability. President Wahid s government, from late 1999 till mid- 2001, 247 was struggling to manage the economy, it has been suggested that the result was social instability and violence. In fact, the January 2000 riots in Lombok, like other conflicts across the archipelago emerged as direct consequence of these budgetary and economic problems, according to media reports. 248 Therefore, financial and economic circumstances need to be considered when evaluating conflict management. The current political elite in Lombok, including the immediate-past and current NTB governor, have both acknowledged the importance of economic management and development in relation to the maintenance of social harmony. 249 The economics of violence are not always direct. An example of the indirect role that money plays emerges from within Lombok s political elite. Candidates currently running for political office in Lombok, as elsewhere in Indonesia, typically pay a political party to endorse and support their election campaign. With this fee the candidate is given access to the party machinery for campaigning purposes. This includes the use of professional staff and party cadres for support and the provision of other services, such as marketing. Some commentators have noted the corrosive effect that this has on Indonesian politics. They argue that this situation ensures that 247 President Wahid was the second Indonesian president following President Soeharto s resignation. He continued the democratic reform process instigated by President Habibie, who had taken over from Soeharto. However, Wahid s administration was beset by administrative and political problems, combined with several scandals, and he was eventually dismissed from office by the MPR following impeachment. 248 Brutality and Budgets in Indonesia, The Economist (London, UK), 22 January 2000, Interview with Lalu Serinata (Mataram, 8 January 2008); TGH Bajang, Pre-Inauguration Comments (Speech Delivered at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008). 58

77 politicians are almost automatically ensnared by corruption, due to the need to recoup the costs of endorsement and campaigning. 250 In this situation the debt is not owed by the political party, but rather directly by the individual candidate. As a consequence, an informant told me that the politician is frankly indebted to his or her backers. He or she usually owes a major financial debt that needs to be repaid. This entanglement makes it hard to avoid misusing the state treasury or allowing opportunistic cronyism, such as the allocation of business contracts to financial backers. 251 It has been alleged that candidates wanting to run for Governor in NTB in the 2008 elections were required to pay between Rp 15 billion to Rp 30 billion ($AU2 million to $AU4 million) for political party endorsement. The figure varied depending on the size, importance and capacity of the political party both nationally and locally. TGH Bajang has directly refuted claims that he, or any member of his campaign team, made such payments and it must be clearly acknowledged that there is no evidence that Bajang or members of his team were involved in this practice. However, information about the need to make payments to political parties, and the size of these in NTB, came from a reliable informant and it is believed that other candidates did make such payments. This informant, a prominent community leader, found out about these payments because he was considering running in the gubernatorial elections. He decided against it, believing he would financially compromise himself (or perhaps because he couldn t raise the money). 252 Similar problems have been reported in other parts of Indonesia where politik uang (money politics) has become a common factor contributing to political tension and conflict. 253 Financial rewards and opportunities for corrupt behaviour escalate during election campaigns. The various campaign teams allegedly distributed money widely across Lombok to gain political and public support prior to, and during, the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections. 254 I heard about and saw the results of the distribution of 250 Marcus Mietzner, Stable but Unpopular Political Parties after Suharto, IIAS Newsletter, Spring 2008, Field notes, 4 June Ibid. 253 Elizabeth Collins and Muhammad Sirozi, Blood or Money? Ethnicity now Plays a Role in Local Politics in South Sumatra but Money Still Rules (2004) Inside Indonesia < at 19 January Antisipasi Money Politic, Bentuk Satgas, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 July 2008; Panwas Terima Laporan Dugaan Money Politics, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 August

78 money by candidates and their campaign teams, before and after the 2008 elections. To be clear, I did not personally see the supply of money by campaign teams to religious or community leaders. However, at this time many major construction projects commenced, such as the supply of electricity to a village and major renovations to Islamic boarding schools. People openly talked to me about how these projects were reportedly funded by the various campaign teams. The amount of money distributed is difficult to assess, but considering the nature and number of projects commenced it must have been considerable. It is widely believed that electoral success brings financial dividends. These rewards are the heart of the issue and the source of potential tensions and violence. Electoral success brings career opportunities in the bureaucracy and direct financial reward for one s family, ethnic group and political clique, through access to the government s treasury and control of government departments. In the past, financial rewards emanated from what has been called non-budgetar. 255 These funds did not require the same accountability or auditing processes as other items of the NTB budget. Nonbudgetar was intended to be a discretionary budget item intended to be used only in emergency or exceptional circumstances. However, it is alleged that it became an unaccountable slash-fund for many politicians and their entourages. This problem also exists elsewhere in Indonesia, but non-budgetar had been estimated to be as much as one-third of the annual NTB budget in the early part of this century, a sum that equates to around Rp100,000,000,000 ($AU12,500,000). 256 Non-budgetar is now technically prohibited but there are still treasury management problems in provincial and local government that allow for financial grey areas, where funds can be misused. This is particularly true for the provinces, according to a consultant specialising in economic development. 257 This allows money to leak from the state treasury into politicians pockets, due to grey areas in budget processes and auditing deficiencies. 258 The effect is the same as if non-budgetar still existed. 259 The 255 The official title of this source of revenue was dana taktis or the tactical/operational part of the Indonesian budget. 256 Government sources in Mataram provided these estimates Field notes, 4 June Informal discussion with an anonymous foreign consultant (Jakarta, 16 March 2009). 258 These grey areas in the operation of the Indonesian treasury are connected to reforming and developing the activities of bureaucrats and the departmental processes that are used. This will be a difficult and lengthy process see Ross H. McLeod, The Struggle to Regain Effective Government 60

79 German aid agency, GTZ, for example, has been working with provincial authorities in Mataram to improve local treasury accountability and processes over the last decade, yet in GTZ s view the core competencies needed for good local governance are still lacking. 260 A telling indictment of these issues is that in the aftermath of the 2008 gubernatorial elections, former governor Lalu Serinata and three other prominent local politicians were charged and detained for corruption on 27 October The charges were based on allegations that Serinata and his co-conspirators used money from the provincial parliament up to Rp 23 billion (just over $AU3 million) for improper political purposes. It is thought that these improper political purposes involved inducing legislators to vote for Serinata in the 2003 election for governor. 262 These charges did not come as a surprise, as the media had been reporting on the allegations for several months. 263 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had authorised the NTB Attorney General s Department to investigate allegations of corruption in April 2008, four months before the provincial gubernatorial elections. 264 Since his imprisonment there has been high drama, with the former governor going on a hunger strike which led to his hospitalisation. 265 He was finally convicted of corruption in mid-2009 and was recently imprisoned to serve a three year sentence. 266 Under Democracy in Indonesian (2005) 41 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 367, 377; Didi S. Damanhuri, Korupsi, Reformasi Birokrasi dan Masa Depan Ekonomi Indonesia (2006) Ibid. 260 Good Local Governance (2010) GTZ < at 25 March Kejaksaan (Attorney General s Department) Republik Indonesia, Kasus Dana APBD Kejaksaan Tahan Mantan Gubernur NTB (2008) < at 12 December Jeremy Kingsley, D-Day for Anti-Corruption Reform (2009) Inside Indonesia < at 19 March Panca Nugraha, Prosecutors in NTB Send Red Light to Governor (2008) The Jakarta Post < at 12 December 2008; Mahasiswa Aski Para Koruptor NTB (2008) Sumbawa News < at 12 December 2008; Dewi Indriastuti, Permeriksaan Serinata Lancar (2008) Kompas < at 12 December 2008; Keluarga Serinata Lapor Ke Polda (2008) <lotengpers.wordpress.com> at 10 December 2008; Kasus Gubernur Serinata Kembali Dipertanyakan (2008) Nusa Tenggara News < at 12 December Irwan Nugroho, Gubernur NTB Diperiksa Kejagung 24 April Sebagai Tersangka (2008) Detik News < at 12 December Yusuf Riaman, Mantan Gubernur NTB Serinata Dilarikan ke RS (2008) Media Indonesia < at 12 December Panca Nugraha, Former Governor Sent to Jail to Serve his Sentence, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 29 July

80 There have been many political and social responses to corruption in Lombok. One of these was an increase in the political strength in Lombok of the Islam-oriented party, PKS. 267 It was part of the two-party coalition with another Islam-oriented party, Partai Bulan Bintang, 268 which supported the candidature of current NTB Governor TGH Bajang. 269 Some people have supported PKS because of its strong Islamic credentials, but many others have decided to support this party predominantly because it prioritises cleaning up politics and taking strong measures against corruption. 270 TGH Bajang gave a speech prior to his inauguration highlighting his desire to combat corruption. He wanted amplop (envelope) culture to come to an end. The reference to amplop culture denotes the practice of giving envelopes of money to people when politicians come to visit a community or place of worship. His priority, he said, was to have a clean and professional provincial government. 271 TGH Bajang in a preinauguration speech (see Picture 2.5) noted that the concepts underpinning this principle were not just Islamic, but could also be found in Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. Interestingly, religious pluralism was woven into his anti-corruption rhetoric. 272 Picture 2.5 R-L Governor TGH Bajang and Deputy Governor Badrul Munir, following Bajang s speech at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party 268 PBB or Crescent Moon and Star Party. 269 Djoko Tjiptono, PBB: Kemenangan TG Bajang akan Menginspirasi Rakyat di 2009 (2008) Detik News < at 13 January Interview with Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani (Mataram, 18 December 2007). See also Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia the Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (2008) 3; Najwa Shihab and Yanuar Nugroho, The Ties that Bind: Law, Islamisation and Indonesia s Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (2010) 10 Australian Journal of Asian Law TGH Bajang, Pre-Inauguration Comments (Speech Delivered at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008). 272 Ibid. See also Pluralitas Jadi Komitmen Utama, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 August

81 It is worth considering one more, very significant element that contributes to the demand for economic inducements poverty. An anonymous informant told me that during the January 2000 riots, people believed that not all the rioters became spontaneously involved. Rather for a sizeable contingent, financial inducements for participation were provided. 273 Farouk Muhammad, former Kapolda NTB, also believed that money was distributed to rioters during the January 2000 disturbances. 274 This monetary incentive is an effective generator of noise, tension and potentially violence, according to Ryanto Rabbah, editor of local social affairs magazine Religi. There is a large number of economically-disadvantaged people in Mataram and elsewhere in Lombok who are vulnerable to manipulation that leads them to become demonstrators (or rioters) for money. 275 The January riots More than burning tyres The events of January 2000 will not happen again. I will work to ensure this. TGH Bajang, Governor NTB. 276 Although he was sparse on details TGH Bajang has publicly committed his provincial administration to actively avoid a re-occurrence of events like the January 2000 riots. These statements were made in one of his first addresses as Governor-elect and they highlighted the ongoing local political resonance of these riots. The January 2000 riots are an example of the convergence of many of the issues considered in this chapter. This section will also consider why certain lines in the sand were not crossed by the rioters. As mentioned previously there was, for example, property damage, but no reported serious assaults, sex attacks or murders. Despite this, many people in Lombok feel that the riots are a stain on the island s 273 Field notes, 2007 (date withheld to insure anonymity). 274 Interview with Farouk Muhammad (Mataram, 3 November 2007). 275 Interview with Ryanto Rabbah (Mataram, 3 October 2007). This was also mentioned by Pendeta Hasanema, see Interview with Pendeta Hasanema (Mataram, 12 December 2007). 276 TGH Bajang, Pre-Inauguration Comments (Speech Delivered at Hotel Bukit Senggigi, 2 August 2008). 63

82 good name; it is a kehilangan muka (loss of face) for them. 277 The embarrassment was clear when speaking with Tuan Guru Besar Sofwan Hakim who felt that youths involved had disregarded the lessons of Islam. These youths according to Hakim, urged on by provocateurs, became drawn into rioting, blindly following their emotions and greed. 278 The actual spark that kindled the riots is unknown, but events started on 17 January 2000, when a public rally assembled outside the military headquarters in Mataram. Over 5000 people turned up to protest the Indonesian government s inability to stop violence in Maluku province that had cost over 1700 Christian and Muslim lives. 279 At the conclusion of the rally provocateurs, allegedly from outside Lombok, whippedup the crowd into a wild frenzy 280 and within hours local Christian and Chinese homes and shops were burning. 281 The rally, a tabligh akbar (mass religious meeting), had been planned as a peaceful show of solidarity for fellow Muslims. 282 However, the riots were not simply an innate emotional response to the tragic events in Maluku and the suffering of their Muslim brethren. Rather it has been suggested that the riots reflected a calculated act of manipulation. It was alleged that in the preceding six months before the rally, radical elements had distributed emotive videos calling for Muslim solidarity in response to the conflict in Maluku. To generate these primal and emotional responses the videos drew upon religious symbols combined with graphic imagery of dead women and children in Maluku. 283 Events were supposedly aggravated further through the distribution of money, as already noted, to the participants. In many respects, the looting and violence could also be viewed simply as opportunistic, rather than religious or political. People knew that the local 277 Kerusuhan Mataram, Keluguan Pemuda Yang Membawa Petaka, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 February Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). Islamic teachings about social harmony and the avoidance of violence are considered in Chapter British Broadcasting Corporation, Riots Hit Indonesian Resort (2000) < at 12 October Ibid. 281 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Indon Military Shipped to Lombok (2000) < at 12 October John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Suharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) John M. MacDougall, Criminality and the Political Economy of Security in Lombok, in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds), Renegotiating Boundaries Local Politics in Post- Suharto Indonesia (2007)

83 Indonesian Chinese in Mataram and West Lombok had fled and they used this as an opportunity to raid their shops. 284 Whatever the cause, the disturbances which lasted five days, led to significant property damage. The riots resulted in the razing or demolition of 20 churches, 740 homes, 62 shops, 24 rumah makan (restaurants), 5 bar/restaurants, 36 cars and motorbikes, 23 villas, 41 hotel bungalows, 11 ruko (shop/homes), 30 warehouses, 20 public buildings, 1 hairdressing salon, 2 banks, 2 medical clinics and 3 offices. 285 This damage was caused by an estimated 5000 rioters and the assessments of property damage reached about Rp 60 billion ($AUS7.5 million). 286 The riots also led to approximately 7,500 Indonesian Chinese (and other non-muslim residents) fleeing to Bali and further afield. 287 Anecdotally it has been suggested that this meant that at least 80% of entrepreneurs left the island. This subsequently hampered efforts to recover from the riots, because many of the key economic drivers were no longer present. 288 As a consequence, the provincial authorities provided compensation for people whose property was damaged or destroyed, in order to persuade them to return. 289 While many found their way back to Mataram and West Lombok in the following months, it is recognised that hundreds did not. Furthermore, many of those who returned still live with a high level of anxiety about their personal and family security. 290 During the violence several fatalities were reported. Those killed were all rioters shot by police or the military. The exact number of fatalities is unclear. The International 284 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008); see Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 285 Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April Kerusuhan Mataram, Keluguan Pemuda Yang Membawa Petaka, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 February Jana Mason, Shadow Plays: The Crisis of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia (2001) United Nations Refugee Agency < at 26 May Sebagian Besar Pengusaha Keturunan Alami Trauma, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 February Korban Kerusuhan Akan Dapat Bantuan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 18 April This was clearly expressed to me when I was looking for a rental property early in During the inspection of potential houses with Chinese Indonesian businessman, JT, he kept repeating the importance of personal security. He mentioned these issues with specific reference to the 2000 riots. 65

84 Crisis Group 291 and the local social affairs magazine Religi 292 placed the death toll at five. Academic Stein Kristiansen believes, however, that the death toll was seven. 293 There is also evidence from some informants suggesting that these figures are underestimates. 294 Additionally, 152 people were reportedly lightly injured, as a result, of their participation in the violence. 295 Those involved (the rioters) were fundamentalists for religion, but not fundamentalists for religious knowledge. 296 Religion was undoubtedly one of the factors motivating some of the rioters. Rather than Islam, maybe it is better to identify the symbolism of religion as a powerful motivator for violence. Pastor Rosarius felt that the affinity Sasak people felt for Islam may have been manipulated through the provocateurs appropriating Islamic imagery and sense of affiliation. 297 It was not Islam s teachings or principles being used, he said, but its symbols. 298 The rioters could be likened to soccer hooligans who use a sporting team s jersey to provide cover for their emotional outburst. TGH Humaidi Zaen said that Islam teaches that two wrongs do not make a right. He felt strongly that the righteous act of showing solidarity with co-religionists should not have turned violent. 299 An important element of Sasak responses to stress and conflict is the use of symbolic violence. One of the political explanations for the January 2000 riots was that it was a reflection of Sasak authority, or at least an attempt to assert it, in the newly decentralised political environment a flexing of socio-political muscle. This correlates with the violence being limited to property damage rather than being 291 International Crisis Group, The Perils of Private Security Groups in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok (2003) < at 12 October Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April Stein Kristiansen, Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, My source for this is a key informant, JT, who told me that several rioters were shot by the military outside his Church (which happens to be on an Indonesian military base). 295 Meredam Konflik, Menghidupkan Kasadaran Multikultur, Religi (Mataram, Lombok), 16 April Interview with Mukhtar (Mataram, 28 August 2008). 297 Interview with Pastor Rosarius (Mataram, 10 October 2007). 298 Ibid. 299 Interview with TGH Humaidi Zaen (Memben, East Lombok, 9 August 2008). 66

85 directed at individual people it was a show of power through political symbolism, such as the torching of a church. 300 Connected to this is speculation that the January 2000 riots may have been a calculated political strategy used to raise the local profile of new governor Harun Al-Rasyid. The riots, the rumour goes, were instigated to show that he could take strong and decisive steps during a crisis (he had been a reasonably noteable figure in Jakarta politics, as Mayor of South Jakarta, and needed to gain authority locally). 301 In the year 2000, Lombok was beset with political tension and competition. Consequently these allegations, whether correct or not, do have a degree of local currency. 302 There were also reportedly more base personal motivations for participation in the violence, such as the settling of neighbourhood vendettas. A friend of mine, Atun, told me how some locals from her kampung attacked a Hindu family s large home on the outskirts of their community. They told her that they burnt down the house because they didn t like the family s aggressive dog, which had upset neighbours for a long time. 303 No politics, no religion, no economics rather the riots gave cover to the settling of personal grudges. The manipulation of provocateurs was given added impetus by the difficult economic circumstances of the time. Many Sasak believed that Indonesian Chinese in Mataram and West Lombok dominated the economy over the whole island and subsequently Sasak opportunities for economic advancement were limited. 304 This is a common perception grounded in the island s economic reality, and the question that emerges is how this disparity should be addressed. Community leader and Mataram academic, Lalu Nurtaat, suggested that there are two alternatives. One is to become angry and turn to violence, while the other is to improve Sasak access to education and the 300 Field notes, 6 July Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). I had heard this rumour numerous times before this interview. The rumours were based on the circumstances of Al-Rasyid s appointment and previous political activities. There was an alternative candidate for NTB governor in 1999 who was a locallyactive Sasak, Lalu Mudjitahid. Many people saw Al-Rasyid, originally from Sumbawa, as virtually a Javanese import, because he had been active in Jakarta politics for such a long time. There was, therefore, a belief that he needed to obtain local credibility see I Ketut Putra Erawan, Tracing the Progress of Local Governments since Decentralisation in Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre, Indonesia Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (2007) Elite Politik Daerah Jadi Kambing Hitam, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 1 April Field notes, 3 October Field notes, 6 July

86 opportunities that flow from this. 305 The former governor, Lalu Serinata, felt that the disparity was best tackled by focusing more directly on economic development. 306 Having said all this, however, for many Sasak in January 2000, anger became a mechanism for expressing their frustrations. Despite these possible motivations of the rioters, TGH Humaidi Zaen, expressed shock at the rioters behaviour. He felt that this outbreak was uncharacteristic of the Sasak, who normally kept their emotions contained or closed (tutup) and were not usually overcome by passion. 307 An alternative perspective is that the Sasak are emotional and that they express their opinions bluntly. Many people, including Tuan Guru Besar Ulul Azmi told me that Lombok means chilli and that this appropriately describes the Sasak temperament. 308 Both perspectives are underpinned by what seems to be Sasak self-generated, yet contradictory, stereotypes. These accurately delineate elements of the diverse and complex cultural identity of the Sasak, which defies simple or monolithic explanation, as therefore, do the rationales and motivations of the rioters. Many of the punitive responses to the riots were taken outside the state legal systems, with communities dealing with matters in-house. 309 There, however, were also a limited number of court proceedings as a result of the January riots. Only 36 people were charged and found guilty in the Pengadilan Negeri Mataram for theft-related offences. For instance, three youths appeared before the court in late February 2000 charged with looting. They were accused of stealing cigarettes, clothes and DVD players. On the same day, a 40 year-old faced court for stealing 50 kilograms of rice. In these cases, all the accused were convicted and received sentences of 1 3 months imprisonment. 310 The longest of the sentences handed down by the Mataram court 305 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 25 October 2007). 306 Interview with Lalu Serinata (Mataram, 8 January 2008). 307 Ibid. 308 Interview with TGH Ulul Azmi (Jerneng, West Lombok, 17 December 2007). 309 As discussed in Chapter Hari Ini, Kembali Digelar Kasus Kerusuhan 171, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 23 February See also Saad Akhirnya Dihukum 10 Bulan Penjara, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 March 2000; Divonis 3 Bulan, Keluarga Terdakwa Menangis, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 May

87 was five years for two thieves who stole motorcycles during the riots. 311 All these cases were conducted under tight security due to a concern that the situation had the potential to spiral out of control, with the police setting up road blocks around Mataram to monitor people s movements during the trials. 312 There was also an attempt to prosecute higher profile figures who may have acted as provocateurs. An example of this was Zainul Asikin, 313 one of the organisers of the tabligh akbar. His supporters believed that he was used as a scapegoat in order to satisfy the public demand for an apportionment of blame. 314 It was also suggested that even if he had participated in the provocation he was not alone, with many prominent people participating in the tabligh akbar and potentially being provocateurs. 315 Asikin strenuously denied the allegations and participated in a reconciliation process with Christian leaders. 316 The charges were eventually dropped, however, why this occurred is unclear. The only other example of an attempt to prosecute a provocateur was Ishak Sasaki, who was in the end acquitted of all charges. As with Asikin, news reports and further enquiries have unearthed no additional information about the allegations against him, other than that they were serious. It was also difficult to establish the legal arguments or factual reasons leading to his acquittal. 317 Punitive actions emanating from the court system or community were important, but the January 2000 riots also offered the opportunity for Lombok s political elite and general society, to reaffirm important social values. It allowed for the public assertion by state and non-state leaders of the importance of strong inter-ethnic and interreligious relationships, and more broadly, social harmony. 318 An example of this was when Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII or the Islamic Students Movement of Indonesia) Mataram branch that supported the Catholic and Christian 311 Dua Terdakwa Kasus 171 Diancam 5 Tahun Penjara, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 April Kejati NTB Minta Pengunjung Digeledah, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 February When charged, Asikin was the Dean of the Law Faculty, the University of Mataram see Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004) Jangan Cari Kambing Hitam Atas Kerusuhan 171, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 March Kasus 171 Tidak Berdiri Sendiri, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 April Para Pendeta Berbela Rasa Kunjungi Asikin, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 2 April Ishak: Bebaskan Saya Pak Hakim, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 6 June 2000; Ishak Sasaki Bukan Provocator, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 30 June Walikota Awali Hapus Coretan Tembok Gereja, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 22 April

88 community s attempts to ensure their churches were not moved in the wake of the January 2000 riots. This student group felt that the government proposal to move the churches would lead to the further ostracisation of these communities, when instead they should be supporting church-goers to regain their sense of place in Mataram. Forcing their places of worship to move when rebuilt would have made them feel even further marginalised. 319 Additionally, in the months following the riots, communities close to areas affected by the riots often worked to repair and rebuild property that had been damaged. An example of this was a gotong royong meeting (community self help/working-bee) in the Senggigi resort area to help fix hotels and tourism infrastructure. 320 Reconciliation was also achieved in the post-riot period through the formation of inter-religious and inter-ethnic forums by non-state and state officials. In Mataram under the auspices of the mayor, Ruslan, representatives of the various communities were brought together to generate dialogue immediately following the riots with the aim to restore communal relationships. 321 The provincial and city authorities efforts to maintain social harmony remain active, with public campaigns still visible in Mataram (see Picture 2.6 below). Picture 2.6 Billboard in Mataram, which reads "There is no problem with different opinions, but violence no way..." There have also been other positive developments since these difficult times. In a 2005 survey, 76% Mataram residents sampled felt that the security situation had 319 PMII Mataram Tolak Relokasi Gereja, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 23 February Karyawan Hotel pun Gotong Royong, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 Fenruary Dibentuk Forum Bersama Antar Etnis, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 10 February

89 improved since Despite these positive developments, many of the key economic and social problems persist and consequently the window remains open for mob violence in the future. As has been noted, over 1.1 million people in NTB live in poverty. 323 According to these figures, the largest proportion of this group resides in West Lombok the area surrounding Mataram. 324 Endemic poverty is underpinned by continuing infrastructure and economic deficiencies. The World Bank, in an assessment prepared in 2003, found that the economic outlook for Lombok was not positive. 325 The heart of the local economy, the tourism industry, was seriously damaged following the January 2000 riots, and the first Bali bombing of 2002 had reinforced the downturn in tourist numbers from Japan, America, Australia and Europe. 326 In fact, the post-riot downturn was estimated to have reduced provincial tax revenue from tourism by approximately 30% in the months following the violence in Mataram and West Lombok. 327 There have been reports in recent times suggesting that the economic situation is improving, with an increase in investor interest and business activity. 328 However, grand plans for re-developing southern Lombok have stalled, with Dubai-based investors pulling out of a several hundred million dollar deal. 329 Therefore, economic uncertainty and problems still challenge Lombok s policy-makers and business leaders. 322 Stein Kristiansen and Trijono Lambang, Authority and Law Enforcement: Local Reform and Security Systems in Indonesia (2005) 27 Contemporary Southeast Asia 236, Persen Penduduk NTB Miskin, Lombok Post (Mataram), 5 August Ibid. 325 World Bank, Confronting Crisis: Impacts and Responses to the Bali Tragedy (2003) 15. This report is relatively outdated, written seven years ago, but it does highlight many of the ongoing economic problems for Lombok. 326 Yang Tercecer Dari Peristiwa 171, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 23 April Ibid. The riots turned tourist areas, such as Senggigi into ghost towns devoid of tourists, see Senggigi Bagaikan Kota Mati, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 February Ekonomi NTB Mulai Membaik, Lombok Post (Mataram), 11 March Deborah Cassrels, Gold rush at the Other Kuta (2009) The Australian < at 14 March

90 Conclusion Chapter 2 has evaluated the functioning of state institutions in Lombok. The performance of public servants is still inadequate and efforts to reform government operations that have recently been implemented are not believed to be short-term measures, rather they require years of difficult and complex bureaucratic restructuring. Additionally, there are cyclical periods of political and economic instability in Indonesia, which lead to periods of even greater state weakness on this eastern Indonesian island. This chapter particularly focuses upon a period of economic and political instability in Lombok during the late 1990s and early part of this century. This period saw a perceived crime wave, with theft and other criminal activities thought to be on the rise. However, at the same time, police and other law enforcement agencies were in a weakened position. This episode of instability was merely an exaggerated example, at least from my perspective, of the peripheral role in Lombok of state law enforcement. For instance, Mataram s Pengadilan Negeri according to court data, is more interested in traffic offences than any other category of criminal activity (see Appendix 1). I argue that as a consequence of these deficiencies, non-state actors in Lombok responded by developing pamswakarsa militias. Despite these problems with the operation of the state, Chapter 2 introduced the importance of partnerships between state and non-state entities. Their cooperation provides strength and capacity for each other when attempting to avoid or resolve conflict. The first case study about the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections provided a practical example of conflict avoidance partnerships (further elaborated upon in Chapter 5). This chapter concluded with an investigation of the January 2000 riots. The tumultuous violence in Mataram and West Lombok involved approximately 5000 people, lasted five days and caused significant property damage. However, unlike riots elsewhere in Indonesia, there were no serious assaults, rapes or murders reported. Although these important social boundaries were not crossed, the consequences were still traumatic for residents. Additionally, there have been ongoing economic consequences from the perceived insecurity, which Lombok s tourism industry is still only slowly recovering almost a decade after these events. This highlights the broader 72

91 social and economic implications of conflict management in Mataram and West Lombok. The next two chapters will consider two key non-state categories central to this thesis: religious leaders and local communities. These two groups are integral to efforts to avoid or resolve communal or political conflict. The next chapter investigates the role of Tuan Guru, and Chapter 4 follows on by examining the role of local communal relationships and community leadership. These two chapters form a background to the partnerships between state and non-state actors that are explored in the case studies outlined in Chapter 5. The remainder of this thesis considers the strengths and weaknesses of conflict management frameworks in operation in Mataram and West Lombok. The hypothesis of this thesis is that social, political and economic stability can quickly give way to instability. This should be taken into account when investigating how to avoid or resolve conflict in the area being studied. Therefore, the challenge posed is how to maintain social harmony during cyclical bouts of state weakness, which can emerge from political and economic instability. The answer to this question resides in the partnership between state and non-state actors and institutions. The next chapter investigates one of the key elements of these partnerships Tuan Guru. 73

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93 Chapter 3 Tuan Guru Guardians of religious traditions Most of the people here [Lombok] would call themselves santri (observant). 330 TGH Mustiadi Abhar and I were relaxing under a berugaq at his pesantren. As we sat, two students came up to the Tuan Guru kissing the palm and then back of his hand. A little later another student came by, bowing and placing the back of the Tuan Guru s hand to his forehead. These were ritualised demonstrations of respect for the Tuan Guru. 331 This sort of behaviour is an important part of the theatre of deference, which is an integral part of social ordering in Mataram and West Lombok. These practices form part of Sasak communal practice and daily life. 332 Picture 3.1 The kindergarten at Pondok Pesantren Abhariyah in Jerneng, West Lombok This chapter focuses on the non-state religious leaders, Tuan Guru, and their sociopolitical activities and influence in Mataram and West Lombok. It will investigate these issues with regard to how Tuan Guru participate in conflict management processes. This chapter thus leads on from previous chapters, which considered the weakness of state actors and institutions and the consequent strength of their non-state counterparts. Chapter 2 focused particularly on direct measures against crime, social 330 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). 331 These ritualised demonstrations were observable when visiting any Islamic boarding school in Mataram or West Lombok and were obvious during my interviews with Tuan Guru Lokal and Besar, such as those with TGH Mustiadi Abhar, TGH Sofwan Hakim, TGH Ahmad Madani and TGH Ramli. 332 Field notes, 23 July

94 instability and communal violence, predominantly through police and pamswakarsa. Tuan Guru, using their social and religious status, have a role in conflict management processes that is more subtle than the aforementioned law enforcers. Their role in these frameworks is as respected mediators and social stabilisers. Tuan Guru represent the overwhelming majority of the Muslims on Lombok, and therefore, their role as religious leaders is without question important. 333 One of the reasons that they are significant socio-political players is the centrality of religion and ritual on the island (discussed later in this chapter). 334 Additionally, their importance relates to the well-managed nature of their organisations, which have become like tiny quasi-states. These organisations provide social, health, educational and security services to the communities of Mataram and West Lombok (and elsewhere in Lombok). My research on Indonesia s religious leadership and organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama, builds on existing work by scholars, such as Greg Barton and Greg Fealy. However, my research shifts the emphasis from more general analysis of Indonesian Islam or Javanese religious practices to Lombok. 335 In relation to conflict management, this thesis argues that the role of Tuan Guru is essentially positive, as they often use their social influence to assist in avoiding or resolving communal and political conflicts. This position will be developed in the two case studies (see Chapter 5), but their positive role is not an unqualified assertion. 333 Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) The prominent role of Tuan Guru on the island been acknowledged in popular culture with these religious leaders becoming central characters in fictional accounts of life on the island; see Salmon Faris, Tuan Guru (2007). 335 Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (1996). See also: Martin van Bruinessen, Indonesia s Ulama and Politics: Caught Between Legitimising the Status Quo and Searching for Alternatives (1990) 49 Prisma The Indonesian Indicator 52; Greg Barton, Indonesia s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as the Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought (1997) 8 Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 323; Gregory J. Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, (PhD Thesis, Monash University, 1998); Bahtiar Effendy, Hidayat Nurwahid, Masykuri Abdillah and Edy Syachrudin, NU dan Islam Politik Di Era Reformasi (2001); Jusuf Wanandi, Islam in Indonesia: Its History, Development and Future Challenges (2002) 9 Asia-Pacific Review 104; Howard M. Federspiel, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals of the 20 th Century (2006) 27-43; Moch. Nur Ichwan and Noorhaidi Hasan (eds), Moving With the Times The Dynamics of Contemporary Islam in a Changing Indonesia (2007); Andree Feillard, From Handling Water in a Glass to Coping With an Ocean Shifts in Religious Authority in Indonesia in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds), Varieties of Religious Authority and Challenges in 20 th Century Indonesian Islam (2010); Martin van Bruinessen, New Leadership, New Policies? (2010) Inside Indonesia < at 31 July

95 There are concerns about Tuan Guru potentially acting as instigators or provocateurs in conflict situations, and these issues will be addressed later in this chapter. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section, Who are Tuan Guru?, explores the emergence of this type of religious leader. It then proposes a taxonomy of Tuan Guru (based upon their level of social influence) and explores their intellectual and spiritual diversity. The next section, The Historical Emergence of the Tuan Guru, investigates the ascendancy of these religious leaders over the last 100 years. This historical analysis of the burgeoning role of Tuan Guru is followed by the section, Locating Religion in Lombok, which considers the position of religious observance, ritual and religious affiliation in Mataram and West Lombok. The fourth section, Embedded Power, reviews the socio-political power of Tuan Guru. This section also investigates the potential pitfalls of these religious leaders dominant position in a newly-democratising and decentralised political environment. The fifth section, Guardians of Social Order The Key to Social Stabilisation, highlights how Tuan Guru s religious and socio-political activities make them legitimate authority figures within the Sasak community who are able able to act effectively as mediators and social stabilisers during periods of tension and violence. This chapter provides essential background to the role of Tuan Guru in conflict management processes. Tuan Guru and their organisations have, in many ways, built an atmosphere supportive of social harmony. For instance, Lalu Aksar Anshori, the head of an NU-affiliated youth group strongly criticised the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) in mid-2008 for their activities in Java, and elsewhere in Indonesia. The problem he identified with FPI was that they used religion to justify violent behaviour, such as raiding bars Kutuk Kekerasan Atas Nama Agama, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 3 June

96 Who are Tuan Guru? On a basic level Tuan Guru are akin to both Muslim religious teachers (ustadz) and leaders (ulama) in Lombok, and are essentially similar to Kiyai in Java. 337 Tuan Guru are pivotal religious, social and political leaders on the island. They are the most influential category of non-state actors in Mataram and West Lombok, and are involved with the spiritual life, such as the leading of prayers, and educational guidance of the Sasak community. Tuan Gurus pedagogic contribution is undertaken through personal and institutional avenues. Primarily, Tuan Guru are religious educators who provide Islamic teaching through Friday sermons (khutbah) and Qur anic education classes (pengajian). Their educational prowess is the key to establishing credibility within the community. 338 Tuan Guru may also oversee Islamic boarding schools (pondok pesantren), and this becomes their contribution to institutional education in Lombok. 339 In the mid-1970s, Nahdlatul Wathan recognised the social and political potency of the title Tuan Guru and sought to establish criteria for its use, 340 but, this prescriptive approach never gained broad acceptance, at least not in Mataram or West Lombok. Accordingly, no definitive qualification or selection criteria for use of the title Tuan Guru is available at the moment. It remains totally unregulated in a formal sense by the state or by Islamic organisations. 341 Yet it can be clearly said that the title Tuan Guru is granted by Sasak society to a respected religious figure. 342 Their status emanates from their personal religious knowledge, social standing and charisma. 343 One of the strongest features within the armoury of Tuan Guru is their close relationship with society and the importance that the Sasak community of Mataram 337 Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) 81-88; Endang Turmudi, Perselingkuhan Kyai Dengan Kekausaan (2004). 338 Field notes, 7 August Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 340 Judith L. Ecklund, Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) A Tuan Guru is not appointed by a government agency or department, nor do Islamic organizations designate people to become Tuan Guru, although, they may groom and promote people as such. 342 Interview with Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani (Mataram, 18 December 2007). See also: Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006) 180; Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 343 Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006)

97 and West Lombok place upon religious ritual and affiliation. One way of understanding this close relationship, which many Sasak told me about, was by contrasting Javanese Kiyai and Tuan Guru. Interestingly, this contrast is in many ways not about religious leaders, but rather about the presumed differences between Javanese and Sasak society. TGH Mustiadi Abhar felt that the distinguishing features are not the role or functions that these religious leaders undertake or their personal character, but the way that the general public relates to them. 344 For the Sasak, Abhar asserted, religious practices and ritual are central to their identity and daily lives, while to the Javanese, he said, religion does not necessarily have the same level of importance (although, most Javanese would dispute this). In fact, he jokingly said that many Javanese families have different religions within the one family one child Muslim, one child Hindu, one child Buddhist. 345 The implication of this admittedly absurd joke was that Javanese religious values are all mixed up, and by implication, weak. This comparision is not intended to undermine Javanese religious practices, but rather to highlight the way that the Sasak in Mataram and West Lombok place significant value upon religious affiliation and ritual. Consequently, the Sasak place a high degree importance upon religious leadership. The high social status ascribed to Tuan Guru means that they are able to effectively engage in conflict management processes. TGH Ahmad Madani told me that Islam was central to Sasak social processes and customary rules (adat). 346 The centrality of religion in Lombok, Madani noted, could be seen in the way that the Sasak prioritised Haj the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. He explained to me that many Sasak believed that this pilgrimage is more important for the Sasak than for the Javanese. Many Sasak, Madani noted, would go on Haj 344 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 345 Ibid. 346 The parallel, and connected, role of religion and adat in Lombok has been discussed in Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) 33. Similar research findings are found in the work of Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977) 9; and Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999) However, the research of Leena Avonius found that in northern Lombok there was a contrary position with a clear distinction between adat and religion (or at least a desire for this). As noted earlier, this is not undermining the point that I am making. Rather it highlights the eclectic nature of Sasak society in Lombok and the potential for different parts of the island to have distinct socio-religious realities (this is discussed in Chapter 1). See Leena Avonius, Reforming Adat Indonesian Indigenous People in the ear of Reformasi (2004) 4 The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 123,

98 when they were young, while the Javanese often left this till later in life (although, again, he provided no data to support these claims). 347 This commitment to their religious beliefs went to extreme levels, with some Sasak so eager to go on the Haj that they would sacrifice their children s education and sell land if the need be. 348 Table 3.1 (below) indicates that the religious leaders in Lombok can be appointed by the state or appointed by society, or both. In broad terms, state and non-state Muslim religious leaders in Mataram and West Lombok are not of the same social standing. Tuan Guru are unquestionably held in higher esteem than their government-appointed colleagues. Despite this, I have put Penghulu (state-appointed religious leaders) and Tuan Guru (non-state appointed) at the same level in the table for the purposes of explaining the operation of religious leadership, rather than suggesting that they are of equal status. To assume that these positions are mutually exclusive roles is incorrect, as sometimes Tuan Guru are also Penghulu. This emphasises the point made in Chapter 1 that the distinction between state and non-state actors and institutions is often blurred. However, understanding the basic distinctions between different types and levels of religious leadership is useful when attempting to comprehend the conflict management processes implemented in Bok (see Chapter 5). In this case study, the role of religious leadership and the types of religious figures deployed becomes central to the dispute resolution process. 347 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). This was also noted by other interviewees, such as Mukhtar, see Interview with Mukhtar (Mataram, 28 August 2008). 348 Cynthia L. Hunter, Local Issues and Changes: The Post-New Order Situation in Rural Lombok (2004) 19 Sojourn 100,

99 State Penghulu 1 per dusun (a subdistrict of a village desa) Their official role encompasses being invited to lead religious ceremonies, such as deaths, marriages and zikir (collective prayer). Appointed by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs Kyai 3-5 per dusun. This official position fulfils most of the same functions as the Penghulu. Usually appointed by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs Non-State Tuan Guru Lokal and Besar Religious leader with a role that encompasses acting as a teacher, spiritual leader, religious authority and organisational figure. Appointed informally by social acceptance Ustadz/Ustadza Religious teacher at an Islamic boarding school. Appointed by non-state religious organisations or boarding schools Table 3.1 Religious leadership in Bok Picture 3.2 Tuan Guru Besar Sofwan Hakim in Kediri, West Lombok,

100 Picture 3.3 Tuan Guru Besar Mustiadi Abhar in Pagutan, Mataram, 2008 Picture 3.4 Tuan Guru Besar Abdul Hamid in Ampenan, Mataram,

101 Picture 3.5 Tuan Guru Besar Ulul Azmi in Jerneng, West Lombok, 2007 How Tuan Guru are appointed is difficult to establish definitively. The answer to this question is opaque in theory, however, in reality a practical and straightforward communal process occurs. Having said this there are essentially no official rules for becoming a Tuan Guru, 349 nor are there any criteria approved by government, as there is for the position of Penghulu (see Table 3.1). Although the Penghulu is a respected person in Lombok, they do not hold the same level of social authority within the community as do Tuan Guru. 350 According to ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani, the role of Tuan Guru is simply an honour bestowed by society upon a respected religious figure due to his religious knowledge and charisma. 351 There are only two tangible criteria that I could firmly establish are required in order to gain the title of Tuan Guru. First, all Tuan Guru must have made the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca. 352 Second, all are male. 353 Other factors that determine who may 349 Ibid. 350 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 351 Interview with Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani (Mataram, 18 December 2007). See also: Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008); Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 352 Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006)

102 become a Tuan Guru are highly subjective and difficult to define with precision. There are nonetheless common characteristics that are often shared by those who are deemed worthy by their community to hold the title of Tuan Guru. To become a Tuan Guru, prospective Muslim religious leaders in Lombok should generally have a high-level of knowledge (ilmu) of Islamic teachings as they are primarily considered religious mentors and educators. 354 TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal explained that Tuan Guru consider their role first and foremost to be communal teachers and leaders, rather than being an institutionalised figure, such as the leader of a pesantren. 355 Recognition as a Tuan Guru, and consequently, socio-political strength, rests with their community s trust and support. 356 This endorsement comes from a religious leader s ability to engage their community and the manner in which the community accepts their opinions. Tuan Guru as educators establish their credentials and solidify their communal support through Friday sermons and their Islamic education classes. This role as educator sits comfortably within Sunni Muslim tradition where ulama, as non-state religious leaders, act as jurists and teachers. 357 Another point of difference between Tuan Guru and Javanese Kiyai can be seen when it comes to the management and control of Islamic boarding schools. An assumed criterion for being a Kiyai in Java is leadership of a pesantren. 358 However, no similar 353 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 354 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008); Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008); Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008). 355 Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008). 356 Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 357 Faud I Khuri, The Ulama: A Comparative Study of Sunni and Shi a Religious Officials (1987) 23 Middle Eastern Studies 291, For a discussion of the intellectual, social and spiritual issues currently facing Ulama across the Muslim world, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam Custodians of Change (2002). Also, for an analysis of the historical development of Indonesian and Malaysian ulama and how this fits into broader Islamic intellectual and political trends, see: Martin van Bruinessen, Indonesia s Ulama and Politics: Caught Between Legitimising the Status Quo and Searching for Alternatives (1990) 49 Prisma The Indonesian Indicator 52; Gregory J. Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, (PhD Thesis, Monash University, 1998); Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama (Working Paper No. 122, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2007); Andree Feillard, From Handling Water in a Glass to Coping with an Ocean Shifts in Religious Authority in Indonesia in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds), Varieties of Religious Authority and Challenges in 20 th Century Indonesian Islam (2010). 358 Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the Umma Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java (2007)

103 expectation exists for Tuan Guru. 359 Essentially, Tuan Guru are scholars and teachers rather than institution-builders, although to ignore the importance of their organisational capabilities would be unwise. Religious leaders who have the backing of organisations acknowledge that organisational support does augment community perceptions of them and increases their socio-political influence. Organisational backing creates an image of authority to the community and Tuan Guru are able to advance their socio-political status through the provision of health, education and social services. Having said this, the provision of these services is not merely a tactical political matter. Rather most Tuan Guru perceive it to be part of their responsibilities to their community (ummah). 360 Not all Tuan Guru have equal status, and their levels of influence vary. Throughout this thesis Tuan Guru are divided into Tuan Guru Lokal (local Tuan Guru) and Tuan Guru Besar (important Tuan Guru). This categorisation emerged from my own observations and many informal discussions and was further developed during an interview with Asnawi, the Rektor of the State Islamic Insitute Mataram. 361 Although most Sasak would recognise the delineation they would not necessarily use the terms Tuan Guru Lokal or Tuan Guru Besar. 362 This taxonomy represents their spheres of influence and where their authority has effect. Tuan Guru Lokal have influence within a confined geographic area, for example a village. By contrast, Tuan Guru Besar attract support from across the island, and in some cases they may have a reputation outside Lombok, such as TGH Sofwan Hakim from Kediri 363 and TGH Bajang from Pancor. 364 Despite the importance of lineage (which will be considered later in this chapter) there is a strong element of meritocracy in deciding who is classified as a Tuan Guru and 359 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 360 Ibid. 361 Institut Agama Islam Negeri Mataram or The State Islamic Institute Mataram. The position of Rektor is similar to University Vice-Chancellor or President elsewhere. 362 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). 363 His prestige and social status is, for instance, recognised by a weekly column in the Lombok Post called Dialog Jumat (Friday Dialogue) in which he answers questions from readers on religious practice and interpretation. 364 Both have santri (religious students) who come from across Lombok to attend their pondok pesantren and former students will often travel across the island for their Friday sermon. For instance, two or three cars from Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom each week head across to Pancor for Friday prayers Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 85

104 into which category he should fall. Religious leaders are not confined by birth to being a Tuan Guru Lokal or Tuan Guru Besar. For example, Tuan Guru Besar Sofwan Hakim was born to the late Tuan Guru Lokal Abdul Karim. 365 There are also networks of interconnected religious leaders. Tuan Guru Lokal are often part of religious networks affiliated to more senior Tuan Guru. TGH Ramli, a Tuan Guru Lokal from Lom, told me that he was closely affiliated with NW Pancor and that he had studied at their principle educational facility, Pondok Pesantren Darun Nahdlatain. He explained that his religious leader was, therefore, TGH Bajang who is a Tuan Guru Besar. 366 Tuan Gurus religious empires have grown significantly over the past 100 years. 367 Historically three religious centres hosted Tuan Guru Besar and their organisations Kediri (West Lombok), Praya (Central Lombok) and Pancor (East Lombok). More recently this has expanded to several new centres, such as Pagutan (Mataram) and Anjani (East Lombok). In each of these religious centres there are often several Tuan Guru, for instance, there are now five Tuan Guru Besar in Kediri who are affiliated with five large Islamic boarding schools. 368 This steady historical rise of Tuan Guru will be discussed in the next section. In a local community a man is considered a Tuan Guru because of his religious knowledge and his community s willingness to learn from him. Beyond the boundaries of a village or neighbourhood other people would not necessarily consider him to be a Tuan Guru. This geographic restriction of influence marks a Tuan Guru Lokal s authority. 369 Tuan Guru Lokal are more than simply a religious teacher (ustadz) although this is the foundation to their role. They also have a position of leadership within the community and are influential in shaping public opinion, as well as offering counsel to other local leaders, such as Kepala Desa (village heads) from Herawati to Jeremy Kingsley, 26 July Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 367 Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) ; Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) ; Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006) Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 369 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). 86

105 The Tuan Guru Lokal in Lom, TGH Ramli, is an elderly man with a calm and sensitive nature. This was actually very much the way he described how Tuan Guru should be halus (cultured or refined). He emphasised this point at least three times during our interview. 370 When talking with Imran, the Sekretaris (a village official) of Bok, he told me that in most village there may be several Tuan Guru Lokal. In Bok, there was a Tuan Guru in each hamlet. However, this pattern of religious leadership does not strictly follow official boundaries. 371 Tuan Guru Lokal, such as TGH Ramli, do not necessarily have high-levels of religious education. In fact, Ramli s religious studies did not go beyond his time at Pondok Pesantren Darun Nahdlatain. 372 He had studied the Qur an, Hadith and kitab kuning (the Yellow Books texts that provide commentaries on Islamic jurisprudence) during his younger years, but other than his limited formal religious education he is self-taught. Nonethless, Ramli is highly respected locally as a teacher because of his insightful perspectives on religious and social issues. 373 In contrast to Tuan Guru Lokal there is an expectation that Tuan Guru Besar will have higher levels of religious education. As a result they will usually have studied at religious institutions overseas. TGH Ahmad Madani received his religious education at Pondok Pesantren Darul Falah in Pagutan on the outskirts of Mataram. He then spent four years in Saudi Arabia furthering his religious education. 374 TGH Subkhi Sasaki had a similar trajectory of religious education, living for eight years at an Islamic boarding school in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. It has been argued that Saudi Arabia, and its state ideology Wahhabism, provides the intellectual and institutional support for many forms of puritanical Islam. 375 However, Sasaki, a prominent progressive religious leader and advocate of women s rights in Lombok, painted a different picture of his experiences. His pesantren in Saudi Arabia was a plural institution with scholars coming from across the Muslim world, covering most of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence. He said it was a place of argument and debate, which was more 370 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 371 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 372 Ibid. 373 Field Notes, 30 July Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). 375 Noorhaidi Hasan, Faith and Politics: The Rise of Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia (2002) 73 Indonesia 145,

106 open and tolerant than Saudi state universities. 376 Another example of a Tuan Guru who has had foreign religious education is TGH Bajang, who studied at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo where he received his doctorate. 377 Tuan Guru Besar usually find themselves to be incredibly busy. Their teaching and religious guidance is often sought across the island, not to mention the obligations that they may have within their own organisations, such as committees or supervisory duties at their pesantren. For example, TGH Sofwan Hakim has a gruelling schedule. He teaches pengajian every morning in Kediri to various groups of santri from the pesantren and the broader community, while on Friday he also teaches a women s only class. Additionally, he travels nearly every day to different parts of Lombok to provide religious teaching and assist his sizable community of followers (ummah). This extensive list of teaching and pastoral activities does not include his administrative tasks which are many. 378 One method for judging the level of a Tuan Guru s influence and public support can be seen by the response and size of the audiences attracted to their sermons and religious education classes. When a Tuan Guru s knowledge is combined with charisma he can draw large audiences, and consequently, becomes powerful. This popularity allows Tuan Guru to guide public opinion and gain the devotion of supporters. 379 Despite noting that it is not necessary for Tuan Guru to run a pesantren, their organisational muscle is another way of measuring whether a religious leader is a Tuan Guru Besar or Tuan Guru Lokal. If a Tuan Guru has a large boarding school and controls other institutional functions, such as health clinics, social services or businesses then he can safely be categorised as a Tuan Guru Besar. Examples of the size of some larger pesantren are TGH Sofwan Hakim s Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim in Kediri, West Lombok, which has over 3000 students, 380 or TGH Munajid 376 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008). 377 Akhirnya, HM Zainul Majdi Pimpin NW, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 September Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 379 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 380 Ibid. 88

107 Khalid s Pondok Pesantren Al-Halimy in Gunung Sari, West Lombok, with 1200 students. 381 Picture 3.6 Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim (led by TGH Sofwan Hakim) A wide variety of religious leaders come under the title Tuan Guru. A taxonomy based on the level and reach of their influence has just been explained, but there are also other areas of difference among these religious leaders. Essentially, Tuan Guru are not a homogenous group, but rather hold a diverse range of religious positions. 382 This multiplicity of perspectives among Tuan Guru reflects the Indonesian context, which is marked by a plurality of Islamic traditions, interpretations and practices. 383 One of the major divisions in Indonesian Islam is between modernist and traditionalist approaches to Islamic thought. 384 However, in Lombok, modernist 381 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 382 During an informal discussion with Dr Erni Budiwanti, a researcher at the Research Centre for Regional Resources, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PSDR-LIPI), who is originally from Lombok, she stressed that Tuan Guru are an eclectic group. They hold a wide range of religious beliefs and political affiliations. 383 M.B. Hooker and Tim Lindsey, Public Faces of Syari ah in Contemporary Indonesia: Towards a National Mazhab (2002) 4 Australian Journal of Asian Law 259, 289; Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World (2001) ; Geraldine Doogue and Peter Kirkwood, Tomorrow s Islam Uniting Age-Old Beliefs and a Modern World (2005) 268; Abdullah Saeed, Introduction: the Qur an, Interpretation and the Indonesian Context in Abdullah Saeed, Approaches to the Qur an in Contemporary Indonesia (2005) 6; Kamrani Buseri, Humaidy and Ahmad Juhaidi, Islam dan Keragaman Budaya Lokal di Kalimantan: Meneguhkan Visi Keindonesiaan in Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gauf, Menjadi Indonesia 13 Abad Eksistensi Islam di Bumi Nusantara (2006) ; Greg Fealy, Virginia Hooker and Sally White, Indonesia in Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) Howard M. Federspiel, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals of the 20 th Century (2006)

108 Islamic theology is not particularly popular. The modernist interpretive approaches of returning to the core sources of Qur an and the Hadith and then construing them within contemporary circumstances is embodied by the mass Islamic movement, Muhammadiyah. 385 Muhammadiyah is, however, nowhere near as influential as traditionalist mass movements, Nahdlatul Ulama and Nahdlatul Wathan, in Lombok. This position was noted by Tuti Harwati, et al, who said Sasak Muslims follow the religious conceptions which are taught by Tuan Guru who place a great deal of belief in Sunnah and Shafi fiqh. 386 The orthodox traditionalist approach to interpretion in this quote relies on reading Islamic texts and traditions within their historical context and following jurisprudential traditions that have developed over centuries. 387 Having said this, Lombok actually reflects a microcosm of Indonesian diversity and religious eclecticism. 388 It is often assumed by Muslim and non-muslim alike that Islam is some sort of monolith, but even momentary reflection is sufficient to show that this is not true. On the contrary, intellectual and social variation and variability is the norm and has always been the norm throughout Islamic history. 389 Islam in Indonesia is not uniform or standardised rather it is an eclectic and diverse spiritual tent. Even using words such as Syari ah, a concept broadly defined as Islamic law a fundamental concept within Islamic teaching, involves a disparate array of interpretations. 390 It must be understood that Islamic concepts are interpreted and applied differently depending on one s geography, cultural lineage, intellectual 385 Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World (2001) 87-89, Tuti Harwati, Mohamad Abdun Nasir, Nikmatullah and Siti Nurul Khaerani, Tradisi dan Transformasi Pemikiran Hukum Keluarga Islam di Lombok Poligami, Kawin Cerai dan Kawin Sirri Muslim Sasak (2007) Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World (2001) Greg Fealy, Virginia Hooker and Sally White, Indonesia in Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) M.B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam Social Change Through Contemporary Fatawa (2003) The difficulties in defining sacred law is a scholarly and political debate with hundreds of years of lineage, see Baber Johansen, A Perfect Law in an Imperfect Society Ibn Taymiyya s Concept of Governance in the Name of the Sacred Law in Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss (eds), The Law Applied Contextualizing the Islamic Shari a (2008)

109 background and political aspirations. 391 These differences have created an intellectually rich interpretive history and practice across the Indonesian archipelago. 392 It is easy to consider this ethnic, religious and theological diversity from a national perspective, but this plurality of perspectives and positions also exists within Lombok. Picture 3.7 TGH Subkhi Sasaki talking with me about different religious positions and practices among the Sasak and Tuan Guru (Kediri, West Lombok, 2008) There is cultural and religious diversity, for instance within the role and application of adat, and organisational rivalry between religious groups in Lombok, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Nahdlatul Wathan, however, when talking with Tuan Guru these cleavages did not play upon their consciousness actively (or at least they did not discuss them directly with me). Rather, as TGH Subkhi Sasaki (photograph above) has suggested that there are identifiable groupings of Tuan Guru. 393 He articulated these as being based on three major streams of thought and practice among mainstream Muslims in Lombok. The first group, Sasaki said, are people whose religious practices focus on textual strictures. This involves emphasising the key Islamic sources Qur an, Hadith, Fiqh 391 M.B. Hooker, Indonesian Syariah Defining a National School of Islamic Law (2008) This is discussed in greater detail in R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (2007). 393 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008). 91

110 (Islamic jurisprudence) and kitab kuning. They follow a strongly textualist and traditionalist approach to the elucidation of Islamic principles, 394 which undertakes interpretation that relies on text and tradition and at the same time approaches the question of interpretation strictly from a linguistic perspective. 395 Essentially, they focus upon a legalistic interpretation of their religion. This group, Sasaki felt, are fixated on Islam s laws (hukum Islam) and include most santri who have come through an Islamic boarding school education. 396 The second group comprises people who are mostly from villages and whose religious practices are more spiritual (mystical) and emotional rather than intellectual (this can be seen as religion coming from the heart rather than from the head). 397 This practice emphasises ritual and prayer rather than textual understanding. The third group is a blend of the first two groups. This last group emphasises spiritual and ritual practices, while also incorporating textual learning. 398 Sasaki identified most closely with the third group using text while also recognising the importance of the local cultural context and mysticism. 399 On the other hand, TGH Ahmad Madani described himself as a conservative and strong traditionalist, but he was also socially aware and progressive when developing his religious opinions and communicating them with his community. Madani felt that primacy should be given to the key Islamic texts, however, he also recognised that these texts should be interpreted in order to accurately represent the cultural context and contemporary environment faced by his community. 400 These three categories are broad generalisations, with many Tuan Guru falling somewhere in between, or even shifting between them over time. There is broad sprectrum of approaches to religious jurisprudence, interpretation and ritual in 394 Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006) Abdullah Saeed, Interpreting the Qur an Towards a Contemporary Approach (2006) This approach to education through pesantren and the type of interpretive approach it creates has been discussed in Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) This spiritual and mystical approach to Islam among many Sasak is considered in Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006). 398 Tuan Guru Besar Muhammad Mutawalli has supported this combination of textual understanding, spirituality and traditional practices see Fahrurrozi Dahlan, Sejarah Perjuangan dan Pergerakan Dakwah Islamiyah Tuan Guru Haji Muhammad Mutawalli di Pulau Lombok (2006) xiv. 399 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008). 400 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). 92

111 Lombok, yet the three groups I have described capture the broad trends and the kinds of emphasis given by most religious leaders in Mataram and West Lombok in dealing with Islamic ritual and teachings. The two taxonomies above highlight the eclectic nature of Tuan Guru. They are based on approaches to Tuan Gurus religious orientation and their levels of socio-political and religious influence. Other differences between these religious leaders, such as those related to political affiliation, will be discussed later in this chapter. The point to be made here is simply that the multiplicity of perspectives and different levels of social influence underscore the complex nature of Tuan Guru as a socio-political and religious elite in Lombok. The final part of this section considers the standards expected of Tuan Guru by Sasak communities in Mataram and West Lombok. This, in many ways, is the counterpoint to the criteria noted earlier in this section for becoming a Tuan Guru. The ambiguous manner of appointment, combined with their high social status, leads to serious expectations being placed upon Tuan Guru. In reality, Tuan Guru are not in a tenuous position in constant fear of losing their role as religious leaders, however, they do realise that they need to behave cautiously. Their community (ummah) watches what they wear and how they behave. Essentially, Tuan Guru act as a contoh (example) and are role models to society. 401 On a basic level, they should not undertake certain activities which may, in the minds of community members, reduce their standing, such as riding a pushbike. 402 This example may sound trivial, but there is an etiquette and propriety expected of Sasak religious leaders. For many in Lombok, small acts connected to one s behaviour or dress are relevant to assessing a person s character. Consequently, if they misbehave many Tuan Guru feel that they are likely to lose social support, or at least, have it reduced. 403 Tuan Guru need to act with the best interests of their ummah in mind, because they are seen as guardians of their respective communities. 404 There are two logical 401 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 402 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). 403 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 404 TGH Muhammad Zainul Majdi (TGH Bajang), Islam & Masalah Keumatan Khutbah Jum at (2007)

112 explanations for their need to act responsibly. First, if society loses faith in a particular Tuan Guru and believes that they are not acting in their best interests then the Tuan Guru s individual social status may be diminished. Second, if a Tuan Guru loses sight of the high expectations placed upon him by his community (by becoming corrupt, for example), he may jeopardise the overall reputation of Tuan Guru. Therefore, to be considered a Tuan Guru and maintain one s status, a bond of trust and respect between the religious leader and their community needs to be carefully nurtured. 405 This section has considered the personal qualities, perspectives and expectations placed upon Tuan Guru. In the next section consideration will be given to the historical development of Tuan Guru and their organisations. These local religious leaders are aware that their standing as individuals and a group has developed over a lengthy period, however, if Tuan Guru abuse this influential position then their role within the Sasak community could quickly diminish. The historical emergence of Tuan Guru The emergence of Tuan Guru as socio-political leaders has occurred through a historical process that saw them eclipse other leadership figures on the island. Throughout this thesis I argue that the importance of religion in Lombok underpins Tuan Gurus socially and politically pivotal role. This is correct, but the rationale for their pre-eminence as non-state actors is more complex than this assertion suggests. Therefore, this section examines the historical rise of Tuan Guru and the rationale for their high social standing. Their respected position in society and organisational capacity is essential to their role in conflict management processes in Lombok. The contemporary role of Tuan Guru needs to be read within the context of Lombok s history over the past 100 years. During this period, Tuan Guru overtook the mamiek (Sasak nobility) as the leading non-state actors on the island. 406 This competition between rival political elites representing nobility and religious leadership also 405 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 406 Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977) 9. 94

113 occurred in Java. 407 During the Dutch colonial period in Lombok, Tuan Guru actively challenged Dutch rule and established alternative institutional and social networks outside colonial control which still remain active today. 408 At the same time, their noble rivals were part of the colonial governance structures. 409 The ascension of Tuan Guru over mamiek was based on three key factors. First, through the management of food stocks during cyclical drought periods Tuan Guru and their organisations were able to provide sustenance via rationing to their community. 410 When discussing famines in Lombok it is essential to understand the serious and cyclical nature of these events. 411 For instance, in 1883 a famine that affected Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa saw an estimated 117,000 people die. 412 Droughts and food shortages have historically occurred every two to three years leading to starvation due to crop failure. 413 The last major famine in Lombok occurred during 1966 when approximately 10,000 people died (the starvation was concentrated in southern Lombok). 414 Conditions have improved in recent times, however, the World Food Programme still manages several food distribution programs on the island. 415 The suffering that resulted was not merely due to climatic events or extraordinary circumstances. To a significant degree, these problems emerged from the exploitative nature of colonial rule, for instance, heavy taxation. 407 In the colonial period, the rivalry in Java between religious leaders and the nobility was manifested in various arenas, such as the creation of rival educational institutions. The priyayi (Javanese nobility) supported Dutch colonial government schools, while the educational alternative was Islamic boarding schools. These two streams of school had significantly different content, pedagogy and linguistic requirements. See M.C. Ricklefs, Religion, Politics and Social Dynamics in Java: Historical and Contemporary Rhymes in Greg Fealy and Sally White, Expressing Islam Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia (2008) Asnawi, Islam dan Visi Kebangsaan di Nusa Tenggara Barat in Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gauf, Menjadi Indonesia 13 Abad Eksistensi Islam di Bumi Nusantara (2006) Kari Telle, Spirited Places and Ritual Dynamics Among Sasak Muslims on Lombok (2009) 19 Anthropological Forum 289, See Alfons van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, (1980) 173; Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) ; Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) 17-24, Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 (3 rd edition, 2001) Mary Poo-Mooi Judd, The Sociology of Rural Poverty in Lombok, Indonesia (PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1980) 10 & Kari Telle, Spirited Places and Ritual Dynamics Among Sasak Muslims on Lombok (2009) 19 Anthropological Forum 289, Indonesia (2010) World Food Programme < at 28 April

114 This led to increasing shortages of food in Lombok, leaving people almost perpetually close to starvation from 1900 to Tuan Guru and their organisations, were able to reduce the severity of these events, through the management of food stocks and as a consequence build a system of necessity-based patronage and loyalty. Second, the Sasak created a distinct line of informal organisation and authority under the control of Tuan Guru. 417 I have seen their organisational prowess across the island at pamswakarsa posts, medical clinics and Islamic boarding schools. This skill is also seen in the development of local Islamic movements that have mass affiliation, such as Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) and the local branch of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). 418 NW was formerly incorporated in 1953, while Lombok s NU branch was established in 1955 (just before the 1955 national elections). 419 These religious organisations (and their predecessors) led by Tuan Guru became shadow governments providing an array of health, education and other services during the colonial and quasi-colonial periods in Lombok. The influence of these organisations remains strong, in fact, to a large extent undiminished. 420 There was a lengthy period of colonial and quasicolonial rule in Lombok when the island was ruled by the Balinese, Dutch, Japanese and the outside technocrats of the New Order administration. Over a period of three centuries, 421 the Sasak developed organisational methods to resist and exert their own socio-religious identity Alfons van der Kraan, Dutch Rule on Lombok : The Development of Underdevelopment (1980) Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Wetu Lima versus Waktu Lima (2000) Lalu Djelenga, Orang Sasak Dalam Perjalanan Sejarah Lombok (2002) 1 Journal Pemikiran Sosial Ekonomi Daerah NTB 5, Judith L. Ecklund, Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) The extensive leadership and organisational capacity of NW has been explored in Masnun, Tuan Guru KH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007). 421 Lombok was subject to control by outsiders starting with Balinese rule in 1677 and ending with the fall of President Soeharto in See W. Cool, The Dutch in the East An Outline of the Military Operations in Lombock [Lombok], 1894 (1897); Alfons van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, (1980) 16-58; Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004) 4-5; John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) Ibid

115 Third, strong and respected families have led to organisational continuity. This has allowed some of the most prominent Tuan Guru to build upon the success of previous generations. 423 These familial and organisational networks rely upon developing upand-coming Tuan Guru. Typically this involves fostering young, bright students considered to be future candidates for senior religious leadership positions, providing them with high-levels of religious education in Java or further afield. 424 Family ties can also lead to rivalry as, for example, occurred within the local religious movement Nahdlatul Wathan (NW). In 1998, this movement split during the NW Congress in Praya, Central Lombok. The division was the result a power struggle between two siblings, Rauhun and Raihanun, the daughters of NW s founder, the late TGH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, commonly known as TGH Pancor. 425 NW fractured into two organisations, NW Pancor and NW Anjani, 426 arguably weakening both. 427 While speaking at the 73rd Anniversary of NW Pancor, in August 2008, TGH Bajang indicated that he would be supportive of reconciliation moves, but at the time of writing the separation still seemed solidly entrenched. 428 This section considered the historical trajectory of religious leadership in Mataram and West Lombok. This builds on the earlier section that examined the diversity of Tuan Guru and how they gain their status and maintain it. The next section looks to the foundation for Tuan Gurus high social standing the religiosity of Sasak society. 423 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). See also Mohammad Noor, Muslihan Habib and Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, Visi Kebangsaan Religius Refleksi Pemikiran dan Perjuangan Tuan Guru Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid (2004) Akhirnya, HM Zainul Majdi Pimpin NW, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 20 September 1999; Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008); Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008); Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008); Interview with TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid (Mataram, 25 August 2008). 425 Saipul Hamdi, Reconciling Muslim Conflict in Nahdlatul Wathan in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia (Paper presented at the 4 th Asian Graduate Forum on Southeast Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, July 2009) The reference to Pancor and Anjani identifies the towns in East Lombok where these rival NW organisations are now headquartered. 427 Saipul Hamdi, Reconciling Muslim Conflict in Nahdlatul Wathan in Lombok, Eastern Indonesia (Paper presented at the 4 th Asian Graduate Forum on Southeast Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, July 2009) TGH Serukan NW Pancor-Anjani Bersatu, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August

116 Locating religion in Lombok The importance of Islam to the Sasak people cannot be overstated. 429 When investigating conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok it is essential to understand the social forces at play. One of the most important of these is religious affiliation and ritual. As the quote above indicates, Islam plays an integral role within the daily life of the Sasak. The implication of this is that the role of nonstate religious leadership, Tuan Guru, cannot be ignored. The respect accorded to Islam among the Sasak is omnipresent. There are even inbuilt linguistic mechanisms in Bahasa Sasak that identify this. 430 For instance, when speaking to someone who has been on the religious pilgrimage of Haj there are special forms of address and ways to speak with them. 431 Religion and its rituals are socially significant for the Sasak in that they demarcate the social boundaries of life as ritualized behaviour circumscribes and delineates danger areas and marks cultural limits. 432 The centrality of Islam for the Sasak has been widely recognised by scholars, such as Judith Ecklund, who wrote that the idiom in Islam is proving to be an acceptable and effective means of organizing and asserting local consciousness 433 The contours of daily life are given structure and meaning through religious ritual: The vague movement of time is only punctuated by annual rituals, the Friday prayer and the five daily calls to prayer issuing from the mosque Mahyuni, Speech Styles and Cultural Consciousness in Sasak Community (2006) 89. Similar sentiments are also presented in Tadashi Kitamura, Political Leaders and Rank Society in a Sasak Village, East Lombok, Indonesia in Toh Goda, Political Culture and Ethnicity An Anthropological Study in Southeast Asia (1999) Bahasa Sasak is the language of the Sasak. 431 Mahyuni, Speech Styles and Cultural Consciousness in Sasak Community (2006) Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977) Judith L. Ecklund, Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) M. Cameron Hay, Remembering to Live Illness at the Intersection of Anxiety and Knowledge in Rural Indonesia (2001)

117 Religion in the life of the Sasak is a physical and social reality in Mataram and West Lombok. Each kampung has a small prayer house (musholla) and there is a mosque (masjid) within one kilometre of the residents homes. Therefore, it is hard to avoid religious participation. 435 Lombok is known, at least locally, as the island of 1000 mosques. With over 3000 mosques on the island the slogan is an understatement. 436 The ubiquitous nature of mosques in Lombok is symbolic of the importance of Islam for the Sasak. 437 TGH Sofwan Hakim felt that Islam was at the core of life for the Sasak. For him the centrality of religion was rivalled only in other, very pious areas of Indonesia, such as Aceh and Madura. 438 This is a significant statement. Edward Aspinall has suggested that Islam and Aceh are two sides of the same coin. 439 Lombok, or Sasak, could replace Aceh in this quote and it would adequately represent the importance of religion on the island. Every Tuan Guru interviewed repeated, like a mantra, that the Sasak were a pious ethnic group who adhered to their religious obligations. For instance, TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal said we are all santri here in Lombok. 440 Obviously, these assessments of the importance of ritual and religiosity are coming from Tuan Guru who have a biased perspective on local piety. However, it would be naïve to interpret these assertions as simply self-serving, because the reality that I observed corresponds to their assessment. 441 The spiritual history of Lombok is a rich mosaic of religions and theological influences. Prior to Islam arriving in Lombok, the Sasak were predominantly Hindu and Buddhist. 442 Islam has played an important role in Lombok since being brought to the island by Sunan Prapen, an Islamic teacher (also locally recognised as a saint) 435 Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). This was also mentioned by TGH Humaidi Zaen, see Interview with TGH Humaidi Zaen (Memben, East Lombok, 9 August 2008). 436 Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Nusa Tenggara Barat Dalam Angka (2008) Religious affiliation and ritual also plays a significant role in the life of members of other religious groups in Mataram and West Lombok, but this section focuses on the majority Sasak community. 438 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 439 Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (2009) Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008). Half a dozen other interviewees made almost exactly the same statement. 441 Field notes, 20 July Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) 9. 99

118 from Java in the 16 th century. 443 Lombok has also received Islamic influences from Makassar and Bima during the early part of the 17 th century. 444 From the time of Islam s arrival on the island its social traction has progressively increased. 445 Picture 3.8 A Mataram mosque The importance of Islam in Lombok has meant that Tuan Guru play a role that is not limited to the spiritual realm, but also have a pivotal social and political role within Sasak society. Tuan Guru wield significant religious authority in their communities and this is provides them with access to other leadership domains, such as political office (discussed in further detail later in this chapter). 446 As religious teachers and leaders who are also politically active, the role of Tuan Gurus correspond to Islamic jurisprudential traditions that have historically fused religion and state. This is a complex relationship and the way that this is interpreted through legal structures, such as Syari ah-based codes, and religious principles, varies greatly Asnawi, Islam dan Visi Kebangsaan di Nusa Tenggara Barat in Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gauf, Menjadi Indonesia 13 Abad Eksistensi Islam di Bumi Nusantara (2006) See also W. Cool, The Dutch in the East An Outline of the Military Operations in Lombock [Lombok], 1894 (1897) Robert Cribb, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (1992) 269; M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 (3 rd edition, 2001) Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999) See Khaled Abou El Fadel, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy in Khaled Abou El Fadel (ed), Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (2004) 12-16; Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (2005) ; Tim Lindsey and Jeremy Kingsley, Talking in Code: Legal Islamisation 100

119 To understand the religious and socio-political role of Tuan Guru it is worth considering their practical activities and functions. These have already been touched upon in earlier sections that discussed the criteria for becoming a Tuan Guru. In earlier sections, I particularly focused upon the importance of their provision of religious education classes and sermons. Through these activities they develop the loyalty of pious students (santri) and create a following (ummah their own religious community). 448 The educational activities of Tuan Guru can be seen across the island every day in a multitude of ways, such as when they lead religious education classes, an example of which is shown below (in Picture 3.9). The educational function of Tuan Guru is not necessarily limited to their personal activities, but many also oversee educational institutions (such as Islamic boarding schools). They can guide people s activities and attitudes through these learning processes. This educational role is one of the reasons for their influential role in conflict management. 449 They can do this, for example, by presenting a sermon that calls for calm during tense times, or lead religious education classes designed to reinforce Islamic concepts that warn against social anarchy. Tuan Guru can also speak directly to protagonists in a dispute and counsel them about their religious obligations in order to avoid or resolve a conflict. 450 in Indonesia and the MMI Shari a Criminal Code in Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. Weiss (eds), The Law Applied Contextualizing the Islamic Shari a (2008) Inflasi Tuan Guru (1976) Tempo < at 18 May 2009; Mohammad Noor, Muslihan Habib and Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, Visi Kebangsaan Religius Refleksi Pemikiran dan Perjuangan Tuan Guru Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid (2004). This was also discussed in several interviews, for instance, with TGH Sofwan Hakim and TGH Munajid Khalid Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 449 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 101

120 Picture 3.9 Pengajian in Memben, East Lombok The functions of Tuan Guru are connected to specific religious objectives and principles, as well as social priorities. TGH Muharror said that Tuan Gurus educational aims are focused on guiding their community s religious activity through reinforcing three important Islamic principles akidah (faith), ibadah (worship) and muamalah (relationships among people). They have strong religious backgrounds and knowledge which means that they are able to advise their ummat (community) on matters of religious instruction. 451 An example of the teaching they undertake can be seen in relation to the principle of ibadah. TGH Muharror felt that Tuan Guru help people to improve the quality of their worship 452 by helping members of their community undertake their basic religious obligations, such as prayer (sholat) and fasting. A Tuan Guru s role as a guide for their community parallels their function within conflict management processes. They perceive their goal as actively helping people find a way out of their problems, consequently, avoiding conflict and violence is part of this. 453 The way that a Tuan Guru carries out his educational role also indicates his stature and influence (as noted earlier when differentiating Tuan Guru Besar and Lokal). After Friday prayers (sholat Jumat), Tuan Guru will give a sermon (khutbah). This may be given at their local mosque, however, Tuan Guru Besar are also often invited to other villages or communities. This shows how Tuan Guru Besar do not only belong to their own community 454 but also the broader society with their social 451 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 452 Ibid. 453 Ibid. 454 Ibid. 102

121 influence extending beyond their local community. 455 This is also the case in relation to the provision of pengajian, with TGH Sofwan Hakim often criss-crossing Lombok to provide religious education and advice. People invite him to teach in their community because of the high esteem in which he is held. 456 This shows how Tuan Gurus educational function is connected to their socio-political status greater demand for their teaching services is indicative of their high social standing, and as a result, how far their influence and opinions travel. Tuan Guru also exercise influence through the provision of fatwa, which are nonbinding socio-religious legal opinions that answer questions asked by members of their community. 457 This role as fatwa-maker solidifies their position as authoritative interpreters of Islamic religious teaching and gives them social leverage within people s daily lives as guardians of local religious practice and interpretation (their role as guardians of religious traditions is reviewed later in this chapter). 458 The Sasak consider these religious opinions to be a vital mechanism for understanding their social roles and delineating acceptable behaviour. There is a Qur anic injunction (Qur an 2:285) to follow the prophet and religious leaders, sami na wa atha na ( we listened and we obeyed ). 459 The Sasak take this seriously, and as a consequence, a fatwa from a Tuan Guru carries considerable weight. 460 A 23 year-old teacher, Herawati, told me whatever a Tuan Guru says, we are loyal to it. 461 Therefore, these pedagogic and legal activities provide Tuan Guru with the ability to act effectively in conflict management strategies. This influential role as religious educator and interpreter is often reinforced by institutional infrastructure, which generates strong informal mechanisms for allegiance and sources of patronage. These educational activities are often framed 455 Ibid. 456 Nurul Hakim Sebar Dai Pelosok Desa, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 21 August See also Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 457 Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker, Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) xxxvii. 458 The importance of this role for ulama in Indonesia as the source of local interpretations of Islam is discussed in R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (2007) This verse was mentioned by every Tuan Guru interviewed from Herawati to Jeremy Kingsley, 30 July This is also noted by Maria Platt, one of whose informants told her that If a tuan guru tells you to go home and scratch yourself you will. See Maria Platt, Sasak Women Navigating Dynamic Marital Continuums: Patriarchal Institutions and Female Agency in Indonesian Marriages (PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, 2010) Ibid. 103

122 within a broader organisational network, which also include educational institutions (such as Islamic boarding schools), the provision of social services (such as medical clinics) and businesses (including stores, catering services and quasi-banks). 462 Institutional activities such as these create and increase a Tuan Guru s social engagement with the community through the provision of essential services. Another barometer for comprehending the socio-political role of religion in Lombok can be seen in the way that political loyalties have changed since the start of Reformasi. To understand this approach to measuring the role of Islam, it is worth considering some provincial election history. During the New Order period, the regime s political party, Golkar, 463 dominated Lombok politics. 464 In the last national election of the New Order era in 1997, NTB voters strongly endorsed Golkar who received 72% of the ballots cast. 465 However, with Reformasi and subsequent democratic reforms Golkar s support dropped from 44% in 1999 to 30% in This represents a 42% decrease within support in the first five years of the political transition. 466 Golkar support has slipped even further. While it remained the single largest party in the 2009 provincial legislative elections Golkar now holds only 20% of the seats (10 seats out of 55). 467 The political movement from nationalist parties (such as Golkar) to Islam-oriented political parties started almost as soon as Reformasi ushered in democratic reforms. For instance, an estimated 5000 locals rushed to join Islam-oriented political parties, 462 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). See also: Mohammad Noor, Muslihan Habib and Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, Visi Kebangsaan Religius Refleksi Pemikiran dan Perjuangan Tuan Guru Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid (2004); Masnun, Tuan Guru KH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007). 463 In Lombok, it was believed that allegiance to Golkar was necessary to enter and progress within the civil service Sven Cederroth, Traditional Power and Party Politics in North Lombok, in Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth, Elections in Indonesia - The New Order and Beyond (2004) John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) Ribuan Massa Golkar Bakal Eksodus ke Masyumi Baru, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 4 June Dirk Tomsa, Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia Golkar in the Post-Suharto Era (2008) Panca Nugraha, 55 New West Nusa Tenggara Councilors Inaugerated, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 1 September 2009; Lalu Muhamad Jaelani, Daftar Nama Anggota Baru DPRD NTB (2009) < at 6 July

123 such as Masyumi Baru, moving away from Golkar in This was a significant move as Golkar previously had held an extremely strong political position and had impressive party machinery in Lombok. 469 The post-reformasi movement towards religious parties is, in many ways, history repeating itself. Masyumi was one of the largest political parties, representing an Islamic political perspective, during the brief period of Indonesian democracy in the mid-1950s. 470 In the 1955 elections, Masyumi had significant electoral success across Lombok. They received 49.8% of the votes cast, with the next closest party being Partai Nahdlatul Ulama with 20% and then PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) with 15.2%. 471 Most of the Masyumi voters came from rural areas, which constituted their primary support base across Indonesia. Masyumi received significant support from the religious leadership at the village-level across the archipelago. 472 Tuan Guru have a reinvigorated role as a major force in mobilising political support in the Reformasi era and are themselves politically active. 473 At the moment, Islamoriented parties hold 23 of the 55 seats in the NTB provincial legislature (approximately 40% of the elected representatives). 474 The political influence that Tuan Guru and Islam-oriented parties have in Lombok is best exemplified by TGH Bajang who became NTB governor in He was endorsed by two Islam-oriented parties, PKS and Partai Bulan Bintang. The strength of Bajang s candidature was seen by his margin of victory. He received 38.8% of the vote, while the second-placed ticket led by former governor Lalu Serinata and Golkar-endorsed, received only 26.4% of the vote. 475 The two other candidates for governor each received less than 468 Ribuan Massa Golkar Bakal Eksodus ke Masyumi Baru, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 4 June Ibid. 470 Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia (2009) Judith L. Ecklund, Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) Herb Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (1962) Tuan Guru were extremely visible during the 2008 election cycle, which included various rounds of legislative and executive elections across Lombok. They supported an assortment of campaign teams and political interests. See, for instance: Sahur Janjikan Kemajuan Baji Lobar, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 August Panca Nugraha, 55 New West Nusa Tenggara Councilors Inaugerated, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 1 September 2009; Lalu Muhamad Jaelani, Daftar Nama Anggota Baru DPRD NTB (2009) < at 6 July Panca Nugraha, West Nusa Tenggara Poll Body Names Governor, The Jakarta Post, 15 August

124 20% of the votes cast (approximately 17% each). 476 This comprehensive victory in a four way contest showed the strength of support that Bajang and the Islam-oriented parties were able to receive in a highly competitive political contest. Greg Fealy has commented that the performance of Islam-oriented parties in recent national elections in Indonesia has been disappointing. 477 An alternative perspective has been offered by some Indonesian political commentators who highlight the ongoing importance of these parties. 478 Whatever one s perspective is about Islamoriented parties at a national-level, in Lombok what is clear is that they are now firmly entrenched as major political players in the legislative and executive branches of the provincial government. The Islam-oriented parties control 40% of the NTB provincial legislature compared to approximately 30% of seats in the national legislature. 479 This section has focused upon the importance of religion in Mataram and West Lombok and how this been translated into the socio-political realm. But how is religion actually practiced? TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal identified the Sasak as being direct and straightforward people, which translates to their connection with their faith. He paralleled Sasak piety with one of the supposed root meanings of the word Lombok lurus, which means to be straight. 480 The argument is that the Sasak have a strong and direct connection with Allah (God). 481 Being lurus, Faisal felt, led to the generally high levels of ibadah (individual religious devotion) in Lombok. 482 Islam, as has been noted, is based upon fundamental universal principles, 483 but it is given life by local communities incorporating their cultural norms. 484 Without 476 Ibid. 477 Greg Fealy, Analysing the Indonesian Election Results (Speech Delivered at the Indonesia Study Group, Australian National University, Canberra, 30 April 2009); Greg Fealy, Indonesia s Islamic Parties in Decline (2009) < at 27 July Politik Islam Belum Mati, Republika (Jakarta, Indonesia), 16 March DPR-RI Factions (2010) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia < at 6 July Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July Interview with TGH Ulul Azmi (Jerneng, West Lombok, 17 December 2007). 482 Interview with TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal (Mataram, 19 July 2008). 483 For a broad discussion of these universal principles and the way they are acculturated into the Indonesian context, see Nurcholish Madjid (ed), Islam Universal (2007). 484 Local cultural factors are incorporated into Indonesian approaches to Islam. See Fu ad Jabali and Jamhari, Introduction in Fu ad Jabali and Jamhari (eds), Islam in Indonesia Islamic Studies and 106

125 question, local cultural factors and traditions colour the interpretation of Islam across Indonesia and Lombok is no exception. There is a long history of a co-existence and intertwining between Islam and these local social forces. 485 Tuan Guru are perceived to be the guardians of local religious traditions. 486 Their authority in religious, social and political affairs stems from this. In many ways local interpretations of Islam can be seen as a syncretic blending of orthodox Islamic doctrine and local cultural practices and beliefs. 487 Syncretism is the amalgamation of different religions, cultures, or schools of thought, 488 which in this context relates to the bonding of classical Islamic teaching with local practices and understandings. 489 For example, kawin lari, the local practice of secret elopement, does not fit comfortably with strict Islamic interpretations of marriage processes, but in Mataram and West Lombok, at least, this adat practice is still commonly accepted. 490 Therefore, rather than seeing syncretism as counter to orthodox interpretations of Islam, it can be seen as reflecting the plural cultural and religious realities that influence the practice of Islam in the area being studied. 491 The nature of Sasak piety and its local foundations is, in fact, a key ingredient to conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok. It provides an understanding of the way that religion is lived. It helps, for instance, to explain the socio-political significance of Tuan Guru. Social Transformation (2002) xii. For three studies of local Islamic practices and communities elsewhere in Indonesia, see AG Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon Ibadat and Adat Among Javanese Muslims (1995); Jamhari, Popular Voices of Islam: Discourse on Muslim Orientations in South Central Java (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2000); Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the Umma Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java (2007). 485 M.B. Hooker, Introduction: Islamic Law in South-east Asia (2002) 4 Australian Journal of Asian Law 213, 215; M.B. Hooker and Tim Lindsey, Public Faces of Syari ah in Contemporary Indonesia: Towards a National Mazhab? (2002) 4 Australian Journal of Asian Law 259, Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) Abstract. 487 Interview with TGH Zainal Arifin (Jerneng, West Lombok, 28 August 2008). 488 Syncretism (2009) Oxford Dictionaries < at 22 July There are some groups, for instance, the Wetu Telu in northern Lombok, who have taken this blending of local traditions and practices with Islam far beyond orthodox practices - see Datu Sudarman: Wetu Telu, Kelompok Masyarakat Adat Sasak, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 16 June The Wetu Telu were also discussed in Chapter 1. This group, particularly found in northern Lombok, has been considered by many scholars, see Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981); Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000); Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004). 490 Maria Platt, Sasak Women Navigating Dynamic Marital Continuums: Patriarchal Institutions and Female Agency in Indonesian Marriages (PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, 2010) Similar situations are seen in other parts of Indonesia. See AG Muhaimin, The Islamic Tradition of Cirebon Ibadat and Adat Among Javanese Muslims (1995)

126 One of the broad trends in relation to Islam on Lombok, especially in rural parts of the island, is mysticism and a belief in the supernatural. The role of the metaphysical finds expression in Lombok through notions of supernatural powers and this potentially plays a role within conflict situations. 492 For instance, a male university student told me how his village in West Lombok was famous for its constant clashes with surrounding villages. This pattern of ongoing conflict was connected to a tradition of using magic during these fights. These powers were designed to protect the combatants during the confrontation. Members of the village believed that if they were stabbed nothing would happen to them. The only way that their strength could be weakened was if they were attacked by naked women. The women s nakedness would remove their supernatural protections, and if stabbed, they could die. The story, although strange for me, held real resonance among residents of this village. 493 These supernatural powers led members of this community to feel willing and able to enter into conflict, believing that they would come out unscathed. Supernatural powers and beliefs are often connected with religious practices on Lombok. One afternoon after visiting a pesantren with one of my friends, Denny, he had to rush off to attend a group prayer session (zikir bersama) with his family. They were joining together to pray for his sister who had cancer. This did not surprise me, but what was intriguing was that this prayer session also involved working with a dukun (traditional healer). 494 This exemplified a blurring of religious ritual and mystical practice that is relatively common in Lombok. 495 Therefore, supernatural forces and their perceived connection to religion, or at least its local interpretations, cannot be discounted when investigating conflict management processes in Lombok. 492 The role and power of the mystical is not limited to superstitious rural communities, with Linda Rae Bennett detailing the use of love magic in Mataram see Linda Rae Bennett, Indonesian Youth, Love Magic and the in/visibility of Sexual Desire (2003) 37 Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 135, Field notes, 6 July Field notes, 23 August John MacDougall has written that he knew of Tuan Guru who had been trained in mystical beliefs (tasawuf) and were involved in magical activities, such as giving his santri belts that made them invulnerable (sabuq). This is not something that I can say emerged directly in my findings. However, within the Sasak community the supernatural and mysticism does play an important role, therefore, that Tuan Guru might be involved in such activities is not inconceivable. See John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005)

127 This is because religion and the supernatural world form part of the cultural milieu in Mataram and West Lombok and are part of people s outlook on the world. Embedded power The powerful role of Tuan Guru should not be underestimated in any analysis of Lombok affairs. 496 Their influential socio-political and religious status allows them the ability to play a significant role in conflict management. In previous sections, I have shown that Tuan Guru have significant influence and considered why this exists. In this section, I consider how they use this social status. This analysis will also look to the boundaries and nature of this authority. I will also explore how they use their authority and how this impacts upon conflict management processes. Tuan Guru are more powerful in many ways than state actors, a point that has been highlighted by Judith Ecklund. She noted that religious leaders [Tuan Guru] have established localised followings of villagers over which they have more effective control than do representatives of the local government. 497 The dominant role of Tuan Guru in Lombok has also been noted by Tuti Harwati et al., who said that Sasak society is a community that greatly respects the position of Tuan Guru. 498 Tuan Guru, it has been suggested, have a cult-like status. 499 In short, the role of Tuan Guru is deeply embedded into the communal life of Lombok. The non-state source of authority for Tuan Guru emanates from being accepted by society indicates that their leadership is based on an intangible form of power. Yet this has real effects in the community. Benedict Anderson has argued that power in Java is manifested in a less concrete and more elusive manner than western 496 Inflasi Tuan Guru (1976) Tempo < at 18 May Judith L. Ecklund, Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979) 254. See also Inflasi Tuan Guru (1976) Tempo < at 18 May Tuti Harwati, Mohamad Abdun Nasir, Nikmatullah and Siti Nurul Khaerani, Tradisi dan Transformasi Pemikiran Hukum Keluarga Islam di Lombok Poligami, Kawin Cerai dan Kawin Sirri Muslim Sasak (2007) Judith L. Ecklund, Tradition or Non-tradition: Adat, Islam, and Local Control on Lombok in Gloria Davis (ed.), What is Modern Indonesian Culture? (1979)

128 constructs. For instance, spiritual potency is a considerable asset. 500 In this sense Java and Lombok are not dissimilar. Considering power as ethereal allows one to more clearly understand the potency of Tuan Guru. It is almost impossible to make social policy or gain public support for an initiative in Lombok without the active (or at least tacit) support of a Tuan Guru Besar. For instance, East Lombok has become one of Indonesia s HIV-AIDS hotspots, but anecdotal evidence from non-government agencies suggests that they have had little success in developing awareness programs, due to a lack of support from any Tuan Guru Besar. LBH-APIK NTB 501 has recognised the importance of working with Tuan Guru and has appointed a specific religious liaison officer, making NTB the only Indonesian province where LPH-APIK has a dedicated staff member appointed to foster relationships with ulama. This attests to the powerful role of these local religious leaders. 502 The political leadership on the island is also well aware of the powerful role of Tuan Guru. I personally witnessed two Golkar members of the provincial legislature, both men of high social standing, waiting for over an hour to receive advice from a Tuan Guru Besar. 503 With democratic reforms and decentralisation over the past decade, non-state leaders such as Tuan Guru are now blending into state frameworks. For example, Tuan Guru are beginning to play an increasingly important role within the legislative and executive structures of the province. The most prominent example of this transition into the formal structure is, of course, TGH Bajang, the religious head of NW Pancor, who recently acquired the most senior political position in the province that of NTB Governor. Other Tuan Guru holding senior political and government positions include TGH Abdul Hamid Faisal, who has become a legislator in the regional parliament, TGH Mustiadi Abhar, the head of the Electoral Commission for Mataram and TGH Mahally Fikri, the head of the Electoral Commission for NTB. This phenomenon, and the possible harm that it could cause, will be discussed later in this section. 500 Benedict R. O G. Anderson, The Idea of Javanese Culture in Claire Holt (ed), Culture and Politics in Indonesia (1972) Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia Untuk Keadilan or Legal Aid Institute - Indonesian Women s Association for Justice NTB Branch. 502 Field notes, 11 August Field notes, 20 July

129 As mentioned, Tuan Guru Besar deepen their influence in Lombok society through their teaching activities and institutional operations, such as their leadership of Islamic boarding schools. The Islamic boarding schools are the places where there is a transmission of religious knowledge from religious leaders (ulama) to their followers (santri). This provides the foundation for the development of a Tuan Guru s religious message and endows them with a platform to gain ongoing loyalty from their followers. An example of this continuing allegiance is from Lom where several cars each week head across the island to attend Friday prayers in Pancor (as is mentioned in Chapter 1). This allegiance to particular Tuan Guru and their theological perspectives emerges from the teaching methods used. Pedagogically, the Islamic instruction provided in most pesantren demands students rote learn rather than undertake critical thinking. It has been suggested that this form of learning is about the passive consumption of information, 504 and it has been argued that the cadre of loyal followers of Tuan Guru and their organisations are developed through this slow-cooking indoctrination. Institutional muscle, not just religious authority, therefore, supports the status of a Tuan Guru. 505 Nahdlatul Wathan based their dakwah (Islamic outreach) strategies over the past half century on developing an extensive network of pesantren. This furthered their organisational reach and intensified support for their spiritual leader, the late TGH Pancor. 506 Similarly, TGH Sofwan Hakim explained that his organisation controlled a pondok pesantren with over three thousand students, a yayasan (charitable foundation), a medical clinic and businesses (including their own bank and several shops). Although he did acknowledge his organisation s strength, he suggested that the late TGH Pancor was the strongest organisationbuilding figure who had emerged from Lombok. The late TGH Pancor worked on 504 Many 20 th century Muslim reformists believed that this approach was a form of passive consumption of Islamic teachings in pesantren across the archipelago. For a discussion of this position, see R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (2007) For general discussion of this, see Judith L. Ecklund, Marriage, Seaworms, and Song: Ritualized Responses to Cultural Change in Sasak Life (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 1977) 48; Erni Budiwanti, Islam Sasak Waktu Telu Versus Waktu Lima (2000) Mohammad Noor, Muslihan Habib and Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, Visi Kebangsaan Religius Refleksi Pemikiran dan Perjuangan Tuan Guru Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid (2004) This is also discussed, in general, with Tuan Guru using pesantren to develop their social and religious influence in Asnawi, Agama dan Paradigma Sosial Masyarakat (2006)

130 creating his own institutional base: Nahdlatul Wathan. 507 This institutional mastery supports religious status and visa versa. Strong Islamic knowledge and charisma provides the core for someone to become a Tuan Guru, however, their institutional activity provides a mechanism for broadening and strengthening their influence. Picture 3.10 Minaret in Jerneng, West Lombok The practical importance of religious affiliation and the penetration of Tuan Guru s influence and Islamic education infrastructure in Mataram and West Lombok is apparent in the small village of Jerneng, West Lombok. This community of about 2000 residents has two Tuan Guru Besar and two pesantren (although the new one is still small). It is the home town of TGH Ulul Azmi, and his Pondok Pesantren Abhariyah, and the young TGH Zainal Arifin with his new Pondok Pesantren Syamsul Falah. Arifin works closely with Tuan Guru Besar Mustiadi Abhar, and concurrent to his activities in Jerneng, he is also the head educator at Pondok Pesantren Darul Falah in Pagutan. Jerneng highlights the depth of the roots that Tuan Guru have in Sasak society, and shows how religious activities have a dynamic nature with the emergence of new pesantren and informal networks among religious leaders (such as Abhar and Arifin). Muslim religious mass movements have become quasi-states at different times and places during Indonesia s history. They have taken on the provision of services and activities normally associated with the state, such as health, education and security. 507 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 112

131 The role of religious organisations and leadership in Lombok can, in this sense, be seen as parallel to the role of Nahdlatul Ulama s activities in East Java. During the colonial period, for example, the members of Nahdlatul Ulama saw the colonial authority as a reality, but for them the colonial state was irrelevant and disconnected from the local people s day-to-day activities. The colonial authorities did not have a significant impact on their local religious life, health care or education which was provided by Kiyai and Nahdlatul Ulama, the state was therefore essentially bypassed. 508 This situation continued under Japanese occupation and then after independence 509 and is, to a large degree, replicated in Lombok today. Tuan Guru maintain an integral practical role in conflict management, because in many ways they and their organisations are like miniature quasi-states, providing education and social services relevant to their community s needs. Therefore, Tuan Guru can act decisively in times of trouble not just personally, but also through their network of supporters and services. Picture 3.11 Crowds at the NW Pancor anniversary rally in 2008 Religious leaders were essentially limited to spiritual and social roles during the New Order era. 510 However, over the past decade with the burgeoning democratic and 508 Jean Gelman Taylor, Indonesia Peoples and Histories (2003) Ibid. 510 Greg Fealy, The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath: Abdurrahman Wahid, Suksesi and the Battle for the Control of NU in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (1996) ; M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200 (3 rd edition, 2001)

132 decentralised political environment in Indonesia there has been a realignment of political players and influences across the archipelago. This has led Tuan Guru to actively seek public office. The recent movement of Tuan Guru into public office has many benefits and potential pitfalls. 511 Tuan Guru and public intellectuals in Lombok harbour a range of perspectives on whether or not it is advisable for Tuan Guru to enter the political arena, and if so, under what circumstances. IAIN Mataram Rektor, Asnawi, differentiated between the role of religious leaders and politicians, but noted that there is a degree of overlap. Asnawi felt that there was no problem with a Tuan Guru being involved in politics, however, there is a need for them to be disciplined, in order not to become corrupted by the inducements of political office. 512 TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid held a similar position. He was anxious that public office would potentially tarnish their reputation as a group, and as a result, diminish their religious and educational leadership and consequently their overall status. 513 The systemic nature of corruption in Lombok politics and the temptation that it offers Tuan Guru worries many people. The negative aspects of politics could potentially undermine Tuan Gurus moral authority, and consequently, reduce their sociopolitical influence which has been described as acting like a social glue. 514 A reducation in the standing of Tuan Guru would also have negative effects upon their role within conflict management processes, which is based on their respected community position. With this said, there should be real concern about the nefarious aspects of Lombok politics which can be seen with the former governor, Lalu Serinata, who has recently been convicted and jailed for corruption (this will be discussed in greater detail Chapter 5) The issues and challenges of religious leaders entering into public office have been considered elsewhere in Indonesia; see Ali Maschan Moesa, Kiai & Politik Dalam Wacana Civil Society (1999) Interview with Asnawi (Mataram, 5 August 2008). 513 Interview with TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid (Mataram, 25 August 2008). 514 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 28 July 2008). 515 Izin Gubernur NTB, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 8 August 2007; Jeremy Kingsley, D-day for Anti-corruption Reform (2009) Inside Indonesia < at 6 July 2010; Panca Nugraha, Former Governor Sent to Jail to Serve his Sentence, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 29 July

133 Concerns about corruption are not simply about the community distress that might result, but are also because corruption is deemed prohibited (haram) under Islamic law, according to TGH Mahally Fikri. The behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah), he said, should act as a guide to Muslim politicians to make decisions without undue influence of personal gain or acting in an unjust manner, hence the prohibition of corruption. 516 Beyond the problem of the corrupting influence that potentially exists in Lombok politics, there are several practical reasons why some Tuan Guru do not want to enter public office. Some are concerned that their ability to act as a community advocates may be reduced. TGH Sofwan Hakim does not hold political office, despite his high profile and significant social influence. He feels that Tuan Guru are the people s delegates and their role is to critique government, as they did during the late 1990s and the early part of this century. They should, for instance, place constant pressure on government about the ineffectiveness of police operations or the high levels of crime. When someone becomes institutionalised as a politician, their role as critical commentator and community advocate may be reduced. This doesn t disqualify Tuan Guru from political office, but it does highlight a serious tension between their potential leadership activities. 517 If they were to lose this role as community voice and advocacy, their social position would potentially be reduced, and consequently, their ability to influence their followers would diminish. One consequence of this could be that, as noted before, their role as mediators and respected social figures able to intervene during times of communal and political conflict might be constrained. For other Tuan Guru, involvement with public office is a distraction from their core religious and educational functions. TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid was not averse to Tuan Guru participating in politics if they were careful. He had himself been courted by several political parties, but did not want to be distracted from his educational focus, particularly the development of his Islamic boarding school, Pondok Pesantren Darul Hikmah. 518 The perception that politics could be a diversion from religious and social responsibilities is not a new idea. In the 1950s, during an earlier period of 516 TGH Mahali Fikri: Politik Uang Hukumnya Haram, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 15 March Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 518 Interview with TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid (Mataram, 25 August 2008). 115

134 liberal democracy in Indonesia, senior Nahdlatul Ulama leader, Wahid Hasjim, felt that people were becoming too absorbed with politics and neglecting their spiritual, educational and social roles. 519 If Tuan Guru were to become too distracted then not only would their focus on core activities be reduced, but they would also not be as readily available to intercede in conflict avoidance or resolution situations. Tuan Guru are essentially faced with a balance of responsibilities and leadership questions when considering whether to enter into politics. Many Tuan Guru have been willing to enter into the political arena in order to advance their community s interests and the overall welfare of people in Lombok. TGH Mustiadi Abhar is one of the new wave of Tuan Guru becoming politicians. He has been the Chair (Ketua) of the Electoral Commission 520 for Mataram. He was previously involved with Golkar, however, he is now looking to affiliate politically elsewhere, as he feels that Golkar is not focused enough on Islam. According to Abhar, Tuan Guru actively participating in politics was a natural extension of their social, religious and community leadership roles. However, he noted that his religious teaching and role as community leader remained his primary function. 521 The late TGH Pancor was also cautious about involvement in politics, suggesting that participation should depend upon the political climate and whether it was conducive to an Islamic perspective. 522 Tuan Guru as a group of respected religious leaders are crucial to conflict management in Lombok. Their high social status and role as interpreters of local religious tradition is what provides them collectively with the legitimacy necessary to act as mediators during social tensions and conflict. In the week preceding the 2008 elections for NTB Governor many people in Lom, a community in Mataram, 523 were discussing each candidate s strengths and weaknesses. TGH Bajang was seen as a charismatic candidate, but arguably more important to the Sasak residents of Lom was his status as a Tuan Guru Besar and the leader of NW Pancor. 524 Tuan Guru s social 519 Gregory J. Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, (PhD Thesis, Monash University, 1998) Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU. 521 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 522 Masnun, Tuan Guru KH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007) Lom is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Field notes, 6 July

135 status, which has led them to political success, also provides them with legitimacy to act in tense communal and political situations (see Chapter 5). Their function as social stabilisers and mediators is predicated, therefore, on their social standing. The longerterm issue is how to maintain this level of influence if they enter the murky world of politics. Some Tuan Guru have chosen a mid-way approach to their role in political affairs in Lombok: they do not themselves enter into elections for public office, but are actively involved with supporting political candidates. Therefore, they enter the political arena with less risk. Since the democratic transition, political campaign teams in Lombok have sought to attach themselves to Tuan Guru Besar whose social networks and prestige are considered an important element of contemporary campaign strategies in Lombok. Political parties across the spectrum from the nationalist (such as Golkar, Hanura and Partai Democrat) to the Islamic (such as Partai Bulan Bintang and PKS) have sought to strategically rely upon Tuan Guru Besar to rally support. 525 The outcomes of these endorsements have been varied. TGH Ulul Azmi has shown his sociopolitical strength by actively endorsing the successful candidates for Bupati (Regent) and Wakil Bupati (Deputy Regent) in West Lombok, Zaini Arony and Nurdin Ranggabarani. His involvement included giving speeches at their campaign rallies. 526 This allows Tuan Guru to influence political life in a less direct manner. It potentially provides them with close access to the political elite without necessarily entering directly into the opaque world of Lombok politics, thus avoiding the pitfalls that have been previously mentioned. To understand this desire for political parties to form relationships with religious leaders, it is worth considering the manner that Tuan Guru and their organisations have the ability to mobilise thousands to their cause. This is a component of their socio-political power and it highlights that religious affiliation is not merely about spiritual connection, but rather has a strong organisational purpose within Sasak society. Therefore, when attempting to understand the resonance of religion and 525 Ulama dan Santri Iringi Pendaftaran Pasangan SUFI, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 9 April 2008; Semarak, Haul Al-Az am Syekh Abdul Kodir Jaelani, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 May This was discussed in a blog connected to the Indonesian political party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP or United Development Party): Dinamika Kegiatan PPP (2008) < at 12 January

136 religious affiliation in Lombok, it is useful to look to public activities, events and ceremonies as indicators of Tuan Guru s ability to rally support. The importance of religion on the island was emphasised for me one afternoon when walking through Mataram s Lombok Raya Hotel. I watched thousands of NW Pancor supporters wearing green uniforms and carrying the green flag of their organisation essentially taking control of the hotel through sheer force of numbers. They had been bussed into Mataram from all over Lombok to participate in the annual general meeting of NW Pancor. What startled me was the efficient mobilisation of thousands of supporters and it showed the sort of mass support that Tuan Guru could muster. 527 It also highlighted the efficiency of Tuan Guru and their organisations. Picture 3.12 TGH Bajang addressing the 73rd Anniversary of NW Pancor I also witnessed another powerful show of organisational strength when thousands of people were mobilised to show support for their religious organisation at the 73 rd Anniversary of Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor. 528 It was held at the organisations headquarters in Pancor, East Lombok, and was an enormous celebration, with an estimated several hundred thousand people in attendance. 529 The NW compound had four or five major holding areas mosques and open spaces where people were seated listening to the proceedings (see Pictures 3.11 and 3.12). Not only was the 527 Field notes, 4 January The 73 rd Anniversary of NW Pancor was a much anticipated event; see Hari ini, Pawai Ta aruf Hultah, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 9 August Perayaan Puncak Hultah NWDI dan Haul Maulanasyekh. Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August

137 sheer weight of humanity involved overwhelming, but the huge NW compound, including the large Pondok Pesantren Darun Nahdlatain, felt almost like a medieval castle in the way that it physically dominated Pancor. 530 Many important political and religious leaders were at this celebration, including senior representatives of political parties from across the political spectrum and a full range of religious organisations and their leadership from across the archipelago. Even as an outsider, the event conjured extremely strong feelings for me and by the end of the day I felt emotionally drained. 531 Events such as this strengthen the emotional bonds of a religious community and provide an affirmation of its members loyalty to a Tuan Guru. It is these bonds, and Tuan Gurus abilities to function as mediators and social stabilisers, that provide them a pivotal role within conflict management processes. The next section extends upon these functions and explains how their role as guardians of local religious traditions provides them with social influence to engage with protagonists in times of tension and conflict. Guardians of religious traditions The key to social stabilisation Tuan Guru have been able to gain significant social status in Lombok because they are considered the guardians of religious tradition. As a consequence, they are perceived to be the interpreters of local Islamic traditions and practices. 532 This provides them with social power because they have the ability to speak on religious matters in an authoritative manner. As a result, they can influence public opinion in the devout Sasak community. 533 This social influence is part of their armoury when Tuan Guru involve themselves in conflict management processes. Additionally, to argue with a Tuan Guru is by implication, to dispute their religious authority something most Sasak would not be willing to do. 534 This means that the role of Tuan Guru as mediator is highly regarded and their legitimacy is not normally challenged. 530 Field notes, 10 August Ibid. 532 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) Abstract. 533 R. Michael Feener, Muslim Legal Thought in Modern Indonesia (2007) Asnawi, Islam dan Visi Kebangsaan di Nusa Tenggara Barat in Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gauf, Menjadi Indonesia 13 Abad Eksistensi Islam di Bumi Nusantara (2006)

138 The influential role of Tuan Guru can sometimes cause problems. There is an intensity that exists about the importance of Sasak religious traditions and these feelings can make communities very protective of their practices. This sometimes leads them to forcefully defend their religious traditions and leadership. 535 For instance, when mainstream Sasak beliefs were challenged by Lombok-based groups known there as Wahabi, 536 several local communities reacted badly to perceived affronts to their local Islamic traditions and religious leaders. 537 I am not suggesting that Tuan Guru instructed the residents of these communities to act violently towards these minority Muslim groups, but rather that the reactions were induced by the importance of these local religious traditions and interpretations to these communities. The Sasak can gain strength from being a pious community, but this can also be a weakness if it leads to violence. There were several violent attacks on so-called Wahabi groups during 2005 and 2006, in Sesela, West Lombok, during November 2005; Repuk, West Lombok, during March 2006; and Masbagig, East Lombok, during August It is worth considering these conflicts to understand such emotional reactions and to comprehend how religious dissent can raise the ire of many Sasak. One case of violence occurred during November 2005, in the village of Sesela, West Lombok. It was triggered by events during a funeral service. The main religious figure of the village was not present at the time. As a consequence, a Wahabi religious leader led the burial service. Traditionally in Lombok before the burial process begins, the leader of the rite reads 535 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) So-called Wahabi groups in Lombok are understood by the mainstream Sasak community, rather than by the members of these groups themselves, to have an ideology and approach to Islam based on Middle Eastern-influenced puritanical views of Islamic teaching Interview with Zey (Mataram, 3 October 2007). These groups do not adhere to local traditions or Islamic practices, preferring to focus their interpretations and approaches on the early generations of Muslims as their inspiration Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) xivii. This means that they often deem local practices to be corruptions of Islamic theology and are seen to be at odds with local traditions. The Wahabi groups are believed, by many Sasak, to hold views often intricately connected to the Saudi Arabian state religious ideology known outside Saudi Arabia as Wahhabism, but the term is often locally used to cover a broader range of Middle Easterninfluenced groups, see Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Mataram Mediation Centre, Social Conflicts in Lombok, This material was provided by Mohamad Abdun Nasir, Lecturer, IAIN Mataram. 538 Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Mataram Mediation Centre, Social Conflicts in Lombok,

139 talqin (a prayer) for the dead, hoping that they live peacefully in the hereafter. However, the Wahabi leader refused to read it, declaring that such a reading was unknown during the prophet s lifetime and was bid ah (innovation in religion) in other words, a corruption of Islamic teaching. The family and the relatives of the deceased were outraged. As a result of this omission, a large number of people massed outside the Wahabi leader s home and proceeded to destroy it. Other houses belonging to Wahabi members nearby were also levelled, with order only being restored after police intervened. The message was a clear and unequivocal support for local Islamic leaders and religious practices. It showed the strong reaction against those who challenge the status quo. There needs to be an important caveat made in relation to the generally positive force that Tuan Guru exert within conflict management in Lombok. When dealing with any group that has a high level of social status there is always a possibility that they might act nefariously. This could occur if their position is threatened, or if they can gain significant status from inspiring or organising communal trouble. 539 For some Tuan Guru Besar, as discussed in Chapter 2, their control of pamswakarsa provides them with a rapid ability to mobilise trouble, so this threat is real. This sort of situation occurred in Situbondo, East Java, where Jemma Purdey noted that rivalry between religious leaders was one of the local rationales for violence against Indonesian Chinese in October The case studies in Chapter 5 provide two recent examples of the overwhelmingly positive role that Tuan Guru play in bringing conflicts to a peaceful conclusion or avoiding it altogether in Lombok, but it is worth recognising potential weaknesses in conflict management processes. Many Tuan Guru told me about how they worked to ensure toleransi through their teaching in pengajian, sermons and when speaking to people privately. 541 This is where their role as guardians of religious traditions can be used as a force for social 539 Kenapa Kiai Banyak Tapi Banyak Masalah?, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 26 December Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, (2006) Among those Tuan Guru who noted the particular need to focus on teaching about toleransi were TGH Subkhi Sasaki, TGH Munajid Khalid and TGH Sofwan Hakim. See Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 121

140 stabilisation. They found the need to continually work with their communities on the issue of tolerance and social harmony, because several Tuan Guru said that sometimes the Sasak were easy to anger. TGH Mustiadi Abhar noted that even the smallest incidents, such as a minor motorcycle accident, could lead to a fight between drivers that could escalate into a brawl involving large numbers of people from their respective communities. This is negative aspect of communal solidarity is discussed in Chapter 4. Therefore, Abhar felt that the role of Tuan Guru was to direct their community away from such negative responses. 542 Tuan Guru Besar Abdul Hamid Faisal said that when the violence erupted during the January 2000 riots Tuan Guru acted quickly: calling santri, making announcements over mosque loudspeakers and walking the streets to calm things down. 543 More coordinated efforts also occurred amongst the Tuan Guru during these riots. An example of this occurred when several groups of Tuan Guru met during these troubled events under the auspices of Majelis Ulama (the Ulama Association) and Lembaga Dakwah (the Muslim Outreach Institute) to coordinate their activities in order to restore calm. 544 Those who believe (in the Qur an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord; and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. Qur an, 2: The role that Tuan Guru play as social stabilisers is embedded in Islamic doctrine through several Qur anic injunctions, such as the verse quoted above. TGH Munajid Khalid told me that the role of Tuan Guru during conflicts was to follow Islamic teachings and restore calm. 546 When social tensions emerge, TGH Sofwan Hakim felt that Tuan Guru can intervene at three points. These are: anticipating a conflict; 542 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 543 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 544 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 545 Abdullah Yusuf Ali (translator), The Holy Qur an (2000). 546 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 122

141 calming emotions once conflict starts; and mediating a resolution to the dispute. 547 This outline of the process of conflict management shows how the social standing of Tuan Guru is used to create networks of activity to avoid or resolve conflict situations. 548 In relation to the anticipation of conflict, this phase can involve various activities. Tuan Guru may teach specifically about the importance of social harmony (kerukunan) during sermons and pengajian. But, also if trouble is brewing, a Tuan Guru can hold special pengajian that emphasise social stability and specifically consider problems that are emerging. The substance of these lessons will be further outlined in Chapter When discussing the role of Tuan Guru during efforts to calm emotions, TGH Sofwan Hakim talked about how he dealt with the January 2000 riots. He explained how he needed to cool down his emotional students. 550 He had gone to the tabligh akbar to show solidarity towards Muslims suffering in Ambon, but had noticed that some people on the periphery of the large ceremony were getting too excited. He felt that they there were being led astray by provocateurs whom he described as being criminals (preman). With this said, he had not realised the amount of anger that was growing in the crowd or that it would explode into riots. 551 When Hakim returned home his students came to him wanting permission to participate in the riots. He sat them down and sought to calm their emotions. Then, sensing the anger expressed by his santri, he decided to issue a statement to his community making it clear that he did not approve of anyone participating in the violence. He then deployed his students to spread out across Kediri to communicate his message. The message transmitted by the students incorporated an explanation of why not to participate and an implicit threat from Hakim those partaking in the violence would be disappointing him and acting contrary to their religious obligations. People knew that this threat came with serious community sanctions if 547 The stages and processes for resolving conflicts involving Tuan Guru was raised by several informants. See Field notes, 10 August See John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination The Art and Soul of Building Peace (2005). 549 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 550 Ibid. 551 Ibid. 123

142 ignored (the form and type of communal punishment, such as social ostracism, are discussed in Chapter 4). 552 Additionally, to disobey the instructions of a Tuan Guru may lead to punishment in the afterlife, they believed. 553 There is a strong belief among the Sasak that they need to behave properly and in accordance with Islam s injunctions, otherwise they will not be accepted into heaven. This corresponds to general Islamic teachings, which have indicated that if you do wrong against your religion then when attempting to enter through the gates of heaven you will be forbidden passage. 554 According to Hakim, the final point where a Tuan Guru can intervene is during the resolution of a conflict. When explaining how to mediate the resolution of a dispute Hakim told me an anecdote. A primary school teacher in Kediri was physically disciplining his students. This is not something rare, but it was getting out of control as he was hitting the students too much, and parents were no longer willing to accept this level of punishment. They tried to persuade him to be less strict, but the parents overtures were ignored, so, in despair, they held the teacher hostage in his classroom. The police were unwilling to intervene, in fact, they were scared, and so Hakim accompanied by a government official, went into the school in order to negotiate a solution that would end the standoff. He had feared that the parents would kill, or at least badly beat the teacher. Hakim talked to the parents and heard their grievances, something that the teacher had refused to do. Thus listening was an important element of resolving the dispute and provided a path to negotiating the teacher s eventual release. 555 Tuan Gurus pivotal role in conflict management is not just through personal involvement, but they can create networks to deal with troubled situations whether through their santri or with government officials. Their social status gives those participating in conflict the means of removing themselves or negotiating solutions while maintaining their pride: they are able to keep face. Statements such as: I would have continued, but I wanted to show respect to Tuan Guru A are common. This 552 Ibid. 553 Sven Cederroth, From Ancestor Worship to Monotheism Politics of Religion in Lombok (1996) 32 Temenos 7; Bartholomew Ryan, Alif Lam Mim Reconciling Islam, Modernity, and Tradition in an Indonesian Kampung (PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1999) Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (2000) Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 124

143 gives the protagonists a way out without showing weakness. 556 Therefore, this thesis argues that by and large Tuan Guru play an positive role in conflict management and have been actively engaged in avoiding or resolving conflicts over the period However, as has been noted, this is not an absolute assertion. The challenges posed by Tuan Guru have already been discussed in this section and in the last chapter (in the context of their leadership of pamswakarsa). It has also been alleged role that some Tuan Guru have made sermons that were instrumental in fermenting antagonism towards the minority Ahmadiyah group (this situation is investigated in Chapter 5). It is worth remembering that tolerance and social harmony also needs to be performed in public. Unless Tuan Guru visibly show their relationship with leaders of other faiths, communal conflicts are still likely in Mataram and West Lombok. During an interview with Pendeta (Reverend) Jimmy Iroth from Mataram s GPIB Church 557 he noted that he had a close personal relationship with several Tuan Guru, however, he felt these relationships were too private. They needed to be more public and show to the broader community that tolerance is a lived activity and not just talked about. Iroth believed that this would lead to broader social changes in relation to Muslim perceptions of Christians in Lombok. Otherwise, the friendships and what they symbolise will not filter down to the grassroots of Sasak society. 558 Conclusion In conclusion, Tuan Guru play a fundamentally important role in contemporary conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok. I have highlighted the role of Tuan Guru as both religious and educational leaders who have significant socio-political powers. Their high social status has led many Tuan Guru in the post- Soeharto era to take positions of state office, such as TGH Bajang who recently became NTB Governor. 559 This chapter also divides Tuan Guru into Tuan Guru Lokal 556 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 557 Gereja Protestan di Indonesia Bagian Barat (The Protestant Church of Western Indonesia). 558 Interview with Pendeta Jimmy Iroth (Mataram, 9 October 2007). 559 Although Tuan Guru have successfully sought political office I am unaware of any legislation that they put forward to promulate religiously-influenced local regulations. Even the failed attempt to enact a morality-based regulation for Mataram emerged from Golkar politicians rather than religious sources Peraturan Daerah Kota Mataram Tentang Pencegahan Maksiat (1983) (Mataram Local Regulation Preventing Immoral Behaviour). However, Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani did talk in detail about his 125

144 and Tuan Guru Besar. This categorisation identifies different levels of communal influence. The relevance of this taxonomy is seen in practical terms during the second case study about social instability in Bok (see Chapter 5), where it was not until a well-respected Tuan Guru Besar became involved that things settled down. I have shown the historical development of Tuan Guru and their organisations. This helps to explain their social status and activities, which go beyond merely being religious leaders. Their social, political and economic interests reach into all levels of Mataram and West Lombok society. This central position of Tuan Guru also emerges from Lombok s widely recognised religiosity. Islam plays an integral part in the daily life of people on this island with some commentators noting that time is not measured by clocks, but rather the call to prayer. This assessment is reinforced by the local slogans, which have been mentioned earlier, such as Lombok being the Island of 1000 mosques, and Mataram s official slogan being Mataram Progressive and Religious ( Mataram - Maju dan Religius ). 560 In Chapter 3, I have also argued that Tuan Guru, and their organisations, operate as quasi-state entities. They provide infrastructure and services from security to education in a similar manner to the state. This powerful role can be seen as challenging state authority and potentially creating social instability. However, as the case studies in Chapter 5 identify, these religious leaders interests currently rely more on continued social harmony and cooperation with state actors and institutions, in order to maintain their high socio-political status. This has led to Tuan Guru playing an important role within conflict management processes. support for PKS being because of their calls for Syari ah-based legislation - Interview with Ustadz Abdul Qodir Jaelani (Mataram, 18 December 2007). Also, TGH Mustiadi Abhar felt that religious voices needed to be heard in local legislative processes, but he was unclear as to whether this meant that he supported religiously-influenced local regulations - Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 560 This slogan for Mataram is also used by one of Mataram s pamswakarsa Lang-Lang (see Picture 4.10). These two uses of the slogan reflect the influence of Ruslan as Mataram Mayor and the head of this community security group. This heading also builds upon previous slogans for Mataram that adopted a similar line of thought the former slogan was Mataram Religious City ( Mataram Kotaragama ) see Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan and Museum Negeri Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat, Pengungkapan Nilai Budaya Naskah Kuno Kotaragama (1995/1996). 126

145 In the next chapter, the role of community relationships and local leadership will be considered in more detail. The focus of Chapter 4 is upon the leadership structures, approaches to community management and social relationships within a Mataram community, Lom, and its leadership, including Tuan Guru Lokal. This chapter aims in particular to understand how the community members protected each other during the January 2000 riots and recovered a sense of community in the aftermath of these events. It will also investigate the contemporary environment in this ethnic and religiously diverse community. This acts to explain how community relationships and local leadership are integral elements of the conflict management processes observed in Mataram and West Lombok. 127

146

147 Chapter 4 Adat, leadership and community Why go to the police if you have a problem? You just create another problem Ita, 20 year-old Mataram student. 561 As Ita claims, police are not essential to the frameworks necessary for the maintenance of social harmony in Mataram and West Lombok, although they should not be dismissed altogether (see Chapter 5). But if they are not central to conflict management and security, who is? This chapter looks at conflict management and the pivotal role of local community leadership, relationships and adat processes in a system from which the state is often absent. It includes an in-depth examination of the Mataram community of Lom, 562 noting the utility of communal relationships and local leadership, particularly during the January 2000 riots. In this chapter, I develop a narrative of the local situation in Lom and consider how it fits into community-based conflict management processes, drawing on 15 months of observational research and 25 interviews with residents. This analysis illuminates an intricate, complex and sometimes chaotic picture of life in Lom, as well as the realities of conflict management processes. This chapter, is broken into six sections. The first section provides background to the community of Lom. It outlines the strength and weaknesses of the three areas that together constitute Lom. The analysis also considers the physical lay-out of the community (see Map 4.1) and the effect that the built environment has upon community dynamics. The next section of this chapter focuses on adat and explores its impact upon conflict management processes. The third section of this chapter looks at local community leadership. It highlights the roles of the local non-state and state leaders, which are, at times, blurred. The function of these local leaders is not just administrative, but is also central to the development 561 Field notes, 4 May Lom, a community in Mataram, has been de-identified in accordance with the requirements of the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee for this research. 129

148 of relationships within and between communities. In Lom, this involves community leaders working together to solidify social relationships between the three residential areas. In the fourth section, social relationships within and between communities in Lom are examined. This section is underpinned by considerations of the notion of mutual benefit, where relationships between people and communities are developed and strengthened through reciprocity. In reviewing social interactions in Lom, it becomes clear that this is not just a rosy picture of communal engagement. There are some serious problems between the three Lom communities. For instance, the Indonesian Chinese from Komplek Cina Lom have extremely limited contact with the two other parts of Lom. Therefore, they tend not to be protected by security mechanisms based on social relationships during periods of instability and violence. This demonstrates the importance of social engagement and dialogue within and between communities that I see as integral to conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok. Social relationships can prevent the flaring-up of disputes and allows communities to protect each other in times of communal or political violence. 563 The fifth section focuses on the January 2000 riots and provides a practical example of strong local leadership, social processes and relationships in Lom. Following on from this the sixth section then considers local security mechanisms that were put in place as a result of the January 2000 riots, as well as the perceived crime wave of the late 1990s and early 2000s. This led to the development of new security arrangements in Lom in the form of a paid ronda (night watch) and local connections to pamswakarsa (community security group/militia). 564 Komplek Cina Lom residents would presumably receive protection from this paid ronda, but could not rely on the social relationships, such as those that exist between Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom. 563 Departemen Agama, Manajemen Konflik Umat Beragama (2003) The paid ronda (night watch) is an eclectic group of people from Kampung Lom. They provide a nightly security service across Lom. Ronda members are usually volunteers, but Lom s ronda is a paid job. Unlike satpam (private security) guards, the members of the Lom ronda are not necessarily young or physically able. Therefore, I have called them a paid ronda (a hybrid between a ronda and satpam operation). More details on this security arrangement in Lom are provided later into this chapter. 130

149 MAP OF LOM Map 4.1 Lom, which is situated in Mataram, Lombok Notes: Common Space includes a berugaq and open meeting space. Multi-purpose space includes a basketball court and a small stage. 131

150 Lom Unity in diversity? Lom is a community in Cakranegra, Mataram. In this thesis, I use Lom as an allegory for conflict management more generally in Mataram and West Lombok. It is made up of three separate, yet interconnected, communities with a combined population of just over 700 people (see Map 4.1). In the middle of Lom is Kampung Lom, the economically-disadvantaged residents are all Sasak. Geographically positioned on either side of the kampung are two middle-to-upper class housing projects (kompleks). Middle class Komplek Lom, consists of residents from all over Indonesia who are affiliated with a variety of religions (including Hinduism and Catholicism). By contrast, Komplek Cina Lom, an upper middle class area, is exclusively Indonesian Chinese. Family and community are not taken for granted and play a pivotal role in peoples daily lives in Mataram and West Lombok. The focus of society is not on the individual, but rather the collective. Patrick Guinness noted that in a Javanese kampung there is a sense of social solidarity. People stick firmly together and see their lives as deeply intertwined. 565 This sense of social solidarity is replicated in Lombok and this colours almost every aspect of conflict management. Sasak society has been described as a community of families enmeshed in one another s concerns. 566 A sense of social solidarity within a community provides many benefits to members. However, it can also turn minor disputes into sizeable clashes between communities. A small dispute among some youths from two kampung can spark a larger fight as members of the two communities go to the aid of their brethren. 567 It is not uncommon to have 20 family members living under the same roof. Sasak families typically extend to include uncles, aunts, cousins and people who may not even be biologically related. Along with religious organisations, community and family provide a social safety net for the Sasak. The strong communal relationships in Kampung Lom are thus central to leadership activities and social relationships more broadly in Lom. 565 Patrick Guinness, Harmony and Hierarchy in a Javanese Kampung (1986) M. Cameron Hay, Remembering to Live Illness at the Intersection of Anxiety and Knowledge in Rural Indonesia (2001). 567 Interview with TGH Mustiadi Abhar (Mataram, 23 July 2008). 132

151 Picture 4.1 The affluent Komplek Lom Picture 4.2 Another part of Komplek Lom 133

152 Picture 4.3 Kampung Lom Picture 4.4 Children playing in Kampung Lom 134

153 I initially chose Lom because of the particularly close relationships between Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom. In many respects, the closeness of the relationship between these two parts of Lom can be contrasted with the limited relationship that exists with their neighbours in the Indonesian Chinese community of Komplek Cina Lom. There are links between these communities, but they are less intimate and supportive. The connections between these two communities are based on mutual benefit. An example of this is a kampung resident, Hera, a high school student, who is only able to attend school because one of her neighbours from the komplek, Ida, funds her education. This generosity is reciprocated by Zey, Hera s sister, who looks after Ida s house and children when she is away. 568 This example of interconnection provides the foundation for social harmony and relationships that can protect communities and individuals during times of social instability and conflict. There are many factors that support the relationships between these two communities. One important factor is the physical lay-out of the two parts of Lom, which creates several meeting points see Map 4.1. This includes a joint multi-purpose sporting/recreation facility and a common area between these two communities see Pictures 4.5 and 4.6. The close relationships are visible on a daily basis between people from Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom. Walking around these two areas, even late at night, children from the two communities can be seen running and playing together while the older women meet outside each others homes or in the common area next to Ibu Una s small kiosk (warung). These physical spaces allow for communal engagement. This can be contrasted to the limited physical connection between Kampung Lom and Komplek Cina Lom. The weak social relationship between these two communities is replicated in the built environment. The two communities are connected by a stairway that is situated at the back of both communities, and it bends in a manner that obscures any visual contact between the neighbouring areas Field notes, 6 September Field notes, 1 and 13 October

154 Picture 4.5 Common area between Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom Relationships between the communities of Lom are not always marked by similarities or common ground. Accepting diversity within and between communities can provide social strength to places, such as Lom. This is recognises the plural reality of this community which they often use as a tool for social connection. For instance, they celebrate christmas or the end of Ramadan party, idul fitri, together. 570 However, if acknowledging differences leads to stereotyping, then there is potential for problems to emerge between neighbours. Across Indonesia, the broad range of ethnic and religious groups has meant that an elaborate set of stereotypes or labels define the characteristics of various Indonesian groups vis-à-vis each other. 571 It is not uncommon when talking with people in Mataram that they will refer to one ethnic group as sinister or another as rough or uncouth. In many ways, the community in Lom is a microcosm of the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Mataram and West Lombok. One of the by-products of ethnic and religious diversity is that stereotypes sometimes develop. As will be discussed in the next section, Sasak adat considers 570 This practice of joining together for major religious celebrations is interesting, as there has been controversy about such activities elsewhere in Indonesia. For instance, the quasi-state Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI or the Indonesian Council of Ulama) issued a fatwa (non-binding legal opinion) which forbade Muslims from attending Christmas celebrations. They justified this position because they believed that these are religious rituals rather than social celebrations John R. Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia (2003) 235. However, for the leadership and residents of Lom, this is a social and community activity, essentially a means of showing social solidarity and sharing their lives with each other. They did not see it as a religious ritual per se. 571 Edward M. Bruner, The Expression of Ethnicity in Indonesia in Abner Cohen, Urban Ethnicity (1974)

155 respectful relationships as a key to social harmony, yet, this can be dislodged by prejudiced stereotypes. Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom have positive social relationships. Despite this, many of the non-sasak residents within the komplek hold negative stereotypes about the Sasak. There are also class-based points of social difference and potential stereotypes. It was suggested to me by Andi, one of the leaders of Komplek Lom, that educational disparities between these two communities sometimes cause difficulties when resolving communal tensions. Although, I felt uncomfortable with this argument, I could see that it did reflect a blunt appraisal of the two close, but different communities. His argument was that there are generally lower-levels of education in Kampung Lom compared with people from Komplek Lom and Komplek Cina Lom. According to Andi this meant that Kampung Lom residents struggled with problemsolving and could sometimes become angered quickly by situations. Patronisingly, he said that the lack of education meant that people from the kampung often couldn t see beyond an immediate problem. This became apparent to Andi when Lom was renovating their mosque (masjid) and problems emerged. The kampung residents just wanted the job finished. Andi felt that they had a rigid vision. He claimed that no matter what anyone from Komplek Lom said they would not alter their approach. 572 While he was telling me about the educational differences between these communities I felt that he was missing one significant possibility maybe the kampung residents merely had different priorities or values, or just didn t appreciate being bossed around by their neighbours? Also, I was uncomfortable with what seemed to be his over-emphasis on the Sasak s low-levels of education. Implicit in this was the stereotyping of them as lazy and backwards. This sort of labelling has been observed in previous studies of Sasak society. 573 Such an analysis is too simplistic. The Sasak have created intricate social networks and organisations, such as Nahdutul Wathan, the religious organisation, discussed in Chapter 3. These religious organisations mimic state institutions and they provide religious education of a relatively high 572 Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 573 Jocelyn Grace, Lacking Education, Young Sasak Women and Teenage Marriage, Divorce and Polygamy in Rural East Lombok (Paper presented at Biennial Asian Studies Association of Australia Conference, La Trobe University, Melbourne, 8-11 July 1996) 3; M. Cameron Hay, Remembering to Live Illness at the Intersection of Anxiety and Knowledge in Rural Indonesia (2001)

156 standard. 574 This does not mean that there is not a problem with the levels of secular education and literacy on the island. It has been argued that improvements in this area are key priorities of economic and social development for Lombok. 575 However, Andi s comments merely follow stereotypes about class and ethnicity. It is true that many of the older residents education does not extend beyond primary school. However, many younger kampung residents do reach university level. I do not intend to labour the point about education, rather I am seeking to highlight that stereotypes may have basis in fact, but also demean communities and create the potential for problems and conflict to emerge. The positive relationships between Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom could deteriorate if these stereotypes became the dominant way they look at each other. Integral to social harmony in Lom is the protection and support that the communities and neighbours give to one and another. However, the relationships within Lom are not all close. The residents of Komplek Cina Lom are, in many respects, disengaged from the two other communities. Many conversations I had with residents, for example with Abdul from Komplek Lom, were riddled with generalisations about Komplek Cina Lom and its residents. This highlights the corrosive aspects of stereotyping just discussed. For instance, Abdul said that Indonesian Chinese work all the time and do not want to engage with their neighbours. 576 This may be true, but it ignores why this estrangement exists. There are complex social and practical reasons that will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. However the estrangement of Komplek Cina Lom demonstrates that police and fences do not provide security, but rather in my observation it is relationships and community that are the most reliable form of personal and property security in Mataram and West Lombok See Jamilah, Peranan Tuan Guru Sebagai Pelopor Dalam Pengembangan Pendidikan Islam Di Kecamatan Gunung Sari (Honours Thesis, State Islamic Institute Mataram, 1998) 10-16; Lalu Darmawan Putra, Peranan Tuan Guru Kiyai Haji Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid Dalam Mensosialisasikan Pendidikan Islam Di Desa Pancor Lombok Timur (Honours Thesis, State Islamic Institute Mataram, 2001) 24-28; Masnun, Tuan Guru KH Muhammad Zainuddin Abdul Madjid Gagasan dan Gerakan Pembaharuan Islam di Nusa Tenggara Barat (2007) Farid Tolomundu, Mampukah NTB Bangkit? (2007) Field notes, 8 August This perspective was shared by Kampung Lom leader Sahnan; see Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 138

157 The next section explores the place of adat within conflict management processes in Lom. This provides background to community and leadership issues discussed throughout this chapter. Adat Lore of the local In this thesis, adat is defined as the social processes, communal expectations, ritual practices and leadership structures within local areas. It can be seen as forming the character of our society 578 and changes according to the needs of a community. 579 This section considers the effect of adat on local communities and conflict management processes. Adat is a contested notion with multiple interpretations and applications. It is, therefore, worth considering its nature and definition. Adat is commonly defined as customary or traditional law. 580 This characterisation, although broadly correct, arguably underestimates the complexity of meaning and political connotations attributed to this term. By using the term law it is possible to take the view, as did some Dutch colonial observers, that adat can be paralleled with western positivist conceptions of law (which assert that these social positions are able to be reified and fixed into codified law). 581 M.B. Hooker aptly described this Dutch approach as rather optimistic. He believed that the distillation of adat in Indonesia into a solidified and consolidated system was illusory. Local eclecticism and the nature of these rules does not lend itself to this form of reification. 582 The Dutch during their colonial reign also sought to use adat as a means of constraining Islam and its authority, which they saw as potentially challenging their authority. 583 As has been noted previously, the full separation of Islam from adat is not practically possible in 578 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). 579 Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008). 580 Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia Asia A Contemporary Sourcebook (2006) xxxiii. 581 For discussion of the intellectual problems and conundrums that this approach caused, see Peter Burns, The Leiden Legacy: Concepts of Law in Indonesia (2004). 582 M.B. Hooker, Adat Laws in Modern Malaya (1972) 1; M.B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia (1978) See Harry J. Benda, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Police in Indonesia (1958) 30 The Journal of Modern History 338; Karel A. Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam Contacts and Conflicts (2006). 139

158 Mataram and West Lombok. They are, according to the Sasak that I spoke with, and in my own observation, intricately interconnected. 584 There are other approaches to adat, although legitimate, which are not applicable to this thesis. For example, Leena Avonius focused on adat in northern Lombok as a ceremonial mechanism and form of political organisation. 585 This emphasis emerges, in many ways, from decentralisation and local politicians attempts to create a unified Sasak identity and ceremonial adat to utilise this for their own political advantage (see Chapter 5). 586 This has some parallels with the Dutch use of adat as a vehicle for their attempts to consolidate colonial political power, although, as noted, the political objectives of the Dutch were to counter Islam and its possible political uses, rather than reinforce local identity and ethnic political connections. The definition utilised here emphasises adat as a fluid concept and its content is interpreted in various ways within local communities depending on their cultural and geographic realities. 587 These social norms regulate the obligations that people have to their community and what behaviour is acceptable. 588 Therefore, when considering social frameworks it is necessary to recognise that different Sasak communities in Mataram and West Lombok function differently. The demands placed on their members are not the same. Leaders and residents relate to each other based on 584 This was discussed at length by TGH Zainal Arifin, see Interview with TGH Zainal Arifin (Jerneng, West Lombok, 28 August 2008). The more general difficulty of separating Islam and adat as simply the Dutch sought to do is discussed in Roy F. Ellen, Social Theory, Ethnography and the Understanding of Practical Islam in South-East Asia in M.B. Hooker (ed.), Islam in South-East Asia (1983) Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004). These recreated, and now becoming, institutionalised forms of adat were also discussed by Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia < at 1 May See also David Henley and Jamie S. Davidson, Introduction Radical Conservatism the Protean Politics of Adat in Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley, The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics the Deployment of Adat From Colonialism to Indigenism (2007) See Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia < at 1 May This is also occurring elsewhere in Indonesia, see Greg Acciaioli, Grounds of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony: Custom, Religion, and Nationalism in Violence Avoidance at the Lindu Plain, Central Sulawesi (2001) 72 Indonesia 81, M.B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia (1978) Ibid 28 &

159 informal understandings. 589 Adat in Lom and Bok is not comprised of prescriptive rules, rather it is better described as the way that things work. 590 The social processes reflected in local adat provide an underpinning for conflict management frameworks. Research by Farid Imran Muslim in the northern Lombok village of Bentek came to similar conclusions, finding that local adat processes were effective in resolving communal disputes due to their flexibility and social legitimacy. 591 Articles in the Lombok Post have also affirmed the value of Sasak social and cultural mechanisms to ensure communal harmony. 592 Adat regulates significant issues and also reasonably minor matters. For instance, I went to the marriage of the daughter of one of my friends, Ani, and asked her why she was standing well away from the wedding parade (nyongkolan). She explained that adat in her community dictated that she had to stand in a specific place as the wedding parade entered her kampung. 593 Sasak adat, although fluid and variable between communities, is underpinned by two common ingredients respect for leadership (kepemimpinan) and solidarity among society (masyarakat). 594 One principle that emerged as a theme when discussing adat among Sasak was the notion of respect (hormat). 595 Respect can be conveyed through simple acts of hospitality, such as the offering of tea to guests. 596 Djalaluddin Arzaki said that for the Sasak welcoming someone into your home or workplace with this small gesture of tea and respect is an integral part of building relationships between people and communities. 597 It has been suggested that the principle of respect exemplifies the overlap between adat and local Islam, as respect is an essential 589 The effectiveness of this informal legal ordering has been considered an important element of social control in Indonesia, see Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara and Mulyana W. Kusumah, Aspek-Aspek Socio Legal Pendidikan Hukum Non Formal (1988); Hilman Hadikusumu, Pengantar Antropologi Hukum (2004) Field notes, 14 July Farid Imran Muslim, Pembelajaran Otononomi dan Demokrasi Desa Studi Tentang Peran Majelis Krama Pengelolaan Norma-Norma Sosial (MPhil Thesis, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2008) 49-51, Budaya Sasak Miliki Nilai Berlapis-lapis Menjamin Harmoni Manusia, Alam dan Tuhan, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 15 June Field notes, 27 August Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 595 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). This was also mentioned by Djalaluddin Arzaki; see Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008). 596 Interview with Djalaluddin Arzaki (Mataram, 27 July 2008). 597 Ibid. 141

160 element in Islamic teaching. This also connects to the Sasak s emotional makeup, according to TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid, who felt that if Sasak believed they were not being shown respect they can become offended, leading to conflict and violence. 598 Adat and local Islam are intricately connected in Mataram and West Lombok. 599 However, Dutch colonial authorities historically felt that adat could be separated from Islamic traditions and law, Syari ah. 600 The intertwined belief systems that I observed in the field may explain why there does not appear to be any specific position within local communities known as tokoh adat (adat leaders). A specific adat leadership position has been formalised into local socio-political frameworks in other parts of Lombok, but in Lom and Bok there was no such position. 601 Instead in these two communities adat is interpreted and implemented by community and religious leadership. 602 However, Maria Platt in her research on the West Lombok community of Teduk did identify a tokoh adat. 603 Whether a community has a tokoh adat or just tokoh masyarakat is immaterial as the central point in Mataram and West Lombok is that adat and Islam are intertwined. TGH Zainal Arifin, from West Lombok, told me that his father was simultaneously a Tuan Guru and community leader highly respected for his religious and adat knowledge. 604 This highlights that it is possible to have an understanding of religious and adat teachings and frameworks; and acknowledges that the two are not opposed. Breaches of adat do have sanctions in local communities, but these vary from area-toarea. For instance, some communities make a person who has stolen from within their community wear a sign around his or her neck identifying him or her as a thief or 598 Interview with TGH Aminullah Abdul Hamid (Mataram, 25 August 2008). 599 Judith L. Ecklund, Sasak Cultural Change, Ritual Change, and the Use of Ritualized Language (1977) 24 Indonesia 1, Jan Prins, Adatlaw and Muslim Religious Law in Modern Indonesia: An Introduction (1951) 1 Die Wlt Des Islams For a discussion of the role of tokoh adat elsewhere in Indonesia, see Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra (1981) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism 117; Craig Thorburn, Adat Law, Conflict and Reconciliation: The Kei Islands, Southeast Maluku in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008) Lalu Muhammad Azhar and Lalu Muhammad Sholeh Tsalis, Tuan Guru Lopan: Waliyullah Dengan Kiprah dan Karomahnya (2003) Maria Platt, Sasak Women Navigating Dynamic Marital Continuums: Patriarchal Institutions and Female Agency in Indonesian Marriages (PhD Thesis, La Trobe University, 2010). 604 Interview with TGH Zainal Arifin (Jerneng, West Lombok, 28 August 2008). 142

161 wrongdoer. In other areas, they may not be allowed to attend community functions a social sanction that is potent in a communally-focused society. 605 This social isolation can go on for years; for instance, those from Kampung Lom who participated in the January 2000 riots are still ostracised. This means that they are not able to attend community functions or sit under the berugaq with the rest of the men. The powerful role of localised adat, as observed in Lom, is more than a set of rules, but a way to guide one s daily life and relationship with neighbours. Additionally, it provides a legitimate mechanism to reduce or resolve communal or political conflict. 606 An example of this will be considered in Chapter 5, with an analysis of a period of social tension and conflict in the West Lombok village of Bok. This consideration of adat leads into the next section about local community leaders, because these social processes rely upon influential figures mediating and guiding communal life, and consequently, conflict management frameworks. Local leadership The importance of local community leaders was obvious in Lom (and Bok). They are highly influential as they are able to communicate across their community effectively and lead by example. This section will consider their role and where they fit into conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok. During the January 2000 riots some communities of mixed ethnicity, consisting of Sasak and non-sasak residents, were able to protect each other. 607 This reflected cohesive social arrangements and strong leadership. When discussing close relationships and friendships in Lom, I am referring to the cooperation between Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom. The local level state leadership roles are shared between these two neighbouring areas. 608 The Kepala Rukun Tetangga (RT) oversees 605 Ibid. 606 Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 607 See Sukaraja Barat, Miniatur Kerukunan Antar Etnis, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 January 2000; Riyanto Rabbah, 171 Sebuah Catatan in Jeremy Kingsley and Abdul Wahid, Lombok: Menuju Masyarakat Multibudaya Conference Procedings (2007). 608 See Table 4.1 later in this chapter for further details about where the RT and RW fit within the governance hierachy (they are the lowest two levels). 143

162 Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom, while the Kepala Rukun Warga (RW) oversees the larger Lom community (this also includes Komplek Cina Lom). Every few years leaders from the two communities swap roles. At present the leader of the RW is from Kampung Lom (Sahnan) and the leader of the RT is from Komplek Lom (Arifin). The roles alternate between these two communities and leaders from each community are nominated according to this arrangement to fill these two positions. 609 Lom s communal leaders go together to life cycle events, such as births, weddings and deaths. Adat is said to play a dominant role in this approach, leading to an active and engaged communal leadership, based on respect and mutual benefit. 610 Komplek Cina Lom leaders play a less direct or influential role, acting predominantly as financiers, and supporting activities such as Lom s paid ronda. This means that the Komplek Cina Lom residents are not protected by social relationships, but would be alerted to problems by the paid ronda. Although, the paid ronda s ability to do more than alert people to problems is questionable. Conflict management in Lombok is like a spider s web, with a system of interconnected community and organisational networks (see Chapter 1). 611 In the last chapter, I considered non-state religious leaders, Tuan Guru, and their role as sociopolitical actors and creators of institution and spiritual networks. This section moves to an assessment of local community leaders and their intricate personal relationships within their communities. Leaders and their grassroots supporters create a web of relationships that are essential during times of social instability to avoid or resolve conflict, and importantly, to potentially shield people from violence. Leaders are described by John Paul Lederach as orb weavers, and act metaphorically as the spiders who weave the key strands of a social web. Their community then builds on these strands producing the intricate netting of relationships that is necessary for conflict management frameworks. 612 I have defined community leaders (tokoh masyarakat) broadly in this thesis as respected local leaders. 613 This is an intentionally ambiguous definition that covers 609 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 610 Ibid. 611 John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination The Art and Soul of Building Peace (2005) Ibid Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 16 August 2008). 144

163 a wide range of individuals. This thesis then divides communal leaders into two interrelated categories that are not always mutually exclusive. The first category covers non-state community leaders who, through their social standing, are recognised as authority figures within their neighbourhood or village. They do not necessarily have any official state function or role. The second category of leaders hold local government positions, such as Kepala RT or Kepala Desa see Table 4.1 below, which outlines the structure of the NTB provincial government. 614 They are on the lower rung of the government hierarchy in Lombok. Their role is less bureaucratic than other parts of the state and their function is more grassroots, making them potentially effective participants in conflict management. Common to both these categories is that these people work as local leaders within villages and neighbourhoods. They usually have similar personal backgrounds, for example that their parents were leaders, or that they are wealthy or educated (or a combination of all of these). 615 The categorisation used assumes a blurring between state and non-state leadership at this local level. Although there is overlap between state and non-state local leaders, it is the non-state players and institutions which are arguably still more relevant in relation to conflict management processes in local communities. For instance, pamswakarsa are more important in Lom s security arrangements than police (as highlighted later in this chapter). 614 Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008); Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). 615 Interview with Lalu Nurtaat (Mataram, 16 August 2008). 145

164 Level 1 Province (Provinsi): NTB Head: Governor (EO) Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 City (Kota) Head: Mayor (Walikota) (EO). 1. Mataram 2. Bima Kecamatan Head: Camat (AO, by Walikota) 1. Ampenan; 2. Mataram; 3. Cakranegera; 4. Sekorbela (established in 2007); 5. Sandubya (established in 2007). Kelurahan Head: Lurah (AO, by Walikota). Lingkungan Head: Kepala Lingkungan (Kaling) (AO, by Walikota). RW Rukun Warga Head: Kepala RW (approximately people). RT Rukun Tetangga Head: Kepala RT (approximately people). Regency (Kabupaten) Head: Bupati (EO). 1. West Lombok; 2. Central Lombok; 3. East Lombok; 4. West Sumbawa; 5. Sumbawa; 6. Dompu; 7. Bima; 8. North Lombok (established in 2008). Kecamatan Head: Camat (AO, by Bupati) There are 16 Kecamatan in West Lombok. Desa Head: Kepala Desa (EO). West Lombok has approximately 125 Desa. Dusun Head: Kepala Dusun (EO). Desa Bok has six dusun. RW Rukun Warga Head: Kepala RW. RT Rukun Tetangga Head: Kepala RT. Table 4.1 NTB government structure 2008 Abbreviations: EO means Elected Official ; AO means Appointed Official. Local leadership plays an important role in reinforcing relationships between Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom. The personality of leaders also has a significant influence on the operation of their communities. When discussing leadership during an interview with Arifin, the Kepala RT, he emphasised the important role of the Kepala RT, RW and Lingkungan, the three lowest rungs of the governance structure in Indonesia. They were not merely government officials, but also social facilitators he said. Arifin felt that these leaders provided an informal local touch to the activities of government. 616 He felt that these levels of government were the most responsive to the community. Kampung Lom resident, Sahnan, who was the Kepala RW told me that the most influential local player was the Kepala Lingkungan, Sani, who came from a kampung adjoining Lom. 617 The reason that he was so effective was that people were afraid of him and his powerful personality acted as a deterrent to 616 Interview with Arifin (Mataram, 16 October 2007). 617 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). The importance of the Kepala Lingkungan was also discussed in other interviews; see Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 146

165 misbehaviour, or outsiders taking advantage of Lom. 618 It was not made explicit as why people were afraid of him, but possibly his official position as Kepala Lingkungan and role as local Amphibi head, created an aura of ruthlessness. This was reinforced by Sani himself when he told me that if people tried to steal or disregarded local adat that he would have no hesitation in beating them up. 619 The effectiveness of these leaders thus emerges not just from title, but also from their communal activities and personalities. Even though there is a blurring of state and non-state roles, tensions can arise between local communities and state institutions such as the police. When the police act unilaterally they can cause social unease within a community and potentially create further problems. For instance, in 1999 there was a conflict between two Lombok villages Penujak, West Lombok, and Ketara, Central Lombok which the communities themselves resolved. 620 However, in the aftermath the police raided Penujak, making two arrests in relation to the clashes between these two villages. According to newspaper reports, these raids were part of the police efforts to hunt down provocateurs within the two communities. 621 This raid angered both communities because they perceived the issue to have been resolved. Additionally, many residents were distressed by the polices actions and felt frightened to return to their homes. 622 Consequently police behaviour, rather than being a constructive aspect of conflict management, in this situation became a point of tension, which led community leaders to hold discussions with members of the provincial parliament. 623 Without question, police can play an important role within the maintenance of social harmony in Lombok, but this should be done in coordination with local communal leaders, otherwise their actions may simply make matters worse. Disputes in Lombok are resolved by combining state and non-state leadership and organisations, rather than unilateral action. An example of this will be considered in Chapter 5. The next section moves from the role of local community leaders to investigate relationships within and between communities. 618 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 619 Interview with Sani (Mataram, 29 November 2007). 620 Lagi, Sesepuh Sorot Tindakan Polisi, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 31 April Tersanhka Kasus Penujak Jadi Enam Orang, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 April Warga Trauma dan Tidak Berani Pulang, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 26 April Ibid. 147

166 Communal relationships The importance of mutual benefit They were our friends If you know and like people you will look after them no matter their religion or ethnic background. Santi, a 27 year-old Sasak women living in Mataram. 624 Relationships create an important foundation for conflict management as the quote above suggests. Points of communal engagement and friendship allow for communication that can overcome problems and protect people in times of crisis. Pendeta (Reverend) Hasanema explained the importance of communal relationships using the example of the former NTB Deputy Governor, Thamrin Rayes, who ran a youth program focused on bringing children from various ethnic and religious communities together to meet and learn. This, Hasanema said, allows participating youths to meet people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, hopefully leading to longer term friendships. Hasanema hoped that these relationships would protect people in times of trouble and social instability. 625 High levels of cooperation and engagement are at the heart of the relationship between Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom. 626 The positives that emerge out of this relationship are both tangible and intangible. These two communities provide each other with mutual benefits, and as a consequence, they believe that this implies a responsibility to one and another. 627 The relationships are based on accepting the differences between people from the two communities. People from the komplek are middle-class Indonesians, many of whom have office jobs that demand reasonably long hours of work. This means they are not as involved in community affairs as residents of the kampung who often have more time to dedicate to these activities Field notes, 16 April Interview with Pendeta Hasanema (Mataram, 12 December 2007). 626 Field notes, 22 November Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 628 Interview with Achand (Mataram, 6 August 2008). 148

167 Picture 4.6 Multi-purpose recreational area which hosts many community activities in Lom Mutual benefit in Lom is based on three elements, which community leaders felt formed the basis of Lom s adat. First, friendship underpins communal relationships, for example, by sharing celebrations. Second, finances and work are used to bind the community together. Many kampung residents are employed in Komplek Lom, for example, in people s homes as domestic helpers (pembantu) and caretakers, or by residents of the komplek at their businesses. This sort of employment also leads to pseudo-familial relationships. The final element is that at times of emergency people in these two communities look after each other. For instance, when people from the kampung need, but cannot afford, medical treatment people from Komplek Lom often pay for them to go to hospital. This reflects a sense of social obligation towards their less affluent neighbours. These relationships are reciprocated. For example, during the January 2000 riots, the komplek residents found refuge in the kampung until they could be evacuated. 629 Therefore, these relationships are not just symbolic, but are also based on practical mutual benefit. However, these communal relationships and this reciprocity are not extended to the Indonesian Chinese in Komplek Cina Lom. When undertaking research it is easy focus on the big issues and forget the more basic aspects of daily life, yet these have very great social force. For instance, when sitting around one night in the berugaq discussing local politics with several men 629 Interview with Zey (Mataram, 3 October 2007); Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007); Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 149

168 from Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom it dawned on me that this was a very natural and normal friendship. It showed bonds that were real, and in many ways, more effective than high fences or the police. 630 People from Kampung Lom often said to me that they do not care about intellectual concepts, such as multiculturalism, but they would do anything to look after their friends, whether they are from Komplek Lom or Kampung Lom, and regardless of whether they were Muslim, Hindu or Christian. 631 The engagement between these two parts of Lom needs to be continually worked upon. I remember watching the preparations for Indonesian Independence Day celebrations in Over 200 people attended this event giving it not just a festive air, but also providing sustenance to the relationship between the kampung and the komplek. The communities nominated two of their most energetic youths to organise the event, Zey (from Kampung Lom) and Finna (from Komplek Lom). These two young women, both in their early 20s, acted as joint leaders of a team comprising people from both communities. They arranged a full day of events for the children and then a performance in the evening. Leading this event together, Zey and Finna became firm friends and helped unite their communities. 632 An important point of communication in Lom is their weekly community meetings. These mushawara are one of the methods for creating positive communal relationships and allowing effective communication. 633 This is a community meeting for the RT (comprising of both Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom) and is usually held in this RT once a week. It allows people to voice their problems and give vent to emotions before these turn to anger. Community leaders are important at this stage to ensure that things stay calm and constructive. The mushawara also discusses practical issues of community concern, for example, the renovation of the masjid or management of the paid ronda. 634 The communal situation in Lom, up until this point, has been described as generally positive. This reflects the relationship between Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom. 630 Field notes, 6 August Interview with Tika (Mataram, 17 October 2007). 632 Field notes, 31 July 2008 and 19 August Chapter 5 considers the use of a mushawara as part of the conflict management process in Bok. 634 Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 150

169 However, the situation in relation to their neighbour Komplek Cina Lom is a different predicament altogether. This komplek does not really form part of the relational networks shared by the two other parts of Lom, nor do most of the members of the komplek feel protected by it. 635 Most of the residents of Komplek Cina Lom are, in fact, alienated from the rest of Lom. This is even though many Indonesian Chinese residents of Lom have lived in the area for several generations. They are, by and large, still seen as newcomers. 636 Also, they are perceived as being exclusive and uninterested in engaging with their neighbours. This alleged exclusivity of Indonesian Chinese more generally has, unfortunately, led to a history of violence against them. 637 These negative perceptions are connected to the administrative techniques of Dutch colonial authorities, 638 which regulated social affairs by providing ethnic groups with carefully defined and limited spheres of influence. 639 This process empowered Chinese traders and gave them economic advantage the result of which continues to this day, and perpetuates stereotypes of their exclusivity. 640 The isolation and perceived exclusivity of many Indonesian Chinese in Mataram and West Lombok is a partly self-fulfilling prophecy. When visiting Gereja ROCK (Representative of Christ s Kingdom), a charismatic church popular with Mataram s Chinese community, I discussed with a friend, Tomi, his children s education. He confided that he did not feel comfortable sending them to a government school and sent them to a private school instead. He told me about the poor quality of the government schools, but when I pressed him further on this, he said that he felt his children wouldn t be fully accepted by other students and teachers. This sentiment was replicated in other conversations that I had with Indonesian Chinese residents of Mataram. Many do not feel part of mainstream Lombok society. 641 Jemma Purdey has highlighted this social isolation saying that there is an ongoing need to acknowledge 635 Interview with Meme (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 636 Interview with Kong (Mataram, 12 November 2007); Field notes, 9 January Masyhuri, Bakar Pecinan! Konflik Pribumi v Cina di Kudus Tahun 1918 (2006). 638 Daniel S. Lev, Colonial Law and The Genesis of the Indonesian State (1985) 40 Indonesia 57, Charles A. Coppel, Historical Impediments to the Acceptance of Ethnic Chinese in a Multicultural Indonesia in Leo Suryadinata, Chinese Indonesians State Police, Monoculture and Multiculture (2004) James R. Rush, Opium to Java Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia (1990) Field notes, 17 March

170 the fact that ethnic Chinese are still marked as different and other in Indonesia and as such remain highly vulnerable. 642 The social isolation of Indonesian Chinese from the mainstream and their perceived unwillingness to assimilate means that they are commonly labelled with negative attributes. 643 This allows for antagonism and the creation of stereotypes that further reinforce their isolation. 644 This creates a vicious circular logic, whereby through fear of violence and anti-chinese sentiments, Indonesian Chinese separate themselves from the mainstream society, thus contributing to notions of Chinese exclusivity which further fuel anti-chinese sentiments. The Chinese caution is not without foundation, as the violence of the late 1990s in Jakarta against the Indonesian Chinese showed. Jacques Bertrand has bluntly observed that hundreds were killed. Dozens of Chinese women were raped. 645 The Indonesian Chinese of Mataram are well aware of this violence. The relative wealth of Indonesian Chinese further fuels perceptions of their otherness. In an impoverished island, such as Lombok, economic jealousy can strengthen barriers between the local Sasak and their affluent neighbours. This is reinforced, for example in Komplek Cina Lom, 646 with people living in large houses behind high fences. 647 The antagonism projected towards Indonesian Chinese and their decision to live behind high fences is therefore part of a self-fulfilling, but understandable, vicious cycle Jemma Purdey, Political Change Reopening the Asimilasi vs Integrasi Debate: Ethnic Chinese Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2003) 4 Asian Ethnicity 421, Charles Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (1983) 4. The Indonesian Chinese community s fragile status is also discussed in Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (eds), Chinese Indonesians Remembering, Distorting and Forgetting (2005). 644 Ibid Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (2004) The economic jealousies that can boil over were discussed by James Siegel in relation to the Indonesian city of Solo s social disturbances of the early 1980s. See James T. Siegel, Solo in the New Order Language and Hierarchy in an Indonesian City (1986) Most wealthy Indonesians live behind high fences. The issue is that in Lom, the Indonesian Chinese are the only ones who do so. 648 There are some areas of Mataram where the Indonesian Chinese have created close relationships with their neighbours, but these are exceptional situations. During the January 2000 riots these communities protected their Chinese neighbours - see Sukaraja Barat, Miniatur Kerukunan Antar Etnis, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 27 January

171 The social isolation of this minority has also been observed elsewhere in Indonesia where the Indonesian Chinese community tends to segregate itself socially and residentially, a behavior they [other Indonesians] see as an arrogant expression of feelings of superiority. 649 In Komplek Cina Lom, the high fences and razor wire feed the notion of their perceived superiority and suspicion of their neighbours. Yet, ironically it is these security mechanisms that alienate them from the wider Lom community and deny them access from more communal forms of security and relational protections. This was seen during the January 2000 riots, when the Komplek Cina Lom residents were not provided shelter in the kampung and had to be evacuated under police protection. The police did not arrive for several days. They were therefore extremely vulnerable to attack by the rioters. 650 Picture 4.7 The physical seperation is visible in Komplek Cina Lom On top of these physical impediments, it seemed that there was little if any contact between residents of Komplek Cina Lom and their neighbours in Lom. In fact, I had great difficulty trying to make contact with members of this komplek myself in order to explore their perspectives on living in Lom and being Indonesian Chinese in Mataram. When I asked people from Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom to introduce me to their neighbours they too found it challenging, because they did not have ongoing friendships with them. I know of only a few practical connections, such as 649 Mély G. Tan, The Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Role of Ethnic Chinese in Indonesian Society (1991) 51 Indonesia 113, Interview with Benny (Mataram, 30 October 2007). 153

172 those forged by assisting with the financing of the paid ronda. Beyond this arrangement, Komplek Cina Lom has limited contact with the two other communities. 651 This distinct and separate social position fed into stereotypes about them it is easier to ridicule someone you do not know. 652 Eventually, people from Kampung Lom arranged for me to talk with Meme from Komplek Cina Lom. It was an extremely difficult and tense meeting. She specifically requested that her identity be kept secret, even though this had already been promised. This was the only time in my fieldwork that someone was so protective of their anonymity. She appeared very anxious about discussing relationships and friendships within Lom and would not talk about the January 2000 riots at all. Eventually the interview was terminated after about 20 minutes as she was too uncomfortable. The interview reflected the sensitivity of her social position. Interestingly, she said that residents of Komplek Cina Lom did not talk much amongst themselves; she felt there was little or no sense of community. 653 The only other Komplek Cina Lom interview I had was an easier experience. This interview was with elderly resident, Kong, who talked openly of feeling sensitive about his social position. Consequently, he kept in regular contact with the kampung leader, Sahnan, the Kepala RW. He recognised that without this relationship he would be in trouble if there was ever a repetition of the January 2000 riots. 654 A time of riots Testing a community s resolve The cornerstones of local conflict management in Lom adat, leadership, relationships and strong community have been considered in the previous parts of this chapter. These issues will now be put into practical context by investigating how Lom dealt with the January 2000 riots and its aftermath. The violence of January 2000 in Mataram and West Lombok was tragic, according to Lom s Tuan Guru Lokal 651 Field notes, 22 October Stereotyping between ethnic and religious groups has historically been an issue across the Indonesian archipelago. The difficulty in managing the problems and conflict emerging from this activity has been discussed in Suwarsih Warnaen, Stereotip Etnis Dalam Masyarakat Multietnis (2002). 653 Interview with Meme (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 654 Interview with Kong (Mataram, 12 November 2007). 154

173 Ramli, but he was proud of the way that community members had generally looked after one another. 655 It was not just the residents of Kampung Lom who were proactive, but also Muslim residents of Komplek Lom. Mukhsin, a Muslim living in Komplek Lom, told me how his home had become a storage facility for the belongings of his non-muslim neighbours, with his living room decorated with a whole wall of televisions. 656 This protection of property was organised by local leaders to make sure that if anything happened to the non-muslim residents homes, such as being burnt down or ransacked by the rioters, at least their personal possessions would be protected. 657 In Mataram and West Lombok people can become vulnerable if they do not have the protection of their neighbours. This position is obviously more precarious during periods of social tension and violence. For instance, there was limited police protection for Lom residents. One Kampung Lom resident, Tika, said that during the January 2000 riots two trucks of Brimob (police paramilitary mobile brigades) came to Lom on the fourth or fifth day of the riots. This was well after the trouble had started and when, according to Tika, the situation had already calmed down. Interestingly, they only went to Komplek Cina Lom. 658 Tika did not really say why this occurred, but the way that I read his body language implied that this was the only area that the police cared about protecting, or given the history of police corruption, it is conceivable that the police were paid to come. 659 This was despite looting and fires occurring in Komplek Lom. 660 Several homes of non-muslim residents in Komplek Lom were looted or set ablaze. It was believed that some of the kampung residents who had been participating in the riots must have identified these homes. This is why when those who had joined in the rioting were caught returning to the kampung they were arrested by the community and given a severe beating. The reason for this sharp response was not just their 655 Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008). 656 Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 657 Field notes, 25 May Interview with Tika (Mataram, 17 October 2007). 659 The accusation that the police only protected those living in Komplek Cina Lom was also noted by Ida Interview with Ida (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 660 Field notes, 17 October

174 participation in the riots, but perhaps more importantly, they challenged the local leadership and adat by ignoring the social relationships between these two communities. After the beating, those who participated in the riots were detained in a vacant building on the outskirts of Lom until collected by police. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, they were then taken to prison, and held without charge, in accordance with the request of Kampung Lom s leadership. This imprisonment was intended to make them cool down. 661 As has been noted, these kampung residents are still ostracised from communal spaces and are not welcome at community festivities. Some ambivalence exists in Lom regarding the events of January There was a broad range of observations about how people responded to these events. 662 To me it felt like there was a Rashomon effect in operation a situation where different participants recollections of events diverge greatly. 663 This is not surprising, given that during times of fear and anxiety events are often experienced subjectively, and therefore recounted in contradictory ways. 664 Initially, when visiting Lom many of the communal leaders would tell me how positively Lom had operated during the January 2000 riots, painting an almost romantic picture. However, the reality was more confused. 665 For instance, during an interview with Ida, a member of Komplek Lom, she told me that this depiction of people from the kampung defending Lom from the marauding rioters was exaggerated. The situation was both positive and negative. Kampung residents and Muslims from the komplek helped to protect the personal belongings of their non-muslim neighbours and brought them into the kampung until they were able to be safely evacuated. At the same time, many kampung residents fled to central and eastern Lombok. Additionally, the people who were attempting to protect Lom were unable to stop several houses from Komplek Lom being vandalised, looted and even burnt down Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 662 Field notes, 30 October See Karl G. Heider, The Rashomon Effect: When Ethnographers Disagree (1988) 90 American Anthropologist Mike Sugimoto, The Fifty-Year War: Rashomon, After Life, and Japanese Film Narratives of Remembering (2003) 7 Japan Studies Review 1, Field notes, 24 October Interview with Ida (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 156

175 Despite these multiple and competing narratives one point is clear relationships are vital for personal safety. Residents of Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom looked after each other during these violent events, 667 while those in Komplek Cina Lom were cutoff from the rest of the area and waited anxiously for Brimob to arrive before being evacuated. 668 The benefits of this relationship between these two areas was highlighted with non-muslims from Komplek Lom being given refugee in the kampung s musholla (small Muslim prayer house) until they were evacuated see Picture 4.8 below. 669 The seperation of Komplek Cina Lom heightened the potential for serious attacks to have occurred, because they were not protected in a revered space like a musholla or masjid. These are protected sanctuaries that I doubt Sasak would have attacked, given the importance of Islam for this ethnic group (see Chapter 3). Picture 4.8 Kampung Lom s musholla where Komplek Lom residents were given sanctuary There was real trauma caused to the non-muslim residents of Lom. Dewi, from Komplek Lom, told me that before the 2000 riots there were five protestant families who lived in the komplek but now there are only one or two. She returned to Lom from her family s home in Bali six months after the riots, but only because her 667 Interview with Benny (Mataram, 30 October 2007). 668 This precarious position was noted by elderly Indonesian Chinese resident of Komplek Cina Lom, Kong, see Interview with Kong (Mataram, 12 November 2007). 669 Interview with Jupri (Mataram, 9 November 2007). 157

176 husband had to return to his job in Mataram. 670 Her anxiety was clearly visible in our interview while she recounted her experiences of these events. 671 Despite these anxieties, she felt that Lom was a safe and strong community. She would prefer to live in Lom than other parts of Mataram, because of the strong relationships between Komplek Lom and Kampung Lom. 672 Ida, another resident of Komplek Lom, despite also being scared during these riots, told me that their community was based on close personal relationships between people from these two parts of Lom. These firm personal bonds gave her a real sense of security, because she felt that people from the kampung would protect her if ever she were threatened. 673 This troubled period brought many members of Kampung Lom and Komplek Lom together to work on their community s security arrangements, such as introducing a paid ronda. The next section will investigate the rationale for, and responsibilities of, the paid ronda, as well as the role of pamswakarsa in this part of Mataram. Local security measures Paid ronda and pamswakarsa The social, political and economic instability around the turn of the century, including the January 2000 riots and the perceived crime wave, 674 presented many challenges to Lom. As a consequence the community leadership felt that additional local security measures were necessary. 675 A paid ronda (night watch) reflects the most significant official community response in Lom to the January 2000 riots. This night watch involves seven guards patrolling Lom every night in shifts that start at 11pm and continue until morning prayers. 676 If anything untoward occurs, the members of the night watch will alert the community by striking a kul-kul (drum made from bamboo or wood which is struck to sound an alarm) Interview with Dewi (Mataram, 19 October 2007). 671 Field notes, 23 October Interview with Dewi (Mataram, 19 October 2007). 673 Interview with Ida (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 674 Stein Kristiansen, Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia: The Cases of Yogyakarta and Nusa Tenggara Barat (2003) 18 Sojourn 110, Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007); Interview with Arifin (Mataram, 16 October 2007); Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007). 676 Field notes, 16 October Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007). 158

177 As the quote suggests at the start of this chapter local people do not obtain a sense of security from the police. Rather, the people in Lom rely upon the paid ronda, and discussed later the pamswakarsa, to obtain a sense of personal and property safety. These two community security mechanisms underpin the local security arrangements. 678 The covert nature of the pamswakarsa will also be considered. The paid ronda initiative emerged for two reasons. First, it allowed for a more secure community, preventing criminal activity, such as theft. It was also believed that this would be the first line of defence for Lom if riots were to happen again. 679 Second, the creation of a paid ronda allowed for the employment of Kampung Lom residents and this assisted the community financially. 680 Once again, this highlights a situation of mutual benefit in Lom. The paid ronda is an eclectic group of people who do not seem to fit any particular age, physical or educational criteria. The only discernable requirements for participation was that they be male and from Kampung Lom. Unlike the satpam (private security) at Mataram Mall or other commercial facilities, the members of the paid ronda are not necessarily young or physically strong. They range in age from their early-30s to mid-60s and they were in various states of physical fitness, with two of them having obvious disabilities (such as blindness in one eye or walking with a limp). Educationally, two of the paid ronda members had not attended school at all, and only one had finished high school. 681 The physical abilities of those employed in the paid ronda helps explain the limitation of its role to primarily act as a first-warning for the community, while satpam are usually expected to be in good physical shape and able to respond effectively to problems in the area they are protecting. Therefore, the nature of this group is more like a night watch with salary, rather than a professional security service.this explains my decision to call them a paid ronda rather than satpam The use of non-government militia, and the like, was a historical feature of Dutch Colonial East Indies and the early period of the Indonesian Republic see Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People s Militia and the Indonesian Revolution (1991). 679 Interview with Ida (Mataram, 23 October 2007). 680 Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007). 681 Field notes, 14 November Ibid. 159

178 Alongside the paid ronda, pamswakarsa are also as an important element in the security arrangements of Lom. This is primarily because most of the paid ronda guards are also members of pamswakarsa. These community security groups have played an important role in other parts of Lombok in relation to law enforcement during the recent period of social instability in the late 1990s, and are still operative (see Chapter 2). However, establishing the presence and activities of pamswakarsa in Lom was initially difficult. Some of the communal leadership, Arifin, Sahnan and Sani, were adamant that pamswakarsa have never played a role in Lom, although this was clearly untrue. 683 The rationale for these leaders denial of pamswakarsa activity in Lom was difficult to understand. Maybe they thought that I wouldn t be favourably inclined to such groups. They were also trying to convince me that pamswakarsa were not needed in their community, because they had harmonious relationships among themselves and outsiders were scared to challenge them. 684 One leader, Sahnan, told me that he knew all the local thieves and had talked them out of coming near Lom. 685 Whatever the reason, they did not want to convey the perception that pamswakarsa are needed in their community. 686 In fact, the contrary is true, pamswakarsa are active and the community s leaders are well aware of this. Far from not being involved, according to several Lom residents, Lom s leaders were actually the coordinators of pamswakarsa activities. Sani, the Kepala Lingkungan, is allegedly the local Amphibi leader. 687 Despite this, during our interview Sani denied that Amphibi was active or that he was this group s local leader. 688 An alternative reason for the denial of pamswakarsa operation among leaders in Lom was public debate over the past decade in Lombok about the utility of such community security groups. The links between pamswakarsa and criminal activity which has led many leading figures to call for them to be 683 Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007); Interview with Arifin (Mataram, 16 October 2007); Interview with Sani (Mataram, 29 November 2007). 684 Field notes, 17 October Interview with Sahnan (Mataram, 15 October 2007). 686 Field notes, 17 October Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007). This was confirmed during a later interview Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008). 688 Interview with Sani (Mataram, 29 November 2007). 160

179 banned may also explain Lom leaders reticence to acknowledge their involvement with these groups. This denial of any pamswakarsa presence was quickly dispelled by a number of Lom residents. One kampung resident, Zey, suggested that pamswakarsa had been active for a long time. 689 Another kampung resident, Tika, told me that two pamswakarsa, Amphibi and Lang-Lang, were still active in Lom. He also pointed out that almost all the paid ronda members were also pamswakarsa members. 690 While most of the paid ronda were members of pamswakarsa, this is not a prerequisite either officially or unofficially. Involvement in these community security groups is a matter of personal choice. Two members of Lom s paid ronda, Saonah and Sahari, are not affiliated to a pamswakarsa. The other five are affiliated to either Amphibi or Lang-Lang (see Pictures 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11). The two who are not members of either of these pamswakarsa told me that there are a number of disincentives to becoming involved with them. For instance, a reasonably large membership fee of Rp.150,000 (just under $AU 20) 691 was required when signing-up to Amphibi (this covered uniform and pamswakarsa identification card). An additional fee is payable each month, which is Rp5000 (payable to the area captain the Kepala Lingkungan, Sani). 692 Saonah argued that this membership fee is like a pyramid scheme in that the rewards to members were not great, but that the leaders become rich from membership contributions. 693 He also noted that there was no specific training available for pamswakarsa members in Lom or strong connections with near-by groups. 694 Meanwhile, Sahari felt that membership in these groups was unnecessary as the paid ronda looked after the community s safety and security. 695 None of the watchmen were concerned with past reports of violence or misbehaviour by members of these groups Field notes, 16 October Interview with Tika (Mataram, 17 October 2007). 691 This was a significant fee for someone from the Kampung and could amount to several weeks wages for them. 692 Interview with Jupri (Mataram, 9 November 2007); from Zey to Jeremy Kingsley, 7 June Interview with Saonah (Mataram, 7 November 2007). 694 Ibid. 695 Interview with Sahari (Mataram, 11 November 2007). 696 Field notes, 16 October

180 Picture 4.9 Kampung Lom paid ronda member in Amphibi uniform Picture 4.10 Kampung Lom paid ronda member in Lang-Lang uniform In contrast, the remaining five paid ronda members saw their membership of pamswakarsa not just as being practically important to their role as night watchmen, but also a source of pride. It was considered to be an affirmation of their Sasak identity. 697 Their enthusiasm could be seen with the desire to wear their pamswakarsa 697 Field notes, 10 November Similar declarations of ethnic identity have been highlighted in other parts of Indonesia, for instance the Betawi Brotherhood Forum. Their leader, Fadloli el-muhir, said The first step we need to take post-new Order is to raise our heads, to stop cowering and take pride in our ethnicity. Cited in Ian Douglas Wilson, Continuity and Change: the Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia (2006) 38 Critical Asian Studies 265,

181 uniforms at the time they were being interviewed. They all did this without invitation from me their smile when wearing the bright orange windbreaker of Amphibi or a Lang-Lang t-shirt demonstrated their pride in their membership of these groups. 698 Paid ronda member Ciman stressed his pride in being connected with Amphibi, which he saw as directly allied to his sense of Sasak identity. Amphibi showed him how the Sasak could look after themselves and the people they cared for. 699 These Sasak assertions of ethnic identity and pride are noteworthy considering the lengthy history of their preference for non-state forms of authority and control (see Chapters 2 and 3). Picture 4.11 Identity card for Amphibi member from paid ronda in Lom [anonymity protected] The debate about whether to be a pamswakarsa member or not took an interesting twist when I interviewed Tumi, who was a member of not just one pamswakarsa, but two both Amphibi and Lang-Lang. When I asked him why he was a member of two competing pamswakarsa he was surprised that I would think there could be conflict between these two allegiances. Considering the intense rivalry among these groups (see Chapter 2), I too was a little bewildered, although for different reasons. For Tumi the divergent political connections and affiliations of these groups were irrelevant, as both aimed to protect his community. This was interesting, as his argument seemingly had an internal contradiction. His membership to Lang-Lang arose because of its particular and direct political linkage to Mataram Mayor, Ruslan, who Tumi saw as an 698 Field notes, 8 and 14 November Interview with Ciman (Mataram, 8 November 2007). The pride in self-reliance regarding Lom s security was also raised by Jupri see Interview with Jupri (Mataram, 9 November 2007). 163

182 inspiration. 700 Yet this meant that if there was a political conflict between Amphibi and Lang-Lang he could be placed into a compromised position. These security groups, although emphasising crime prevention, also have political connections, and therefore, membership of two groups could see someone in a awkward position with loyalties divided between the two groups. As was noted before, pamswakarsa have been known to battle each other (see Chapter 2) and I doubt that either of these groups would be happy with Tumi having dual membership. There are operational motivations for paid ronda members to have connections to pamswakarsa. For instance, if a guard is affiliated to Amphibi, then if they experienced trouble with thieves or the like they could (according to Subuh) call upon Amphibi members from nearby areas for assistance. This reinforces the ronda s role as first warning with backup coming from others, such as pamswakarsa, although, Subuh was not able to give any examples of pamswakarsa actually being called upon. 701 More specific explanations of the operational practices of the night watch was provided by Ciman. He said that they would use adat if they caught a thief or wrongdoer. When he referred to adat processes being used this seemed to imply the use of swift justice with the alleged criminal being beaten up. In relation to theft, he told me that whether they used state law or adat processes would depend on whether the person was, in his words, considered to be a small thief or a big thief. From Ciman s perspective a small thief was someone who attempted to steal a t-shirt or the like. On the other hand, a big thief was someone who attempted to steal a motorbike or something of more significant value. This was an elastic categorisation that left significant room for discretion by the ronda and community leadership. Those considered a big thief would be handed over to the police. Those deemed to be a small thief would be dealt with according to adat. This involved taking them to a vacant house close to the edge of the kampung where the paid ronda and community leaders would teach them a lesson (read: give them a beating). Ciman said that the 700 Interview with Tumi (Mataram, 12 November 2007). 701 Interview with Subuh (Mataram, 6 November 2007). 164

183 aim of this approach was to show them the error of their ways and dissuade others considering such activities. 702 The reason that they would hand a big thief over to the police rather than handling it in-house was unclear and Ciman could not, in fact, remember the paid ronda ever handing anyone over to the police, although he noted that there were several smaller thieves in recent years whom had been dealt with by the watchmen and communal leaders. The lessons seem to have been learnt by these wrongdoers and they did not return to Lom to participate in criminal activities. 703 This non-repetition of wrongdoing is likely to be connected to the shame attached to being caught and receiving a severe beating. Stigma has been found to have significant social resonance in Sasak society. 704 Conclusion Picture 4.12 View of Lom from the fields This chapter has documented the intricacy of social processes and adat practices that guide communal leadership and communities in Lom, and Mataram and West Lombok more broadly. Lom is a community that has obvious strengths and weaknesses. Elaborate networks within and between communities form a web of 702 Interview with Ciman (Mataram, 8 November 2007). 703 Ibid. The beating of thieves who are caught by members of the local community was also discussed by others who noted that it was used as a lesson or warning to the wrongdoer and potential criminals. See Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 704 The use of shame within Sasak society is discussed in Linda Rae Bennett, Women, Islam and Modernity Single Women, Sexuality and Reproductive Health in Contemporary Indonesia (2005). 165

184 relationships that provide personal and property security. There are also potential points of weakness within these networks, such as the detrimental affects of stereotyping and the problems that individuals or communities face when they are outside these relational protections. This was most starkly reflected in Komplek Cina Lom. Lom s leadership was aware that additional measures were necessary during and after the tumultuous period of social, political and economic instability during the late 1990s and early part of this century. They therefore created a paid ronda which patrol Lom every night and acts as a first-warning system for the community against criminals or rioters. Most of the night watchmen are also members of pamswakarsa, which has symbolic and operational consequences. This chapter also highlights the limited role of state law enforcement agencies in these local security arrangements. The next chapter outlines two case studies placing the material so far presented in the thesis into context. The first case study in Chapter 5 involves the coordination of state and non-state actors in order to avoid election-related violence during the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections. The second case study considers a West Lombok village, Bok, which went through a period of social and political instability that threatened to spiral into serious violence. 166

185 Chapter 5 The art of conflict management Avoiding and resolving conflict we needed to cool our emotions conflicts will not make us happy Satriawan, Mataram Electoral Commission Member. 705 Satriawan explains in simple terms the futility of communal and political violence in Lombok. The dangers of this violence and the importance of social harmony are messages commonly communicated by local religious leaders. TGH Sofwan Hakim regularly warns his santri (students) that becoming involved with violence is not just in principle wrong, but also something that can have terrible and unexpected consequences. One may think that they are just burning down a church in a symbolic statement of Muslim identity, and they may have some personal rationalisation for this, but what happens next could be unexpectedly tragic. Hakim asks, what if there is a little child locked in the church, or if the spark leads to a fire that devastates a nearby kampung? He maintains that violence is not to be played with, nor is it an effective political tool. 706 The two case studies investigated in this chapter highlight examples of the avoidance and resolution of political and communal violence in Lombok. The first case study investigates the strategy implemented by senior provincial government figures to avoid potential conflict during the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections. During the campaign and in the lead up to the elections, state officials cooperated closely with non-state religious leaders, Tuan Guru, to create an atmosphere designed to prevent political competition between ethnic groups and political interests turning violent. This approach was conceived due to several outbreaks of political and ethnically- 705 Asrori S. Karni, Roots of Tolerance Sprang Out from the Ashes of Conflict in Asrori S. Karni, A Celebration of Democracy A Journalistic Portrayal of Indonesia s 2004 Direct Elections Amongst Moderate and Hardline Muslims (2006) Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 167

186 related violence during election periods in Lombok since They were determined to avoid a repetition of these past events. The second case study reviews a serious period of social instability and demonstrations that affected the West Lombok village of Bok during July During this time, there were serious allegations against a village official that led to demonstrations which threatened to explode into violence. This example reflects the methods deployed successfully and unsuccessfully by local state and non-state leadership to bring these village tensions to a peaceful resolution. The strength of the conflict management processes that I observed while in the field is that they are fluid and adaptable to circumstances. The examples of conflict management identified in this chapter are not about idealised visions of Sasak identity or adat, 708 but rather are about deploying techniques which utilise local leadership and social processes congruent with local realities. 709 When discussing idealised versions of Sasak adat or identity, what is being acknowledged is the recreation for political purposes of a reified version of Sasak ethnicity. This has emerged, to a degree, with political manoeuvring during the decentralisation of political power over the past decade. 710 However, as has been noted, this thesis considers adat as the localised social patterns of behaviour and expectations, guided by local community and religious leaders. These localised approaches have been used effectively in the case studies of conflict management in this chapter. They operate efficiently and with high- 707 Bok is a village in West Lombok and has been de-identified in accordance with the requirements of the University of Melbourne Ethics Committee for this research. Accordingly, all names in the second case study are pseudonyms. 708 This politicisation of Sasak adat has been discussed in several articles, see Leena Avonius, Reforming Wetu Telu: Islam, Adat, and the Promises of Regionalism in Post-New Order Lombok (2004); Leena Avonius, Reforming Adat Indonesian Indigenous People in the era of Reformasi (2004) 4 The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 123; Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia < at 1 May For discussion of adat and conflict management processes elsewhere in Indonesia, see Greg Acciaioli, Grounds of Conflict, Idioms of Harmony: Custom, Religion, and Nationalism in Violence Avoidance at the Lindu Plain, Central Sulawesi (2001) 72 Indonesia 81; Craig Thorburn, Musibah: Governance, Intercommunal Violence and Reinventing Tradition in the Kei Islands, Southeast Maluku (Working Paper No. 125, Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 2005); Craig Thorburn, Adat Law, Conflict and Reconciliation: The Kei Islands, Southeast Maluku in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008). 710 See Kendra Clegg, Ethnic Stereotyping by Local Politicians in Lombok Fails to Please All (2004) Inside Indonesia < at 1 May

187 levels of social legitimacy. In periods of state weakness, a partnership between state and non-state actors means that even if judicial processes or policing are weakened, social harmony does not disappear, although it may become more precarious. The next section provides an example of this kind of partnership. Case study Provincial elections and the power of partnerships Ethnic tensions and political violence in Lombok Early on the morning of 21 July 2003, a police cordon surrounded the provincial legislative buildings in Mataram. This protective barrier marked the first-ever legislative elections for NTB Governor. The local political elite were being given an opportunity to select the provincial governor. The police commanders were concerned that the supporters of rival candidates who were rallying outside the legislative buildings would clash, and that the compound would be stormed. These concerns were proven correct, in part at least, with fights occurring between the supporters of rival gubernatorial candidates. 711 The incident above, along with several other incidents of political conflict that will soon be discussed, provided the rationale for provincial authorities developing a conflict avoidance strategy for the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections. The first direct election of provincial governor precipitated concerns that an outbreak of politicallymotivated violence could occur. Consequently, the provincial intelligence department, Kesbanglinmas, 712 was delegated the responsibility for designing and implementing a conflict avoidance strategy for this election. The plan devised by the department to avoid political competition turning violent was based on three elements. First, a partnership was developed between provincial authorities and Tuan Guru so that the message of social harmony was communicated effectively and authoritatively to local communities across the island during the elections. The transmission of this information was done through Tuan Guru and their 711 Rosiady Husaenie Sayuti and Muhammad Faqih Langitan, Perjalanan Orang Sasak Menjadi Gubernur (2006) Kesbanglinmas means Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat (Office of National Unity and Community Protection) essentially local intelligence. 169

188 organisational networks. 713 These religious leaders supported this strategy due to their religious beliefs, which emphasised social harmony, as well as a realpolitik approach to the maintenance and enhancement of their socio-political role. The government strategy reinforced Tuan Gurus high-social standing through their overt reliance upon them. Second, a compromise was negotiated between elements of the political elite from Lombok and Sumbawa to avoid ethnic clashes. Essentially, they negotiated a division of the potential political and economic rewards of political success along ethnic lines. They did this through the distribution of places on the campaign tickets, with the Sasak candidate being given top position on each gubernatorial ticket and each candidate for deputy being from Sumbawa. Third, local security groups, pamswakarsa, were kept inactive during the election campaign as a result of negotiations between state officials and the non-state leadership of these groups. The politically-motivated violence of 2003 was part of Lombok s recent history of social instability and turbulent local political competition. 714 The volatility corresponded with the collapse of the island s tourism industry, a casualty of the 1997 Asian economic crisis. In the period since this economic turmoil and the collapse of the Soeharto government, the residents of Mataram and West Lombok have faced a series of destabilising events. These have included a crime wave, anti-chinese riots, often out-of-control pamswakarsa (private militia), and violence during elections at a Mataram university. It should also be recognised that the 2008 gubernatorial elections came during a period of political transition for NTB. Until the end of the Soeharto era, Lombok had been under almost constant colonisation or quasi-colonialisation for over 400 years the Balinese, the Dutch and the Japanese, and then by outside New Order 713 This reflects the web of relationships concept discussed by John Paul Lederach, which was considered in Chapters 1 and The nature of, and concerns caused by, political competition in Lombok were discussed in Asrori S. Karni, Roots of Tolerance Sprang Out from the Ashes of Conflict in Asrori S. Karni, A Celebration of Democracy A Journalistic Portrayal of Indonesia s 2004 Direct Elections Amongst Moderate and Hardline Muslims (2006) The broader canvas of local political rivalries that developed across Indonesia during Reformasi have been discussed in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation and the Rise of the Local in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, Local Power and Politics in Indonesia Decentralisation and Democratisation (2003)

189 technocrats. 715 Over the last decade, Indonesia s process of democratisation and decentralisation brought local political empowerment to Lombok. 716 This seismic political change in Lombok created competition between local political elites for the opportunities and spoils that decentralisation produced, leading to the potential for conflict during election periods (see Chapters 1 and 2). 717 The rapid political transition, and consequent development of new avenues for political competition, led to serious concerns among government officials about the potential for violence to emerge during the direct election of NTB governor in mid In August 2007, provincial authorities held a meeting of government agencies and local non-government groups to discuss potential points of communal conflict in NTB. One of the main concerns aired at this meeting was the 2008 gubernatorial elections. State institutions are still relatively weak in Lombok, although the situation is arguably improving. With this said, institutional weakness provides an opportunity for state institutions, such as the police and other government departments. They can partner with non-state leaders, such as Tuan Guru, to avoid or minimise violent confrontation motivated by the elections. These partnerships between state and non- 715 Alfons van der Kraan, Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, (1980); Sven Cederroth, The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah A Sasak Community on Lombok (1981) 90; John MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005) There has been a proliferation of literature and research on decentralisation, and related issues, in Indonesia. It has taken various perspectives on this issue from more general to localised analysis. See Harold Crouch, The Key Determinants of Indonesia s Political Future (Working Paper No. 7, ISEAS, 2002); Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gusti Asnan (eds), Indonesia in Transition Work in Progress (2003); Marcus Mietzner, Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: Mitigating or Fueling Secessionism? (2007) 84 Indonesia 1; Leo Schmit, Decentralisation and Legal Reform in Indonesia: The Pendulum Effect in Tim Lindsey (ed), Indonesia Law and Society (2008) ; Coen J.G. Holtzappel and Martin Ramstedt (eds), Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia Implementation and Challenges (2009); Michelle Ann Miller, Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia Jakarta s Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh (2009); Michael Buehler, Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: The Marginalisation of the Public Sphere in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, Problems in Democratisation in Indonesia Elections, Institutions and Society (2010) Problematik Pilkada Dalam Kacamata Publik, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 18 February 2008; Kalla: Pilkada Sumber Konflik, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 8 June 2008; Unrest Colors Regional Elections in Tana Toraja, Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 25 June This was also discussed during a recent speech by Jusuf Kalla, Making Good Economic and Social Policy in a Democratic Indonesia: An Insider's Perspective (Speech delivered at the Indonesia Study Group, Australian National University, Canberra, 10 June 2010). See also Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia (2002)

190 state actors and institutions corresponds to theories developed by John Paul Lederach (see Chapters 1 and 4). 718 The provincial authorities built an intricate web of relationships with non-state actors to confront the issues emerging from this potential point of communal and political conflict. The approach adopted included multiple levels of leadership, from the provincial governor to junior public servants and Tuan Guru Besar to Tuan Guru Lokal. These leaders combined with their constituent government departments and supporters (santri) to implement the conflict avoidance strategy. The cooperative approach that was adopted acknowledged the limitation of provincial state-based institutions. The provincial authorities, therefore, based their policy response on the capabilities of non-state leaders and their organisations. 719 Provincial authorities contributed training and support, through police and bureaucrats, while Tuan Guru and their organisations gave the strategy grounding within the community. There are specific ethnic rivalries that have played an important part in the local political competition. The provincial government s conflict avoidance strategy was based on not inflaming these ethnic tensions. A significant portion of political competition in Lombok is between local politicians representing the Sasak (from Lombok) and the Bimanese (from Sumbawa). Both groups are Muslim. Normally the Sasak and Bimanese who reside in Mataram live together peacefully, but tensions have emerged during recent elections. This rivalry is prefaced on local political elite s increased access to state office in recent years. The opportunities to gain financial and political rewards from these positions have caused tension between ethnic groups. It is a commonly-held perception in Lombok that the election of a Sasak or Bimanese politician to a senior position leads to advantages for members of their ethnic group in relation to jobs and potential business opportunities. 720 Ethnic tensions also rise in Mataram during election periods due to the influx of people from other parts of Lombok and Sumbawa 718 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) Ibid. 720 Concern about the apportionment of roles in the NTB public service and its impact on ethnic relations have been reported since early in the Reformasi period, Ada Kecemburuan Etnis Penempatan PNS, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 December

191 to work on campaigns. With increased numbers, and the political and economic gains that election success can bring, there is an amplified possibility for conflict. To understand how these ethnically-focused tensions developed it is essential to consider recent developments in provincial politics. The tensions between these two ethnic groups developed during the decade preceding the 2008 gubernatorial elections. In 1999, the central government in Jakarta appointed Harun Al-Rasyid, a politician of Bimanese origin, although he had been active in Jakarta politics for a lengthy period of time prior to this appointment. In many ways he was still considered an outsider, despite being originally from the province. 721 Picture 5.1 Gubernatorial campaign material in Lombok Then in 2003 came the election to the position of NTB governor of the first Sasak and locally-active politician, Lalu Serinata. 722 Serinata s appointment was not by direct election, but rather by a vote of the provincial legislature. The election of Serinata 721 Rosiady Husaenie Sayuti and Muhammad Faqih Langitan, Perjalanan Orang Sasak Menjadi Gubernur (2006) Lalu Serinata had previously been the Ketua (Chair) of the provincial legislature. For further details about the events leading to Serinata s election, see Rosiady Husaenie Sayuti and Muhammad Faqih Langitan, Perjalanan Orang Sasak Menjadi Gubernur (2006). 173

192 caused clashes between supporters of these two politicians who were essentially split down ethnic lines the Bimanese supporting Al-Rasyid and the Sasak supporting Serinata. These clashes led to an unknown number of casualties and injuries. The lack of detail about these events stems from the fact that local people still seem reluctant to talk about this period, in many ways, more so than in the case of the January 2000 riots. Asking about these events would often elicit only silence, or a quick change of topic. Ethnic clashes also occurred in connection with the election of a Sasak Rektor (University Vice-Chancellor) at a major Mataram university 723 during the mid-2000s. Bimanese students had actively protested against the declared election result. The demonstrations only stopped when the Rektor allegedly brought in some hired preman (thugs), resulting in the death of one student and the injury of several others. 724 Clashes such as this heightened anxieties among provincial authorities about the 2008 gubernatorial elections. The concern about ethnic rivalries leading to violence was an important risk factor incorporated into the conflict avoidance strategy. The next section will investigate the mechanics of the conflict management process adopted. Political and religious cooperation Concerns about the potential for election-related violence were felt at the highest level of NTB provincial government and this led them to act in preparation for the first direct election of NTB governor. The former governor, Lalu Serinata, delegated primary responsibility to devise methods for conflict avoidance and resolution to a team of provincial bureaucrats. This group was led by Dahlan Bandu, who at that time was Senior Staff, Kesbanglinmas NTB. He was well suited to this task, as his regular duties included gathering intelligence on potential points of social tension and conflict in Lombok The name of this educational institution will remain anonymous considering the nature of the allegations outlined. 724 Interview with anonymous informant (Mataram, 6 August 2008). 725 Dahlan s role in these efforts was pieced together through several informal discussions during and a lengthy interview: Interview with Dahlan Bandu (Mataram, 13 November 2007). For additional information, see Yusuf Riamon, Banyak Mengaku Intel di NTB (2006) Media Indonesia < at 29 May

193 The strategy that emerged was based on three central elements as highlighted earlier. First, the development of a close working relationship between Kesbanglinmas and many Tuan Guru. The second element was an agreement within the local political elite that ensured that there was representation of political interests from Lombok and Sumbawa on each ticket for the 2008 elections. Third was that localised security arrangements were negotiated to ensure that pamswakarsa were sidelined. 726 Dahlan s approach of creating a web of relationships and agreements between key sociopolitical players mirrored the conflict management strategies that John Paul Lederach and other scholars have advocated. 727 Lederach suggested that the avoidance or resolution of communal or political conflict is best served by social and political elites combining their activities with grassroots organisations. 728 Local intellectuals came to similar conclusions. Abdul Wahid, for example, wrote an opinion piece in the Lombok Post endorsing partnerships between state and non-state leaders and their organisations in order to avoid and resolve communal disputes. He argued this sort of partnership was a constructive way to manage local social tensions and conflicts. 729 Tuan Guru played a crucial role in maintaining social harmony during the election campaign. The socio-political and religious authority of Tuan Guru was used by Dahlan s team to underpin this state initiative. Tuan Guru communicated clear messages during sermons (khutbah) and religious education classes (pengajian), with the specific aim of avoiding political tension. 730 They supported this strategy, despite Tuan Guru having a variety of political affiliations and supporting different gubernatorial candidates Also several political leaders and public figures urged that campaigning remain positive so as to avoid conflict, Tuan Guru Bajang: Hindari Black Campaign, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 April 2008; Diintimidasi, Ismail Husni Ajak Semua Pihak Arif, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 24 April John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination The Art and Soul of Building Peace (2005) John Paul Lederach, Building Peace Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997) Abdul Wahid, NTB Plural Perlu Gerakan Harmoni, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 11 August One community leader told me that because there was a positive atmosphere during the campaign this allowed the different political tickets to visit his community, Lom, without any problem Interview with Drun (Mataram, 28 July 2008). 731 Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 175

194 When teaching about the importance of social harmony, Tuan Guru used the Islamic principle of silaturrahim (maintaining good social relations). 732 The lesson, TGH Muharror said, is not only related to fellow Muslims, but also requires people to keep peaceful relations with people from other religions. 733 There is no religious prohibition (in fact far from it) for making friends with anyone, he said, as long as they respect each other s beliefs. 734 These religious lessons from Tuan Guru to their followers acted as important reminders of behavioural expectations during the campaign. Many Tuan Guru told me that election tensions can lead to violence. They pointed to election-related violence that had occurred elsewhere in Indonesia and several Tuan Guru felt particularly passionate about avoiding communal violence in the aftermath of the January 2000 riots. 735 Therefore, when Dahlan sought assistance from Tuan Guru, their support was, by all accounts, quickly provided. 736 Tuan Guru cooperated with the state to communicate religious messages to reinforce the provincial government s efforts to reduce election-related tensions. The almost universal message that Tuan Guru highlighted was the importance of maintaining social unity and building ta awwun (an atmosphere of helping each other), and once again, not exclusively amongst Muslims, but also with non-muslims. 737 The role of Tuan Guru was essential to the dissemination of the provincial authority s message and they were integral to maintaining social unity. Dahlan worked with Tuan Guru Besar and Tuan Guru Lokal to coordinate their statements and actions, but each Tuan Guru tailored his message and the way it was presented as he saw appropriate for different audiences. 738 Another pivotal message emphasised was tolerance and respect within the Muslim community (ummah) and between Muslims and people of 732 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 733 Ibid. Very similar sentiments were expressed by TGH Wawan Stiawan; see Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 734 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 735 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 736 Tuan Guru have participated with state authorities in a similar strategy to avoid outbreaks of violence during the first direct election of Indonesian President in 2004 see Asrori S. Karni, Roots of Tolerance Sprang Out from the Ashes of Conflict in Asrori S. Karni, A Celebration of Democracy A Journalistic Portrayal of Indonesia s 2004 Direct Elections Amongst Moderate and Hardline Muslims (2006) Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 738 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 176

195 other faiths. The importance of social harmony was deliberately incorporated into their teachings during this period and they specifically focused upon the challenges that the election process was raising. 739 Incorporated almost universally into lessons about social harmony was the assertion that Islam is a peaceful religion with good relationships between communities being important and that Muslims should follow this basic principle. 740 These religious teachings are derived directly from Qur anic injunctions. TGH Muharror and TGH Wawan Stiawan, for example, both pointed to Qur anic verse 49: (see below), which they both considered central to their teaching about social harmony : The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: so make peace and reconciliation between two (contenting) brothers; and fear Allah, that ye may receive Mercy. 13: O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (will all things). Qur an, 49: 10 and This Qur anic verse, in their view, reinforces the message that relationships between Muslims needs to be maintained and that Muslims should also protect members of other religions. 743 It reminded people, they felt, that during the election process disagreements were appropriate, but they should act with integrity and respect towards fellow-muslims and non-muslims. TGH Muharror divided his interpretation of this verse into two parts. First, he said, Muslims are brothers and sisters and should treat each other well. Second, the Qur an says that Allah created all people giving them different religions and ethnic backgrounds and Muharror said that this verse highlights that people should get to know and respect each other. His interpretation 739 Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 740 Ibid. 741 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009); Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 742 Abdullah Yusuf Ali (translator), The Holy Qur an (2000). 743 Interview with TGH Muharror (Electronic Interview, 11 May 2009). 177

196 simply reinforces the message of tolerance that was important during the election process. Beyond reinforcing these religious messages, Tuan Guru were prepared to take more direct steps if violence seemed imminent or had occurred during the campaign and election process. 744 This intervention would usually involve two types of action. First, they would engage with protagonists and attempt to comprehend their position while also seeking to calm emotions. Second, they would take direct action to avoid or resolve a conflict by forcing protagonists to sit down together and negotiate (see the second case study). An example of Tuan Guru s role in such conflict situations was demonstrated by TGH Wawan Stiawan: The first time that I confront a conflict I have to examine the case, what is its cause, why has it happened, etc. Most conflicts in society happen because of misunderstandings. And after finding what triggers it, then I ask the people to discuss it with me and together to find out the solution. Usually I ask representatives from each group which are fighting to come to me (or I go to them) and ask them what they want, and then try to find out the best way to satisfy all of them. 745 Similarly other Tuan Guru have not shied away from directly intervening in conflict. For instance, TGH Subkhi Sasaki said he would go to the mosque to make statements over the loudspeaker urging restraint, while TGH Munajid Khalid told me about hitting the street to ensure that potential provocateurs were calmed down during the January 2000 riots. 746 These religious leaders stressed that they were prepared to directly confront people in order to try to dissuade them from participating in violence. TGH Munajid Khalid told me that during the riots, I went walking around 744 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). All these interviewees told me that in normal circumstances, and not just during the elections, a direct approach to intervention in communal or political conflict would be taken if necessary. 745 Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 746 Interview with TGH Subkhi Sasaki (Kediri, West Lombok, 23 August 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 178

197 my community, with government officials, trying to cool people down and at night I called on the mosque loud speakers for people to stop their bad behaviour. 747 Tuan Guru commonly back their theological rhetoric with action. TGH Wawan Stiawan said that The first time I call upon them [the protagonists] and give them advice about appropriate behaviour according to Islamic teachings. But if after this advice they continue to create problems and ferment social disorder I will give them a punishment. 748 He did not specify what this would be. However, one of the most serious sanctions that a Tuan Guru could issue, according to TGH Humaidi Zaen (and many other people with whom I spoke to informally), was to ostracise someone from their community. 749 This means that they are typically excluded from communal life. In Sasak society, given the high levels of poverty and consequently the need to rely on friends and family as a social safety net, this has significant ramifications. The effects of social exclusion can be seen in Kampung Lom. Members of the kampung who rioted in January 2000 were detained by the community. 750 They were taken to a building on the edge of the kampung, locked in, and not allowed out until the unrest had ended. The rioters still live in the area, but eight years later are still not able to attend community events and celebrations, such as weddings, or sit under the berugaq (Sasak pavillion) in the main parts of Kampung Lom. The effect of this latter prohibition means that they cannot attend their community s nightly informal gatherings. Consequently, when job opportunities are discussed or community decision-making occurs they are not present, further perpetuating their social and economic exclusion. In short, the social stigma attached to their participation in the riots remains strong nearly a decade after these events. The partnership between Kesbanglinmas and Tuan Guru was supported by other members of the local political elite in the lead-up to the 2008 gubernatorial elections. The provincial authorities worked with the political elite of Lombok and Sumbawa to avoid political tensions turning violent between ethnic groups from these respective islands. The result of this cooperation was that they came to an understanding 747 Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 748 Interview with TGH Wawan Stiawan (Electronic Interview, 18 July 2009). 749 TGH Humaidi Zaen (Memben, East Lombok, 9 August 2008). 750 This community s response to these events was discussed in Chapter

198 amongst themselves to establish a power-sharing arrangement. Each political ticket, as mentioned earlier, agreed to appoint a Sasak as calon (candidate) for the position of governor and a politician from Sumbawa as wakil (deputy). 751 All the political tickets participating in the gubernatorial elections held to this compromise. While there is no formal document outlining this compromise, it has been confirmed anecdotally by several campaign teams. A senior NTB Golkar official, for example, confidentially acknowledged the need for an ethnic balance in gubernatorial tickets. 752 The rationale for this ballot paper hierarchy reflects the demography of the two islands there are just over three million people in Lombok compared to approximately one million people in Sumbawa. 753 This compromise seems to be working for the time being as a means of allocating of the financial and political rewards of office between interests from Lombok and Sumbawa. Ensuring this political compromise works has direct economic and political consequences for Lombok. However, I am unsure if it will be sustainable in the future, as it is an inequitable arrangement, because residents of Sumbawa are effectively barred from becoming governor. This has the possibility of leading to increasing calls for Sumbawa to become a separate province, a proposal that is already actively supported on websites such as The website s slogan is Masa Depan Kami Provinsi Sumbawa (In the future we will be the Province of Sumbawa). This separation would have a direct economic affect on Lombok, because a significant portion of provincial revenue comes from the Newmont gold mine in Sumbawa. Politicians in Lombok are well aware of this economic reality and this provides part of the impetus for the compromise Several members of the campaign teams described how an ethnic balance between leaders from Lombok and Sumbawa was a political reality from anonymous Golkar political operative to Jeremy Kingsley, 19 May Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Nusa Tenggara Barat Dalam Angka (2008) In the short term this is not going to be possible, as the Indonesian government has halted the establishment of new provinces until the end of 2010 see Moratorium on Regional Autonomy (2009) Tempointerative < at 5 August The Newmont Mine provides over 35% of the provinces Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is over 10% more than any other sector of the economy, such as tourism or farming BAPPEDA Provinsi NTB and Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi NTB, Tinjauan Perekonomian Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2006 (2007)

199 Implementation of conflict management In order to prepare for the elections, the staff of Kesbanglinmas and other government departments were involved in intensive consultations with local community and religious leaders. They did this so that these leaders participated in the provincial authority s conflict avoidance strategy and were fully briefed on how the policy worked. Dahlan attended seminars, liaised with Tuan Guru and ensured that the police had carefully negotiated security arrangements with local authorities. 756 I observed Dahlan discuss the upcoming elections with communal and religious leaders at a September 2007 seminar run by Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN). 757 He outlined a variety of ways that they could ensure calm within their communities during the gubernatorial elections. This was an active engagement that saw him address the audience while symbolically seated next to a prominent Tuan Guru Besar. 758 The provincial authority s strategy not only recognised the importance of Tuan Guru, but also one of their key political motivations: the desire to protect their social standing. Tuan Guru generally have vested interests in maintaining social stability, as violence has the potential to destabilise Tuan Guru s current powerful position. If a situation gets out of control, the prestige (and consequently influence) of a Tuan Guru is at risk, if it is perceived that they are not able to control their community. However, the response of Tuan Guru is not just a political calculation. Their actions are underpinned by the doctrinal requirement for Muslim religious leaders to ensure that their followers fulfil their obligation to forbid wrong. TGH Sofwan Hakim, along with several other Tuan Guru, 759 stressed this religious message, distilling it into a simple point: every Muslim has an obligation not to act anarchically or violently, as some did during the January 2000 riots. 760 The participants who are involved with conflict management strategies in Mataram and West Lombok depends upon the nature of the issues. During the 2008 elections 756 Kodim 1606 Lobar Gandeng Pamswakarsa, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 7 July Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara means Adat Society Alliance of the Indonesian Archipelago. 758 Field notes, 10 September See, for instance, Interview with TGH Ramli (Mataram, 29 July 2008); Interview with TGH Munajid Khalid (Gunung Sari, West Lombok, 24 August 2008). 760 Interview with TGH Sofwan Hakim (Kediri, West Lombok, 13 August 2008). 181

200 Tuan Guru were peacemakers. They do, however, have the potential to become peacebreakers. Erni Budiwanti has suggested that some Tuan Guru have acted in a provocative manner during Ahmadiyah-related violence. 761 The problems arose because Ahmadiyah, a minority Muslim group, was deemed to be a deviant sect by the quasi-official Majelis Ulama Indonesia. 762 As a response to a series of MUI fatwa mobs in Lombok and Java rioted at Ahmadiyah s places of worship and residence. 763 In fact, the violence in Lombok against Ahmadiyah would better be described as a slow reign of terror, with violence occurring sporadically over a lengthy period of time between 1998 and The violence varied in nature and level across the island, but the uniform aim was the removal of Ahmadiyah members from their local communities. 765 Budiwanti asserted that some Tuan Guru provoked their followers with inflammatory language during sermons and preaching, and this spurred their followers into violent action. 766 Tuan Guru need to be careful with their selection or omission of words in khutbah and pengajian as these have a powerful ability to influence their followers. Tuan Guru may not intend to be provocative, but a lack of caution may have the same affect. Their followers may, for example, perceive it as tacit acceptance of an aggressive response to Ahmadiyah. 767 The notion that Tuan Guru need to use their social authority carefully is supported by Lombok scholar Sabirin, who believes that Tuan 761 Erni Budiwanti, Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jema ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and its Persecution (Working Paper Series No. 117, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2009). 762 MUI issued two fatwa to this affect in 1980 and then 2005 see Erni Budiwanti, Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jema ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and its Persecution (Working Paper Series No. 117, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2009) Tangani Ahmadiyah, Pemprov Tunggu Regulasi Pusat, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April 2008; Tak ada Pengamanan Khasus Untuk Jemaat Ahmadiyah, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 30 April There are reports of violence against Ahmadiyah communities in Keruak, East Lombok, in 1998; Bayan, North Lombok, in 2001; Pancor, Medas, Sukamulya and Sembalun in East Lombok during 2002; Ketapang, West Lombok, in 2005; and then Praya, Central Lombok, in See Institut Agama Islam Negeri Mataram (IAIN) Mediation Center, Social Conflicts in Lombok (2006). 765 Ibid. 766 Erni Budiwanti, Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jema ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and its Persecution (Working Paper Series No. 117, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2009) Interview with Muhammad Dimiati (Mataram, 12 August 2008). 182

201 Guru must act with sensitivity in relation to minority Muslim groups because of the propensity for the Sasak to respond negatively towards them. 768 As mentioned, Tuan Guru can act as either peacemakers or peace-breakers, depending on the circumstances. It is important to recognise that this fluid position is similar to ulama across the Muslim world, whose role and status change and develop continually as circumstances change. 769 Tuan Guru do not have a static or unchanging role. However, my observations indicate that Tuan Guru in Lombok generally seem to desire the maintenance of the status quo that social harmony brings, and this position is currently stronger than the allure of any alternative and more disruptive course of action. One of the major achievements of those working on preparations for the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections was ensuring that pamswakarsa groups were nowhere to be seen during the campaign or on election day. 770 These groups could have easily mobilised thousands and caused a law enforcement problem of significant proportions. 771 Several informants from the political campaign teams said that politicians involved in their tickets used their close connections with the pamswakarsa to ensure they remained out of sight. This was meant to avoid confrontations between rival supporters backed by different pamswakarsa. There are significant connections between local politicians and pamswakarsa. One concern that I heard several times while talking with local activists was these relationships could, given appropriate circumstances, lead community security groups into conflict with rival political factions. Political and religious leaders have extensive connection to pamswakarsa (see Chapter 2). The control or patronage of all of the pamswakarsa by Tuan Guru indicates the potential for them to become peacebreakers as they have control over a large numbers of pamswakarsa members who 768 Sabirin, Respon Pemikiran Tuan Guru Terhadap Penetrasi Ajaran Wahabi Pada Etnik Sasak di Pulau Lombok (M.Phil Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2008) Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam Custodians of Change (2002) The elections were held on 7 July John M. MacDougall, Self-reliant Militias (2003) Inside Indonesia < on 29 May 2009; John M. MacDougall, Buddhist Buda or Buda Buddhists? Conversion, Religious Modernism and Conflict in the Minority Buda Sasak Communities of New Order and Post-Soeharto Lombok (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2005)

202 they could mobilise to participate in communal conflict if they desired. Therefore, the significance of arrangements to minimise the presence of pamswakarsa during this period cannot be underestimated. Picture 5.2 Polling booths in Mataram With all these measures in place, the elections of 7 July 2008 saw the NTB Provincial government s conflict avoidance strategy put to the test. The strategy succeeded, with the elections held in a calm atmosphere without any incident. The social control emanating from communal and religious leaders meant that a large police presence was not necessary. In fact, I noticed fewer police than usual while criss-crossing town that day by motorbike. The only time I saw a police officer that day was when a local community leader and Tuan Guru Besar visited a polling station accompanied by a high-ranking police officer. The police had trained and organised themselves in case large-scale protests and civil disturbances occurred during the elections. 772 This meant that police officers, and the police auxillary (Linmas), 773 were prepared to deal with any trouble. For instance, in Central Lombok there was 510 police officers on duty on election day, supported by 2558 Linmas members, with similar arrangements being made in other parts of Lombok and Sumbawa. 774 Linmas formed the core of the visible police strategy with 772 Amankan Pilkada, Polda NTB Terjunkan Kekuatan Penuh, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 17 June Perlindungan Masyarakat (Community Police Auxiliary). 774 Pengamanan Pilkada, Korem Siapkan 10 SSK, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 March 2008; Show Force Pasukan Pengamanan Pilkada Lombok Timur, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok),

203 unarmed Linmas officers present at polling stations, while police officers were in barracks. This calm is actually astonishing when one considers that in October 2008, almost immediately after losing office, Lalu Serinata, the former governor, was charged, detained, 775 tried and then sentenced to three years jail for corruption. 776 The investigation into these allegations had started well before the election campaign, so the avoidance of violence was a particularly significant accomplishment. 777 The allegations of corruption against Serinata had the potential to incite anger and violence among his supporters, some of whom faced not only losing their source of patronage, but may have also feared being implicated and potentially charged themselves. The pressure on political figures was also intense, with political parties including Golkar seeing the gubernatorial election as a test of their local relevance. 778 With this said, on 1 September 2008, power changed hands peacefully with the inauguration of TGH Bajang. There was no violence reported during the transition of Governor from Golkar s Lalu Serinata to TGH Bajang from Partai Bulan Bintang and PKS. Prior to, and during, the 2008 NTB gubernatorial elections state institutions (coordinated by Kesbanglinmas) cooperated with non-state leaders, particularly Tuan Guru, in order to preempt communal or political violence. The strategy discussed in this case study does not provide a perfect or neat one-size-fits-all solution to conflict avoidance or resolution. Rather, it highlights a complex series of relationships and arrangements within the local political elite that allowed for flexible responses to Lombok s intricate realities. This approach of state and non-state cooperation can be applied to general conflict management processes or used to deal with specific tensions that can arise, for instance, during elections. These sort of partnerships do, however, need to be continually reassessed according to the problems confronted and April 2008; Pilkada, Polres Loteng Siapkan 3068 Personil, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 19 June He spent approximately nine months in prison prior to the conclusion of his trial. 776 Mantan Gubernur NTB Lalu Serinata Ditahan (2008) Tempointeraktif < at 29 May 2009; Jeremy Kingsley, D-Day for Corruption Reform (2009) Inside Indonesia < at 29 May 2009; Panca Nugraha, Former Governor Sent to Jail to Serve his Sentence, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 29 July Izin Gubernur NTB, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 8 August Pilkada NTB Adalah Ujian, Lombok Post (Mataram), 9 September

204 local circumstances. The next case study moves from strategic programs for conflict avoidance across the island to a more locally focused analysis of a period of social conflict and its resolution in a West Lombok village. Picture 5.3 Bajang-Munir posters in the NW heartland of Pancor, East Lombok Case study Testing times in Bok The pressures of leadership I am tired. Very tired! I just want the demonstrations and threats to be over Zaini, an exhausted Bok community leader. 779 Zaini made this comment as he slumped down on the couch next to me. The usual smiling face that would have greeted me remained, but it was strained. His exhaustion was the result of over two weeks of rolling demonstrations that took place in July 2008 in the village of Bok, West Lombok. These protests were taking a toll, and he felt under siege. 780 Zaini is one of the senior non-state community leaders in Bok. Along with several other local leaders, such as Eni, the Kepala Desa (village head) of 779 Field notes, 28 July Ibid. 186

205 Bok, he was at the epicentre of the social tensions and demonstrations that are being considered. 781 This case study investigates the processes that Bok s leadership used to put an end to several weeks of demonstrations and social conflict. It provides an example of how state and non-state leaders combined to develop an intricate, and yet, at points, chaotic, conflict management process. The events in Bok exemplified dispute resolution in Mataram and West Lombok, where adat was integral to the eventual resolution of the situation. This was seen, for instance, when the local leadership used a mushawara (community meeting) to finally negotiate a resolution of these issues. 782 When this forum was combined with the social influence of religious leaders, the dispute resolution framework was able to acquire significant legitimacy within Bok. The village of Bok is situated in West Lombok (just outside Mataram). The social troubles that are considered in this case study relate to attempts to remove one of Bok s Kepala Dusun. 783 These efforts to get rid of the village official led to rolling demonstrations that threatened to become violent. The rationale for this was believed to have been political manoeuvring within the village in the lead-up to the election for a new Kepala Desa. The current Kepala Desa, Eni, was not standing for re-election, so there was an open field for contenders, and the politics became decidedly dirty with the potential candidates positioning themselves and trying to discredit their possible adversaries (one of whom was the Kepala Dusun). 784 Several community leaders told me that the protests were merely a manipulation of emotions with the aim of obtaining political advantage in the lead up to the village elections Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 782 The dispute resolution mechanisms used in this case study indicate a localised approach to conflict management. A similar localised approach was also identified in Lom. However, Mohammad Koesnoe thought that local villages in Lombok did not have this sort of authority to convene and maintain conflict management processes as they were not within adat terms a legal community capable of undertaking these processes see Mohammad Koesnoe, Report Concerning a Research of Adat Law on the Islands of Bali and Lombok (1977) This does not correlate with my findings that these localised dispute resolution mechanisms are an effective tool for avoiding or minimising violence. The difference of views may reflect changes on the ground in Lombok over the nearly 40 years since Koesnoe s field work and mine. 783 The Kepala Dusun is the head of one of Bok s hamlets. 784 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 785 Field Notes, 28 July

206 The case study is the result of interviews with four key local community leaders from Bok, whom were central to the community s response to the demonstrations. The interviewees were the Kepala Desa Eni; the Sekretaris Imran; one of the local Penghulu Abdullah; and non-state community leader, Zaini. These leaders had an intimate knowledge of the events and the processes that led to the resolution of the social disturbances. I also had the opportunity to observe some of these events as they occurred. The protests in Bok emerged without warning in early July 2008 and lasted several weeks. In response, leading state and non-state community figures created a leadership group to react to these events. It was an ad hoc arrangement that formed the backbone of the conflict management processes that were used. 786 The leadership group was made up of the Kepala Camat, the Kepala Desa, the local police liaison officer, the local military liaison officer, two key non-state community leaders (including Zaini), one of the village Penghulu (Abdullah), and several staff of the Desa office (including the Desa Sekretaris, Imran). The Tuan Guru Lokal and a Tuan Guru Besar who became involved in calming tensions down were not part of this leadership group. Rather these religious leaders were called upon to help out at strategic moments. They were used to assist with soothing emotions and to ensure the participation of all parties in the conflict management process. 787 The roles taken by leaders within this group depended on their individual strengths and socially-accepted roles. For instance, religious leaders, such as the Tuan Guru and Penghulu, 788 took on the task of calming the situation once events became more serious in the second and third week. Their role was to take the heat out of the issues for the main protagonists and their followers. 789 Then community leaders, with the 786 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008); Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008); Interview with Abdullah (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 787 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). 788 See Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, for an explanation of the differences between these two types of religious leader. 789 This role as social stabilisers is also discussed during interviews in Lom, see Interview with Mukhsin (Mataram, 14 July 2008); Interview with Andi (Mataram, 4 August 2008). 188

207 assistance of the religious leaders, worked on mediating a reconciliation between the parties. 790 An important feature in the state and non-state partnership that developed was the influential involvement of a local military liaison (Babinsa) officer and local police liaison (Babinmaspol) officer. These two officers were stationed in the village and supported the leadership of Desa Bok during these tense times. They provided a bridge between state law enforcement and security institutions and the village leadership. The officers advised the local leadership group and communicated with police headquarters in Mataram. This was something that would become important as events intensified and the local leaders themselves needed protection from the aggressive crowds. 791 The police liaison, in particular, played an influential and constructive role contrary to many of the negative perceptions about state law enforcement agencies and their inadequate performance (see Chapters 1, 2 and 4). 792 Part of the rationale for the officer s proactive role was that he was closely engaged with the local leadership before these events and had in-depth knowledge of village affairs. 793 It was this close engagement of the police liaison officers over a lengthy period which was believed to have provided him with legitimacy and the ability to have an effective role in the leadership group. 794 This approach to communityengaged policing has acceptance at senior levels of the police, but it is not often implemented on the ground, at village level. 795 Former Kapolda NTB, Farouk Muhammad, told me that police would only be effectual when they fully engaged their operations into a community s life. He felt that they have not done this yet. 796 This situation exemplifies the possibility of more effective approaches to policing than those currently used in many parts of Lombok. 790 Field notes, 10 August Field notes, 10 July Concerns about the role and operation of police liaisons in local villages in other parts of Indonesia have centred on them pressuring or bullying villagers on behalf of political or commercial interests. See Anthony Bebbington, Leni Dharmawan, Erwin Fahmi and Scott Guggenheim, Local Capacity, Village Governance, and the Political Economy of Rural Development in Indonesia (2006) 34 World Development 1958, The role of negotiation in social disputes, rather than the use of force, and close engagement between police and local community leaders has been considered a priority by many leading Indonesian police officers in relation to conflict avoidance and resolution, see Andi Masmiyat, Konflik SARA Integrasi Nasional Terancami (2007) Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 795 Polisi Berjiwa Reformis, National News (Jakarta, Indonesia), 24 September Interview with Farouk Muhammad (Mataram, 3 November 2007). 189

208 Local political rivalries As previous sections demonstrate, decentralisation and the devolution of power has meant that greater scope for conflict has emerged in recent times between leadership rivals at all levels of government, including local village politics. 797 The social tensions that developed in Bok, and the demonstrations that threatened to spiral out of control, were connected to this localised political competition. Similar situations have occurred elsewhere in Lombok. For instance, early in 2008 the village of Sukamulia, East Lombok, was affected by a dispute over village subsidies and transportation that led to violent protests. 798 Also in early 2008 the village of Spakek, Central Lombok, was the site of an intense local dispute about electoral procedures during local elections for Kepala Desa. 799 Another example during June 2008, in the village of Kateng, Central Lombok, saw police intervene to stop demonstrations over alleged corruption and malfeasance in this village s administrations. 800 The problems in Bok stemmed from accusations against one of the Kepala Dusun 801 who was alleged to have either inflated the price of government subsidised rice or failed to distribute the rice properly among poor villagers. The exact nature and detail of these initial allegations were sketchy. These accusations, if proven true, were very serious. Rice is the basic staple for villagers and rice subsidies are one of the most important anti-poverty measures taken by the national and provincial governments across Indonesia. 802 As a consequence of the allegations, some local residents were demanding the Kepala Dusun s resignation. These accusations came to the attention of Bok s leadership on the morning of the first day of demonstrations. By late afternoon two trucks of demonstrators had been mobilised and begun rallying to the cause. 803 The action took place outside the home of the Kepala Desa, Eni, with 797 Achmad Maulani, Pilkades, Otonomi, dan Kemandirian Desa, Kompas (Jakarta, Indonesia), 15 August Masyarakat Sukamulia Nyaris Hakimi Kadesnya, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 25 April Konflik Pilkades Spakek Bermuara di PTUN, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 5 March Lagi, Massa Segel Kantor Desa Kateng, Lombok Post (Mataram, Lombok), 14 May See Table 4.1 in Chapter 4, for the Kepala Dusun s status within the Indonesian governance hierarchy. 802 Anne Daly and George Fane, Anti-Poverty Programs in Indonesia (2002) 38 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 309, Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). 190

209 demonstrators keeping a large part of the village up all night with their boisterous and vitriolic protests. 804 On the first evening of the protests there was initially a dispute within the leadership group about how to respond to the protestor s demands. Two alternative strategies were developed at the impromptu meeting held at Eni s home. One group argued that there was a need for a quick resolution. Those advocating this position wanted to dismiss the Kepala Dusun and just move on. The remainder wished to allow temperatures to cool down before considering the demonstrators allegations and responding to them in a thoughtful manner. 805 The key advocate for quick (immediate) resolution of the dispute was the Kepala Camat. 806 He was new to the job and was concerned that if there was an escalation of the situation he could be marked as weak and unable to take effective action. The Kepala Camat even told the leadership group that an intensification of the demonstrations and an explosion of violence would reduce his capacity to confront social tensions in the future. 807 On the other side of the debate were Eni and Zaini. They thought that in the next two or three days things would probably calm down and a solution would emerge. Additionally, if there was any truth to the allegations about the misuse of subsidised rice these could be carefully investigated. 808 One further factor supporting the wait and see strategy was legal in nature: the Kepala Dusun could only be sacked if serious malfeasance was shown according to Provincial regulations. At this stage, the allegations were still sketchy and this did not provide legitimate grounds for the Kepala Desa to act. Several people in the leadership group also expressed the view that sacking the Kepala Dusun without proper investigation was simply unfair. After lengthy deliberation, the leadership group resolved to adopt the approach of Eni and 804 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 805 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 806 The Kepala Camat is immediately senior to the Kepala Desa on the Indonesian governance hierarchy. Despite this, in many ways, the Kepala Camat is a less significant position, because it is appointed rather than elected. See Table 4.1 in Chapter Ibid. 808 Ibid. 191

210 Zaini: they would hold off deciding upon anything at this early stage to avoid making mistakes by acting too hastily. 809 During this period of instability, the leadership group met regularly at the Kepala Desa s house to plan strategy and also to ensure that the protestors did not behave recklessly and attack Eni s home. At this point, the military and police liaison officers played a critical role in ensuring community safety, as well as protecting Eni (and her family). The liaison officers saw their role as part of the local leadership and they also reported to Mataram police headquarters. These links between village and police headquarters allowed requests for police assistance to be made quickly. The need for police assistance was something that became necessary as tensions escalated. 810 This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. The temperature continues to rise The problems did not stop after the initial demonstration, and the protestors came back two days later. This time, the demonstrations were outside the village office rather than Kepala Desa s home. Over two hundred people arrived on the back of trucks. Some of the leadership group began to wonder whether the crowds were being rented by provocateurs, as many protestors were unfamiliar faces (see Chapters 1 and 2). 811 At this demonstration the protestors provided a letter to the Kepala Desa outlining their grievances. The letter demanded the sacking of the Kepala Dusun for two reasons. First, the Kepala Dusun was alleged to have stolen subsidised rice from members of his community. Second, the embattled leader was supposedly egotistical, because he often revved up his motorbike too loudly, particularly at nights. 812 Allegations that the Kepala Dusun had stolen rice came without any details. While the leadership group was concerned, internal investigations found that there were no problems with the rice allocation within Kepala Dusun s hamlet. In fact, the 809 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 810 Field notes, 14 July Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). 812 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 192

211 rice subsidy for eligible families had risen from three kilograms per family per month at the start of his incumbency, to over to nine kilograms by the time of the demonstrations. As to the second accusation about the Kepala Dusun s arrogance, this was, at worst, a dispute between neighbours, but not an issue that warranted his dismissal. The letter from the demonstrators proved problematic in other respects. For instance, questions surrounded the veracity of the 200 signatures. Many of the signatures attached to the letter looked to have been made by one person (the handwriting appears to have been the same). 813 Yet, the most significant outstanding issue was that the protest leaders still had not identified themselves. When the Kepala Desa spoke to the protestors she asked their leaders to come forward, but they did not. There was a feeling among the leadership group that they knew who was behind these actions, but this could not be confirmed. Eni wanted to know with whom she could negotiate. 814 In many ways the phantom provocateurs of the demonstration gave credence to a belief among the leadership group that the protests were linked to the local elections rather than any legitimate allegations against a village official. According to Eni, the protests were actually a character assassination of the Kepala Dusun. 815 During the next wave of demonstrations over the following days, the behaviour of the protestors became increasingly threatening. One afternoon, the Kepala Camat and police vehicles were surrounded and not allowed to leave the Kepala Desa s office. The situation became serious when demonstrators stopped the cars and started rocking them until the occupants were forced to jump out. These officials were threatened, but not hurt. The crowds only dispersed when the police liaison officer stood on the bonnet of his car and negotiated a compromise. He stated that if the demonstrators were able to find more signatures of support then the leadership group would pay further attention to their claims. This compromise took the heat out of the immediate situation allowing the leaders to leave safely Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 814 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 815 Ibid. 816 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). 193

212 The following day, Eni decided that she needed to make her intentions clear to the protestors. From the patio of her home she told demonstrators that she would not be threatened and that she refused requests to remove the Kepala Dusun. From her perspective this was a matter of principle. She was not going to be forced by mobs who wanted to make her act outside her authority (as specified in local regulations). 817 Unless there were serious breaches of his duties, which she believed there were not, then she was not permitted to remove the Kepala Dusun. She told the crowd that Indonesia is a Negara Hukum and she was not going to be politically blackmailed. 818 During this time, she was coming under serious political and emotional pressure from the demonstrators, which was affecting her health. 819 As the situation intensified, the local religious leadership was deployed. As the crowds dispersed once again, the TGH Lokal accompanied by two local Penghulu, including Abdullah, swung into action. They started to visit the homes of people believed to be connected with both sides on behalf of the leadership group. Their aim was to reduce tension by reminding people of their religious obligations to refrain from violence or aggression (see the previous case study). The leadership group thought that these local religious leaders would likely be able to settle emotions, but despite their efforts over several nights, things did not appear to be returning to normal. 820 The demonstrations continued, and in many ways worsened, over the next week. There were two further letters of demand from the protestors one of these had more signatories (over 150 additional signatures were tendered). Interestingly, in the second of these letters, the allegation of corruption was removed and all that remained was the accusation that the Kepala Dusun was egotistical. Zaini was not satisfied with the veracity of the signatures, as he recognised only a few names. Yet, each of these letters created the impetus for another round of rallies For discussion of the legal status and requirements of Desa administration, see Deddy Supriady Bratakusumah and Dadang Solihin, Otonomi Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Daerah (2004) Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 819 Field notes, 28 July Interview with Abdullah (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 821 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 16 July 2008). 194

213 One positive factor to emerge was that finally with the second of these new letters came the identification of the provocateurs. This allowed Eni and the leadership group to confirm who it was they needed to talk to. The political angle of the protests also became clearer the leaders of the demonstrations were potential rival candidates for the position of Kepala Desa at the upcoming local elections. 822 Despite identifying who was leading the campaign against the Kepala Dusun the situation escalated. As tension built and the demonstrations grew larger a change in tactics was necessary. It was at this point that Zaini, at the behest of the leadership group, visited a Tuan Guru Besar from Kediri. Zaini sought his advice and asked if he would intervene. 823 The seriousness of the situation was also highlighted by the fact that the police liaison officer in Bok, after consultation with police headquarters in Mataram, had 12 (Polsek) police officers deployed to guard the office and home of the Kepala Desa (the Kepala Dusun and his family had temporarily sought refuge outside the village). The rallies were now attracting over 350 aggressive protestors and there were fears at one point that the village office was going to be overrun. 824 Because of this tense situation, the Tuan Guru Besar agreed to act with the support of local religious leaders. His assistance came in two parts. First, he gave a Friday sermon about the importance of social harmony in the democratic era. Second, he made private visits to all of the key protagonists. One of the Penghulu, Abdullah, explained that the message he presented at these private meetings was simply a reminder of the religious obligation of social harmony. He also made a personal request for them to find an amicable resolution at the mushawara that Eni was attempting to organise. 825 The Tuan Guru Besar s intervention was a decisive turning-point two weeks into the crisis. It is believed that the only reason that the key protagonists attended the mushawara was that Tuan Guru Besar had personally invited them. 826 Additionally, the statements and assertions of the Tuan Guru Besar indicated to all involved in the dispute that they were not just expected to attend the mushawara, but also to find a 822 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok 28 July 2008). Eni also considered local political manoeuvring to be the rationale for the demonstrations, Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 823 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok 28 July 2008). 824 Interview with Imran (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 825 Interview with Abdullah (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 826 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 28 July 2008). 195

214 resolution to the conflict. To refuse a direct instruction of this nature from a Tuan Guru Besar would be considered disrespectful and inappropriate behaviour (see Chapter 3). This provided the various leaders with izin (permission) to talk and compromise. 827 The role of the Tuan Guru Besar did not just influence the protest leaders, but also supporters on both sides. They understood their leaders were now obliged to be flexible and come to a solution. 828 This active engagement of the Tuan Guru Besar reveals the strength that can be gained by blending local communal dispute resolution mechanisms with religious authority. This was further shown by the fact that the mushawara was held at the village mosque. 829 This exemplified how cultural and religious patterns of behaviours and leadership were combined to facilitate an atmosphere where resolution of the dispute in Bok was possible. 830 The next section will review how the dispute resolution processes were undertaken. Powerful negotiations At the core of the conflict management process applied in Bok, were direct negotiations between the protagonists. The mushawara, convened by Eni 831 was the heart of the dispute resolution process. This meeting allowed the parties to air their grievances and to hear the other side s arguments. 832 Mushawara have become part of Indonesia s legal culture(s) and have even been received into formal legal structures. 833 These community meetings have also been considered to be part of the social contract within communities across Indonesia. These forums definitely play an important role in decision-making and dispute resolution in Bok (and Lom). 827 Ibid. 828 Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 829 Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 28 July 2008). 830 Ahmad Salehudin, Satu Dusun Tiga Masjid: Anomali Ideologisasi Agama dalam Agama (2007) A Kepala Desa s role is to facilitate communication within a community. This is particularly important at times of social instability and crisis. See Made Wahyu Suthedja and I Gusti Ketut Swalem, Management Pembangunan Desa (1981) These community meetings are a pivotal part of problem solving in Mataram and West Lombok Konsortium Pengembangan Nusa Tenggara Untuk Kepentingan Pendidikan Politik Masyarakat, Kelola Alam Bersama-sama Partisipasi Masyarakat di Era Otonomi Daerah (2007) See also the discussion of mushawara in Chapter Mohammad Koesnoe, Musjawarah Een Wijze van Volksbesluitvorming Adatrecht (1969)

215 Mohammad Koesnoe correctly points out the localised nature of this activity that is, the way a mushawara functions varies from community to community. 834 The approach taken in Bok is consistent with a dispute resolution framework known as principled negotiations. 835 In this theoretical approach parties articulate their interests and then listen to the perspectives and arguments of the other side. By moving beyond merely seeing their own position to actively listening to their opponents, negotiations can lead to new avenues for resolving a conflict. 836 Common to both principled negotiations and mushawara is the fact that all parties have the opportunity to express their views (and emotions). This allows the air to be cleared and validates all perspectives. 837 The aim of principled negotiations is to achieve a resolution that provides mutual gains, with all sides to a dispute walking away with something. 838 As will be seen, the mushawara in Bok incorporated these two steps the articulation of positions; and listening to each other in order to obtain an outcome that involves mutual gains. The mushawara reinforces an important Islamic principle outlined by leading Indonesian Muslim scholar, Nurcholish Madjid, who wrote, man has a duty to listen to other people s ideas, and then to examine those ideas critically in order to determine which is the best to follow. 839 Like principled negotiation, listening and expressing a position is integral to resolving disputes, allowing all parties to resolve their differences. The mushawara allowed the airing of grievances between the protagonists ensuring that they felt heard, while also forcing them to listen to the other side of the argument. This forum gave people the space for negotiating solutions. 840 Although, the Tuan Guru Besar was present, he did not say anything. His presence was an implicit 834 Ibid. 835 Marc Howard Ross, Creating the Conditions for Peacemaking: Theories of Practice in Ethnic Conflict Resolution (2000) 23 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1002, Ibid Ibid Ibid Nurcholish Madjid, Interpreting the Principle of Religious Pluralism in Abdullah Saeed (ed), Approaches to the Qur an in Contemporary Indonesia (2005) 217. This assertion is based on Qur anic verse 39: Interview with Eni (Bok, West Lombok, 16 August 2008). 197

216 reminder to those involved that a conclusion to these troubles was expected. 841 Silence is a powerful form of communication within Sasak society. For instance, when issuing directives Sasak of high social status do not necessarily need to make their instruction explicit. Silence often provides an understood non-verbal expression of instruction. 842 After several hours of in-depth discussion an agreement was reached. The Kepala Dusun, whose alleged wrongdoing had caused the protests, would step down before October (approximately two months after the mushawara) and approximately two months before village elections. This outcome was seen as a win win result for all parties. The significance of this compromise cannot be underestimated as it ensured that the protagonists left the mushawara with their dignity intact and calm returned to Bok. 843 Both sides of the confrontation could claim victory. The Kepala Dusun did not resign immediately, but it was understood that he would soon step down soon. The result was not disadvantageous for the Kepala Dusun as he had political ambitions to become the Kepala Desa. According to local regulations, if he wanted to run for the position of Kepala Desa it was necessary for him to resign prior to the village elections in any case. 844 Picture 5.4 A sporting tournament in Bok in the week after the mushawara. Calm was restored and life returned to normal quickly 841 Interview with Abdullah (Bok, West Lombok, 26 August 2008). 842 Mahyuni, Speech Styles and Cultural Consciousness in Sasak Community (2006) Pusat Penelitian Bahasa dan Kebudayaan Universitas Mataram dan Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Konflik dan Harmoni Dalam Masyarakat Indonesia: Insight Dari Lombok, Nusa Tenggara Barat (2004) Interview with Zaini (Bok, West Lombok, 28 July 2008). 198

217 This period of social instability in Bok was resolved through discussion relying on a Sasak cultural practice the mushawara. Despite the tenuous nature of the situation, there was no need to resort to a forceful police intervention. TGH Madani said that forceful police tactics were often counter-productive in Lombok. While using force may disperse a crowd, it doesn t necessarily solve problems. In fact, an aggressive police response has the potential to make those involved even angrier. In tight-knit Sasak society which has high levels of social solidarity, friends and fellow kampung members may enter the fray, resulting in an escalation of the situation. This could lead to a rise, rather than a reducing, of tensions. 845 The police liaison in Bok implemented a minimalist approach, limiting the police s role to protecting the leadership group. The liaison officer thus became part of the community s response, rather than acting unilaterally, as had occurred in the village of Penujak, West Lombok (see Chapter 4). The conflict management processes utilised in Bok demonstrate the coalescing of state and non-state forces to resolve conflict. Integral to this dispute resolution process were the efforts of religious leaders and their ability to change the dynamics of the situation at a crucial moment. This was particularly important when the protagonists needed to be forced to the negotiating table. The religious leadership created an atmosphere where people felt obliged to participate in good-faith negotiations. The participants knew their actions were being watched by the Tuan Guru Besar and that they would be judged sternly if they did not participate with appropriate respect and effort. This is an example of the authoritative role of Tuan Guru, which has been acknowledged in other research as being pivotal for conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok. Tuan Guru have been observed also in other tense situations as ensuring the participation of protagonists in social and legal processes connected to the avoidance and resolution of conflict. 846 The religious leaders underwrote the process ensuring that the protagonists attended the mushawara, came to an agreement and felt obliged to adhere to it. They did this through their social influence, rather than direct involvement in the mushawara. The Tuan Guru Besar increased the legitimacy of the process itself, as mediation, will 845 Interview with TGH Ahmad Madani (Mataram, 21 August 2008). 846 Lalu Said Ruhpina, Menuju Demokrasi Pemerintahan (2005)

218 build no more than superficial temporary truce unless the process is managed to allow the parties to discover a common bond deeper than the process alone. 847 That common bond was the watchful eye of the Tuan Guru Besar. Conclusion These two case studies are not templates for conflict management. Rather, they incorporate many of the key ingredients discussed throughout this thesis. They underline the ability of local conflict management processes to prevent social tensions from turning violent, as well as highlighting methods for the resolution of political and communal conflict. Across Lombok, the possibility of social and political tensions sparking violence is not uncommon. 848 Therefore, the importance of conflict avoidance and effective resolution of disputes should not be underestimated. Both case studies highlighted the potential for effective conflict management by combining state and non-state actors and institutions, while also noting the importance of these frameworks being fluid and flexible. When considering conflict management in post-soeharto Lombok, state legal responses, such as statutes or court cases are important. Yet, the strategy used for the NTB gubernatorial elections illuminated a method for maintaining social stability through partnerships between state and non-state actors who have high-levels of social standing, such as Tuan Guru. These religious leaders abilities and social roles were put to good use during the gubernatorial elections, as well as in Bok. Yet, a cautionary note is needed, as Tuan Guru also have the potential to be peace-breakers. This is most apparent from their control of pamswakarsa and the allegations of their role in marginalising minority groups, such as Ahmadiyah. Despite this, the violence that had marred earlier election processes in Lombok did not occur during the 2008 gubernatorial elections, and Tuan Guru played a significant part in this. A Tuan Guru Besar was also vital to resolving the problems in Bok through his guidance and 847 Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community (2002) 18 Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution 27, Violence often occurs during election periods in Lombok. This has also been seen as a problem elsewhere in Indonesia where elections have become flashpoints for pre-existing socio-political issues. See Unrest Colors Regional Elections in Tana Toraja, Jakarta Post (Jakarta, Indonesia), 25 June

219 influential role in bring the protagonists together. In an overall sense, the role of these religious leaders should be read as providing a positive contribution to the avoidance and resolution of violence in Mataram and West Lombok. Conflict management processes adopted at the grassroots level in the village of Bok emphasised the stress that these sorts of events can cause to those involved and the flexibility required. The leadership group was aware that despite the stressful nature of events they needed to respond without rigidity and if one approach, such as the initial intervention of religious leaders, was unsuccessful, then new tactics were applied. These case studies emphasise the role of Tuan Guru, adat and communal relationships which are at the heart of conflict management processes in Mataram and West Lombok. All these factors intersect through the development of networked relationships that are time and again seen as essential to avoiding or resolving social tensions and conflict. These case studies also highlight the importance of partnerships between state and non-state actors in effective conflict management. This is further explored in next chapter which concludes this thesis and provides an overall analysis of its findings. Picture 5.5 Santri at TGH Sofwan Hakim s Pondok Pesantren Nurul Hakim 201

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221 Chapter 6 Chaotic harmony We cannot allow minorities to continuously feel threatened. Nurcholish Madjid, The beach resort of Senggigi, just north of Mataram, had gone quiet. By February 2000, the formerly bustling tourist town was a ghost town. Over the course of the previous month, the town had seen the departure of 4000 tourists fleeing the riots and chaos of January These events bring us back to the start of this thesis and Pastor Rosarius screen saver of his Church ablaze during the January 2000 riots. Both the deserted resort and the image in Pastor Rosarius office are salient reminders of the personal trauma that communal and political violence can have. As Nurcholish Madjid has pointed out, minorities should be able to live without fear. With the images of a silent Senggigi and Pastor Rosarius flaming computer in mind, along with Madjid s ideas, this thesis has investigated conflict management processes and how they have contributed to people in Mataram and West Lombok being able to live without fear. The question underpinning the doctoral research is: what are the legal and social mechanisms that have prevented, or could have prevented, communal or political violence in Mataram and West Lombok? To answer this question, my research has focused on events that occurred on this eastern Indonesian island during the period 1998 to The detailed primary research undertaken has led me to a series of key conclusions about conflict management processes. At the centre of these findings are the relationships between the state, such as police and public servants, and non-state actors and institutions, for instance, Tuan Guru and their organisations. Their cooperation, which I often refer to as a partnership, has foundations in local communities and their adat processes, such as mushawara, which provide mechanisms for resolving communal and political disputes. 849 Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World (2001)

222 Whether talking to local people at a warung (food stall) or interviewing senior provincial politicians, the complex nature of Lombok s social, legal and political ordering become apparent in the course of my research. It became clear to me that the art of conflict management on Lombok requires an awareness of the intricacies of local affairs. The findings of this thesis therefore draw on Lombok s history, which has seen non-state actors and institutions gain significant socio-political influence over the years. These historical legacies, which saw the development of powerful nonstate actors and institutions, are also influential in the rapidly changing political environment of post-soeharto Lombok. This can be seen with the large number of Tuan Guru who now hold legislative and executive office due to their significant support bases (see Chapter 3). Picture 6.1 A nyongkolan for Lom highlights the vital role of adat and community in Mataram and West Lombok This research contributes, through an in-depth analysis of Lombok, to broader discussions of the cyclical communal and political violence in Indonesia. This has been witnessed in different parts of the archipelago during periods of social, economic and political instability, for instance, during the mid-1960s and late 1990s. This thesis has identified conflict management frameworks used in Mataram and West Lombok. These may have broader application in other parts of Indonesia, but this thesis leaves that further enquiry to others. 204