Generating Executive Incentives: The Role of Domestic Judicial Power in International Human Rights Court Effectiveness

Transcription

1 Generating Executive Incentives: The Role of Domestic Judicial Power in International Human Rights Court Effectiveness Jillienne Haglund Postdoctoral Research Associate Washington University in St. Louis Oct. 11, 2014 Haglund (WashU) 1 / 15

2 An Example from the Inter-American Court Haglund (WashU) 2 / 15

3 Research Question To what extent do adverse decisions made by international human rights courts influence respect for rights? Haglund (WashU) 3 / 15

4 Research Question To what extent do adverse decisions made by international human rights courts influence respect for rights? The conventional wisdom holds that international human rights legal commitments have little influence on state behavior. Haglund (WashU) 3 / 15

5 Research Question To what extent do adverse decisions made by international human rights courts influence respect for rights? The conventional wisdom holds that international human rights legal commitments have little influence on state behavior. Recent work highlights the wide variation in state response to international legal commitments as mediated by domestic institutions. Haglund (WashU) 3 / 15

6 Why Focus on Domestic Politics? International court judges aim to maintain or enhance legitimacy of the international court. Haglund (WashU) 4 / 15

7 Why Focus on Domestic Politics? International court judges aim to maintain or enhance legitimacy of the international court. Like all courts, international courts lack enforcement capability and must rely on other actors to implement decisions. Haglund (WashU) 4 / 15

8 Why Focus on Domestic Politics? International court judges aim to maintain or enhance legitimacy of the international court. Like all courts, international courts lack enforcement capability and must rely on other actors to implement decisions. Theory needs to focus on domestic actors: the executive and other actors who could threaten the executive s hold on power. Haglund (WashU) 4 / 15

9 Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives Haglund (WashU) 5 / 15

10 Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives The executive influences international court effectiveness via: Haglund (WashU) 5 / 15

11 Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives The executive influences international court effectiveness via: Future respect for rights Haglund (WashU) 5 / 15

12 Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives The executive influences international court effectiveness via: Future respect for rights Incentives to evade international court ruling: Haglund (WashU) 5 / 15

13 Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives The executive influences international court effectiveness via: Future respect for rights Incentives to evade international court ruling: Material costs Haglund (WashU) 5 / 15

14 Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives The executive influences international court effectiveness via: Future respect for rights Incentives to evade international court ruling: Material costs Loss of power Haglund (WashU) 5 / 15

15 Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives The executive influences international court effectiveness via: Future respect for rights Incentives to evade international court ruling: Material costs Loss of power Loss of political allies Haglund (WashU) 5 / 15

16 Indirect Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives Haglund (WashU) 6 / 15

17 Indirect Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives Why does the executive adhere to adverse international court decision? Haglund (WashU) 6 / 15

18 Indirect Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives Why does the executive adhere to adverse international court decision? Executive behaves in expectation of implementation by other actors. Haglund (WashU) 6 / 15

19 Indirect Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives Why does the executive adhere to adverse international court decision? Executive behaves in expectation of implementation by other actors. Domestic Actor Implementation Efforts International/Domestic Pressure Executive Respect for Rights Haglund (WashU) 6 / 15

20 Indirect Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives Why does the executive adhere to adverse international court decision? Executive behaves in expectation of implementation by other actors. Domestic Actor Implementation Efforts International/Domestic Pressure Executive Respect for Rights Haglund (WashU) 6 / 15

21 Indirect Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives Why does the executive adhere to adverse international court decision? Executive behaves in expectation of implementation by other actors. Domestic Actor Implementation Efforts International/Domestic Pressure Executive Respect for Rights Haglund (WashU) 6 / 15

22 Indirect Threats to Political Survival: Executive Incentives Why does the executive adhere to adverse international court decision? Executive behaves in expectation of implementation by other actors. Domestic Actor Implementation Efforts International/Domestic Pressure Executive Respect for Rights Haglund (WashU) 6 / 15

23 Domestic Judicial Power? Extent to which domestic judiciary influences executive incentives depends on... Haglund (WashU) 7 / 15

24 Domestic Judicial Power? Extent to which domestic judiciary influences executive incentives depends on... Domestic Judicial Power (autonomous and effective) Haglund (WashU) 7 / 15

25 Domestic Judicial Power? Extent to which domestic judiciary influences executive incentives depends on... Domestic Judicial Power (autonomous and effective) Concern for public support Haglund (WashU) 7 / 15

26 Domestic Judicial Power? Extent to which domestic judiciary influences executive incentives depends on... Domestic Judicial Power (autonomous and effective) Concern for public support Overcomes procedural difficulties Haglund (WashU) 7 / 15

27 Domestic Judicial Power? Extent to which domestic judiciary influences executive incentives depends on... Domestic Judicial Power (autonomous and effective) Concern for public support Overcomes procedural difficulties Raises shaming costs for evasion Haglund (WashU) 7 / 15

28 Hypothesis Domestic Judiciary Hypothesis: As domestic judicial power rises, the presence of adverse international court decisions that find human rights violations are more likely to improve domestic respect for human rights. Haglund (WashU) 8 / 15

29 Hypothesis Domestic Judiciary Hypothesis: As domestic judicial power rises, the presence of adverse international court decisions that find human rights violations are more likely to improve domestic respect for human rights. Respect for Rights = α + β 1 International Court Judgment*Domestic Judicial Power t 2 + β 2 International Court Judgment t 2 + β 3 Domestic Judicial Power t 2 + z + u Haglund (WashU) 8 / 15

30 Hypothesis Domestic Judiciary Hypothesis: As domestic judicial power rises, the presence of adverse international court decisions that find human rights violations are more likely to improve domestic respect for human rights. Respect for Rights = α + β 1 International Court Judgment*Domestic Judicial Power t 2 + β 2 International Court Judgment t 2 + β 3 Domestic Judicial Power t 2 + z + u Haglund (WashU) 8 / 15

31 Hypothesis Domestic Judiciary Hypothesis: As domestic judicial power rises, the presence of adverse international court decisions that find human rights violations are more likely to improve domestic respect for human rights. Respect for Rights = α + β 1 International Court Judgment*Domestic Judicial Power t 2 + β 2 International Court Judgment t 2 + β 3 Domestic Judicial Power t 2 + z + u Haglund (WashU) 8 / 15

32 Research Design: Data and Model Choice ECtHR judgments from for all ECHR contracting parties (42 countries included) and IACtHR judgments only for those states under the compulsory jurisdiction of the IACtHR for the years (21 countries included) Haglund (WashU) 9 / 15

33 Research Design: Data and Model Choice ECtHR judgments from for all ECHR contracting parties (42 countries included) and IACtHR judgments only for those states under the compulsory jurisdiction of the IACtHR for the years (21 countries included) Bayesian hierarchical linear regression model Haglund (WashU) 9 / 15

34 Dependent Variable International court effectiveness (respect for physical integrity rights) Haglund (WashU) 10 / 15

35 Dependent Variable International court effectiveness (respect for physical integrity rights) Physical Integrity Rights: includes torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and disappearance; ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating greater respect for rights (CIRI 2010). Haglund (WashU) 10 / 15

36 Dependent Variable International court effectiveness (respect for physical integrity rights) Physical Integrity Rights: includes torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and disappearance; ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating greater respect for rights (CIRI 2010). InternationalCourtRuling t1 RespectforRights t2 Effectiveness = Respect t2 Respect t1 Haglund (WashU) 10 / 15

37 Key Independent Variables International court violation: coded 1 for violations of physical integrity rights of the relevant articles of the ECHR and the ACHR Haglund (WashU) 11 / 15

38 Key Independent Variables International court violation: coded 1 for violations of physical integrity rights of the relevant articles of the ECHR and the ACHR Domestic Judicial Power: latent variable capturing whether judge s actions reflect autonomous and effective decision-making Haglund (WashU) 11 / 15

39 Key Independent Variables International court violation: coded 1 for violations of physical integrity rights of the relevant articles of the ECHR and the ACHR Domestic Judicial Power: latent variable capturing whether judge s actions reflect autonomous and effective decision-making International Court Violation*Domestic Judicial Power Haglund (WashU) 11 / 15

40 Influence of Adverse International Court Judgment and Powerful Judiciary on Physical Integrity Rights European Court of Human Rights Albania Andorra Armenia Austria Azerbaijan Belgium Bosnia Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep Denmark Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Malta Moldova Monaco Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia San Marino Serbia Slovak Rep Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK Ukraine Parameter estimates shown as dots. Quantile-based 90 percent probability intervals shown as lines. Parameter estimates indicate the association between adverse ECtHR decision and physical integrity rights as domestic judicial power rises (from 0 to mean value of each country). Haglund (WashU) 12 / 15

41 Influence of Adverse International Court Judgment and Powerful Judiciary on Physical Integrity Rights Inter-American Court of Human Rights Argentina Barbados Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia CostaRica DomRep Ecuador ElSalvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Suriname Trinidad Uruguay Venezuela Parameter estimates shown as dots. Quantile-based 90 percent probability intervals shown as lines. Parameter estimates indicate the association between adverse IACtHR decision and physical integrity rights as domestic judicial power rises (from 0 to mean value of each country). Haglund (WashU) 13 / 15

42 Implications and Conclusions Contrary to the conventional wisdom, both the ECtHR and the IACtHR influence state behavior. Haglund (WashU) 14 / 15

43 Implications and Conclusions Contrary to the conventional wisdom, both the ECtHR and the IACtHR influence state behavior. Despite the great diversity in which these legal bodies operate, both the ECtHR and the IACtHR have similar influences on respect for rights. Haglund (WashU) 14 / 15

44 Implications and Conclusions Contrary to the conventional wisdom, both the ECtHR and the IACtHR influence state behavior. Despite the great diversity in which these legal bodies operate, both the ECtHR and the IACtHR have similar influences on respect for rights. Focus should be on the incentives of various actors within the state, most notably the executive, to adhere to adverse international court decisions. Haglund (WashU) 14 / 15

45 Questions? Haglund (WashU) 15 / 15