Climate policy networks in South Korea: alliances and conflicts

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1 Climate Policy ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: Climate policy networks in South Korea: alliances and conflicts Sun-Jin Yun, Dowan Ku & Jin-Yi Han To cite this article: Sun-Jin Yun, Dowan Ku & Jin-Yi Han (2014) Climate policy networks in South Korea: alliances and conflicts, Climate Policy, 14:2, , DOI: / To link to this article: The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis. Published online: 25 Sep Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1360 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 7 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at Download by: [ ] Date: 16 December 2017, At: 21:58

2 Vol. 14, No. 2, , B synthesis Climate policy networks in South Korea: alliances and conflicts SUN-JIN YUN 1 *, DOWAN KU 2, JIN-YI HAN 1 1 Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Seoul National University, 1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul , Republic of Korea 2 Environment and Society Research Institute, Hyundai Superville Officetel 512, Seocho-dong , Seocho-gu, Seoul , Republic of Korea A policy network analysis using a questionnaire survey was conducted to identify the main climate policy actors in South Korea and examine how they form alliances and come into conflict over four major issues. Generally, it was found that governmental organizations are the main actors in the South Korean climate policy arena and that they mediate between the business and civil sectors. In particular, key organizations in each sector play a leading role in the formation and maintenance of at least two distinct alliance networks: growth and environmental. In particular, the growth network has been stronger and more intense than the environmental network, with the exception of nuclear power policy. The crucial drivers of proactive policy discourse in South Korea have been scientific discourse and a consensus on the advent of anthropogenic climate change by the international scientific community, the international climate change negotiations and the pressure to commit to GHG emissions reduction, and low-carbon green growth strategy. Policy relevance The positions of South Korean governmental organizations (as well as other civil society organizations) on the four major issues of climate policy have not been aligned. The government has not acted as a unified body; instead it is an aggregated body composed of organizations with competing interests. If policy actors with different interests share the recognition of the state of the country within global society and understand international pressure as well as the urgency of combating climate change, then a common policy goal can be achieved. It is essential for the government to exert proactive leadership for climate policies in mediating the growth and environmental networks. It is important to boost environmental networks in order to overcome the alliance of growth networks. A more proactive response for combating climate change would establish open policy-making processes for environmental network actors and provide economic opportunities for climate actions. Keywords: climate change; climate policy; country studies; policy network; social network analysis; South Korea 1. Introduction Cooperation among the various relevant actors is critical when it comes to managing a global commons such as the Earth s climate. Various global actors involved in dealing with climate change including, inter alia, nation-states, the UN, and international NGOs set and implement the global agreements on GHG emissions reduction targets and other important climate policies. B *Corresponding author. ecodemo@snu.ac.kr # 2013 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis. This is an Open Access article. Non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly attributed, cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way, is permitted. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.

3 284 Yun et al. However, the efficacy of the decisions made by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is dependent on the agreement of participating nation-states. Thus, national policy actors, who exert a significant influence on the climate policies of nation-states, can play a crucial role in determining and implementing global climate policy making. South Korea holds a unique position under the UNFCCC. Along with Mexico, it has been classified as a non-annex I party, despite its membership of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in As such, South Korea stands at the line that divides developing and developed countries. However, it has experienced difficulties in securing developing country status: its annual CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion by 2010 were the fourth highest of the OECD countries and the seventh highest overall in the world (IEA, 2012). Furthermore, the growth rate of its GHG emissions since 2000 is the highest in the OECD. The international community has thus focused on maintaining South Korea s current status. Under international pressure, the South Korean government announced a voluntary reduction target, i.e. a 30% reduction, by 2020, below business-as-usual (BAU) levels (the highest pledge that has been made by any developing country), and subsequently declared that South Korea needs to play the role of a bridge between developed countries and developing countries. Since then, the South Korean government has considered several controversial climate policy options aimed at achieving this 30% reduction target. Climate policy has become a critical item on its policy agenda and the government s responses have become more proactive and self-assured over time. South Korea deserves the international community s attention for its policies concerning climate change. This paper will conduct a policy network analysis to examine how major climate policy actors in Korea establish alliances and engage in conflicts. This study raises the following questions: 1) Who are major policy actors that exert influential power in the climate policy arena?; 2) How are climate policy networks shaped? Do different issues affect the shape of policy networks in divergent ways?; and 3) What factors drive the formation of alliance networks and the conflicts between them? To answer these questions, this study carried out a social network analysis based on a questionnaire survey with regard to the first and second questions, and a literature review for the last question. There are currently few empirical studies on climate policy networks which use questionnaire surveys to research Korean climate policy. This study empirically shows how major climate policy actors organize coalitions resulting in alliances and conflicts among and/or between themselves and theoretically interprets the results of the analysis. This study will contribute to understanding the framework of Korean climate policy, major issues of the climate policy arena, and major actors responses to these issues. Consequently, it will contribute to expanding the theoretical and practical knowledge required in understanding the drivers and processes that induce nation-states to move toward more proactive climate change policies. 2. Research methods 2.1. Policy network, and social network, analyses Policy network analysis has gained recognition as a useful conceptual tool to understand complicated decision-making processes. Such an analysis can succinctly describe the diversified, decentralized, and complicated reality of modern-day policy making and policy change, and can identify both the major

4 Climate policy networks in South Korea 285 influential policy actors in decision-making processes and the various relationships between the relevant actors (Rhodes & March, 1992). There are three key components in a policy network analysis: actors, their interactions, and the arising network structures. The pattern of actors interactions can shape the pattern of networks. The patterns of networks may then influence the pattern of interactions (Dohler, 1991; Fowler, 2006; Ingold, 2011). Interactions mainly occur between actors. The pattern of interactions can shape the pattern of networks. The patterns of networks may influence the pattern of interactions in turn. Interactions are analysed using three main variables: resource exchange, collaboration, and opposition (Jost & Jacob, 2004). Resources are exchanged and policy networks are shaped and maintained through interactions among actors. Governments secure procedural rationality, support, and resources through interactions, while non-governmental actors confirm their existence and prepare a basis for exercising influential power (Waarden, 1992). A network structure is the pattern that is created by the relations among actors (Jost & Jacob, 2004; Waarden, 1992). The range of strategies that a particular actor can implement is determined by its structural position in the network. This is because the relationship of an actor with other actors in the network and its pattern can create the resources, information, and even power wielded by the actor (Goddard, 2009; Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2006). An actor can take power from the pattern created by the relations of the network and at the same time create opportunities to change it through the power they have obtained (Grewal, 2008). In order to understand comprehensive analysis of policy networks, systematic analyses of complex policy networks are required based on quantitative data. A social network analysis (SNA) was utilized in this study to conduct a quantitative analysis of alliances and conflicts in South Korean policy networks. An SNA analyses the structures of networks by using graph theory and linear algebra, and defines the system, which is the target of the analysis, as a function of participants and relations (Scott, 2000). It focuses on the relationships between actors rather than each actor s characteristics (Davies, 2009; Fischer, 2011). The degree and centrality of a network are representative indicators of its characteristics. The degree is the number of other nodes to which a single node is tied (Scott, 2000), and centrality is the degree of a single node located at the centre, which shows the status of the node in the network. Degree centrality, which is useful for measuring centrality, refers to the number of nodes tied together (Freeman, 1979; Wasserman & Pattison, 1996). The majority of SNAs are descriptive and aim at visualizing social networks and summarizing the basic properties of the network based on specific data. In the field of public administration and public policy, more attention has been given to SNA since O Toole (1997) called for researchers in the field to treat networks seriously (Hwang & Moon, 2009). Recently, there have been noticeable advancements in policy network analyses (Robins, Lewis, & Wang, 2012). A number of studies have been more concerned about testing policy theory with statistical models of networks (Henry, Lubell, & McCoy, 2011; Lubell, Schloz, Berado, & Robins, 2012; Robins et al., 2012). For instance, recent studies (Desmarais & Cranmer, 2012; Fischer, Ingold, Sciarini, & Varone, 2012; Frank et al., 2012; Jasny, 2012; Lee, Lee, & Feoick, 2012; Marcum, Bevc, & Butts, 2012) have utilized statistical models, including the exponential random graph model (ERGM), quadratic assignment procedures (QAPs), and stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs), to test hypotheses from theories of the policy process, analyse interdependent interactions among actors, and identify

5 286 Yun et al. driving forces of network formation. Such studies have gone beyond simply finding the most active and important actors and describing the patterns of associations within policy networks. SNA is good at evaluating complex policy networks such as those concerning climate change (Drew, Aggleton, Chalmers, & Wood, 2011; Fischer, 2011). Ingold (2011) and Morris (2009) have applied SNA, in conjunction with multi-criteria analysis and narrative analysis, to discern the existence of climate policy networks, influential actors, and shared belief systems among actors and, consequently, understand the climate policy-making process in Switzerland and the US State of Maine. Weiler (2012) has also used ERGM to explain networks found in the international climate change negotiations and has argued that coordinated behaviour in the network strongly depends on countries interests and characteristics. A descriptive SNA concerning climate policy networks in South Korea was carried out in order to answer three main questions. Who are the major climate policy actors? What are the shapes of the networks? What are the differences between the networks in terms of the different climate policy issues, for the period of this research? The data in this study have direction, because actors were told to indicate who they cooperated or conflicted with. Thus, major actors were identified by analysing indegree centrality, focusing on those actors who were identified by others. Data were built on the basis of a full network matrix composed of organizations, comprising all the policy actors selected for the analysis as described in the following. UCINET 6.0 was used for matrix composition and centrality analysis. NetDraw was utilized to produce an output in the form of a sociogram, using the matrix Questionnaire survey design Interactions among actors concerning climate policy occur at multiple levels, including local, national, regional, and global spheres. However, only climate policy interactions at the national level will be analysed here. In order to reflect their views and interests, diverse policy actors from the government, business, and civil society all participate in the decision-making process. In this study, the unit of the policy actor is the organization, rather than any individual, because it is organizations that make networks and influence climate policy decision-making based on their common interests. After identifying major policy actors at the organizational level in each sector, a questionnaire survey was conducted, followed by a network analysis of the survey results. The organizations to be surveyed were selected using a three-stage process. First, a media analysis was conducted to create a preliminary list of major actors in the climate policy arena based on how frequently they were cited in the media. Three major newspapers in Korea were selected due to their political bias and subscription rates: Chosunilbo, a conservative newspaper; Hankyoreh, a progressive newspaper; and MK Business, a business daily newspaper (Yun, 2012; Yun, Ku, Park, & Han, 2012). The preliminary list consisted of 244 organizations. Second, a reputation assessment was conducted using an survey targeted at 30 renowned climate specialists. They were asked to grade the reputation of each organization on a five-point scale. Eleven specialists responded to the survey, and 122 organizations obtained an above average score. Finally, an advisory meeting, composed of six climate specialists, was held to select the most important organizations among those chosen as reputable. A total of 96 organizations were finally targeted for the questionnaire survey. Survey participants were queried about their organization s stance.

6 Climate policy networks in South Korea 287 TABLE 1 Summary of research subject organizations Government Code No. Business Code No. Civil society Code No. Department GD 10 Organization BO 3 Civic organization SC 17 Institution GI 2 Association BA 6 International SI 2 Research GR 9 Company BC 11 Research SR 3 Legislature GL 6 Energy BE 4 Academy SA 6 Party GP 3 Research BR 3 Autonomous GA 6 Service BS 5 No. of responses 35 (97.2%) 27 (84.4%) 22 (78.6%) No. of organizations Notes: Total response rate ¼ 84 (87.5%) Total number of organizations ¼ 96 In the case of Civil society, S instead of C was used for acronyms since it was not easy to distinguish C from G for governmental organizations in the figures below. The questionnaire survey lasted for about two months, from 17 May 2010 to 20 July Before the main survey began, a pretest was given, targeting 30 major policy actors in three sectors in order to check the readability and potential issues in obtaining responses. The main survey questionnaires were distributed and collected via , and were sent to individuals who could represent the official position of their organization. Among the 96 organizations surveyed, 84 responded with a rate of response of 87.5%. The distribution of research subjects, their acronyms, and rates of response by sector are summarized in Table 1. The survey questions were divided into two sections. The first identified major climate policy actors in general, with five questions: (1) Which policy actors are especially influential in domestic climate politics? (2) What are the sources of scientific information about climate change used by your organization? (3) Which organization provides your organization with reliable advice about climate policy measures? (4) With which other policy actors does your organization collaborate regularly concerning climate change issues and politics? (5) Which organization commonly takes a position toward climate change that your organization opposes? The second part of the survey identified those major policy actors who are concerned with the most controversial climate policy issues in South Korea and the shape of interactions among them. The four controversial policy issues selected were the following: B B B B Setting a national reduction target The introduction of an emissions trading system, in the form of cap-and-trade The introduction of carbon taxes Expansion of nuclear power as a mitigation option

7 288 Yun et al. The national GHG reduction target had already been determined in 2009, before this survey. At the time of the survey, the introduction of a cap-and-trade system was announced, and an article referring to it was included in the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth (established in January 2010). However, it lacked a specific policy design, and newspapers reported strong resistance from the business sector. At the same time, carbon taxes were not being discussed in earnest in South Korea, although some civil organization (COs) had suggested it as a replacement for cap-and-trade (Han & Yun, 2011). There were also disputes over nuclear power as a proper mitigation option (Yun, 2012). The South Korean government has identified nuclear energy as the cornerstone of low-carbon green growth (LCGG) and declared the expansion of nuclear electricity generation a means for climate mitigation (Prime Minister s Office, 2008). 3. Results 3.1. Major policy actors in general climate policy Governmental organizations (GOs) were the most important actors in general climate policy in South Korea (see Table 2) and the top three players (identified by their answers to the five questions) were all GOs. In particular, the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy (MKE, GD-09), the Ministry of Environment (ME, GD-10), and the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG, GD-05) were identified as the three most influential, collaborative, and oppositional organizations. The ME has taken a proactive position on climate change by promoting relatively active policies. The MKE, in charge of industrial and energy policies, has implemented policies aimed at boosting economic growth through an abundant and cheap energy supply. The PCGG, established in 2009 to implement the national vision of LCGG, formulates policies for green growth and coordinates the related branches of the government. GOs were indicated as being the most actively involved in collaboration, while COs were the least (Table 3). Most organizations collaborated with organizations within the same sector: GOs obtained advice from other GOs the most, followed by business organizations (BOs), and then COs. BOs and COs have seldom collaborated. TABLE 2 Major policy actors for general climate change policies Rank Influential Scientific information Reliable advice Collaboration Opposition 1 GD-09 GI-01 GD-10 GD-10 GD-10 2 GD-10 GR-04 GI-01 GD-09 GD-09 3 GD-05 GD-04 GR-04 GD-05 GD-05 Note: GD-04, South Korean Meteorological Administration; GD-05, the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG); GD-09, the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy (MKE); GD-10, the Ministry of Environment (ME); GI-01, Korean Energy Management Corporation (KEMCO); GR-04, Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI).

8 Climate policy networks in South Korea 289 TABLE 3 Policy actors collaborating regularly concerning climate change issues Government organizations (36) Business organizations (32) Civic organizations (28) No. % No. % No. % Total No. Total % Governmental organizations (35) Business organizations (27) Civic organizations (22) Total (84) Note: Emboldened figures indicate the largest figures in each case. Organizations in left-hand column were respondents that selected more than one organization with which they collaborated regularly; those in top row were electable objects, i.e. organizations listed on the questionnaire Major actors on climate policy issues and their positions Table 4 shows that the degree of agreement was highest in relation to the national GHG reduction target, and that with nuclear power was the lowest. Most policy actors supported the national GHG emissions reduction target with a mean of 3.8; only some BOs showed opposition, with more than half of them supporting it (mean of 3.3). This result implies that the national target has been successfully established in South Korea. Regarding cap-and-trade and carbon taxes, the means of all groups for both issues were similarly supportive, but there were nevertheless differences by sector, with GOs showing no difference in their preferences, BOs preferring cap-and trade, and COs preferring carbon taxes. In relation to nuclear power, heavy opposition by all COs led to the absence of agreement, while more than half of BOs took a neutral position and one-fifth of GOs a negative position. The major organizations that were focused on each of the four issues were different: GOs were major actors concerning national emissions reduction targets and cap-and-trade, while BOs and COs were alliance players for carbon taxes and nuclear power, respectively (see Table 5). In addition, GOs were TABLE 4 Positions on climate policy issues by organization group Issues Statistics GOs BOs COs Total I. National GHG reduction target Mean Std. dev II. Cap-and-trade Mean Std. dev III. Carbon tax Mean Std. dev IV. Nuclear power Mean Std. dev Note: The mean difference among sectors is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Std. dev. means standard deviation.

9 290 Yun et al. TABLE 5 Alliance, conflict, and bridges among South Korean climate policy actors I. National GHG reduction target II. Cap-and-trade III. Carbon tax IV. Nuclear power Rank AL CF BR AL CF BR AL CF BR AL CF BR 1 GD-05 GD-09 GD-09 GD-10 GD-09 GD-09 BO-02 GD-10 GD-09 SC-08 GD-09 GD-09 2 GD-09 GD-05 GR-06 GD-05 GD-10 SI-02 BO-03 GD-09 GR-06 SC-10 GD-05 GL-03 3 GD-10 GD-10 SC-10 BO-03 GD-05 BC-08 BA-02 BO-02 SR-01 SC-11 BC-08/GR-08 SC-10 Notes: AL, alliance; CF, conflict; BR, bridge; BA-02, Korea Petrochemical Industry Association; BC-08, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Corporation; BO-02, Business Institute for Sustainable Development; BO-03, Korea Business Council for Sustainable Development; GD-05, the Presidential Committee on Green Growth; GD-09, Ministry of Knowledge and Economy; GD-10, Ministry of Environment; GL-03, Special Committee on Climate Change Response; GR-06, Korea Environment Institute; GR-08, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute; SC-08, Green Korea United; SC-10, Korean Federation of Environmental Movements; SC-11, Environmental Justice; SI-02, Carbon Disclosure Project Korea; SR-01, Institute for Climate Change Action. Bold type indicates that organizations were in agreement; italic type indicates organizations were in disagreement; plain text indicates that organizations were neutral. largely indicated as conflicting actors. This is because not only BOs and COs but also GOs indicated GOs in different positions as conflicting actors General climate policy networks Question 4, which concerned collaboration (see Section 2.2), was used to analyse the alliance of policy networks among climate policy actors. The results show that GOs are placed at the centre of policy networks, with the ME, MKE, and PCGG being major actors. The ME was identified most frequently as a collaborative organization, but it had few mutual collaboration networks with other organizations (see Figure 1). The PCGG and MKE were in strong mutual collaboration networks. MKE has actively interacted with BOs, while BOs such as the Business Institute for Sustainable Development (BISD, BO-02) and Korea Business Council for Sustainable Development (KBCSD, BO-03) have formed multi-cores of collaboration networks within the business sector. The PCGG has mutually collaborated with relatively diverse organizations. Three major environmental NGOs Green Korea United (SC-08), Korean Federation of Environmental Movements (SC-10), and Environmental Justice (SC-11) have also formed mutual collaboration networks. However, the civil collaboration networks have been slightly limited within the civil sector, despite some connection with GOs Climate policy networks by policy issues The results of the survey regarding the four controversial climate policy issues are described in the following sections National GHG emissions reduction targets The three main GOs the ME, KME, and PCGG have played a central role, each having similar levels of influence in alliance networks on national emissions reduction targets (see Figure 2). Almost all GOs, including MKE, and all COs supported this issue. Even though the MKE and many BOs had different

10 Climate policy networks in South Korea 291 Figure 1 Policy networks for regular collaboration Note: The size of node depends on the number of selections taken by other organizations. Thick lines indicate that two organizations selected each other as a source of reliable advice. Figure 2 Policy networks for national GHG emissions reduction target

11 292 Yun et al. TABLE 6 Alliance networks among organizations on climate policy issues Government organizations (GOs) (36) Business organizations (BOs) (32) Civic organizations (COs) (28) Total (96) Issues (density) No. % No. % No. % No. % I. National GHG reduction GOs (35) target (0.0645) BOs (27) COs (22) Total (84) II. Cap-and-trade (0.0434) GOs (35) BOs (27) COs (22) Total (84) III. Carbon tax (0.0361) GOs (35) BOs (27) COs (22) Total (84) IV. Nuclear power (0.0262) GOs (35) BOs (27) COs (22) Total (84) Note: Organizations in the second left-hand column are respondents and organizations in top row are selectable objects listed on the questionnaire. Numbers in bold indicate highest frequencies. Numbers in bold of Total column show total number of indications taken by all types of organizations with regard to each issue. positions, they established strong alliance networks. The ME has formed other alliance networks with various organizations that have supported reduction targets. The PCGG, which initiated the process of setting the national target, was located at the centre of MKE-centred and ME-centred networks, which implies that the PCGG has acted as a mediator between the two networks. Most COs also supported national emissions reduction targets and established alliance networks among themselves. However, civil alliance networks do not seem to be strongly connected with the ME, in contrast to the strong connections the MKE has had with BOs. Table 6 shows that the degree of connections and density of network for this issue (515 and , respectively) were the highest among the four issues examined. This implies that organizations have tried to establish connections for this issue most actively. In addition, inner alliance networks within each sector were stronger, especially between BOs. BOs and COs had the lowest density Cap-and-trade There were strong veto alliance networks regarding cap-and-trade (See Figure 3). In contrast to other GOs, the MKE has participated in strong veto alliance networks with BOs in opposition to this issue.

12 Climate policy networks in South Korea 293 Figure 3 Policy networks for cap-and-trade Together with the MKE, two BOs BISD and KBCSD were at the centre of the veto alliance networks. In reality, BOs have publicly declared their opposition to cap-and-trade due to the economic burden and decline of competitive power (Han & Yun, 2011, p. 85). As shown in Table 6, the degree of connection within the business sector was the highest, accounting for 77% of the total degree of BOs. BOs have actively interacted with other BOs to oppose cap-and-trade. COs have collaborated with GOs and COs equally, but have done so very little with BOs. The ME also established diverse supporting alliance networks, which were less intense than veto alliance networks. Facing opposition by the MKE, the ME has tended to support alliance networks to keep in check the MKE. Also, at the time of this survey, there was some debate about which ministry should be in charge of the cap-and-trade system. Both the MKE and ME insisted on their own superiority for fulfilling the lead role. Ultimately, the PCGG was placed between these two counter-networks. The positions of COs, especially the three major NGOs SC-08, SC-10, and SC-11 have not been unified. Some COs have opposed cap-and-trade because it allows polluters to benefit financially from the system, while others have supported it as a realistic policy option (Han & Yun, 2011) Carbon taxes The major actors regarding carbon taxes were BOs and COs (Figure 4). In particular, BOs in opposition forged strong alliance networks within the business sector and with the MKE, even though their positions were not unified. There were few visible GOs; most of them, except for the MKE, took either a positive or neutral position, and rarely played a bridging role between business and civil

13 294 Yun et al. Figure 4 Policy networks for carbon taxes Figure 5 Policy network of nuclear power expansion

14 Climate policy networks in South Korea 295 sectors. In contrast with cap-and-trade, most COs supported carbon taxes and created alliance networks within their own sector. These alliance networks were less intense than veto alliance ones. Table 6 shows that the business and civil sectors had stronger ties regarding carbon taxes within each sector than on cap-and-trade, while GOs had slightly looser ties within the sector and with other sectors Nuclear power Strong alliance networks were built in opposition to nuclear power (see Figure 5). The three major environmental NGOs were located at the centre of these networks as leading actors, while relatively weak supporting alliance networks were tied around the MKE. In contrast to other policy issues, networks concerning nuclear power are clearly divided into two groups: opposition alliance networks (mainly composed of COs and a small number of GOs) were separated from supporting networks (mainly composed of GOs and BOs). As shown in Figure 5 and Table 6, COs identified barely any GOs and no BOs as alliance partners. In short, COs networks were isolated. 4. Discussion Based on the survey results, questions posed by this study can now be answered Major climate policy actors in South Korea The results show that the major actor in South Korean climate policy decision making is the government. GOs were identified most frequently as collaborating organizations as well as sources of important information and reliable advice. In particular, the ME, MKE, and PCGG were key climate policy actors. National emissions reduction targets were supported by almost all GOs, but their positions regarding other issues differed. This shows that the government has not been a unified body but rather an aggregated body composed of organizations with different interests. In particular, the MKE has consistently made alliance networks with BOs and played a leading role in all networks. The ME has shown clear support for reduction targets and cap-and-trade, but has taken a neutral position on carbon taxes and nuclear power. Even though the ME has formed supporting alliance networks for reduction targets and cap-and-trade as a key player, it has rarely formed alliance networks with environmental NGOs. It has pursued environmental protection as its major role, but it has been reluctant to take a position that might threaten short-term economic growth How have climate policy networks been shaped? In general climate policy, GOs were located at the centre of policy networks bridging the civil and business sector. However, the shape of the policy networks for the four major issues was very different. First, almost all GOs and COs have supported reduction targets, and major GOs have been located at the centre to drive a social consensus. The degree and density of networks concerning reduction targets were the highest of the four issues. BOs veto alliance networks seem to have been surpassed by strong supporting alliance networks established within and between GOs and COs. In particular, the MKE, despite being a key node of veto alliance networks, has taken a positive position that

15 296 Yun et al. differs from those of major BOs. This is because reduction targets were deemed critical by the South Korean government, with an official announcement to the international community that promised a voluntary national target would be set. However, BOs and the MKE established strong veto alliance networks against cap-and-trade and carbon taxes because these measures were likely to place an economic burden on certain BOs. The MKE, acting as an essential node, clearly opposed these issues. By contrast, the ME has maintained loose networks with COs concerning emissions reduction targets and cap-and-trade issues and has established few ties with COs concerning carbon taxes and nuclear power issues. There were clearly two distinct alliance networks concerning nuclear power: COs formed strong and intense opposition alliance towards it, while the MKE and BOs formed relatively loose supporting alliance networks. This is because nuclear policy has already been firmly established and there is little possibility of changing it. Because nuclear power is defined in South Korea as a low-carbon green energy, the ME has not opposed it. Even though opposition networks have been strong, they have not been strong enough to negate nuclear policy. Two separate alliance networks were found in the climate policy arena in South Korea. One network comprises the MKE and business-centred alliance networks, which pursue economic growth and resist economic burden-sharing. This group can be referred to as a growth network. The other network includes civil society-centred alliance networks, which pursue active climate responses and environmental protection. This group can be referred to as an environmental network Determinants of alliance networks and conflicts Growth and environmental networks have conflicted over major policy issues. However, the national emissions reduction target was set successfully even with the veto power of the growth network. What made this partial success possible? First, one major factor was the increasing influential power of the international scientific and policy communities (OECD & IEA, 2008; Yun et al., 2012). As a result of the publication of Stern (2006) and successive assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change particularly the Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 there has been an increase in the international consensus on required climate actions, and climate change denial/scepticism has decreased overall in South Korea. Generally, the South Korean press has actively reported on the scientific consensus and on the seriousness of climate change itself (Yun et al., 2012). Around 97% of South Koreans believe climate change is a fact and over 90% think climate change is a serious problem (ME, 2008). Under these social circumstances, the government, including the MKE and the environmental network, were able to overcome the opposition of the growth network. Second, a shared recognition concerning international pressure was a critical factor. Most climate policy actors have recognized that South Korea does not have enough political power to avoid international pressure for emissions reduction. Furthermore, they are aware of the inherently limited conditions of South Korea s export-oriented economy, which reacts sensitively to global climate policies and the global market (Yun & Won, 2012). These shared recognitions led to setting the national target. The successful setting of this target implies that achievement of a common goal is not impossible if all policy actors involved recognize the state of South Korea in global society, and if the government were to actively exert mediating leadership for proactive climate policies.

16 Climate policy networks in South Korea 297 Third, adoption of LCGG as a new national development paradigm moved climate policy forward, as has been pointed out by climate experts in South Korea (Yun & Won, 2012). Governments waver, not only between the business sector and civil society, but also between two imperatives of the state: economic growth and environmental protection. (Environmental protection is a new imperative that has appeared in the face of environmental destruction; see Dryzek, Hunold, Schlosberg, Downes, & Hernes, 2002.) In the context of global environmental problems such as climate change, each nation-state is required to take responsibility for the simultaneous pursuit of national economic growth and global environmental protection. In these circumstances, some countries work to avoid their obligations for global environmental protection, while others implement an ecological modernization strategy that pursues both environmental protection and economic growth. When the government can meet or balance these two imperatives it may gradually weaken the veto power of the growth network and push forward more proactive climate policies. The former Lee administration in South Korea associated economic growth with green discourses by adopting the LCGG strategy as a Korean-style method of environmental modernization, and appropriated it as a proper national strategy to simultaneously accomplish the imperatives of environmental protection and capital accumulation (Yun et al., 2012; Yun & Won, 2012). The pivotal idea of green growth is of economic growth accomplished with the minimization of resource use and pollution (through green technologies and green industries) becoming the basis for environmental protection (Lee & Yun, 2011). The setting of the national GHG emissions reduction target can be interpreted from this perspective. The South Korean government could have played a key mediating role between the growth and environmental networks to establish the national reduction target. Following the request to respect the environmental protection imperative, voiced simultaneously by the international community and domestic civil society, the South Korean government could have persuaded the growth network not to use its veto power. The LCGG strategy was aimed at presenting the growth network as a way to simultaneously enjoy economic growth and protect the environment. The MKE was a key node of the growth network and it seems that it accepted the necessity of setting the target due to the reality of South Korea s export-oriented economy (which is sensitive to global climate policies and markets). Thus, the MKE tried to persuade BOs and acted as a mediator between the business and governmental sectors. Based on sharing this view of the South Korean economy, BOs seemed to accept the target, even along with inner-opposition networks. Furthermore, BOs saw little immediate threat to themselves because the reduction target is a voluntary mid-term target at the national level, and does not directly target the business sector. Nevertheless, the effect of the LCGG was very limited. The LCGG derived a symbolic policy transition that only succeeded in announcing a reduction target. The government was unable to surpass the veto power of the growth network concerning the introductions of the cap-and-trade system and carbon taxes, which would probably have placed an instant economic liability on BOs. Meanwhile, the potentially dangerous nuclear power generation has been promoted as a cost-effective climate mitigation option, while proactive policy options like cap-and-trade and carbon taxes have not been introduced. In other words, there has been progress in discourses concerning the climate, but little advance in the real policy arena in South Korea. The strength of alliances and the influential power of the growth network have been much stronger than those of the environmental network. More fundamentally, the inherent limit embedded in the concept of green growth is responsible for the little progress that has been made beyond setting the national reduction target. In spite of similarities between green

17 298 Yun et al. growth and ecological modernization, the former differs from the latter because it ignores the participation of citizens in the decision-making process and a social consensus in policy formation (Lee & Yun, 2011). Thus, the environmental network could not exert strong power in the adoption of climate policy options and the ME has seldom made ties with the environmental NGO-centred environmental network. 5. Conclusions Three main empirical findings were drawn from this study. First, governmental organizations (GOs) have been the main actors in the general climate policy arena, and have mediated between the business and civil sectors. They have taken different positions on major policy issues and have led alliance networks. Second, there have been two distinct alliance networks, a growth network and an environmental network, each in conflict with the other. The growth network has been stronger and more intense than the environmental network, except in relation to nuclear power policy. Third, scientific discourse and a consensus on the advent of anthropogenic climate change within international scientific communities, international climate change negotiations and the pressure to move forward, and the LCGG strategy have been crucial drivers for proactive policy discourse in South Korea. Actions by the international community will empower the environmental network in individual countries. Therefore, it is vital to secure close cooperation between policy actors who are actively pursuing climate actions in scientific, political, and economic arenas inside and outside of the nation-state. This study has made significant methodological, theoretical, and practical contributions to the field. By applying the methodology of descriptive SNA, it has, for the first time, empirically explored pro- and con-networks for South Korean climate policy in general, and for alliance and conflict networks on specific climate issues. Groups with similar ideological inclinations displayed divergent positions on specific climate issues, and the alliance and conflict networks among organizations on each issue have taken different forms. The empirical findings reveal the general and complex nature of a single country s climate policy networks, and will contribute to future analyses on the dynamism of policy networks. Specifically, organizations with contrasting positions in relation to climate policy in general can collaborate and establish alliances regarding particular issues, depending on the particular political and policy context. In the context of global environmental problems such as climate change, each nation-state is required to take responsibility for the simultaneous pursuit of national economic growth and global environmental protection. By adopting LCGG as its new national development paradigm, South Korea has begun to partially implement the environmental modernization strategy. This study conducted a climate policy network analysis at the very moment of this switch in policy. Given this changing political and policy context, several significant implications of this research are clear. Climate policy networks can be shaped in diverse ways by issues during the period of a national paradigm shift into ecological modernization. Specifically, strong opposition alliances can be formed concerning issues associated with large additional burdens on businesses. It is more likely that agreements or the formation of relatively weak opposition alliances can occur when this burden is small or delayed. The establishment of a long-term national reduction target in South Korea is an example of the formation

18 Climate policy networks in South Korea 299 of a weak opposition alliance because stakeholders were able to agree easily that there was no immediate economic threat. Even though the interests of policy actors differ, a common policy goal can be achieved if the policy actors involved recognize the state of the country in global society and understand international pressure as well as the urgency of combating climate change. In addition, it is essential for the government to exert proactive leadership for climate policies in mediating the growth and environmental networks. It is important to boost the environmental network in order to overcome the alliance of growth networks that oppose (or at least, are reluctant to carry) the immediate economic burdens associated with combating climate change. A more proactive response for combating climate change would establish open policy-making processes for environmental network actors and provide economic opportunities for climate actions. There is a limit to the answers produced by the descriptive SNA and literature review undertaken in this study in response to the question of what determines the shape of a network. The identified determinants the scientific discourse of the international science community and the IPCC, and the diplomatic pressure placed on the South Korean government by global climate negotiations were established merely by inferring their identity from a discourse analysis and comprehensive review of previous studies. Therefore, none of the claims presented in this study should be considered conclusive. The driving factors addressed in this study do not necessarily imply a causal relationship with the structural patterns of climate policy networks. Rather, actors beliefs and attitudes regarding these factors must be formally and statistically tested to see if they work as real driving factors in the formation of climate policy networks. By adopting more advanced statistical models such as the exponential random graph model (ERGM), the driving factors of network formation will be tested statistically and identified. It is acknowledged here that this study, which was based on a descriptive SNA, has its limitations. Future studies on South Korea using climate policy network analysis will need to utilize the quantitative and stochastic ERGM to statistically address the question of what drives climate policy network formation. Acknowledgement This work was supported by the National Research Foundation (NRF) Grant funded by the Korean Government (Ministry of Education, MOE) (NRF B00013). References Davies, R. (2009). The use of social network analysis tools in the evaluation of social change communications. Retrieved from The-Use-of-Social-Network-Analysis- Tools-in-the-Evaluation-of-Social-Change-Communications-C.pdf Desmarais, B. A., & Cranmer, S. J. (2012). Micro-level interpretation of exponential random graph models with application to estuary networks. Policy Studies Journal, 40, Dohler, M. (1991). Policy networks, opportunity structure and neo-conservative reform strategies in health policy. In B. Marin & R. Mayntz (Eds.), Policy networks: Empirical evidence and theoretical consideration (pp ). Boulder, CO: Campus Verlag, Westview Press.

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