How Mafia Works: An Analysis of the Extortion Racket System 1

Transcription

1 How Mafia Works: An Analysis of the Extortion Racket System 1 Antonio La Spina 1, Giovanni Frazzica 2, Valentina Punzo 3, Attilio Scaglione 4 1 LUISS alaspina@luiss.it 2 UNIPA giovanni.frazzica@unipa.it 3 UNIPA valentina.punzo@unipa.it 4 UNIPA attilio.scaglione@unipa.it ABSTRACT In this document, we will present an analysis of quali-quantitative data on Extortion Rackets in Sicily. The second section provides an introduction to the interpretative framework on Extortion Racket Systems (ERSs). Therefore, the third section takes into account the methodological issues in the collection and analysis of data on extortions. The fourth and five sections offer an analysis on the types of extortion and the correspondent behaviour of the victims, followed by a focus on the process of extortion. An overview of the case-studies analysis on mafia-type organizations ends the document. 1. Executive summary In the document a summary of quali-quantitative data and analysis on Extortion Rackets in Sicily is presented. Firstly, an introduction to the interpretative framework on Extortion Racket Systems (ERSs) is provided. Connections between ERS and mafia-type organizations, as well as normative questions related to the crime of extortion into the criminal justice system are highlighted. Extortions can be exerted by both individuals and criminal organizations. The analysis aims to explain differences among types of extortion 1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/ ) under grant agreement n , GLODERS Project.

2 racket systems, both from a sociological and a legal point of view, in order to highlight the necessary conditions and features of the extortions carried out by a mafia-type organization. Elements which characterize a criminal organization as a mafia-type organization (MTO) are then discussed. Secondly, the document deals with the methodological issues in the collection and analysis of data on extortions. A study of extortion, as well as an analysis of its spreading with reference to different concrete forms of extortion, requires a complex collection of data and information about the properties of criminal organizations on the one hand and socioeconomic and cultural aspects of territorial contexts on the other. Analysis of the case data on extortions had been undertaken utilising a quali-quantitative approach. An analysis on the types of extortion and the correspondent behaviour of the victims is followed by the focus on the process of extortion. An overview of the case-studies analysis on mafia-type groups ends the document. 2. Introduction on Extortion Racket Systems Extortion can be exerted by individuals, or more frequently by organized groups. Only in some cases such groups (which we label extortion racket systems: ERSs) are mafia-type organizations. To be engaged in extortion in a stable way is one of the essential features of mafia-type organizations. On the other hand, there can be an organization whose only aim is extortion, or which practices extortion among some other activities, but it is not a mafiatype organization. We face a mafia-type organization (MTO) when the following elements are present. 1) A MTO controls a given territory, normally in a monopolistic way. Such territory falls under its jurisdiction. There are boundaries which separate different jurisdictions. The MTO exerts extortion towards economic agents which operate in that territory, either because they stay there in a stable way (e.g. a shopkeeper whose only shop is physically located in that jurisdiction; or a shop which is a branch of a chain with the same brand, and is located in that territory), or because they are doing a significant piece of work there (e.g. a building contractor which is repairing a block). This does not mean that all economic agents which are significantly present in that territory at a given time will undergo extortion. There is a selection. The first criterion for such a selection relates to the type of economic activity. A shop, a bar, a supermarket, a housebuilder, a craftsman most of the times will be required to pay. An engineer or an architect or a computer scientist most of the times will not be asked to pay, albeit their office is located in that territory. A second criterion can be the ethnic one: in a given territory only economic agents who belong to a given ethnicity are asked to pay (and sometimes not all of them,

3 because of the first criterion). Thirdly, exemptions granted to some economic agents (occasionally or in a stable way) are possible. 2) A MTO asks some economic agents for money (the pizzo in a strict sense) 2, or also for other goods or services which anyway have a monetary worth ( I am referring to goods or services in kind.) Some other times economic agents are forced to hire personnel imposed by the MTO, or to buy some goods of services from some suppliers at some conditions fixed by the MTO. Other types of cooperative behaviour (such as the readiness to give help or shelter to a fugitive) might be required as well. However, this is not requested by anybody, because a high degree of reliability is required. It is possible that the MTO enters in the management of a given firm and eventually substitutes the entrepreneur, which maybe continues to act as a man of straw, while substantive decisions are taken by MTO members. These cases are much less frequent compared to those in which the economic agent remains independent and is only required to pay money or to deliver the above said responses in kind. Secondly, if an economic agent is totally expropriated the very ground for extortion vanishes altogether. MTOs ask for the pizzo in its various forms, and offer protection in return. This is a necessary feature of MTOs, but not of all ERSs. Other ERSs, different from MTOs, might not offer protection at all. 3) In some cases the MTO protects the same goods that the State is supposed to protect. This means for example that the persons and the assets which belong to a given productive unit will be safeguarded against unlawful conducts such as violence or theft. In other cases the MTO protects economic actors against lawful behaviours. For instance, a MTO can intimidate the competitors of its protege. Here the damage suffered by the protege would be lawful (and socially desirable), but the MTO, together with their complicits, distorts the proper functioning of the market. Another possibility is that a MTO safeguards economic activities which are themselves illegal (e.g. the production or exchange of counterfeited goods, or the illicit disposal of special waste). Parallel markets and submerged economic activities are protected by MTOs against controversies which can arise between contractors, or against disturbing interferences from public authorities. The possible reaction of economic actors who are asked to pay the pizzo is threefold: either they pay (although they would not like to do so), or they pay and in addition they cooperate with a MTO so to receive some improper advantage, or they refuse to pay and choose to resist the racket. We call the first group acquiescents, the second complicits, the third one resistants (Centorrino, La Spina, Signorino 1999): 2 Pizzo means the amount of money required by mafia to the firms for ensuring protection.

4 Acquiescents, receive a cost that they are unwilling to bear. They might as well receive an unwanted benefit (protection). Complicits, as we have seen, receive improper advantages thanks to their cooperation with MTOs. They can be shielded from competition or protected while they engage in unlawful behaviours or transactions. Resistants refuse to pay the pizzo. 4) MTOs' members are expected to obey to the law of silence (omertà). The term omertà, etymologically connected to being a strong man, took in the usual meaning of a specific attitude to silence and secrecy even in adverse conditions. In a so called traditional area, area in which a MTO is embedded, as Sicily is, the term omertà refers to the attitude (or also a sort of law) to keep reticent in front of the investigators, and more generally, the reluctance to confide in strangers. The law of silence, is seen one of the distinguishing characteristics assigned to the Mafia, together with violence. The same applies for complicits. Also acquiescents tend to comply with the law of silence. We said that MTO are secret. At the same time, their presence in a given territory must be widely recognized, as well as their agents must be recognizable. 5) A MTO exerts a monopoly on a given territory, unless there is a conflict with another MTO. There can even be an agreement for the division of labor among two or more organizations (and one of them is an MTO). For instance, the MTO can import drugs and a different and smaller organization might push them. 6) MTOs frequently entertain or try to relationships with some members of the local political elite (politicians, civil servants). MTOs are especially interesting because they can mobilize political support. They do so in the areas in which they are traditionally embedded, or also outside those areas, with those people who have a feeling for them (some relatives, some members of the same ethnicity, some of the economic actors who normally deal with them). Besides extortion today all MTOs perform other types of productive activities. Some of these activities are normally more profitable than extortion itself: drug trafficking, sometimes also gambling, gunrunning, and so on. If an organization gives up extortion altogether, it will not be a MTO anymore. The stable and recognized practice of extortion in a given territory is the hallmark of MTOs. Not only because extortion is more o less profitable, but because it is extortion itself and the territorial control which goes with it that gives MTOs a distinctive trait (differentia specifica: Gambetta 1992) and a para-political character. A MTO can be big and complex. It can encompass several sub-units, which might be located in various territories. If sub-unit b which is located in territory y does not practice extortion at all (because it acts through other means), but it remains closely linked to the mother unit a, which operates in territory x, both b and a must be deemed a MTO (the same one),

5 provided that the mother unit a continues to practice extortion in a systematic way. But if sub-unit b sewers its previous links to the mother unit a, and continues not to practice extortion in a systematic way, it will become a new and autonomous criminal organization, but not a MTO anymore. 7) MTOs are professional organizations (or professional bureaucracies) in Mintzberg's sense (1983). Therefore, their crucial components are the professionals, which must be able to perform heuristic, non standardizable, discretionary tasks. Men of honour are such professionals. Therefore, they must possess peculiar inclinations, they must have experienced a long and demanding training, they must be chosen through selective cooptative procedures. Extortion itself is implemented through non-routine, creative decisions, which must be tailored to the case at hand. Mafia-men should be able to communicate, to limit the use of violence to extreme cases, to choose the right ways of threathening, and so on. Professionals are a strength and a weakness at the same time. They are a strength because a professional organization is able to work in sophisticated, adaptive, skilful and effective ways. It can be a weakness because when one or more professionals are lost (possibly because they are in jail) it is very difficult to replace them properly. 8) A crucial resource for MTOs and their members is reputation (see i.e. Gambetta 1992) Reputation entails the expectation that they are ready to use violence, but also other things such the above said monopolistic or overarching position. In a sense, mafia-men want to appear friendly and fair to their clients. They emphasize that they are offering a service and that their reserve a reward. Often the amount of the pizzo is bargained. 9) MTOs can be small, medium or large. The large ones are not monolythic unitary structures, but rather federations of units (cosche, famiglie, locali) which maintain a substantial degree of autonomy. Such units (and the federation as well) are democratic (which is typical for professional bureaucracies). Professional men of honour regard themselves as peers. Their leaders must be legitimized from below. MTO have stable, resilient structures (Gambetta 1992; La Spina 2005). They have recurrent costs, revenues, budgets. They must guarantee the welfare, the social security for members and their families. This means that when some of them are in prison, the MTO will pay legal expenses as well as allowances for the convict's relatives. Sometimes to face such cash outflows is easy, some other times it becomes difficult. In historical periods in which MTOs experience tolerance and impunity, they prosper and become richer and richer, more and more powerful, more and more professional, more and more differentiated. If on the contrary they are attacked by public bodies, MTOs go under stress, lose essential members, see their assets seized and confiscated. MTOs can be defeated.

6 Apart from the struggle against them fought by public authorities, another thing is crucial: the behaviour of economic actors. If those who resist became a large number, the demise of MTOs becomes more probable. 3. Methodological issues on quali-quantitative data on extortions 3.1 Data sources on extortion racket systems A study of extortion, as well as the analysis of its spreading with reference to different concrete forms of extortion, requires a complex collection of data and information about the properties of criminal organizations on the one hand and socio-economic and cultural aspects of territorial contexts on the other. Starting from this perspective, the specific aim of the empirical research on case studies of extortions is to deepen the knowledge on the Extortion Racket Systems in a territorial area in which mafia-type organization is embedded. So far, most of research on ERS aimed to measure the quantum of extortions (La Spina 2008; Di Gennaro, La Spina 2010). In this perspective, several surveys tried to quantify the amount of money and goods extorted in Italy (e.g. surveys conducted by CENSIS with Bnc Fondation, 2003; SOS Impresa 2007; Eurispes 2007), through the means of victimization studies. Thousands of entrepreneurs have been interviewed in order to address their perception about the spread of extortion in a specific territorial area. This kind of methodological approach does not seem adequate to measure the impact of extortions as the data obtained cannot be considered reliable (La Spina 2008). Recently, empirical research on ERS tried to overcome some of the limitations of current surveys, employing other empirical sources to measure the impact of ERS (Chinnici Foundation 2008; Chinnici Foundation 2010; Transcrime 2013). The analysis of judicial documents, containing official results of judicial investigations (conducted through wiretaps, depositions by collaborators with justice, patrimonial surveys, analysis of documents detected to Mafiosi etc...), seem to be a more objective source of information about ERS then the victimization surveys and to offer a more realistic picture of the phenomenon of extortion. Following this methodological approach, the collection of empirical sources has been crucial in order to enrich the quality of empirical evidence and to deepen the knowledge about ERSs. It could not be enough to know the quantum of the extortion, that s why we focused our empirical study on the dynamics of the process of extortion. Our main research questions were: how extortion process takes place; which kind of actors the process of extortion involves; which are the factors that intervene into the process and under which conditions extortions are exerted; which are the main characteristics of mafia-

7 type organizations that affect their embeddedness into the traditional areas and in which way extortions are exerted by mafia type organizations. In order to answer these questions, our empirical research followed two different directions: o Interviews with victims of extortions, judges, members of anti-racket association, etc.; o Analysis of judicial sources. As for interviews, we conducted in-depth interviews with entrepreneurs who reported the crime of extortion to the police. We also interviewed judges involved in anti-mafia investigations. Concerning the judicial sources, we collected judicial documents related to the most important anti-racketeering law operations conducted in Sicily against mafia-type organization between 2007 and Specifically we selected the following judicial documents: Eleio Nuove Alleanze The End Addiopizzo 5 Hybris Grande Padrino Araba Fenice Atropos Argo Alexander The analysis of the above mentioned judicial documents has been conducted following two different types of investigation. On the one hand we gathered information about the cases of extortion reported into the judicial documents in order to construct a data-base on extortions. Specifically, we collected and analyzed more than 150 cases of extortion (actual or attempted), for a total of 154 cases of extortion. On the other hand we focused on the structure of criminal organization conducting a case study analysis on the mafia-type groups (or families) involved in extortions. We analyzed 10 case-studies of mafia-type organizations (MTOs) emerged from the database: six of whom are active in the city of Palermo, the remaining four in the province (three cases concern the province of Palermo, one the province of Trapani).

8 3.2 The structure of the data-base on extortions The data-base on racketeering containing cases of extortion from 2007 up to 2013 got more than 150 cases of (actual or attempted) extortion. The data-base includes quali-quantitative data on extortions in order to offer a representation of the phenomenon not only in quantitative terms but also in a qualitative way. Specifically, quantitative data related to the amount of extortion were associated with qualitative information on the process of extortion, the kind of actors involved and the dynamics by which it arises: types of intimidations, presence of negotiation, types of mediator, etc.. A description of the structure of data-base follows. Districts involved in the data-base are the following: Tab Distribution of cases of extortion per province/district Province/district Number of cases Bergamo 1 Catania 1 Palermo 139 Trapani 13 Total 154 Data for each case of extortion have been processed. The data-base consists of a matrix in which on every row a case of extortion is presented, and in columns various identifying data. Below we list the variables considered. 1. Progressive number; 2. Document type: this type of variable refers to the source (judicial documents) from which we extracted data about each extortion; 3. Name of extortionist; 4. Position in the mafia-type organization (i.e. He has a leadership role within the family or not; he can be the linked to the boss of a certain part of the city or not, and so on); 5. The name of the mandamento ; 6. Name of the victim of the extortion request; 7. Name of company extorted; 8. Description of the company. In this case, the database contains a variety of information on the characteristics of the company and its geographical location, such as its local address. 9. Kind of extortion. In this case is specified if the extortion is just attempted or actual.

9 10. The frequency of payment. The request may include an extortion payment only, or more payments during special occasions. Extortion often involves the payment of a monthly tax. 11. Amount in cash or other charges for the victim; 12. Presence or absence of intimidation. In this case the type of intimidation is specified. Some of intimidation may be addressed to the physical person, with threatening or other, sometimes intimidation may include damage to the premises; 13. Kind and characteristics of direct contact (if there is a direct contact) by the criminal. Sometimes the employer contacts the mafia to pay protection money. Nowadays it is ever more rare, but it can happen, sometimes just after intimidation or damage to the property; 14. Negotiation. Often, following an extortion request a negotiation occurs. This helps to reduce the amount of money to pay or just to delay in time the payment; 15. If there is negotiation, the database provides a brief description; 16. Presence of a mediator. Sometimes it may be a colleague who plays the role of the good fiend who pretends tries (trying) to resolve the conflict between the criminal and the victim; 17. Brief description of mediation; 18. Kind of the victim's behaviour (acquiescent, resistance, or conniving); 19. Presence of complaint. In this case the information concerns the presence or absence of a spontaneous complaint by the entrepreneur who reports the crime to the police. 20. If there is a complaint, brief description of the situation by the explanation of punishment, if there is an explicit punishment. 3.3 Features and structure of the interviews with entrepreneurs During the project we also interviewed entrepreneurs who have spontaneously denounced to the police the criminal who asked them for protection money. We contacted more than thirty people. So far 15 of them have allowed to be interviewed and, at the same time, the recording of the answers on digital media. Currently, we are continuing to interview and contact other entrepreneurs. So far, we have carried out fifteen in depth interviews according to the design presented below. Interview to entrepreneurs 1. What is the market sector in of your business? 2. When the extortion request happened for the first time and how long time you had to pay if you decided to pay? 3. Can you tell us exactly what happened?

10 4. By what means you have been contacted by the Mafia? 5. Have you been threatened? If yes, what kind of threats? 6. Why did you decide to denounce? 7. What happened after? 8. Do you know people who have been punished after denouncing? 9. You think useful anti-racket associations? 10. Are you a member of some anti-racket association? 11. In your opinion, when someone mentions the cost of extortion what does he mean? And how might the costs of extortion be distinguished? 12. In your opinion, how much extortion has affected (or would affect) in absolute on a total financial statements of your company? 13. In your opinion, could the entrepreneur get benefits if he decides not reporting the extortion request? What kind of benefits? 14. In your opinion, what are the most affected area? 15. In your opinion, what are the most common crimes suffered by Sicilian companies? 16. According to you, How much widespread is the phenomenon of extortion? 17. What measures should the State select to combat the phenomenon of extortion? 18. What measures could / should the company follow to limit the phenomenon of extortion? 19. In your opinion, what measures should associations take to protect enterprises and limit the phenomenon of extortion? 20. Have you ever received support from the State? If so, when and under what terms? 21. What do you think about the proposal of the Vice- President of Confindustria (Entrepreneurs Italian Association) to use the army to control the construction sites? 22. What do you think about the possibility of punishing employers who pay protection money? 23. In your opinion, should the anti-racketeering legislation provide for more severe penalties than currently planned?

11 4. Types of extortion and the behavior of the victims As we know, in many cases, the information comes from investigations carried out through video monitoring and environmental interception or by statements of law collaborators. Lawful interceptions of communications has made possible to gather very important information about the dynamics that characterize how criminal organizations work. This information has allowed the law enforcement agencies and those who oppose the criminal phenomenon to achieve important results in the fight against Mafia-type organizations. Tab. 4.1 Types of extortion Kind of extortion Number of cases Actual 100 Undetectable 3 Attempted 51 Total 154 The use of wire-taps and bugs are, therefore, vital tools without which it would probably not have been possible to achieve the results now apparent to everyone. In fact, only 20 entrepreneurs (in the database analyzed so far) reported spontaneously the crime to the police. The role of institutions and police forces is consequently crucial. Often the victim is called to confirm what police already know. The construction industry and the retail trade are the sectors most affected by extortion racket. The discovery of the accounting records and the testimony of a witness for justice induce victims to admit that they were subjected to extortion. The number of cases and their distribution depend on the availability of the judicial documents that we have collected so far. Ta b. 4.2 The places of extortion Town Frequency Isola delle Femmine 1 Alcamo 2 Altavilla Milicia 1 Bagheria 4 Balestrate 4 Baucina 2 Bergamo 1 Calatafimi/Segesta 2

12 Carini 5 Casteldaccia 2 Castellammare del Golfo 6 Castelvetrano 1 Cinisi 4 Cinisi/Terrasini 1 Catania 1 Ficarazzi 3 Ganci 1 Isola delle Femmine 2 Monreale 1 Palermo 92 Partanna 1 Partinico 5 Santa Flavia 2 Termini Imerese 1 Terrasini 2 Trapani 1 Between Carini and Torretta 1 Villabate 2 Villagrazia di Carini 1 Undetectable 2 Total 154 Before we present some of the data obtained from both the analysis of the database and the interviews conducted, summarize the possible choices of the entrepreneur as a result of extortion request is appropriate. As it is known, the victim of extortion racket system can: a) decide to pay the required sum. In this case there may be a negotiation; b) decide not to pay the required sum, c) pay and not denounce the criminal to the police never, pay first, and only later report the crime to the police. We have also to consider the importance of the factors that can push to denounce the crime (trust, behavior of other entrepreneurs, highprofile arrests, economic factors, such as shortage of cash or a decline in business, existence of forensic evidence, etc.). Below we try to present some evidence useful to enable us to better understand the behavior of the victim of the extortion request.

13 Fig. 4.1 Presence of a complaint by the victim 25 4 No Yes Not clear 125 Fig. 4.2 Sectors of companies extorted With reference to the interviews, in particular, approximately 30 entrepreneurs have been contacted so far. The interviews were analysed according to a qualitative approach, selecting each significant portion of text useful to better understand the behavior of the victims. So far, we have selected the most significant portions of the text with reference to the various topics covered by questions. We carried out in depth interviews and the answers of the entrepreneurs have been recorded on digital media. We asked entrepreneurs to tell us what exactly happened and to describe the extortion request, how they reacted and what happened after they reported the event to the police. We also interviewed two members of the anti-racket associations operating in Sicily and judges. We are continuing performing the interviews and we are even further increasing the database. Before moving on to describe what emerged from the analysis of judicial

14 documents, with particular reference to the reaction of the victims, we focus on the answers to the questions of the interviews to entrepreneurs. According to some witnesses, in some cases, the extortion request, which is not only a monetary transaction, gives rise to a series of "performances". This is possible in a frame already characterized by "weak law" that creates both a certain alteration of the rules of the market and perverse dynamics distorting the economy and inhibiting free competition. As also stressed Lo Bello (2011, p. 30), as president of Confindustria Sicilia: Pollution of the market, which operates in the South and the North, passing through mode in the South known for some time, which are those of the Mafia that you do business, the modus operandi of the mafia is not the market. It is the construction of markets protected and regulated. If we are still prisoners of the myth of the privacy of the citizen, which still has to be guarantee, and we do not put an operation in the field of transparency, linking all information sources that are available in the country, we make a gift to a situation that the country is deteriorating, because the gangs have become a national and international level, and have a significant economic and social importance. Interesting in this regard is the evidence of an entrepreneur who has rebelled against the racket and who, at first, did not find the support of other entrepreneurs, often disillusioned whit regard to repressive actions and the possibility of rescue: "After having received an extortion request, taken from a state of anxiety, I spent days asking everyone I knew for advice on what to do and how to behave. I must say that at that time no one told me: Come with me, I'll help you, go to the police... go to the police... everyone told me: there's nothing to do, either you pay or you can leave. Those who had a shop paid."(sicilian entrepreneur). In addition, the deteriorating economic conditions of the productive industrial unit in Sicily and the limited availability of liquidity, as well as the changing attitude of civil society, associated with the successes achieved by the actions of fighting organized crime, have probably favoured over time the increase of cooperation. Perhaps there is a multiplier effect that favours the choice to cooperate when criminal groups and those responsible for the extortion demand are achieved by proceedings for detention, also for other kind of crime. As has been noted in several cases by the entrepreneurs we interviewed, it may happen, for example, that the entrepreneurs recognizes the person under arrest as their extortionist (which in some cases has already been reported by others) and decides, consequently to report the crime immediately. The obvious consequences on the emotional level are often associated with economic risks, often linked to the obligation in respect of some banking institution from which the entrepreneurs has got on one or more loans for investment.

15 4.1 Possible paths to follow for future analysis The question we ask could be for instance: can we talk about a threshold effect? (i.e. Granovetter, 1978). In this case using a model of collective behaviour developed for situations where actors have to analyze cost and benefits could be interesting. The key concept is that of "threshold": the number or proportion of others who must make one decision before a given actor does so; this is the point where net benefits begin to exceed net costs for that particular actor (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1420). Or, in other cases, can we consider complaints of extortion by using a model that studies the diffusion of innovations (i.e. Bass, 1969). This model could be very useful to try to detect both a coefficient of innovation and a coefficient of imitation in the choice to denounce. In some cases, in fact, the choice of paying, even in particularly reluctant subjects, who initiated the activity independently and not replacing a previous administration of a subject older, may derive (the reference goes to about 15 years ago) from the information obtained during interactions with other stakeholders in the same territory. In many cases, with reference to the decision to report, we can identify push factors and pull factors. In the stories of the witnesses some interesting information came out, not only on the dynamics of extortion, but also about the forms of interaction and the different ways that the relationship between mafia and business can be created. For example, in some cases, these particular relations take on the configuration of services that are in various ways linked with the payment of the imposition by an entrepreneur. Imagine a company (A) who is going to invest in the "territory of competence" of the criminal group, where is already operating another company (B). The exponents of these criminal organizations, often in a friendly way, get in touch with the company that is "in good standing with the payments" and present themselves as those who are able to raise the barriers to entry in the market, perhaps also by requiring the entrepreneur (A) to give up from making the investment. In these cases, the entrepreneur (who somehow has already spoken to use to their advantage the relationship with the criminal groups) has to deal with a scene from the very ambiguous boundaries. In this case, defining how much the behaviour of the entrepreneur is directly pushed by criminal organizations is not easy to understand. Moreover, it has to be considered, that different territories have different consequences on the behaviour of entrepreneurs. In areas where the control of organized crime it is stronger people who complain spontaneously are few.

16 Fig. 4.3 The behavior of entrepreneurs Acquiescent Conniving Resistent Undetectable If, on the one hand, in the short term these entrepreneurs may benefit from a direct advantage, seeing weakened, if not non-existent, the uncertainty arising from the choice of the competitor, on the other hand: "If with the extortion you are a victim, when you interact, ask them and they give, the relationship changes radically: they are even more inside the company than you... You sign a blank check that will be cashed at the times and with methods that you can no longer decide (Sicilian entrepreneur). Resistant entrepreneurs are more likely to denounce than others. The conniving often report the crime to the police only when their affairs were discovered. So, this data has to be analyzed with extreme caution. It is very clear, therefore, that conniving business owners rarely complain or claim to have links with criminal organizations. This mainly happens only when they are forced by strong forensic evidence and they cannot do anything else. Acquiescent Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, do not report almost never until they are discovered or only when a police operation discover the facts. Generally, court evidence come out as a result of the complaints of a resistant businessmen or through wiretaps that permit to initiate investigations. For these reasons, anti-racket associations and the change in attitudes towards organized crime are key factors.

17 Fig. 4.4 Presence of complaint and behaviour of the entrepreneurs As it has came out from the empirical evidence, sometimes the Mafia-type organizations act in the management of the company. There are often favours, which sometimes also involve the mediation with the employees in the presence of corporate conflicts of various kinds. The reference is, in this context, the different strategies adopted by the entrepreneur and that make him an acquiescent, resistant or conniving (La Spina, 1999). Fig. 4.5 Frequency of imposition and victim's behavior (No one-off: regular imposition, One-off: una tantum, N.d.: not defined, undetectable)

18 Generally extortion is done through the periodic payment of a tax, two or three times a year, corresponding during the major holidays. For the construction industry and for companies that work with public contracts or with large amount of money, a percentage of the total amount is usually requested only once. If the frequency of imposition and victim's behaviour are obviously different, in some cases it was reported that the extortion are hidden behind the imposition of some works which in some cases are regularly invoiced. An employer, for example, reports that in 2000 he took over a holding already started, in which there were costs for routine maintenance on a monthly basis to 1,000. "They made me a bill of 1000 per month for routine maintenance... it was the" vigilance"" (Sicilian entrepreneur). In other cases, as is well known, the imposition of money is flanked by forms of taxation of labour that hinder even more free competition and economic rationality. In particular, it is common to find out that in such contexts some companies refuse to carry out certain activities, as renovate a building or do others jobs, just in order not to obstruct the conniving company. In recent years the number of complaints of extortion and related offenses (such as damage and intimidation) has significantly increased. Almost always, the criminals recourse to some form of intimidation. In many cases, the entrepreneur is a victim of intimidation. Fig. 4.6 The Presence of intimidation 5 10 No Yes Undetectable 139 Of course, next to the dissemination of the achievements and next to the efforts of trade associations, we can found a number of facts that suggest the presence of some factors that activate mechanisms of multiplication and argues in favour of increased sense of security. This also thanks to the spread of anti-mafia who have found force in the younger

19 generations. For entrepreneurs who are resistant, the presence of a mediator is more widespread. Often he is another trader who plays the role of the good friend. Fig. 4.7 Presence of the mediator and the victim's behaviour Undetectable yes no 6 The representation of the payment as something almost necessary is replaced by a representation of the choice to pay as a factor of guilt, especially to young people and to the children educated in the values of legality and respect for the rules. In particular, in some areas, as reported by some entrepreneurs, it is the decision of the first entrepreneur (we might call him innovator) to set off a reaction of others, who, until then intimidated by the possible repercussions, decide to cooperate with the police. The choice of colleague at this point seems to constitute one of the factors of thrust that results in action with higher probability, where it is obvious a condition in which there is no risk to be punished. "Loneliness was the first problem. Nobody talked about it. The word pizzo was banned. Until four years ago, the word pizzo could not be said. I was among the first to denounce. I did a clear complaint and I indicated the people who asked me the pizzo. Than I explained my reasons and immediately after me more or less ten entrepreneurs reported the crime to the police, because they knew that they were the same people (Sicilian Entrepreneur). It seems that the behavior of individual entrepreneurs is linked both to the choice of others and networks of relationships in the area. But on this issue we obviously need more data. The construction of the time series would probably be helpful. Someone said that there are young entrepreneurs who were sure that they had never paid protection money. They knew about the presence of the practice to meet the demand of extortion in the company from his father, a businessman before them, who, on his deathbed, confessed who has to have always paid secretly. They are individuals, who then promptly denounced. If it is true that the damage and the punishments that follow the refusal to pay are some of the factors that push

20 the entrepreneur to pay, it is also true that in certain situations such decisions produce perverse effects (Boudon, 1977) certainly unwanted by the criminal organizations. Also the social representations of mafia-type organizations may influence the behaviour of the victims of extortion. For instance, the way in which the relationship between the suspected or confirmed members of criminal organizations and members of institutions is discussed is very a important factors because it can act in the construction of trust in the State and in the power of police. We may add that the current economic situation, which has greatly reduced the liquidity of companies, is also another factor that correlated with the foregoing, encourage the choice to report the crime to the police. Then there are those who denounce as a result of having suffered damage. This is the case of the head of a small shop. He took the decision after having undergone some robberies just to intimidate. In these cases, of course, next to a predisposition to cooperate with law enforcement, the fear that has always played in favor of the criminal organizations is now configured as another pushing factor. All interviewees who decided to cooperate with law enforcement in order to see even protected their own safety, said that the availability of those responsible for the protection from retaliation is very high. There are also those who claim that attended to cracking of neighborly relations and relations with other members of his family due to cultural factors. However, they are very few. Most of them admitted that the decision was taken by common agreement with other members of the family. In specific cases, some people reported that they have stopped their business, not only for the repercussions which had met after the denounce, but also as a result of the change in the attitude of traders who insist on the same sidewalk. In these cases, when the directors of the companies are not elderly and reluctant to change, the possibility of cooperation is higher. At least for the people we interviewed, the decision to denounce the crime was also a moral choice. I did it mainly for my children [...] I was embarrassed for them. How is it possible, after having brought up to respect the rules and the civicness, say to his son: There's Uncle Pino and every month you have to give him an envelope with 2000 (Sicilian entrepreneur). Finally, as a result of interviews that have been conducted so far, on the basis of the recent increase in complaints, as well as on the basis of several empirical evidence we notice that at first there is a very small number of isolated individuals who agree to cooperate with law enforcement. Over time the number of complaints has considerably increased. As we have already written, some people, clearly encouraged by the changing environmental conditions, said that shortly after their action, many others have decided to report the crime, noting that in many cases the protection offered by the police prevented future punishments.

21 5. The process of extortion: intimidation, negotiation, and demand In this section, an analysis of the quali-quantitative data on the process of extortion, collected into the data-base on racketeering in Sicily, is presented. The process of extortion can be analyzed as a dynamic process emerging by actions of actors - both mafiosi and extortees - who interact each others in different contexts of interaction (Sciarrone 2009). Then, actions and interactions between actors (mainly extorters, extortees, mediators, etc..) give rise to (or we can say generate ) different extortion paths, which is possible to identify. Starting from a bottom up perspective, the process of extortion grows up by different kinds of interactions. Specifically, the process of extortion can be analytically examined as a dynamic process involving different phases (see Fondazione Chinnici 2008; 2010), which, from a conceptual point of view, come about at different steps of the process. Three ideal phases can be distinguished (see Table 5.1) and each one is influenced by the interaction between extorters and extortees. The main phases of the extortion process can be summarized as follows: at first there is the first approach/intimidation phase, secondly there is the negotiation phase; finally there is the proper phase of demand (or consumption). The three phases can not be viewed in a consequential way, as, for example, after the initial request made by the extorter, intimidation may also occur, as a consequence of the extortee s behaviour/choice. Starting from this perspective, an analysis of the main characteristics underlying the process of extortion, as it emerges from the data on extortions, follows. Table 5.1 The process of extortion First approach/intimidation Negotiation Demand/Consumption o Threat or Use of violence o Warning/damage o Against property/against people o Bargaing (present/absent) o Mediated/unmediated o Predatory/protective o Episodic/periodic o In cash/in goods o Selective/systematic Each phase shows some intrinsic characteristics. The first approach/intimidation represents the first contact between the Mafioso and the victim. This phase always involves the threat or use of violence. In fact, one of the main aspects of the mafia power is the proper use - actual or potential - of violence (Gambetta 1992). It (the use of violence) is seen as an instrument of a broader strategy put in place by those boss Mafiosi, named by Catanzaro (1993) «entrepreneurs of violent protection». The possibility, hidden but systematic and known in advance to the parties, of the use of violence by Mafiosi is, in fact, the main difference between a mafia-type criminal organization and

22 other criminal organizations (La Spina 2005). Moreover the use of violence characterizes the first as professional organizations (Ibidem). Summarizing, in providing protection, the Mafia relies on three key resources: information, violence, reputation (Matsueda 2013). Specifically the use of violence, or its threat, is included in the definition of organized crime (see Cressey 1996). Moreover, the use of violence can acquire a prevalent symbolic meaning, when for example intimidations carried out by the Mafioso to induce entrepreneurs to pay extortion acquire the form of warnings which cause little damage to the firm (for example the practice of filling the shop s bolts and locks with glue). On the contrary, the acts of intimidation, may be far more serious turning into real damages, such as attacks or arson (see Scaglione 2008; Daniele 2009; La Spina and Lo Forte 2006; Vaccaro 2012). Scaglione has distinguished the damages into symbolic damages and material damages (2008: 89), in relation to the behavior of entrepreneurs. Indeed, «the extortion activity is exerted with a proper sense of proportion: it is articultaed in relation to the resistance of the victim and it can never be a gratuitous act» (ibidem). Then, symbolic damages aim to scare the victim and to solicit the payment. In the case in which the entrepreneur unwilling to the mafia warnings, then, «the criminal organization proceeds to the realization of a series of material damages, with a growing entity, stopping only in front of the fulfillment of their requests» (ibidem). In this perspective, the distinction between intimidation as warnings and intimidation as damages, both exerted against people and against property, can be useful to better collocate the different types of intimidations into the archetypical process of extortion. Warning (yes/no) Request Pay or not pay Damage (yes/no) Warnings and damages can be distinguished on the basis of a temporal sequence, as the warning comes before the request. On the contrary, the damage comes after the request and it is always retaliatory - that is intended to punish the employer for the failure to pay. Damages, in terms of costs, are often greater than the demand of pizzo measured in monetary terms. In the case of damages, «the only rule followed is that of gradually increasing» (Ibidem), where «In the face of the obstinacy of the victim to not pay, retaliation may be even more serious» (Ibidem). Thus, while warnings have typically a low cost, that is: the damage caused by warning are minimal (i.e. shattered windows), those caused by damages as retaliation for failure to pay have a high cost that overcomes the demand for money itself (i.e. vandalistic raid). The pizzo is, therefore, the tax that entrepreneur must pay to live and work without any inconvenience. Some scholars emphasize the need for protection as a reason relevant to pay the pizzo (Gambetta, 1993; Kumar and Skaperdas, 2008; Krkoska and Robeck 2009). Actually,

23 it is connected to the fear of reprisals (Comitato Addiopizzo 2008), since it is generally paid as a consequence of an extortive pressure by a MTOs. Indeed, mafia artificially creates its own demand for protection exercising an authoritarian and threatening power over the territory. The reference to protection is plausibly related to the nature of pizzo. It wants to communicate the power of clan, but also to reassure. In this way, the collector of the pizzo, asking every week or every month a sum of money, becomes, in time, a sort of member of the family helpful in solving for any kind of problem, relying on his relationships in business network, to entrust the resolution of disputes (Confesercenti 2012). In Table 5.2 we summarized different types of acts of intimidation. Table. 5.2 The first approach/intimidation phase As for the negotiation phase, it can be mediated or not by a third subject who acts the role of a mediator. Moreover, in some cases, it can involve a bargaining between extorter and extortee. Finally, concerning the third phase of the demand (or consumption), different forms of extortion request can be distinguished (Monzini 1993; Sciarrone 2009; Scaglione 2008). Firstly, the demand of extortion can be distinguished into a predatory or protective type (Scaglione 2008). It can also exhibits an episodic or periodic request of money or, in some cases, of goods or services (ibidem). Moreover the demand of extortion can be made to all entrepreneurs, who operate in a specific territorial area, subjected to the mafia control, or only to some selected entrepreneurs. The latter means a selective demand of extortion. Specifically, the strategy of Cosa Nostra in the management of extortion has changed over time, in favor of systematic requests (often also of little amount) towards all entrepreneurs,

24 following a strategy of gradual extension of the imposition of the pizzo to the economic agents, following the rule of the pay little, but pay all consisting of the so-called strategy of recovery carpet of pizzo, though in proportion to the economic capacity of each economic operator. As for the Demand phase (see Table 5.3), the extortive request can be periodic, when the request is continuative during time (i.s. once at Christmas, Easter, etc..) or episodic i.s. (Una tantum). Although the extortion of payments from legitimate business enterprises by mafia families is an old phenomenon which has not changed its substance over time, the forms of extortion followed the evolution of the economic system becoming in some cases, more flexible (Confesercenti 2012). Indeed, these payments can also be made in the form of goods or services, or certain conditions are imposed on business management, such as preferred suppliers and personnel to be hired (Anderson 1995). Then, Demand can be distinguished into a parasitic request, when extorters get something from the extortees (money or goods). On the contrary, in the case of active demands, extorters impose some personal performance (i.e. supplies, purchase of products and services, purchase of video poker machines, recruitment of employees, etc.). Table 5.3 Demand/Consumption phase In the next section an overview of the first approach/intimidation process, as it emerges from the quali-quantitative data on racketeering in Sicily will be presented. The data-base containing more than 200 hundred cases of extortion collected on the basis of the evidence coming from judicial proceedings in different Sicilian provinces and interviews, allows for

25 the observation of the features of extortion rackets in Sicily. In fact, a study of extortion as well as the analysis of its spreading with reference to different concrete forms of extortion requires a complex collection of data and information about the properties of criminal organizations on the one hand and socio-economic and cultural aspects of territorial contexts on the other. 5.1 First approach/intimidation Intimidation is widespread. Almost every case of extortion presents a case of intimidation, where intimidation is present in 89% cases of extortion (see Fig 5.1). As it is known, the mafia families exercise a power of intimidation to extort periodic payments from legitimate business enterprises. However, in order to better understand how the process of extortion takes place, the analysis of different types of intimidation is needed. Figure 5.1 Presence of intimidation Firstly, intimidation can be implicit or explicit. In fact, in most cases, intimidation does not involve any use of violence or damages against people or property. In those cases, intimidation is intrinsic, where it is implicit in the presence itself of a Mafioso. It relies on the reputation of the Mafia-men and on the Mafia itself. The presence itself of a Mafia-man, representative of the MTO, represents a form of intimidation which is intrinsic to the characterization of the MTO which entails the expectation of to use violence.

26 Consistently with a widespread implicit intimidation, data show that there is no violence in the 64% of the cases (see Fig. 5.2). Moreover among the 36% cases of explicit intimidation, verbal threat prevails (see Fig. 5.5). Figure 5.2 Implicit and explicit intimidation Combining these empirical evidences, it is possible to suggest the level of reputation held by Cosa Nostra in the district of Palermo. In fact, «reputation is earned by delivering promised protection, which implies keeping promises using information effectively and resorting to violence when necessary» (Matsueda 2013: 312). Reputation for the mafia is an asset that exempts the firm from having to prove quality and reliability in every transaction and also helps shelter from them from competition from other firms. Moreover, according to Gambetta (1993), reputation to the mafia reduces the so called costs of production, where the stronger the reputation the less likely the Mafia will have to use up resources, such as violence, to guarantee protection and to maintain a high reputation and the control of the territory. Thus, the low percentage of explicit intimidations indicated the reputation of the Mafia. Dasgupta (1989) suggested to measure reputation as a dichotomous, rather than continuous, variable. Therefore, the loss of reputation of mafia-men is impossible to remedy, and that is the reason why mafia-men exert punishments to endangering reputation with drastic executions often arranged with horrific and theatrical detail to discourage future opponents (see Chinnici and Santino 1989 in Gambetta 1993: 46). In order to deeply understand the connection between types of intimidation exerted by mafiosi and their reputation, a distinction between intimidation against people and intimidation against property is also made.

27 In this perspective, data suggest that intimidation is almost equally directed both against people and against property. Only a small number of cases (6% out of cases) show the two types of intimidation together. Figure 5.3 Types of intimidation This evidence could be misleading, outside of a consideration of different forms of intimidation against people. Figure 5.4 Warning and damage against people Following the distinction between intimidation as a warning and intimidation as a proper damage (both directed against people and against property), firstly we will analyze the types of intimidation against people. In this regard, only a small number of cases show a

28 proper damage against people (see Fig. 5.4), where in most cases, intimidation against people takes the form of warnings. Specifically, the presence of intimidation against people generally acquires the form of a verbal threat that is a symbolic warning which normally characterizes the first approach started by the Mafioso with the entrepreneur. The value of the warnings in these cases relies on the reputation of the mafia type organization which controls the territorial area. The higher the embeddedness (and also the credibility) of the mafia type organization over the territory is, specifically the mafia-family which controls that territory, the higher the symbolic value of the warnings by the extorter. In fact, as pointed out by Matsueda, even if periodic demonstrations of violence would reinforce the value of the Mafia s reputation, «even in the absence of such demonstrations, reputations persist because customers are unlike to challenge them on account of the high costs of violence» (Matsueda 2013: 312). As a consequence, the request of pizzo acquires the form of a protection-racket (Gambetta 1992, Sciarrone 1999, Santino 2000), where the mechanism of protection-extortion is based on the reputation of Mafioso. Thus, intimidation against people can be viewed as an escalation of acts of intimidation which start from symbolic warnings (mainly verbal threat) and grow up to proper damages such as physical aggression in a fewer number of cases. The distribution of frequency in the case of intimidation against people in fact shows an asymmetric shape in which the largest numbers of cases thickens around the verbal threat and only a relative limited number of cases show a physical aggression. The latter case is almost always associated to cases of resistant behavior against extortion acted by entrepreneurs. Moreover, in the cases of resistance against extortive request, intimidation against people is often accompanied by some form of intimidation against property, mainly arson. Figure 5.5 Intimidation against people

29 In fact, contrary to the intimidation against people, intimidation against property, in most cases takes the form of damage (see Figure 5.6). Only in a relative lesser number of cases (37%) extorters just make warnings against property. Figure 5.6 Intimidation: Warning and damage against property Thus, the most widely form of warning against property is the glue or attack into the locks (46% out of cases) and it always acquires a symbolic meaning. Among the symbolic damages, a common method is «to use young people to place the quick-setting glue type attak in the locks of the shop, the fuel tanks near the firm or gun shells in an envelope, and so on» (Scaglione 2008: 89). Locks with glue can be seen as a mafia brand, which has an high symbolic value whose meaning is that of confirming the presence of the Mafia into the territory with its requests. In fact, one of the initial and first acts by the Mafia against an entrepreneur who refuses to pay pizzo is «to fill the shop s bolts and locks with glue during the night. The next morning, the shop manager has to call for a carpenter or the police to get access to the premises, which results in loss of business» (Vaccaro 2012: 28). Only in a relative few cases warnings are a proper sabotage.

30 Figure 5.7 Warnings against property Among damages against property, data show a prevalence of arson. In most cases arson is perpetrated against cars and only in few cases against shops or houses. Moreover, as for physical aggression in the case of intimidation against people, arson is always associated with a resistant behavior by the victim of extortion. Figure 5.8 Damages against property 5.2 Negotiation As far as the Negotiation phase is concerned, a bargain between extorters and extortees appears only in a few number of cases, where only the 8% out of cases show some sort of negotiation (see Fig. 5.9). Bargain is then absent in almost all cases (where 88% out of cases show no negotiation). In the few cases in which negotiation comes about, the bargain between extorters and extortees deals with the reduction of the initial request or in some

31 cases also with the increase of the time to the payment of the pizzo. In the first case, the bargain often gets the reduction of the initial request up to the 50%. Figure 5.9 Negotiation Moreover, negotiation is almost always unmediated (see Fig. 5.10). Only in few cases the negotiation is managed with the presence of a third subject, who acts the role of mediator. Negotiations between extorters and extortees are then generally direct. Fig Mediated vs. Unmediated negotiation 3 3 The basic population of this figure are those cases in which negotiation takes place (specifically, the 8% out of all cases).

32 Moreover, as for the presence of a third person who mediates the relation between extorters and extortees, only in few cases their interaction is mediated by a third subject (see Fig ). In those limited cases the mediator is often a fellow countryman. Sometimes the mediator is also researched by the victim. It is useful to point out that the presence of a mediator does not mean that some bargain comes about. Where, in most cases, even if there is a mediator, there is no negotiation. Fig Presence of a mediator Demand/consumption The extortion racket is the typical activity of the MTO, as it is the most suitable tool for the control of the territory. Indeed, as pointed out by the literature, there can be extortion without mafia, but there is not (nor there could be) mafia without extortion. According to Monzini «the specificity of extortion is that it continuously penetrates into areas of existing markets, licit or illicit, influencing their operation. Thus, extortion is the criminal activity «bounded to a specific organizational context, which overlaps and which tends to become an integral part: parasitic or symbiotic in its forms, is always linked to the local level» (1993: 1). Different types of extortion can be found in literature, corresponding to different typical methods of request. 4 The basic population of this figure are all cases, not only those in which negotiation takes place.

33 Firstly, the demand can be predatory or protective (Monzini 1993; Sciarrone 2009; Scaglione 2008) on the basis of the strategy implemented by the mafiosi, on the relationship that the MTO establishes with victims/recipients of the extortion request and on the organizational configuration (for a review see also Punzo 2013). Predatory extortion is the simplest form of extortion, which is episodic in nature. Mostly, it is observed in areas characterized by the presence of criminal organizations in disarray and it is generally addressed to wealthy, or also vulnerable, entrepreneurs (Scaglione 2008). To the threat of actions against the property or individuals, follows the monetary request, often disproportionate, where «the extortee has no interest in show and does not assume, therefore, any responsibility to protect entrepreneurs» (Monzini 1993: 15). The threat, therefore, is almost always anonymous, commenced with caution and sometimes crudely and improvised. In this case the consumption of extortion rarely materializes itself in the payment of the amount demanded, and it often ends up with the payment of a minimum amount in goods or in cash (one time), which is generally considerably lower than the initial request. Moreover the demand of extortion can be made to all entrepreneurs, who operate in a specific territorial area, subjected to the mafia control. On the contrary it can be exerted selectively, only to some selected entrepreneurs. Fig Episodic and periodic demand In the case of the protective demand, the aim of the MTO is to maintain the control over the territory through systematic extortions. In this perspective, «it will appear rational to the mafiosi to impose the correspondence of a periodic payment by each extorted, mostly agreed on the basis of the economic possibilities of the victims»(scaglione 2008: 95). In turn «the organization is committed in providing protection from the risk of theft, damage, theft

34 etc..» (Ibidem). The perception of threat, in the case of systematic extortion by the mafia, is very high, such as to place the recipients of the request in a position of subordination or acquiescence. In such cases, the request «tends to maintain a threshold of coexistence and tolerance between criminal organizations and their environment you reference» (Monzini 1993: 17). Among the protective extortion, which typically characterizes the MTO in a given traditional area, different forms and types of demand/consumption have been distinguished (Monzini 1993; Sciarrone 2009; Scaglione 2008). The demand can be an episodic or a periodic request of money or, in some cases, of goods or services. Data show that periodic request is most widespread than the episodic one (see Fig. 5.12) Periodic and episodic demands can also be made in the form of goods or services, or also in the form of certain conditions imposed on the business management, such as preferred suppliers and personnel to be hired. We distinguished the parasitic demand, in which extorters get something from the extortees (money or goods) from active demands, when extorters impose something to the extortees, especially they impose some personal performance: supplies, purchase of products and services, purchase of video poker machines, recruitment of employees, etc... As we can see in Fig. 5.13, the 72% out of a cases entail a parasitic demand of money. Fig Parasitic and active demand Among active demand, imposition of supplies, purchase of products and recruitment of employees are almost equally present.

35 6. Understanding mafia-type organizations: resources, dimensions and leadership styles 6.1 Introduction In this section, we take into account the main characteristics of mafia-type organizations that affect their embeddedness process in Traditional areas (Traditional areas are context with a high density of mafia-type organizations dating back in time). This study moves from empirical evidence collected during the research: interviews with judges, entrepreneurs, etc. and judicial sources analysis. The method adopted is that of the case study. In particular, it focuses on ten mafia-type organizations (MTOs) emerged from the database: six of whom are active in the city of Palermo, the remaining four in the province (three cases concern the province of Palermo, one the province of Trapani). The former include the families of Brancaccio, Borgo Vecchio, Noce, Pagliarelli, Porta Nuova and Tommaso Natale. Among the latter there are the clans of Bagheria, Carini, Castellammare del Golf and Partinico. The antimafia investigations, which allowed us to conduct this study, have been carried out between 2010 and In all cases considered, we take into account territorial contexts characterized by a consolidated long-term presence of mafia phenomenon. Table Case studies emerged from the database Anti-mafia operation name Mafia family City Year Eleio Borgo Vecchio Palermo 2010 The End Partinico Partinico 2010 Addiopizzo 5 San Lorenzo Palermo 2010 Hybris Pagliarelli Palermo 2011 Grande Padrino Carini Carini 2011 Araba Fenice Brancaccio Palermo 2011 Crimiso C. del Golfo C. del Golfo (Trapani) 2012 Atropos Noce Palermo 2012 Argo Bagheria Bagheria 2013 Alexander Porta Nuova Palermo 2013 In this study we consider MTOs as a network of criminal organizations that operate illegally, using different types of resources in order to gain money and power. Most common mafia activities include extortion, drug trafficking, money laundering, loan sharking, counterfeiting, etc. However, the activities of the mafia groups do not end with their engagement in some specific illegal business. Individuals who are part of it form a secret society with clear loyalties and with a defined chain of command. Mafia groups have an organizational structure more or less articulated. They tend to be rooted in a specific local context and to reproduce over time. Mafia-type organizations are able to expand and spread

36 to other areas. Recent judicial investigations have revealed an extensive and pervasive presence of mafia-type organizations in the central and northern Italy. In particular, it has emerged the embedment of the Ndrangheta (Calabrian mafia) in the North-West of the country, especially in Lombardy, Piedmont and Liguria, but reasons for concern also occur in other regions, such as Emilia Romagna, Veneto and Lazio, where groups linked to the Camorra (Neapolitan/Campanian mafia) are involved in several illegal activities. Table 6.2 Types of resources of mafia-type organizations Resources Threat or use of force Cultural capital (codes and values) Social capital (strong and weak ties) Economic capital Running illegal businesses involve the use of different types of resources. The threat or use of force, of course, is the main resource at their disposal, but it is rarely used. The use of violence is never an end in itself and indeed excessive use is rather a sign of weakness. Intimidation is intrinsic in the mafia behavior, and especially in an high mafia density area, such as those of genesis of the mafia phenomenon (e.g. Sicily, Campania, Calabria), it often does not need to occur. Cultural capital is a resource of the utmost importance that has allowed its persistence over time. Mafia organizations are characterized by the ability to manipulate specific cultural codes. These codes often refer to the distortion of values inspired by the Sicilian tradition. The use of these cultural resources is observed for example in the formal observance of traditions and religion (festivities, worship of saints, etc.). Mafia-type organizations also have a large endowment of social capital. The relational resources of the organization can be divided between internal and external. Mafia members tend to establish strong ties inwards and weak ties to the outside. The first are those that characterize the relationships between relatives and close friends, the latter are typical of the relationships that you have with acquaintances: e.g. political representatives, business owners, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and so on. This allows mafia members to place themselves, depending on the circumstances, such as mediators, patrons, protectors in relational structures of different nature that they can use for their own goals. In this regard, it is very important to analyze the interplay between cooperative and conflictual mechanisms. Members of the mafia organizations in general tend to establish a variety of cooperative ties (exchanges, temporary collaborations, permanent alliances) with members of the gray area but also with other criminal groups. However, if the cooperation is not

37 reachable, the dynamics of conflict (competition, obstruction, aggression) may be useful to achieve their goals. Economic capital is obviously a strategic resource. The enrichment is for mafia groups an end but also a means. Through illegal activities, money laundering in the legal economy and the appropriation of public funds, mafia organizations enhance their reputation and increase their power in the territory.

38 Tab. 6.3 Characteristics of the case studies Information Territory Palermo district Province Power Syndicate Enterprise Syndicate Organization Family name Borgo Vecchio Brancaccio Noce Pagliarelli Porta Nuova San Lorenzo Carini C. del Golfo (TP) Bagheria Year Members arrested Extortion/ protection Clientelism/ patronage Control of territory Other illegal activities Legal activities Infiltration in public contracts Leader (Initials) Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s Ye s No No No Ye s Ye s Ye s No No No Monopoly Drug trafficking Robberies No Conflict/ competition Drug trafficking Commercial activities Partinico Competition Competition Monopoly Monopoly Competition Competition Monopoly Conflict Drug trafficking Commercial activities Betting agencies Drug Trafficking Drug trafficking Drug trafficking No No Commercial activities No No Gambling Drug trafficking Drug Trafficking Construction Construction Ye s Commercial No No No No No Ye s No No No No LA LN (AS) FC (SS) GN MA AD GC GP Leadership Democratic Authoritarian Structure Single group hierarchical Relationships Strong ties Ye s Weak ties (Palermo families) Not emerged (Authoritarian) Two s ub-groups autonomous Yes (Palermo families) Authoritarian (Permissive) Two subgroups hierarchical Ye s (Pagliarelli) Permissive Authoritaria n Two subgroups hierarchical Ye s (Sa n Lorenzo e Pagliarelli) (AP) Authoritarian Democratic Democratic Single group hierarchical Ye s (Pagliarelli, Mazara) Sub-groups hierarchical Ye s (Authoritarian) Two groups autonomous Ye s (Palermo families) activities DR (MS) GD LV Democratic (Permissive) Two subgroups autonomous Yes (Trapani families) Permissive Two subgroups hierarchical Yes, Rizzuto (Canada) (FT) Authoritarian Two groups autonomous Ye s (Altofonte) Not emerged Not emerged Not emerged Not emerged Ye s Not emerged Not emerged Ye s Not emerged

39 6.2 Power syndicate and Enterprise syndicate The mafia phenomenon can be analytically distinguished in two large categories that are combined with one another in a variable way: the dimension of the power syndicate and that of the enterprise syndicate. In other words, we can consider, on the one hand, the Mafia as an organization of territorial control and, on the other hand, the Mafia as an organization of illegal activities (Block 1980; Catanzaro 1988a, 1988b; Sciarrone 2009). The two dimensions can be distinguished from each other only analytically. In real life individuals who belong to a group of power are involved in illicit trafficking and groups who manage trafficking may establish a political domain. Yet, we can define criminal groups according to the prevalence of one or the other type of activity. Table 6.4 Two dimensions for understand mafia-type organizations Organization Cosa nostra (Sicilian mafia) Dimension Power syndicate Enterprise syndicate Mechanism Control of the territory Patronage/clientelism Extortion/protection Illegal activities Money laundering in legal economy Appropriation of public funds Mafia groups exert control over the territory. In this respect, mafia-type organizations can be defined as political groups whose funding is based on a parallel system of taxation. Mafiosi are subjects skillful in the supply of protection and in the provision of guarantees to private individuals. Mafia organizations are groups of political power. To hold power does not mean the exert of violence. In this respect, they compete with the State, presenting themselves as protectors. The mechanism of extortion is one of the mechanisms that allow the social recognition of the mafia power, and therefore its dominion on the territory. Mafia power is not directed only towards the upper world but it is also exhibited towards other criminals. They can limit the exercise of violence of other criminals representing themselves as guarantors of order and social stability. This type of activity, which has to do with the sphere of power and politics in the broadest sense, that is, the exercise of the violence as a form of dominion and subordination of a territory, requires a form of centralized organization. The Mafia, as an organization of territorial control, has the need to build up its own military structure. The power of these groups is exercised within the boundaries of the territory in which they operate. In Sicily, the relationships between mafia families are similar to those between states (Catanzaro 1988b). Among them exists the respect of borders and noninterference agreements. The violation of these agreements may lead to a violent clash. Conflictual dynamics can explode also within a mafia group. These conflicts can be originated by the ambition for power of single Mafiosi or sub-groups that are looking for new opportunities or different strategies of action. Anyway, War still seems the ultima ratio 39

40 for resolving conflict. Alongside the activities of power syndicate are those of enterprise syndicate. Mafia families are involved in economic activities on illegal markets. The functioning of these markets, like legal market in general, are very different from the logic of the power (Catanzaro 1988a, 1988b; Sciarrone 2009). These activities are oriented by a business logic. On illegal markets is applied the principle of competition which collides with the strict delimitation of the territorial jurisdiction. Mafia groups try to get to agreements of cooperation, alliances in order to rule the market. The illegal market is ruled by competition, and therefore there is no organization. The activities of the enterprise syndicate derive from the freedom granted to the members of the group to carry out trafficking. These activities entail, especially for large-scale trafficking, such as drugs, the overcoming of the territorial boundaries. Figure 6.1 The division of the territory in Palermo city 40

41 By its nature, the business logic is the logic of the market, which knows no territorial boundaries. In Sicily, during the '70s and '80s, the expansion of drug trafficking has led to an accentuation of these tensions. As a consequence, it has emerged a need to prevent and regulate conflicts between competing groups and families, applying the model of organizational centralization, for the whole field of mafia activities, including trafficking. This attempt has led to the establishment of a superior body to coordinate the mafia families, the so-called "Commission" or "Cupola", to create a global government of criminal activities. In recent years, MTOs have tried to reconstitute a superior body like the commission to regulate the relationship between the different criminal organizations. The case studies analyzed highlight several attempts in this direction. The dynamics of cooperation and conflict are therefore two fundamental coordinates to read the transformations of the Mafia both with respect to the logic of power and to the logic of businesses (Lupo 1993, 1996; Catanzaro 1988b). 6.3 Embeddedness and infiltration Unlike the common organized crime, mafia groups tend to reproduce within a territory over the years. As a general rule, through the activities of power syndicate, the Mafia takes root in a territory (embeddedness), while through the activities of the enterprise syndicate, mafia groups infiltrate the economy (infiltration). The basic mechanism of the embeddedness is the protection. It may take different forms: the protection/extortion mechanism (which concerns the regulation of economic activities licit and illicit); the patronage mechanism, which involves the distribution of goods or services in exchange for votes, goods, services or other benefits; the brokerage mechanism for the resolution of disputes. The protection function concerns in general all those activities which involve the maintenance of the order and the exercise of authority within a territory. On the contrary, the mechanisms of infiltration are: the management of trafficking; the money laundering in legal economic activities; the interception of public funds. Among the typical activities of mafia groups that most distinguishes them is the protectionextortion (Gambetta 1992). The emergence of the system of extortion is a fundamental element for the control of territory. There are, broadly speaking, two forms of extortion / protection. The first requires an active protection, or the establishment of a reciprocal relationship with the extorted. The second one is configured as passive protection, which instead is perceived as a unilateral imposition. Extortion is therefore an activity linked to a specific organizational context and is always tied to the local level. Through extortion mafia fulfills a function of redistribution of resources to the members of the criminal organization. The mechanism of the mediation instead is connected with the function of the Mafiosi as brokers. The role of the mediator is to connect individuals who are at different levels and 41

42 have no ties or direct relationships. Brokers are the strategic nodes of such networks. They manipulate the tensions and conflicts that arise between different groups. They do not operate to eliminate conflicts, but rather they try to preserve these tensions that constitute their power. The broker power thus derives from his ability to act in both spheres in which he operates as a link. The broker takes advantage of the lack of connections or communication between the parties in order to assert his own power. The function of patronage is linked to the previous one. The Mafiosi appear as patrons for the members of the local community. They replace the state in the resolution of many different problems. The patron can act to recover the stolen goods; he can grant permission to sell goods in a square or a street. In return, the Mafioso increases its authority and reputation, achieving consensus on the part of society that can be spent to direct the vote and even to mobilize the entire community against law enforcement. The Mafiosi are very interested in the issue of consensus (Sciarrone 2009). Consensus is a consequence of the mafia services. Mafia groups are a regulatory element of the local society. They attribute to themselves a function of social order. Moreover, mafia groups are very careful about the perception of public opinion. Mafia members try to get consensus, understood in a positive and active way, especially on the part of some political and economic sectors of society. The supply of protection is able to create not only relations of subordination, but also ties active support. In this way, the Mafiosi are able to obtain the cooperation of other actors. Table 6.5 Contextual factors that may favour the reproduction of MTOs in traditional areas Economic An economic structure of small dimensions, little innovative and closed to the outside factors A public sector excessively developed A high level of unemployment The high incidence of the underground economy The high incidence of the illegal economy Cultural The lack of trust in institutions factors A low level of civicness The spread of weak legality A low level of reactivity of the civil society Political The systemic crisis of the institutional structures factors The unpreparedness of the security forces The absence of law enforcement agencies on the territory The spread of clientelistic behaviors A high level of corruption of the political class All of these mechanisms allow the mafia to take root and reproduce within a territory. It should be added, however, that since the criminal organizations are in fact embedded in institutional settings (set of rules, principles, criteria of legitimacy) that define the mode of operation, the spread of the mafia phenomenon also depends on a set of contextual factors 42

43 that can facilitate or hinder the embeddedness over the years. In the table below, we have summarized some of the factors the favor reproduction of MTOs. It can be distinguished three broad categories: socio-economic factors, cultural-relational factors, politicalinstitutional factors. On the basis of the empirical sources collected, we have hypothesized four different scenarios represented in table 4. Embeddedness (1): monopoly of violence, active protection, high mafia reputation, a certain degree of consensus collected by mafia-type organizations; omertà and fear; Tension-conflict (2): passive protection, high mafia reputation, law enforcement reaction; report by some entrepreneurs; Repression (3): law enforcement reaction, civil society reaction; mafia in crisis. Violence and disorder (4): competition between different groups, predatory extortions or passive protection, absence of institutions; omertà and fear. Table 6.6 A typology of mafia-type organizations spreading scenarios in traditional areas Institutional context and authorithies response Weak legality Strong legality Power syndicate Strong Embeddedness (1) Tension-conflict (2) Weak Violence and disorder (4) Repression (3) The four scenarios are obviously ideal-typical situations, which do not exclude the possibility of identifying other situations or overlaps between them. This typology can also be read as a temporal sequence. An organization can move from one quadrant to another over time. The table is therefore a model to guide the research. It will have to be deepened in the advancement of the project. Ultimately, we expect to reconstruct a more detailed series of spread scenarios of mafia violence in traditional areas, and to highlight the different relational dynamics of conflict and cooperation underlying each of these cases. 6.4 Leadership styles In order to achieve its goals, a mafia group, as any other organization, has to take decisions. Taking decisions means following a strategy. So which are the strategies of the bosses to increase or maintain their power? Which strategy characterize the conduct of a mafia boss? Identifying these aspects becomes crucial to understand the roots of mafia groups in the territorial context but also to evaluate the different ways of spreading of extortions. Talking about strategies leads us to talk about leadership. In literature it is possible to recognize different types of leadership. The triangle of leadership is one of the best-known 43

44 models to analyze the style of a leader. It allows us to identify three basic types of leadership. The authoritarian style, the democratic and permissive. The authoritarian style is when the leader takes all the decisions. Who uses this style does not allow other to dissent with him and does not provide any explanations for his choices. Moreover, he severely punishes those who violate its decisions. Compliance with the rules is obtained through coercion. Democratic style instead provides that major decisions are taken with the participation of the group, and taking into account the proposals of all. The permissive style finally confers considerable autonomy to the members of the group. The participation of the leader is reduced to a minimum. The permissive style can also be destructive. These are obviously ideal types, but which are the leadership styles that characterize the conduct of a mafia boss? We have adapted this pattern to the analysis of the Mafia. The authoritarian style is inspired by the logic of power. Democratic style instead follows the logic of membership, it is oriented to the relationship. The permissive one is rather oriented to the interest, to the personal profit. Salvatore Riina, the period in which he ruled Cosa Nostra, was an authoritarian leader. He had centered around himself any decisions, he ruled out all forms of sharing, if not in his inner circle. He used violence to eliminate every form of dissent. Bernardo Provenzano however, in the period following the reaction of the police, has strongly mitigated this style towards a more democratic decision-making. We could define him a paternalistic leader, because he has allowed for the dialogue and a collective decision. At the end of 70 years, Michele Greco, representative of the commission of Cosa Nostra, had adopted a permissive style, he was only the secretary of Cosa Nostra and could not take decisions for the whole organization. On the contrary, Salvatore Lo Piccolo, after the capture of Provenzano in 2006, has sought to expand his power through an authoritarian behavior. Matteo Messina Denaro, the last major fugitive, now can be considered a leader close to the authoritarian and permissive style. He is a reference point of Cosa Nostra but he is not able to make decisions that apply to everyone. 44

45 Fig. 6.2 Mafia bosses Leadership styles Different styles of leadership may be adopted by the same person. They represent policy options and can be conditioned by external factors. For example, in a period of expansion by a Mafia Type Organization an authoritarian style may be useful to achieve results in the short period, but it can also lead to destructive results. On the other hand, the democratic style can be useful to consolidate and reorganize a group The permissive style instead may be the result of a crisis situation or a choice dictated by a transition phase. Leadership styles are also useful for analyzing the diffusion of the extortion phenomenon. The authoritarian style is typically associated with an aggressive extortion strategy. There is no chance for negotiation. Entrepreneurs have to pay as much as asked without complaint. The use of violence is a constant to punish those who do not recognize the authority of the Mafia. This strategy is based on the fear and focused on results. Extortions represent the recognition of the mafia power (passive protection). The democratic style instead is oriented to interact with entrepreneurs. The mafioso makes a controlled use of violence and can also tolerate dissent. In some cases, he may not even punish the entrepreneur who does not pay protection money. The demand for money is still usually negotiable. This strategy is synthesized by the sentence "Pay a little, pay all." It is a collaborative style, oriented to the relationship. Extortion is then a contribution. This strategy can promote forms of complicity (active protection). The permissive style may have different outcomes. If this style is determined by a situation of crisis of leadership, extortion will take on a predatory nature. Otherwise, it could also lead to the establishment of individual relationship of complicity and connivance between an entrepreneur and a mobster. The absence of strong leadership means that the mobsters may decide from time to time who extort and how. It is a style oriented towards the interest. 45