Changing the Boundaries of Indian Democracy Alistair McMillan 1

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1 Changing the Boundaries of Indian Democracy Alistair McMillan 1 Introduction The framework of India s democracy was established in the Constitutional Convention, but one aspect of that framework, which lays down the means of maintaining a basic structure of one-person, onevote, one-value, has been systematically undermined. This relates to delimitation, the process by which constituency boundaries are drawn up, and States are allocated seats in the national parliament. The subject is a somewhat esoteric one, but that does not mean it should be ignored. Delimitation affects the relative influence of each voter in India, and as such is at the heart of the democratic process. In a country with an electoral system based on single -member constituencies there should be a basic requirement that each constituency should have roughly the same size of electorate, so people voting in one place do not have a greater influence over the result than people voting in another 2. Delimitation is a particularly sensitive political issue because the people it directly effects are sitting politicians. Changing constituency boundaries can have an immediate impact on an MP or MLA s chances of re-election, and so the process of delimitation is always carefully monitored. Of course, politicians are not just affected by the process, but are in a position to actively intervene, and not just through influencing the operation of delimitation (or gerrymandering), but by changing the principles and methods laid down by law to regulate the process. In order to prevent politicians manipulating the delimitation process for their own self-interest guidelines have to be established which entrench procedural and methodological aspects, thus limiting the scope for partisan interference. The Indian Constitution lays down certain ground rules for delimitation, but leaves the actual practical details for Parliament to decide. Both the underlying principles and the practical measures have been the subject of much debate and reform since independence, although there has been a hiatus since 1976 when the delimitation process was put on hold until the end of the century. This chapter examines the principles underpinning the delimitation process and looks at the practice of implementing the redrawing of constituency boundaries in the light of current attempts to reform the system. First, the institutional framework of delimitation is reviewed, covering the establishment of a system of Delimitation Commissions and the status of the rules under which such Commissions have operated. Second, the practice of drawing the boundaries of constituencies within States is examined, and measured against the ideal of equal electorates for each seat. Third, the process by which seats are allocated between States is analysed, showing how certain methods favour large States as against smaller ones, and proposing that unbiased techniques be adopted for future delimitations. The final section looks at current proposals for reform, and suggests alternative measures for reforming the rules and constitutional status governing delimitation. 1 Research supported by ESRC award R This Chapter is partly based on two articles prepared for Economic and Political Weekly (see McMillan 2000 and 2001). I am grateful to K C Sivaramakrishnan for information and discussion on the topic. 2 For a review of the principles and practice of drawing single-member constituency boundaries see McLean and Butler (1996).

2 The institutional framework of delimitation in India The Constitution lays down the basic principles that should govern delimitation. Article 81, section (2) states: (a) there shall be allotted to each State a number of seats in the House of the People in such manner that the ratio between that number and the population of the State is, so far as practicable, the same for all States; and (b) each State shall be divided into territorial constituencies in such manner that the ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allotted to it is, so far as practicable, the same throughout the State (Article 81, section (2)) 3. Article 81(1) also sets a maximum number of MPs to be elected to the Lok Sabha, and states that the population figures should be determined by the national census. These underlying principles have remained unchanged, although a number of Constitutional Amendments have altered the details. These have mainly occurred alongside the reorganisation of the State structure within India: for instance, the abolition of Part A and Part B States, the incorporation of Goa and Sikkim, and changes in status as Union Territories have become States. The maximum number of MPs has changed with subsequent delimitations, incorporations, and alterations in status. The creation of the small North-Eastern States saw the introduction of a clause exempting them from the application of population criteria for the determining of their seat allocations. The main substantive amendment has been the Forty-Second Amendment, which cancelled the delimitations which should have taken place after the 1981 and 1991 censuses. This meant that provisions for the periodic adjustment of constituency boundaries and the allocation of seats between States according to changes in population were nullified. The consequences of this Amendment will be discussed at various points in the remainder of this Chapter. Article 82 states that delimitation shall be carried out by such authority and in such manner as Parliament may by law determine. The lack of Constitutional entrenchment relating to the practice of delimitation has been described as rather odd by Ivor Jennings (q. Bhalla 1973: 45), and stands in contrast to the explicit directions regarding the structure and authority of the Election Commission (Article 324). Leaving the process of delimitation to the discretion of politicians has opened it to the charge of political manipulation; and the history of delimitation shows a continuing conflict between the desire to present the process as open and fair, and the temptation for politicians to control the process. The first delimitation was carried out under the office of the President, with the groundwork being done by the Election Commission, whose proposals were then laid before Parliament. The process was seen as unsatisfactory, and the Union Minister of Law, C C Biswas, commented that: The President s Orders which were laid before the Parliament, were simply torn into pieces by Parliament, whose decisions seems to have been actuated more by the convenience of individual Members of the House rather than by considerations of general interest (q. Jha 1963: 132). The Delimitation Commission Act 1952 was passed, which provided for a three-member Delimitation Commission made up of two Judges (or ex-judges) and the Chairman of Election Commission (exofficio). This was an attempt to judicialise the process, but was tempered by the provision for two to seven Associate members for each State; MLAs who were to be appointed by the Speaker of the State Legislative Assembly. Whilst the system worked much more smoothly than before, the setting up of the Delimitation Commission did not completely remove doubts about the independence of the 3 The rather unwieldy phrasing of (b) stems from the original provision of multi-member constituencies. Following the Two-member constituencies Abolition Act 1961 the parliament has only been made up of singlemember constituencies.

3 process. As R P Bhalla notes: It was regarded as a familiar device of giving an unbiased colouring to the biased proposals of the government (Bhalla 1973: 61). The First Delimitation Commission carried out the apportionment of seats for the 1957 elections, taking into account the population figures from the 1951 census. The Second Delimitation Commission was established under the Delimitation Act The Act increased the number of Associate Members to nine for each State: four from the Lok Sabha and five from Legislative Assembly. The change suggests that MPs wanted to keep a close eye on changes to their own constituencies. The Third Delimitation Commission, and the last one before the 2001 census, was set up under the Delimitation Act The basic structure of a three-member Commission with two judicial members and the Chairman of the Election Commission was retained, although the number of Associate members for each State was increased to ten (five MPs and five MLAs), appointed by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or Vidhan Sabha. Other redistributions have been carried out on an ad hoc basis. After the Two-member Constituencies Abolition Act 1961, the Election Commission was in charge of dividing the double-member constituencies, and the reorganisation of States (e.g. the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960; Punjab Reorganisation 1966; Goa, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act 1987) were accompanied by Delimitation Orders passed by Parliament (Butler et al 1995: 14 15). Three aspects of the institutional structure of the Delimitation process merit discussion: the need for Constitutional entrenchment, the need for political Associate members, and the role of the Election Commission. The provisions of Article 82 are clearly inadequate, and should be redrafted to ensure the Constitutional entrenchment of the delimitation procedure. This would remove the necessity for Parliament to legislate for a Delimitation Commission after every census, and insulate the Commission from charges of political manipulation. Given that there is already a recognition of the special status of the delimitation process, through Article 329 which makes decisions of the Commission non-justiciable, such a reform would be in line with the existing tenor of the Constitution. The presence on the Delimitation Commission of Associate members from the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas is too easily construed as political interference 4. Although they do not have voting rights, the number of such appointments and their privileged position at the heart of the process is bound to undermine the appearance of impartiality. Speakers of the State Assemblies have not been shown to be particularly neutral when adjudicating on the provisions of the Anti-Defection Act, and the suspicion is that they will appoint Associate members on a partisan basis. Provision has been made within the Delimitation Acts for a process of public consultation, and there seems no reason to give sitting MPs and MLAs an influence beyond other informed members of the public. The Election Commission has played a key role in supporting the work of Delimitation Commissions, and has the expertise and resources necessary for the effective application of delimitation. As such, the Election Commission s role as the organisational force behind delimitation should be recognised in law. Whether the Election Commission takes over the whole process of delimitation depends on two considerations. The first concerns the perceived benefits of having periodic judicial appointments which, whilst perhaps adding a veneer of independence, could disturb the application of what are technical procedures. The second consideration relates to the clarity of the rules laid down for delimitation, and the need for the Election Commission to maintain its reputation for neutrality and legitimacy. Here reference can be made to the Australian Electoral Commission, often seen as a model of best practice in this field. The Australian Commission operates under a framework where: the legal provisions governing redistribution are precisely drafted, are detailed, and give relatively little scope for discretion in their implementation Particular outcomes can be seen to be the product of application of enduring principles rather than less well-defined ad hoc considerations (Maley et al 1996: 145). 4 Jaya Prakash Narayan complained in the 1950s that the task [of delimitation] has been practically left in the hands of single party, Congress (q. Bhalla 1973: 50).

4 This focus on processes rather than outcomes has enabled the Australians to largely depoliticise the implementation of delimitation. The following sections deal further with the development of the principles and rules which should guide delimitation in India. The allocation of seats within States The task of drawing the boundaries within States is more complex than it at first appears. The Delimitation Commission is bound by the Constitutional stipulation that the population of each constituency should be, as far as practicable, the same throughout the State. However, the Delimitation Act (1972) adds further requirements, relating to geographical compactness, and the need to take account of physical features, existing boundaries of administrative units, facilities of communication and public convenience. Furthermore, the boundaries of Assembly constituencies should fall within just one Lok Sabha constituency, and hence the Assembly constituencies become the building blocks of each Lok Sabha constituency. And finally, there is the task of reserving particular seats for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Whilst the Scheduled Tribe seats should be in areas where the proportion of Scheduled Tribes is highest, the Scheduled Caste seats are meant to be both in areas where the proportion of Scheduled Castes is high, and also dispersed in different parts of the State. The fact that these criteria are often indeterminate or conflicting (or both) leaves the outcomes open to challenge, and the process open to gerrymandering 5. In the wake of the creation of the new State of Punjab in 1966, there were accusations that the boundaries had been drawn to favour the Congress and Akali Dal, grouping their supporters in smaller constituencies, and concentrating opponents in much larger seats (Bhalla 1973: 65 66). Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, in an analysis of the effects of the Second Delimitation Commission Report in 1966, argues that the delimitation showed signs of being gerrymandered in the interests of the Congress party (Bueno de Mesquita 1978). Comparing those constituencies which had their boundaries changed and those that did not, he finds that, despite the drop in Congress support between 1962 and 1967, the vote is much more efficiently deployed in seats which had had their boundaries changed (measured by the swing ratio : the efficiency with which a party turns votes into seats). He claims that without this gerrymandering the Congress might not have won a majority of seats in The institution of electoral reservation, whereby only members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes can contest for a particular seat, has also seen the development of a new type of electoral manipulation, similar to gerrymandering. This involves changing the categorisation of a constituency in order to prevent a rival candidate contesting. R P Bhalla claims that a new double -member constituency in Orissa was created for the 1957 election in order to defeat Godavari Mishra, an ex- Finance Minister in the Congress Government, who had become a leader of the Swatantra Party (Bhalla 1973: 60). G N Gawa Guru argues that in Maharashtra Scheduled Caste reserved seats were used as a dumping ground for areas which did not support the Congress (Gawa Guru 1986: 64) 6. An effective gerrymander depends on some stability of voting patterns, and the volatility of the 1977 and 1980 elections make it unlikely that anyone could have influenced the outcome in any systematic way. Butler et al look at the size of electorate in Congress and non Congress seats between 1980 and 1991, and find that there is little difference (Table 2.7 Butler et al 1995: 17), and the level of instability in voting patterns from constituency to constituency and from election to election suggests that systematic gerrymandering of constituency boundaries would be unlikely to have any effect. 5 Gerrymandering is the drawing of constituency boundaries in such a way as to maximise the returns for a particular party or candidate. 6 In a similar vein, Muslims in Karnataka recently protested that Muslim majority constituencies at the local level were being categorised as reserved, to prevent the representation of Muslims. Muslims protest delimitation Times of India, 5/1/2001.

5 Table 1 repeats and updates this analysis, and adds the electorate in seats won by the BJP. Congress does appear to have a slight advantage, with a lower average electorate in each of the elections, but the difference is small. The only sizeable difference in electorates is for elections since 1996, when the average electorate in Congress seats was much lower than the electorate in BJP seats. The most likely explanation is that the Congress s appalling performance in the Lok Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh, when they won just five and zero seats of the 85 highly populated seats. This analysis suggests that the BJP could benefit from a full delimitation, which would even-out the size of constituencies. Table 1: Average electorate in seats won by Congress, BJP and others, 1952 to 1999 Congress n BJP n Others n 1952 a 340, , a 392, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,022, ,160, ,085, ,078, ,161, ,102, ,124, ,177, ,124, Source: Data f rom CSDS Data Unit, and Singh and Bose (1984). a Adjustments have been made for the presence of multi-member constituencies in 1952 and There is, therefore, a tension between delimitation equalising the size of constituencies, but also being used for political ends, although Table 1 does suggest that far greater distortions in political outcomes occur when there is no redistribution of seats 7. The failure to carry out the delimitation exercise in the 1980s and 1990s has led to far greater inequalities between constituencies than existed previously. Table 2 looks at how the variation of the constituency sizes within States has changed over the years. With each measure, the value for each State which returned more than two MPs to the Lok Sabha has been calculated, and then the average taken across these States. Each tells us something slightly different about the changing distribution of sizes of electorates of Lok Sabha constituencies, but for each measure the results show that constituency electorates are becoming more unequal across States, and have done so steadily since Column A shows that from 1952, when the variation of electorates within States tended to be around just 3.2 per cent, there has been a steady rise until by 1999 the average variation within the States with more than two constituencies was 14 per cent. Column B indicates that now nearly a third of Lok Sabha constituencies are different from the State average by more than ten per cent. Whilst the large overall growth in the size of the electorate explains part of the rise in the standard deviation of constituency electorates shown in column C, controlling for this by dividing the standard deviation by the mean size of constituency (column D) shows that, again, there has been an upward trend in the variance in constituency sizes within States 8. Evidence from Table 2 does suggest that delimitation in the 1960s and 1970s did something to check the growing variation in constituency sizes within States, but the cancellation of delimitation after 1976 has meant that since then the growing inequalities of constituency sizes within States has been allowed to continue unchecked. 7 Indeed, Gelman and King have demonstrated that in the United States, where the redistricting system is more open to partisan influence, the benefits of redistricting still outweigh the costs, with the outcome a more competitive electoral arena (Gelman and King 1996) 8 This technique is used by Butler et al to look at the overall change in the variation of electorates (Butler et al 1995: 16, Table 2.6).

6 Table 2: Measures of variation in State constituency electorates, Lok Sabha elections 1952 to 1999 Year Average Deviance from State Mean (%) Constituencies with more/less than 10% deviance from State average (%) Average standard deviation for States Average coefficient of variation (A) (B) (C) (D) Number of States/UTs with more than two constituencies a 1952 b b Source: Data from CSDS Data Unit, and Singh and Bose (1984). a Only States where elections were held in more than two constituencies have been included. Hence for 1980 and 1989 Assam has been excluded, and for 1991 Jammu and Kashmir has been excluded. b Adjustments have been made for the presence of multi-member constituencies in 1952 and Much has been made of the growing disparity in constituency sizes within States. Attempts were made by Parliament in 1990 and 1996 to undertake a limited delimitation which would redraw constituency boundaries within States, although both failed (see Sivaramakrishnan 1997: 3281). The introduction of the Constitution (Ninety-First Amendment) Bill in 2000 makes provision for redistribution of seats within States, and, even if it does not pass through Parliament, the delay imposed by the Forty-Second Amendment (postponing delimitation until after 2000) will have lapsed. Although previous delimitations have been accompanied by a consultation process, there have still been complaints about partisan control 9. The Chairman of the Second Delimitation Commission, S Chandrasekhara Aiyar, responded to such criticism by noting that the particular changes to constituency boundaries were all justified by the multiple criteria laid down in the law, although he acknowledged that there was a problem of balancing between rival factors (cited in Bhalla 1973: 62). The problem is that when there are conflicting criteria just about any outcome can be justified. The figures shown in Table 2, column B, show that, even when the delimitation process was happening, the number of constituencies with more or less than ten per cent deviation from the State average was greater than the level in One point to recognise is that during this period the number of constituencies has risen (from 401 in 1952 to 543 in 1999), whilst the administrative boundaries and physical features have remained relatively unchanged, and communication facilities have improved vastly. Hence there is much less justification for deviating from the average State constituency size now than there was fifty years ago, when the average deviation was just 3.2 per cent 10. In the light of the non-justiciable nature of the decisions of the Delimitation Commission, the openness and fairness of the delimitation process is particularly crucial. Provision for public hearings in each State on the proposals of the Commission are provided for under the Delimitation Act However, if the methodology and rules which guided the process were more transparent the process of public consultation could be made more effective. In future a number of reforms could be introduced. The primacy of the Constitutional requirement that seats should be roughly the same size should be made clear. A limit should be put on the permitted deviation of any constituency size from 9 R P Bhalla writes that during the 1956 review the Commission s proposals were stated to have been circulated in advance to all the offices of the Congress units in Madhya Pradesh (Bhalla 1973: 67). 10 It could be argued that the provision for multi-member constituencies made delimitation somewhat easier in the 1950s. Even so, the 1962 election involved just 494 constituencies, and the average deviation from the State average was just 7.2 per cent.

7 the State average. My suggestion would be a limit of ten per cent 11. Further to this, a threshold of deviance from the State average should be set beyond which any proposals have to be explicitly supported in terms of the statutory criteria; say five per cent. If a Delimitation Commission proposed a constituency boundary which deviated from the State average by more than this threshold it would have to justify its proposals in writing, and the reasons would then be open to public scrutiny. It has been suggested, above, that the practice of appointing Associate members from the legislatures involved should be ended. However, politicians and the public should be encouraged to scrutinise and propose changes to the proposals made by any Delimitation Commission. It should be clear that any counter proposals would have to satisfy the same criteria as that used by the Commission. In the case of my own proposals, no counter-suggestion should lead to any constituency being more than ten per cent different to the State average, and if more than five per cent different the reasons would have to be justified strictly in terms of the statutory criteria. It should be made clear that proposals which increased the overall deviation from the State average would be considered less favourably than ones which reduced the overall deviation. The reasons why any amendments to the original proposals of the Delimitation Commission are accepted should be made clear in the final report of the Commission. The allocation of seats between States In their comprehensive and fascinating work on the history and principles of delimitation (or apportionment, as it is known in the United States), Balinski and Young examine different approaches to the proportionate allocation of constituencies to States (Balinski and Young 1982) 12. In the United States, the method of apportionment has been a source of political contestation since Independence, having an influence on the effects of the acceptance of new States into the Union, as well as its federal nature, with some methods favouring large States over small, and vice versa. Beneath the paradoxes and partisanship involved, Balinski and Young identify a number of principles from which the most acceptable method of delimitation can be identified. This method, known after its first proponent, Daniel Webster, provides a procedure which is not systematically biased towards large or small States, and which reflects relative changes in the population of States 13. The Webster method is used here for modelling the theoretical outcomes of redistributions in India. The method used by the Delimitation Commissions for allocating seats to States has not been made explicit; the use of the Webster method should be written into the law, thus removing any uncertainty about the process of allocation between States. Table 3 shows how many seats were allocated following the 1971 census, after the Third Delimitation Commission reported in 1975, with the number of seats that would have been allocated had the seats been distributed proportionately (subject to a minimum of one seat for each State/UT). It also shows 11 This may not be feasible in Jammu and Kashmir, but it is presumed that some special provis ion would be drafted to deal with such special cases. At present Article 81(2)(b) exempts States with a population of less than six million from certain aspects of the delimitation process. In Australia there is a statutory limit on constituency size of ten per cent deviation from the quota, and the Electoral Commission has to take population trends into consideration when drawing boundaries so that future divergences from the quota are minimal (Maley et al 1996: 134 8). 12 The US constitution states that representation should be apportioned among the several States according to their respective Numbers, a wording similar to the Indian. Balinski and Young also show that the underlying principles of apportionment apply both to the allocating seats to states and to the distribution of seats between parties under proportional representation electoral systems (Balinski and Young 1982, ch. 12). 13 Webster s method is summarised thus: Choose the size of the house to be apportioned. Find a divisor x so that the whole numbers nearest to the quotients of the states sum to the required total. Give to each state its whole number (Balinski and Young 1982: 32). See Table 1 for an example of how the Webser method is applied.

8 the population totals from the 1991 census, and an estimation of how seats would be distributed had not the delimitation been postponed 14. Table 3: 1971 distribution of seats, and estimated effect of redistribution using 1991 census with no change in size of Lok Sabha 1971 Population Actual no. of Seats, proportionate allocation a Difference between actual and proportionat e allocation, Population Actual no. of Seats, proportionate allocation b Difference between actual and proportionat e allocation, 1991 All India 548,159, ,302, Andhra Pradesh 43,502, ,508, Arunachal Pradesh 467, , Assam 14,957, ,414, Bihar c 56,353, ,374, Goa d 857, ,169, Gujarat 26,697, ,309, Haryana 10,036, ,463, Himachal Pradesh 3,460, ,170, Jammu and Kashmir 4,616, ,718, Karnataka ,977, Kerala 21,347, ,098, Madhya Pradesh c 41,654, ,181, Maharashtra 50,412, ,937, Manipur 1,072, ,837, Meghalaya 1,011, ,774, Mizoram , Nagaland 516, ,209, Orissa 21,944, ,659, Punjab 13,551, ,281, Rajasthan 25,765, ,005, Sikkim 209, , Tamil Nadu 41,199, ,858, Tripura 1,556, ,757, Uttar Pradesh e 88,341, ,112, West Bengal 44,312, ,077, A and N Islands 115, , Chandigarh 257, , DNH 74, , DD d 101, Delhi 4,065, ,420, Lakshadweep , Pondicherry 471, , a b Calculated using a divisor of 1,025,500, with a minimum allocation of 1 seat. Calculated using a divisor of 1,573,000, with a minimum allocation of 1 seat. 14 At present there are 543 elected me mbers of the Lok Sabha (13 from Union Territories, 530 from States). The most recent change occurred in 1989, when the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu (which had two seats) was divided and the State of Goa (with 2 seats) and Union Territory of Daman and Diu (with 1 seat) created. Further changes to the allocation of seats have been made with the creation of three new States in November 2000 (see below).

9 c The creation of the new States of Uttaranchal, Jharkhand, and Chhatisgarh from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh in November 2000 has not been factored in to these calculations, as population figures are not yet available. See below for a discussion on the impact of the creation of these new States. d Prior to 1989, Goa and Daman and Diu was a single Union Territory. e Mizoram became a union territory on 21 January 1972, and hence population figures are not included in the 1971 census. Table 3 shows that the 1975 redistribution favoured small States, over-representing them at the expense of the larger States. The most extreme over-representation is for Delhi, which, if the allocation was proportionate to population, should have received four seats, but actually received seven. Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir were both over-represented by one seat each, which could be a result of their mountainous location. The North-Eastern States of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Meghalaya were each allocated an extra seat, as was Goa, Daman and Diu. It appears that this was a political decision, which seems to contravene the constitutional provision for the allocation of seats. This over-representation is at the expense of the largest States; with Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Bihar, and Assam each under-represented by one seat. The estimated reallocation using the 1991 population figures shows the effect of different rates of population growth since The change from 1971 to 1991 is shown in Table 4, which also shows the estimates prepared by the Census of India of the population in 2001 (Census of India 1996: 57 65). The largest population shifts are in the small North Eastern States, and the Union Territories. However, these large shifts have little effect on the distribution of seats, since the populations are still relatively small and these States/Union Territories were already over-represented. Despite a growth in population between 1971 and 1991 of 131 per cent in Delhi (from four million to over nine million), it is still over-represented by one seat. The more significant changes are in the larger States, where a clear North/South divide can be seen to have arisen. Lower population growth in Tamil Nadu and Kerala, in particular, sees them significantly over-represented (by three and two seats respectively), whereas higher population growth in Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra sees them significantly under-represented (by three, three, two, and two seats respectively). The failure to carry out delimitation in the 1980s and 1990s has also denied members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes representation by means of reserved constituencies Census figures suggest that the Scheduled Castes should now have up to ten more reserved seats in the Lok Sabha, and the Scheduled Tribes up to five more reserved seats. The Scheduled Castes, which made up 14.6 per cent of the population in 1971, are now some 16.4 per cent, and the percentage of reserved seats should have risen accordingly. Maharashtra has seen a rise in SC population of some 5.1 per cent, which should have translated into at least two more seats reserved for SCs, and West Bengal should also have had two more. The Scheduled Tribes, which received a 41 seats after the third Delimitation, have seen their proportion of the population rise from 6.9 to 8.0 per cent, and should have had up to 46 reserved for Scheduled Tribes in the 1990s 15. The Ninety First 15 Article 330(2) of the constitution states that: The number of seats reserved in any State or Union territory for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes under clause (1) shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats allotted to that State or Union territory in the House of the People as the Population of the Scheduled Castes in the State or Union territory or of the Scheduled Tribes in the State or Union territory or part of the State or Union territory, as the case may be, in respect of which seats are so reserved, bears to the total population of the State or Union territory. This obtuse instruction leads to a somewhat skewed outcome, with the Scheduled Tribes receiving a disproportionately large number of reserved seats. This is because the calculation of seats is made at the State and Union Territory level, rather than national level. Using the constitutional method the 1971 census figures should have seen 78 Scheduled Caste reserved seats and 43 Scheduled Tribe (the allocation made was 79 and 41). If done according to national population there should have been 79 Scheduled Caste reserved seats and 38 Scheduled Tribe. The discrepancy arises because the Scheduled Tribes benefit from their concentration in small North Eastern states and Union Territories, which are over-represented, whilst the Scheduled Castes are spread throughout the larger states. The Third Delimitation Commission seems to have offered a compromise between the two methods. For the 1991 census figures, the constitutional method allocates 86 seats to be reserved for SC

10 Amendment Bill goes some way towards addressing this shortfall, suggesting that reserved seats be allocated according to the 1991 census figures, but there seems to be no reason why the redistribution should not use the 2001 figures: the consequence of using old data will be to under-estimate the actual proportion of seats that should be reserved. Table 4: Population change 1971 to 1991, and estimated population change 1971 to 2001 Population change (%), 1971 to 1991 Estimated population change (%), 1971 to 2001 All India Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam Bihar Goa a Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Jammu and Kashmir b Karnataka Kerala Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Manipur Meghalaya Nagaland Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Sikkim Tamil Nadu Tripura Uttar Pradesh West Bengal A and N Islands Chandigarh DNH Delhi Lakshadweep Pondicherry a b Note that the 1971 population for Goa includes Daman and Diu, so a straight comparison is not possible. There was no census in Jammu and Kashmir in These figures are based on Census of India estimates Electoral reservation has restricted the opportunity for some candidates to contest from their local constituency, and has added a new dimension to the process of electoral manipulation through delimitation (see above). The reservation of constituencies has been accompanied by lower turnout, and there is no clear evidence that the system has gone any way towards improving the relative sociocandidates, and 46 for ST candidates. If allocated according to the national proportion of the population, there would be 89 reserved for SCs and 43 for STs.

11 economic position of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The rotation of reserved seats has been discussed since the First Lok Sabha election, but the disadvantages in terms of lack of continuity of representation have been seen to outweigh the advantages in terms of allowing non-scs and non- STs to compete for all seats at some point 16. The need for Scheduled Tribe reservation is particularly doubtful in the aftermath of the creation of the new States of Chhatisgarh and Jharkhand. In these States and the North-Eastern States there is no real impediment to the electoral prospects of Scheduled Tribes in open competition. In general, the geographical concentration of Scheduled Tribe voters means that they are well placed to influence the electoral outcome, and electoral reservation is an unnecessary electoral distortion. Reforming the delimitation process At the time of writing (March 2001), the Constitution (Ninety-First Amendment) Bill is before Parliament. The Bill is a curious one, for it is a Constitutional Amendment that seeks to prevent change, to block procedures that were established to enhance the representativeness of the Lok Sabha (House of the People). The Amendment renews the effect of a similar Amendment (the Forty- Second) passed during the Emergency at the instigation of Sanjay Gandhi, not a person associated with best democratic practice 17. Article 81(2) of the Constitution asserts that there shall be allotted to each State a number of seats in the House of the People in such manner that the ratio between the number and the population of the State is, so far as practicable, the same for all States. The Amendment is designed to prevent adjustments being made which would have changed the allocation of seats to various States to reflect their growing population. The change, which under the Constitution is meant to occur automatically after each census, would have meant that constituency sizes throughout the country are roughly equal. Preventing such redistribution means that certain States are becoming significantly under-represented in the Lok Sabha, and the failure to put forward a coherent rationale for such a policy undermines the democratic foundation of the House of the People. The Ninety-First Amendment Bill seeks to cancel the redistributions due after the 2001, 2011, and 2021 censuses 18, although it does allow the boundaries of seats within States to be redrawn so the 16 Rotation of seats is discussed in the Election Commission Report on the First Lok Sabha Elections (Election Commission of India 1955: 75). The problems would be magnified if the proposals for Women s Reservation for Lok Sabha and Assembly elections were passed by Parliament. The problems of adding a further layer of reservation are discussed by Madhu Kishwar, who proposes an alternative system where political parties have to put forward a certain proportion of women candidates (Kishwar 2000). The costs of reservation preventing candidates from certain social backgrounds contesting in some constituencies, reducing turnout, and the weakness of the symbolic representation involved have too often been ignored. The reservation of seats has become a convenient way of glossing over the substantive problems that Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes face. 17 Granville Austin, in his recent book on the Indian Constitution, subtitles his chapter regarding the 42 nd Amendment Sacrificing Democracy to Power (Austin 1999). The fact that the postponement of delimitation has happened at the same time as rather clumsy attemp ts to change the nature of the constitution may not be entirely coincidental. The Emergency saw speculation that Indira Gandhi would support a move to a Presidential System, believed to be the reason for the setting up of the Swaran Singh Committee, which has some echo in the manoeuvring behind the establishment of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution in February Ironically, one of the main opponents of Presidentialism in the 1970s and early 1980s was L K Advani, one of the proponents of such a change in 1998 (see, for instance The Case Against Presidency in Times of India, 30 November 1980, compared to Why Advani harps on presidential system Times of India, 6 May, 1998; Austin 1999: 378). 18 There have been reports that the delimitation process could be restarted after the 2011 census. No justification has been given for the year 2026, since it does not relate to any census and so would by default actually mean My own suspicion is that 2026 was picked because it was roughly the same length as the last postponement, and that very few of the current Parliamentarians would be around by then to have clear up the mess that had been left behind with the current fudge.

12 large differences in constituency populations within States can be addressed 19. The ostensible reason (and the same one put forward to justify the change in 1976) is that changing the number of seats according to population unfairly punishes those States which have managed to restrict the growth in population. The Statement of Objects and Reasons released with the Bill states that: Keeping in view the progress of family planning programmes in different parts of the country, the Government, as part of the National Population Policy strategy, recently decided to extend the current freeze on undertaking fresh delimitation up to the year 2026 as a motivational measure to enable the State Governments to pursue the agenda for population stabilisation. In a similar vein, Rami Chhabra, who helped draw up the NPP, has argued that had a delimitation taken place on the basis of the 2001 census The vast majority of the new seats would have accrued to the very States that had failed to curb populatio n growth rates and improve their population s wellbeing, thus further tilting the balance of power in favour of those who had been derelict in their duties (Chhabra 2000: 34) 20. The connection between the implementation of family planning strategy and the allocation of seats to the National Parliament is far too tenuous to be taken other than as a smokescreen for more meaningful political considerations. To deny a person an equal voice in the democratic process because they happen to be living in a State that has had a high population growth rate is clearly undefendable. Such reasoning takes no account of migration between States, which may be just as significant a cause of population fluctuations than birth-rate. There is no coherent rationale for fixing the base line for the correct population balance at 1971 levels. If the idea were really to encourage best practice in the future the policy should be to peg the levels at the rate they are now, as given by the 2001 census. As it is, voters in States like Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are being punished for high population growth rates over the last 30 years which they can hardly be held responsible for, and which they can do nothing about now. The States which have actually had the highest population growth since 1971 are the small States of the North East (see Table 4), and the issue does not affect them since they were over-represented in previous Parliaments, and are only now catching up with their correct allocation of seats. The real motivation behind the change in the Constitution is the balance of political power between the regions, and, in particular, between the north and the south. As K C Sivaramakrishnan notes, the real fear is not about population control but political control (Sivaramakrishnan 2000: 3093). Simulations calculated using estimates of the population for 2001 suggest that the Southern States (Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu) are currently over-represented by some 11 seats, whilst the Hindi-heartland States (Bihar and Jharkhand, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Chhatisgarh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal) are under-represented by 14 seats 21. The fear seems somewhat over-played. At present the four large Southern States fill 23.8 per cent of the Lok Sabha seats; such a redistribution would reduce this by about 1.1 per cent. The Hindi-heartland States now return 39.4 per cent of the Lok Sabha seats, and an adjustment after 2001 would be likely 19 For instance in Jammu and Kashmir the Ladakh constituency has just 64,706 voters, whilst Jammu has an electorate nearly ten times larger at 601,007. In the capital, Chandni Chowk constituency has just 376,603 people on the electoral register, an eighth of the size of Outer Delhi with 3,101, Why the National Population Policy felt the need to delve into matters of constitutional restructuring and electoral mechanics is unclear. The incongruity between the statements of the NPP on Delimitation and the actual proposals for changing patterns of population growth, which move away from focus on incentives and disincentive towards a focus on health care, education, and female empowerment, is glaring. The NPP hardly appears as a neutral arbiter in the current debate, with Gita Sen noting that the National Population Policy 2000 was drafted and discussed almost entirely within a closed circle of the Government (Sen 2000). 21 Details of the methodology and results of these simulations are given in McMillan (2000, 1274: Table 4). They are based on a redistribution of seats with the overall size of the Lok Sabha kept at 545, and assuming that for smaller states and Union Territories the allocation will remain constant. These figures were calculated prior to the creation of three new states in November 2000 (discussed below), but the overall pattern of regional change is not affected.

13 to raise this by about 1.6 per cent. There does not actually have to be any reduction in the number of seats that are returned from any States. The effect of the Forty-Second Amendment was to fix the size of the House, when previous Delimitations had seen the total number of MPs rising along with the population. In a bigger Lok Sabha new seats could be allocated to the States whose population has grown rapidly since 1971, without affecting the number of MPs returned from States like Tamil Nadu, where the population growth has been much slower 22. The extent of the distortion has been exacerbated by the creation of three new States in November 2000; Uttaranchal, Jharkhand, and Chhatisgarh. This has been done with an ad hoc redistribution of seats based on the current geographical allocation, which, as has been noted above, is extremely out of date, and no consideration of the overall effect on State-wise allocations of seats. The five seats which make up the core of the new State of Uttaranchal have an average electorate of 1,170,465, compared to the 80 seats left in Uttar Pradesh which have an average electorate of 1,216,018. The creation of Jharkhand is based on 14 constituencies with an average electorate of 1,065,554, whereas the 40 seats which are remain in Bihar have an average electorate of 1,097,638. The new State of Chhatisgarh has eleven seats with an average electorate of 1,100,004 compared to 1,200,184 in the seats which remain in Madhya Pradesh. The consequence is that Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, which are already under-represented compared to other States, have had their proportion of seats reduced even further to facilitate the creation of the new States 23. Again, the danger is that ignoring the worsening under-representation of States like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh for another thirty years will make their grievance stronger. Part of the problem has been that the delay in delimitation after the Third Delimitation Commission carried out its work after the 1971 census has meant that the effect of any new delimitation is much greater more seats should be transferred and boundary changes have to be more radical. However, the remedy is to carry out frequent readjustments of constituency boundaries, rather than keep puttingoff the problem. The Ninety-First Amendment merely begs the question of what happens after another thirty years. The fact that population growth will have been smaller in the South will not have changed, and the danger is that putting off a difficult decision until the future not only delays the inevitable, but makes the change much bigger when it actually happens. What explains the lack of an informed debate on the Delimitation issue? The answer seems to largely rest with a political consensus embracing the main parties and the bureaucracy. At an all-party meeting in May 2000 there was reported to be unanimity among the party representatives on the need to continue the freeze on fresh delimitation 24. This seems to be partly driven by the regional ambitions of the BJP and the Congress parties, who are unwilling to alienate support, and are probably right in thinking that the losers are more likely to make an issue of any redistribution of seats than the winners. The issue has been sensitised by the key role played in the National Democratic Alliance by parties from Tamil Nadu, and the fact that Assembly elections are due in Kerala and Tamil Nadu in The silence of regional parties from States which would undoubtedly gain 22 See McMillan 2000 Figure 1 for a depiction of the change in size of the Lok Sabha since 1952, with an estimation of how the size could have increased if there had been no freeze in Table 5 shows how seats could be distributed in an enlarged Lok Sabha so no state would lose representation. 23 Details of the new State boundaries are contained in the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Bill, the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Bill, and the Bihar Reorganisation Bill, all passed in the year In the Rajya Sabha debate on the Uttar Pradesh Bill, Akhilesh Das, MP, argued that Uttaranchal should receive four seats rather than five, leaving Uttar Pradesh with 81 seats (debate on 10/8/2000). Accurate allocations of seats are not possible until the population figures from the 2001 Census are made available. The current calculations are based on the electorates in 1999 of seats which approximately conform to the new state boundaries. 24 The quote comes, rather confusingly, from an article headlined No consensus on delimitation of constituencies The Hindu 14/5/2000. The lack of consensus relates to the mechanics of any intra-state delimitation, in particular whether to rotate reserved seats for SCs and STs, and whether any delimitation should be carried out by the Election Commission. 25 An example of the politicisation of delimitation in the run up to the Tamil Nadu Assembly Elections comes from Murasoli Maran, a DMK leader who was reported taking a dig at the Congress (I) by suggesting they

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