Briefing. Counterterrorism and Nuclear Security in Pakistan

Transcription

1 Briefing Counterterrorism and Nuclear Security in Pakistan February 2011

2 The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and educational organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security. We promote sustainable security through research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers. A leader in the conflict assessment and early warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on the problems of weak and failing states. Our objective is to create practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers. Copyright 2010 The Fund for Peace. All rights reserved. This program description is proprietary to The Fund for Peace. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Fund for Peace. The Fund for Peace Transnational Threats Threat Convergence Series Editor Patricia Taft Report Written by Ryan Costello The Fund for Peace Publication FFP : TTCVR1101 (Version 11E) Circulation: PUBLIC The Fund for Peace 1720 I Street NW 7th Floor Washington, D.C T: F: The Fund for Peace

3 Threat Convergence in Pakistan Overview Executive Summary & Contents Pakistan s nuclear arsenal and materials represent a significant proliferation risk that could become a target for terrorist groups operating within the country and in neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan. Pakistan s nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the context of state instability and fragility, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties between the government and Islamist militants. The possibility that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons or materials, either through an assault on nuclear facilities or with internal assistance, should not be underestimated. Pakistan possesses a sizable nuclear arsenal estimated to contain more than 100 nuclear weapons. This nuclear stockpile is likely to continue to expand as Pakistan develops new nuclear-capable missiles and increases its capacity to produce weapons-grade material. An expansion will require supplementary security to guard the additional nuclear material, facilities, and waste. As a result, there will be more vulnerabilities in the system and a greater chance that Pakistan s nuclear security could break down. There are several terrorist groups operating within Pakistan that have challenged and weakened the Pakistani state. For example, as part of an upsurge of violence within Pakistan, suicide bombings have increased from two in 2002 to eighty-nine in In addition, Al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have utilized the mountainous, semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan as a safe haven in order to launch local, regional, and international attacks. Al- Qaeda has also expressed its desire to obtain a nuclear weapon, demonstrated by the reported meeting between two Pakistani nuclear scientists and Osama bin-laden prior to the September 11th attacks. The scientists allegedly provided bin-laden with a rough sketch of how to construct a nuclear weapon. Given the numerous terrorist groups threatening the Pakistani state and its nuclear materials, Pakistan remains one of the world s great est nucl ear secu rity vulnerabilities. The threat of terrorist attack on nuclear facilities is high, and there is a strong potential for collaboration between terrorist groups and rogue elements within the Pakistani security services. The threat of insider collaboration with terrorist groups is enhanced by the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network and allegations that elements of the Pakistani government support Islamist militants. Over the long-term, there is a somewhat distant threat that the Pakistani state could collapse or weaken to the point that nuclear safeguards would be unable to protect Pakistan s nuclear weapons. However, the threats of external attack and internal collaboration are partially addressed by current safeguards. Total state collapse is unlikely, particularly if the United States and the international community remain engaged in the region. Nevertheless, nuclear Pakistan is a state confronting multiple internal and external threats to its security from rogue and terrorist entities and, as such, remains at significant risk for exploitation and proliferation. Nonproliferation Overview 4 Terrorism Profile 5 Pakistan s Nuclear Security 7 Pakistan-United States Cooperation 11 Conclusion 15 Endnotes 16 About The Fund for Peace 19 List of Acronyms CIA: FATA: HEU: IAEA: ISI: NCA: NWFP: PAL: PRP: SPD: TTP: Central Intelligence Agency Federally Administered Tribal Areas Highly Enriched Uranium International Atomic Energy Agency Inter-Services Intelligence National Command Authority North-West Frontier Province Permissive Action Links Pakistan People s Party Personnel Reliability Program Director of the Strategic Plans Division Tehrik-i-Taliban, a.k.a. Pakistani Taliban 3 The Fund for Peace

4 Threat Convergence in Pakistan Non-proliferation Overview Terrorist groups operating within Pakistan and neighboring countries could potentially target Pakistan s nuclear arsenal and materials. The Pakistani state s fragility, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties between the government and Islamist extremists raise international fears regarding Pakistan s nuclear security. These fears are justifiable. The possibility that a terrorist group could acquire nuclear materials, either through an assault or with assistance from rogue elements within Pakistan s security apparatus, is real. Pakistan s nuclear weapons have been a source of tension between the United States and Pakistan for a long time. Over the past several decades, U.S. foreign policy has oscillated between engagement and isolation. Throughout the 1980s, the United States and Pakistan cooperated to support the Afghan mujahideen and oust the Soviets from Afghanistan despite Pakistan s ongoing nuclear weapons program. Once the Soviets were gone, however, the United States withdrew from the region and sanctioned Pakistan after the army refused to end its nuclear weapons program. 1 According to former Pakistani Ambassador Riaz M. Khan, the United States left Pakistan high and dry after the 1980s. 2 Pakistan felt betrayed by its former American ally which now sought to prevent Pakistan from having a weapon deemed critical to Pakistani national security. Further sanctions were imposed on Pakistan (and India) by the international community following its nuclear tests in American sanctions on Pakistan were lifted after the September 11th attacks when the invasion of Afghanistan necessitated cooperation with Pakistan. However, many Pakistanis have not forgotten about U.S. efforts to derail the nation s nuclear weapons program and distrust America s interest in Pakistan s nuclear security. Today, Pakistan s nuclear arsenal is estimated to be greater than 100 nuclear warheads. Pakistan s guiding principle for its nuclear strategy is minimum credible deterrence. As a result, the arsenal is used to deter external aggression, particularly from India, and act as a force-multiplier for its conventional forces. 3 Pakistan appears to be rapidly increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal through the development of new nuclear-capable missiles and the expansion of its capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material. 4 Pakistan is currently building two new plutonium production reactors and an additional chemical separation facility. These efforts will help upgrade the arsenal from its first-generation design based on highly enriched uranium (HEU) to a new plutoniumbased design. 5 This nuclear expansion could have a negative impact on Pakistan s nuclear security. An expansion will require supplementary security to guard the additional nuclear material, facilities, and waste. As a result, there will be more vulnerabilities in the system and a greater chance that Pakistan s nuclear security could break down. 6 4 The Fund for Peace

5 Threat Convergence in Pakistan Terrorism Profile There are several terrorist groups operating within Pakistan s borders that have demonstrated increasing cooperation. Thus, distinctions between the groups are not clearly defined. This growing nexus of terror has challenged and weakened the Pakistani state. 7 Pakistan has experienced a steady rise in terror attacks since In 2007, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence asserted that there were more deaths resulting from Islamist militancy in Pakistan that year than during the previous six years combined. 8 In 2009 there were eighty-nine suicide bombings and over 3,000 terrorist-related deaths, which was another record year for terrorist attacks and civilian casualties. 9 By comparison, there were only two suicide bombings in Pakistan in The following terrorist groups are a serious threat and could potentially target Pakistan s n u c l ear w eapo n s a n d materi a l s. Understanding the threat these groups pose is essential to ensuring the security of those weapons and materials. Al Qaeda Following the September 11th, 2001 attacks and the subsequent American invasion of Afghanistan, al-qaeda and many of its Afghan Taliban allies fled their former safe haven and reconstituted themselves across the border in the mountainous, semiautonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have used FATA, in addition to sections of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in West Pakistan, as a safe haven in order to launch local, regional, and international attacks. 11 Some analysts believe that Osama bin-laden and other top al-qaeda leaders are hiding within Pakistan s tribal areas. 12 A great deal of the rising tide of violence in Pakistan can be attributed to al-qaeda and its efforts to unite its affiliate groups against the Pakistani government. Many experts believe that al-qaeda has trained or is training most of Pakistan s extremist groups in terror tactics. For example, they are believed to have introduced suicide bombings to the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, one of al-qaeda s affiliate groups (for more on the TTP see below). 13 Al-Qaeda has rallied support against the Pakistani government by serving as a mediator and coalition builder for militant groups, providing technical expertise to assist in terrorist attacks, and casting their efforts as part of a religious struggle. 14 This may demonstrate that al- Qaeda relies on more legitimate local militants in order to achieve its regional goals. 15 Al-Qaeda s stated regional objectives include toppling the Pakistani state, undermining American efforts in Afghanistan, and driving a wedge between the United States and Pakistan. 16 These regional objectives are part of al Qaeda s global fight to eliminate American and Western influence in the Islamic world and replace the governments of Muslim countries with religiously fundamentalist regimes. 17 Al-Qaeda has also indicated a desire to obtain nuclear weapons. Osama bin Laden has described the task of obtaining a nuclear weapon as a religious duty, and several al-qaeda operatives have attempted to purchase a weapon or gain nuclear expertise. Before the September 11th attacks, two Pakistani nuclear scientists allegedly met with bin Laden and senior al- Qaeda members and provided them with a rough sketch of how to make a nuclear weapon. 18 Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, one of the Pakistani scientists, believed that Pakistan s nuclear weapons belonged to the worldwide Muslim community, or ummah. 19 The threat of al-qaeda or one of its affiliates obtaining a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials should not be underestimated. Many reports have indicated that terrorists could fashion a crude nuclear device with the right materials, though, it seems that this has not yet happened. Nuclear materials could be seized from poorly secured nuclear facilities, intercepted during transport, or obtained from the black market. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has indicated that there have been eighteen confirmed cases of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium to date. 20 It is likely that there are many more unconfirmed cases of loss or theft which have resulted in nuclear smuggling, which is extraordinarily difficult to prevent given the weakness of state borders and the difficulty of detecting small quantities of radioactive material The Fund for Peace

6 Terrorism Profile Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP): Pakistani Taliban The formation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in late 2007 has also been instrumental to the recent upsurge of violence in Pakistan. 22 The TTP formed as an umbrella organization, incorporating thirteen former militant groups from the tribal areas of Western Pakistan that had lent support to the Afghan Taliban and al- Qaeda. Members of the TTP, which are expected to number between 30,000 and 35,000, come from all of FATA s seven agencies as well as several frontier provinces in the NWFP. 23 The TTP has sought to unite pro-taliban groups within the country, assist the Afghan Taliban in its insurgency campaign against American and allied forces across the border in Afghanistan, and establish an Islamic state in Pakistan based on the model of the Taliban s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 24 According to U.S. ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism Daniel Benjamin, the TTP cooperates with al- Qaeda and acts as a force multiplier for the terrorist network. 25 The group has been accused of the December 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in addition to many other terrorist attacks across the country. 26 Recent attacks have demonstrated that the TTP targets the United States and seeks to export terrorism beyond Pakistan s borders. On December 30, 2009, a Jordanian born double agent working for the Pakistani Taliban, who professed to have knowledge of the whereabouts of senior al-qaeda members, set off a suicide bomb outside Forward Operating Base Chapman near Khost, Afghanistan, killing the base chief, six other CIA employees, and two Blackwater private security contractors. 27 Additionally, the TTP trained and assisted Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad in his failed attempt to detonate a car bomb in Times Square on May 1, On September 1, 2010, the United States formally declared the TTP a terrorist organization and charged their current leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, with conspiracy to murder American citizens. 29 Other Extremist Groups Aside from al-qaeda and the TTP, disparate extremist groups have stepped up attacks against the state, possibly as a result of the groups increasing drive for cooperation. According to Pakistani journalist Imtiaz Gul, terrorist groups that were formerly confined to FATA are now joining forces with groups around the country -- and the result is a networked terrorism outfit with an ever-growing capacity to produce pain and mayhem. 30 Extremist groups such as Jaish-e -Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, 31 which have supposedly been supported by Islamabad as pawns to undermine India and liberate Kashmir, forged links with the TTP and al-qaeda after they were banned by the former Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf. As a result, extremists have been able to conduct attacks outside of the tribal areas, which have become the recent focus of Pakistani military operations and U.S. drone strikes. 32 Furthermore, individual Islamist extremists or alienated members of Pakistan s security services could potentially launch devastating attacks throughout the country. This was demonstrated by the January 2011 assassination of the secular governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, by a member of his own police guard. Mumtaz Qadri gunned down Taseer over his stance on Pakistan s anti-blasphemy law. The governor had supported amending the law so that it couldn t be used to persecute religious minorities, and had urged leniency for a Christian mother sentenced to death for blasphemy. Although Qadri confessed to the crime, he has received disturbing levels of support from sympathetic segments of the Pakistani population The Fund for Peace

7 Threat Convergence in Pakistan Pakistan s Nuclear Security The threat to Pakistan s nuclear arsenal and materials is extensive given its proximity to well organized Islamist extremists, the relative fragility of the state, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and the possible existence of ties between elements of the government security apparatus and Islamist extremists. These threats are partially mitigated by a robust nuclear security system that has improved over time. However, no nuclear security system is foolproof, despite the claims of Pakistani officials to the contrary. 34 Command and Control Pakistan has taken many steps to boost nuclear security, including the creation of a three tiered command and control structure. The National Command Authority (NCA) oversees all organizations involved in nuclear research, weapons development, strategy, deployment and employment. 35 The NCA is headed by the Prime Minister and includes the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, the Director of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Commanders of the various branches of the Armed Services, and Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Finance. A full consensus is required for any nuclear strike. 36 The SPD is tasked with the daily management of Pakistan s nuclear assets and oversees approximately 10,000 personnel involved in securing the arsenal and strategic infrastructure. 37 The SPD also formulates nuclear doctrine and strategy; the chain of command; and plans for the storage, transport, deployment and use of nuclear weapons. 38 The Army, Air Force, and Navy of Pakistan each have their own strategic forces command, which comprises the third tier of command and control. 39 External Security Measures Pakistan appears to have robust security measures in place to moderate the threats posed by external assault. Pakistan s nuclear weapons are believed to be scattered and disassembled. Reports indicate that the weapons are stored at up to six locations and are likely buried in deep underground facilities in order to prevent their destruction or seizure during an attack on the facility. 40 Analysts believe that the weapons are stored in component form in separate buildings or facilities, thus necessitating multiple operations to seize control of a complete nuclear weapon. 41 The SPD s official position is that the weapons will be ready when needed but will not be on hair trigger alert. It should be noted that if the weapons are stored in component form, this measure might make the theft of a fissile nuclear core easier if its location within the facility is known and can be accessed. 42 This indicates that Pakistan s nuclear security is principally designed to safeguard against an attack by states, such as India, and not by extremist or rogue forces interested in obtaining nuclear components rather than a full-scale, strategic nuclear device. Pakistan implements security measures that are integrated into the nuclear weapons themselves. Pakistan claims to have developed its own Permissive Action Links (PALs) technology and has integrated the PALs into its nuclear security system. Assuming this is the case, anyone seeking to utilize a nuclear weapon would need to have authorizing codes, which are controlled by the NCA. Additionally, Pakistan operates a standard two-man or three-man rule so that multiple individuals are needed to activate the weapons. 43 If terrorists seek to acquire the fissile core for use in a dirty bomb, however, the PALs will be unable to prevent them from doing so. 44 The physical security measures in place also present considerable challenges to potential external assaults. It is believed that the SPD and its 10,000 member security force exclusively guard Pakistan s weapons sites. 45 Shaun Gregory, a scholar focused on Pakistani security, indicates that Pakistan operates a layered concept of concentric tiers of armed forces personnel to guard nuclear weapons facilities, in addition to utilizing barriers and intrusion detection systems. 46 Perimeter security measures such as 7 The Fund for Peace

8 Pakistan s Nuclear Security strengthened fencing and heightened surveillance are also utilized. Counterintelligence teams operate within nuclear facilities in order to identify both external and internal threats. 47 It appears as if external attacks by extremist forces would not be able to overcome the physical safeguards in place without internal assistance. Another tool that Pakistani forces utilize to safeguard their nuclear weapons is the secrecy of the program itself. The location of nuclear weapons sites and other critical aspects of the program are kept secret, and transport of nuclear components and mat eri als is genera lly con duc ted clandestinely and avoids highly visible security measures. 48 This approach offers both strengths and weaknesses for countering external attacks from extremist forces. The secrecy of the location of nuclear components limits the ability of extremists because they will not know where to look for the weapons without insider assistance. Ideally, not only will outsiders not know precisely which facilities house nuclear components, but they also will not know where to look within those facilities for the components in question. 49 However, this emphasis on secrecy rather than overt security could create vulnerabilities during transportation. If a terrorist group obtained intelligence on the timing and route of transported nuclear components they could be susceptible to theft. 50 Although Pakistan s external security measures significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists would be able to obtain nuclear weapons or materials, they are far from invincible. Many of Pakistan s suspected nuclear weapons facilities are located near or within areas contested by al-qaeda and its affiliates. As a result, this increases the likelihood that terrorists would be able to launch an attack on the facilities. According to Gregory, three terrorist attacks have been launched against Pakistan s suspected nuclear facilities in recent years. 51 The facility at Sargodha, which allegedly stores nuclear missiles, was attacked on November 1, On December 10, 2007, there was a suicide bombing at Kamra, a suspected nuclear airbase. Finally, on August 20, 2008, Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers attacked several entrances to the Wah cantonment, considered to be one of Pakistan s main nuclear weapons manufacturing sites. 52 These attacks are alarming, and suggest that a better organized attack aimed at obtaining nuclear weapons or materials could potentially succeed. However, it bears emphasizing that these attacks were all suicide bombings targeted against the Pakistani military which occurred outside of the respective facilities. Terrorists were not necessarily targeting nuclear materials and they did not breach the facilities during these attacks. 53 The Obama administration is apparently confident that Pakistan s nuclear facilities are secure from external assault. However, the administration harbors deep concerns regarding the potential insider threat to Pakistan s nuclear materials. 54 Internal Security Concerns: Support for Extremist Groups? Concerns regarding Pakistani nuclear security are heightened by accusations from journalists and scholars 55 that the Pakistani government has supported and continues to support Islamist extremist groups. According to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and America s loss of interest in the region, Pakistan supported the Taliban s rise to power. This strategy was based on the notion that a friendly government in Afghanistan could check Indian influence and provide strategic depth in any future conflict with India. Such a strategy fundamentally ignored the destabilizing influence that strengthening Islamist groups would have on Pakistan and the region. 56 According to Rashid, Pakistan also supported the creation of Islamist extremist groups in Kashmir as they sought to undermine India s control of the disputed territory. 57 Rashid asserts that although al-qaeda became allied with the Taliban and began to use the region as a safe haven, Pakistan turned a blind eye to al- Qaeda s operations due to the group s support for the Taliban and Kashmiri militants. 58 Following the September 11th attacks, Rashid argues that Pakistan has engaged in a duplicitous game in which the government has tolerated the presence of and supported certain terrorist groups it deems valuable as counters against India, such as the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in addition to many Kashmir oriented groups, while making efforts to hunt down al-qaeda 8 The Fund for Peace

9 Pakistan s Nuclear Security militants on behalf of the United States. 59 Although several high profile arrests of al- Qaeda leaders have been made by Pakistan, including Abu Zubaydah in March 2002 and Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the so called Mastermind of 9/11, in March 2003, 60 Rashid asserts that many al-qaeda operatives eluded capture and were able to coalesce in FATA without interference. 61 As several terrorist groups continue to use Pakistan as a safe haven, accusations regarding active Pakistani support for these groups persist. The notion that Pakistan supports extremist groups is highly disputed by Pakistani officials. Following Harvard scholar Matt Waldman s recent assertions that Pakistan s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supports and partially controls the Afghan insurgency, a Pakistani military spokesman denounced Waldman s report as an untruthful, malicious account. 62 Former Pakistani ambassador Riaz M. Khan rejected the notion that Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban in order to provide strategic depth in any future conflict with India. Rather, Ambassador Khan insisted that it was the strategy of Pakistan to promote a stable and strong neighbor in Afghanistan. 63 Furthermore, an alternative explanation exists for the prevalence of terrorist safe havens within Pakistan. Rather than evidence of active Pakistani support for terrorist groups, the safe havens could be indicative of the semi-autonomous nature of Pakistan s tribal areas and the inability of the central government to reclaim them. U.S. officials have confronted Pakistan over alleged ISI links to militant networks. U.S. concerns have extended to the highest level of government, as former President George W. Bush reportedly confronted the Pakistani Prime Minister and asked who was in control of the ISI, claiming that members of the ISI were leaking sensitive intelligence to terrorist groups. 64 Currently, the Obama administration has been frustrated by what they deem as Pakistan s unwillingness to confront the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban, which continue to use Pakistan as a base to plan and launch attacks across the border in Afghanistan. 65 State Department cables leaked in November 2010 reveal that the former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, remained deeply skeptical that Pakistan would abandon its ties to certain militant groups. Ms. Patterson wrote that [t] here is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support for these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India. 66 Although Pakistan s relationship with Islamist militants is unclear and disputed, allegations of ties raise concerns regarding the security of Pakistan s nuclear weapons. If the ISI or its members actively support Islamist militants or are sympathetic to their cause, the chances are stronger that a rogue member would attempt to divulge critical intelligence regarding the nation s nuclear security or otherwise assist the networks in obtaining nuclear materials. Internal Security Concerns: The AQ Khan Network The legacy of A.Q. Khan s nuclear proliferation network is also a serious cause for concern. In order for Pakistan to obtain nuclear weapons technology, Dr. Khan set up a black market network to purchase and manufacture the equipment. Technology was bought secretly in Europe and copied in factories run by Khan around the globe. Khan then used this network to supply other nations seeking to obtain nuclear weapons, apparently believing that the more nations with nuclear weapons programs, the less pressure that there would be on Pakistan s proliferation efforts. 67 It was later found that the network sold nuclear weapons-related technology, uranium enrichment materials, and possibly blueprints for the construction of advanced nuclear weapons to countries including North Korea, Iran, and Libya. 68 Khan was blamed for Pakistan s proliferation activities, which he initially accepted while insisting that the Pakistani government and army were not involved. 69 The United States accepted this version of events, and Khan was placed on house arrest. However, many experts believe that it is highly unlikely that the head of Pakistan s most prominent nuclear research lab, Dr. Khan, could have acted on his own without the knowledge and support of the Pakistani army. 70 Although Khan has been closely monitored and restricted from talking to U.S. or international officials, he has recently backed away from his prior confession, indicating that it was forced upon him so as to protect other officials from blame. In 2008, Khan stated that a shipment of centrifuges to North Korea in 2000 was 9 The Fund for Peace

10 Pakistan s Nuclear Security supervised by Pakistani security officials with the consent of President Musharraf. 71 Experts have indicated that several Pakistanis involved in the proliferation network remain at large and as a result there is reason to believe that the network could be revived. 72 Additionally, some believe that the Pakistani army cooperated with A.Q. Khan in order to assist global proliferation efforts. If either scenario is true, it could mean that Pakistan, or elements within the country, could revive the network and seek to sell nuclear secrets or materials, potentially to a terrorist network. These fears are further enhanced by the meeting between two Pakistani nuclear scientists and senior al-qaeda members, including Osama bin Laden, before the September 11th attacks. Internal Security Measures Pakistan has acted to improve its nuclear security measures in response to international pressure. Individuals involved in the nuclear program must undergo a Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), which examines a person s background for evidence of Islamist sympathies, improper group affiliations, and other potential personality problems such as drug use and sexual deviancy. 73 An 8,000 member workforce from four intelligence agencies, including the SPD and the ISI, is involved in the vetting process. Security clearance renewal is required every two years or when a worker is transferred to a different post and random checks are performed when needed. 74 The SPD has instituted a monitoring system to follow the movements of all personnel involved in nuclear security. 75 Officers are drawn primarily from Punjab province, which is believed to have fewer extremist sympathies and ties. As described previously, a two or three man rule is in effect to limit the risk of a lone rogue agent colluding with external actors. 76 Furthermore, General Kayani, the former head of the ISI, took measures to weed out members of the organization with known Islamist sympathies. 77 These measures reduce the likelihood of insider-outsider collusion. However, no personnel security system guarantees complete protection. Should an insider be able to assist in the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology, expertise, or weapons, they would greatly increase the chances that terrorist groups could acquire a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb. Despite relatively robust security measures, there is a chance that sleeper agents could slip past security measures unprotected, provided that they displayed no overt sympathies or links to terrorist groups. 78 Finally, serious concerns remain regarding Pakistan s nuclear expertise. A.Q. Khan and Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood s separate attempts to assist global proliferation efforts underscore this problem. As Pakistan s nuclear program expands it is necessary to monitor and carefully manage those possessing nuclear knowledge. Efforts to retrain and assist those who are leaving Pakistan s nuclear program may be needed. 79 Summary of Pakistan s Nuclear Security The existence of well organized Islamist extremist groups within Pakistan s borders, the relative fragility of the state, allegations of governmental support to terrorist groups, and lingering doubts concerning the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network raise red flags concerning Pakistan s nuclear security. Fortunately, Pakistan has a robust system in place to mitigate many threats to its nuclear security. However, no system is perfect. Given the enormous threats to the country s nuclear arsenal, Pakistan remains one of the world s greatest nuclear security vulnerabilities. The threat of terrorist attack on nuclear facilities, and potentially of insider collaboration with terrorist groups, is high. Over the long-term, there is a somewhat distant threat that the Pakistani state could collapse or weaken significantly so that nuclear safeguards would be unable to protect Pakistan s nuclear weapons. However, the threats of external attack and internal collaboration are partially addressed by current safeguards. Total state collapse is unlikely, particularly if the United States and the international community remain engaged in the region. 10 The Fund for Peace

11 Threat Convergence in Pakistan Pakistan-United States Cooperation Pakistan s nuclear security could potentially be strengthened by increased cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. Beneficial cooperation between the two countries might include consultations and sharing of best practices, disrupting terrorist networks, and promoting strong Pakistani democracy and good governance. Protection against a threat as catastrophic as nuclear terrorism cannot be limited to a single dimension. As Matthew Bunn argues, reducing the risk of nuclear theft in Pakistan must include both steps to further improve nuclear security measures and steps to reduce extremists ability to challenge the Pakistani state, to recruit nuclear insiders, and to mount large outsider attacks. 80 Efforts to address these issues are ongoing and should be reexamined to ensure that they are effective. Pakistan s nuclear security is an important, yet sensitive, issue in U.S. foreign policy. Pakistan takes great pride in its nuclear arsenal and the United States has attempted to deter Pakistan from obtaining nuclear weapons, to rollback Pakistan s nuclear capability, and has sanctioned Pakistan for its nuclear arsenal. Many Pakistanis view American skepticism regarding Pakistan s nuclear security as evidence of further interventionism in Pakistani affairs. Thus, the United States must carefully balance efforts to address the threat with sensitivity to Pakistan s desires for secrecy and national control of the program. Assistance efforts should avoid pressing Pakistan to divulge too much critical information. A false step on this issue could jeopardize the overarching U.S.- Pakistan relationship. Consultations Consultations between the United States and Pakistan have reportedly involved the sharing of best practices, technical measures to prevent theft or accidental launch of nuclear weapons, personnel reliability and the physical security of nuclear facilities.81 Pakistan has also accepted highlevel training on nuclear security from the United States. 82 For the most part, these consultations are shrouded in secrecy. According to a Pakistani official, Pakistan reserves the right to pick and choose which aspects of nuclear security the consultations will address, and only non-intrusive measures have been accepted. 83 American diplomatic cables leaked in November 2010 have revealed that the United States has tried and failed to get Pakistan to remove highly enriched uranium from a nuclear research reactor since The uranium stockpile is believed to be large enough to build several dirty bombs or, in the hands of a skilled nuclear physicist, potentially a nuclear bomb. U.S. officials feared that the uranium could be seized by a terrorist group, whereas Pakistan feared a potential media backlash if they agreed to American requests to secure the uranium. 84 Despite Pakistan s aversion to cooperate on every issue, these consultations may have helped Pakistan improve its nuclear security measures in recent years. In light of recent improvements, the United States has denied the charge that Pakistan s nuclear weapons are not secure. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage asserted that we have spent considerable time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. 85 While Pakistan does have robust measures that have likely been enhanced with input from the United States, nuclear security is an ongoing process that requires constant improvement. Consultations between the two should continue and should aim to reduce vulnerabilities in Pakistan s nuclear arsenal. In order to cooperate on this issue, the United States and Pakistan need to build confidence in one another and lower the levels of persistent mutual suspicion and mistrust. Thus, there is a strong need for clear communication regarding the threat that nuclear terrorism poses to both countries. 86 Pakistan has traditionally focused more on external threats to its nuclear arsenal than on internal threats. This includes India, but also the United States. The United States needs to reassure Pakistan that it is respectful of Pakistan s sovereignty and is not seeking to seize control of its nuclear arsenal. Pakistani fears that the United States is once again interfering with Pakistan s nuclear arsenal could jeopardize any potential working relationship. Furthermore, there is a tendency 11 The Fund for Peace

12 Pakistan-United States Cooperation for some Pakistanis to underestimate the threat posed by Islamist extremist groups, writing them off as men in caves. 87 It must be clear to Pakistan that terrorist groups do pose a threat to the Pakistani state and that its nuclear arsenal has to be robustly defended against internal threats. Once Pakistani fears regarding American intentions are allayed and Pakistan understands the common threat, close cooperation on the identification of vulnerabilities is necessary. For example, the two countries could cooperate on securing Pakistan s nuclear expertise. Consultations should consider long-term trends that could create new vulnerabilities in Pakistan s nuclear security system, such as rising levels of extremism within the country and Pakistan s expanding nuclear arsenal. Rising levels of extremism could mean that there is a greater likelihood of insider collaboration with external threats. Pakistan s nuclear expansion will result in more facilities, weapons and materials to protect. 88 Furthermore, Pakistan and the United States ought to consider developing contingencies for communication in the event of a crisis in order to promote predictability and ease tension if an emergency arises. 89 Finally, joint public outreach efforts to the Pakistani public could increase transparency and support for U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. It is important for the Pakistani public to see that joint cooperation on nuclear security is normal and that the United States does not have ulterior motives. Joint cooperation is currently kept secret, leading many to doubt American intentions. 90 Some Islamic extremists have played upon Pakistani fears, suggesting that the United States seeks to scoop up Pakistan s nuclear weapons. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, the nuclear scientist who met with Osama bin Laden, suggested that Pakistan should support extremists to guard against a potential American seizure of the weapons. 91 Counter-Terrorism Efforts to strengthen Pakistani nuclear security cannot simply cover Pakistani safeguards. They also have to counter the growing terrorist threat within Pakistan. Ongoing counterterrorist operations within Pakistan consist of two separate initiatives. The first is CIA operated drone strikes within FATA to eliminate known insurgent leaders. The second initiative is comprised of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Pakistani army to eliminate terrorist safe havens. The Drone War over Western Pakistan is controversial and is shrouded in secrecy. Drones are unmanned, remotely flown aircraft that utilize video surveillance and launch missiles onto targets from miles above. The U.S. government runs two drone programs, one controlled by the military in acknowledged war zones and one controlled by the CIA that seeks out terrorists around the world. The program in Pakistan is run by the CIA and is operating not in a war zone, but in an allied country. The CIA s efforts are classified, and thus there is no official information on where the drones operate, how they select their targets, who oversees the program, and how many civilians are killed. 92 However, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann of the New America Foundation indicate that drone strikes in Pakistan have been limited to FATA, primarily focusing on the terrorist safe havens in North and South Waziristan. 93 This is likely due to restrictions placed on the United States by Pakistan and to the fact that FATA possesses virtually no infrastructure, is highly rural, and has been the principal safe haven for terrorist networks in the region. As a result, civilian casualties and attention to the program are minimized. In Pakistan, drone strikes have been conducted by the United States since They have relied on a human intelligence network established during the Bush administration to inform the CIA of the whereabouts of al-qaeda militants and other terrorist groups in the region. 94 The pace of drone strikes has been rapidly accelerated by the Obama administration. According to Bergen and Tiedemann, there were only forty -five drone attacks in Pakistan during the entire Bush administration. In 2009, the Obama administration launched 51 drone attacks. 95 This total was more than doubled in 2010, with as many as 118 drone strikes. 96 It appears as if the drone program has 12 The Fund for Peace

13 Pakistan-United States Cooperation severely disrupted the operations of al- Qaeda and its affiliates. The drone program has killed many terrorist leaders - more than half of the CIA s high value targets were killed by the drone program in An atmosphere of fear and distrust has allegedly been created among the extremist groups operating in FATA due to the constant threat of drone strikes. Militants have taken to sleeping outside among the trees rather than risk being killed inside a building. As the drone program depends on a human intelligence network, al-qaeda and its affiliates have regularly executed suspected spies. 98 However, several factors complicate the supposed success of the drone program. First, terrorist groups have continued their operations despite the threat of drones in FATA. The sharp rise in drone attacks undertaken by the Obama administration has not resulted in a sharp reduction of terrorist attacks within Pakistan. Militant leaders are killed, but replaced. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are still able to use Pakistan as a base to recruit and train future terrorists from around the globe, including from Western countries. 99 After a years-long sustained drone campaign, many of the militants originally limited to FATA may have fled the region to undertake operations in more urbanized settings, potentially further destabilizing Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistanis overwhelmingly view the drone strikes negatively as violations of sovereignty and attacks against civilians. A Gallup poll from August 2009 found that only nine percent of Pakistanis approved of the attacks. 100 The number of civilian and terrorist deaths in these strikes is extraordinarily difficult to determine. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann estimated that 114 drone attacks from 2004 through early 2010 killed between 830 and 1,210 people. Of those killed, between 550 and 850 were reported to be militants, or approximately two-thirds of the total. 101 Given that considerable civilian casualties accompany the program, whether or not the drone program kills or creates more terrorists is a matter of debate that should be openly discussed. However, Bergen and Tiedemann argue that civilian deaths declined in 2010 due to better intelligence, more accurate targeting, smaller missiles, and enhanced cooperation with Pakistan. 102 Reducing the number of civilian deaths is an important trend that should be continued so as to reduce blowback against the United States and Pakistan. The second major ongoing counterterrorist initiative within the country is the Pakistani army s counterinsurgency operations against domestically based militants. According to many American observers, Pakistan has been slow to address the rising threat of militancy emanating from within its borders. These observers argue that despite Pakistan s longstanding promises to reign in terrorist groups, Pakistan has continued to serve as the base of operations for al-qaeda and its affiliates. The United States has sought to convince Pakistan of the need to reorient the military from its traditional focus on a conventional war with India to a counterinsurgency war against domestic terror groups. 103 Since 2001, Pakistan has conducted several operations to reign in militants and assert control over the semiautonomous tribal regions. Many of these efforts have proven largely unsuccessful, although Pakistan s 2009 operations in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan may have shown some improvement. 104 Measuring the Swat Valley and South Waziristan operations in purely military terms could yield the conclusion that they were moderately successful. The operations succeeded in temporarily ousting insurgents from the targeted areas, but at a steep cost. They resulted in a huge wave of internally displaced persons. Efforts to stabilize and revitalize Swat and South Waziristan have stalled. Many civilians are still displaced by the fighting and guerrilla groups have challenged the Pakistani army. Safe havens persist, such as in North Waziristan, and violence continues to grip the country. 105 The Role of Democracy, Development & Good Governance Over the long-term, the stability of the Pakistani state and its nuclear materials depends on Pakistan s ability to undercut support for extremist groups by promoting democracy, good governance, and development. An economically sound, democratic Pakistan would limit the appeal of terrorism by providing avenues for economic advancement and political participation through the state. A sole focus on military efforts against terrorist groups will result in casualties and increase the political appeal of 13 The Fund for Peace

14 Pakistan-United States Cooperation extremists if not accompanied by measures to benefit the people of Pakistan. Pakistan has been directly controlled by the military for more than half of its existence. Former General Pervez Musharraf assumed control of the country in a bloodless coup in 1999 and ruled until 2008, when the late Benazir Bhutto s Pakistan People s Party (PPP) gained power in elections that rejected Musharraf s policies. 106 Unfortunately, the new civilian government that took power in 2008 under President Asif Ali Zardari (Benazir Bhutto s widower) has been weak and divided. Internal strife and a bad economy have limited his government s appeal and contributed to the feeling that Zardari is out of touch with the people. As a result of Zardari s unpopularity and diminished power, the army still retains significant power, autonomy and influence in Pakistan s foreign and national security policy. 107 Economic development is needed, but the outlook in January 2011 is grim despite U.S. aid efforts. Pakistan has been one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid at approximately $10.4 billion since 2001, $6 billion for development and humanitarian assistance and $4.4 billion for security related assistance. 108 Additionally, Pakistan is reimbursed for many counterterrorism related expenses. The United States expanded its assistance with the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, which provides Pakistan with $1.5 billion per year for five years in nonmilitary aid while making military aid to the country conditionsbased. 109 Although the bill resulted in a huge expansion of aid for economic development, concerns remain as to how effective it will be and how much will get to the Pakistani people. 110 High inflation and unemployment, food shortages and an energy crisis have gripped Pakistan in the past few years. Recent recovery has been modest at best, and Pakistan s growth outlook is troubled. Investors fear operating in an atmosphere as chaotic as Pakistan. 111 Expanding access to American markets for Pakistani exports is a goal that could assist the country s economic development, but the United States has stalled in efforts to do so. 112 During July and August of 2010, Pakistan was devastated by torrential rains that caused widespread flooding. Thousands died, as many as 20 million Pakistanis were displaced, and countless villages were destroyed. 113 The flooding is likely to create a food shortage and devastate the economy, thus straining an already cash-strapped Pakistani government. Pakistan s precarious security situation could also deteriorate. Flooding has disproportionately impacted poorer, rural areas that were already prone to militancy. 114 The NWFP and Swat Valley, recent havens for terrorist groups, were flooded, potentially creating an opening for militant groups to retrench and gain support among the people by providing their own relief. 115 Amid the deepening chaos, the Pakistani central government must remain vigilant regarding its nuclear security so that its nuclear weapons and materials remain secure. Given America s strong interest in a stable Pakistan, relief efforts should continue to be a top priority of the United States. 14 The Fund for Peace

15 Threat Convergence in Pakistan Conclusion Pakistan s expanding nuclear arsenal and materials exist in the context of state fragility, the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network, and alleged ties between rogue elements of Pakistan s security services and Islamist militants. Al-Qaeda, which seeks to conduct a nuclear attack, has challenged the Pakistani state along with numerous homegrown militant groups. Efforts to bolster Pakistan s nuclear security should address safeguards, counterterrorism, and the promotion of democracy and development. As long as Pakistan remains unstable and the home of the world s most dangerous extremist groups, it will continue to be one of the world s most significant nuclear security threats. Given the stakes, reducing the nuclear threat in Pakistan must be a top international priority. 15 The Fund for Peace

16 References Endnotes Non-proliferation Overview 1. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (Penguin Books, 2009), Ambassador Riaz M. Khan, Pakistan s Afghanistan Policy, East-West Center, Washington, DC, (Talk), June 17, Karen DeYoung, New Estimates put Pakistan s Nuclear Arsenal at More than 100, Washington Post, January 31, 2011, AR html. See also: Paul K. Kerr & Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation & Security Issues, Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2010, sgp/crs/nuke/rl34248.pdf 4. This is potentially a response to recent Indian nuclear advances, including the U.S.-India nuclear pact. 5. Robert Norris & Hans Kristensen, Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2009, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2009, fulltext.pdf, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism, Arms Control Today, July 1, 2009, b e l f e r c e n t e r. k s g. h a r v a r d. e d u / p u b l i c a t i o n / / nuclear_security_in_pakistan.html?breadcrumb=%2fproject%2f62% 2Fusrussia_initiative_to_prevent_ nuclear_terrorism. Terrorism Profile 7. Imtiaz Gul, Pakistan s New Networks of Terror, Foreign Policy, June 10, 2010, pakistans_new_networks_of_terror?page=0,0. 8. K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, February 6, 2009, Gul. 10. Kronstadt, Don Rassler, Al Qa ida s Pakistan Strategy, CTC Sentinel, June 2009, Vol. 2, Issue 6, Jayshree Bajoria & Greg Bruno, al-qaeda (a.k.a. al-qaida, al-qa ida), Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, December 30, 2009, co=c Ibid. 14. Rassler, Ibid, Ibid, Bajoria & Bruno. 18. Bunn, Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, V, Baitullah Mehsud was killed on August 5, 2009 by a U.S. Predator drone strike. See: Jane Mayer, The Predator War, The New Yorker, October 26, , h t t p : / / w w w. n e w y o r k e r. c o m / reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer?printable=true. 23. Bajoria, Pakistan s New Generation of Terrorists. 24. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was the political entity formed by the Afghan Taliban in the mid-1990s, lasting until the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Spencer S. Hsu & Greg Miller, U.S. Government Charges Pakistani Leader Hakimullah Mehsud in CIA Attack, Washington Post, September 1, 2010, AR html?hpid=sec-nation. 26. Mayer. 27. Hsu & Miller. 28. Benjamin Weiser, Call to Taliban After Failed Bomb Attempt in Times Sq., The New York Times, September 29, 2010, w w w. n y t i m e s. c o m / / 0 9 / 3 0 / n y r e g i o n / 3 0 s h a h z a d. h t m l? ref=faisalshahzad. 29. Hsu & Miller. 30. Gul, Pakistan s New Networks of Terror. 31. Lashkar-e-Taiba is the group that is believed to have orchestrated the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November See Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Gul, Pakistan s New Networks of Terror. 33. Karin Brulliard, As Progressive Pakistani Politician is Mourned, his Suspected Killer is Lauded, The Washington Post, January 5, 2011, AR html 16 The Fund for Peace

17 Endnotes Non-proliferation Overview 34. Nick Schifrin, Pakistan Calls Nuke Security Program Foolproof, ABC News, January 26, 2008, id= Kerr & Nikitin, Ibid, Kenneth N. Luongo & Naeem Salik, Building Confidence in Pakistan s Nuclear Security, Arms Control Today, December 2007, Kerr & Nikitin, Luongo & Salik. 40. Vikram Jagadish, Pakistan s Ultimate Nightmare Scenario: Preventing Islamic Extremists from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons, Texas Review of Law & Politics, Spring, Bunn, Kerr & Nikitin, Jagadish, Ibid, Ibid, Gregory, Jagadish, Larssen, Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism. 49. Jagadish, Larssen, Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism. 51. Gregory, Ibid, Robert Mackey, Have Pakistani Nuclear Facilities Already Been Attacked? The New York Times, The Lede, August 11, 2009, thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/have-pakistani-nuclear-facilitiesalready-been-attacked/. 54. Jane Perlez, David E. Sanger, and Eric Schmitt, Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance with Pakistan, The New York Times, November 30, 2010, w.nytimes.com/20 10/1 2/01/ world/asia/01wik ileakspakistan.html?_r=1&emc=eta1 55. See Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, and Karin Brulliard, Pakistan Rejects Report Saying Nation s Intelligence Agency Aids Afghan Taliban, The Washington Post, June 15, 2010, Rashid, Descent into Chaos, Ibid, Ibid, Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink, The New York Review of Books, June 11, 2009, Volume LVI, Number 10, (12-16), Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Rashid, Descent into Chaos, Karin Brulliard, Pakistan Rejects Report Saying Nation s Intelligence Agency Aids Afghan Taliban, The Washington Post, June 15, 2010, AR html. 63. Ambassador Riaz M. Khan, Pakistan s Afghanistan Policy. 64. Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Jayshree Bajoria, The Strained U.S.-Pakistan Alliance, Council on Foreign Relations, October 22, 2010, strained_uspakistan_alliance.html. 66. Perlez et al. 67. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Rashid, Descent into Chaos, Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Pakistani Says Army Knew Atomic Parts Were Shipped, Associated Press, New York Times, July 5, 2008, world/asia/05pstan.html. 72. Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Gregory, Jagadish, Feroz Hassan Khan, Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth from Reality, July/August 2009, khan. 76. Gregory, Gul, Pakistan s New Networks of Terror. 78. Jagadish, Feroz Hassan Khan. 17 The Fund for Peace

18 Endnotes Pakistan-United States Cooperation 80. Bunn, Kerr & Nikitin, Khan. 83. Kerr & Nikitin, Perlez, et al. 85. Kerr & Nikitin, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Building a Strategic U.S.-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship, CTC Sentinel, April 2010, Vol. 3, Issue 4, belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ctcsentinel-vol3iss4.pdf, Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, Jane Mayer, The Predator War, The New Yorker, October 26, 2009, printable=true. 93. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, , The New America Foundation, policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf, Matt Irvine, On Drone Strikes, Abu Muqawama, Center for A New American Security, April 16, 201 0, w.cnas.org/blogs/ abumuqawama/2010/04/drone-strikes.html. 95. Bergen & Tiedemann, New America Foundation, counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones, (summary of Bergen & Tiedemann s findings updated frequently) 96. Ibid. 97. Mayer. 98. Bergen & Tiedemann, Year of the Drone, Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Hidden War, Foreign Policy, December 21, 2010, the_hidden_war?page=0, Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, C. Christine Fair & Seth G. Jones, Pakistan s War Within, Survival. December 2009-January pubs/ _fair_and_jones.pdf, Terrence Smith & Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, Pakistan: In the Cauldron Center for Strategic & International Studies, South Asia Monitor, Number 139, March 3, 2010, K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments, Congressional Research Service, June 1, 2010, row/r41307.pdf, Ibid, Kronstadt, Key Current Issues & Developments, As discussed above Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, Ahmed Rashid, Last Chance for Pakistan, New York Review of Books, August 16, 2010, last-chance-pakistan/ The country s northern provinces, including the NWFP and Swat Valley, Sindh province in the South, and Balochistan, home to a separatist insurgency, have been among the hardest hit territories. Rashid, Last Chance for Pakistan Ibid. 18 The Fund for Peace

19 About The Fund for Peace Conflict Early Warning and Assessment Transnational Threats Sustainable Development, Sustainable Security The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) nonprofit research and educational organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security. We promote sustainable security through research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers. A leader in the conflict assessment and early warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on the problems of weak and failing states. Our objective is to create practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers. The Fund for Peace offers a wide range of initiatives focused on our central objective: to promote sustainable security and the ability of a state to solve its own problems peacefully without an external military or administrative presence. Our programs fall into three primary thematic areas: Conflict Early Warning and Assessment; Transnational Threats; and Sustainable Development, Sustainable Security. About The Center for the Study of Threat Convergence After three years of project work, in January 2009, The Fund for Peace established The Center for the Study of Threat Convergence (CSTC) to explore the linkages among the three biggest threats to global security: fragile states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and terrorism. The Center aims to: raise the profile of the challenges in vulnerable, fragile and ungoverned regions on the nonproliferation agenda; explore how these regions may serve as enabling environments for nuclear terrorism; promote more coherent and strategic policy approaches to nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear trafficking; and become a hub for threat convergencerelated analysis. The CSTC encourages innovative and fresh approaches to the issue by convening experts, performing extensive field research in some of the world s most difficult environments, and by partnering with international and regional organizations to explore how the threat of catastrophic terrorism emanating from weak and failing states can be prevented. /tc