Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy on the Taiwan Issue*
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1 Issues & Studies 46, no. 3 (September 2010): Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy on the Taiwan Issue* T. Y. WANG The relationship between China and Taiwan has improved substantially since the election of President Ma Ying-jeou ( ) in The reduction in cross-strait tension is welcomed by the United States but the resulting changes also call into question the utility of Washington's policy of strategic ambiguity. Employing the theory of deterrence, this study analyzes the logic of U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue and current cross- Strait interaction. It is concluded that both sides of the Taiwan Strait continue to act as conditional revisionists and Washington's deterrence policy remains effective in that it serves to maintain cross-strait peace and stability. KEYWORDS: deterrence; strategic ambiguity; cross-strait relations; Ma Ying-jeou; Taiwan Relations Act. T. Y. WANG ( ) is a professor in the Department of Politics and Government, Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois, USA. He was coordinator of the Conference Group of Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) of the American Political Science Association ( ) and is currently the co-editorof the Journal of Asian and African Studies. He canbe reached at <tywang@ilstu.edu>. *This research is an extension of a previous study in 2005; see: T.Y. Wang, "Extended Deterrence and US Policy towards the Taiwan Issue: Implications for East Asia and Taipei," Taiwan Defense Affairs 6, no. 1 (2005): The author would like to thank Professors Steve Chanand Shelley Rigger andtwoanonymous referees for theirhelpful comments. Acknowledgment is extended to Professor Emerson Niou of Duke University and the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, for making the survey data available. All errors are my own. Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (ROC). September
2 ISSUES & STUDIES * * * Thirty years have passed since the enactment of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Together with the three Sino-U.S. communiques: the Shanghai communique of 1972, the normalization communique of 1979, and the joint communique of 1982, the TRA constitutes the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Within this framework, Washington has repeatedly asserted its interest in a peaceful settlement of the cross-strait conflict but has been deliberately vague about the depth of its commitment to defending the island in the event of an attempt by Beijing to unify China by force. The policy of "strategic ambiguity" making it clear that "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes" would be of "grave concern" to the United States (TRA, Section 2 (a)), but refusing to spell out exactly what would trigger an American military response is a form of deterrence, or more specifically, a form of extended deterrence. 2 U.S. policy on Taiwan has been judged one of Washington's most successful foreign policies in recent history, but the recent improvement in cross-strait relations has led some in the United States to question its continuing utility. Indeed, tension between Taipei and Beijing has subsided substantially since the election of President Ma Ying-jeou ( ) of the Kuomingtang (KMT, ) in In contrast to his predecessor, who pursued anti-china, pro-independence policies, Ma has shown himself to be determined to improve Taiwan's relations with China. Taipei's moderate and accommodating policies have invited reciprocal responses from Beijing. The reduction in cross-strait tension is welcomed by the United States but the resulting changes also call into question whether Washington should continue its policy of strategic ambiguity. 3 This suggestion implies that structural changes have taken place in cross-strait relations that warrant a fundamental alteration of Washington's deterrence policy. But is 2 Ibid. 3 Bruce Gilley, "Not So Dire Straits," Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January-February 2010): September 2010
3 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy this actually the case? This study analyzes the logic of U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue and current cross-strait interaction. Employing the theory of deterrence, it is concluded that both sides of the Taiwan Strait continue to act as conditional revisionists. Therefore Washington's deterrence policy remains effective in that it serves to maintain cross-strait peace and stability. The Logic of Deterrence A state of deterrence is a situation in which a deterring state seeks to prevent a target state from taking actions to change the status quo. 4 This is accomplished by the deterring state's threatening to take actions that will potentially deny the target state its expected gains or punish it to the extent that the costs of the unwanted acts exceed the gains. In order to be effective, the deterring state needs to possess, or at least to appear to possess, sufficient retaliatory capability to deny the target state the fruits of the unwanted actions. Most importantly, the deterring state must demonstrate a reputation for resolve so that the target state is persuaded that the threats are credible. Thus, in addition to the display of retaliatory capability, a clear communication of such resolve becomes critical in deterrence diplomacy. In a situation of extended deterrence, credibility of threat is not easily established because threats are being used to prevent the target state from attacking a third state, and a defender's resolve to use force to protect another state is intrinsically doubtful. 5 As Schelling convincingly pointed out, "the difference between the national homeland and everything 'abroad' is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if un- 4 For a review of recent developments in deterrence literature, see Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory Toward a New Research Agenda," International Studies Quarter 54, no. 3 (September 2010): Paul Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (June 1988): September
4 ISSUES & STUDIES spoken, and threats that have to be made credible." 6 To show the defender's resolve in extended deterrence, mechanisms such as a treaty of mutual defense and the stationing of troops in the third state's territory to act as a tripwire have been used and examples of both can be seen in Washington's relationship with South Korea. A mutual defense treaty essentially communicates to all parties that members of the alliance surrender the option of reconsidering their allegiance to each other even if a war breaks out. A trip-wire mechanism also signals to the target state that the deterring state is willing to commit its valuable possessions in order to ensure the safety of the third state where its troops are stationed. Because both mechanisms carry huge costs, they demonstrate a credible resolve to the target state. 7 In a situation where there is neither a formal alliance nor a trip-wire mechanism, the deterring state needs to signal that it has interests in the third state vital enough to justify the use of retaliatory force. Such interests may be in the form of economic ties that are significant to the deterring state. They could also be political or military interests that have strategic implications for the deterring state. The amount of trade between the third state and the deterring state, and the level of arms that the deterring state exports to the third state, or a declaration of how politically or strategically important the third state is, may also be used as signals, albeit weaker ones, of the deterring state's resolve. While credible threats will make the target state believe in the deterring state's resolve, this belief is not sufficient for an effective deterrence. If compliance with the deterring state's demands would ultimately deprive the target state of a prized possession, there would be little incentive for it to comply and thus it may choose to take the unwanted actions. Tokyo's decision to attack Pearl Harbor in World War II is a case in point. The trade embargo imposed by Washington on Japan in 1941 was an act of deterrence aimed at stopping Tokyo's aggression in order to preserve the status quo. 6 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), Steve Chan, "Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations," WorldAffairs 166, no. 2 (September 2003): September 2010
5 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy Knowing full well that America's threats were backed up by sufficient capabilities and credible resolve, Japan still attacked because it believed that failing to do so would be tantamount to economic suicide. The Japanese were not unaware of the costs involved in their action. Neither did they doubt the credibility of Washington's deterrence, but rather they realized that failure to take action in this case would have even less attractive consequences. This example shows that the target state's evaluation of the opportunity costs of compliance versus noncompliance determines its behavior. 8 Thus, convincing assurances from the deterring state that the target state's principal values will not be subject to attack if it complies with the demands play an important role in deterrence diplomacy. 9 With the addition of assurances of credible threats, deterrence becomes a web of incentives and disincentives that prevents the target state from taking unwanted actions. However, deterrence diplomacy is effective only when targeted actors are conditional revisionists. Citing Robert Jervis's work, 10 Christensen argued that political actors such as Hitler's Germany and Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network are examples of "unconditional revisionists," actors that are impossible to dissuade from pursuing their political objectives. Other politicalactors, such as the United Kingdomand Japan, do not need to be deterred. These unprovokable friends of the United States may be annoyed with Washington's policies from time to time, but they have no intention of challenging the status quo and Washington does not regard them as potential threats to U.S. interests. The threat of deterrence is simply not needed for this type of "non-revisionist." Thus deterrence diplomacy can only be applied to "conditional revisionists" who are willing to exploit theiropponents' weaknesses in orderto change the status quo but would refrain from taking action unless opportunities arise. Because the 8 I wanted to thank Steve Chan for suggesting this point to me. 9 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966); Thomas J. Christensen, "The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). September
6 ISSUES & STUDIES deterring state can hold the target state's prized possessions hostage while at the same time providing convincing assurance, the latter can be forced to comply with the former's demands. 11 Washington's Deterrence Diplomacy, Washington's policy of deterrence regarding China and Taiwan was most apparent from 2000 to early 2008, particularly in terms of providing convincing assurance to China's leaders that the United States would not support Taiwan independence as long as Beijing complied with Washington's demands for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Indeed, Beijing has always considered Taiwan "an inalienable part of China," the last remnant of a century of humiliation by Western imperialism. The unification of China is viewed by Beijing as being in "the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation." 12 No Chinese leader could allow Taiwan to declare itself independent without being regarded as a traitor to the nation. Beijing's leaders also fear that the failure of their Taiwan policy might incite other separatist groups in Xinjiang and Tibet and threaten the territorial integrity of the country. Given the high stakes involved, Chinese leaders have been extremely suspicious of any Taiwanese leaders who promoted the island's separate identity. With national unification in mind, the Beijing government has undertaken a military buildup designed to coerce Taipei into accepting its unification formula, known as "one country, two systems." That said, Beijing leaders fully understand that the price of unification by force would be high. An attack on Taiwan, especially if Taipei had not provoked it, could invite military intervention by the United States, the only superpower in the world that has clear military superiority over China. 11 Christensen, "The Contemporary Security Dilemma," Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council of the PRC, "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," People's Daily Online (Renmin ribao), February 21, 2000, at September 2010
7 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy A war in the Taiwan Strait would also hold back China's drive for economic development launched two decades ago. As few on the Chinese mainland still adhere to Communist ideology, economic devastation would probably threaten the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime in Beijing. A war with Taiwan would also shatter Beijing's grand strategy of "peaceful development" and foster the idea of the "China threat" 13 that Beijing has tried very hard to defuse. 14 But given that the cross-strait power differential is steadily tilting in China's favor, Chinese leaders seem to believe that time is on their side. Rather than attempting to force unification through military means and running the risk of adverse consequences, Beijing's strategy toward Taiwan during the period was to prevent the island from declaring independence through a policy of economic integration and diplomatic isolation. Since China has both economic and military reasons for avoiding a cross-strait military conflict, but would be willing to fight if it was in danger of losing its prized possession, it may be said to have been acting as a conditional revisionist. During the same period, the Taipei government was headed by President Chen Shui-bian ( ) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, ). Chen had strong pro-independence credentials and the DPP was the only major political party that was seeking the de jure independence of Taiwan through an island-wide referendum. The DPP government aimed to strengthen the feeling of a Taiwanese identity among the island's citizens and to develop Taiwan's status as an independent political entity distinct from China. These policies included suspending the Guidelines for National Unification (, GNU) and the operation of National Unification Council (, NUC), adding the words "Issued in Taiwan" to the island country's passports, supporting a movement to replace the term "China" with "Taiwan" in the names of Taiwanese organizations (Taiwan zhengming yundong, ), holding con- 13 For an analysis of the "China threat" arguments, see Denny Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue," Asian Survey 26, no. 8 (August 1996): Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005). September
8 ISSUES & STUDIES troversial referendums on relations with China during the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections, and bidding for full membership of the United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organization. Beijing's leaders viewed these tactics of Chen's as part of a process of "creeping independence" which had to be stopped. As cross-strait tension mounted, many of Chen's pro-independence initiatives were scaled back under pressure from Washington. The DPP government seemed to be well aware that an outright bid for independence would certainly invite a radical response from Beijing and that they could expect little if any help from the United States. An attack from China, even if unsuccessful, would have had a disastrous impact on Taiwan's economy and democratic way of life. The fact that the Chen administration bowed to pressure from Washington to modify its behavior supports its identity as a conditional revisionist. 15 Knowing that Beijing was willing if necessary to "shed blood" to defend China's "territorial integrity," the Bush administration had to keep emphasizing that the United States was committed to its pledge to oppose any use of force or threat of force against Taiwan. 16 In order to raise the costs for Beijing of carrying out unification by military means, Washington got involved in the reform of Taiwan's defense, sending U.S. officers to observe military exercises and conduct capability assessments in Taiwan, and providing Taipei with large quantities of weaponry. 17 Meanwhile, in order 15 One example of how the DPP administration was willing to modify its behavior under pressure andact as a conditional revisionist was whenchen, underpressure from Washington, toned down the language used on the ballot for his 2004 referendum. See Tim Culpan and Philip P. Pan. "Taiwan Alters Arms Referendum Language," Washington Post, January 17, 2004, at Another example was when the DPP government announced that the National Unification Council would "cease to function" and the Guidelines for National Unification would "cease to apply," rather than abolishing these symbols of commitment to reunification totally. See Shu-ling Ko and Charles Snyder, "Chen Says the NUC Will 'Cease'," Taipei Times, February 28, 2006, at James A. Kelly, "Overview of U.S. Policy toward Taiwan," Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony at a hearing on Taiwan, House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2004, at rm/2004/31649pf.htm. 17 Michael S. Chase, "U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial Relation- 136 September 2010
9 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy to discourage Taipei from making any moves that Beijing might deem provocative, Washington also made it clear that its security commitment to Taiwan was not unconditional. As James Kelly, the Bush administration's assistant secretary of state, pointed out in his testimony to Congress, "the President [of the United States] knows that American lives are potentially at risk [in a cross-strait conflict]" and thus Washington opposed Taipei making "unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it." A clear message was sent to Taipei that the United States might not intervene in a cross-straitconflict should Taipei make "statements or [take] actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status." 18 This uncertain security commitment served to deter the DPP government from possible risky behavior. Ultimately, a successful deterrence policy depends on Washington's convincing Beijing that it will not support Taiwan independence. Because the Chinese leadership has always suspected that the United States has a hidden agenda where unification is concerned, 19 defense cooperation between Washington and Taipei like that described above is precisely the kind of behavior that Beijing would interpret as confirming a covert U.S. policy of supporting Taiwan independence. As demonstrated by Kelly's testimony, the Bush administration clearly understood this logic. "We have very real concerns that our efforts at deterring Chinese coercion might fail," Kelly said, "if Beijing ever becomes convinced Taiwan is embarked on a course toward independence and permanent separation from China, and concludes that Taiwan must be stopped in these efforts." 20 To reassure Beijing that the United States had no interest in backing Taiwan independence despite Washington's military and political support for the island, the Bush administration directed a series of pubic criticisms at the DPP govship," in Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, ed. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), Kelly, "Overview of U.S. Policy toward Taiwan." 19 Andrew Bingham Kennedy, "China's Perceptions of U.S. Intentions toward Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon?" Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (March-April 2007): Kelly, "Overview of U.S. Policy toward Taiwan." September
10 ISSUES & STUDIES ernment's pro-independence initiatives. Commenting on Chen's referendum plans in 2003, President Bush reiterated Washington's long-standing policy of "one China based upon the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act." He said that the United States opposed "any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo." Bush warned that Chen "may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose." 21 Similarly, while reaffirming Washington's commitment to help Taiwan to defend itself, the Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated that "we do not support independence for Taiwan" and warned that there should be "no doubt in either Chen Shui-bian's mind or any other Taiwanese leader's mind that that is a firm U.S. policy that is not going to change." To further reassure Beijing of Washington's position, Powell bluntly stated that "Taiwan is not independent" and it "does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation." 22 In general, the Bush administration's approach to managing cross- Strait relations during the period clearly followed Washington's long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity. The policy encompasses both credible threats and convincing assurances and is double-edged. Through various means, including maintaining the capacity to resist Beijing's military coercion and boosting Taiwan's defensive capability, the United States has demonstrated that it has the ability and the resolve to deny China its expected gains and to raise the costs to Beijing of launching a military attack on the island. While taking action to impose costs that outweigh the benefits of an unwanted action is a form of deterrence, inaction can also exert the same deterrent effect as it can also raise the expected costs of unwanted acts taken by the target state. This uncertain security commitment to Taiwan thus served both to restrain Taipei from undertaking any 21 Federal Document Clearing House, "Bush, Wen Meet at the White House: Text of the Chinese and American Leaders' Comments," Washington Post, December 9, 2003, at Colin L. Powell, "Interview with Mike Chinoy of CNN International TV," the US Department of State, October 25, 2004, at Powell, Colin L., "Interview with Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV," the Department of State, October 25, 2004, at September 2010
11 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy risky behavior and to convincingly assure Beijing that Washington had no interest in supporting a bid by Taiwan for de jure independence. Despite the tense relationship between Beijing and Taipei during Chen's tenure as Taiwan's president, the policy of strategic ambiguity was successful in maintaining cross-strait peace and stability. Beijing and Taipei: Conditional Revisionists Still? The relationship between China and Taiwan has improved substantially since Ma Ying-jeou took office in May With the objective of maintaining the status quo in cross-strait relations, the Ma administration has endorsed the principle of "one China with different interpretations" and has pursued a "three-nos" policy of "no unification, no independence, and no use of military force." On this basis, Taipei has resumed talks between the two quasi-governmental bodies handling cross-straitrelations Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (, SEF) and China's Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (, ARATS). Several accords have been reached by the SEF and ARATS, including agreements on scheduled direct flights, direct cargo shipping, tourism, Chinese investment in Taiwan, financial cooperation, and the safety of Chinese food products. 23 Most importantly, Taipei signed a landmark trade deal - the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Beijing in June 2010, which is a major component of Ma's policy of rapprochement in cross-strait relations Forthe various agreements reached by the SEF and ARATS, see the website of the Mainland Affairs Council: xitem=67145&ctnode=5710&mp=1. 24 The ECFA is a Free Trade Agreements (FTA)-like accord under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) aimed at strengthening bilateral economic relations between China and Taiwan. The web link to the agreement is RelatedDoc.aspx. For an analysis of the issue, see T. Y. Wang, "Economic Rationality and National Security: Taiwan's New Government and the Global Economic Recession," in Taiwan and the Global Economic Storm, Asia Program Special Report, no. 143, ed. Bryce Wakefield (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009), September
12 ISSUES & STUDIES Taipei's efforts at engagement evoked reciprocal responses from Beijing. Contrary to their usual practice of imposing diplomatic isolation on Taipei at every opportunity, China's leaders did not make any objection to Taiwan being represented by Lien Chan, a former vice president, at the annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Beijing also responded favorably to Taipei's call for a "diplomatic truce" by halting its efforts to establish ties with several countries in Central America. 25 Most importantly, Taipei was finally invited to attend the 2009 World Health Assembly (WHA) under the designation "Chinese Taipei," presumably with Beijing's tacit consent. Although its rights and responsibilities were restricted by its observer status, Taiwan's presence at the WHA was important, as it was the first time that it had been allowed to participate in a meeting or activity of a specialized UN agency since losing its UN membership to China in This kind of reciprocity also brought further interaction between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, which culminated in the aforementioned agreements between Beijing and Taipei governing a host of cross-strait activities. The improvement in cross-strait relations has led some in the United States to suggest that Washington should reconsider its policy of strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan issue. Arguing that both Beijing and Taipei now hold a view of security that is based on contact and reduced threats of force, these observers advocate that "Washington should drop its zero-sum view" of cross-strait relations and "embrace the strategic logic underlying the rapprochement." 26 In this new climate, they maintain, the Obama administration "can reinforce the détente by holding back planned [arms] sales" as the first step to changing its policy. 27 Such a suggestion, unfortunately, is based on a false premise that cross-strait relations have undergone such a 25 In reciprocation, Taipei also ruled out persuading Malawi to switch recognition back to Taiwan in See Jenny W. Hsu, "Malawi Unhappy with Beijing Ties," Taipei Times, February 5, 2009, at Gilley "Not So Dire Straits," Ibid., September 2010
13 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy fundamental change that Washington's deterrence policy is no longer applicable. One reason for arguing against such a fundamental change in cross- Strait relations is that despite the thaw between the two sides, the Chinese government continues to insist that Taiwan is "part of the sacred territory" ofchina and that itis its "lofty duty" to accomplish "the greattask ofreunifying the motherland" (Preamble, PRC Constitution). Rather than relying mainly on aggressive policies such as diplomatic isolation and military intimidation which only breed public resentment in Taiwan, Beijing has become increasingly sophisticated and subtle in managing cross-strait interaction. 28 In a recent statement on relations between China and Taiwan, President Hu Jintao ( ) of China repeated calls for cross-strait talks to end military confrontation, enhance economic cooperation, and negotiate arrangements on Taiwan's international status. 29 While claiming that they intend to realize their "one country, two systems" plan through a policy of "peaceful unification," Chinese leaders nevertheless have refused to renounce the option of using force against Taiwan. Even at a time when cross-strait relations are becoming more cordial, Beijing continues to deploy increasing numbers of long-range missiles near Taiwan. 30 The military buildup sustains a trend toward the cross-strait military balance tipping in China's favor, and this growing imbalance will only provide the Beijing leaders with an incentive to apply military coercion to Taiwan. 28 Chen-Yuan Tung, "An Assessment of China's Taiwan Policy under the Third Generation Leadership," Asian Survey 45, no. 3 (May-June 2005): ; T. Y. Wang, Wei-chin Lee and Ching-hsin Yu. "Taiwan's Expansion of International Space: Opportunities and Challenges," Journal of Contemporary China (forthcoming); Shiquan Xu and Ezra F. Vogel, "Dampening the Taiwanese Flash Point," in Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the US-China Relationship, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Gu Guoliang (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), Similar appeals were made in the reports of the 16th and 17th Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and in the Anti-Secession Law of See Hu Jintao, "Hu Jintao's Speech on Commemorating 'Paper to Taiwanese Compatriots'," People's Daily Online (Renmin ribao), December 31, 2008, at html. 30 Ralph Jennings, "China Adding Missiles Near Taiwan: Navy Official," New York Times, March 27, 2010, at September
14 ISSUES & STUDIES Meanwhile, poll data have repeatedly shown that very few members of the public in Taiwan want to see an immediate political change toward either unification or independence. Ninety percent of the island's population would prefer maintainance of the status quo, despite their different opinions on the island's long-term relationship with China (see table 1). Overall, support for unification has declined over the years, while backing for independence increased to around 25 percent between 2004 and It is important to note that throughoutthe last fifteen years about40 percent of respondents have been "undecided" as to Taiwan's long-term status in the international community. These findings suggest that the Taiwan public's preferences concerning the island's future relations with China are contingent on the perceived costs associated with each option. The majority of respondents express a preference for independence as long as it does not lead to war with China, but they take a different view if Beijing is likely to respond violently. Indeed, an attack from China would destroy the economic prosperity and perhaps even the democracy enjoyed by the people of Taiwan. More than two-thirds of Taiwan respondents reject unification while there is a great disparity between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait but are divided on the issue of unification if the social, economic, and political conditions on the two sides are relatively compatible (see table 2). Consistent with previous findings, 31 the above evidence demonstrates that Taiwan's security, autonomy, and prosperity are highly prized by its citizens. They do not want their government to make any radical moves that would invite a military attack from China or compromise their democratic way of life, but they would be willing to pursue independence if the opportunity were to arise. Individually, they present the typical characteristics of a conditional revisionist who is willing to change the status quo when circumstances are favorable. Because Taiwan is a democratic country, its politicians have to heed the majority opinion on important issues such as the island's future relations 31 T. Y. Wang, "The Perception of Threats and Pragmatic Policy Choice: A Survey of Public Opinion in Taiwan," Issues & Studies 41, no. 1 (March 2005): September 2010
15 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy Table 1 Preferences of Taiwan's Citizens Concerning Policy on Cross-Strait Relations: Year L 2004P L 2008P (1) Unification as soon as possible (2) Status quo now, then unification (3) Status quo now, future action undetermined (4) Status quo forever (5) Status quo now, then independence Note: Row percentages. Data Sources: various polling data fromthe Election StudyCenter, National Chengchi University. (6) Independence as soon as possible Total Cases 1,113 1,448 1,167 1,088 1,019 1,823 1,147 1,677 1, ,192 1,784 September
16 ISSUES & STUDIES Table 2 Distribution of Responses on Conditional Policy Preferences: 2008 and 2009 Agree Prefer Taiwan independence Even if war with China 25.0 (269) Only if no war with China 65.7 (707) 2008 (N = 1076) Even if two sides are not compatible 17.1 (184) Prefer unification Only if two sides are compatible 43.6 (470) Disagree 62.4 (671) 21.8 (234) 68.8 (740) 42.9 (461) No responses 12.7 (137) 12.6 (135) 14.1 (152) 13.5 (145) 2009 (N = 1676) Agree 31.4 (526) 70.7 (1185) 14.0 (234) 36.3 (609) Disagree 59.5 (997) 20.9 (350) 75.8 (1271) 53.7 (900) No responses 9.1 (153) 8.4 (141) 10.2 (171) 10.0 (168) Note: Column percentages are on the top and the corresponding frequencies are in parentheses below. Data Sources: The 2008 Taiwan National Security Survey (Program in Asian Security Studies, Duke University) and 2009 Taiwan Citizens' Political Support: Concept, Measurement and Applications (Election Study Center, National Chengchi University). with China, otherwise they become politically irrelevant. The DPP, now in opposition and much weaker than it was before the 2008 presidential election, is still determined to pursue the island's permanent separation from China as stipulated in its party charter. Given that few Taiwanese want to live under Communist rule and most would pursue the island's de jure independence if the opportunity arose, the pendulum may well swing back in the DPP's favor in future elections. In addition, the difficulties encountered by ruling KMT candidates in the recent municipal elections in 144 September 2010
17 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy part reflected the voters' unhappiness with the performance of the Ma administration. If Ma cannot reverse his low approval rating, an electoral come-back for the DPP in the 2012 presidential election is not impossible. Taiwan's electoral politics thus add an element of uncertainty to future cross-strait relations. Collectively, Taiwan also presents the typical characteristics of a conditional revisionist. Since today's opposition may be tomorrow's ruling party, the uncertainty introduced by Taiwan's democracy has made China's leaders uneasy. This explains why Beijing refuses to renounce the use of military force against the island despite recent positive developments between China and Taiwan. Thus, the structural conditions of cross-strait relations remain the same. Although both Beijing and Taipei are working toward a peaceful relationship, they continue to be conditional revisionists as each is willing to exploit its opponent's weaknesses in order to change the status quo if the right conditions present themselves. Conclusion The policy of the United States on the Taiwan issue, embodied in the three communiques and the TRA, is regarded as one of the most successful policies in U.S. history. Employing both credible threats and convincing assurances, Washington has been able to deter Beijing from adopting non-peaceful means, including military force, to achieve the unification of China. By making it clear that its security commitment to Taiwan is not unconditional, Washington has been able to dissuade Taipeifrom declaring de jure independence, and this also serves as a convincing assurance to Beijing. Through a web of incentives and disincentives, the U.S. policy of deterrence has maintained peace and stability in East Asia forthe past three decades. The significant improvementin cross-strait relations since the inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou has led some to wonder whether Washington's deterrence policy needs to be changed. The above analysis has shown that the structural conditions of cross-strait relations remain the same, despite an improvement in the atmosphere between China and Taiwan. On the September
18 ISSUES & STUDIES basis of poll data collected on the island as well as China's persistent military threat toward Taiwan, one can conclude that both Beijing and Taipei continue to act as conditional revisionists, each prone to exploiting its opponent's weaknesses in order to realize its own objectives. The Obama administration views Ma's extraordinary shift in cross- Strait policies as an attempt to reduce cross-strait tension rather than as capitulation to China. The effects of Taipei's compromising approach are thus consistent with Washington's convincing assurance to Beijing that its core interests will not be challenged, at least not during Ma's term as president. This explains why the Obama administration endorses Ma's rapprochement policy and welcomes the resulting changes. In an effort to refute the suggestion that Washington is worried that China and Taiwan are getting too close, Raymond Burghardt, the chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), commented that "this new era of cross-strait civility is very welcome" and "we really and truly are enthusiastic about the kind of stability that we now see." Burghardt went on to emphasize that the center of U.S. strategic concern remains that the Taiwan issue should "be dealt with peacefully, it's that it be dealt with in a way that represents the agreement, the will of the people on both sides of the Strait, particularly the will of the people in Taiwan." 32 Given that both China and Taiwan continue to act as conditional revisionists, Washington's policy of strategic ambiguity is necessary in order to preserve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In particular, the Obama administration should keep supplying the island with arms of a defensive character since U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are an essential part of its deterrence policy. These sales will not only display Taiwan's retaliatory capability and make the prospect of war seem prohibitively costly to Beijing but will at the same time demonstrate Washington's resolve and make its threats more credible. Given that the balance of power and influence is tipping increasingly in Beijing's favor, as Robert Sutter recently pointed out, Taipei will need even more support 32 American Institute in Taiwan, transcript of the Raymond Burghardt's press conference, Taipei, March 18, 2009, at September 2010
19 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy from Washington if it is to avoid being forced into accepting unwanted conditions. 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY American Institute in Taiwan, transcript of Raymond Burghardt's press conference, Taipei, March 18, 2009, at Chan, Steve "Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations." World Affairs 166, no. 2 (September): Chandler, Clay "China Threatens Voters in Taiwan." Washington Post, March 16. Chase, Michael S "U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial Relationship." In Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, edited bynancy Bernkopf Tucker, New York: Columbia University Press. Christensen, Thomas J "TheContemporary Security Dilemma:Deterringa Taiwan Conflict." Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Autumn): Culpan, Tim, and Philip P. Pan "Taiwan Alters Arms Referendum Language." Washington Post, January 17, at wp-dyn/articles/a jan16.html. Federal Document Clearing House "Bush, Wen Meet at the White House: Text of the Chinese and American Leaders' Comments." Washington Post, December 9, at Gilley, Bruce "Not So Dire Straits." Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January- February): Goldstein, Avery Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Hsu, Jenny W "Malawi Unhappy with Beijing Ties." Taipei Times, February 33 Robert Sutter, "Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States Policy Adjustments Needed," PacNet, no. 17, March 5, 2009, at September
20 ISSUES & STUDIES 5, at Hu, Jintao "Hu Jintao's Speech on Commemorating 'Paper to Taiwanese Compatriots'." People's Daily Online (, Renmin ribao), December 31, at Huth, Paul K "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War." American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (June): Jennings, Ralph "China Adding Missiles Near Taiwan: Navy Official." New York Times, March 27, at idustre62q0as Jervis, Robert Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Kelly, James A "Overview of U.S. Policy towardtaiwan." Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony at a hearing on Taiwan, House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, April 21, at Kennedy, Andrew Bingham "China's Perceptions of U.S. Intentions toward Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon?" Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (March-April 2007): Ko, Shu-ling, and Charles Snyder "Chen Says the NUC Will 'Cease'." Taipei Times, February 28, at /02/28/ Lupovici, Amir "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory Toward a New Research Agenda." International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 3 (September): Powell, Colin L. 2004a. "Interview with Mike Chinoy of CNN International TV." The U.S. Department of State, October 25, at rm/37366pf.htm b. "Interview with Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV." The U.S. Departmentof State, October 25, athttp:// Roy, Denny "The 'China Threat' Issue." Asian Survey 26, no. 8 (August): Schelling, Thomas Arms and Influence. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Sutter, Robert "Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States Policy Ad- 148 September 2010
21 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and U.S. Policy justments Needed." PacNet, no.17, March 5, at Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council of the PRC "The One- China Principle and the Taiwan Issue." People's Daily Online (, Renmin ribao), February Tung, Chen-Yuan "An Assessment of China's Taiwan Policy under the Third Generation Leadership." Asian Survey 45, no. 3 (May-June): Wang, T. Y "Economic Rationality and National Security: Taiwan's New Government and the Global Economic Recession." In Taiwan and the Global Economic Storm, Asia Program Special Report, no. 143, edited by Bryce Wakefield, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars a. "Extended Deterrence and US Policy towards the Taiwan Issue: Implications for East Asia and Taipei." Taiwan Defense Affairs 6, no. 1: b. "The Perception of Threats and Pragmatic Policy Choice: A Survey of Public Opinion in Taiwan." Issues & Studies 41, no. 1 (March): , Wei-chin Lee, and Ching-hsin Yu. Forthcoming. "Taiwan's Expansion of International Space: Opportunities and Challenges." Journal of Contemporary China. Xu, Shiquan, and Ezra F. Vogel "Dampening the Taiwanese Flash Point." In Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the US-China Relationship, edited by Richard Rosecrance and Gu Guoliang, New York: Public Affairs. September
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