Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

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1 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Volume 16, Issue Aticle 9 ON THE DEFINITION AND DOMAIN OF PEACE ECONOMICS, PAPES IN HONO OF WALTE ISAD On the Salience of Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict Syed Mansoob Mushed Institute of Social Studies and Univesity of Bimingham, mushed@iss.nl Copyight c 2010 Bekeley Electonic Pess. All ights eseved.

2 On the Salience of Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict Syed Mansoob Mushed Abstact This pape models two foms of low intensity conflict based on identity: civilizational conflict between Muslim migants and the West in Euopean counties, and sectaian violence between eligious goups in cetain developing counties. Both histoical gievances and cuent mateial inequalities can motivate individuals to join o efain fom violence in aid of a goup cause. With civilizational conflict, hated of the West aises because of economic disadvantage among Muslims, histoical gievances and contempoay foeign policy deemed to be against Muslims. Fea of Muslim minoities among the Euopean population may esult fom stident popaganda. Without tackling inequalities of oppotunity, policies of assimilating migants ae doomed to failue. Sectaian conflict in developing counties like India is diven both by pospect of loot and hated of the othe. Localized conditions ae salient in this egad. Povety and inequality eduction and positive local social capital ae key to addessing this type of conflict. Histoical factos that shape the myths placing cetain minoities advesely within society also need addessing. KEYWODS: identity, cultual conflict, sectaian conflict Financial assistance fom the Euopean Union Famewok 7 eseach poject EUSECON is acknowledged. I thank aul Causo fo comments on the fist vesion of this pape that consideably impoved the final vesion.

3 Mushed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict Since the witing of the fist vesion of this pape, Walte Isad has passed away. I came to know Walte Isad pesonally in the last decade of his life. Pofessionally he was a colossus, the acknowledged fathe of egional economics and peace economics. In addition to his pofessional billiance, Walte was a tue gentleman, and epesented a gentle, kinde bygone age, which peceded ou own excessively competitive ea when academic discouse sometimes descends into downight bad mannes. Walte was neve stingy with compliments; he could inspie, and any wods cafted by me can neve do justice to this tuly geat economist, whose passing constitutes an iepaable loss to ou pofession. 1.Intoduction Identity is salient in defining antagonism in all foms of conflict since time immemoial. It efes to the goup cause in the context of conflict, and that which individual paticipants in wa o conflict identify with and ae willing to fight fo. It is elevant to was between states, as well as intenal wa (civil wa 1 ), and even othe foms of violence whee the state is not necessaily a taget, with o without explicit political objectives, (such as sectaian violence between eligious goups, violent potest and ioting). Identity defines who we ae. It specially identifies which goup(s) we have an affinity with. It can be multi-dimensional, extending fom family, vocation, tibe, eligion to nation. One of these identities can acquie elevance in the context of wa and violence. As egads inte-state wafae, identity usually takes the fom of (pimitive o moden) nationalism; my county against anothe. Fo God, king and county is an age old efain diving individuals into paticipation in inte-state conflict. Similaly, tibal, othe ethnic (ace, language) and eligious diffeences define antagonists in civil wa; see Hoowitz (1985) fo a discussion on ethnicity as an unalteable attibute that individuals associate themselves with. Patiotism, o identification with goup causes, constitute an impotant intinsic motivation fo individuals to join a collective violent entepise against anothe goup. But people also have mecenay motives; pecuniay gain looting anothe county, destoying its tade o gabbing its colonies---simila foms of geed can also exist in domestic conflict. Most conflicts, aguably, eflect mixed intinsic and pecuniay motivations within thei paticipants. Within the ealm of fomal economics, Akelof and Kanton (2000) wee pionees in developing utility functions whee individuals diectly obtain utility fom thei own identity based actions, and not meely fom consumption. They do this by making themselves, as well as othes in thei goup, behave in confomity 1 In a civil wa thee is usually the political objective of eithe ovethowing o seceding fom the state. Militay coups also aim at the downfall of the govenment. Published by Bekeley Electonic Pess,

4 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, At. 9 with goup noms. This wok is in the tadition of the bugeoning field of behavioual economics. Akelof and Kanton (2000) focus on a single, defining, identity. But, it also has to be bone in mind that individuals often have multiple and layeed identities, as emphasised by Sen (2008). Identity, and its study, is likely to become inceasingly salient within the ational choice methodologies studying the economics of conflict as the emphasis moves fom pecuniay to intinsic and mixed motivations fo individual paticipation in violence. The impotance of identity will be heightened as the study of conflict shifts to moe local o mico-levels, coupled with the gowing impotance of foms of oganised violence whee the state is not a diect paticipant o taget. Identity is cucial to shaping conflict, as it allows fo goup fomation fo the puposes of violence. It esolves the collective action poblem (Olson, 1965) in all foms of conflict, even when the motive is mainly mecenay. As fa as goup gievances ae concened, these may cente aound histoical injustices, but pesent day enduing inequalities and inequalities of oppotunity usually also matte. Gu (1970) indicated that the diffeence between aspiations and eality duing a peiod when geneal mateial conditions ae impoving may induce disadvantaged individuals to evolt. This, howeve, is moe likely to take the shape of oganised goup conflict when individual and goup gievances mege, simply because collective action is easie. Also, collective action may be motivated not just by injustices against the self o goup membes in the immediate neighbouhood, but peceived histoical injustices, and unfainess against goup membes who ae geogaphically dispesed may also figue pominently (a Muslim esiding in Euope may identify with the plight of the Palestinians fo example). Thee is a consideable liteatue on both the causes and consequences of civil wa in the ational choice tadition. These mainly focus on the mateial (economic, political) basis fo conflict, as well as its mateial effects on society. Thee is elatively less on intinsic and identity based motivations fo conflict---a goup cause based on identity that individuals identify with and can fight fo. One eason fo this is ational choice appoaches often ignoe histoy, concentating on moe immediate cicumstances. Secondly, thee is elatively less liteatue oiginating fom the economics discipline on two foms of low intensity violence: civilizational o cultual conflict and sectaian violence. Pehaps, this is because neithe tuly undemines the existence of the state. This pape attempts to fill this gap by focussing on both histoical factos and pesent-day mateial diffeences that motivate individuals to identify with a goup cause diving civilizational and cultual conflict. I also examine sectaian foms of ethnic violence. Identity is also impotant to the analysis of sectaian conflict. The focus hee is on individual choices to join o efain fom violence, athe than collective o goup choices, as these modes of sectaian/ethnic conflict ae elatively less pe-meditated. DOI: /

5 Mushed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict Civilizational conflict efes to a conflict between diffeent ways of life. 2 In pesent-day Euope, fo example, thee is a fea of Islam, in the shape of Muslim migants in Euope (25 million Muslims eside in the Euopean Union); both in the sense of annoyance with Muslim pactices, and the potential danges fom home gown teoism (Madid tain bombings, the London bombings, the mude of Theo van Gogh in Amstedam, ioting by Muslim youths in Paisian sububs). Cetain segments of the Muslim immigant population have developed a coesponding hated fo the West. Teo and migation (to the West) ae said to be the two weapons in the militant Muslim s amouy. This may bing about a clash of civilizations in Euope. Thee can be two explanations fo civilizational o cultual conflicts between Islam and the West. One is the inevitable clash of civilizations theoy, as outlined by Huntington (1996)? The hated fo the West by some Muslim goups is teated as given, and conflict with the West necessaily follows. The poblem with these cultualist views is that it teats cultue as monolithic, and individual identity as a singula phenomenon, ignoing the multiplicity of identities that individuals may possibly possess (Sen, 2008). Thus, it is conceivable to be simultaneously a Muslim, a Euopean citizen, a believe in democacy, as well as someone who espects diffeence and human ights. Contempoay acism in Euope is diven moe by disdain fo cultual identities such as Islam, athe than biologically based phenomenon, such as complexion, as was the case until the ecent past. acist messages that beed fea of minoities like Muslims can emanate fom attention seeking politicians, who campaign on a single issue that scapegoat a paticula goup fo all of society s ills (cime, unemployment and so on). Continental Euope has seen the ise of anti-immigant, especially anti- Muslim immigant, political paties in Denmak, the Nethelands and elsewhee. Accoding to suveys 3, negative peceptions about Muslims among non-muslims have gown: in % in Spain, 50% in Gemany, 38% in Fance and 23% in the UK felt negative about Muslims and Islam. The PEW wold suveys indicate that dislike of Muslims in Euope is geate among the olde and less educated segments of the population. The same suvey indicates gowth in the Muslim sense of identity amongst Muslims immigants in Euope. The altenative view holds that adicalization o political Islam in Euope does not aise in a socio-economic vacuum, and disguntled Muslim behaviou in Euope may lie in wide mateial, political and identity based disadvantage. Stewat (2009) has documented the systematic disadvantage that Muslim goups face in Euopean counties and woldwide (Muslims ae nealy a quate of humanity). These ange fom economic discimination in tems of jobs and lowe 2 Thee can be an avowed o stated clash between democacy and autocacy, fo example duing the two wold was of the 20 th centuy. 3 Published by Bekeley Electonic Pess,

6 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, At. 9 incomes to unde epesentation in public life. This phenomenon may be descibed as the hoizontal inequalities that Muslims suffe fom in contempoay Euope. Hoizontal inequality is goup-based inequality, athe than the inequality in an othewise cultually o ethnically homogenous society; see Stewat (2000) on this. Muslim citizens in Euope ae systematically pooe, suffe fom geate unemployment and ae less than popotionately epesented in public life (Stewat, 2009), in addition to the oppobium thei cultual identity attacts. Thus, some of the moe exteme foms of teoism and even othe non-violent acts, which make a statement of diffeence with the majoity community such as the weaing of hijabs, may have as thei oot cause, both the collective sense of injuy caused by the suffeings of Muslims globally (such as in Palestine, Iaq o Afghanistan) 4, as well as the moe palpable economic, political and social discimination felt within the Euopean states that they eside in. I model this in section 2, based on extensions of Akelof and Kanton (2000) model of identity, going on to look at goup behaviou. In section 3, I model fea of Muslim migants oiginating in signals sent out by cetain political goups, which may esult in public action poscibing Muslims and thei pactices. Sectaian violence between eligious goups chaacteise seveal developing counties: Hindu-Muslim violence in India, Chistian-Muslim violence in Indonesia and Nigeia. These ae highly localized (as it is confined to cetain egions of lage counties), and does not undemine the state. The state itself is not a taget of the violence, unlike in the case of civil wa; only localized state functionaies ae found to be actos in this fom of violence. India (see, Vashney, 2002) has a longe histoy than eithe Nigeia o Indonesia in this egad. Bass (2003) points out that Hindu-Muslim sectaian violence (known as communal ioting in India) is not as spontaneous as we ae led to believe, but is vey much pat of the political pocess in India, paticulaly the ise of Hindu fundamental paties in Indian politics in the post-nehu ea. Among many histoical factos, Muslimness is associated with a dak medieval age duing which little pogess took place, and Muslims ae also blamed fo the ceation of the beakaway state of Pakistan in He also feels that, since Muslims, ae a egula taget of these attacks, they should be moe appopiately temed as pogoms athe than spontaneous ioting. Tadjoeddin (2008) points out that Chistian-Muslim violence in cetain egions of Indonesia was pompted by the elative ise in Muslim mateial cicumstances compaed to the histoical Chistian ascendant position. This was 4 Galtung (1964) agues that in choosing foeign policy options thee may be diffeences in opinion within any given society. Thee is a cental opinion and a peipheial opinion. Muslim minoities esiding in Euope may hold stong peipheial opinions about policies towads the Palestinian question, Iaq and Afghanistan. Moe peaceful options, both in tems of domestic hamony, and foeign elations, should incopoate the peiphey s opinions. DOI: /

7 Mushed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict duing Indonesia s democatic tansition, and it has mostly fizzled out. The impotant point is that, in the case of sectaian violence localized factos and institutions matte, and not national aveages o chaacteistics. Hee both histoical factos and pesent-day mateial diffeences ae salient. I sketch a model of sectaian conflict in section 4 based upon individual choices to paticipate o eschew this fom of violence, befoe concluding in section Islamic adicalization 5 We need to distinguish between individual motivation to dissent, followed by alienated goup dynamics leading to a clash with the state. As fa as individuals ae concened, following Akelof and Kanton (2000), I postulate that individuals diectly obtain utility fom thei identity, and the behaviou demanded by that sense of belonging. Thus, an individual membe () of a potential minoity goup (say, Muslims in Euope) deives utility (U ) fom identity elated actions in the following manne (othe aguments in the utility function such as consumption ae ignoed at this stage fo the sake of simplicity): U I U ( s, s whee s I ( s, s j j, I, ) ) U o ( k ) j (1) Hee the paamete s efes to pincipal identity based actions, which yield utility (U s ) fom actions (s ), as well as utility (U o ) fom othe identity based actions, k. The fome is like a club good, and the latte simila to a pivate good. These two ente individual utility in an additive and sepaable fashion. Unlike in Akelof and Kanton (2000), an individual is allowed to have a complex multiple identities (Sen, 2008), and coesponding to these ae additive sepaable inputs into his utility function, which is an innovation of my model. The individual not only deives utility fom a vecto of his own actions (s ), but also simila actions of othe like-minded individuals belonging to his goup (s j ), and above all his own identity o self image (I ), which in tun depends on the actions (s, s j ) just descibed, as well as the invese of the goup s social standing, θ. This concept esonates with Boulding s (1956) concept of image. Boulding egads image to be the basis of behaviou. Image, including self-image, is always subject to messages, akin to signals, which can eithe be intenalised o lead to changes in the image, which, on occasion, can be quite damatic o evolutionay, leading, as 5 The model in this section, and in section 3, is based on Mushed (2009 and 2008). Published by Bekeley Electonic Pess,

8 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, At. 9 in my examples below, to viulent collective action., In geneal, one s selfpeception o image depends both on the goup s economic disadvantage, and othe factos such as the West s foeign policy towads the Muslim wold. θ may also be constued to be a metic of advese cicumstances that poduce disadvantage and enduing inequalities of oppotunity, as in oeme (1998), which disadvantage cetain goups because of an advese peception of thei identity iespective of individual qualities and qualifications (see also Stewat, 2009 on this). Moe impotantly, it is also a baie to integation with the majoity. An incease in θ is a eduction of social standing, but it will enhance utility fom own-identity based actions. It could, howeve, be agued that low social standing may encouage individuals to abandon thei pimay identity in favou of othe, less fowned upon, identities. These actions, howeve, would be insincee and based on oppotunistic consideations. Also, following Akelof and Kanton (2000), it is possible to show that many such individuals may be deteed fom this couse of action by thei pees. The budget constaint descibing input o actions to individual utility takes on the following fom (whee S efes to the total endowment of possible actions): S s (, ) k (2) It is postulated that the attactiveness of inputs into own-identity type behaviou (s ) ises with μ (estictions by the state on the behaviou of Muslim minoities) and θ; an incease in both can be descibed as a fall in the elative pice of ownidentity based actions elative to othe-identity based actions (k ). 6 Following Akelof and Kanton (2000) it is also possible to show that individuals deive disutility fom the non-confomity of othe goup membes. Secondly, if the costs of so-doing ae low compaed to the pain inflicted on eant membes, individuals of a goup will exet effot to bing back membes who have stayed fom ideal goup behaviou back to the fold, as analysed by Akelof and Kanton (2005). Such behaviou can also be said to descibe the stategies adopted by conflict entepeneus amongst Muslim minoity goups who ae bent on confontation. If anothe goup membe (j) suffes disutility (I j ) fom otheidentity based behaviou (k ) by peson, they may lue the eant individual back to the fold povided that the cost of doing so to themselves (c j ) is not too lage and is less than the loss inflicted (l ) on the deviant goup membe though a coopeative game, equiing the condition: 6 Othe-identity based effots include actions confoming to the spiit of the law of the land, and behaviou that might be consideed by some to be at vaiance with the individual s pincipal identity, such as consuming alcohol o dessing immodestly. DOI: /

9 Mushed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict c j I l (3) j This condition above is moe likely to hold amongst poo but cultually homogenous communities suffeing fom widespead unemployment, and who live poximately to each othe in isolated ghettos with close kinship ties (as in many metopolitan locations thoughout Euope whee Muslim families elated to each othe live cheek by jowl). This is also typical of the hoizontal inequalities faced by many Muslim goups in Euope. In many ways, this confoms to the classic Tiebout (1956) outcome whee like-minded individuals endogenously congegate in localities that facilitate the common enjoyment of shaed public goods o club (associational) goods. Moeove, the dissident goup may use the behaviou denoted in (3) to esolve mutual mistust, the collective action poblem as descibed by Olson (1965). Thus, goup gievances become individual gievances, and individuals act upon thei collective gievances. This, at the exteme, can include teoist acts such as suicide bombing, as outlined in Wintobe (2002), with k = 0, implying a cone solution (all o nothing choice). Note, that it is not just individual povety that motivates membes, but athe the goup s elative depivation; this explains why some extemists ae dawn fom a elatively moe affluent and educated backgound. Dissident goup behaviou is aived at afte summing the choices egading s fom individual utility maximization descibed in (1), subject to individual constaints (2): n 1 s e (4) Fo collective action (like a club good) to take place via the adoption of the goup stategy (e), a citical theshold of aggegate own-identity based actions, s, must be chosen. Not all individuals will engage in own-identity based actions. The foging of collective action equies high enough values of μ and θ; condition (3) must also hold so that it is not too costly to dete non-own-identity based actions though coopeative games; at high enough values of μ and θ condition (3) becomes moe elaxed, as moe self-enfocing and sincee own-identity based behaviou takes place via (2). The dissident goup, objective o utility function,, takes the following fom: P C ( a, e) (1 )( ) E( e) (5) Published by Bekeley Electonic Pess,

10 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, At. 9 whee: P C Y Y T ( A) e F (, ) T ( A) pf T ( A) cf (, ) (, ); F, F 0 (6) The supescipts P and C efe to states which ae moe peaceful and confontative, with pobabilities π and 1- π espectively. The pobability of peace ises with an action (e) by the dissident goup, and (a) on the pat of the state to be outlined below. Both stategies ae, howeve, a hybid of accommodation and aggession. P and C descibe dissident goup pay-offs in the two states, with utility geate in the peaceful states. Utility is deived fom income (Y ), and a tansfe (T) obtained fom the state, which is elated to the manne in which the state spends its secuity budget (A). The state s decision making is descibed in the section that follows. Stategic choices suound e (effot with egad to peace with the state) obtained fom (6); it is a atio of tansfes (which geneate peacefulness) to fighting, F, which is geate when the goup s social standing (hoizontal inequality) declines (θ ises). The paamete µ descibes geate estictions by the state on the behaviou of Muslim minoities, and is theefoe liable to aise militancy. E descibes the aggegate cost function fo undetaking e, composed of psychic costs of capitulation to the state o the total costs of inducing own-identity based behaviou in (3), with E e > 0. Note that as e ises thee is moe peace with the state; a decline in e defines geate militancy. Collective goup behaviou, via the goup stategy, e, is akin to a club o associational good (Cones and Sandle, 1996). A club good is excludable in natue, only those who subscibe o contibute can patake in it. It is voluntay because individuals do not have to paticipate, unlike in the case of nonexcludable pue public goods. With club goods, membeship and povision ae insepaable. This club will not suffe fom congestion extenalities; membes may not be homogenous in thei ability to contibute, which ae not necessaily anonymous. Diffeentiating the dissident goup s stategic vaiable (e) in (6) we find: TA T ( ) T ( ) de da d d (7) 2 2 F (, ) F F The fist tem on the ight-hand side of (7) is positive, e ises with T, but falls with θ and μ. Equal oppotunity policies aise peaceful behaviou; economic disadvantage, diminution of social standing and state posciption enhance adicalization. DOI: /

11 Mushed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict The disguntled goup will maximise (5) with espect to e, equating its maginal benefit to maginal cost: e P C (.) (.) E e (8) 3. The Cescent and the Coss The utility of the state o the majoity goup is given by: P C G ( a, e) G (1 )( ) G C( a) (9) whee: G G P C Y Y G G pf cf T ( A) a G F ( A, ) c p 0, c p 1, G G ( A, ) T ( A) ( A, ) T ( A) a, e 0. (10) G P and G C efe to exogenous pay-offs to the govenment in the two states. Fo the govenment (and the society it epesents), utility is deived fom two public goods: geneal consumption (Y G ) and secuity expenditue (A) against domestic teoist theats, with the fome lage in the peaceful state. Also, G P >G C ; society at lage deives geate satisfaction in the peaceful state when spending on public goods such as education and health is geate. Secuity expenditue can be used in two ways: a component (F G ) devoted to suppessing dissidents (via policing, suveillance and the pohibition of cetain cultual pactices in ode to induce integation), and anothe element T, which is a tansfe to the dissident goup, which seves to assuage thei gievances. The tansfe can mean seveal things: geate inclusion in public secto jobs, political epesentation and voice; basically equal oppotunity policies. It is the pecuniay value of including the excluded. Obseve that thee is a tade-off based on two policy altenatives towads the dissidents: suppession (stick) and tansfes (caot). The pobability of peace, π, inceases with the paametes, a and e, which coespond to mixed stategies of accommodation and aggession pusued by the two sides to the game, the govenment and dissidents, espectively. Fo the govenment side, fo example, a is defined in (10) as the atio of tansfes (T) and fighting (F G ), with the numeato aising the chances of peace and the denominato educing it. An incease in the atio, a, theefoe implies a ise in Published by Bekeley Electonic Pess,

12 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, At. 9 elative peaceful behaviou. I postulate a ise in heavy-handed behaviou towads dissidence (F G ), has only a limited deteent effect; it actually inceases militancy and the sense of gievance. C efes to the cost of undetaking a by the state, C a > 0. These costs consist of pecuniay and non-pecuniay elements; the fist because of the cost of distotionay taxation to finance secuity; the latte because accommodating dissidents entails a political cost by alienating those opposed to the policies adopted. Violent acts occu only in the confontative state, and the Nash equilibium to the game between the two sides occus along a continuum of peaceful actions by both sides. Equilibia with low levels of peace chosen by both sides ae confontative, enhancing the isk of ioting and teoism by the dissidents. The paamete μ is cucial to the detemination of the aggessive component of the policy vecto adopted by the govenment side towads potentially adical Muslims. A highe μ implies a moe confontative public policy. Following Glaese (2005) we can think of μ as oiginating in a signal sent out by a politician, whose wod (cedibility) is not exactly the coin of the ealm, because he may be delibeately sending out a false hate message as a cheap way of advancing his own populaity. Its attactiveness to the public will depend on thei need fo scapegoats and thei own pesonal life expeiences of these minoity goups. Not all these signals will be believed: fo example, some hate mongeing politicians may be mistusted, the bette educated among the public may discount pat of the message and othes with geate knowledge of the minoities based upon pesonal inteaction may similaly disegad this signal. Thee is a cost (z) to membes of the public of veifying the veacity of the signal though a seach pocess. Let φ be the pobability that the politician is sending out a false message and the Muslim goup in question is lagely innocent; 1 φ is the pobability that they ae not, and will theefoe impose a net cost μ. Individual s will update thei Bayesian pio fo this in the following manne: ( 1 ) (11) The pio may be updated subject to the afoementioned seach cost z, and othe exogenous events like iots and acts of teoism (close to home) pepetated by Muslims. The public is composed of two types: a high cost type (indexed by subscipt h) who both suffe moe potential damage (μ) and also have highe seach costs (z); and, a low cost type (subscipt l) who suffe less disutility fom a potential Muslim theat and have lowe seach costs of finding out the tuth (because of education, say). The fome may include the less educated, the moe socio-economically disadvantaged, those who would like to find close to home scapegoats fo the isk of unemployment that the globalization of poduction DOI: /

13 Mushed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict bings, othes who wish to find a simple explanation fo the ise of cime, as well as those with a negative expeience of inteaction with Muslims. In geneal: V y ( z)(1 ) z( i) i h, l i (1 ) z fo high cost types hz i and (1 ) z fo low cost types lz i h l (12) Whee V epesents expected utility and y income of individuals of i = h,l types, diminished by μ and z costs. Maximization of this expected utility with espect to seach (z) leads to the conditions descibed in the second and thid lines of (12) espectively. The high cost type of individual suffes both a geate peceived loss fom Muslim dissidents (μ h ) and has a highe cost of veification of the signal (z h ). This is all the moe so, if the seach costs of veifying the signal entail an ealie lumpy fixed cost in education, say. These individuals ae moe likely to abandon the seach fo tuth in favou of the hate message, setting φ = 0. Not only that, but they will clamou fo public action against the object of thei phobia. Even the low cost type individual (who will engage in the seach fo tuth) may at cetain times andomise the pobability of φ aound 0 o 1, if say equilibium φ 1/2 in (12). Also, afte majo iots involving (male) Muslim youths and teoist attacks like the London bombings, all individuals fom the majoity community may set φ to zeo fo a cetain time, effectively taing all Muslims with the same (teoist) bush. If enough votes believe the signal then public action will be called fo, and Islamophobia o fea of Muslims acquies the natue of a public good. Note that i i in equations (9) and (10); this includes individuals whose actual valuation of μ is non-positive because of the non-ivalled and non-excludable natue of a public good, even those who do not deive utility fom it ae foced to consume the good and finance it via taxation. The state will be compelled to act at the taxpayes expense (C), but some esevations may exist about suendeing to Islamophobia. It is instuctive, theefoe, to examine the govenment s stategic vaiable, which is a mix of accommodation (T) and confontation (F G ). Totally diffeentiating, a, in (10): TA T ( ) T ( ) da da d G G2 G2 F F (13) A F All the patial deivatives in (5) ae positive. The secuity budget (A) can be utilised eithe to incease tansfes to the dissidents o fight them. Theein lies a tade-off; thus the tem in squae backets in (5) is ambiguous in sign. The second Published by Bekeley Electonic Pess,

14 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, At. 9 tem on the ight-hand side of (5) is negative, because a ise in the confontation public policy vecto (μ) causes the state to be less peaceful. Fo a cetain type of govenment, the fist tem is positive; it pefes peace. I utilise this taxonomy, because thee may be diffeent expenditue effects following an incease in the secuity budget depending on the type of govenment in diffeent counties. 7 The govenment side maximizes (9) with espect to a: P C a[ G (.) G (.)] Ca (14) Essentially, this means that the govenment equates the maginal utility of its stategic action (a) on the left-hand side of (14) to its maginal cost on the ighthand side. One can utilize equations (8) and (14) to obtain eaction functions fo the dissidents and the govenment espectively. It can then be shown that inceases in militancy can be a esult of a ise in hoizontal inequalities (θ) amongst Muslims, foeign policy actions that advesely affect Muslims (also a ise in θ), o a eaction to geate state estictions on Muslim behaviou, μ (such as the weaing of hijabs). All of this esult in less peaceful behaviou by both the Euopean state and its Muslim malcontents towads each othe. Fo militancy to become violent, a citical low theshold of e min must be aived at. 4. Hating One s Neighbou: Sectaian Violence Now we tun to puely sectaian violence, also based on identity, in counties like India, Indonesia o Nigeia. 8 Hee the antagonists ae two diffeent ethnicities, without the diect paticipation of national govenment, although occasionally local authoities take sides in these clashes. The violence that occus is spontaneous and spoadic, and is usually descibed as ioting. These violent episodes do not necessaily undemine the existence of the cental state, unlike in the case of civil wa. But, nevetheless it is a cause fo concen; Vashney (2002) estimates that it has killed o maimed 40,000 individuals since India s independence in The model that follows is based on Mahmud and Mushed (2010). Let us say that society is chaacteised by the pesence of two goups, Hindus (H) and 7 Good examples could be given by contasting the pesent Spanish and Danish govenments. The latte s (o some of its coalition patnes) negative attitudes and explicit policies towads Muslims is well known; see By contast the Spanish govenment led by Pime Ministe Zapateo is fa moe conciliatoy towads Muslims, including illegal Muslim migants, and Zapateo called fo an intenational alliance of civilizations; see 8 India has the longest histoy of this type of sectaian conflict; in cetain pats of the county it is almost an annual event; see Bass (2003). DOI: /

15 Mushed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict Muslims (M), with i = H, M. Hee the pobability of peace, π, is declining in the numbe of adicalized individuals fom each goup, H and M. Not evey membe of eithe community will join the adicalized segments of thei goup ( H and M espectively). Thus, thee will be two types of individuals: joines and non-joines. That will depend on thei peacetime income (Y P ) elative to income in conflict (Y C ), and the valuation of looting (l) in a state of violence, as well as the costs of paticipation, τ. Fo some extemist individuals these costs may even be negative, eflecting histoical hateds and injustice. Looting is moe successful the geate is the numbe of adicalized individuals. If an individual fom any goup becomes a joine (J) into the adicalized segment of his goup, his expected utility (U) takes the fom: U ij Pi Ci H M ) Y (1 )( H, M )( Y l( H, M )) (, (15) i Even if income in the state of conflict is low (Y C ), one expects that this individual s income in the peaceful state, Y P is moe than countebalanced by lootable income (l) in the state of conflict. His paticipation costs (τ) may even be negative. This peson is both consumed with hate, and is likely to be poo. Fo the peson fom eithe goup who does not join, (N), thei expected utility is: Pi U in (( H, M ) ) Y (1 ( H, M ) ) Y (16) Ci In othe wods, fo this type of individual, the pobability of peacetime income is highe by a facto λ, and similaly lowe in the state of conflict; this type of individual has a lot to lose fom paticipating in violence. This peson must be, elatively speaking, moe affluent. The necessay and sufficient conditions fo paticipating in sectaian ioting ae: U ij U in Ci Pi ( Y Y ) (1 )( H, M ) l( H, M ) 0 i (17) A numbe of points can now be made. Fist, the quasi-eaction 9 functions of individuals may not always be positive, meaning that a tit-fo-tat stategy is not always followed. It is pefectly possible fo weake goups to eact to moe 9 A quasi-eaction function epesents eactions by an individual to the goup behaviou of the ival community. Published by Bekeley Electonic Pess,

16 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, At. 9 violence by the othe goup by defensively efaining fom violence. Fo example, Mita and ay (2010) point out that in India, the Hindu community as a whole tends to pedate on the Muslim community, wheneve the elative expenditue of Muslims ove Hindus ises. If that is tue, then thee is an aggesso and a taget, with the taget goup acting defensively. In that case, thei quasi-eaction function will be negatively sloped. Secondly, it is possible fo non-joines to fund violence by pooe membes of thei community towads the othe goup. In this case, τ(y N P ). In this connection an incease in between goup polaization will encouage moe sectaian violence. Even an incease in within goup polaization (geate inequality inside each goup) may encouage moe violence, if thee ae moe ich fundes and moe adicalized poo individuals eady and willing to paticipate in violence. Thidly, an incease in lootable income, elative to peaceful income, encouages moe violence---this is likely to aise duing political tansitions o egime changes in counties like Indonesia o Nigeia, o because of a geneal laxity towads law enfocement by local authoities, as is the case sometimes in cetain Indian cities. Finally, an incease in peacetime income is likely to educe violence, and the numbes of those who join such conflictual entepises. This even moe likely if thee ae economic complementaities between the two goups, as identified by Jha (2008). In the Indian state of Gujat thee is no communal (Hindu-Muslim) ioting in Suat, unlike in anothe city, Ahmedabad, whee such ioting is endemic. This is because taditionally Hindus and Muslims depend on each othe fo thei livelihoods (thee ae occupational complementaities) in Suat, unlike in some othe pats whee thei livelihoods involve competition fo esouces, and they theefoe ae moe likely to attack each othe. Analytically, this would mean peaceful income Y P fo one goup depends on the othe goup s peaceful income also. In cities like Suat, Hindus and Muslims may have built up positive social capital vis-à-vis each othe; this encouages coopeative behaviou. They ae also pehaps bette acquainted with each othe. This also helps the accumulation of bidging social capital (Basu, 2005). 5. Conclusions In this pape, I have highlighted the salience of identity in explaining conflict, which may be of inceasing impotance in futue diections of conflict eseach, paticulaly at a mico-level and in the foms of conflict that ae not stictly civil wa. I focussed on individual decision making, whee identification with the goup is salient in diving violent collective action against anothe goup in the context of low-intensity cultual and sectaian conflict. Histoical factos and DOI: /

17 Mushed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict pesent-day socioeconomic factos matte. An ideal society, one that is toleant of diffeence as descibed by awls (1999), is pehaps what we ae aiming fo in tems of policy. As fa as civilizational conflict is concened, excessive deteence against potential dissidents may backfie. These include heavy handed policing and the posciption of Muslim pactices. It may poduce moe militancy and swell the anks of the disaffected, and inceases the dange of both vandalism and teoist violence. Secondly, space needs to be ceated so that most Muslim migants ae able to mege thei pesonal identities within thei adopted Euopean homelands. This includes developing a pesonal impeative to be toleant of diffeence. This will seve to incease the costs of admonishing othe goup membes fo adopting behaviou in confomity with the othe-identities that make up thei complex pesonal identity. Policies that make it difficult to be both Euopean and Muslim ae bound to be self-defeating. Many of the pepetatos of the London bombings wee well integated second geneation immigants befoe becoming adicalized. Thidly, economic discimination, the hoizontal inequalities faced by Muslims in Euope, needs addessing. Othewise policies of integation o assimilation ae bound to fail. This equies a stengthening of equal oppotunity policies and laws to deal with the systematic disadvantage, paticulaly in labou makets, faced by Muslims in Westen Euope, as pointed out by Stewat (2009). adicalization amongst Muslim minoities may be less significant in societies whee they face less identity based inequality of oppotunity, as in the USA o Canada. Economic pogess will educe the powe of the ghetto by pemitting exit fom the ghetto; allowing individual Muslims to act moe on the basis of thei othe identities, and aise the costs of luing them back into distasteful and dubious own identity based violence like ioting o teoism. One common featue unning though both civilizational and sectaian conflict is the pesence of an alien anothe in the midst of a so-called diffeent majoity. Cuiously, Muslims figue in both my examples: as they ae the undesiable aliens in the context of Euope, as well as India. The easing of sectaian conflict in developing counties equies povety eduction and the stemming of the inequalities poduced by economic globalization. Declining povety aises the attactiveness of peaceful income, athe than the eanings elated to loot and violence. The inequality poduced by globalization poduces iche sectaian individuals who fund sectaian causes, leaving it to thei pooe bethen to enact the violence. Hence social safety nets and the public povision of health and education that combat povety and lowe inequality ae impotant. Localized institutional functioning also needs addessing. This includes the often viulently sectaian outlook of local govenments, such as the govenment of the Indian state of Gujat. Futhemoe, getting to know the othe via moe bidging social capital between communities Published by Bekeley Electonic Pess,

18 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, At. 9 is also impotant in building peace, as ae the advantages of peaceful income to individuals. The histoical dimensions of sectaian (communal) conflict cannot be oveemphasized, although beyond the scope of this wok. They have thei oots in the nationalist movements in Bitish India, and the stuggle fo independence, and may even go futhe back in histoy. Bass (2003) points to the histoiogaphy (encouaged fom Bitish times) that is pevasive in moden India. In that discouse, thee is fist an olde/ancient Hindu peiod oughly up to the 12th centuy (whee the salience of the Buddhist efomation and the Hindu counteefomation is often conveniently fogotten), followed by a peiod of Muslim conquest and dominance which is usually viewed as a dak age fo the Hindu majoity, leading finally to Bitish ule fom the 18th centuy, culminating in the nationalist stuggle and independence in In contempoay India, the Muslim collective identity is sometimes associated with the medieval peiod in Indian histoy, an ea of decline, and as something alien to tue Indianness. Muslims ae also blamed fo the ceation of the beakaway state of Pakistan. Most Muslims in South Asia ae, howeve, not descended fom foeign migants, but ae indigenous South Asian convets to Islam. Bass (2003) points out that Muslim enclaves in India ae often egaded in the communal discouse as epesenting mini-pakistans. In shot, the 'Indianness' of Muslims in post-independence India is suspect, and they may be egaded as 'outsides'. Thei potential disloyalty has fed communal violence in its hated dimension, in addition to the economic factos we have outlined. Equally, it is also impotant to undestand the complexities of the Muslim identity; thee is a sense of belonging of Muslims to an Islamic wold that can tanscend South Asia, although this does not peclude good citizenship within any of the South Asian states that followed Bitish depatue in Muslims in India have a sense of loss of thei identity and cultual positioning, exemplified much long ago (in 1888) in the vese of the Udu poet, Altaf Hussein Hali, and spawned out of his palpable fea fo the futue maginalization of South Asian Muslim cultue. 10 In the post-nehuvian peiod, and since the 1980s in paticula, militant Hindu paties such as the BJP (Bhaitiya Janata Paty), elated to olde militant paties such as the SS (ashtiya Shyamsevak Sangh) have gained a foothold in 10 Faewell O Hindustan We you homeless guests have stayed too long We wee convinced that advesity would befall us in time And we O Hind would be devoued by You by Altaf Hussein Hali (1888)---Shikwa-e-Hind (Complaint to India) quoted fom Jalal (1999). Note Hind is the Aabic wod fo India. DOI: /

19 Mushed: Identity in Civilizational and Sectaian Conflict mainsteam Indian politics at both the state and national levels. 11 These paties ae wedded to concepts of Hindutva (Hinduness), whee Muslimness may be seen as an outside cultue and influence. Incidents such as the destuction of the Babai Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992, and the iots in Gujaat in 2002 (whee even the state Pemie was implicated as being complicit with the violence against Muslims) ae examples of the most egegious events in ecent communal stife in India. Ultimately, the flawed natue of Indian democacy and its political pocess, which institutionalizes communal politics, needs addessing. As Bass (2003) has pointed out, Hindu-Muslim conflict is not just a spontaneous event, as is commonly descibed, but is vey much pat of the politics of post-nehu India. Bass (2003) also agues that the asciption of communal violence, howeve, to spontaneous combustion is vey much pat of a blame shifting execise to explain away its deepe causation. Ultimately, communal hamony equies acceptance by all of a pemanent South Asian place fo Islam, and as something which is not evanescent but pat and pacel of its domestic landscape. efeences AKELOF, G., KANTON,. E., (2000), Economics and Identity, Quately Jounal of Economics, vol. 11, n. 3, pp BASU, K., (2005), acial Conflict and the Malignancy of Identity, Jounal of Economic Inequality, vol. 3, n. 3, pp BOULDING, K. E., (1956), The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society, Ann Abo, Univesity of Michigan Pess. BASS, P.., (2003), The Poduction of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contempoay India, Seattle: Univesity of Washington Pess. CONES,., SANDLE, T., (1996), The Theoy of Extenalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, 2 nd edition, Cambidge, Univesity Pess. GALTUNG, J., (1964), Foeign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position, Jounal of Peace eseach, vol. 1, nn. 3-4, pp GANDHI, M. K., (1927), An Autobiogaphy o the Stoy of My Expeiments with Tuth, (oiginal in Gujaati), Ahmedabad, Navajivan, GLAESE, E. L., (2005), The Political Economy of Hated, Quately Jounal of Economics, vol. 120, n. 1, pp GU, T.., (1970), Why Men ebel, Pinceton, Pinceton Univesity Pess. 11 Even, Mahatama Gandhi (1927) chaacteized Muslims as mainly bullies and Hindus as mainly cowads, following the outbeak of Hindu-Muslim violence duing the 1920s. Ionically, this may have spawned Hindu militantism. Published by Bekeley Electonic Pess,

20 Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 2, At. 9 HOOWITZ, D. L., (1985), Ethnic Goups in Conflict, Bekeley, Univesity of Califonia Pess. HUNTINGTON, S. P., (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the emaking of the Wold Ode, New Yok, Simon and Schuste. JALAL, A., (1999), Exploding Communalism: The Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia, in Sugata, B., Ayesha, J., (eds), Nationalism, Democacy and Development: State and Politics in India, Delhi, Oxfod Univesity Pess. JHA, S., (2008), Tade, Institutions and eligious Toleance: Evidence fom India, Stanfod Gaduate School of Business eseach Pape n MAHMUD, A. S.,MUSHED, S. M., (2010), Hate Thy Neighbou: On the Analytics of Sectaian Violence, mimeo. MITA, A., DEBAJ., (2010), Implications of an Economic Theoy of Conflict, mimeo. MUSHED, S. M., (2008), A Note on the Inteaction between Identity Based Fea and Hated, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 14, n. 3, aticle n. 5. MUSHED, S. M., (2009), On the Inteaction between Fea and Hated, Eusecon Woking Pape n.10. OLSON, M., (1965), The Logic of Collective Action, Cambidge MA, Havad Univesity Pess. AWLS, J., (1999), The Law of Peoples, Cambidge MA, Havad Univesity Pess. OEME, J. E., (1998), Equality of Oppotunity, Cambidge MA, Havad Univesity Pess. SEN, A. K., (2008), Violence, Identity and Povety, Jounal of Peace eseach, vol. 45, n. 1, pp STEWAT, F., (2000), Cisis Pevention: Tackling Hoizontal Inequalities, Oxfod Development Studies, vol. 28, n. 3, pp STEWAT, F., (2009), A Global View of Hoizontal Inequalities: Inequalities Expeienced by Muslims Woldwide, MICOCON eseach Woking Pape n. 13. TADJOEDDIN, M. Z., (2008), Educated but Poo: Localized Ethnic Violence Duing Tansition in Indonesia, ISA Confeence Pape. TIEBOUT, C., (1956), A Pue Theoy of Local Expenditues, Jounal of Political Economy, vol. 64, n. 5, pp VASHNEY, A., (2002), Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, New Haven, Yale Univesity Pess. WINTOBE,., (2002), Can Suicide Bombes Be ational, Pape pepaed fo the DIW Wokshop on Economic Consequences of Global Teoism. DOI: /

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