Policy Paper Technical & Research Department ACFIN POSITION ON POLITICAL ASPECTS OF FOOD AID

Transcription

1 Policy Paper Technical & Research Department ACFIN POSITION ON POLITICAL ASPECTS OF FOOD AID ACF June 2006

2 CONTENTS: Executive Summary 3 I Introduction 5 Debate 6 II History and Governance of Food Aid 6 Origins 6 Primary Types of Food Aid 7 Existing Regulating Bodies 8 III Current Main Issues 9 Timing 9 Tied versus Untied Food Aid 10 Selection of Recipient Countries 11 Media coverage 12 Food aid as a political tool 12 III Conclusion 13 IV Recommendations 13 Abbreviations 15 Bibliography 15 * * * * * * * We thank Dr. Edward Clay for valuable comments on an earlier draft. ACFIN is responsible for all errors and opinions. 2

3 Executive Summary Food aid is an integral part of humanitarian emergency response and over the years this response has helped save the lives and livelihoods of thousands of vulnerable people around the world. Action Contre la Faim International Network (ACFIN) 1 is a key actor in food security and food aid, and continues distributing food to vulnerable populations faced with political crises and natural disasters in order to avoid or alleviate malnutrition and diseases, meet immediate food needs and/or protect livelihoods. However, food aid is not always the most appropriate response to meet the vulnerable population s needs, and despite good intentions, it can engender adverse secondary effects at a variety of levels. ACFIN s 26 years of experience in over 40 countries around the world has led us to categorise the problems related to food aid into three main areas: timing, food aid contributions and selection of recipient countries. This paper will deal specifically with the macro level of food aid and its political aspects. The conclusions and recommendations advocate for changes in the current system so as to have a real impact on hunger around the world. ACFIN recommends the following: Adequate food security analysis is paramount to determine the best response and duration for each given situation food aid should be a response to an assessed need and its impact systematically monitored. Food security programs should be promoted in the Least Developed Countries to enhance the countries food sovereignty, reduce future food aid needs and promote sustainable productive opportunities for the most vulnerable. When justified, food aid should be unconditional and given as donations based on the real food needs of the affected populations. Donor countries should enhance local purchases and triangular transactions by reducing in-kind donations in favour of cash donations: o In-kind food aid should be used only in acute local food shortages. o Detailed market analysis should form part of every assessment of needs in order to determine the scope for, and potential impacts of local or regional procurement so as to both ensure that opportunities to support developing country agriculture are taken and to avoid negative impacts on the concerned markets. The provision of food aid should be managed and regulated on a global level: o A universally accepted, standard international food aid code of conduct should be updated and formalised. o A regulatory body made up of donors and recipient countries must be established and supported to enforce the international food aid code of conduct. Existing international institutions, such as FAC or the CSSD, could be options, but key changes are required: 1 ACFIN is the international network comprised of ACF Canada, ACF France, ACF Spain, ACF United Kingdom and ACF United States. The international network shares a common charter, follows the same objectives, policies and methodologies, and globalises its means. 3

4 - Clear minimum and maximum donation criteria for in-kind food aid should be set. - Legal authority is required to put pressure on or reprimand countries that do not adhere to the code of conduct. - The FAO should be actively involved with the regulatory body to promote food and agricultural equality around the world. o The WTO should be involved in regulating tied food aid to ensure that it does not contribute to trade distortions, but it should not be involved in other aspects of international food aid governance because it lacks the capacity and the expertise to play this role. If emergency aid is exempted from WTO disciplines, a universal definition of emergency food aid is required to reduce the risks of creating a legal loophole for inappropriate, trade distorting food aid. 4

5 I Introduction Food aid is an integral part of humanitarian emergency response and over the years this response has helped save the lives and livelihoods of thousands of vulnerable people around the world. Action Contre la Faim International Network (ACFIN) 2 is a key actor in food security and food aid, and continues distributing food to vulnerable populations faced with political crises and natural disasters in order to avoid or alleviate malnutrition and diseases, meet immediate food needs and/or protect livelihoods. In an emergency context, food aid should enable the survival of people affected by a crisis by making the commodities available and accessible to them, in terms of adequate quality and quantity, in such a way as to avoid malnutrition and diseases. Another objective of food aid is livelihood support and protection. Food aid can be provided to prevent people from resorting to survival strategies that engender long-term negative consequences with regard to living conditions and food security, such as the sale of productive assets or engaging in harmful or unsustainable economic activities. However, food aid is not always the most appropriate response to meet the vulnerable population s needs, and despite good intentions, it can provoke adverse secondary effects at a variety of levels. Since its creation 26 years ago, Action Contre la Faim has fought to reduce hunger and malnutrition around the world. ACFIN was not developed to be a permanent organisation; but rather to reduce its activities directly in response to declining levels of hunger. Unfortunately, despite this goal, ACFIN has seen an increase in the number of hungry people around the world. The positive initiatives set by the World Food Summit in 1996, aiming to halve the number of malnourished people by 2015, have been extremely disappointing and the number of hungry people has continued to grow at a pace of 4.5 million per year 3 (UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 2004). The most disheartening aspect of this growth is that reports have repeatedly shown that there is enough food currently being produced to feed the entire world s population. This means that the problem of hunger around the world is more related to a problem of access and availability by zone. This constant makes the food aid debate even more important. If there is currently enough food being produced, how can we ensure that no one suffers from hunger? Action Contre la Faim is currently working in nearly 40 countries around the world and has directly witnessed the positive and negative impacts that food aid can cause on recipient 2 ACFIN is the international network comprised of ACF Canada, ACF France, ACF Spain, ACF United Kingdom and ACF United States. The international network shares a common charter, follows the same objectives, policies and methodologies, and globalises its means. 3 This number is based on country-level estimates of apparent consumption from balance sheets but takes into consideration chronic malnutrition or stunting. Chronic malnutrition causes growth retardation, meaning a below-average height for age score. It is due to chronic or temporary nutritional deficiencies (energy or micronutrients), and/or it can also be the result of an exposure to repeated infections or even to generally poor living conditions, which hinder (or has hindered) the growth of a child. Acute malnutrition or wasting results in a below-average weight for height score and/or the presence of bilateral oedema, and it reflects the current nutritional situation of a child. It is due to nutritional deficiencies (poor contribution or absorption). Action Contre la Faim programmes target specifically, but not exclusively, this type of malnutrition. 5

6 countries and beneficiaries. Our experience is primarily with emergency food aid, aiming to save lives and prevent malnutrition. This experience has led us to categorise the problems related to current food aid into 3 main areas: timing, food aid contributions and selection of recipient countries. This paper will deal specifically with the macro level of food aid and its political aspects. The conclusions and recommendations advocate for changes in the current system, making food aid a genuine tool to combat hunger. Refer to the Action Contre la Faim Food Aid positioning paper for more information on the implementation of food aid programmes in the field. 4 Debate Since the Marrakech Decision in 1994, and leading up to the WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting in 2005, food aid has become the object of intense debate. The debate has gathered momentum among political leaders, and NGOs are now becoming increasingly involved. It is clear that the donation, destination and use of food aid are being openly questioned. Who should control the levels of food aid? Who should have priority access to food aid? In what form should aid be given? Should there be minimum and maximum quotas per donor country? Should food aid be given in kind or in cash? The questions are endless, but the responses will have a strong impact on the most vulnerable populations around the world. II History 5 and Governance of Food Aid Origins International food aid began in the United States and Canada in the early 1950s as a part of national agricultural policy, with the aim of supporting North American farmers production and stabilising local prices of agricultural products. The timing of this policy coincided with the build-up of large agricultural surpluses in North America after the end of the Marshall Plan and the Korean War. Agricultural surpluses were purchased by national governments and given or sold to different countries around the world at reduced rates. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which together with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers the bulk of US food aid, has evolved over the last 45 years, but has maintained many of the original goals of food aid as seen in their objectives stated in the 1999 food assistance report (USAID, 2000) 6 : Combat world hunger and malnutrition and their causes; Promote broad-based equitable and sustainable development, including agricultural development; Expand international trade; For more details on the history of food aid, please refer to Bitter Wheat Food Aid, and the Fight Against Hunger, Frédéric Mousseau, October 2005, found on the ACF web site: 6 The United States is one of the key players in food aid. 6

7 Develop and expand export markets for US agricultural commodities, and foster and encourage the development of private enterprises and democratic participation in developing countries. These four points form the core of the current food aid debate. Since its origins, and up until the present day, food aid has been not only an instrument to fight world hunger, but a political tool par excellence used by developed countries to promote and expand their own agricultural markets; aid leads to trade (USAID, 2000). The third and fourth goals stated above are even more critical as they explicitly influence the use, amounts and destination of food surpluses around the world, thus impacting not only the final beneficiaries of the food, but also influencing local and national economies of the recipient countries. Aid provided using these last two points does not, by definition, combat hunger or increase access to aid for the most needy. Primary Types of Food Aid Over the last fifty years, food aid has been distributed using three main types of categories: programme food aid, project food aid, and emergency food aid. Until recent years, the primary type of food aid was programme food aid. Programme food aid is based on the contribution of commodities directly from a government to a recipient government, or its agent, for sale on the local markets in the recipient countries 7. The type and amount of food could vary greatly from year to year depending on the agricultural surpluses of the donor countries. Typically, there is some form of conditionality or policy framework associated with the provision of aid. The food is received either free of charge or as a credit by the recipient country, and the proceeds from the sale (or counterpart funds) are used for the development needs of the recipient country. Considering the expenses of this type of programme (primary products, post-harvest processing, transportation, etc.), however, only a small percentage of the investment actually reaches the most vulnerable populations. Approximately one-third of the US food aid budget is spent on shipping costs, and several studies have shown that the cost of food aid can be reduced significantly through local purchases or triangular transactions (see below). Programme food aid is the most criticised as it distorts local markets, causing financial difficulties for local producers, and it may eventually lead to a sort of dependence on the newly imported commodities. Whereas, the donor countries farming and transporting industries benefit greatly from this type of transaction, as it spurs the donor s economy. Project food aid can be monetised 8 or used directly in different types of projects ranging from school feeding to food-for-work campaigns. The food is generally shipped from the donor country and distributed through the World Food Programme (WFP) and/or Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Donor countries can earmark the food for specific recipient countries, but the direct beneficiaries are usually chosen according to the level of needs. Over the last fifteen years, emergency food aid has taken on a new dimension, increasing from 20% of global food aid to 70% in This type of aid is given free of charge by the donor countries and is distributed using selection criteria based on vulnerability levels. The donor 7 Commonly referred to as monetised aid. 8 In 2003, 70% of US non-emergency food aid was monetised by NGOs or recipient governments to provide budgetary support or project funds for NGOs (Oxfam, 2005). 7

8 countries are still responsible for selecting the recipient countries, and the choice often remains highly political and, all too often, is regrettably based on the media coverage a crisis receives. Emergency food aid is indispensable in many crisis situations when the population is suffering from the consequences of conflict, political instability, or natural disaster, but the definition of emergency remains vague, leading to emergency food aid being distributed over an extended period in a wide variety of situations. Existing Regulating Bodies Since the early days of food aid, it became necessary to regulate commodities at an international level. The Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) was established in 1954 by the primary donor countries and some recipient countries. The CSSD was an offshoot of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and was located in Washington DC. The role of the CSSD was to ensure that the code of conduct for the distribution of surplus agricultural commodities was respected 9, concentrating principally on ensuring that food aid does not replace commercial imports or local production. Despite the principles of surplus disposal, the CSSD was created and continues to serve the commercial interests of the donor countries. The sub-committee is also very weak and cannot maintain any pressure or influence on the donor countries. The Food Aid Convention (FAC) was ratified in 1967 as part of the International Grains (then Wheat) Agreement amongst the primary grain exporters. The FAC aimed to set a basic code of conduct for food aid and establish minimum volumetric contributions of food aid by donor countries. It is clear that the FAC represents the interests and values of the donor countries and no recipient countries are currently members 10. In reality, minimum contributions are set by the FAC at quite a low level and do not reflect the evolving needs of food aid, allowing the grain exporting donor countries to determine the amounts of in-kind food aid they wish to donate. These amounts remain a direct result of the grain harvest in the donor counties. The FAC has been updated and has evolved over the years, but negotiations on a new Convention have been postponed until a clear decision is made by the WTO concerning food aid. Despite the treaty status of the FAC, it does not currently have any type of authority to ensure that the donor countries meet their minimum contributions of food aid. The World Trade Organization (WTO) began to play a key role in food aid during the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in 1994, when the Marrakech Decision was also signed. The decision aimed to reduce the potential negative impacts of agricultural trade liberalisation envisaged under the Uruguay Round on the economies of the Least Developed Countries (LDC). It stated that a transitional period should be established favouring special policy for the LDC concerning: - Export credits - Financial support for food imports - Food aid - Technical aid to improve infrastructure and agricultural production. Nevertheless, the decision was never implemented. 9 Established by the Principles of Surplus Disposal. 10 India and Brazil have an observer status. 8

9 Food aid discussions were continued in the Doha round of the WTO in December 2005 and a consensus was found concerning the elimination of commercial displacements of food aid. However, no common agreement was reached on how this should occur and to what extent the WTO should be involved. A working committee continues to debate the possibilities of moving gradually towards untied food aid and the necessity to clearly define emergency food aid, which could be exempt from the potential disciplines. The World Food Programme (WFP) The World Food Programme was originally established in 1963 in response to President Eisenhower s proposal to provide food aid through the United Nations. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) created the WFP as a three-year experimental programme to provide project food aid for development with a small emergency role. Over time, the WFP has become the largest and most powerful humanitarian branch of the UN. In 1999, the WFP expanded its mandate of providing food aid to meet emergency needs, and reaffirmed its role of support for economic and social development. The United States is the principal donor country, contributing over 1 billion dollars worth of food in 2004, the vast majority of this being in-kind donations. The second largest donor, the European Community (EC), reaches only 200 million dollars of contributions. It is important to note that the significant financial support of the US can impact the political and implementation aspects of the WFP, as most of the humanitarian aid is provided as directed aid, where the donors specify the beneficiary country, commodities and the source of supply of their grant. Additionally, the WFP could be greatly affected by any attempts to regulate inkind or tied donations. This was recently seen when the WFP strongly supported the importation of US products containing Genetically Modified foods (GM) to Zambia in 2002 and After Zambia refused the GM foods, the WFP supplied only half of the food aid needed by March Despite financial support from other donors, the WFP claimed that it was unable to meet food needs in Zambia without the use of the United States GM food contributions. Timing III Current Main Issues Emergency food aid, like most international humanitarian aid, is usually based on short term programming cycles and must be available quickly to impact the most vulnerable in the most effective manner. In some reoccurring conflicts, or in slow onset disasters, such as drought, assistance can be programmed in advance, allowing for eventual delays. However, in sudden disasters or unforeseen events, the speed of assistance can play a life-or-death role. Given the distance and difficult access to many of the countries where ACFIN works, food shipped from developed countries can take weeks, if not months, to arrive at its final destination. 9

10 Aceh, Indonesia, December 2004 After the massive destruction caused by the tsunami in Indonesia in late December 2004, hundreds of thousands of people in Aceh had lost members of their families, along with their homes and their livelihoods. An emergency response was needed to ensure the survival of the affected population. Thanks to an overwhelming solidarity among the local population and the Bulog (Indonesia s Grain Marketing Board), an immediate food aid response was put into action. The Bulog was able to supply enough rice to the NGO and the UN to carry out immediate distributions to the affected populations. ACF continued to monitor the highly dynamic food security situation along the west coast of Aceh, while implementing emergency food aid distributions during the three months following the tsunami. The food security surveillance 11 demonstrated an adequate regional rice harvest in March 2005 and recommended the promotion of sustainable food security activities and the evolution of general food aid distributions into target distributions favouring local purchases of food products. Despite the recommendations from the NGO community, the WFP decided to import American rice to cover the food needs of the entire population in the affected zones (directly or indirectly) for an additional six months. The imported food only began to arrive and be distributed consistently several months after the catastrophe, when regional production was already beginning to cover the population s needs. Tied versus Untied Food Aid Food aid can be given to the recipient countries in a variety of ways, including free donations and sales. Furthermore, it can be provided as in-kind food produced in the donating country or as cash to fund food purchases in a variety of countries. Unrestricted cash donations provide the opportunity of looking for the best combination of nutritionally or socially appropriate commodity, speed of delivery and cost. However, approximately 90% of food aid is actually tied. Tied aid includes loans, grants, or associated financing packages with a grant element greater than 25% and defined as aid which is in effect (in law or in fact) tied to the procurement of goods and/or services from the donor country and/or a restricted number of countries 12. Even if explicit links to trade deals are disallowed under the Agreement on Agriculture under WTO, some unofficial tying still takes place. Three broad categories of food aid transactions can be distinguished: Direct transfers of food originating in the donor country. In most cases, direct transfers equal in-kind food aid, where the recipient country or its agent receives a donation of food produced in the donor country. Triangular transactions, where food is purchased in a developing country, other than the recipient country. This category is closest to an unrestricted commercial transaction. Local purchases, where food is procured in the recipient country. Direct transfers, where food is sourced in the donating country, is the most striking example of tying of food aid. The tying of food aid to donor countries has interesting advantages for the donors, promoting their national economies and agriculture, and/or opening up new commercial trade, by creating markets. On the other hand, tying aid to the donor country has negative consequences on the programmes, limiting their cost-effectiveness and potential impact. The first disadvantage related to timing has already been highlighted above. When in- 11 Implemented throughout the tsunami affected zones by ACFIN, Oxfam UK and Save the Children UK DAC Revised Guiding Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and Partially Untied ODA (OECD, 1987) quoted in OECD,

11 kind food aid arrives too late, the consequences can be disastrous, ranging from increased rates of malnutrition and mortality to economic impacts if the food arrives after the harvest, thus depressing market prices and hurting local production. Direct transfers have also been proven to be far more costly than local purchase or triangular transactions, decreasing the cost-effectiveness of the programmes. An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2005) study has shown that local or regional (triangular) purchase of food aid can reduce the cost by up to 50%. Another study on US food aid found that the cost of domestically sourced in-kind food aid can be over 100% higher than locally sourced food aid (Barrett & Maxwell, 2005a). Almost 100% of the food aid coming from the United States is provided as direct transfers, promoting not only American agriculture, but also providing advantages to post-harvest processing and transportation. This has resulted in major business opportunities and a strong lobby to continue tied aid. The position in Europe, once similar, has been gradually altered over twenty years as both the Commission and most member states have changed their policies to allow, and then sought to source, food aid in developing countries. After the creation of a single European market in 1992 the pressures on member governments to procure nationally was much reduced. In 2004 more than three quarters of all EU and member states food aid was sourced in developing countries. The process of tying food aid can thus have long-term impacts on the recipient countries economy and has been used as an instrument to encourage future imports. When inappropriately used, in-kind and tied food aid risks causing trade distortions and affecting market opportunities for locally produced items. Considering that tied food aid tends to be advantageous to the donor countries, the selection process to determine recipient countries can be influenced more by the potential benefits to be achieved rather than real food aid needs (see the section below on the selection of recipient countries for more information). In-kind donations and direct transfers are, however, necessary when local purchase or triangular transactions are not possible, or when they risk having a negative impact on the local economy (detailed market analyses are crucial prior to local or regional purchases). However, donors are encouraged to increase their un-tied food aid funding, allowing for the possibility of food aid programmes to make local purchase or regional transactions, permitting faster and more culturally adequate food aid responses. Selection of Recipient Countries The third problem area of food aid is the choice of recipient countries. As mentioned above, the selection of recipient countries on a global level remains in the hands of the donors. The donors choice of recipient countries can largely be considered two-fold. Countries are prioritised according to either media coverage or political advantages to be gained. As ACFIN is primarily concerned with emergency food aid, food distributions in country are carried out using ACFIN s food aid methodology and targeting strategy, ensuring that the food reaches the most vulnerable population groups. 11

12 Media coverage The needs of the population in the countries where ACFIN works are constantly being monitored through ACFIN food security surveillance systems. The systems produce periodic reports highlighting needs in order to take direct action or to lobby for change with the different local and international actors. This information has served as a useful tool to advocate for the use or discontinued use of food aid; however, the reaction of the different actors does not always respond to the needs. In recent years, ACFIN has highlighted the continued need of food aid in certain forgotten crises, including those occurring in Chad, Mongolia and Afghanistan 13. Despite hard data and important food needs, appeals were not answered sufficiently, thus denying food aid to the most vulnerable populations. Due to lack of donor funding, the ACFIN programme in Chad was forced to close, despite malnutrition rates in children reaching up to 30%. On the other hand, certain highly publicised crises are very attractive to the donors, leading to higher levels of donations of food and aid. The war in Afghanistan in 2001 grabbed donors attention, causing a shift of some food aid originally programmed for the war-torn regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The food aid was later re-routed back to the DR Congo after the unfortunate, but highly publicised, explosion of the Goma volcano. Food aid as a political tool As was seen in the goals of USAID, food aid is an important political tool. It can help to strengthen already existing international relationships or to put pressure on recipient countries to respond to the political wishes of the donor countries. This phenomenon has been repeated over the 50 years of food aid and has been seen in the recent wars against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. The levels of food aid relate directly to the official beginning of these wars. In order to realise the significance of figure 1 below, it is important to take into consideration the severe drought that hit much of Afghanistan. It started in 1999, and lasted for much of the region until Despite this, the levels of food aid did not greatly increase until the beginning of the war in 2001, and then dramatically declined with the beginning of the war in Iraq. In 2004 and 2005, it was extremely difficult to find donors to support food aid programmes in the drought affected areas of Afghanistan. At the same time, ACFIN s food security assessments in Iraq could never find the justification of such a large-scale food aid programme in Afghanistan Irak Figure 1: Food aid donations in Afghanistan and Iraq (metric tons) 13 The reference to Afghanistan concerns the period of , after media coverage of the war was reduced. 12

13 III Conclusion In certain contexts, food aid can be indispensable for saving lives and preventing malnutrition. However, the uses and methods of assessment must be carefully considered so as to ensure a positive impact on the population and to reduce potential negative impacts. The current politico-economic dimension of food aid must change in order to improve the situation of thousands of vulnerable people around the world and to reverse the continually growing levels of malnutrition. Since its origin fifty years ago, food aid has continued to be a political instrument used by donor countries to expand their commercial opportunities and manage their agricultural commodity stocks. The beneficial results for the donor countries are not always shared with the recipient countries, leading to trade distortions and damaging recipient countries local production. In order for food aid to have a real impact not only on the most vulnerable people, but also on the most vulnerable economies, serious changes must occur. IV Recommendations Adequate food security analysis is paramount to determine the best response and duration for each given situation food aid should be a response to an assessed need and its impact systematically monitored. Food security programs should be promoted in the Least Developed Countries to enhance the countries food sovereignty, reduce future food aid needs and promote sustainable productive opportunities for the most vulnerable. When justified, food aid should be unconditional and given as donations based on the real food needs of the affected populations. Donor countries should enhance local purchases and triangular transactions through reducing the in-kind donations in favour of cash donations. o In-kind food aid should be used only in acute local food shortages. o Detailed market analysis should form part of every assessment of needs to determine the scope for and potential impacts of local or regional procurement, both to ensure that opportunities to support developing country agriculture are taken and to avoid negative impacts on the concerned markets. The provision of food aid should be managed and regulated on a global level: o A universally accepted, standard international food aid code of conduct should be updated and formalised. o A regulatory body made up of donors and recipient countries must be established and supported to enforce the international food aid code of conduct. Existing international institutions, such as FAC or the CSSD could be options, but key changes are required: - Clear minimum and maximum donation criteria for in-kind food aid are set. 13

14 - Legal authority is required to place pressure or reprimand countries that do not adhere to the code of conduct. - The FAO should be actively involved with the regulatory body to promote food and agricultural equality around the world. o The WTO should be involved in regulating tied food aid to ensure that it does not contribute to trade distortions, but it should not be concerned with other aspects of international food aid governance because as it lacks the capacity and the expertise to play this role. If emergency aid is exempted from the WTO disciplines, a universal definition of emergency food aid is required to reduce the risks of creating a legal loophole for inappropriate, trade distorting food aid. 14

15 Abbreviations CSSD FAC FAO LDC NGO OECD USAID USDA WTO WFP (FAO) Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal Food Aid Convention United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Least Developed Country Non Governmental Organization Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development United States Agency for International Development United States Department of Agriculture World Trade Organization United Nations World Food Programme Bibliography ACFIN (2000). Geopolitics of Hunger (Giroux and Littell), Paris. ACFIN (2005). Preliminary Analysis on the Food Aid Response to the Tsunami Crisis Indonesia Aceh Province, Action Contre la Faim. ACFIN (2004). Food Aid policy, Paris. Barrett, Christopher and Maxwell, Daniel (2005a). Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting Its Role. London: Routledge. Barrett, Christopher and Maxwell, Daniel (2005b). Towards a Global Food Aid Compact. New York: Cornell University and CARE International. Clay, Edward (2004). Responding to Change: WFP and the Global Food Aid System, Development Policy Review, Vol 21(5): Clay, Edward (2006). Food Aid and the Doha Development Round: Building on the Positive, Overseas Development Institute, London. Background Paper. European Council (1996). Food Security Regulation, European Council Regulation N 1292/96, 27/06/1996. FAO (2001). Reporting Procedures and Consultative Obligations Under the FAO Principles of Surplus Disposal: A Guide to Members of the FAO Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal, quoted by P. Konandreas in Multilateral Mechanisms Governing Food Aid and the Need for an Enhanced Role of the CSSD in the Context of the New WTO Disciplines on Agriculture (FAO, 2005). FAO (2004). The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets. FAO (2004). U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization s Annual Hunger Report. FAO Domestic supply FAOSTAT. Lappé, Collins and Kinley (1980). Aid As Obstacle. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy. McEwan, Margaret (2003). Changing Landscapes and the Outliers: Macro and Micro Factors Influencing Livelihood Trends in Zambia Over the Last Thirty Years, CARE SWARMU. Mousseau, Frédéric, (2005). Bitter Wheat Food aid, and the Fight Against Hunger. Mousseau, Frédéric, (2005). Food Aid or Food Sovereignty. Oakland Institute. Action Contre la Faim. OECD, The Development Effectiveness of Food Aid: Does Tying Matter? Paris, ISBN: Oxfam (2005). Food Aid or Hidden Dumping? Separating Wheat from Chaff, Briefing Paper. 15

16 Oxfam, (2004). Role of and Alternatives to Food Aid in Southern Africa, report. Ruttan, Vernon W. (1993). Why Food Aid? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. USAID (2000). US International Food Assistance Report USDA, Vorley, Bill (2003). Food Inc. UK Food Group, Foodinc-Nov03.pdf. World Bank, (2004). Report No , Zimbabwe Country Assistance Evaluation, Operations Evaluation Department. WFP web site: WFP (2005). Press communication 07/07/2005 Southern Africa Faces Severe Food Shortages: Millions of People Need Urgent Humanitarian Aid. 16