Pathways to Policy Deviance Economic Policy Preferences, Social Class, and Voting Behavior

Transcription

1 Pathways to Policy Deviance Economic Policy Preferences, Social Class, and Voting Behavior Shaun Bowler, University of California, Riverside Christopher Ojeda, Stanford University Gary M. Segura, UCLA

2 Motivating Observation We begin with two fairly obvious (and, by now, widely examined) observations: A fair number of people with modest incomes consistently vote for the economically conservative party; A fair number of people with higher incomes consistently vote for the economically more redistributive party.

3 The Question Why is the electorate divorced from class? 1. To what degree is this so? 2. Is this pattern consistent throughout subpopulations of citizens? 3. Is there a modal path to class-inconsistent political behavior, or are there multiple processes?

4 Lots of Spilled Ink Frank s What s the Matter with Kansas? Socio-cultural issues displace economic ones A new conservative populism redefines class politics Bartels responses what s the matter with Thomas Frank? Little evidence of change in the behavior of the working class Working class not conservative Gelman et al., Red State, Blue State Aggregate irony of wealthier states voting Democratic Within states, still a link between income and voting behavior.

5 The Puzzle The volume of class-inconsistent political behavior is still large perhaps it hasn t increased, perhaps the slope on income is nonzero but still important: In 2004, 36% of people living at or below poverty are voting Republican while 38% of the wealthy voting Democrat. Less about whether individuals deviate from economic voting and more about when and why deviations occur

6 Our response to this puzzle 1. Build a comprehensive model of economic voting 2. Identify when individuals deviations from economic voting 3. Examine whether deviations occur at different points for different groups

7 A simple model of economic voting

8 Accounting for heuristic thinking

9 Deviations from economic voting Conceptual errors that result from a misunderstanding of the world Linkage errors results from a failure to correctly connect the steps of the economic voting process

10 Deviations from economic voting

11 Measuring Economic Policy Preferences

12 Self-Reported Ideology Below-Median Income Above-Median Income

13 One dimensional ideology and its discontents Self-reported ideology is a bad proxy for policy preferences; Collapsing on one dimension allows other, non-economic considerations to inform ideology Ideological labeling notoriously bad among mass publics Significant over-reporting of conservatism vis-à-vis policy beliefs

14 Distinguishing what s good for you from what s good for America Each question asked twice: Would this be good, bad, or neither good nor bad for you personally? Would this be good, bad, or neither good nor bad for the country? I use the two distributions of policy preferences to identify respondents who get it wrong : Personally meaning that they report believing classinconsistent policies benefit them; and Ideologically meaning that they believe class-inconsistent policies benefit the country; Helps us distinguish false consciousness from sociotropic evaluations.

15 Economic Policies Six economic policies from EGSS3 (ANES) End the current Medicare system and replace it with a system of credits for individuals to buy their own health insurance. Raise the minimum wage every year to keep pace with inflation. Increase taxes on people making over $250,000 per year. Increase taxes on corporations. Replace Social Security with private retirement accounts that people manage themselves. Reduce U.S. federal government spending on everything the government spends money on.

16 Creating Two Measures Indices a little noisy, but they correlate well with one another, and less well with self-reported ideology. Self-Reported Ideology for You for Country Self-Reported Ideology for You for Country * * *

17 Personal and Sociotropic Economic Policy Progressivism, All Citizens

18 Which Economic Policies are Good? Below-Median Income Respondents Good for you personally Good for the country

19 Which Economic Policies are Good? Below-Median Income Respondents Good for you personally Good for the country Getting it Wrong Ideological Deviance

20 Personal and Sociotropic Economic Policy Progressivism, Below Median Income

21 Personal and Sociotropic Economic Policy Progressivism, Below Median Income

22 Which Economic Policies are Good? Above-Median Income Respondents Good for you personally Good for the country

23 Which Economic Policies are Good? Above-Median Income Respondents Good for you personally Good for the country Getting it Wrong Ideological Deviance

24 Personal and Sociotropic Economic Policy Progressivism, Above Median Income

25 Personal and Sociotropic Economic Policy Progressivism, Above Median Income

26 Class-Consistent Policy Evaluations Below-Median Income for R Liberal/Mod for R Preferences by Income Policies 2.8% 1.2% 5.0% 91.0% Liberal/Mod for US Above-Median Income /Mod Policies Good for R Liberal/Mod for R /Mod Policies 52.4% 18.3% Liberal Policies 2.0% 27.3%

27 Class-Consistent Policy Evaluations Below-Median Income for R Liberal/Mod for R Preferences by Income Policies 2.8% 1.2% 5.0% 91.0% Liberal/Mod for US Above-Median Income /Mod Policies Good for R Liberal/Mod for R /Mod Policies 52.4% 18.3% 2.0% 27.3% Liberal Policies A surprising 91% of those below the median income articulate policy evaluations that are class consistent in terms of personal and national well-being;

28 Class-Consistent Policy Evaluations Below-Median Income for R Liberal/Mod for R Preferences by Income Policies 2.8% 1.2% 5.0% 91.0% Liberal/Mod for US Above-Median Income /Mod Policies Good for R Liberal/Mod for R /Mod Policies 52.4% 18.3% 2.0% 27.3% Liberal Policies A surprising 91% of those below the median income articulate policy evaluations that are class consistent in terms of personal and national well-being; By comparison, only 52.4% of those above the median income offer class consistent evaluations; Note If I used a more demanding criterion of rightness, (below 0 for upper income, above 0 for lower income), 74.4% of lower income whites still in that fourth cell, whereas only 31.4% of upper income whites are in the first cell.

29 Limiting to High Political Interest Below-Median Income for R Liberal Policies Good for R Policies 6.1%.9% 12.8% 80.3% Liberal/Mod for US Above-Median Income for R Liberal Policies Good for R /Mod Policies 40.9% 8.8% Liberal Policies 3.9% 46.5%

30 Limiting to High Political Interest Below-Median Income for R Liberal Policies Good for R Policies 6.1%.9% 12.8% 80.3% Liberal/Mod for US Above-Median Income for R Liberal Policies Good for R /Mod Policies 40.9% 8.8% 3.9% 46.5% Liberal Policies Deviation among both low and high income respondents goes UP with higher levels of political interest.

31 Comparing Issue Positions to Self- Descriptions Self-reported ideology appears to demonstrate a centrist or slightly center-right population; By contrast, views on actual economic policy issues are skewed meaningfully to the left; There is significant variation between pocketbook and sociotropic evaluations of policy, especially among higher income persons.

32 What have we learned? Lower income respondents get it right ; False consciousness X, at least for them Over 1/3 of upper income folks deviate ideologically favor really progressive economic policies, evidence of sociotropic evaluations: But, curiously, more of those deviators think that liberal policies are good for them too, implying either misperception, or a more expansive utility function; Worth noting that IQ3 and IQ4 look alike. Controlling for higher levels of political interest increases deviation of high income markedly

33 Possible Artifacts Driving Distributions Racial and Ethnic Minorities Southerners

34 Netting Racial Minorities Below-Median Income for R Liberal Policies Good for R Policies 3.2% 1.2% 6.6% 88.9% Liberal/Mod for US Above-Median Income for R Liberal Policies Good for R /Mod Policies 55.6% 22.2% 2.1% 20.1% Liberal Policies Since minority citizens might be inflating class consistency at the low end and deflating class consistency at the higher end of income, non-whites are excluded in these tables.

35 The Southern Effect on Whites: Below Median Income Southerners (39%) for R Liberal/Mod for R Policies 4.7% 1.0% 10.7% 83.5% Liberal/Mod for US Non-Southerners (61%) for R Liberal/Mod for R Policies 2.4% 1.3% 4.3% 92.0% Liberal/Mod for US Below median income white southerners are about 9 points less likely to articulate class-consistent economic policy preferences than similarly situated white non- Southerners.

36 The Southern Effect on Whites: Above Median Income Southerners (28%) / Mod Policies Good for R Liberal Policies Good for R / Mod Policies 63.1% 21.8% 1.9% 13.1% Liberal Policies Non-Southerners (72%) / Mod Policies Good for R Liberal Policies Good for R / Mod Policies 54.0% 22.3% 2.2% 21.5% Liberal Policies This is the Gelman effect. Above median income southerners are about 9 points more likely to articulate class-consistent economic policy preferences than similarly situated non-southerners. Among whites, there is an observable Southern conservative shift (or Northern progressive shift) in economic policy preferences which is of approximately the same magnitude across income quartiles. Remember that these measures of ideology are devoid of religious and (explicitly) racial content.

37 What s to Explain? We have clear evidence of ideological deviation among higher income Americans; We have much less for lower income Americans, and this result holds even accounting for race and the South.

38 Ideological Deviance Strongly Predicts Vote There is no question that holding class-inconsistent economic preferences predicts class-inconsistent voting; But class-consistent economic views are much less successful at telling us who R will vote for

39 How Deviation Varies Across Income But Few Lower Income folk express deviant economic preferences: For upper income folks, over 60% of intended vote for Obama is from those expressing liberal economic preferences; For lower income folks, ideological deviation can account for less than a quarter of intended GOP vote most GOP voters among the lower income quartiles support moderate to liberal economic policies.

40 Paths to Political Deviance: High Income VOTE GOP Moderate to Economic Views VOTE DEM Above Median Incomes VOTE GOP Liberal Economic Views VOTE DEM * 60% of deviants diverged through liberal policy preferences.39

41 Paths to Political Deviance: Low Income Economic Views 1.0 VOTE GOP.10 Below Median Incomes.10.0 VOTE DEM 0.90 Moderate to Liberal Economic Views.39 VOTE GOP VOTE DEM By contrast, 78% (35 of 45) of deviants diverged despite liberal policy preferences; Only 22% diverged at the policy level first..55

42 Different Paths to Deviation For higher income quartiles, economic ideology explains a fair amount of vote choice; For lower income quartiles, class-inconsistent voting behavior is largely NOT a function of economic beliefs: Undertaken notwithstanding R s knowledge that the policies aren t serving her/him or even the nation.

43 Testing Alternatives Model partisanship and vote choice as a function of the two measures of economic policy preferences, usual controls, and alternative explanations: Social Mobility: Economic Well-being, Change in the Last 10 years, Will R ever be poor or rich? Racial Resentment: four item index Social Gospel: Religious beliefs regarding helping the poor, feeding the hungry, treating all equally (SEE ERIC McDANIEL) Religious Conservatism: Biblical literalism, Morality, and following God s commands

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46 Conclusions Multiple paths to class-inconsistent preferences and behavior: For lower income, class-consistent economic beliefs fail to produce consistent partisan and voting behavior; For upper income, class-inconsistent political behavior more a function of diverse economic beliefs Small social mobility effects on economic preferences and almost none on behavior.

47 Conclusions Race is reflected in the economic views of lower income Americans: Huge effects on political behavior of all income categories; Social gospel significantly shapes economic views of upper income citizens and reduces their likelihood of GOP identity: Increases Obama vote among all income categories Religious conservatism is unrelated to economic policy preferences but strongly impacts political behavior.

48 BTW Who are Tea Party Supporters? Below-Median Income for R Liberal/Mod for R Policies 3.2% 6.6% 9.2% 12.7% Liberal/Mod for US 1.2% 88.9% 2.1% 29.0% Above-Median Income / Mod Policies Good for R Liberal Policies Good for R / Mod Policies 55.6% 2.1% 41.5% 0.9% Liberal Policies 22.2% 20.1% About 20% of whites and 13% of non-whites reported some level of sympathy or support of the Tea Party movement; Numbers in red represent share of that total from each cell all add to approximately 100 (with rounding error); Over 40% of all identifiers are upper-income, economic conservatives; But between a quarter and a third are from low income people expressing consistently liberal policy preferences. 2.4% 2.1%

49 Patterns vary considerably by Race Among minorities, about half of all TP supporters are in the highest income quartile; Among whites, less than 5% Within quartiles, medium-low income whites have the highest level of TP support; For minorities, the highest quartile.