Maendeleo Policy Forum

Transcription

1 Maendeleo Policy Forum Violent Extremism in Africa: Challenges, Options, and Opportunities for Response Report of the Maendeleo Policy Forum held on 11 November 2015 UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Disclaimer Views expressed in this report represents the opinions of panellists and participants, not the position of UNDP. 1 P a g e

2 Table of Contents 1. Background 3 2. The Maendeleo Policy Forum 6 3. Panellists 7 4. Drivers and enablers of violent extremism 7 5. The development response 8 6. Key discussion points 9 7. Summary of Key Recommendations Conclusion Annex 14 Biographies of panellists Event Agenda Concept Note Front Cover Photo: Ugandan soldier from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) launches surveillance equipment over the town of Qoryooley, Somalia one month after the town was captured from Al-Shabaab militants, 30 April 2014, Qoryooley, Somalia (UN Photo/Tobin Jones) 2 P a g e

3 1. Background The growth of violent extremism and the devastating impact of groups espousing violent ideologies is not only setting in motion a dramatic reversal of development gains already made, but threatening to stunt prospects of development for decades to come. 1.1 Impact of the Violent Extremism Levels of religiously-inspired violent extremism have reached unprecedented levels, and the impacts are far reaching. It is estimated that there have been over 4000 terrorist attacks since 2011 in Africa and 24,000 killed 1.The presence and operations of Boko Haram, for example, have displaced 1.2 million people internally and forced more than 200,000 Nigerians to flee to Cameroon, Chad and Niger. 2 Boko Haram is now known as the deadliest of all the violent extremist groups.two terrorist groups were responsible for over a half of the killings in 2014 Nigeria-based Boko Haram and Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS), which aims to expand its influence from the powerbase in Iraq and Syria globally. Together they were responsible for 51 percent of all global fatalities in 2014 claimed by any group, and almost 40 percent of all fatalities, according to the Global Terrorism Index published by the Institute for Economic and Peace (IEP) 3. static.visionofhumanity.org Internal displacement often feeds into and exacerbates pre-existing conflicts and dynamics of displacement amongst pastoralists; not least since Boko Haram implements a strategy of stealing livestock and burning farmlands in rural communities. 4 1 UNDP Infographic: Fatalities from Terrorist Attacks in Africa UNDP Sub-regional Strategic Scoping Report, Central Africa, Draft I, August Global Terrorism Index 2015 Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, Institute of Economics and Peace 4 Ibid. 3 P a g e

4 Increasing levels of insecurity forced Cameroon to close its border with Nigeria, which highly affected frontier dwellers whose livelihoods depend on cross-border informal trade. In Kenya, over 200 incidents involving explosives or automatic weapons linked to Al Shabab between 2011 and 2015 were recorded. Attackers target night clubs, markets, bus stops and places of worship, killing innocent people and instilling a sense of fear and insecurity, and exacerbating inter-religious tensions. The movement (Al-Shabab) has successfully built a clandestine support network, spreading from the northeast of the country to the capital Nairobi and the Indian Ocean coast 5 and beyond, enabling them to easily recruit vulnerable populations. In the Sahel, violent extremist groups are becoming increasingly active: in Mali, it is estimated that several hundred children were radicalised and recruited, and harsh corporal punishments often against women and children, were reportedly inflicted for failure to observe strict Islamic family codes. 6 Extremist violence is negatively impacting development performance in Africa. Economies have been devastated in Nigeria and Cameroon, affecting the livelihoods of a large population that depend on cross border trade. According to the IMF, Chad s GDP will contract by 1% this year from a 5% growth in 2014 due in part to the negative impact of neighbouring Nigeria s Boko Haram insurgency 7. Kenya s tourist industry, which accounts for over 20% of its economy, has also been in decline since 2013 after Al -Shabab killed 67 people at Westgate Shopping Mall. 23 hotels on the coast alone closed in with Kenya experiencing a 25 % decline in visitors during the same period, with over 15,000 employees in the sector made redundant 9. The increase in security checks and controls in public places is also transforming day-to-day life, with significant psychological impact on populations across the region. This is a growing phenomenon, which will not slow down, unless steps are taken now to address the drivers and enablers of violent extremism. A man prays at dawn where a mausoleum once stood at the three saint s cemetery in Timbuktu, Mali, The Site was destroyed by Militants during the seizure in early 2012, Timbuktu UN Photo/Marco Dormico 5 International Crisis Group, Kenya Somali Islamist Radicalisation, Policy Briefing, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No. 85, Nairobi/Brussels, 25 January 2012, page 1. 6 Alao, Abiodun, Understanding radicalisation and the challenges posed to development, paper prepared for UNDP, 2015, page Kenya Tourist Board June 2015, 4 P a g e

5 1.2 Current Responses Responses to date have largely been security dominated and somewhat reactive. In Mali for example Operation Serval and Barkhane have had some success disrupting extremist networks. 10 In addition, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has largely pushed Al Shabab out of the capital Mogadishu, and Operation Usalama Watch in Kenya has resulted in over 4,000 people arrested and detained on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. 11 Military operations alone, however, can only hope to curb some of the outward manifestations of violent extremism but cannot address its root causes, drivers, and appeal: the endemic levels of poverty and marginalisation, lack of governance, corruption, and instability. Rand Corporation indicates that despite the US spending tens of billions of dollars on counterterrorism operations, only 7% of terrorist groups have been quelled due to military action. The organization says that policing and negotiations are the most successful way of countering terrorist groups, with the two having a combined success rate of 83 percent. According to the UN Secretary General, what is needed is a multilateral, multifaceted strategy that goes beyond the immediate security approach. Over the long term, the biggest threat to terrorists is not the power of missiles, it is the politics of inclusion. 12 This emphasises an approach which addresses structural, causative, and perpetuating factors and their implications in the rise of violent behaviours by citizens. Understanding the underlying causes of violent extremism will be vital in informing a decisive response to the menace. Without solutions to the underlying grievances or causes that lead to extremism, tackling terrorism will be more difficult. Even though responses have been mostly security-centred, the pathways to violent extremism are multiple and cross cutting which could include the following: marginalization and exclusion, injustice and intolerance; lack of vertical and horizontal social contracts; neglected ungoverned spaces (including states or regions where the state has collapsed); lack of economic opportunities; self-identity ideology (the us versus them mentality well 10 International Crisis Group, The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm, Africa Report N. 227, 25 June 2015, page Statement by Ban Ki Moon, UNDP Secretary General, during the discussion of Resolution 2178 at the Security Council. 5 P a g e

6 explained by social identify theory); and lack of education opportunities. Given the causes of violent extremism to be multi-causal, the responses to radicalization must also be multidimensional, integrating security and developmental response. 1.3 Drivers of Violent Extremism While violent extremism cannot be traced to a single causal factor, the Global Terrorism Index 2015 has shown some correlation between violent extremism and a cocktail of factors. The research found that 92 per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries where political violence by the government was widespread. The report equally establishes an intricate link between a country s safety and security environment. According to the report, in the last 25 years, 88 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts. Less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror. Additionally, other important correlates aside from political terror and ongoing conflict include lower respect for human rights, the existence of policies targeting religious freedoms, group grievances, political instability and lower respect for the UN or the EU. Interestingly, the report equally identifies different drivers of terrorism in wealthier countries than in poorer countries. In OECD countries socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, confidence in the press, faith in democracy, drug crime and attitudes towards immigration correlate significantly. In non-oecd countries factors such as a history of armed conflict, ongoing conflict within the country, corruption and a weak business environment are more strongly correlated The Maendeleo Policy Forum The Maendeleo Africa Policy Forum is one of UNDP s contributions to the search for workable solutions to new and persistent problems of developmental transformation and effectiveness in Africa. Through this forum, UNDP provides thought leadership, spaces, and platforms where issues are vigorously interrogated within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals. The collective thinking and recommendations of Africa s best and brightest and its friends are then put forward before decision makers 13 Global Terrorism Index 2015 Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, Institute of Economics and Peace 6 P a g e

7 at the national, regional, and continental levels. The Maendeleo Policy Forum was moderated by Ms. Ruby Sandhu-Rojon, Deputy Director of UNDP s Regional Bureau for Africa, and attended by members of the Diplomatic Corps in Addis, Research Institutions, Civil Society and UN Partners. 3. Panellists The Panellists were H.E. Ambassador Usman Baraya, the Nigerian Ambassador to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the African Union and UNECA; Professor Amr Abdalla, Senior Advisor on Policy Analysis and Research at the Institute of Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University; Dr. Mustafa Ali, Secretary General of the Global Network of Religions for Children & Director of Arigatou International in Nairobi; Dr Anneli Botha, a senior researcher at the Institute of Security Studies and Mohamed Yahya, the head of the Africa Regional Programme at UNDP s Regional Service Centre 4. Drivers and Enablers of Violent Extremism Dr Abdalla noted that senior individuals of Islamic Jihadists, including future members of Al Qaeda, see themselves as defenders of Islam s glorious past. But they also see the West and their puppet regimes as the major obstacles hindering the achievement of their noble objectives. According to Dr Abdalla, one cannot address the causes of extremism unless one understands the drivers and grievances that lead these individuals to join violent Islamic groups. The developmental approach is key, but it should also address the role ideology plays, with a focus on Islamic perspectives. Many of the leaders of Islamic Jihad have now renounced violence and are pursuing non-violent approaches, Dr. Abdalla concluded. But the texts they wrote in the early 80 s are still used by violent extremists today to justify their actions. Ambassador Baraya stressed that in Nigeria, many of the causes are linked to issues of lack of opportunity, poverty, and segregation, which give rise to unemployment and deprivation. Institutional support is absent to monitor and support religious bodies to work with vulnerable groups, especially the youth, to forestall recruitment into violent extremist groups. These groups exploit real and perceived injustices to recruit many young people. This phenomenon is transnational and regional, he noted. Al Qaeda provides Boko Haram with financial and ideological support, and has lately affiliated with ISIS. Thus, there is growing recognition in Nigeria that violent extremism is a regional issue. This is why the Government of Nigeria works through the African Union (AU) and the Multinational Joint Taskforce, besides Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. 7 P a g e

8 Dr. Mustapha Ali noted that states and regional institutions have been responding to violent extremism since September 11, but have not defeated any terrorist organisation. On the contrary, more groups are sprouting up. International community responses have to date focused on the blunt security approach. Dr Anneli Botha: Terrorist groups are extremely adaptable, and easily integrate into the societal mainstream. State responses are outdated and difficult to adapt, while terrorist groups adapt and blend into society easily. It is important to understand human nature if violent extremism must be defeated. Why one brother joins a terrorist organisation and the other joins the police force, for example, is unknown. The problem is lack of counter-narratives and society s inadequate understanding of human nature. Responses to violent extremism have to date been wholesale, and hardly identifies and addresses the needs of different populations engaged in violent extremism: foot soldiers, ex-convicts, funders, communities, states, etc. 5. The Development Response Mr Mohamed Yahya noted that the impact of violent extremism is pervasive. It can been seen almost everywhere: shopping mall, airports, etc. Its impact on Africa has been profound: the innocent have been blown up in Mogadishu, and many have been killed in markets, mosques, and churches across Nigeria. Girls have been kidnapped, and schools have been disrupted in Nigeria. Radicalisation is one of the biggest threats to development today. The hospitality industry has collapsed in Kenya, and foreign trade and investment have seen a downward spiral in Nigeria. Mr Yahya noted that three fundamental strategies have shaped UNDP s development response. Ideology: violent extremism is influenced by ideas. There is a general lack of understanding of how extremist ideas are propagated. Inter-faith and intra-faith-based organisations have not been fully engaged to counter the manipulation of Islam. Institutions: state and informal institutions do not often coordinate efforts to meet the development needs of their populations, especially in the area of gainful employment. Institutional mechanisms have not been established in mosques and madrassas to prevent their takeover by extremist groups and individuals. Communities: communities at risk have no support mechanisms, and those that support violent extremism have not been identified. Mr Yahya concluded that with 24,000 killed and 1.2 million displaced, the SDGs cannot be met unless violent extremism is addressed. 8 P a g e

9 6. Key Discussion points Several questions during the discussion sought to expand on the causes and drivers of violent extremism. The neo-liberal agenda is a major factor as it has widened inequalities all over the world. This can be seen in many contexts in Africa. But the issue of inequality is overemphasized by terrorists, who believe they possess all the answers to this human injustice. Lack of educational opportunities, particularly when it disproportionately affects particular ethnic or religious groups, encourage recruitment into extremist groups. Violent extremism lacks a targeted response; very often governments are not proactive and slow to respond even when the indicators are clearly visible. In Nigeria, the majority of young people who join extremist groups are uneducated and unemployed. The causes of unemployment and lack of meaningful occupation have not been seriously addressed, and different segments of the population do not participate in community, national, or regional issues. The Forum highlighted the role information and communications technology (ICT) plays in violent extremism, and the multiplier effect social media has on this social scourge. Families have not been educated on the effects social media have on children, faith, and community leaders. Currently, in Kenya, there are approximately 1000 websites engaged in radicalising young people, but only 5 are countering radicalisation. ISIS sends approximately 100,000 messages per day. To date, the strategy has been to take down sites, without investments in countermessaging, especially counter-messaging through community groups. Persons at greater risk of indoctrination, especially the youth, have not received any targeted response. Groups and individuals that are likely to be more effective in countermessaging, such as imams, peers, community representatives, etc. have not been identified. A good lesson can be learned from the Rwandan Genocide, during which Muslim communities acted as peacekeepers in communities by countering hate speech. Countermessaging is more often than not undertaken by governments, and thus perceived as propaganda. 9 P a g e

10 Participants also pointed out the difficulties of working with disengaged or marginalised individuals, as community acceptance is a persistent issue. Questions were raised as to whether there are agreed processes in dealing with disengaged persons, in addressing issues of stigma, and in ensuring communities are not targeted. Violent extremism has assumed transnational and regional dimensions. Groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram and Al Shabab thrive in ungoverned spaces, are often found in cross-border areas, and provide safe havens and platforms for violent activity. State presence is lacking in many regions in Africa, and there are a good number of ungoverned areas on the continent. Several questions touched on foreign policy, its relationship with military response to violent activity, and the nexus between military response and increased violent extremism. Noted examples were the Israeli-Palestinian relations, and the post-september 11 interventions. Selective foreign policies and double standards on the part of the West received high attention. Violent extremist groups have justified violence through the us versus them perspective. This black and white way of seeing the world have not been countered and challenged through development programming. It is unrealistic to defeat terrorism only by military means. Insurgencies in Africa, as elsewhere, continue for many years. Violent extremists are extremely adaptable, even after they are defeated on the battlefield as they change to asymmetric tactics. Violent groups are more flexible than nation-states and easily disappear into communities. Military or security responses alone penalise entire communities, and is counter-productive. The weakness of such a narrow approach and limited response is highly evident, as incidences of terrorism have only risen and not fallen. Though security-based responses are important, they have not been mixed with long-term development interventions. Mr Yahya and Dr. Botha briefly discussed the lack of research on human behavior: journey mapping of a person who joins a violent extremist group. Thus, why members of the same family take different courses of action are largely unknown. What drives an individual to join an extremist group, and what potential development interventions could arrest those motivations? What groups are at greater risk from messaging, and what priority actions could inform research? Research is vital to identify the role families, communities, and institutions play in stopping violent extremism for evidencebased interventions. The important role the family, supported by the community, plays in curbing violent extremism has not been explored. Consequently, the family structure has not been 10 P a g e

11 supported, but this is particularly important because teenagers are more likely to be attracted to violent extremist groups. 7. Summary of Key Recommendations 7.1 Ideology: a. Research and understand violent extremism through Islamic perspectives and perceived grievances. b. Understand why original leaders and of violent groups have renounced violence and now pursue their goals through non-violent means; and use such new narratives to counteract extremist propaganda. c. Partner with community leaders, women s groups, etc. to support intra-faith and inter-faith leaders to produce counter narratives, raise awareness about radicalisation, and reduce tensions. d. Develop tailor-made approaches to address ideology, including identifying ways to deal with charismatic leaders who misuse Islam to brainwash and recruit young men and girls into violent extremist groups. e. Research human behaviour; undertake the journey mapping of persons who join violent extremist groups to better understand their motivations. f. Identify ex-terrorists, and work with such populations to spread a peaceful ideology 7.2 Counter-narratives a. Broaden the scope of counter-messaging: involve religious leaders, community leaders, and the peers of violent extremists. Do not use governments in countermessaging as such messages are more likely to be perceived as propaganda. b. Publicise violent extremist messages in order to promote non-violent reactions and approaches. c. Take down hate websites, but also invest in counter-messaging through investments in ICT and increased initiatives with traditional media. d. Counter the black and white us versus them way of seeing the world through development programming. 7.3 Inter-faith and intra-faith Initiatives a. Identify groups and individuals at greater risk of indoctrination, for example, the youth, convicts, and ex-convicts, produce a development response. b. Work with communities to support grassroots practices and initiatives that support interfaith and intra-faith efforts. 11 P a g e

12 7.4 State Presence Ensure state presence in ungoverned areas through local governments, security presence, development initiatives etc. 7.5 Socio-economic a. Address the underlying causes of unemployment; target the manufacturing sector to increase employment. b. Address the root causes of meaningful occupation by adopting strategies for increasing participation in community, national, and regional issues. 7.6 Family Support the family structure to identify and address violent behaviour, and establish mechanisms to deal with the effects of ICT on families. 7.7 Security and comprehensive approaches a. Mix security approaches with long-term development interventions. b. Develop strategies to win the hearts and minds of terrorists. c. Invest in dialogue at all levels: local, national, and international. d. Distinguish between fighting radicalisation and fighting an insurgency. 7.8 Institutions and regional approaches a. Establish institutional mechanisms in mosques and madrassas to prevent their takeover by extremist groups and individuals b. Increase coordination between formal and informal institutions to meet the development needs of populations, especially in the area of gainful employment. c. Increase coordination of institutional activities: local, national, international, and global institutions d. Establish regional and sub-regional mechanisms to address radicalisation and violent extremism 7.9 Communities a. Adopt consultation strategies to address community marginalisation and increase community participation in decision-making. b. Develop strategies to harmonise efforts of religious institutions, families, schools and local governments in the fight against violent extremism c. Target communities at risk, and develop support mechanisms to prevent and respond to violent extremism. d. Adopt strategies to curb radicalisation of prisoners, and facilitate ex-prisoner and exterrorist integration into communities. 12 P a g e

13 7.10 Foreign policy a. Target and resolve long-standing international conflicts. b. Develop strategies to avoid double standards and approaches to addressing global and international issues. c. Research perceived and real injustices in the international system, and develop strategies to address them. 8. Conclusion The Maendeleo Policy Forum provided an opportunity to look at the growth of violent extremism and its manifestations. Participants agreed on a number of causes and drivers of violent extremism and also made several recommendations to address this human scourge. In particular, participants stressed that the fight against violent extremism cannot be won alone with guns and bullets, but with the winning of the hearts and minds of those who engage in violent extremist behaviour. 13 P a g e

14 9. Annexes Annex 1: Biography of the Panellists H. E. Amb. Usman Baraya H. E. Amb. Usman Baraya is the Nigerian Ambassador to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Prior to his current assignment, Amb. Usman Alhaji Baraya, had served in various duty stations and in various capacities including as Ambassador of Nigeria to the Kingdom of Belgium, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the European Union, Brussels (May 2008 to March 2012). During the period Amb. Baraya served as Vice Chair, ACP-EU Sub Committee on Investments, Chairman, ACP-EU Development Financing Committee and Chairman, ACP Committee of Ambassadors in Brussels. Amb. Baraya has also served as Representative of Nigeria to the Organization of American States (OAS) April 2007-April Amb. Baraya holds a Master s degree in Development Policy from the University of Paris /CERIS, Brussels. Dr. Amr Abdalla a.abdalla@ipss-addis.org Dr. Abdalla is the Senior Advisor on Policy Analysis and Research at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University. In , he was Vice President of SALAM Institute for Peace and Justice in Washington, D.C. From he was Professor, Dean and Vice Rector at the United Nations-mandated University for Peace (UPEACE) in Costa Rica. Prior to that, he was a Senior Fellow with the Peace Operations Policy Program, School of Public Policy, at George Mason University, Virginia. He was also a Professor of Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences in Leesburg, Virginia. Both his academic and professional careers are multidisciplinary. He obtained a law degree in Egypt in 1977 where he practiced law as a prosecuting attorney from 1978 to He then emigrated to the U.S. where he obtained a 14 P a g e

15 Master's degree in Sociology and a Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University. He has been teaching graduate classes in conflict analysis and resolution, and has conducted training, research and evaluation of conflict resolution and peacebuilding programs in several countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the Americas. He also authored, and co-authored, several research and evaluation teaching manuals including: Doing What You Want With Your Data, A Step-by-Step Guide to Planning and Implementing Evaluation Strategies, and Qualitative Evaluation: The What and Why. Dr. Abdalla teaches regularly (face-to-face and online) at American University in Washington, D.C., University for Peace, University of Addis Ababa, and Open University of Catalonia. Dr. Mustafa is the Secretary General of the Global Network of Religions for Children (GNRC) and Director of the Arigatou International Nairobi. He has served as the Secretary General of the African Council of Religious Leaders and Africa Representative of Religions for Peace International for the last six years He has been working to build peaceful, just and harmonious societies and promoting peaceful coexistence between faiths and communities in Africa since He focuses on radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. Dr. Mustafa Y. Ali m.ali@arigatouinternational.org He is a recipient of the 2012 Coexist International Peace Prize, awarded to him in New York, USA by a UK-based Foundation. He was voted to receive the Peace Prize by former President of Ireland Mary Robinson, Grand Mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa, Chief Rabbi David Rosen, among others, for his vision and courage in mobilizing religious and faith leaders in transforming difficult and challenging conflicts in many parts of Africa including in Somalia, Libya, Nigeria, Burundi and Uganda. He holds a PhD from United Kingdom; MA in Diplomacy and International Studies from the University of Nairobi (Kenya) and a BSc. in Information Sciences from Moi University (Kenya). Dr. Mustafa is the Director of the Japanese Foundation Arigatou International in Nairobi. 15 P a g e

16 Mohamed Yahya Dr. Anneli Botha Dr. Anneli Botha joined the ISS in 2003 as a senior researcher on terrorism with the Transnational Threats and International Crime division in Pretoria. After completing an honors degree in international politics she joined the South African Police Service s Crime Intelligence Unit in 1993, focusing on terrorism and religious extremism. Anneli has a Master s degree in political studies from the University of Johannesburg and a PhD from the University of the Free State. Over the last seven years Anneli produced the official training curricula for police agencies in southern Africa (under Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization or SARPCCO), eastern Africa (under Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization or EAPCCO) and western Africa (under Economic Community Of West African States or ECOWAS). Her specific areas of interest are counter-terrorism strategies and the underlying causes of terrorism and radicalization. Mohamed YAHYA is responsible for the coordination, management, and quality assurance of UNDP s Africa regional programme delivery and its projects. Prior to this appointment, he served as a Country Support Specialist for the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery. He has also worked as the Team Leader for the UN-EU Partnership on Natural Resource Management, the head of UNDP s Parliament Programme in Afghanistan, and a Technical Specialist for Diamond for Development Programme in Liberia. Before joining UNDP, Mohamed worked with International Alert for 7 years in Sao Tome, Nigeria, and Liberia. He holds a Master s degree in Conflict and Development, and a Bachelor s degree in Politics frim the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London). Annex 2: Programme Time Activity Responsible Party Registration/Light Lunch Welcome remarks Lebogang Motlana Director Introduction of the topic/panelist Moderator Intervention by Panelists UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa Ruby Sandhu-Rojon Deputy Director, Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP, New York 1. Dr. Amr Abdallah, Senior Policy Advisor, IPSS, Addis 2. Dr. Mustafa Ali, 16 P a g e

17 Q & A and contributions from participants Summary of the session/ way forward Moderator End of session/refreshment Director of the Japanese Foundation Arigatou International in Nairobi. 3. Dr. Anneli Botha - Senior Researcher on terrorism, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, ISS, Pretoria. 4. Mohamed Yahya, Regional Programme Coordinator, UNDP RSCA 17 P a g e

18 Annex 3 United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Africa Maendeleo Policy Forum Theme: Violent Extremism in Africa: Challenges, Options and Opportunities for Response Context The growth of violent extremism - and the devastating impact of groups espousing violent ideologies is not only setting in motion a dramatic reversal of development gains already made, but threatening to stunt prospects of development for decades to come. Religiously inspired violent extremism have reached unprecedented levels, and the impacts are far reaching. It s estimated that there have been over 3000 terrorist attacks since 2011 in Africa and over 8000 killed. The presence and operations of Boko Haram in Nigeria have displaced 1.2 million people internally and forced more than 200,000 to flee to Chad, Niger and Cameroon. In Kenya there have been 60 incidents and attacks in the last four years alone attributed to Al Shabab: the attackers target night clubs, markets, bus stops and places of worship, thereby killing innocent people and instilling a sense of fear and insecurity, and exacerbating inter-religious tensions. In the Sahel, violent extremist groups are becoming increasingly active: in Mali, it is estimated that several hundred children have been radicalized and recruited by extremist groups, and harsh corporal punishments have reportedly been inflicted, often against women and children for the failure to observe strict Islamic family codes. In addition to the human cost, extremist violence is negatively impacting development performance in Africa. According to the IMF, foreign investment in Nigeria has fallen by 30% as a direct consequence of terrorism from 2010 whereas Kenya has seen a 25% reduction in tourism, a vital revenue earner and source of employment. The closing of borders in Nigeria and Cameroon due to insecurity devastated local economies and adversely affected the livelihoods of thousands who depend on cross border trade. The phenomenon shows every sign of growing, unless steps are taken now to address the drivers and enablers of violent extremism. UNDP s Development Response 18 P a g e

19 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the leading development agency for the United Nations System has sought to understand the drivers of radicalization, its manifestations at the national and regional level and how government, communities and citizens can be supported to respond. Even though responses have been mostly security-centred, the pathways to violent extremism are multiple and cross cutting which could include the following: marginalization and exclusion, injustice and intolerance; lack of vertical and horizontal social contracts; neglected ungoverned spaces (including states or regions where the state has collapsed); lack of economic opportunities; self-identity ideology (the us versus them mentality well explained by social identify theory); and lack of education opportunities. Given the causes of violent extremism to be multi-causal, the responses to radicalization must also be multi-dimensional, integrating security and developmental response. UNDP has designed a four year development programme to respond to the growth of violent extremism in Africa. The programme articulates a development response to violent extremism addressing the structural causative or perpetuating factors and their implications in the rise of violent extremism moving beyond the security response which has not always proved sufficient by itself. The strategy should be guided by a theoretical framework interventions focusing predominantly on ideology: looking at how extremist narratives are propagated, who they are targeting and assessing the impact and potential for radicalization processes to begin. These engagements should be designed to understand processes of manipulation and coercion, through engagement with formal and informal channels of communication (virtual and real) and with a view to intercept, counter and manage the impacts of ideologies designed to inspire acts of violence, especially amongst vulnerable populations. Interventions focused on ideology, furthermore, may seek to engage in inter- and intra-faith activities, as a way to expose doctrinal fallacies and areas where religion is being manipulated to serve political ends and to justify violence. Other interventions could be more focused on institutions both formal and informal and to address areas of weakness and strengthen their resilience to stop the growth of violent extremism. State institutions are important such as prisons which can become recruitment locations whereas informal, quasi-formal and non-state institutions are equally important; businesses, religious institutions, nongovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, social clubs and traditional community structures to mention only a few - can all be engaged to help facilitate, prevent, hinder or stall radicalization processes. By strengthening both formal and informal institutions, interventions strengthen state-society relations, and ensure approaches are both holistic and inclusive. Whilst addressing ideology and institutions are vital, interventions could also focus on key individuals in order to increase their chances of successfully reducing and addressing the growth of violent extremism. Certain individuals and groups of individuals, of course, serve as facilitators, catalysts and active agents of violent extremism; others may be victims or provide the social network around such individuals. Individuals such as detainees, funders, recruiters, information gatherers, preachers, returnees, disengaged, victims, families, friends, associates and co-workers play instrumental roles in both the processes associated with violent extremism and those associated with de-radicalization and reintegration. Interventions that target individuals should be tailored to ensure the specific reasons such 19 P a g e

20 individuals are supporting directly or indirectly or affected, personally or professionally, are addressed in way that prevents and hinders the growth of violent extremism. The Maendeleo Policy Forum The Maendeleo Policy Forum has been launched to provide space for African statesmen, international mediators and negotiators, researchers, policy makers, development practitioners and writers on African issues, to dialogue and debate on critical issues of development in Africa. Objectives The Maendeleo Policy Forum on the topic: Violent Extremism in Africa: Challenges, Options and Opportunities for Response provides space to reflect on the growth of violent extremism in Africa, its manifestations and impacts on development and collectively advocate for development solutions. It thus present an ample opportunity for stakeholders to brainstorm on the understanding and manifestations of the problem, the drivers and triggers, current responses and successes and failures; and what needs to be done differently. The forum will contribute to deepening the understanding of the issues and seek convergence on effective development responses to the challenges of violent extremism in Africa. Outcome The Maendeleo Policy Forum on Violent Extremism in Africa: Challenges, Options and Opportunities for Response is expected to produce clear and implementable recommendations in the form of a summary report which will be submitted to the Governments most affected by violent extremism in Africa, the United Nations, the African Union and other key stakeholders. 20 P a g e