Citizens, Narrative Economics and Monetary Policy: The Bank of Italy Arithmetic on Italy. Donato Masciandaro Bocconi University May 2018
|
|
|
- Amice Pearson
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Citizens, Narrative Economics and Monetary Policy: The Bank of Italy Arithmetic on Italy Donato Masciandaro Bocconi University May 2018
2 Motivation q Motivation: Citizens and Monetary Policy Conventional and Unconventional Channels q Key Relationship: Sentiments (Beliefs), Narratives and Monetary Policy q A case of Central Bank Narrative on Monetary Policy: The BI Arithmetic on Italy 2
3 Motivation: Citizens and Monetary Policy q Citizens and Monetary Policy: Two-Way (Intertwined) Channels: q 1) Conventional Channel: Expectations and Monetary Policy (Barro and Gordon 1983) q 2) Unconventional Channel Voting on Central Bank Governance: Voters, Politicians, Demand and Supply of CBI (Masciandaro and Passarelli 2018) q On Top: Narrative Economics (Shiller 2017) and the role of Facts, Perceptions and Tales in Shaping Sentiments (Beliefs) q Governor s Concluding Remarks: a case of Central Bank Narrative q Background: q Monetary Policy and Central Banking before the Great Crisis: A Well Established Narrative 3
4 The Old Normal Narrative: The Monetary Policy Setting during the Great Moderation q The three pillars of the monetary setting during the Great Moderation: q 1) Monetary Policy Goal: Macroeconomic Stability (Output Growth + Inflation) with a special focus on Monetary Stability q 2) Monetary Policy Tool: Nominal Interest Rate q 3) Monetary Policy Actor: Independent Central Bank 4
5 Monetary Policy: Goal and Tool. Being in Equilibrium and Without Shocks y = y * π π = π * AS π* AD y y* 5
6 Monetary Policy: and with Shocks q But Macro Shocks can occur, and the Central Bank have to react 6
7 Monetary Policy: Goal + Tool = The Taylor Rule ^ i = r+ π + α π π * + β y y * T Using a monetary rule = anchor for agent expectations and behaviour With its more common specification, i.e. with r^=π*=y* =2 (historical data) and α=β=0.5 : That stresses the dominant role of monetary stability In fact ( ) ( ) i T = 1.5π y 7
8 Monetary Policy and Monetary Stability: The Best Practices Figure 1 National MPs: Aggregation by target variable, advanced countries Source: Cobham, Vox, March 16,
9 The Monetary Actor: Before the Crisis Politicians Society Accountability Independent Central Bank Banking Industry Monetary Policy 9
10 Central Bank: Why Independent? Rationale q Why the modern central bank is designed in order to be independent from the government? q The politicians tend to use the monetary tools with a short sight perspective, i.e. to smooth different kind of macroeconomic shocks unemployment, fiscal deficit financing, banking bailouts - in order to have immediate political gains and postpone or hide the corresponding costs q But
11 Central Bank: Why Independent? Rationale q the more the markets are efficient, the greater the risk that the short sighted monetary policies produces just distortions (inflation and/or bubbles) q The monetary policy becomes time inconsistent (non credible) q Risks of Bad Macro Outcomes: Stagflation, Debt Monetization Imbalances, Bank Bailout Imbalances q Solution
12 Central Bank: Why Independent? and Robustness q CBI and Macro Performances: q Nominal variables: YES q Real variables =? q Fiscal variables =? q CBI as a free lunch Source: Masciandaro annd Romelli, 2015
13 The Meaning of Independence q The establishment of an independent central bank is a solution to have a credible monetary agent without short term biases q CB Institutional (governance) properties: q 1) Monetary Stability Goal (Conservativeness) q 2) No Public Deficit Monetization q 3) No Banking Policy Powers q 4) Accountability q Benchmark
14 14 The ICB: The ECB
15 15 The Great Crisis
16 After the Crisis: Sentiments, Monetary Policy and Central Banking q Narrative News: The case of Euro q 1) Europhilia and ECB Monetary Policy q 2) Politics and ECB Governance 16
17 1) Europhilia and ECB Monetary Policy Source: Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, Monnet s Error?,
18 Europhilia and ECB Monetary Policy Source: Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, Monnet s Error?,
19 Note: Data on Sentiment & MP - Handle with Care Source: Hwang,
20 Europhilia and ECB Monetary Policy Source: Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, Monnet s Error?,
21 Europhilia and ECB Monetary Policy Source: Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, Monnet s Error?,
22 2) CBI and Populism The populist movements, which share a demand for short-term protection, appear to be characterized by three main properties: 1) the claim that they protect the people from the elite (redistributive goal), 2) certain demand conditions and 3) a disregard for future consequences (Guiso et. Al. 2017) A Populist policy is both redistributive (1) and myopic (2+3). Populist policies present solutions that are welfare enhancing in the short run for a selected constituency, which is today the majority of the population, but costly tomorrow for the overall population
23 CBI and Populism with their PhDs, exclusive jargon, and secretive meetings in far-flung places like Basel and Jackson Hole, central bankers are the quintessential rootless global elite that populist nationalist love to hate (Rajan 2017) The narratives of central bankers seem to sketch them out as a natural target for populist policies
24 On the ECB rules : «Asphyxiating rules ( ) written by the Bundesbank» Yanis Varoufakis, Greece Finance Minister, Conference Press, March 2015 ECB and Populism
25 25 Sentiments and Central Bankers
26 Euro and Italian Macro Performances: The Bank of Italy Arithmetic q Narrative: European Monetary Policy and Italian Macro Performances q We are not constrained by the European rules but by economic logic (Vincenzo Visco, p.18)
27 Memo: Euro and Italian Macro Performances Source: Baffigi, Bank of Italy, 2011
28 Memo: Euro and Italian Macro Performances 28 Fonte: BdI, 2008
29 Memo: Euro and Italian Macro Performances 1979 = ERM= European Exchange Rate Mechanism Source: Pane:a, Monetary Policy in the Euro Area, April 2018
30 Euro and Italian Macro Performances: The Bank of Italy Arithmetic q Italy anaemic growth and high public debt (DEBT/GDP=132) q Funding demand = 400 billions per year q D/G Drivers: primary fiscal balance (PFB) + (rg) q Given monetary stability + ECB MP normalization: q with PFB = 3-4 D/G <100 up to 2028 q Bank of Italy Arithmetic as Narrative Benchmark
31 A Note: Sentiments, Politics and Central Banking - An Ongoing Case Study. Turkey 2018 Source: FT, May 25.,
32
Market failures. If markets "work perfectly well", governments should just play their minimal role, which is to:
Market failures If markets "work perfectly well", governments should just play their minimal role, which is to: (a) protect property rights, and (b) enforce contracts. But usually markets fail. This happens
Tilburg University. Modern Monetary Policy and Central Bank Governance Eijffinger, Sylvester; Masciandaro, D.
Tilburg University Modern Monetary Policy and Central Bank Governance Eijffinger, Sylvester; Masciandaro, D. Document version: Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2014 Link
Statutory Central Bank Independence in Taiwan A Review of the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Act. C. James Hueng
Statutory Central Bank Independence in Taiwan A Review of the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Act C. James Hueng Western Michigan University i I. Introduction Backed by academic work, it
Migration and the European Job Market Rapporto Europa 2016
Migration and the European Job Market Rapporto Europa 2016 1 Table of content Table of Content Output 11 Employment 11 Europena migration and the job market 63 Box 1. Estimates of VAR system for Labor
Charles I Plosser: A progress report on our monetary policy framework
Charles I Plosser: A progress report on our monetary policy framework Speech by Mr Charles I Plosser, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, at the Forecasters
Measurement and Global Trends in Central Bank Autonomy (CBA)
Measurement and Global Trends in Central Bank Autonomy (CBA) Conference Central Bank Independence: Legal and Economic Issues Sponsored by the International Monetary Fund and the Central Reserve Bank of
Systematic Policy and Forward Guidance
Systematic Policy and Forward Guidance Money Marketeers of New York University, Inc. Down Town Association New York, NY March 25, 2014 Charles I. Plosser President and CEO Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Monetary Theory and Central Banking By Allan H. Meltzer * Carnegie Mellon University and The American Enterprise Institute
Monetary Theory and Central Banking By Allan H. Meltzer * Carnegie Mellon University and The American Enterprise Institute It is a privilege to present these comments at a symposium that honors Otmar Issing.
Economic Reforms and the Indirect Role of Monetary Policy
Economic Reforms and the Indirect Role of Monetary Policy Andrea Beccarini 25/2012 Department of Economics, University of Münster, Germany wissen leben WWU Münster Economic reforms and the indirect role
Worrisome Arguments in Support of Independent Central Banks
Worrisome Arguments in Support of Independent Central Banks The democratic voting process is not appropriate for deciding at any point in time whether, and by how much, monetary conditions should be altered
Upheavals in Europe: European identity and crisis solution, Europe of the 3 Regions
Upheavals in Europe: European identity and crisis solution, Europe of the 3 Regions Mirta Acero & Christian Ghymers IRELAC/ICHEC-Brussels Management School & Institute of Human Conductivity (London) IX
CHALLENGES OF THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS UPON THE EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
CHALLENGES OF THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS UPON THE EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE MIHUȚ IOANA-SORINA TEACHING ASSISTANT PHD., DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
Central banking and Monetary Policy: What Will Be the Post-Crisis New Normal?
Central banking and Monetary Policy: What Will Be the Post-Crisis New Normal? Report on a conference jointly organised by SUERF and BAFFI CAREFIN Centre (Bocconi University) Milan, 14 April 2016 Sponsored
A Perspective on the Economy and Monetary Policy
A Perspective on the Economy and Monetary Policy Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce Philadelphia, PA January 14, 2015 Charles I. Plosser President and CEO Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia The
Willem F Duisenberg: From the EMI to the ECB
Willem F Duisenberg: From the EMI to the ECB Speech by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, at the Banque de France s Bicentennial Symposium, Paris, on 30 May 2000. * * * Ladies
Should Fiscal Policy be Set by Politicians?
Should Fiscal Policy be Set by Politicians? E. Maskin Harvard University Jean Monnet Lecture European Central Bank Frankfurt September 29, 2016 European Union an enormous success 2 European Union an enormous
Sonja Steßl. State Secretary Federal Ministry of Finance
State Secretary Federal Ministry of Finance Opening Address Dear Governor, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to welcome you to Vienna, also on behalf of Federal Chancellor Faymann, who sends his
Study. Importance of the German Economy for Europe. A vbw study, prepared by Prognos AG Last update: February 2018
Study Importance of the German Economy for Europe A vbw study, prepared by Prognos AG Last update: February 2018 www.vbw-bayern.de vbw Study February 2018 Preface A strong German economy creates added
Jean-Claude Trichet: Completing Economic and Monetary Union
Jean-Claude Trichet: Completing Economic and Monetary Union Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the Gala Dinner of the State of the European Union conference Revitalising
Axel A Weber: The independence of the central bank and inflation the Bundesbank example
Axel A Weber: The independence of the central bank and inflation the Bundesbank example Speech by Professor Axel A Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the Narodowy Bank Polski (National Bank
Chapter 21 (10) Optimum Currency Areas and the Euro
Chapter 21 (10) Optimum Currency Areas and the Euro Preview The European Union The European Monetary System Policies of the EU and the EMS Theory of optimal currency areas Is the EU an optimal currency
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: The euro benefits and challenges
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: The euro benefits and challenges Speech by Ms Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Conference Poland and the EURO, Warsaw,
Implications for the Desirability of a "Stage Two" in European Monetary Unification p. 107
Preface Motives for Monetary Expansion under Perfect Information Overview of Part I p. 15 Why Do Governments Inflate? - Alternative Aspects of Dynamic Inconsistency p. 16 Why Do Central Banks Smooth Interest
Rules Versus Discretion: Assessing the Debate Over the Conduct of Monetary Policy
Rules Versus Discretion: Assessing the Debate Over the Conduct of Monetary Policy John B. Taylor Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference on Are Rules Made to be Broken? Discretion and Monetary Policy
Progress through crisis? Conference for the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the European Monetary Institute
28 February 2014 Progress through crisis? Conference for the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the European Monetary Institute Introduction by Luc Coene, Governor of the National Bank of Belgium
The Benefits of Enhanced Transparency for the Effectiveness of Monetary and Financial Policies. Carl E. Walsh *
The Benefits of Enhanced Transparency for the Effectiveness of Monetary and Financial Policies Carl E. Walsh * The topic of this first panel is The benefits of enhanced transparency for the effectiveness
You Reap What You Sow
Agricultural bias and the electoral politics of democratic sovereign default Cameron Ballard-Rosa Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill International Political Economy
Independence and the Scope of the Central Bank s Mandate. John B. Taylor 1 Stanford University. June 2016
Independence and the Scope of the Central Bank s Mandate John B. Taylor 1 Stanford University June 2016 Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the Riksbank conference on rethinking the central
Friedman and the Bernanke-Taylor Debate on Rules versus Constrained Discretion
Friedman and the Bernanke-Taylor Debate on Rules versus Constrained Discretion Harris Dellas and George S. Tavlas The debate about rules versus discretion in monetary policy is an old one. It goes back
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TROIKA : MAIN MESSAGES FROM THE ETUC REPORT. Athens, March 2014
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TROIKA : MAIN MESSAGES FROM THE ETUC REPORT Athens, March 2014 rjanssen@etuc.org THE PICTURE THAT EMERGES. IS A PICTURE OF A COUNTRY BEING TAKEN OVER NOT A «SILENT» TAKEOVER.. BUT
Global Crises and Populism: The Role of Eurozone Institutions
67 th Economic Policy Panel Meeting 12-13 April 2018 Zurich Hosted by the Swiss National Bank Global Crises and Populism: The Role of Eurozone Institutions Luigi Guiso (Einaudi Institute for Economics
Legislating a Rule for Monetary Policy John B. Taylor
Legislating a Rule for Monetary Policy John B. Taylor In these remarks I discuss a proposal to legislate a rule for monetary policy. The proposal modernizes laws first passed in the late 1970s, but largely
Chapter 20. Optimum Currency Areas and the European Experience. Slides prepared by Thomas Bishop
Chapter 20 Optimum Currency Areas and the European Experience Slides prepared by Thomas Bishop Preview The European Union The European Monetary System Policies of the EU and the EMS Theory of optimal currency
Global Crises and Populism: the Role of Eurozone Institutions
Global Crises and Populism: the Role of Eurozone Institutions L. Guiso H. Herrera M. Morelli T. Sonno May 4, 2018 Abstract Populist parties are likely to gain consensus when mainstream parties and status
CENTRAL BANKING IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSITION COUNTRIES
CENTRAL BANKING IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSITION COUNTRIES by Frederic S. Mishkin Graduate School of Business, Columbia University and National Bureau of Economic Research Uris Hall
Benoît Cœuré: Interview with BFM Business TV
Benoît Cœuré: Interview with BFM Business TV Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, and BFM Business TV, conducted by Mr Stéphane Soumier on 12 March
WORKSHOPS. Proceedings of OeNB Workshops. Recent Developments in the Baltic Countries What Are the Lessons for Southeastern Europe?
OESTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK EUROSYSTEM WORKSHOPS Proceedings of OeNB Workshops Recent Developments in the Baltic Countries What Are the Lessons for Southeastern Europe? March 23, 2009 Stability and Security.
Rise in Populism: Economic and Social Perspectives
Rise in Populism: Economic and Social Perspectives Damien Capelle Princeton University 6th March, Day of Action D. Capelle (Princeton) Rise of Populism 6th March, Day of Action 1 / 37 Table of Contents
Aleksandra Masłowska Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures. Aboa Centre for Economics
Aleksandra Masłowska Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures Aboa Centre for Economics Discussion Paper No. 21 Turku 2007 Copyright Author(s) ISSN 1796-3133 Turun kauppakorkeakoulun
Comparative Economic Geography
Comparative Economic Geography 1 WORLD POPULATION gross world product (GWP) The GWP Global GDP In 2012: GWP totalled approximately US $83.12 trillion in terms of PPP while the per capita GWP was approx.
IMPLICATIONS OF WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEMS ON REGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION LUMINITA VOCHITA, GEORGE CIOBANU, ANDREEA CIOBANU
IMPLICATIONS OF WAGE BARGAINING SYSTEMS ON REGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION LUMINITA VOCHITA, GEORGE CIOBANU, ANDREEA CIOBANU Luminita VOCHITA, Lect, Ph.D. University of Craiova George CIOBANU,
ETUC Platform on the Future of Europe
ETUC Platform on the Future of Europe Resolution adopted at the Executive Committee of 26-27 October 2016 We, the European trade unions, want a European Union and a single market based on cooperation,
John Iannis Mourmouras: Implications of the UK vote to leave the EU a view from the South
John Iannis Mourmouras: Implications of the UK vote to leave the EU a view from the South Panel intervention by Professor John Iannis Mourmouras, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece, at the Bank of Italy-OMFIF
Central Bank Independence and Policy Results: Theory and Evidence
Central Bank Independence and Policy Results: Theory and Evidence Alex Cukierman February 7 2006 Lecture prepared for the International Conference on: "Stabiltity and Economic Growth: The Role of the Central
A2 Economics. Enlargement Countries and the Euro. tutor2u Supporting Teachers: Inspiring Students. Economics Revision Focus: 2004
Supporting Teachers: Inspiring Students Economics Revision Focus: 2004 A2 Economics tutor2u (www.tutor2u.net) is the leading free online resource for Economics, Business Studies, ICT and Politics. Don
THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE EURO. Policy paper Europeum European Policy Forum May 2002
THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE EURO Policy paper 1. Introduction: Czech Republic and Euro The analysis of the accession of the Czech Republic to the Eurozone (EMU) will deal above all with two closely interconnected
CIO Markets Report. Key Observations Implications Markets Charts. Stephen Sexauer, CIO. CIO Markets Report
Key Observations Implications Markets Charts Key Observations and Implications 1. 2017 Eurozone Votes Loom. There are three key Eurozone elections in 2017: The Netherlands, France, and Germany. Table 1
After the crisis: what new lessons for euro adoption?
After the crisis: what new lessons for euro adoption? Zsolt Darvas Croatian Parliament 15 November 2017, Zagreb Background and questions Among the first 15 EU member states, Mediterranean countries experienced
Chapter 20. Preview. What Is the EU? Optimum Currency Areas and the European Experience
Chapter 20 Optimum Currency Areas and the European Experience Slides prepared by Thomas Bishop Copyright 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Preview The European Union The European Monetary
After the Brits Have Gone? Turning a Drama into A Crisis That Will Not Go to Waste.
After the Brits Have Gone? Turning a Drama into A Crisis That Will Not Go to Waste. Intereconomics Conference, Berlin 10/10/16 Mark Blyth Eastman Professor of Political Economy The Watson Institute for
Axel A Weber: A central banker's interest in Phillips curves
Axel A Weber: A central banker's interest in Phillips curves Speech by Professor Axel A Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the Symposium on "The Phillips Curve and the Natural Rate of Unemployment"
Influencing Expectations in the Conduct of Monetary Policy
Influencing Expectations in the Conduct of Monetary Policy 2014 Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Conference: Monetary Policy in a Post-Financial Crisis Era Tokyo, Japan May 28,
Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past Present and Future
Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past Present and Future Alex Cukierman February 2 2006 First version: September 22 2005 1 Introduction Twenty years ago and earlier most
Game theory and applications: Lecture 12
Game theory and applications: Lecture 12 Adam Szeidl December 6, 2018 Outline for today 1 A political theory of populism 2 Game theory in economics 1 / 12 1. A Political Theory of Populism Acemoglu, Egorov
Wage Rigidity and Spatial Misallocation: Evidence from Italy and Germany
Wage Rigidity and Spatial Misallocation: Evidence from Italy and Germany Tito Boeri 1 Andrea Ichino 2 Enrico Moretti 3 Johanna Posch 2 1 Bocconi 2 European University Institute 3 Berkeley 10 April 2018
Université catholique de Louvain, London School of Economic (affiliate) European Doctoral Program in Quantitative Economics
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE Department of Economics Placement Officer: Professor Wouter Den Haan +44 (0)20 7955 7669 w.denhaan@lse.ac.uk Placement Assistant: Mr John Curtis +44 (0)20
The monetary policy of the European Central Bank is too conservative. Discussion.
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive The monetary policy of the European Central Bank is too conservative. Discussion. Mico, Apostolov College of Europe 01. October 2005 Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6543/
There are four major traditions of thinking about the history of monetary union:
Monetary Union and the Single Currency May 1, 2009 EU Workshop Princeton University Harold James This short note first examines the best way of conceptualizing the story of European integration, but also
The Eurozone s macroeconomic framework
Growth and Prosperity Jean Pisani-Ferry Discussions on the Eurozone s macroeconomic framework have been going on since the preparations for the Maastricht negotiations in 1989. Fifteen years later, and
Six Theses about Contemporary Populism. Peter A. Hall Harvard University GEM Conference, April
Six Theses about Contemporary Populism Peter A. Hall Harvard University GEM Conference, April 19 2017 1. Where populist causes or candidates win, it is always on the back of a broad electoral coalition
Hawks and Doves: Deeds and Words
Hawks and Doves: Deeds and Words Economics and Politics of Monetary Policymaking February 2018 Edited by Sylvester Eijffinger and Donato Masciandaro A VoxEU.org Book CEPR Press Hawks and Doves: Deeds and
Paradigms Shifts and Major Economic Institutions
Paradigms Shifts and Major Economic Institutions NAEC Group OECD, Paris 13 September 2018 Laurie Macfarlane Laurie Laybourn-Langton Michael Jacobs Agenda 1. Introduction 2. Political-economic paradigms
Public finances, efficiency and equity: what are the trade-offs?
Lars Jonung, DG ECFIN, Public finances, efficiency and equity: what are the trade-offs? Brussels 12 November 2004. Comments on: 1. Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuknecht: Reforming Public Expenditure in Industrialised
Mark Allen. The Financial Crisis and Emerging Europe: What Happened and What s Next? Senior IMF Resident Representative for Central and Eastern Europe
The Financial Crisis and Emerging Europe: What Happened and What s Next? Seminar with Romanian Trade Unions Bucharest, November 2, 21 Mark Allen Senior IMF Resident Representative for Central and Eastern
Regional Wage Differentiation and Wage Bargaining Systems in the EU
WP/08/43 Regional Wage Differentiation and Wage Bargaining Systems in the EU Athanasios Vamvakidis 2008 International Monetary Fund WP/08/43 IMF Working Paper European Department Regional Wage Differentiation
Jens Weidmann: Fiscal and monetary policy dancing too close?
Jens Weidmann: Fiscal and monetary policy dancing too close? Speech by Dr Jens Weidmann, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Paris, 25 January 2013. * * *
The North Wind Doth Blow: U.S. Recession Brings Turbulence to the Mexican Economy Presented to: Maquiladora Industry Outlook Conference May 16, 2008
The North Wind Doth Blow: U.S. Recession Brings Turbulence to the Mexican Economy Presented to: Maquiladora Industry Outlook Conference May 16, 2008 Presented by: Rafael Amiel, Ph.D. Managing Director,
The Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Institutions
The Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Institutions 1 The Problem of Debt: The Game of Banks government guarantees bank debts banks keep the winnings, tax payers keep the losses so banks want to
For progressive candidates in the upcoming federal elections in September, DiEM25 has the following eight proposals.
German elections 2017 8 proposals for Germany s Progressives Introduction Germany is pivotal. It is, and ought to be, a country central to the European project. But this project is in trouble because of
The Monetary Dialogue and Accountability for the ECB
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY The Monetary Dialogue and Accountability for the ECB NOTE Abstract Over the past five years, the Parliament
Money Deficits and Inflation Evidence and Policy Issues of Euro Zone during Debt Crisis
Money Deficits and Inflation Evidence and Policy Issues of Euro Zone during Debt Crisis Dr. Stamatis Kontsas Adjunct Professor, Technological Education Institute of Western Macedonia, Department of Business
Party Ideology and Policies
Party Ideology and Policies Matteo Cervellati University of Bologna Giorgio Gulino University of Bergamo March 31, 2017 Paolo Roberti University of Bologna Abstract We plan to study the relationship between
3 Wage adjustment and employment in Europe: some results from the Wage Dynamics Network Survey
3 Wage adjustment and in Europe: some results from the Wage Dynamics Network Survey This box examines the link between collective bargaining arrangements, downward wage rigidities and. Several past studies
The first eleven years of Finland's EU-membership
1 (7) Sinikka Salo 16 January 2006 Member of the Board The first eleven years of Finland's EU-membership Remarks by Ms Sinikka Salo in the Panel "The Austrian and Finnish EU-Presidencies: Positive Experiences
François Villeroy de Galhau: What are the economic prospects for the euro area?
François Villeroy de Galhau: What are the economic prospects for the euro area? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Conference at LUISS University, Rome, 29
Centre for Economic Policy Research Center for Economic Studies Maison des Sciences de l'homme
Centre for Economic Policy Research Center for Economic Studies Maison des Sciences de l'homme Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries Author(s): Vittorio
The Social State of the Union
The Social State of the Union Prof. Maria Karamessini, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece President and Governor of the Public Employment Agency of Greece EuroMemo Group
The European Central Bank and the Euro: The First Year
The European Central Bank and the Euro: The First Year The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation Published Version
Central Bank Independence and its Role During Financial and Economic Crises
Central Bank Independence and its Role During Financial and Economic Crises Dr. Shamsuddeen Usman Chairman/CEO Susman& Associates A Lead Presentation at the Symposium at the 38 th Ordinary Meeting of the
Being a Good Samaritan or just a politician? Empirical evidence of disaster assistance. Jeroen Klomp
Being a Good Samaritan or just a politician? Empirical evidence of disaster assistance Jeroen Klomp Netherlands Defence Academy & Wageningen University and Research The Netherlands Introduction Since 1970
Is the ECB sufficiently accountable and transparent?
EUROPEAN NETWORK OF ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTES WORKING PAPER NO. 7/SEPTEMBER 2001 Is the ECB sufficiently accountable and transparent? Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi and Daniel Gros ISBN 92-9079-343-0 Copyright
The economic crisis in the low income CIS: fiscal consequences and policy responses. Sudharshan Canagarajah World Bank June 2010
The economic crisis in the low income CIS: fiscal consequences and policy responses Sudharshan Canagarajah World Bank June 2010 Issues addressed by this presentation 1. Nature and causes of the crisis
The Greek crisis effects on the Albanian economy
The Greek crisis effects on the Albanian economy MSc. Veronika Durmishi, (PhD Candidate) University Pavarësia Vlorë, Albania MSc. Valbona Gjini, (PhD Candidate) University Ismail Qemali Vlore, Albania
Western Balkans Countries In Focus Of Global Economic Crisis
Economy Transdisciplinarity Cognition www.ugb.ro/etc Vol. XIV, Issue 1/2011 176-186 Western Balkans Countries In Focus Of Global Economic Crisis ENGJELL PERE European University of Tirana engjell.pere@uet.edu.al
OPENING ADDRESS DELIVERED THE 2017 CONTINENTAL SEMINAR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN CENTRAL BANKS (AACB) SECOND DEPUTY GOVERNOR, BANK OF GHANA
OPENING ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE 2017 CONTINENTAL SEMINAR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN CENTRAL BANKS (AACB) BY DR JOHNSON P. ASIAMA SECOND DEPUTY GOVERNOR, BANK OF GHANA THEME: CREDIBLE COMMUNICATION
Textbooks: The course will rely on two required textbooks in addition to the assigned articles and books:
Romain Wacziarg Winter Quarter 2003 February 2003 POLECON 686 POLITICAL MACROECONOMICS This Ph.D. level course covers research in positive political economy with special emphasis on macroeconomic aspects.
Governments unable to make credible promises hinder economic development and effective
American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 3 August 2003 The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy PHILIP KEEFER The World Bank DAVID
Does Political Business Cycle exist in India? By
Does Political Business Cycle exist in India? By Ashok K Nag* Extended Abstract There exists a vast literature inquiring and modelling the nexus between politics and macroeconomic policy making. Mostly
Communicating a Systematic Monetary Policy
Communicating a Systematic Monetary Policy Society of American Business Editors and Writers Fall Conference City University of New York (CUNY) Graduate School of Journalism New York, NY October 10, 2014
GOING ALONE UK TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION - AN EXPAT SAVINGS TEAM UPDATE. Going alone - UK to leave the European Union
GOING ALONE UK TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION - 1 GOING ALONE UK TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION - Introduction 3 More questions than answers 4 What happened / Market reaction 5 Outlook 6 Politics is a growing
Coordination Through the Crisis: The State of Research on Coordinated Wage-Setting and the Social Partnership
CANADA-EUROPE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE: SEEKING TRANSNATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO 21ST CENTURY PROBLEMS http://www.canada-europe-dialogue August 2012 Literature Review and Comment Coordination Through the Crisis:
Reflections on Americans Views of the Euro Ex Ante. I am pleased to participate in this session on the 10 th anniversary
Reflections on Americans Views of the Euro Ex Ante Martin Feldstein I am pleased to participate in this session on the 10 th anniversary of the start of the Euro and the European Economic and Monetary
MYPLACE THEMATIC REPORT: POLITICAL ACTIVISM
MYPLACE THEMATIC REPORT POLITICAL ACTIVISM MYPLACE: Aims and Objectives The central research question addressed by the MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy & Civic Engagement) Project is: How is young
A Political Economy Theory of Populism and Discrimination
A Political Economy Theory of Populism and Discrimination Gilles Saint-Paul (PSE & NYUAD) Davide Ticchi (IMT Lucca) Andrea Vindigni (IMT Lucca) May 30, 2014 Gilles Saint-Paul (PSE & NYUAD), Davide Ticchi
Economic Voting Theory. Lidia Núñez CEVIPOL_Université Libre de Bruxelles
Economic Voting Theory Lidia Núñez CEVIPOL_Université Libre de Bruxelles In the media.. «Election Forecast Models Clouded by Economy s Slow Growth» Bloomberg, September 12, 2012 «Economics still underpin
The EMU: A Challenging Goal for the New Member States of the European Union?
meow From the SelectedWorks of Roberta De Santis 2007 The EMU: A Challenging Goal for the New Member States of the European Union? roberta De Santis Available at: https://works.bepress.com/roberta_de_santis/6/
CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION AND MONETARY POLICY CREDIBILITY PROF. PETER QUARTEY (HEAD, DEPT. OF ECONOMICS, UG)
CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION AND MONETARY POLICY CREDIBILITY BY PROF. PETER QUARTEY (HEAD, DEPT. OF ECONOMICS, UG) OUTLINE Introduction Effective communication strategies Central bank communication and monetary
Externalities, Institutions and Public Perception - The Political Economy of European Integration Revisited
Externalities, Institutions and Public Perception - The Political Economy of European Integration Revisited Hans Peter Grüner Moving closer rather than drifting apart: Challenges to economic integration
Global trade in the aftermath of the global crisis
Global trade in the aftermath of the global crisis Jeffry Frieden Harvard University Re-balancing global trade will be difficult, generating substantial protectionist pressures. To manage these pressures,
ETUC Mid-Term Conference Rome, May 2017 THE ETUC ROME DECLARATION
ETUC Mid-Term Conference Rome, 29-31 May 2017 THE ETUC ROME DECLARATION Declaration adopted at the ETUC Mid-Term Conference in Rome on 29-31 May 2017. It is ten years since the financial crisis of 2007-2008.