Hybrid Governance Structures for Quality Farm Products

Transcription

1 Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources Institutioneller Wandel der Landwirtschaft und Ressourcennutzung edited by/herausgegeben von Volker Beckmann & Konrad Hagedorn Volume/Band 6 IngridVerhaegen Guido Van Huylenbroeck Hybrid Governance Structures for Quality Farm Products A Transaction Cost Perspective Shaker Verlag Aachen 2002

2 List of Figures List of Tables xvii xix 1 Introduction Changes in food consumption, agriculture and rural policy The development of quality farm products supply channels A classification of Belgian supply channels for quality farm foods Research questions Methodology Structure of the book 8 2 Transaction Costs Economics Introduction New Institutional Economics Transaction Costs Economics Coase and the firm as governance structure Organisational Failures Framework of Williamson Characterising transactions Other fields of application and a criticism Alignment of transactions with governance structures Characterising governance structures The governance of transactions Transaction costs Characterising transactions Asset specificity Uncertainty Frequency Characterising governance structures Incentive intensity and administrative controls Adaptation mechanism 26

3 x Contracts Governance structures characterised Cost minimising alignment between transactions and governance structures Asset specificity and choice of governance structure Frequency and uncertainty, and choice of governance structure Empirical applications Critical reflections on TCE Conclusion 37 3 Governance Structures of Six Quality Food Supply Channels Introduction Farmers' markets Description of the initiative and its objectives Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity Assets invested by the central authority Assets invested by the farmers Characterisation of the governance structure The authority and the distribution of decision power Incentive intensity Adaptation mechanisms Contracts Appropriateness of the governance structure Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance Comparison with other governance structures Conclusion Foodteams Description of the initiative and its objectives Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity Assets invested by the local foodteam and the central regional structure 52

4 xi Assets invested by consumers and farmers Characterisation of the governance structure The authority and the distribution of decision power Incentive intensity Adaptation mechanism Contracts Appropriateness of the governance structure Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance Comparison with other governance structures Conclusion Produits de Qualite d'autrefois Description of the initiative and its objectives Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity Assets invested by the cattle merchant and the co-operative Assets invested by the farmers and butchers Characterisation of the governance structure The authority and the distribution of decision power Incentive intensity Adaptation mechanism Contracts Appropriateness of the governance structure Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance Comparison with other governance structures Conclusion Fruitnet Description of the initiative and its objectives Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity Assets invested by the organisation Fruitnet Assets invested by the farmers Characterisation of the governance structure 74

5 xii The authority and the distribution of decision power Incentive intensity Adaptation mechanisms Contracts Appropriateness of the governance structure Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance Comparison with other governance structures Conclusion Fermiere de Mean Description of the initiative and its objectives Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity Assets invested by the co-operative Fermiere de Mean Assets invested by the farmers Characterisation of the governance structure Authority and the distribution of decision power Incentive intensity Adaptation mechanisms Contracts Appropriateness of the governance structure Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance Comparison with other governance structures Conclusion Coprosain Description of the initiative and its objectives Characterisation of the transaction: asset specificity Assets invested by Coprosain Assets invested by the farmers Characterisation of the governance structure The authority and distribution of decision power Incentive intensity 92

6 xiii Adaptation mechanism Contracts Appropriateness of the governance structure Cost economies realised in comparison with market governance Comparison with other governance structures Conclusion Conclusions 96 4 Classification of Hybrid Governance Structures Introduction Theory and literature about hybrid governance structures Defining hybrid governance structures Classification of hybrid governance structures The six case studies: three types of hybrid governance structures Testing and further defining the classification system Testing of the classification system Distinction between market, hybrid and internal governance Importance of the quality objectives for the classification The characteristics of framework, co-ordinating and participating governance Framework governance Co-ordinating governance Participating governance Classifying governance structures and determining the appropriate governance structure Classifying the applied governance structure Evaluating the applied governance structure Application of this model to the 6 case studies and 12 test initiatives Conclusion 133

7 xiv 5 Comparative Cost-benefit Analysis for Farmers Participating in Supply Channels for Quality Farm Products Introduction A theoretical frame for the comparative cost-benefit analysis of supply channels Comparative cost-benefit analysis of six innovative supply channels Comparison with the common supply channel Revenues Direct costs Transaction costs Uncertainty Global analysis Comparison with individual direct sale of farm products Revenues Direct costs Transaction costs Uncertainty Global analysis Conclusion Conclusions Conclusions about Transaction Costs Economics Governance structures for production and supply of quality farm products Classification of hybrid governance structures Application of TCE to analyse governance and profitability of supply channels Lessons from the use of the TCE as analysis framework Conclusions about supply channels for quality foods Governance of innovative supply channels The profitability of such quality assurance systems Lessons for the food sector Policy implications 162

8 xv Possible government intervention 163 References 167