South Africa as a Regional Power: Multiple Audiences, One Foreign Policy?
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1 Jakkie Cilliers and Paul-Simon Handy South Africa as a Regional Power: Multiple Audiences, One Foreign Policy? JAKKIE CILLIERS is the Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria PAUL-SIMON HANDY is the Research Director of the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria In recent years, South Africa has played an increasingly prominent international role. Be it in its direct neighborhood, on the continent or beyond the country s foreign and security policy has tried to balance a myriad of interests and expectations to which the Zuma administration has recently added a domestic dimension 1. Since the demise of apartheid and the first democratic elections in 1994, which saw South Africa s emergence into the African and international scene, the country was considered as the African regional power par excellence that would help bring some order in an African continent disrupted by conflicts. Although this expectation was mainly expressed by Western countries, South Africa itself embraced this role of regional leadership 2 and saw itself, although with variations, as the country that would take the lead in providing order and stability in Africa. The country s recent admission in the informal group of emerging powers known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and its re-election into the UN Security Council in December 2010 after only two years interval are some indicators of regional and international expectations on South Africa as an African regional power 3. The leadership change in the African National Congress (ANC) and the subsequent election of President Zuma as the country s president in 2009 have sparked a debate about South Africa s capacity to attend to this variety of international, regional and domestic pressures. In a context of global financial and economic crisis in which growth is shrinking and unemployment on the rise, calls for a prioritization of domestic policy issues were expressed, sometimes underlined by the perception that previous administrations were disproportionally focusing on foreign policy and security matters at the expense of internal challenges. Against this background, this paper attempts to identify the roles and factors that characterize South Africa s positioning as a regional power in Africa and beyond. The paper suggests that the growing international demand for a South 56 The authors are grateful to Stine Moeller Kjeldgaard for her invaluable assistance. 1 Elected on a platform of job creation and service delivery, President Zuma has promised to link foreign policy more closely to the national interest. On the difficulties of implementing the national interest see C. LANDSBERG, The foreign policy of the Zuma government: pursuing the national interest?, in «South Africa Journal of International Affairs», 17, 3, There is admittedly a conceptual inflation in the empirical literature regarding a core group of states generally considered as emerging states. They are invariably referred to a as regional hegemons, anchor states, emerging middle-powers, regional leaders or regional big powers. Although abundantly used in the literature, these concepts remain poorly-defined and hardly lend themselves to comparison. For an interesting account of the deficit in the literature on regional powers, see M. PRYS, The variability of regional powers, in «International Studies Review», 12, 4, It should be added that South Africa is also currently member of the African Union s Peace and Security Council, the only African country admitted in the G20, member of the informal South-South grouping known as IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) and is set to host the next round of international climate negotiations (COP17) in Durban end 2011.
2 South Africa as a Regional Power: Multiple Audiences, One Foreign Policy? African leadership role in Africa and on broader international matters are faced with both regional resistance and high domestic pressures to prioritize internal issues, thus creating a tension between international ambitions, regional rivalries and domestic capacities. This tension is particularly evident in South Africa s long-term agenda to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its perceived withdrawal from or more timid stance on peace and security issues in Africa. The paper concludes by indicating that the peculiarities of the African region that South Africa seems to perceive as its most important constituency, linked with a perceived lack of strategic direction and leadership in the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation account for inconsistencies in embracing the different layers of expectations placed on South Africa s foreign and security policy to assume a consensual leadership in the continent. The Global Shift in Power and the Role of Regional Powers The current balance of power in the international system is moving towards what can be characterized as interpolarity 4 that is interdependent multipolarity. Interpolarity reflects, on the one hand, a return to multiple centres of power across the world. Much has been written about the current shift in the balance of power with the relative decline of the US and the West and the relative rise of China and the Rest 5. This is becoming increasingly evident, most especially in terms of the growing importance attached to the G20 compared to the declining influence of the G7/8 6. What is of importance here is that the current development towards multipolarity does not only imply a decentralisation of power but also a fundamental change in how the international system operates. To use the neorealist s terminology as a point of departure the current systemic pressure from the remaining superpower (United States) and the other great powers (especially China) towards new emerging powers is less direct, more diverse, heterogeneous and complex in sum: all but determining. This gives leeway to more autonomy at the regional level for new emerging powers 7. As indicated later on this paper, a structuring factor for new emerging powers is precisely that they should also be considered as regional powers in what is supposed to be their 4 Revision of Giovanni Grevi s use of the term. G. GREVI, The interpolar world: a new scenario, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper, 79, This shift has been accelerated by the economic excesses in the US that eventually led to a recession in many developed world economies whilst growth in developing economies such as China spluttered but remained robust. The United States omnipotence is declining at a more rapid rate than anyone could have predicted and change is palpably in the air. 6 Whereas the contribution of the original G7 to the global economy has dropped to around 50 percent, that of the G20 reflects roughly 88 per cent of the global GDP. J. CILLIERS - B. HUGHES - J. MOYER, African Futures 2050: The Next Forty Years, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 175, The literature on the trend towards regionalisation since the end of the Cold War is also comprehensive. See for example B. Buzan and O. Waever Regional security complex theory which is based on the fundamental assumption that «Without superpower rivalry intruding obsessively into all regions local powers have more room for manoeuvre». B. BUZAN - O. WAEVER, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge
3 immediate environment: India in South-Eastern Asia, Brazil in Latin America, Russia in Eastern Europe and South Africa in Africa 8. On the other hand, interpolarity reflects that the world is becoming more interdependent than ever before through trade, financial systems, energy interdependence and global communication systems. Accelerated processes of globalisation and complex economic interdependence are impacting upon global relations to an unprecedented degree with global trade growth outstripping growths in global GDP by a substantial margin. Multiple commercial ties now bind countries together in an era where trade politics and currency manipulation are more important than the number of battleships and aircraft carriers. The flux in the international system can lead to either increased cooperative or competitive behaviour between major emerging powers. The emergence of multiple centres of power already complicates the conduct of international relations and demands both greater leadership from key countries and legitimacy from existing institutions. The greater complexity of this hot, flat and crowded world (to use Thomas L. Friedman useful characterisation) also complicates the conduct of conceptualisation. Policy makers and theory makers face similar challenges. Without delving into the details of the theoretical debate, it is argued in this paper that a combination of material (hard power) and ideational power (soft power) has to be available for a country to claim a regional or even global power status. For the purpose of this analysis, Flemes regional power typology therefore appears interesting as it identifies criteria that critically reflect the behavior and foreign relations of South Africa and other similar regional powers 9. According to the author, 4 major criteria distinguish regional powers from their peers or competitors. These are: claim to leadership, material and soft power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments and acceptance of leadership. As far as claim to leadership is concerned, post-apartheid South Africa painstakingly avoids taking an open leadership stance in its immediate sphere of influence due to the historical legacy of the apartheid regime that was perceived as aggressive in the Southern African region. However, Pretoria s activism in economic and trade policies and its positioning as the representative of Africa and the South in international fora indicate a more explicit claim to a kind of leadership that is morally and symbolically grounded in the country s experience of peaceful democratic transition 10. However, South Africa s claim to a leadership role is not always by design The emergence of multiple centres of power already complicates the conduct of international relations and demands both greater leadership from key countries and legitimacy from existing institutions 58 8 Along the same lines Schoeman argues that the difference between traditional international middle powers (such as Canada and the Netherlands) and the new emerging powers are that the latter are also regional great powers. M. SCHOEMAN, South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power, in «African Security Review» 9, 3, 2000 and Idem, South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, Hegemon, Partner or Just Another Kid on the Block?, Conference Paper, Cape Town, July D. FLEMES, Regional power South Africa: Co-operative Hegemony Constrained by Historical Legacy, in «Journal of Contemporary African Studies», 27, 2, Started during the Mandela years (characterized by a demonstrated commitment to the promotion of Human Rights in Africa and the World), South Africa s soft claim to regional and to a certain extent
4 South Africa as a Regional Power: Multiple Audiences, One Foreign Policy? but sometimes the outcome of an acute vacuum in Africa. In fact, before South Africa s emergence in the African scene, no African country was perceived both in and outside the continent as having the potential to take a leadership role. Regarding material and ideational power resources Pretoria appears to be the uncontested African giant. The country s economic pre-eminence is characterized by its strong GDP (almost a quarter of African GDP). South Africa has the most advanced and biggest economy on the continent in addition to a wealth of political and economical stability that makes the country more attractive than its regional competitors. In military terms, and despite a steady deterioration of the country s defense architecture, South Africa remains the best-equipped, selfsustained and capable military in the continent. A recent analysis published by the Institute for Security Studies found, however, that over the longer term Pretoria s stance in Africa is declining. Taking into account four dimensions of aggregate material power 11, Cilliers et al. conclude that the African countries with the largest growth potential on multiple dimensions are (in declining order): Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa 12. These African Four or A4 have the greatest material potential to guide African development in the decades to come although Egypt is understandably more focused on the Middle East than on Africa. Two countries from East Africa (Uganda and Tanzania) and one country in Central Africa (the Democratic Republic of Congo) will also have increased their relative material power (largely on the back of the massive population growth that both will experience), but will not be in the league of the A4. Others, such as Libya, Morocco and Algeria, will either lose relative power or retain their current position. However and maybe more importantly, as evidenced by the empirical observation of emerging economies, economic and military preeminence are not sufficient variables to claim regional power status and to exert influence. This is where the power of ideational resources comes into play in framing the identity and the actor s quality of a regional power. More than material and hard power resources, the most important dimension of South Africa s domination in Africa comes from its ideational resources or soft power. This is vividly demonstrated by the fact that South Africa, on the one hand, lags behind the 3 others of the A4 in terms of contributing military and police to United Nations operations 13 and, on the other hand, is the only African country even inglobal leadership (Non-Aligned Movement and South-South cooperation) took a more decisive and structured stance under his successor Mbeki who actively positioned Pretoria as leader in the debate over the reform of international institutions. See J. VAN DER WESTHUIZEN, Still a Twinkling Star? Identity and Change in South Africa s Foreign Policy, in «The Future of South Africa s Foreign Policy: Continuity or Change?», Institute for Global Dialogue, In calculating material power, International Futures (IF) looks to population size (weight of 0.8), GDP per capita at PPP (weight of 1.1), a technology proxy involving GDP per capita and population (weight 0.3) and military spending (weight of 0.9). J. CILLIERS - B. HUGHES - J. MOYER, African Futures 2050, cit. IF s current determination of these elements and weights has roots in the general approach of the Correlates of War project. 12 Projections of current economic data suggest that Egypt will overtake South Africa in 2014 and Nigeria in 2026 as the Africa s largest economy. Ibidem. 13 Nigeria is ranking 4 in the world (5,831 troops) followed by Egypt ranking 5 (5,384 troops), Ethiopia ranking 11 (2,431 troops) and South Africa ranking 14 (2,174 troops), 59
5 cluded in a recent study of countries with the highest amount of soft power resources (ranking 20 in the world) 14. As an advocate of human rights and democracy promotion in Africa and the world, South Africa has crafted a foreign policy identity as good global citizen that has manifested itself in the country s role in disarmament, non-proliferation of arms (including nuclear arms), the promotion of dialogue and institutions for problem-solving and conflict resolution 15. In addition to the country s symbolic significance, a crucial aspect of its dynamic ideational power lies in what might be termed its ideational or soft power infrastructure. In fact South-Africa s universities are ranked at the top end of Africa s universities and its research capacities widely outpace its African competitors capacities. Also, due to the democratic nature of its society, South Africa hosts the highest number of think tanks in the continent and by far the most influential 16. This was particularly manifest under President Mbeki who championed the concept of African renaissance into the African political discourse and practice. The political transition in South Africa, its iconic first president, Nelson Mandela and the strength of its civil society allowed South Africa to transcend its peers, gain a position at the G20 and position itself as a leading contender for a seat at a reformed UN Security Council this despite the fact that Africa will get increasingly multipolar and that South Africa will probably lose its status as the largest economy in the future. No single country will emerge as undisputed heavyweight in Africa, able to command continental leadership but through its membership of the G20, IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum), BRICS, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) and the like, South Africa has carved out a unique leadership role vastly in excess of its material power base. As the table below demonstrates South Africa s inclusion in the BRICS is not derived from a material power base that is comparable with the other members. Relative to the BRIC-countries, the South African economy is much smaller, with Mexico and South Korea more viable additions according to the authors of the Goldman Sachs report who first coined the acronym 17. However, size is not everything. China outstrips the size of Russia and India by the same margin (four times) that they outstrip South Africa. The situation on a GDP per capita More than material and hard power resources, the most important dimension of South Africa s domination in Africa comes from its ideational resources or soft power The Soft Power Index includes the following variables: Business/Innovation, Culture, Government, Diplomacy and Education. See J. MCCLORY, The New Persuaders: An International Ranking of Soft Power, Institute for Government, M. SCHOEMAN, South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, Hegemon, Partner or Just Another Kid on the Block?, cit. 16 South Africa has 83 think tanks whereas the next country in line is Kenya with 53 think tanks. Besides the top 7 of think tanks in Sub-Saharan Africa is all located in South Africa. J.G. MCGANN, Go-Think Tanks The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations in the World, Philadelphia Mexico and South Korea are respectively the world s 13 th and 15 th largest economies, while South Africa is the 32 nd position. For more on this points see J. CILLIERS et al., South Africa s Second Term at the UN Security Council: Managing Expectations, Institute for Security Studies, 2010.
6 South Africa as a Regional Power: Multiple Audiences, One Foreign Policy? Table 1 The BRIC(S) countries in contrast Country/ Brazil Russia India China South Variable Africa Population 194,9 141, (millions) GDP (US$ bn) Real GDP growth (%) GDP per capita (US$ at PPP) Recorded 5,9 6, ,9 unemployment (%) Total contribution to UN operations Military + Police) World ranking Soft Power World ranking Source: Authors compilation from «Economist Intelligence Unit», J. MC CLORY, The New Persuaders: An International Ranking of Soft Power, cit., and contributors/2011. basis is more favorable for South Africa, however. In comparison with both Mexico and South Korea, South Africa is still perceived as the gateway to Africa in economic terms and politically, brings the legitimacy of a continent with it. As the table shows soft power is a more useful variable on the basis of which the BRIC countries can be compared. The use of foreign policy instruments to foster a regional leadership role has been a key feature of Pretoria s diplomacy in Africa. As the country aspires to be a permanent member of a reformed UN Security Council, Pretoria resorts to a wide range of foreign policy and security instruments to demonstrate its capacity to take responsibility on the regional and the international scenes. The creation of the African Union (AU) from the ashes of a widely non-functional Organization of African Unity (OAU) was partly the product of South Africa s ac- 61
7 tivist promotion of regional institutions on the basis of what Pretoria s diplomacy names the African agenda. Based on Mbeki s transformational and developmental African renaissance strategy, the African agenda also ushered into Pretoria s contribution to the creation of the New Partnership for Africa s Development (NEPAD). The prominent role played by Pretoria in Africa s peace support operations with substantial contributions to peacekeeping and mediation has to be understood against this background. South Africa s foreign policy choice to project influence by ways of multilateral institutions both at the regional and the international levels reflects what Flemes calls a strategy of cooperative hegemony 18. If this is how South Africa s role should be understood in the African continent where material power and historical legacy constraint its foreign policy, the concept does not necessarily holds water at the international level. By focusing on South-South coalitions (BRIC, IBSA, NAM) to bring forward its transformational agenda coupled with geo-economic considerations, South Africa rather seems to opt for minilateralism in regards to its engagements with other regional powers. The policy cooperation of for example the BRICS should initially not be overstated. At first glance, it continues to be an economic talking club that can only coordinate policies on an ad hoc basis. This is probably due to a large degree of heterogeneity both in economic size (see table 1) and foreign policy interests on a number of issues i.e. UNSC-reform, where China and Russia already have a permanent seat. The acceptance of leadership or the extent to which a regional power s authority is accepted as legitimate and responsible is a much more complex criteria with regards to South Africa s foreign and security policy. As mentioned above, hard power factors naturally position the country as an African hegemon for the time being, which is however constrained by its own historical legacy in the region and its ambition to lead by example and not more by coercion. However, Southern African countries that were involved in the fight against apartheid (frontline states) consider that South Africa owes them an important debt that in their view should translate into benevolent assistance. The articulation and negotiation of Pretoria s interests in such a context make it difficult for the country s leadership to use coercion in order to persuade friendly regimes in Southern Africa 19. In the rest of the continent, South Africa clearly remains considered as the African power but still has to deal with perceptions of a neo-liberal actor that seeks to promote its own business interests. Rivalries with other emerging African powers like Nigeria and Egypt who have clear ambition to play a greater role in Africa and the world also constraint Pretoria s room of maneuver and therefore its acceptance as a regional power. The dilemma faced by South Africa in Africa was epitomized by an observation of a Nigerian foreign minister referring to South Africa as a «white country with a black president» D. FLEMES, Regional power South Africa, cit. 19 This factor is particularly important given the fact that a great portion of Southern African countries is led by former liberation movements whose leaders are linked by a strong friendship and solidarity, built during the years of oppression. Pretoria s difficulties in adopting a bolder human rights stance against the government of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe has often been interpreted under this light.
8 South Africa as a Regional Power: Multiple Audiences, One Foreign Policy? South Africa s reluctance to be perceived as playing the game of Western countries in Africa, which Pretoria still considers as its prime constituency when it comes to engagements with international actors, can be explained by this dilemma. But in general, the attraction that South Africa exerts among African elites and migrants as a destination country, the high standards of living it offers speak for a wide appreciation of the South African model. Zuma s Burden: Driving Foreign Policy in Difficult Times When Jacob Zuma took over the ANC and the country s presidency from Thabo Mbeki in 2009 after a short intermezzo of Kgalema Mothlante he inherited a foreign policy apparatus that appeared as one of the strongest policy areas of post-apartheid South Africa. Paradoxically, Mbeki s success in this area partly set the ground for the deterioration of his popularity within the ruling ANC and the country at large. Beki s Legacy: a Respected Regional Power There has been much debate in South Africa about Mbeki s legacy after the symbolic presidency of Nelson Mandela. As historians still struggle to find the most appropriate storylines, it appears that the design and conduct of a postapartheid foreign policy as well as the positioning of South Africa as a legitimate African regional power will probably appear as the strongest legacy of Thabo Mbeki. Considered as a foreign policy president Mbeki spent a substantial amount of time dealing with external relations of regional and global significance. Conceptually underpinned by the concept of African Renaissance that he forged before assuming power in 1999 and epitomized by the slogan of «African solutions to African problems» Mbeki considered that it was time for Africa to take its fate in its own hands and stop being the object of great power politics. These beliefs and ideological posture found their material manifestation in the construction of what South African policy makers call the African Agenda. Probably the most important pillar of South African foreign policy, the African agenda is the reflection of the Mbeki administration s continentalism that sought to promote a new continental order through institutionalism and multilateralism 20. It is under this banner that Mbeki s government used the country s material and ideational resources to launch a certain number of developmental and transformative initiatives in the continent that were aimed at going beyond the usual liberation rhetoric. The launch of NEPAD in 2001 can be considered as the materialization of the African Renaissance vision. This comprehensive and African modernization strategy was the first continental en- 20 For a current and well researched account of South African foreign policy identities from de Klerk to Zuma, see C. LANDSBERG, The Diplomacy of Transformation: South African Foreign Policy and Statecraft, Johannesburg
9 deavor that the country launched in cooperation and negotiation with other like-minded African countries 21. Also, South Africa s key contribution in the creation of the AU in 2002 should be seen as the manifestation of Mbeki s belief in continental institutions as key pillars of the continent s development. The design and promotion of common institutions, norms and values that would drive Africa s and the world s development was a central concern of the Mbeki administration. Although the focus placed on institutions could reduce South Africa s room of maneuver as a single actor, the country expects return in investment in the form of greater collaboration between states on the basis of accepted norms 22. The area in which Mbeki s foreign policy has probably had the biggest impact in positioning South Africa as a regional power is peace and security. By taking up the challenge of addressing Africa s destructive conflicts and investing a huge amount of the country s material and human resources to conflict management and resolution, the Mbeki administration followed a two-pronged strategy: the first dimension consisted in implementing the slogan of African solutions to African problems by showing responsibility and positioning the country as a mature candidate for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Another dimension of this strategy consisted in reassuring its African partners by managing perceptions about South Africa s peacemaking role. In engaging in conflict situations in Africa, South Africa s most favored approach appeared to be the one of negotiated settlements brokered between belligerents in view of sharing power in the framework of a government of national unity. This strategy that, in the case of mass violations of human rights, resembles dogmatic pacifism, has attracted much criticism in cases like Zimbabwe and has cast some doubt about South Africa s willingness to look beyond its own experience of democratic transition. If Africa was the traditional terrain of South Africa s foreign policy under Mbeki, the latter also considered the transformation of institutions of global governance through multilateralism as a key priority. In Mbeki s foreign policy role conception, multilateralism was the driver of the reformist profile he gave to his foreign policy with the ambitious agenda to transform international institutions 23. Convinced that the international system was the transposition at the global level of the apartheid system that prevailed in the country for many decades, the Mbeki s administration saw in its commitment to global gover- The design and promotion of common institutions, norms and values that would drive Africa s and the world s development was a central concern of the Mbeki administration NEPAD is the outcome of a patient compromise between different plans presented by Nigeria s Obasanjo, Algeria s Bouteflika and Senegal s Wade in addition to Mbeki s own Millenium African Renaissance Partnership Programme (MAP). 22 A good case in point is South Africa s application for a permanent UNSC seat that was dealt with at continental level under the framework of the so-called Ezulwini Consensus. This consensus stipulates, among other things, that the AU should decide the African candidate(s) for a permanent UNSC seat. 23 P. NEL, The Power of Ideas: Ambiguous Globalism and South Africa s Foreign Policy, in W. CARLSNAES - P. NEL (eds.), In Full Flight. South African Foreign Policy after Apartheid, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand-South Africa, 2006.
10 South Africa as a Regional Power: Multiple Audiences, One Foreign Policy? nance and multilateralism an attempt to promote a better representation for Africa and the Global South. The South-South cooperation entered with many regional powers in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East aimed at both opening new markets for South African goods but also at building critical coalitions in the Global South. Zuma s Foreign Policy Dilemmas Zuma came to power after out-maneuvering Thabo Mbeki at the historic ANC s national conference in Polokwane in Mbeki was widely criticized internally for lacking a national focus and engaging too much in international affairs (an interest he continued to show after being toppled). Given the increased domestic pressures Zuma faced (growing unemployment, widening of social disparities, slow economic growth) he was elected on a platform of service delivery to the people. Translated into the foreign policy arena, service delivery meant that a stronger focus would be placed on South Africa s national interests while designing modes of external interventions. In this regard, the foreign policy was seen as playing very much into this national agenda of securing the necessary economic growth and creating both opportunities for South African companies abroad and jobs at home. Department of International Relations and Cooperation was created to anchor foreign policy in another place than at the Union Buildings (as was the case under Mbeki) and signal a new South African focus on the creation of partnerships in the international and African arena. Despite a voluntaristic discourse of change, despite a stronger focus on economic diplomacy than under Mbeki, Zuma s foreign policy appears to be set for continuity. In short, South Africa s foreign policy under Zuma does Mbekiism without Mbeki. Despite the rhetoric about the links between foreign policy and national interests the Zuma administration failed to clearly define what these national interests are and how their realization would alter the conduct of external affairs. Instead, the main pillars of Mbeki s foreign policy (African agenda, South-South cooperation, multilateralism and the preference for negotiated peaceful settlements of violent conflicts) remained the same and indicated no alteration of policies. Zuma started his Presidency with an extensive tour of the BRIC countries (although with large business delegations), which resulted in major contracts for South African companies. While South Africa s inclusion in the BRICS has loosened economic constraints globally, political constraints on the continent remain, however. The unbridled economic room for maneuver runs the risk of alienating (especially) neighboring countries. South Africa should also be wary of being perceived as only beach head for major emerging economies and not paying enough atten- 65
11 tion to the economic development of Africa thereby also losing some of its regional soft power legitimacy. By advocating the link between foreign policy and national interests without clearly defining the latter, the Zuma administration has also failed to give a new impetus to the country s external action and regional role. It was in fact argued that Zuma s arrival on power coincided with a relative loss of South African visibility at the level of AU. More so, on certain occasions, South Africa seemed to follow a course whose rationale appeared at least unclear and in any case difficult to reconcile with the ambitions of a regional power. This inconsistency was illustrated by South Africa s management of the crises in Cote d Ivoire and Libya. In the Ivorian post-electoral crisis South Africa s foreign policy assumed a relatively unconventional, independent and unilateral thrust departing from its multilateralist conventions. Whereas Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), the AU and the UN swiftly recognised the victory of Alassane Ouattara over incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo at the November 2010 elections South Africa failed to publicly recognize Ouattara as the legitimate president of Cote d Ivoire. The subsequent ambiguous public diplomacy on the matter at a time where South Africa s voice mattered because of its attribute as an influential, democratic norm entrepreneur, only added to the confusion. In fact, it was unclear why Pretoria chose to challenge ECOWAS and Nigeria on an issue where South Africa track-record is not known to be the best. Secondly, the independence of South Africa s position stood in strong contradictions with the country s own principles of subsidiarity and respect for African regional expertise and solidarity. It is unclear how South Africa s early position on the Ivorian crisis could have enhanced the country s national interests. Inter paribus, South Africa s unpredictable behavior undermined its position both in Africa and in the UN Security Council. Regarding the Libyan crisis, where a peaceful revolution turned into a rebellion against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, a certain number of inconsistencies were reflected in South Africa s positions. Whereas Gaddafi s troops resorted to brutal repression of the rebellion, targeting and killing civilians, the UNSC voted an Arab League motivated resolution (1973) that authorized the use of force to prevent the killing of civilian. South Africa voted for the resolution in the Security Council alongside Nigeria and Gabon and despite the abstention of the BRIC states. The surprise came from the fact that when the Western-led coalition started implementing the no-fly zone over Libya, South Africa publicly denounced what it called a foreign military intervention. By advocating the link between foreign policy and national interests without clearly defining the latter, the Zuma administration has also failed to give a new impetus to the country s external action and regional role 66
12 South Africa as a Regional Power: Multiple Audiences, One Foreign Policy? These perceived indecisive courses of the Zuma administration, particularly on issues where South Africa has built its reputation as advocate of democratic norms and multilateral approaches to foreign policy has undermined the country s position in Africa and in the UN. In any case, it is reflective of a difficulty to clearly articulate a foreign policy position that takes into account the country s various audiences and constituencies. Conclusion Since the end of apartheid South Africa has tried to balance between, on the one hand, demands at the international level of South Africa providing regional leadership as a Human Rights frontrunner and, on the other hand, demands at the regional level of South Africa being an African state able to represent the African interest and not just run the errands of the West. South Africa could seem to have more leeway with regard to systemic pressures and great power influence in the African continent. However, these loosened constraints are only transferred into new constraints at the regional level and an inability to tackle important issues on the African continent due to the risks of still being perceived as either meddling or simply as interventionists. South Africa itself runs the risk of being seen as an unreliable partner for both Western and emerging powers, should it be seen to take advantage of the split on pivotal issues between the current P5 of the UN Security Council. This could in the long run lead to an erosion of South Africa s soft power and political capital globally. For the moment there is no doubt that South Africa is the leading African power in terms of material resources. However, at the global level South Africa s hard power resources cannot compete with the other emerging regional powers, which a comparison of the BRICS amply demonstrates. In this light South Africa should be careful not to underestimate the extent to which its global influence is based on its soft power legitimacy. Furthermore, this reliance on soft power legitimacy is only likely to increase as South Africa s relative material advantage in relation to other African countries especially the 3 others of the A4 is likely to decrease in the future, leaving global great powers with more options of African partners to choose from. Besides the difficulties in balancing between international and regional interest and expectation to South Africa s foreign policy, which are often contradictory Zuma equally faces difficulties of meeting domestic expectations. The recent active involvement in Cote d Ivoire and Libya does not resonate with a statement of foreign policy being conducted only to create jobs in South Africa. In the year of job creation, President Zuma could therefore risk parallels to be 67
13 drawn to the foreign policy activism of Mbeki and overstretching the capacities of the state. Much of the current inconsistency in South Africa s foreign policy conduct can be ascribed to the effort of trying to please all audiences at the same time. However, trying the impossible might be counterproductive in the medium to long-term and runs the risk of maximizing instead of minimizing dissatisfaction. To do the latter requests clearer priorities, consistency and reliability from the Zuma administration. 68
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