248 Power and the Global Governance of Plant Genetic Resources

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1 Conclusions From the general, to the particular, and back again. This thesis has provided broad archaeologies and genealogies of discourse which are relevant to the global governance of plant genetic resources. It has argued that there has been a general diffusion of power amongst diverse state and non-state actors. This trend derives legitimacy from global environmental and human rights movements and the participatory processes managed by inter-governmental institutions. The thesis has also examined debates about the minutiae of contemporary international agreements which contribute to global governance. It has been shown that international agreements and institutions can embody and exercise various forms of power: concentrated, pedagogic, gendered, pastoral, and/or coercive power. With its exploration and explanation of the nature and location of these diverse forms of power in global governance, the thesis has challenged more orthodox accounts of power in global governance. As explained in Chapter One, the non-foucaultian approaches taken by realists and neorealists assume that state power is exercised rationally in the pursuit of a rarely problematised national interest. Power is seen as a capacity to exert influence, and less often, as a legitimate capacity to exert influence. State power ranges from great power or superpower strength (such as now possessed by the United States and the European Union), through middle and small powers, to micro-states. The smallest states are the weakest and least able to promote their interests. Both neorealism and realism argue that balances of power underpin the world order. Hegemonic decline often unsettles that order. These approaches were disproved in the thesis. These realisms do not adequately recognise the influence of institutions and norms on international behaviour, beyond analysing norms and policy preferences based on power and interest for leading hegemonic states. They do not provide historical analyses of the changing nature and location of power, nor recognise the diverse actors who exercise power within global governance. The political economy of biotechnology cannot be explained by such realisms. At the global level, the modern biotechnology sector is characterised by the dominance of relatively few transnational agribusiness and pharmaceutical industry associations and corporations, and both public and private sector research and development activities involve transnational collaborative agreements. Global governance also rhetorically recognises a plethora of actors who contribute to the maintenance and development of plant genetic resources. It also attempts to identify and re-orient the processes that contribute to the rampant decline of biodiversity. These realisms do not appreciate the variable extent to which domestic and trans-national organisations in civil society work in partnership with governments and other actors, or the complexity of state formations. They also cannot account for the interaction of 247

2 248 Power and the Global Governance of Plant Genetic Resources norms and principles with macro- and micro-level subjectivities, and the political agency resulting therefrom. The thesis has also queried Marxist, neo-marxist and critical political economy approaches that locate power in the structure of production, the owners of capital or those in control of biotechnology research and development. These approaches see power as uni-dimensional and as enabling control and influence to be exercised to secure outcomes. The approach taken in this thesis rather sees power as complex, inherent in structurating discourse, norms and principles, and as constitutive of macroand micro-level subjectivities and effects. This approach goes beyond control, capacity and consent, and rather examines the variable locations of power. The effects of power in a Foucaultian approach include empowerment and resistance, and the constitution of interests by the interaction of global discourses with political actors at any level from the local to the global. Many examples were provided to substantiate the claim that hegemonic power is not exercised by developed states or social classes. Developing country governments in the G77 continue to insist that conservation and development must co-exist, and they have successfully negotiated the inclusion of beneficial terms in multilateral environmental agreements and declarations. The United States, the most powerful state in the international system if assessed on realist indicators of capacity such as economic and military power, was shown not to have been the most influential actor in any of the institutional case-studies. The thesis argued that on some issues there were no clear North-South negotiating blocs. For example, on issues of agricultural trade reform and biosafety the negotiating coalitions, included developed and less developed states members of the Cairns and Miami Groups. The European Union and some other developed governments have differed from the United States negotiating stance on issues such as the Biosafety Protocol and the labelling of genetically-modified (GM) products. The European Union supported G77 negotiating positions on biosafety more so than did the United States. The most likely explanation for this is electoral considerations arising out of large domestic environmental, and agricultural constituencies and legal considerations concerning compliance with national and regional laws. Diffuse power is at work. Furthermore as argued in Chapter Four, the formation of the FAO s CPGR in 1983 was the result of activist writing and networking by academics and nongovernment organisations who were critical of asymmetries between the returns to donors of germplasm and those available under plant breeders rights legislation, and that the constructed polarities between North and South were taken into negotiations by the G77. The Mexican government was particularly active in the creation of the CPGR. Mexico is a relatively insignificant lesser power if realist indicators of power and influence are used. Academics, NGOs and farmers continue to champion Farmers Rights in many developing countries and network transnationally to promote the implementation of these rights. The thesis provided numerous other examples to refute realist and neorealist

3 Conclusions 249 arguments that power in the global order is hegemonic or unipolar. For example, it was shown that the United States has had several of its unilateral attempts to enforce its environmental laws extra-territorially declared inconsistent with the GATT/WTO agreements in GATT/WTO dispute-resolution processes, following successful legal challenges by various developing countries. The United States and other advanced industrial states have also repeatedly failed in their attempts to progress proposals for the inclusion of a social clause in the GATT/WTO agreements. The findings of the case-study chapters support the conclusion that international agreements do not just reflect the distribution of states quantitative economic and military power in the international system, as conventional explanations of power might suggest. Rather the case-study chapters confirm that power in global governance is diffuse and distributed amongst many actors, state and non-state. The diffusion of power amongst diverse state and non-state actors has been a significant post-1970s trend which draws legitimacy from the participatory processes managed by intergovernmental institutions, governments and NGOs. In the 1960s and 1970s important international conference recommendations concerning plant genetic resource conservation were developed by only a few scientists. In the 1980s and 1990s biodiversity (including plant genetic resource) conservation became the subject of broader-based campaigning and actor involvement. Academics, NGOs and quasi-ngos mainly located in the United States and Europe, succeeded in convincing governments in both developed and developing countries that institutional responses had to be developed to better conserve biodiversity and to govern the international exchange of plant genetic resources. G77 governments successfully argued the case for international commitments to equitable benefit-sharing arising from plant genetic resource conservation and sustainable use. This relative growth in the power of NGOs and private sector corporations follows many governments and inter-governmental institutions willingness to delegate, enter into partnerships, or opt out of some service delivery and/or resource management functions consistent with the liberal democratic practices inherent in human rights discourse and embodied in UN governance practices. Several partnership arrangements amongst inter-governmental institutions, quasi-ngos (such as the IUCN) and NGOs were noted. Examples of these that are relevant to the governance of plants and plant genetic resources include the UNDP-RAFI partnership concerning traditional knowledge awareness-raising and the CITES-TRAFFIC partnership on plant and animal trade monitoring. The IUCN was shown to be a central actor in the development of the Andean Commission s sub-regional agreement concerning access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing, and in the development of numerous other international environmental treaties and policy instruments. These examples, and the broader trends they exemplify, have implications for future research. Chapter Five used the example of the CBD and the Biosafety Protocol to demonstrate further that democratic hegemonic states do not necessarily lead other states and international organisations in learning processes and policy transfer (in the

4 250 Power and the Global Governance of Plant Genetic Resources liberal instititionalist sense), or in the development of disciplined and ethical subjectivities (in the Foucaultian constructivist sense). Chapters Two and Five suggested that the high-valuation approach to genetic resources that is inherent in the CBD reflects the teaching done by academics and NGOs, and followed FAO negotiations which sought to implement these ideas in the IU. Learning also occurred within activist networks as the IUCN s position became more consistent over time with the high valuation approach to genetic resources initially propounded by academics, some of its own academic activists, and other development NGOs. The momentum for the CBD had come from academic and quasi-ngo actors, including the IUCN, even though the United States and the United Kingdom were influential in carrying the IUCN s proposals forward in UNEP meetings. Chapter Five argued that the G77 s agenda on biotechnology, technology transfer and equitable benefit-sharing was recognised in the CBD, because the G77 formed an effective negotiating coalition of weaker states. The G77 and some members of the G7 also largely led the push to have the Biosafety Protocol developed. Chapter Five examined the development of the Andean Commission s sub-regional agreement on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing, and argued that this exemplified the power that non-state and quasi- NGO actors have to promote their perceived version of a public good, or to effect the voluntary transfer of ideas to other states, in co-operation with the governments of those states. This policy transfer involved non-state actors from both North and South. The thesis has argued that there are some similarities between the concept of learning in liberal institutional theory, and the creation of disciplined subjectivities and social movements political cultures using Foucaultian concepts. Analyses of epistemic communities within liberal institutionalism are in some ways consistent with Foucault s analyses of power/knowledge and his assessments of authors and experts function in constituting discursive fields. However, Foucaultian constructivism does not assume pervasive rationality as a characteristic of actors behaviour, and in this regard it differs significantly from liberal institutionalism. The latter also retains a commitment to aggregates of state power as a central force in global governance, whereas Foucaultian constructivism reveals numerous sites, sources and types of power. The thesis also does not support the suggestion that democratic, hegemonic states, guided by ideas and information from universities, bureaucracies and advocacy groups, are most likely to lead other states and international institutions in rational decisionmaking and learning processes. As such, the thesis partially redresses a northern bias in the policy transfer literature by arguing that many innovative policy options and critiques have been actively and successfully promoted by academics, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and quasi-ngos such as the IUCN, indigenous peoples organisations (IPOs) and government agencies in developing countries. Academics, activists and other professionals in or from G77 countries who have been particularly influential in policy debates about biotechnology and sustainable development, and access and benefit-sharing, include Calestous Juma, Vandana Shiva,

5 Conclusions 251 Martin Khor, Jorgé Callaux Zazzali, and Tewolde Egziabher, amongst numerous others. These activists and academics are working within networks of government and nongovernment actors. Some of their views on issues differ in significant ways, but their influence has nevertheless been highly significant. In different ways many non-state actors in developed and developing countries are part of a global campaign against biopiracy. This campaign has focused attention on the inequities of intellectual property rights over biological resources and knowledge if recognition is not given to informal innovation. The evidence presented throughout the thesis sustains the view that much teaching is done by people who publish, network and lobby tirelessly on these and other sustainable development issues. On inter-state negotiations specifically, the thesis has argued that since the mid- 1980s, power/knowledge networks of NGOs and academics, industry associations and social movements have exercised significant influence over the global governance of plant genetic resources. It drew on an approach developed by Shapiro, Bonham and Heradstveit and suggested that inter-state negotiations and collective decision-making can be analysed by assessing the relative influence of various discourses configured as policy options. It argued that hierarchic, hegemonic state power has not been a dominant force in the negotiation or implementation of the international instruments examined in the case-studies. The texts of the selected international environmental instruments do not support arguments that northern developed states exert hegemonic domination over less-developed states. A central theme of the thesis has been that discourses embody power and can have constitutive effects. Discourses can empower subjects and influence subjectivities at the micro-level (domestic individuals for example), and at the macro-level (such as in international environmental negotiations). How issues are framed or constructed within a discourse can also have important implications for the governance that ensues. It can determine how relevant issues are constructed, and in some instances, which intergovernmental institution has primary carriage of an issue. Discourses include bodies of scientific knowledge and expert technical opinion, but also norms and principles, and ethical standards of appropriate behaviour. The examples provided in the thesis support the Foucaultian constructivist view that discourses are ideational structurating forces which may motivate the exercise of political agency, whether it be constitutive, resistant or constraining. Rationalist analyses do not adequately account for the influence and effect of such discourses. The thesis focused specifically on the complex interaction, and constitutive effects, of security, sustainable development and human rights discourses. It has argued that since the 1970s plant genetic resources have become increasingly important within the global political economy and ecology because of the power/knowledge networks contributing to, and responding to developments in the biotechnology sector, and to the rampant erosion of biological diversity. Chapter Three explored how intellectual and cultural property rights have been addressed in various human rights processes, particularly for indigenous peoples. Governments resistance was shown to have

6 252 Power and the Global Governance of Plant Genetic Resources influenced the slow progress of both the DUNDRIP and two reports on human rights and environment issues. The various security implications of plant genetic resource conservation and use, and the uneven impact of human rights discourse within the FAO and the draft text of the revised IU, were examined in Chapter Four. Chapter Five argued that an optimistic assessment of the contribution that gene technologies can make to sustainable development is inherent in the CBD. Chapter Five also argued that the power/knowledge networks involved did not examine traditional security concerns about the potential for gene-technologies to be used in the development of chemical and biological weapons. Human rights discourse has had a strong indirect influence in the CBD, and it has been particularly effective for IPOs. It has been less beneficial for women, minorities and local communities in that forum. Chapter Six argued that sustainable development discourse is becoming more constitutive in the WTO, but that proposals for the inclusion of human rights norms within trade agreements is ardently resisted by many G77 governments. Economic or comprehensive security discourse was shown to be most influential in the WTO. The dissertation also demonstrated that global discourses can have constitutive effects for individual and group identities, and for governments negotiating stances in inter-governmental fora. Chapter Three provided various examples to demonstrate that changing discourses or power/knowledge domains have had uneven constitutive effects for political subjectivities and agency. Liberal discourses of the separation of powers, self-determination, national sovereignty, political representation, and norms of racial equality were outlined in Chapter Three, and their influence was explored in later chapters. The apocalyptic scenarios associated with the 1970s oil crises and their contribution to the restoration of land rights and settlement processes for indigenous peoples, were also shown to be particularly influential for the contemporary global governance of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices. Chapter Four explored how various constructions of security have influenced current negotiations in the FAO s CGRFA. Chapter Five explored how IPOs current political activities within the CBD have been influenced by human rights norms. Chapter Six suggested that the norms and principles inherent in the TRIPS agreement are likely to effect substantial macro- and micro-level changes in subjectivities and power-relations, particularly for those involved in biotechnology research and development, as governments are required to implement its norms and principles in domestic law. Discourses may form the basis of policy frames and preferences, shared values, and inter-subjective understanding amongst actors, but they are also a fertile source for argumentation and political activity concerning law and policy priorities. Foucault s argument that life involves exercise of power but also resistance to power has also been confirmed by the case-studies. Power conflicts, counter-discourse or talking back can contribute to the development, reorganisation and political deployment of knowledge, with political practices able to transform the conditions amenable to the emergence and functioning of particular discourses. The thesis examined significant macro-level shifts in discursive formations during various periods. Resistance by NGOs and G77 states to

7 Conclusions 253 developed states intellectual property rights regimes for plants was examined in Chapter Four, and resistance by the G77 and the EU to patent regimes for living material was examined in Chapter Six. Whilst environmental economics is an ascendant discourse in global environmental governance, some of its precepts such as that the costs hitherto seen as market externalities should be internalised to better reflect the real costs of production, are resisted. This was explored in Chapter Five, where members of the Miami Group of states which are involved in the export of GM products resisted liability obligations and the implementation of the precautionary principle during the negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The apparent resistance of some FAO scientists to the promotion of in situ conservation as actively as ex situ conservation until very recently was examined in Chapter Four. The resistance of some states to the recognition of the right of self-determination for indigenous people[s] was also explored in Chapter Three. The resistance of some states to finalising the Farmers Rights compromise within the FAO s CGRFA was explored in Chapter Four. In each of these examples the tensions amongst and within security, sustainable development and human rights discourses were noted. These tensions are rarely irreconcilable. The thesis has also shown that states are not unitary actors and that power is not exercised rationally by unitary actors in the pursuit of strategically identified goals. Global governance processes and actors are too complex and diverse to permit rationalist and strategic explanations for developments and outcomes. For example, governments do not necessarily act consistently within different global institutions, which is better explained by Foucaultian boundaries of knowledge and networks than it is with realists belief in states self-interest and drive to maximise power. Broad trends are identifiable but these are not necessarily consistent with rational intent. Rather complex configuration of forces contribute to ongoing political evolution but also to unpredictable discursive shifts which also influence outcomes. The absence of strategic and unitary rationalism in negotiating fora is exemplified by the different negotiating stances that may be taken in relation to similar issues of principle in different fora. For example, biotechnology exporting states have taken a stronger stand in the informal Australia Group which promotes the harmonisation of export regulations concerning technology transfer and biological materials that may be used in weapons production, than they did on the precautionary principle during the biosafety negotiations. Both processes are intended to promote environmental and human security. Another example is that the United States and other developed states have taken a much stronger stand on environment and labour standards in the WTO than they have on Farmers Rights in the FAO. Supporting both equally would better contribute to sustainable development and the maintenance of the resource base upon which human security ultimately depends. A more strategic exercise of power was explored in Chapter Six, where industry lobbies, and the United States and other OECD governments, were shown to have exerted significant influence in the GATT TRIPS negotiations. This was motivated by

8 254 Power and the Global Governance of Plant Genetic Resources concerns that economic power derived from IPRs was eroding because of IPR violations. The TRIPS requirements that domestic laws be brought into line with its prescriptions effectively limits governments autonomy in that regard. The availability of coercive dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve IPR disputes was also an important victory for states with high technology industries because the powers of the WTO are stronger than those available under other international IPR agreements such as those administered by WIPO. The concurrence of other governments was necessary to ensure that the agreement on TRIPS would be adopted, but the relative disadvantage of G77 governments in TRIPS negotiations was noted. Notwithstanding that disadvantage, the TRIPS agreement does include various articles which are potentially beneficial for the G77, including those on technology transfer and compulsory licensing. The G77 has also continued to successfully resist proposals that patents or other IPR protections be required for plants and animals, and in 1999 they successfully blocked attempts to establish a biotechnology working group within the WTO. As noted in Chapter Six, plans to launch a new trading round following the 1999 ministerial meeting in Seattle went awry as thousands of protesters impeded access to meeting venues and G77 governments insisted that more time was needed to fulfil existing obligations. Although biotechnology issues were only of minor significance in the collapse of the Seattle proposals, NGOs demonstrated the depth of the concerns they have about some of the trends in global governance. What the thesis could not do, given its already broad scope, was to examine the contribution of economic resources to knowledge/power. That is, it did not attempt to examine the funding sources of the various non-state actors that are influential in the global governance of plant genetic resources. The financial support available to industry associations ordinarily derives from their corporate membership base and government assistance programs, if available, but government and non-government support for other political actors and social movements is more variable. An examination of funding sources could enrich an analysis of discursive power and governance. Although the Internet is a relatively inexpensive means to network globally, the convening of international conferences, authoritative publishing, and attendance at regional and global fora, requires access to financial resources. Access to funding is not a determinative influence on the strength of power, and nor would such analyses be a concession to realism. But analyses of funding sources could create a better profile of the sources of power and the strength of the views held by donors. Significantly for the purposes of the thesis, private donations underwrite many NGO activities, indicating again that power is not necessarily exercised for state maximisation purposes. Normative and principled considerations are more dominant. There are various other research questions which arise from the thesis but which have been left unanswered. Clearly there is a high degree of uncertainty about the ecological implications of the release of GMOs into the environment and there are sufficient concerns about the potential health impacts to warrant the stringent

9 Conclusions 255 application of the precautionary principle. Further research could examine the responsiveness or otherwise of global institutions to the evolving data on these ecological and health implications. Similarly there is a high degree of uncertainty about the social and cultural implications of IPR regimes for developing countries. These implications need to be researched and analysed further. Given the ethical dimensions of the revolution in biotechnologies, it would also be interesting to examine the apparently declining influence of discourses of religion, and religious organisations, on diverse governments negotiating stances, and domestic practices. The thesis noted in passing the evolution of ostensibly secular liberal governance in European states and later in many of European colonies, but in many regions, government and religious organisations are not necessarily distinct and separate. Even in liberal democracies elements of government are likely to identify with religious organisations. The cultural and discursive implications of this for biotechnological developments, or the lack thereof, might justify further analysis. Conversely, the growing environmental movement might suggest that stakeholders in the biotechnology sector will be pressured to better respect species biological integrity. Deep ecology and animal rights discourses, particularly, might strengthen in coming years in response to the expected growth in transgenic research and development in the biotechnology sector. On the other hand, if the promised environmental benefits of gene technologies eventuate, with their attendant benefits for biodiversity generally, this may not occur. The relationship between the United Nations and business associations is evolving in significant ways, and assessments of the global governance of business, rather than for business, could be assessed. Future research concerning biotechnologies could also assess whether NGO fears about vertical integration in the food sector and the negative implications of that for food security, particularly in developing countries, is justified. There is increased discussion about whether global taxes which might be levied on international business transactions, as a means for funding United Nations activities. Such alternative sources of funding need to be explored, given the capacity of donor states to impede the implementation of policies and programs they do not strongly support, as indicated by the slow development of Farmers Rights, explored in Chapter Four. The significant overlap and indivisibility of the foundational discourses of sustainable development, security and human rights, suggests that the current practice of co-operation amongst global institutions should continue, but that more effective and open multi-disciplinary or cross-discourse governance should also be encouraged. The need for better co-operation between the CBD and the BTWC for example, is pressing, so that the revolution in biotechnologies does not precipitate arms racing with biological weapons. Similarly the need for more co-operative governance where trade, sustainable development and human rights overlap, was identified in Chapters Three, Five and Six. More co-operation and co-ordination is needed concerning the governance of issues of concern to indigenous peoples. Gender considerations also need

10 256 Power and the Global Governance of Plant Genetic Resources to be more effectively mainstreamed to ensure that governance commitments are realised in practice. The concerns articulated by G77 countries that proposals such as the social clause in WTO agreements are a protectionist device for developed country governments need to be further assessed and debated, and mechanisms developed to ensure that improvements in compliance with governance standards result in benefits which are shared equitably. In summary then, the thesis has been guided by Foucaultian, reflectivist and constructivist literature and has demonstrated that power in global governance is highly variable. It can be diffuse and pedagogic, but also concentrated and coercive. Power is mediated in a complex way through discourses and amongst networks of academics and private sector researchers, NGOs, business associations, social movements, governments and other actors. The effectiveness of non-state power is likely to increase because of the increasing transparency of the governance processes and growing capacity to network globally using communications technologies such as the Internet. Provided such power is motivated by principles of sustainable development, human rights and common security, better global governance is likely to be the result.