CONFLICT SENSITIVE SCREENING TOOL

Transcription

1 COMPILED BY DFID CONFLICT HELPDESK, 2012 CONFLICT SENSITIVE SCREENING TOOL The primary goal of conflict sensitive options is to avoid harm, and more expansively, to find ways to contribute to peace without changing the objective of the project. They are not about making the project better in more general terms. An option should address a specific actual or potential harm. Purpose This screening tool is a starting point for conflict sensitivity. It provides an initial assessment for possible interactions with conflict, to inform project design prior to a full conflict analysis. It does not substitute for a full conflict analysis these are fundamental to conflict sensitive practice. However it serves as a stop-gap measure until a full analysis can be undertaken. Method This screening tool involves answering a set of questions through deskbased research by DFID staff involved in project designs. It also involves consultation with others implementing similar interventions in relevant regions in order to draw on their insights to answer the questions below. When to use The screening tool is to be used at the initial design stage of an intervention. Assumptions To design conflict sensitive interventions, a full conflict analysis is needed. This does not need to be a massive undertaking, but does involve careful consideration of the actual and potential conflicts in an area and the possible ways our work could interact with it. A screening tool can only give partial analysis. What is "conflict sensitivity"? A conflict sensitive approach involves gaining a sound understanding of the two-way interaction between activities and context and acting to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of interventions on conflict, within an organization s given priorities/objectives. Four key things to remember: 1. All interventions have an impact on the conflict context. You and your work have an impact. 2. Interventions can make situations better or worse. You are making the conflict context better or worse. 3. You can know what your impact is. This is actually not difficult. 4. We can change the impact. You always have options. 1

2 The possible problems have been identified.now what? The screening tool provides numerous examples of how people have adjusted programming to make it more conflict The screening tool provides a series of questions to help the user identify possible ways a project or programme could get caught up in conflict. How then to re-design the intervention to prevent or mitigate such design problems? sensitive. These are not templates similar adjustments may be appropriate in your context, or perhaps a completely different change would be better. The examples are included to provide better understanding of the problem and examples of solutions that have worked elsewhere. Conflict sensitive options must come from the dynamics of the context. There is no scientific method to this, essentially it involves reviewing the project parameters and considering how these could be altered to prevent or mitigate the problem: Who is the project for? Who will implement it? What does it involve? Where will it be implemented? When will it be implemented? How will it be implemented? For example if there is tension over targeting, where only one ethnic group fits the targeting criteria, a number of options could be generated: Targeting criteria could be changed; Discussions could be held with the neighbouring community to explain the targeting criteria; Project activities could be adjusted to incorporate the excluded community; A different role for the excluded community could be created in the project to help them find a stake in it such as procuring certain goods or services from them.

3 Key questions to consider the programme s potential interaction with conflict 1. CONFLICT CONTEXT 1.1 Profile, Actors, Dynamics What groups of people are involved? Where are they located? What is the conflict(s) about and how long has it been going on? What kinds of things divide these groups (for example caste, tribe, neighbourhood affiliation)? What kinds of things connect them (for example, shared cultural practices, local peace initiatives)? 1.2 Conflict Dynamics What stage is the conflict at? What are the past and current conflict trends? Are there specific conflict triggers? How has violence changed over time? What are the best, worst and most likely scenarios for the future of the conflict? 3

4 2. PROGRAMME AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS 2.1 To/By Whom Do targeting criteria coincide with lines of division in the conflict, or with specific ethnic, economic, religious or political grouping? Does HMG or partner agencies have any real or perceived role in the conflict? Could tensions arise over the implementing partner being perceived as aligned with Western or Northern political interests? Who are our staff/implementing partners' staff? Do we represent any particular group in the conflict? Do local authorities seek to control targeting? Does this enhance their legitimacy? 2.2 Where Does the geographical boundary of the response area coincide with lines of division in conflict, or with specific ethnic, economic, religious or political groupings? Does the choice of the intervention location (office sites, operating locations) send any messages about stronger relations with one group or another? Do local authorities seek to manipulate the location of work? Are land titles disputed in the response area? Will access to this area have to be negotiated? What ground rules will you set?

5 2.3 What Could local authorities or conflict actors steal, divert or seek to control resources transferred into this context through the intervention? Could the intervention be used by conflict actors for their own benefit? Is there resistence to the intervention on the basis of religous or ideological grounds? Will local procurement result in links to one party to the conflict? Will bringing in resources distort the local economy? 2.4 When Does the planned timing of project activities (consultations, distributions, etc) coincide with any of the conflict triggers identified in the context analysis? Does the planned timing of activities make any beneficiaries/staff vulnerable to violence? What exit strategies are in place/planned to enable an appropriate exit? 2.5 How How will decisions over resource distribution be made? Does the intervention risk making powerful people more powerful? Will services be provided in a language that makes them accessible to all, or is a predominant language being used that not all can understand? Where civil society is being mobilised to hold state institutions to account are there measures in place to manage this mobilisation so it does not become violent? Are potential backlashes considered? Are there feedback mechanisms to identify tensions that may arise during project implementation? Are communications mechanisms in place to ensure that communities are fully briefed? Does organisational publicity present messages that promote respect, accountability, fairness and transparency? Or do they promote negative messages, such as competition, impunity and fear? 5

6 2 (a). PROGRAMME AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS - WITH EXAMPLES 2.1 TO/BY WHOM EXAMPLES ROGRE ANDTUTIONALS Do targeting criteria coincide with lines of division in the conflict, or with specific ethnic, economic, religious or political grouping? Does HMG or partner agencies have any real or perceived role in the conflict? Could tensions arise over the implementing partners being perceived as aligned with Western or Northern political interests? Who are our When targeting includes technical criteria, such as the most vulnerable/poorest communities, we may inadvertently distribute to just one side of the conflict, as exclusion may be one tactic of conflict. A) In Tajikistan one NGO delivering food for work programming to reconstruct war damaged houses hoped to reach both ethnic groups through its intervention. However its targeting criteria included building houses in the most destructed villages. At the conclusion of the conflict one ethnic group had gone on the rampage, ransacking the villages of the defeated ethnic group (they lived in ethnic enclaves). Thus targeting the most destructed villages meant that they only rebuilt homes of the defeated ethnic group. Additionally the work teams were all created locally, and since the two ethnic groups lived in ethnic enclaves, the same ethnic group were also reaping all the benefits of the food for work component. B) In Sudan, an agency s focus on conflict-affected IDPs - who were of different ethnic, religious, and livelihood background than the host community - by providing food and shelter assistance and discussing distributing seeds and tools to them, provoked violence from the host community toward the IDPs because of fears that the NGO was resettling them permanently. The agency mitigated the conflict through discussing the types of assistance the host community prioritised and assuring the host community that the NGO was not resettling the IDPs. In Nepal the Maoists often challenged development actors on ideological grounds, and asserted that development was aligned with western interests. A risk management office was established by DFID and GTZ which, amongst other things, developed a set of frequently asked questions and answers so that implementing staff did not have to invent responses each time they were interviewed by Maoists. Implementing partners were often chosen on the basis of their perceived neutrality. Some had achieved this neutral positioning through undertaking activities such as fact-finding missions that were critical of both parties to the conflict, or through good reputation in other sectors, notably health, which created credibility and enhanced development space. Implementing agencies engaged Maoists and security forces in dialogue, as a lack of clarity over programming was a key factor in preventing programming. Some staff took personal efforts to learn about Maoists terminology and concepts so as to search for development space within their philosophy. There may be some very significant issues that mean we should hire staff who speak a local dialect and are known and

7 staff/implementing partners staff? Do we represent any particular group in the conflict? Do local authorities seek to control targeting? Does this enhance their legitimacy? accepted locally, and this can be a very important element of generating acceptance at the community level. This should also be tempered with the need to fairly represent the community at large, and not have staff who are perceived to be aligned with one side of the conflict. A) In Kosovo an NGO deliberately created work teams who involved both Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanians who visited communities together, presenting an example of inter-ethnic co-operation. B) In Liberia during the civil war an NGO hired English speakers in an area where a Christian and agriculturalist ethnic group were the only people able to access education in language. They later found this education bias had been reflected in their recruitment of staff, resulting in their programmes focussing entirely on agricultural issues, and with no Muslims among the direct beneficiaries or local staff. C) In Sri Lanka the state language is Sinhala, university education is largely in Sinhala, and civil service positions require Sinhala language skills. This makes it very difficult for those who only speak a minority language to get any relevant education or experience to make them suitable candidates for many positions. A) In the tsunami response in Sri Lanka the local authorities sometimes sought to control beneficiary lists. It was very difficult for individual agencies to challenge inclusion or exclusion targeting errors. A collective voice, that included the respective donors, could have provided a stronger challenge to this practice. Good practices include: Involving the community in the design of targeting criteria Making beneficiary lists public, and giving the community the opportunity to challenge the application of the targeting criteria Undertaking shared assessment with local authorities to inhibit them from pushing for inclusion and exclusion errors. B) In Ethiopia, during a famine, the government strongly recommended certain locations for feeding centres in order to control population movements and to give priority of access to certain groups. C) In Pakistan a local politician wanted a project which reconstructed a local drainage system to be launched under his name. The implementing agency refused and the politician then took action against the NGO, instructing the local authority to ban their activities, and he filed a case against a manager of the NGO. The NGO called a meeting of local activists and beneficiaries and shared the letter of the politician, news of which rapidly spread throughout the community. Mounting public pressure forced the withdrawal of the letter and the legal case. D) During the struggles across Sudan, NGOs encountered several militias and groups of fighters who maintained a practice of riding along with convoys of assistance. When the convoys arrived at their destinations, the fighters would loudly announce (sometimes using a bullhorn) that their group was responsible for the assistance. Some NGOs sought to ban weapons from their convoys, while others insisted that civilian authorities ride with the trucks. Most attempted to establish systems of information that informed communities of where assistance came from, as well as attempting to provide better information to communities generally. 7

8 2.2 WHERE EXAMPLES Does the geographical boundary of the response area coincide with lines of division in conflict, or with specific ethnic, economic, religious or political groupings? Does the choice of the intervention location (office sites, operating locations) send any messages about stronger relations with one group or another? Do local authorities seek to manipulate the location of work? Are land titles disputed in the response area? A) In a public works project in Afghanistan involving the rebuilding of an irrigation canal project, implementers were concerned that those in the upper reaches of the canal may be perceived to take too much water by those in the lower reached of the canal. The two communities were bought together to share ideas and sign protocols, which avoided conflict and built relationships. B) In Sri Lanka during the period of conflict, economic growth programming was targeted at the majority ethnic controlled area, and emergency response programming in the breakaway territories. This was generally true across the full range of donors. The economic growth of the two regions increasingly diverged, further contributing to the conflict dynamics. C) In Kenya, NGOs mounting a humanitarian response to election violence (in 1992) along a Provincial border concentrated only in the Provinces where they were headquartered. The NGOs also did not cooperate across the borders, providing uneven assistance that, over time, became more and more focused on specific tribes. The focus began to pull members of those tribes to move to their side of the border. The communities lost their diversity, and many homes and farms were occupied. A) In Sri Lanka both conflict parties were accused of forcefully resettling populations, often using civilians as human shields. Resettlement had also been used to manipulate ethnic composition. Supporting resettlement schemes risked reinforcing these practices. In one NGO staff maintained vigilance in assessing requests to assist settlement / resettlement to determine if the (re) settlement offered lasting solutions or was ethnic manipulation or for a military objective. B) In one part of Indonesia with Christian/Muslim violence and where movement across those lines was restricted most NGOs set up their offices in a Christian area. One NGO found a small market and a bar where people of both faiths could meet. They rented an office on that street and found that the market expanded. When other NGOs moved to that street, the market grew even further. In Ethiopia a local official insisted that one well (of several planned) be dug in his compound. Development can inadvertently legitimise changes in land tenure when populations are resettled on land whose original owners have been displaced. Conflicts can be triggered when the original owners return. Similarly improving the quality of land through constructing houses or wells can contribute to conflict as disputes over tenure escalate in light of the land s value increasing. In Sri Lanka these problems resulted in one agency developing standards in relation to land tenure including verifying ownership of plots, reaffirming where possible the rights of original owners. Infrastructure would not be built where ownership was in question.

9 Will access to this area have to be negotiated? What ground rules will you set? A) An NGO in Liberia negotiated access with a warlord through an offer of demographic and development information, rather than goods. B) An NGO in Guatemala invested time and effort into educating the actors in the conflict about themselves, their mandate, and their ground rules for operations. When they needed access to an area, they could refer to the fact that everything about them was already known. When needed they often had relationships with commanders and local authorities already in place. 2.3 WHAT EXAMPLES Could local authorities or conflict actors steal or divert resources transferred into this context through the intervention? Could the intervention be used by conflict actors for their own benefit? A) Public auditing is an excellent method to address diversion. In Nepal implementing staff and partners shared project budgets, plans and activities with Users Groups and communities in an open, public manner. Large notice boards were displayed in all communities stating the expenditure of project funds. The practice of public auditing was adopted as a means to avoid misuse of funds and minimize corruption, to maintain transparency and to gain the trust/confidence of local communities. There were numerous instances where partners and community groups were able to defend their projects and better negotiate with Maoists because they had been involved in the planning of activities and budgets through the public auditing system where information and responsibilities were shared and it was clear who was accountable for what. Respondents often commented that through this system there was little doubt about how money was used and that if project expenditures had been done secretly, it would have raised suspicions and possibly created tensions amongst groups in the community. It helped promote trust, accountability, transparency and good governance. B) In Nepal galvanised iron pipes of a specific diameter which were used for irrigation projects were stolen by Maoists to make weapons. Plastic tubes had to be substituted. C) In Somalia, militia groups often taxed food aid at rates of 20% or higher to provide access and security. The construction of roads or other infrastructure can be used by armed actors to move combatants more effectively. A) In Colombia, a village built a road only to find themselves excluded from it by a rebel group who used to move more quickly through the area. B) In Somalia it was found that corruption amongst local authorities was commonplace, but further that there may also be corruption amongst the available implementing partners. It was found that working with a large number of entities helped counteract people working in their own interest, particularly in determining beneficiary lists. 9

10 Is there resistance to interventions on the basis of ideological or religious grounds? Will local procurement result in links to one party to the conflict? Will bringing in resources distort the local economy? Girls education programming in Afghanistan has met with resistance from the Taliban. Efforts to tackle this have included: Finding acceptability for girls education with the Qur an and Islamic frameworks. This involves not only working through Mullahs and Imams but also working through this with staff to help them understand what Islam teaches and how to communicate this effectively. In one project the Mullah and Imam helped create buy-in for a project that challenges the cultural norm of women not working, and did this involving the families and local authorities into decision making for the project; Getting moderate Mullahs and other influential people to represent programming to the Taliban; Inviting moderate religious leaders into projects to generate acceptance. Several Mullahs and elders/influential people were invited to join the teaching training process, and/or religious classes were added to the curriculum; Discussing options with local Taliban commanders who are often not as hardline as the religious leaders in Quetta. In Liberia an NGO brought in rice to combat a famine. They soon observed that the price of rice in local markets fell and that farmers began to join militias. The NGO shifted from rice to bulgar. They saw the price of rice begin to rise and the farmers began to return to their farms. 2.4 WHEN EXAMPLES Does the planned timing of project activities (consultations, distributions, etc) coincide with any of the conflict triggers identified in the context analysis? A) In Sri Lanka flooding coincided with government elections, raising concerns over the potential manipulation of aid for political parties. B) In the DRC clear guidelines had to be developed for coping with elections, for instance handling impromptu political rallies at project sites.

11 2.5 HOW EXAMPLES How will decisions over resource distribution be made? Does the intervention risk making powerful people more powerful? A) Heads of community development committees and District Administrators in Afghanistan are very influential people. They have significant decision making power that affects resource allocations. In some regions of Afghanistan there is a belief that if you want a system to be corruption free then you should hand control of that system to people who already have money, as they are believed to be unlikely to embezzle funds, as they already have money. This attitude can be replicated in the election of community development committee representatives people sometimes simply chose the more powerful, richer community members, who do not necessarily best represent the needs of the community. Secret ballots may be a better mechanism for electing people to influential positions, particularly where belief systems will affect elections. B) In one village in Afghanistan, there was an electrification program. Some members of the village development committee agreed to not be among the first to receive it, instead saying they would wait for the expansion of the program in the next year. This was negotiated prior to beginning the implementation of the project. C) In Burundi it was found that committees established to determine who is vulnerable in a community and thus entitled to food aid were captured by powerful elites. People feared to speak out against these decisions, and voted to support their patron s position or remained silent on their injustices, as they needed the support of their patrons. Consensus based decision making may not be the best approach to decision making at the community level, particularly where there are minority groups. A) In Somalia it was observed that, in situations where the community could not agree, outsiders may be asked to leave the room, and invited back in when consensus was achieved. This presents a moral hazard while consensus based decision making is a Somali tradition, and is a great mechanisms for building community ownership, there is the risk that dissenting voices may be threatened in this situation. B) In Georgia it was observed that different ethnic groups formed positions on programmatic decisions, turning decisions into ethnic rivalries and making consensus based decision making unworkable. Better understanding of power relations in a community would provide insights as to when consensus based decision making is helpful and when it is detrimental. Will services be provided in a language that makes them accessible to all, or is a predominant language being used that not all can understand? An NGO in Indonesia, following the tsunami, posted their plans and notices about hiring on a board in the centre of a village - but all the signs were in English. 11

12 Where civil society is being mobilised to hold state institutions to account are there measures in place to manage this mobilisation so it does not become violent? Are potential backlashes considered? Are there feedback mechanisms to identify tensions that may arise during project implementation? Are communications mechanisms in place to ensure that communities are fully briefed? In Nepal rights based programming involved the mobilisation of lowest caste peoples to gain access to a temple from which they had been previously excluded. Access was negotiated but the elites attacked the lowest caste people attending the temple and ransacked the offices of the local NGO involved. Feedback mechanisms are crucial to identifying problems early on. Complaints mechanisms are becoming increasingly used in humanitarian responses, although these are only one mechanism available. Establishing a credible complaints mechanism is a challenging task, as there needs to be care to ensure influential people do not silence complaints, that complaints are speedily and effectively dealt with to build confidence in the mechanism, and that accessing the complaints mechanism should not be an onerous task. An effective feedback mechanism can promote good governance from the grassroots upwards, as people grow to expect that their concerns will be appropriately addressed by those managing resource distribution. Rumours and incomplete explanations can be incredibly problematic! In Afghanistan an implementing partner was explaining what was and was not eligible in a community development programme which included public works. He stated that Mosques were not eligible. When asked why he said that it wouldn t be right/expected for Afghans to build a church in the USA. This story was told and retold amongst the crowd, and by the time it reached the street it had been transformed into a statement that it would be acceptable to build a church with the project funds but not a Mosque. People became furious and the staff worker s vehicle was stoned. The project was suspended for a year in this location. Careful introductions can help pave the way for projects, particularly ones that challenge cultural norms. The pace of entry needs to be slow, involving participatory consultation, with a clear explanation of the project from the outset. Staff need to listen to ideas and be able to revise the project in light of them. Significant involvement may be required before an activity to prepare a community for it.