Stimson-ACA Event 20 Years Later: The United States and the Future of the CTBT Published on Arms Control Association (

Transcription

1 Stimson-ACA Event 20 Years Later: The United States and the Future of the CTBT Events 20 Years Later: The United States and the Future of the CTBT Tuesday, September 13, 2016, 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m. The Stimson Center, Washington, DC Audio and Slideshow Available Twenty years ago, the United States took a leading role in negotiations for a verifiable ban on the explosive testing of nuclear weapons. The result was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened for signature September 24, Although the treaty has widespread domestic and global support, the CTBT has not yet entered into force because the United States and seven other key states have failed to ratify the treaty. This month, the Obama administration, along with other UN Security Council member states, are considering a resolution that reaffirms support for the global norm against nuclear testing and the eventual ratification of the CTBT. FEATURING: Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State Ambassador Adam M. Scheinman, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United States Michael Krepon, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association TRANSCRIPT FINLAY: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome. My name is Brian Finlay, I'm the president and CEO here at Stimson. And on behalf of our partners and co-conveners for this event, Daryl Kimball and his colleagues at the Arms Control Association, I would very much like to welcome you here to the Stimson Center for what is, as you can see from the panel, going to be an action-packed and international discussion on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It's a little bit deja vu all over again when I think my being in this room with many of you previously talking about this very issue. But it's exciting to open The New York Times and The Washington Post and actually see potential progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But we, as I say, do have a very action-packed agenda. And so without further ado, I would like to welcome my colleague and the co-founder of Stimson, Michael Krepon. (APPLAUSE) KREPON: Thanks for coming. Page 1 of 20

2 For the panel today and for me and the Stimson Center's partner, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty isn't just professional, it's personal. And everybody on this dais has been working on this treaty for 20 years or more. And we are grateful for your commitment to this treaty. And that's what this event is about. That's what the U.N. Security Council resolution is about. That's what the P5 statement is about next week. We're here to remember the value of the treaty, to recommit to its entry into force, to add propulsion to this very long and difficult process. It's not going to happen tomorrow, but tomorrow will come sooner because of the steps that will be taken in New York next week. We are pressed for time. Rose needs to leave us at 9:30. She has an agenda that would buckle the knees of a teenager. So I'm not going to introduce our distinguished panel. You can read their bios. We've asked Rose, Ambassador Kitano and Ambassador Umarov to limit their opening remarks to 10 minutes. Then Daryl will handle the Q&A. And after Rose leaves, Adam, whose commitment to this issue is as immense as anybody else, is going to fill in on the Q&A side, after you perhaps direct just a couple of questions at Rose before she leaves. So with that, Rose, the floor is yours. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much, Michael. It's a real pleasure to be back here at the Stimson Center and also to be participating in this important event in partnership also with the Arms Control Association. So thank you for this opportunity. I love coming to the Stimson Center. Last time I was here it was for an important event to launch our annual publication, "To Walk the Earth in Safety." Many of you also work on the landmine clearance and unexploded ordnance of war, clearance of those kinds of tragic remnants of wars around the world. And I really always take my hat off to the commitment of the Stimson Center to so many important issues in the realm of not only weapons of mass destruction, but also disposition of conventional armaments as well. And I'm delighted to be here with my esteemed counterparts, Ambassador Kitano and Ambassador Umarov. This year has been such an important year for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is the 20th anniversary of the opening of the treaty for signature, and these two countries, Japan and Kazakhstan, have been right at the heart of our commemoration, pushing every day to not only commemorate the event of the opening of the treaty for signature, but to push forward from this moment toward its entry into force. So I very much appreciate the work of the two ambassadors, Ambassador Kitano and Ambassador Umarov, but their countries as well. They have been great colleagues throughout this year. And indeed, as Michael said, next week will be an important week at the U.N. General Assembly and there will be a lot more action there with, again, Japan and Kazakhstan taking a leading role. Ambassador Adam Scheinman is also here. He'll be happy to take a lot of questions from you, or maybe not happy, but he's ready to take a lot of questions from you. (LAUGHTER) SCHEINMAN: Happy, ecstatic. GOTTEMOELLER: I am going to have to depart right around 9:30, but I'll plan on taking one or two questions before I have to run out the door. So I apologize for that in advance. As we come here together to note the 20th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Page 2 of 20

3 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, I'd like to begin, as I often do, by making note of the long road to complete a global ban on nuclear explosive testing. The CTBT is in fact the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control. And we are still fighting. We must remember how far we have come. The creation and implementation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 is a testament to what we are capable of achieving when we set our sights on a goal. That treaty provided the foundation for a total ban on nuclear explosive testing, and another step along the road, let us not forget is the entry into force in 1990 of the TTBT, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as the PNET, the ban on peaceful nuclear explosions. The United States is very proud of its role in the negotiation of a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosive testing, and we were proud to be the first nation to sign the CTBT after it opened for signature in The United States signed the CTBT because we recognized the potential of this treaty to significantly strengthen nuclear nonproliferation, thereby enhancing the security of our nation and every nation around the world. As the president noted in his statement for the CTBTO's June ministerial meeting, after 20 years the full potential of the CTBT remains unfulfilled, but the United States is steadfast in our support for the treaty and for the critical work of the Preparatory Commission. Our dedication to the treaty is demonstrated through unmatched monetary and technical support and our clear commitment to ensuring that the verification regime is completed and able to function as intended. It is critical that every signatory to the treaty support the work of the Preparatory Commission to complete the treaty's verification regime and help enhance the effectiveness of the provisional technical secretariat. We should all work to upgrade the International Data Center, the IDC, and ensure the completion of an effective, on-site inspection capability. Despite our clear support for the CTBT, the United States acknowledges that we have not completed our work on the ratification process and that our delay gives cover to other Annex 2 states who have not yet ratified the treaty. That is why we are building support for this treaty here at home, state by state and sometimes person by person, because we know that a global ban on nuclear explosive testing is good for our country. We are making it clear to the American public that our scientists and military experts agree that the CTBT is verifiable and we do not need to conduct nuclear explosive testing in order to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear stockpile. I won't deny that this work is difficult and that we face domestic political obstacles. That does not change the fact that this treaty is in our national security interests, and so it is incumbent upon us to convince those who doubt this fact. We are certain that we have a good case to make; we will continue to make it. In the meantime, it is in the U.S. national security interests to reaffirm the moratoria against nuclear explosive testing and continually increase our ability to monitor and detect nuclear explosive tests. That is why the Obama administration decided to engage with the members of the U.N. Security Council, including the five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty nuclear weapon states, on potential steps to further reduce nuclear dangers by strengthening the international nuclear explosive detection architecture and supporting existing national moratoria on nuclear explosive tests. To be clear, we are not proposing and will not support the adoption of a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing legally binding prohibitions on nuclear explosive testing. Further, the resolution Page 3 of 20

4 we have in mind would in no way be a substitute for entry into force of the CTBT, which would require, among other things, ratification by the United States with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The administration is committed to working with the Senate to build support for ratification. In the meantime, it is in the U.S. national security interests to reaffirm the moratoria against explosive nuclear testing. In closing, I would like to say that I have always emphasized the clear national security benefits of the CTBT, and over the last few years I've personally seen the effects nuclear explosive testing has had on people and the environment. I was in the Marshall Islands on the 60th anniversary of Castle Bravo. In Alaska, I spoke with residents who said that they are worried that radiation from explosive tests there had found its way into the food chain. I spent time in southern Utah talking to ranchers who had lost their entire flocks to radiation from nuclear testing in Nevada. And in New Mexico, I walked the cold, hard ground at Trinity, still littered with black, glass-like particles from the test. I thought how far we have come, but how far we still have to go. In each place, people of different backgrounds support the treaty 100 percent, no matter what their background, no matter what their experience. The administration will continue to make the case to students, civic groups, faith-based groups, political leaders across this country. But I will say that there are those among us who already recognize the value of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We need to expand that circle every day. Thank you very much for your attention, and I look forward to hearing from my esteemed colleagues. Thank you. KREPON: Thanks, Rose. Ambassador Kitano. KITANO: Thank you very much, Michael. And it is a great pleasure and honor for me to be here, together with the distinguished panelists and Undersecretary Rose Gottemoeller and Ambassador Kairat Umarov of Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan is a country with which Japan is working very, very closely all these years in this area, and Ambassador Scheinman, it is a great pleasure. And many of you have a longer engagement with the CTBT. For me, at least, I can date back 20 years. I was one of the team who was involved for the Japanese signing and ratification in 1996 and So for me, it is an unfinished business. And as I am a participant from Vienna and a participant from Japan and I suppose my role here is to provide some of Japan's perspective and also a perspective from Vienna. Vienna is a place where CTBT organization is located. We have daily discussions on all aspects of CTBT. So let me start my presentation in touching upon our response to the most recent debate which happened last Friday, DPRK's fifth test. It was around 2:30 midnight or early in the morning the event happened. And immediately, an international warning system of CTBT detected this event. And of course, the Preparatory Commission was called to convene and a technical briefing provided. And the countries expressed their perspective on this event. And we have come up with a report and saying that many condemning the announced nuclear test and expressing grave concern over the serious, negative effect about any such test on international peace and security. It is needless to say that this test constituted a serious, grave threat to Japan's security. And it also undermines the peace and security of Northeast Asia and also the international community as a whole. And also in the context of CTBT, I would say that it is a stark reminder of the necessity of the legal, Page 4 of 20

5 binding instrument, legally binding commitment for not to conduct nuclear tests. Now, having said that, I would like to touch upon the significance of CTBT in today's context. For me, the question which is in front of us is appropriate, is it in our interests to try to strengthen, enhance a set of ideas not to conduct nuclear weapon tests? You know, we can hold an international standard for not to conduct nuclear weapon. For me, in view of the most recent event last week, the answer is very much evident and clear. Yes, it is, it is in our interests to do so; we should aim for a set of ideas for not to conduct nuclear testing. And it is very much widely shared. And CTBT was established for that purpose. CTBT was very much widely shared, agreed international agreement. And it has a signing states of 183 signing states. And it has been ratified by 164 states. And this number will soon increase to 166, adding such countries as Swaziland and Myanmar. And as is well-known, all P5 states and nuclear weapon states under NPT, and together with India and Pakistan, declared and maintain moratoria for not to conduct nuclear tests. And it is quite widely shared ideas. Think about the situation if another test, a new test would be conducted anywhere in the world, whether it would be in Northeast Asia, whether it would be in South Asia, whether it would be in Middle East or anywhere else, it should most certainly exacerbate the international security situation very seriously. So thinking about that, I suppose it is very much important we should make efforts to enhance this set of ideas, international standards for not making, conducting nuclear test. But here, I have to make one very much important caveat. That is to say, what we should aim at is a legally binding commitment not to conduct nuclear testing. This should be effectuated by way of entering into force for CTBT. But my point is, while we strive for that, it would be in our interests to strengthen this set of ideas, an international standard not to conduct nuclear testing. Now, I would like to touch upon another important aspect of CTBT, and that is to say a ratification mechanism of CTBT. The idea, underlying idea of a CTBT is that we should come up with a verifiable nuclear test ban treaty, as Rose has mentioned. And for that purpose CTBT is treated in ways very much and robust, solid mechanism of verification centered on international monitoring system. Now, around the world there are around 300 monitoring stations. And they send data to International Data Center of CTBTO. And they gather information and analyze. It is with this system which detected all five nuclear tests of DPRK, including their most recent. So my point here is it is very much in our interests to strengthen, improve this set. And before I make my concluding remarks, let me and touch upon our role as what we call Article 14 co-coordinator. Article 14 is one that was a mechanism of the treaty by which co-coordinator tried to push for the process of entering into force. And the general image of CTBT is that the CTBT might be in limbo, nothing and not many things are happening in the ratification for the remaining eight countries, and putting aside all the effort which is conducted in the United States. From my standpoint (inaudible). For example, China, China had started sending data from their monitoring stations to the International Data Center of CTBT for certification. Thinking about Israel, and Israel's (inaudible) is that the ratification of the CTBT is not a question of why, but it is a question of when. And they could pull out specific issues that have to be addressed. Page 5 of 20

6 Think about Pakistan, for example. Pakistan is one of three countries among the remaining eight and (inaudible) countries who have not signed the treaty. But Pakistan gained the status of observer and status of CTBT, they are part of the discussion of CTBTO in that capacity. And it was quite recent that they made a proposal and was calling to India why not making one step forward for the nuclear test moratorium. So things are happening. So in our role, Kazakhstan and Japan, what we are trying to do is trying to gather this momentum and trying to channel that in the right direction. And concluding remarks, maybe I would like to mention two things. The role of the U.S. is very much important. Japan, and I personally, appreciated, welcomed all the effort it has made and U.S. is making and U.S. is going to make and, of course, the advancement of CTBT. And why I say this, it is not only from disarmament nonproliferation standpoint we are saying, it is based on security considerations we are saying that, too. And as you can see, in my presentation I made reference to DPRK issues, which is national security issues. As you would understand. The last one pitch I would like to make is the significance of this year, and this year is the 20th year anniversary of this opening for signature for CTBT. As I said, in Vienna there is a strong sense that it is unfinished business, let us finish what we have started 20 years. And what happened this year, two rounds of nuclear tests. This is very much in a way we would like to condemn it, but it is also a wake-up call, and it gives at least us a very important message. So what our role is now, to take that message and try to transfer it, bring it to action. Thank you very much for your attention. KREPON: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Ambassador Umarov. UMAROV: It's a pleasure to be here at the Stimson Center. And thank you, Michael and Daryl, for inviting me to speak today as part of this distinguished panel. It's quite symbolic that this event to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the CTBT coincides with the 25th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site in Kazakhstan. These two important events are very much linked. By closing one of the world's largest test sites, Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, made history as the first to legally ban nuclear tests. It wasn't long before other nuclear states or nuclear test sites followed Semipalatinsk, creating a unique condition needed to ensure the ban for nuclear tests becoming a global phenomenon. The day the test site was closed, August 29th, 1991, paved the way for adoption of the CTBT. It is very symbolic that August 29th is recognized by the U.N. as the international day against nuclear tests and is commemorated across the world annually. Another well-known initiative of Kazakhstan, it is the ATOM Project, which stands for Abolish Testing Our Mission. The project is aimed at creating global awareness and support for a final and irrevocable nuclear test ban. It engages hundreds of thousands of general public across the world by explaining the consequences of nuclear tests. It encourages anyone who opposes the nuclear weapons to sign an online petition urging their governments to abandon nuclear testing permanently and help to ensure the CTBT is achieved. At the beginning of this year, my president actually introduced a new and very interesting, I think, initiative, the Manifesto: The World. The 21st Century. Page 6 of 20

7 In this vision and document, my president suggests that the international community should stop being complacent about the nuclear threat and develop a holistic action plan to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, nuclear wars. It actually declares war on wars. Ladies and gentlemen, 20 years ago, U.N. General Assembly resolution adopted the CTBT. Twenty years is a long period of time. But the treaty which was designed to be a key element in the international security system has not yet entered into force. We believe that the reason the CTBT hasn't entered into force is a lack of political will in the Annex 2 states. Political will is essential to build a sense for global solidarity for our shared future. North Korean nuclear and missile testing of recent weeks and months gives added urgency and shows that the global risks of nuclear testing and proliferation are not eliminated completely. With each and every test, we see that North Korea is trying, is attempting to modernize its nuclear capability, which is a very dangerous thing for the global security. Kazakhstan strongly condemns the actions of DPRK leadership. It's not only causing serious damage to the efforts of the international community on nuclear disarmament, but also undermines nuclear balance and security. We need CTBT in place to further pressure Pyongyang to abandon its unacceptable practice and renounce nuclear ambitions. We need CTBT to outlaw DPRK's activities in this dangerous sphere. The treaty and related efforts have so far proved effective. We are confident that the impact will increase significantly after the CTBT enters into force. Considerable progress has been made in creating and deploying the international monitoring system. This system, even in its uncompleted state, has helped to identify nuclear tests conducted by DPRK, including the most recent ones. All onthe-ground nuclear explosions, however small or clandestine, were successfully registered, including by five Kazakh stations connections to IMS. Measures taken by CTBTO on strengthening the verification regime as well as conducting on-site inspections and field experiments should be commended and further supported. Probably we should follow the famous Ronald Reagan's principle, "trust, but verify," but in a little bit reverse order. Probably today we have this verification system in place, in function; now we should probably work on building the trust, which really could help change hearts and minds. And we think that CTBT could exactly play that role. As co-coordinators of Article 14, Kazakhstan and Japan conduct consistent work to help facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT. We made clear our intentions in the high-level joint statement in October, last October, by President Nazarbayev and Prime Minister Abe, as well as this year in two other statements issued at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and the open-ended working group in Geneva. We are committed to continue our efforts on the Annex 2 and Annex 1 states to make the CTBT universal. As a nation, we are also taking important steps domestically to ensure the treaty's entry into force. This August, Almaty hosted the IX International Conference summit titled Monitoring of Nuclear Tests and Their Consequences, aimed at improving the verification methods further and facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT. We also intend to build a radio nuclear control and normal gas station in Kazakhstan. It will help considerably intensify capabilities of the CTBT monitoring system and will be our significant contribution to the nuclear test ban process. Later today, together with Senator Markey, we will host an event at the Capitol Visitors Center in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, where we will further discuss the human and environmental costs of nuclear weapons as well as importance Page 7 of 20

8 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Let me close by stressing the following. The people of Kazakhstan have suffered from the effects of nuclear testing, as well as Japan actually, nuclear testing, and we understand the risks and consequences of nuclear test exposures. This makes us principal believers in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty effectiveness and necessity to bring it into force. Pending the entry into the force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we support the adoption of the U.N. Security Council resolution that would emphasize the importance of maintaining moratoria on nuclear testing and would build support for the completion of the treaty's verification regime. As an incoming, non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, Kazakhstan is looking forward to working with all our partners to achieve progress in this direction. Thank you for your attention. KREPON: Thank you, Ambassador. (APPLAUSE) We might just have one or two minutes for one or two quick questions for Undersecretary Gottemoeller. So let's take those, then we'll go to the rest of the panel. And why don't we start here in the middle? Thank you. Just identify yourself. QUESTION: Hi, Rachel Oswald, a reporter with Congressional Quarterly. Undersecretary, based on your remarks, it seemed that I was hearing from you that the U.N. Security Council resolution will not invoke Chapter 7 authority and that it sounds like it's unlikely words like "determine" and "decide" will be used in the resolution. Correct me if I'm wrong. But will there be any kind of determination that signatories to the treaty should abstain from nuclear testing? And wouldn't the effect of passage of such a resolution be for it to become customary international law? GOTTEMOELLER: No. (LAUGHTER) First of all, I will just reiterate the points that I made during my remarks, that the U.N. Security Council resolution that we are still working on in New York, and as it is a diplomatic effort, diplomatic negotiation with exchanges back and forth still going on, I'm not going to speculate about final word formulations or anything like that. But I can, once again, confirm and underscore for this audience that it will not impose new, legally binding constraints on nuclear testing. That is not the kind of UNSCR that we are after. We are after, and we have been from the outset, a U.N. Security Council resolution that would really give new momentum to entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in this, the 20th year since its opening for signature. And entry into force at its very heart means that states fulfill their internal procedures for entry into force, whether it is pursuing in our own system the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. And people kind of confuse this oftentimes. It is the Senate that gives advice and consent, but it is the president of the United States who actually completes the ratification process. So that is our own national procedure. Whatever the national procedure is, this UNSCR will push forward the momentum toward entry into Page 8 of 20

9 force and each state, in turn, that is among the Annex 2 states will have to complete its own national procedures for ratification. So I do want to underscore that for this audience today. KREPON: Undersecretary Gottemoeller, I just want to respect your time. Are we... GOTTEMOELLER: One more question is OK, if you have one. KREPON: One more question, all right. Julian Borger from The Guardian. QUESTION: Julian Borger from The Guardian. So the other side of that question is, if it doesn't add any binding force, what is the point of it, you know, other than the formal words encouraging countries to adhere to it? In what way does it add momentum? GOTTEMOELLER: Julian, the U.N. Security Council frequently lends its political weight, its international authority to any number of international goals and international policy campaigns. In this case, I stress the entry into force goal, lending momentum into entry into force, but we actually have three goals for this U.N. Security Council resolution. Yes, lend momentum to entry into force is number one. Number two Ambassador Kitano talked about in quite an articulate way, that is strengthening and lending additional moral authority to the moratoria. And the moratoria have had real effect. They are not legally binding, but they have had real effect. We have not tested since We have not conducted a nuclear explosive test. So these moratoria are important to the cessation of nuclear testing worldwide, even though they are not, quote, "legally binding" and this U.N. Security Council resolution will lend new authority and momentum to the moratoria. And the third very important reason is to bolster the work of the PrepCom for the comprehensive test ban, the CTBTO and its very important verification system, the international monitoring system, which over time has gained great effectiveness. Again, I'm grateful to my colleagues for underscoring the role it played in the DPRK test last Friday. Within a very short time, the CTBTO had, from the IMS, results out to the international community in a very public way. And I want to underscore, that is a great, valuable aspect of the IMS, that it does make available to the entire international community serious information about nuclear testing events when they sadly occur, as has been the case with the DPRK tests just this year. It was the IMS that was first off the block with important public information about the nuclear test. We have our own national technical means. They are very important to our own national confidence about what is going on in the nuclear testing realm, but a lot of that information is classified, it cannot be made available to the international community. So the IMS is a very valuable tool for the public role it plays in constraining nuclear testing. So I must excuse myself. My colleague, Ambassador Scheinman, is really good on all these legal issues. (LAUGHTER) So he'll be glad to... KREPON: I'll put some more. GOTTEMOELLER: He'll be glad to answer some more questions. And I apologize to my colleagues, but I will see you later today on Capitol Hill. So thank you very much. Page 9 of 20

10 KREPON: Thank you very much. We'll just take a moment as we transition here. KIMBALL: I want to join Michael Krepon and the Stimson Center, on behalf of the Arms Control Association, in appreciating the work of the people on the panel over the years on the Test Ban Treaty. I want to recognize the immense value of Kazakhstan's decision to close Semipalatinsk's test site, as Ambassador Umarov said, and Ambassador Kitano's work over the decades has been immense and I want to thank him for coming all the way from Vienna just for this event and some other meetings today, and Ambassador Scheinman also. And we have some people in the audience who have a deep familiarity and experience with the Test Ban Treaty, and there are others representing some of the governments and Security Council who are part of this effort also. So we have more time for your questions. And so I just wanted to, once again, open up the floor to questions to the entire panel or to a particular panelist. I see Mr. David Culp from the Friends Committee on National Legislation, in the middle, and there's a microphone for you. QUESTION: Thank you. So a question for the two of you. So as you probably know, 35 Republican senators sent a letter responding to the president saying if the administration goes forward we win, we're going to try to cut off all the money toward the CTBT. So, Adam, do you take this threat seriously? And, Ambassador, you're in Vienna, what would be the impact of U.S. nonpayment to the CTBTO for next year? KIMBALL: And just to clarify, it was written by 33 senators, not 35. QUESTION: Thirty-three, sorry. (LAUGHTER) KIMBALL: All right. Ambassador Scheinman, you want to start, please? SCHEINMAN: Yeah. Well, I can answer that very quickly. I think, David, we certainly take seriously letters from, you know, close to three dozen senators on this question. So our best answer to the group is to answer the questions that they raise, as honestly and as factually as we can. We don't believe that the threats that this group of senators believe exists, is really there, and we'll continue to have conversations with the Senate on what this resolution is and what it isn't. And we think we can address the criticisms very effectively. So I think that's my answer. I pass to Mr. Kitano. KIMBALL: Ambassador Kitano? KITANO: Thank you very much for your question. And the United States is a very important contributor to the CTBTO. And it provides a very much important contribution to our extra budgetary resources also. And it is a very much an important basis for various activities in the CTBT. And verification regime is one of them. And as has been mentioned by Rose and others, this verification mechanism has been in Page 10 of 20

11 operation. And CTBT has not come into effect. So legally speaking, it is not a legally binding instrument. But at the same time, what is very much noticeable is that CTBT is operational and (inaudible) for its verification mechanism. And it is functioning and it functions well and detected all kinds of nuclear tests of DPRK. So I suppose the question I would like to put forward is, will it be in our interests to strengthen that mechanism or not? And U.S. contribution plays a very important role, I would say. Thank you very much. SCHEINMAN: Let me just add one comment. You know, the fact of U.S. funding for the international monitoring system has been with us under both Republican and Democratic administrations. And that's been because, we think, that the IMS actually adds to our own verification capability by providing a global system. That's why it has had the support of Republicans historically. And I suspect, you know, that will remain. KIMBALL: Yeah. Before we go to other questions, let me just see if I could ask Adam a question to clarify Rose Gottemoeller's earlier answer about the concerns of some of these senators. She said that the resolution that the United States is seeking at the Security Council and the P5 statement would not impose any new, legally binding prohibition on nuclear testing. And specifically, as I read a couple of the letters, the concern was about, from Senator Corker, a specific proposal in the P5 statement and the Security Council resolution that might clarify that a nuclear test explosion would violate or defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which, of course, is to ban, prohibit all nuclear test explosions. Would it be fair to say that if that were part of the P5 statement or referenced in the Security Council resolution would be a public articulation of an existing obligation as a signatory not to violate the purpose or intent? How is the administration interpreting that particular aspect of this issue? SCHEINMAN: Yeah. So we had developed the idea in concert with our P5 partners of issuing a statement that would express a national view that each of us share, which is that a nuclear test would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. And as a signatory obligation we all share under CTBT since we've all signed or ratified the treaty, this would then be sort of a national interpretation of our obligations under international law not to defeat the object or purpose of the treaty. The resolution itself would not try to impose that. Our idea is that the resolution would not try to impose that particular interpretation on U.N. member states. It would simply take note of the statement made by the P5 states. KIMBALL: OK, thank you for that clarification. Do we have other questions from the audience, or have we answered every question that you have about the longest-sought, hardest-fought treaty in arms control history? Oh, we have a question here. Mr. Horner, I think I know who you are. (LAUGHTER) QUESTION: Hi, Dan Horner from Nuclear Intelligence Weekly. Panelists here and elsewhere have talked about the North Korean test in the context of the CTBT and the need for having the CTBT. Can you say what you think would have been different about North Korea's behavior if a CTBT had been enforced, given that North Korea has flouted international norms repeatedly? Would that have changed the decision-making and the dynamics? Or what do you think would have been different with a CTBT in force? Page 11 of 20

12 I'll address it initially to Ambassador Kitano, but I'd like to hear all the panelists on that. Thanks. KIMBALL: Thank you. Ambassador? KITANO: Yes. When CTBT is entered into effect, it means that all the remaining annexed states should ratify that. That means in the DPRK should have ratified that. Yes, if that is the case, in that situation, and the DPRK is legally bound by all the provisions of CTBT, including its Article One obligation, very basic obligation not to conduct explosive nuclear testing, so that would be very much in a strong engagement, legal engagement on the part of DPRK. So that is the situation which we would very much aim at. And the other thing which I mention is that I would not say that that would happen overnight. I mentioned in my earlier presentation now there is a very much widely shared international standard not to test. It is only one country in this century who conducted nuclear testing, that is DPRK. So it would be what we should aim at is try to enhance and strengthen that international standard with a view to not coming up with an alternative. This is also the point which was also mentioned by Mr. Umarov of Kazakhstan. Thank you very much. UMAROV: I think that it will create a momentum again to pressurize North Korea to stop testing on the side of other P5 countries and other countries in the world, just to make sure that North Korea is behaving itself outside as an outcast, as an outsider of the international law and boundaries. So I think that this will also create some momentum when we have CTBT in force, enforced, and that will help other countries to make good, resolute actions just to condemn DPRK. KIMBALL: Ambassador Scheinman? SCHEINMAN: Yeah, just I'd add very quickly. I tell you, Dan, you're very optimistic anticipating a CTBT in force because, of course, that means North Korea has signed and ratified the treaty. And obviously, that's the hardest nut to crack among the list of Annex 2 states. In the absence of a CTBT in force, our job should be to create the highest-possible barriers to additional North Korean nuclear testing. If we can't do it today with a CTBT in force, then it seems incumbent upon us to find other ways to do it. And that's one of the reasons why we've looked at the idea of a U.N. Security Council resolution as increasing the political barriers to nuclear testing by North Korea. KIMBALL: All right. Other questions? Jolene, why don't we start over here again, and then we'll come over here. QUESTION: I have a question for Ambassador Scheinman. Is this resolution the last hurrah for the Prague agenda of this administration that, you know, started so optimistically and has, for many different reasons, fallen short of the aspirations? Or is there more to come, are there more options for the administration under that agenda in its last months? SCHEINMAN: Well, I'd say that there are a number of elements of the Prague agenda that are still very much in play, irrespective of our ability to compel states to do exactly what we'd like them to do. You know, the offer is still on the table for Russia to join us in pursuing nuclear reductions. Russia doesn't seem to want to take us up on the offer. Page 12 of 20

13 We'd be very happy to be engaged in multilateral negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty, but Pakistan has not allowed that negotiation to go forward in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament for reasons I think everyone here knows. And we, of course, are pursuing this idea on a CTBT. But, you know, I wouldn't say that the initiative rose from a sort of last-ditch effort to, you know, maybe bookend the Prague agenda. The idea actually originated among some here in this room, that, you know, coming on 20 years since the treaty was open for signature. And, you know, with our interest in guarding against some level of fatigue where political and maybe financial support starts to lag, this was a good time to reaffirm international support for the CTBT and perhaps to reopen the dialogue in the United States on CTBT, even in ways that we didn't necessarily anticipate. So I think one of the benefits that I've seen through this process, notwithstanding the, you know, fairly tough criticism we've heard from some quarters in the Senate, is by making the issue more visible, we've brought ourselves into a debate on the merits of CTBT, and it's one we welcome. KIMBALL: All right, Edward? QUESTION: Yes, Edward Ifft, Georgetown University. Let me just go back for a moment to the Republican senators' letter and try to maybe clarify. I think the concern that was shown in that letter was that the U.S. was going to go to the Security Council and get a resolution under Chapter 7, which would declare that additional testing would be a threat to international peace and security. That would have led to a binding obligation on all U.N. members, and that could certainly have been viewed as an end run around the Senate's prerogatives regarding advice and consent. As Rose explained, the U.S. is not doing that, we're not going to invoke Chapter 7. The language on... KIMBALL: To your question, please. QUESTION: Sorry? KIMBALL: Your question is? QUESTION: I'm just clarifying. (LAUGHTER) KIMBALL: OK. QUESTION: See if the panel agrees. The language on object and purpose comes from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which says that once you've signed a treaty you may not do anything which would defeat the object and purpose. The U.S. position, as I understand it, is that an additional test would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. You could probably find a lawyer somewhere who would say that an additional test or two would not. See what... SCHEINMAN: Yes, if I could just pick up on that because I think -- I thank Ed for his clarification. It's correct, but it missed one element. Under the Vienna Convention, state signatories are obligated not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty unless they no longer intend to become a party to that treaty. This administration clearly has made its support for CTBT very well known, and so we believe it's our interpretation that that obligation under the Vienna Convention exists. We're not creating it Page 13 of 20

14 through a U.N. Security Council resolution. It's been with us for decades. A future administration, should it believe that a nuclear test was required, could make clear to the international community that it no longer intended to become party to the treaty; and therefore, the obligation under the Vienna Convention no longer applies. So, you know, it's sort of legal arcana, but the important element here is that the obligations of a signatory apply so long as you intend to become a party to that treaty. KIMBALL: Correct. Rachel? QUESTION: Well, thank you, Ed and Adam, you kind of answered some of my questions about customary international law under the Vienna Convention, recognizing the U.S. hasn't ratified the Vienna Convention, but still considers it customary international law. Is there a timeline for when this resolution will come before the Security Council? And how, recognizing that there are discussions ongoing, how are the talks with the P5 countries going, particularly Russia and China? SCHEINMAN: One clarification, the United States does not consider the entire Vienna Convention to represent customary international law, only Article 18 which deals with signatory obligations. And that's been a position of the United States going back, you know, before I got involved in this. The resolution is sort of in an advanced state of negotiation. We hope to have it completed and issued before the end of the month. The discussions with other P5 states has gone very well. They're all supportive of the concept and the construct that we have proposed, a P5 statement that would run in parallel to a resolution. And we're talking with our other colleagues on the council, including Japan and others, in an effort to tie it up in a bow in the next week-and-a-half or two. KIMBALL: Great. Ambassador Kitano, do you have anything else to add. KITANO: No, I don't think so. KIMBALL: OK. And could I ask you, Ambassador Kitano, we were discussing this earlier, you mentioned the severe concern about North Korea's fifth nuclear test. The Security Council is also looking at that issue at the same time that it is dealing with this U.N. Security Council resolution on the test ban ahead of the anniversary of opening for signature, which is the 24th of September. Do you expect that these processes will intermingle or will they be separate? I mean, what can we possibly expect? And I recognize that this is in process and you can't say for sure. But, I mean, what is your hope and expectation as a member of the council? KITANO: Thank you very much for your question. Last week on Friday, the Security Council got together and discussed about the DPRK fifth nuclear test. And the chair's statement has been issued, and it clearly states that the Security Council will lead a follow-on discussion because there has been a previous Security Council resolution, which was after the fifth and fourth nuclear test, and a subsequent missile launch was conducted. And it is Security Council Resolution 2270, and it really spells out if another test would be conducted, the Security Council will be in a position to examine the follow-up actions. So last week, Friday, the Security Council got together and confirmed this line of action. And certainly, Daryl, thank you very much for putting that on the table, there will be this discussion going on. And at the same time, and as has been mentioned by Rose and Adam, there has been a discussion about what to do in a CTBT resolution. And (inaudible) something (inaudible) content and how to Page 14 of 20

15 strengthen CTBT and how to give political support to that. And that is on the one hand. The other is on how to give consequences to what DPRK did last Friday. And this is two topics. So what to do with that would be very much a matter of the Security Council. But what I would like to share with you is that this is this in two lines of discussions and how to do that would be the role of the Security Council. KIMBALL: All right, good. Ambassador Graham, and then we'll go back to (inaudible). QUESTION: I'd just like to ask... KIMBALL: Ambassador Tom Graham, who has had a few things to do with nonproliferation and the test ban treaty. Go ahead. QUESTION: I would just like to ask Ambassador Scheinman a small question. Isn't it the case that part of the argument with the Senate was that the actions of President Bush amounted to the U.S. indicating it did not intend to ratify the CTBT; therefore, the U.S. was no longer bound under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and this statement would correct that or make the U.S. government position clear. SCHEINMAN: No, the intent here was not to find a mechanism to reverse the policy pronouncement of the prior administration. You know, it is true that the last administration made clear to the Senate when questions came up on these issues that it no longer intended to become a party to the CTBT; and therefore, the obligations not to defeat the object and purpose no longer would apply. That's what the last administration had done. In our estimation, that policy was effectively reversed with the Prague speech in 2009 where the president said I will aggressively seek U.S. ratification of the CTBT. Now, it hasn't worked out and that's a different conversation. But clearly, this administration has intended to become a party to the CTBT. So that issue was dealt with at the beginning of the administration, and we have not sought to use this resolution to address or even respond to the actions of the previous administration. This has entirely been about, how do we strengthen support for CTBT, how do we reaffirm the moratoria, and how do we acknowledge the good work that has been done in Vienna? KIMBALL: All right. And I would just hasten to add my colleague Michael Krepon testified last week at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also pointed out that the CTBT remains on the executive calendar of the Senate. There has not been a sufficient number of votes to discharge it and to send it back to the White House. So it's still there, it's still technically the business of the Senate. And several senators in 1999 who voted no expected to have another chance to look at the treaty at some point in the future. So that's an important point to keep in mind with respect to Senate prerogatives, which I think some senators were not actually aware of last week. I think we had another question in the back. Yes, sir? QUESTION: Ray Willeman, University of Maryland. The IDC in Vienna has made significant changes to take advantage of new science, but the overall architecture of their data processing is based on a system developed at a DARPA-funded facility during the 1990s. And some of the new science doesn't fit very well into that architecture. Radionuclide science and seismology and other areas. Do any of you see the possibility of a U.S. or international-led effort to develop a completely new Page 15 of 20