THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: WHERE DOES THE EU STAND?

Transcription

1 Policy Brief No. 10 November 2008 qhdjsqjj THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: WHERE DOES THE EU STAND? Marie Vincent Jan Wouters

2 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: WHERE DOES THE EU STAND? Marie Vincent and Jan Wouters AUTHORS Marie Vincent is Project Manager at the Madariaga - College of Europe Foundation. Jan Wouters is Professor of International Law and International Organizations; Director of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and the Institute for International Law, K.U.Leuven. ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE Jan Wouters Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies K.U.Leuven Blijde-Inkomststraat Leuven jan.wouters@ggs.kuleuven.be Marie Vincent Madariaga College of Europe Foundation Rue Royale 87.B 1000 Brussels Belgium mvincent@madariaga.org This policy brief is based on the discussions resulting from the debate that the Madariaga College of Europe - and the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies organized at the European Parliament on 1 July Professor Edward Luck, Special Advisor of the UN Secretary General and Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the International Peace Institute, delivered the keynote speech. The discussion that followed involved a cross-institutional panel of EU representatives: MEP Ana Gomes, who kindly hosted the meeting, Morten Knudsen from the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Richard Kuehnel from the Cabinet of Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, as well as Muriel Domenach on behalf of the French Presidency of the EU. The paper first provides a brief background of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and then explores its state of play at the UN level. The last part looks at the EU s position on R2P and its preparedness to further integrate this concept in its policies and practices by Marie Vincent and Jan Wouters. All rights reserved. No portion of this paper may be reproduced without permission of the authors. Policy Briefs are research materials circulated by their authors for purposes of information and critical discussion. They have not necessarily undergone formal peer review.

3 1. Introduction In September 2005, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously endorsed the World Summit Outcome Document, paragraphs 138 and of which recognize the individual and collective responsibility of states to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This declaration - reaffirmed by the Security Council in April was seen by many as a historic step towards the entrenchment of an emerging international norm: the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), developed only four years earlier by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). As things turned out, however, this was only the beginning of a fastidious, ongoing process of consensus building in support of R2P. Enduring contest and at times virulent opposition - including from some of its earlier promoters - the meaning and implications of R2P as of yet remain unclear. Despite the sensitivity of the matter, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has shown determination to move the debate forward in order to change words into deeds. Taking steps to operationalise R2P within the UN system, the Secretary-General appointed in February 2008 Professor Edward Luck as his Special Advisor with a Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a caseby-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. (Excerpt from the Outcome document of the 2005 World Summit) 2 Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, adopted by the UN Security Council on 28 April 2006: "The Security Council reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity". 2

4 focus on R2P. Professor Luck's appointment is charged to clarify R2P and build consensus for this evolving norm. To this end, Professor Luck is to propose structural recommendations both in consultation with UN Member States as well as the broader UN system with respect to the conceptual, institutional and political dimensions of R2P. To realize such efforts Professor Luck is working in close cooperation with the UN Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng. 2. Origins R2P was born from the debate on the right of humanitarian intervention which, in the 1990s, bitterly divided the international community with dreadful consequences in Rwanda and Bosnia. After the experience of Kosovo, and the ensuing controversy over the legitimacy of NATO s intervention, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made his famous plea to the General Assembly in September 1999:... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? 3. The Government of Canada took up the challenge and announced the creation of an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun. A year later, the Commission issued its landmark report, The Responsibility to Protect, submitted to Kofi Annan on 18 December The main achievement of the report is to overcome the sovereignty versus intervention dilemma by shifting the terms of the debate from intervention to protection, and thus defending a new, positive conception of state sovereignty: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility 4. Departing from the state-centred, Westphalian notion of sovereignty, based on the principles of territoriality and non-intervention, the idea of sovereignty as responsibility holds that sovereign states are responsible for the welfare and protection of the population living within their jurisdiction, and that they are accountable for discharging this responsibility both internally to their own population, and externally to the international community. The notion of sovereignty as responsibility had effectively 3 Kofi Annan s Millenium Report to the General Assembly, September 2000 ( quoted in The Responsibility to Protect Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; International Development Research Centre; Canada; 2001, p.2) 4 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p.13 3

5 started to take roots in the 1990s largely thanks to the contribution of Francis Deng, then UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons 5. It is also echoed by Kofi Annan s view that states are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa 6. On these grounds, the argument of the ICISS report is as follows: states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes. However, should a state prove unable or unwilling to protect its populations, the responsibility to protect yields to the international community. The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. The use of force should be envisaged only as a last resort, along clear criteria, when all other pacific means have been exhausted 7. As Edward Luck points out, core elements of R2P were already well-developed in Africa in the 1990's. The notion that state sovereignty is not absolute, but conditionalis reflected in the African Union's Constitutive Act of 2000, which asserts under Article 4 the right of the Union to intervene in a member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 3. The Responsibility to Protect within the UN framework From Edward Luck's analysis, the Responsibility to Protect as adopted by the 2005 General Assembly rests on the following three pillars: 1. An affirmation of the primary and continuing legal obligation of states to protect all populations within their territory - whether citizens or not - from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This applies not only to the actual listed crimes, but also to their incitement. 2. A commitment by the international community to assist states in meeting these obligations. Neighbours and regional organisations have a big role to play here, and the South-South dialogue must in this perspective be further 5 See Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, Donald Rothchild, Francis Deng, William Zartman, Sadikiel Kimaro and Terrence Lyons, Brookings Institution Press, Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, The Economist 352 (18 September 1999), p The report sets out 6 criteria for the use of military force: just cause; right intention; last resort; proportional means; reasonable prospects; right authority. 4

6 promoted, alongside North-South processes. It is also important to continue looking at, and learning from, positive cases, and to develop mechanisms of prevention better adapted to R2P situations, distinct from existing conflict prevention mechanisms. Indeed, genocide and other mass atrocity crimes may often not be the result of conflicts. 3. An affirmation by the UN Member States of their responsibility to respond in a timely and decisive manner, in accordance with the UN Charter, to help protect populations from the four listed crimes and violations. Response options include a broad range of pacific measures - diplomatic, political or economic - that do not necessarily require the Security Council s consent. Enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter may however sometimes be necessary. The use of military force, which has absorbed most of the discussions, is in fact only a small part of the response options. The early and targeted deployment of troops may also be considered as a preventive measure, as the case of UNPREDEP in Macedonia successfully highlighted. Edward Luck insists that in order to retain its relevance and political legitimacy, R2P should remain confined to the four most extreme crimes and violations with which it is associated. In this sense, the concept is regarded as narrow but deep, in that the tools necessary for its implementation run deep, whether at the level of the UN, regional and sub-regional organisations, Member States or civil society organisations. State sovereignty lies at the heart of the Responsibility to Protect's principle and, contrary to what its opponents often argue, R2P does not undermine sovereignty, but reinforces it. Ultimately, R2P must be realized as a way that enables the international community to deal with states, as well as for states to deal with their people. It is not a last minute resort, but a lens through which information and data should be looked at and analysed, providing an overall perspective on strategic objectives. Here, the case of Kenya after the contested December 2007 elections provides a revealing example. In the first few months of 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon regularly invoked R2P to describe the situation of unfolding violence, and his Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, issued a statement in late 5

7 January warning political and community leaders of their accountability and the risks incurred for violations of international law, urging them to meet their responsibility to protect the civilian population. It is noteworthy that this statement was not only addressed to state authorities, but to all parties that were behind the violence. This example shows that while R2P does not reinvent what the UN is capable of doing, it does provide a useful framework to interpret events and assess objectives to be achieved. However, R2P does not apply to every crisis situation and one should be careful of not over-stretching the concept. Citing the examples of Burma and Zimbabwe, Edward Luck explained that R2P does not necessarily need to be invoked in order for the international community to take effective action under existing laws, practices and norms. He also warns of the danger upon entering hazardous legal games that set out to determine the nature of whether or not particular human actions actually constitute one of the four R2P crimes. 4. From words to deeds Considerable work remains to be done in order to - in the words of Ban Ki-moon change words into deeds and operationalise R2P. The concept needs to be further explained and clarified, and more adequate mechanisms of early warning and early response must be developed. Ultimately, in its broadest scope, R2P must become realized both within the reasoning, as well as the daily work of institutions. At the UN level, most departments and agencies working on human rights, development, peace building, refugee and humanitarian affairs now have a notion of what R2P is and what it is not. They should at present concentrate on better integrating their capacities, especially in the field of early warning information collection, analysis and use. The UN Human Rights Council, Peace building Commission and International Criminal Court also have, in their respective capacities, a key role to play in the development of mechanisms to operationalise R2P. At the regional level, the African Union s convincing transition from the principle of non-interference to a culture of non-indifference is also worth noting. Presently, it is important to promote an increased Southern ownership of this concept, especially at the state level. Indeed, it is often striking to observe the recalcitrance of many Southern state leaders towards R2P - which some are quick to denounce as a Western neo-imperialist instrument - and the contrasting support of 6

8 their populations for the concept. Western states should be careful not to give the impression that they are trying to impose R2P on the UN, and they may wish to keep their support, at least for a while, discreet on the international stage. However, there still is a lot that Western countries can do internally and at regional level, notably in the EU, to integrate R2P in the daily practice of administrations and to build political support for the concept. For instance, it is important to keep mentioning R2P in parliamentary resolutions to show that these issues are not conceptual empty shells, but that they are alive and real. Civil society organisations have been very active in their efforts to promote R2P, and they should continue to foster debate on the issue within society. Some of them have already been involved in regional consultative roundtables, but they should now also concentrate on creating broad civil society networks, particularly focused at involving developing countries, in order to better coordinate their message. Civil society organisations have a critical role in helping change political values which, in the end, will play a determining factor in deciding the fate of R2P. In an address he gave on 15 July 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reaffirmed his deep and enduring personal commitment to what he described as one of the more powerful but less understood ideas of our times - R2P. As the next step in a long journey, he is expected in the course of November or December 2008 to issue a report on R2P, drafted on the basis of Edward Luck s consultations, that will be submitted to the General Assembly and open to Member States feedback. 5. Where does the EU stand? In the run-up to the 2005 World Summit, EU Member States have notoriously been amongst the most fervent advocates of R2P at the UN level. The European Council in its meeting of June 2005 reaffirmed the importance which it attributes to the concept of the responsibility to protect, which must be implemented by the Security Council 8. The European Commission also embraced the cause and issued, a few days before the Summit, a communication to express its wish to see UN Member States endorse R2P in the outcome document. The EU Council, on 7 November 2005, welcomed the endorsement of R2P, which it reckoned would be an important tool of the international community 9. In its Joint Action on the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo the Council made reference to R2P as referred to in the Security 8 Presidency Conclusions, para. 37: 9 EU Council Conclusions UN World Summit (7 November 2005, Brussels) 7

9 Council s Resolution In its priorities for the 63rd UN General Assembly, the EU reiterated that it attaches great importance to the implementation of the Responsibility to protect, a concept that was endorsed at the 2005 World Summit, and emphasizes the need for further consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in the General Assembly and the Security Council. 11 Among EU institutions, the European Parliament is the one which has most consistently kept R2P on its agenda, including reference to the concept in a number of resolutions - most recently on Burma and on the role of China in Africa. Yet, even within the European Parliament, consensus on R2P remains fragile, as exemplified by the recent opposition of the European People s Party (EPP) and Confederal Group of the European United Left (GUE/NGL) to the insertion of a reference to R2P and the concept of human security in a motion for resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP. Their reluctance was based on the assumption that such concepts are increasingly used to justify military intervention. After some years of rather timid backing of R2P, the European Commission, Council and Parliament reaffirmed their commitment to the concept in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, endorsed in December All three institutions have also welcomed the appointment of Edward Luck as UN Special Adviser, regarding his nomination as an opportunity to promote more substantive debate on R2P. The EU has now also included R2P amongst its priorities for the current and next session of the UN General Assembly. The Commission is of the view that the issue should then move beyond the General Assembly and Security Council, to the Human Rights Council. Current discussions on a possible readjustment of the European Security Strategy, as well the entry into function of the French Presidency of the EU on 1 July 2008, have coincided to give a further push to the EU debate on R2P. Driven by its Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner - who famously conceived the principle of droit d ingérence and has since been a dedicated champion of R2P -, France has 10 Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo, Official Journal of the European Union, 2008, L42/92, third recital of the preamble. 11 European Union Priorities for the 63rd General Assembly of the United Nations, 16 June 2008, para. 18, 8

10 declared its intention to use the exercise of its EU Presidency to promote a debate on R2P among the 27 Member States. Setting an example at the national level, France has included a reference on R2P in both its white paper on defence and national security and its white paper on foreign affairs. The French Presidency believes R2P should be reinforced, even implicitly, through increased commitment to the protection of civilians, through the ICC, and through a fresh rethinking of effective multilateralism as the core concept of the European Security Strategy. In the context of the discussions on the revision of the Security Strategy, the French Presidency focuses on giving more substance to the concept of effective multilateralism and, in this framework, it pushes for the inclusion of a reference to R2P. The French Presidency also intends to focus on the operationalisation of R2P. It will, in this context, set up an informal forum to allow the examination of the civilian protection dimension ahead of peace missions. It will also seek to enhance the role of special advisers. The French Presidency is determined to promote an extensive understanding of R2P, which should clearly start with a commitment to the responsibility to prevent. As part of this extensive understanding, and following the controversy around Bernard Kouchner s call to invoke R2P in the case of Burma following cyclone Nargis, the French Presidency will seek to include natural disasters within the scope of R2P. The European Commission echoed the view of the Presidency that the greatest potential for operationalising R2P at the EU level is in terms of prevention. In this respect, the EU does not need to invent a multitude of new instruments in the name of R2P, having already at its disposal a broad range of conflict prevention instruments: from the structural long-term preventive instruments - such as development co-operation, trade, arms control, human rights, social and environmental policies, as well as political dialogue to the diplomatic and humanitarian instruments for short-term prevention. However, the Commission sees a necessity of further investment in helping states build their capacity to protect their population. And here it could play a useful role, building on its experience at capacity-building in the fields of rule of law and good governance. Early warning is another field that should be prioritised and where the Commission could prove a valuable partner, having developed a checklist for root causes of conflict that it has already shared with the UN and other donors. Lastly, the EU has a broad range of 9

11 instruments in the field of crisis management that could be of use, including civilian capabilities such as police missions. In terms of conceptual understanding, however, the Commission didn t share the view of the French Presidency that R2P should be extensively interpreted. On the contrary, the Commission supports the UN narrow but deep approach focused on the four crimes and violations listed in the Outcome document. As a possible solution to these diverging views, it was suggested to go back to a reading of the 2001 ICISS report which in scope is broader than the Outcome document, but more explicit in its account of what R2P entails. While the debate highlighted the persisting divergence of conceptual interpretations of R2P, it also pointed to the increasing willingness of the EU to make R2P an effective dimension of its foreign and security policy. The EU should thus take advantage of the internal political momentum, combined with the impetus given by Ban Ki-moon at the UN level, to clarify its own position and, if it sees a need for the concept, determine how best it could operationalise it internally to act as a reliable partner to the UN. What means and what capacities is the EU willing to commit? What extra instruments and mechanisms should be put in place? It is important to have an open and non-confrontational discussion of these questions among the 27 Member States and the EU s institutions. Independent of its immediate outcomes, the challenges surrounding R2P are enormous and will necessitate a sustained political commitment for many years to come. 10

12 FURTHER READING Annan, K., In Larger Freedom: towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/59/2005, 21 March Ban Ki-Moon s address at event on Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World, Berlin, 15 July Davis, R., Majekodunmi, B. and Smith-Höhn, Judy, Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities and the Responsibility to protect: Challenges for the UN and the International Community in the 21 st Century in The Responsibility to Protect Occasional Paper Series, International Peace Institute, June 2008 Deng, F., Kimaro, S., Lyons, T., Rothchild, D., Zartman, W., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1996 Fiott, D., The Responsibility to Protect: Sovereignty, Political Will and Capabilities in ISIS Europe s European Security Review, n 39, July ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, December High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, New York, United Nations, December Société française pour le Droit international, La Responsabilité de Protéger: Colloque de Nanterre, Paris, Ed. Pedone,

13 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UN document A/60/L.1, 20 September ement Weiss, Thomas and Hubert, Don, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background - Supplementary Volume to the Report of ICISS, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001 For further information and regular updates on R2P, see the following websites:

14 The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies is an interdisciplinary research centre of the Humanities and Social Sciences at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. It was set up in the Spring of 2007 to promote, support and carry out high-quality international, innovative and interdisciplinary research on global governance. In addition to its fundamental research activities the Centre carries out independent applied research and offers innovative policy advice and solutions to policy-makers on multilateral governance and global public policy issues. The Centre brings together talent from throughout the University. It operates on the basis of co-ownership and the strong conviction that interdisciplinary research creates added value to resolve complex multi-faceted international problems. The Centre promotes pioneering projects in law, economics and political science and actively initiates and encourages interdisciplinary, cross-cutting research initiatives in pursuit of solutions to real world problems. The cross-cutting initiatives are thematic projects around which University researchers join forces across disciplines to forge responses to complex global challenges. The cross-cutting initiatives address critical issues in relation to globalization, governance processes and multilateralism, with a particular focus on the following areas: (i) the European Union and global multilateral governance; (ii) trade and sustainable development; (iii) peace and security, including conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding; (iv) human rights, democracy and rule of law. In full recognition of the complex issues involved, the Centre approaches global governance from a multilevel and multi-actor perspective. The multi-level governance perspective takes the interactions between the various levels of governance (international, European, national, subnational, local) into account, with a particular emphasis on the multifaceted interactions between the United Nations System, the World Trade Organization, the European Union and other regional organizations/actors in global multilateral governance. The multi-actors perspective pertains to the roles and interactions of various actors at different governance levels, these include public authorities, non-governmental organizations and private actors such as corporations. For more information, please visit the website Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Europahuis, Blijde Inkomststraat 5, 3000 Leuven, Belgium Tel Fax info@ggs.kuleuven.be 13