SOUTH AFRICA S SECOND TENURE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL:

Transcription

1 SOUTH AFRICA S SECOND TENURE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: Promoting the African Agenda Proceedings of an IGD roundtable, 3 February 2012 Compiled by Francis Kornegay and Fritz Nganje

2

3 SOUTH AFRICA S SECOND TENURE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: Promoting the African Agenda Proceedings of an IGD roundtable, 3 February 2012 Compiled by Francis Kornegay and Fritz Nganje

4 Institute for Global Dialogue, 2012 Published in April 2012 by the Institute for Global Dialogue ISBN: Institute for Global Dialogue 3rd Floor UNISA Building 263 Skinner Street Pretoria Tel: Fax: With generous financial support from the Open Society Foundation for South Africa 2nd floor, B2, Park Lane Corner of Park & Alexandra Roads Pinelands 7405 Cape Town Editor: Beth le Roux Design and layout: Andri Steyn Images: Shutterstock All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored, or transmitted without the prior permission of the publisher. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged.

5 CONTENT INTRODUCTION 1 ABOUT THE SPEAKERS 3 OPENING ADDRESS BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION, MR MARIUS FRANSMAN 5 REFLECTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE AFRICAN AGENDA 11 INTERACTIVE DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FLOOR 17 CONCLUSION 23 ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE 25

6

7 INTRODUCTION South Africa s second tenure on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has, much like the first, generated broad dialogue from a range of actors and observers. Observers have been particularly keen to discern how South Africa navigates its second tenure, interacting with fellow BRICS permanent (Russia and China) and non-permanent (India and Brazil) members on the Council, while also promoting the African agenda. This is due to Africa s centrality within South Africa s foreign policy objectives. As such, the Open Society Foundation (OSF- SA) funded the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) to convene two roundtables on South Africa s second UNSC tenure, the first focusing on the emerging powers dimension and the second focusing on the African agenda, factoring in its BRICS affiliation. The first roundtable was convened on 25 August 2011, just as the Libyan regime of Brother Leader Muammar Gaddafi collapsed. The second IGD roundtable was organised in partnership with the Policy Research and Analysis Unit (PRAU) of the South African Department of International Relation and Cooperation (DIRCO). This roundtable, which was held on 3 February 2012, sought to unpack salient features of South Africa s promotion of the African agenda. This report provides an overview of the key points that came out of the discussion. 1

8

9 ABOUT THE SPEAKERS Aubrey Matshiqi was a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Policy studies (CPS) in Johannesburg until March 2011, and is now a research fellow at the Helen Suzman Foundation. He is also a research fellow at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies (Stias). At CPS he specialized in South African politics with a focus on the ANC and the tripartite alliance, the re-alignment of opposition political politics, electoral system reform and the state of democracy in South Africa. At Stias, he has conducted research on historical memory and politics in post-apartheid South Africa. Fadl Nacerodien is Director of the Policy Research and Analysis Unit in the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation. He has served in various positions in the Department, including as an official in South Africa s Permanent Mission to the UN. Ncumisa Notutela is a Director of UN Affairs in the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation. She has served as an official representative in different South African and bilateral and multilateral missions, including the South African Permanent Mission to the UN. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is an associate professor based at the Centre for Defence and Security Management, Graduate School of Public and Development at the University of the Witwatersrand. He has worked at various academic institutions and between 1994 and 1999 managed the research programme of the Institute for Global Dialogue. He is a member of a team coordinating the research and training activities of the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network. 3

10

11 OPENING ADDRESS BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION, MR MARIUS FRANSMAN In his State of the Nation Address of February 2011, President Zuma said, We have taken up our non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, which we will use to promote the African agenda as well as peace and security in Africa and the world. We have come a long way and we have achieved a lot, but challenges still remain. Allow me to thank the Institute for Global Dialogue for inviting me to this august event, and for giving us an opportunity to share with you some of our foreign policy postures, especially our second tenure in the UNSC in which we are promoting the African agenda. South Africa is an integral part of Africa and therefore, its interests are inseparable from those of the continent. We cannot sustain our hard-won freedom and prosperity, unless our neighbours are safe and prosperous and so goes the adage that says beggar my neighbour, better my neighbour. I say this because our foreign policy posture moves from a premise that there is an inextricable link between our future and that of Africa for the greater good of our continent. It would be recalled that on 12 October 2010 South Africa was once again elected by the United Nations General Assembly to serve as a non-permanent member of the organisation s Security Council (UNSC) for the term. Our country received 182 out of a possible 191 votes of member states attending the meeting. Our candidacy was endorsed by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as the African Union (AU) as the African candidate for this rotating seat on the UN organ. It is against this backdrop that on 1 January 2011, we began our second term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. In pursuing the UNSC membership, we had to build on the achievements and lessons learnt during our previous tenure ( ) in the Council. We did realise therefore that there is a need for continuity in order to consolidate our gains, but also to create flexibility 5

12 south africa s second tenure in the un security council to improve on our work and respond effectively to emerging global issues and challenges. It has become public knowledge that our foreign policy trajectory remains firmly anchored in championing the African agenda and that of other developing countries of the world. In this context, we will continue our efforts to bring into full view our national interests, African aspirations, as well as an equitable and just world order. We have said on various occasions that our vision is of an African continent that is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist, united and which contributes to a world that is just and equitable. Quite clearly, our membership of the Security Council presents us with a golden opportunity to promote the African agenda as well as South Africa s national priorities thus giving us an edge to advance the maintenance of international peace and security for socio-economic development to prosper. I am now reminded by what our Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, said upon our resumption of membership on the UNSC on 5 January 2011: South Africa in the conduct of its international relations is committed to garner support for our domestic priorities; to promote the interests of the African Continent; to promote democracy and human rights; uphold justice and international law in relations between nations; seek the peaceful resolution of conflicts; and promote economic development through regional and international co-operation in an inter-dependent world. Accordingly, our membership on the Security Council coincided with a number of challenges, among them, but not limited to, the holding of a referendum in Southern Sudan, the post-electoral challenges in Côte d Ivoire, the fluid situation in the Middle East and North Africa, and debates around the possible drawdown or exit of key UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Chad/Central African Republic (MONUSCO and MINURCAT) respectively. The first year of South Africa s membership on the UNSC has also been marked by the busy agenda of the Council. During this time, the Council adopted over 55 resolutions, considered 30 presidential statements, and made over 40 press statements. The UNSC has also convened more than 60 meetings in closed consultation to deliberate on various issues on its agenda. Several open debates with participation at Head of Government or Ministerial level including debates on Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Somalia and Timor Leste have also taken place. South Africa has actively participated in all activities of the UNSC in line with its national priorities. Our delegation in New York has made inputs to various UNSC discussions, including debates and consultations on draft resolutions, reports, presidential and press statements. 6

13 proceedings of an igd roundtable, 3 february 2012 With regard to leadership roles in the Security Council, South Africa assumed the chairmanship of the UNSC 1540 Committee (on weapons of mass destruction and non-state actors). In our role as chair, we oversaw the work of the four sub-committees of the 1540 Committee which (1) monitor implementation by member states of the resolution; (2) facilitate assistance that member states may require in implementation; (3) facilitate cooperation with international organisations, as well as other Security Council committees; and (4) conduct media outreach activities and ensure transparency in the work of the committee. South Africa is also chair of the UNSC Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa and serves as Vice-Chair of the Côte d Ivoire and Liberia Sanctions Committees. The Security Council dedicates most of its energy and time to peace and security matters on the African continent. In this regard, more than 70% of Security Council deliberations are centred around African conflict situations, while six of the UN s fourteen peacekeeping operations and nearly 80% of its peacekeepers are deployed on the African continent, including MONUSCO, DRC (23,383 personnel) and UNAMID, Sudan (27,501 personnel). The UNSC has from the beginning of 2011 adopted more than 55 resolutions and 30 presidential statements of which a majority are on Africa issues. Since the beginning of its membership of the UNSC, South Africa sought to promote the country s national priorities and the African agenda. As such, most of the policy positions adopted and pursued by the country since January 2011 have been guided largely by African and AU positions on African conflicts. In this regard, South Africa continued to cooperate and work with other representatives of Africa on the UNSC (Nigeria and Gabon) to elevate the African agenda of achieving peace, security and development. However, the three African countries did not always adopt common positions on African issues before the agenda of the Council. As you are aware, South Africa served as the President of the Security Council for the month of January The Presidency of the UNSC affords the country an opportunity to leave a positive legacy of its two-year term in the Council. This is particularly important for the non-permanent members, as it allows them an opportunity to highlight issues of national interest. In this context, the Presidency of the Security Council has the option of promoting a new or recurring theme of particular national, regional or international significance. Accordingly, South Africa utilised its rotating presidency of the UNSC to continue a debate within the Security Council aimed at enhancing co-operation between the UN and the AU in the maintenance of international peace and security. This initiative was consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as well as the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and Security Council resolution 1625 (2005) which underscore the need to enhance partnership between the UN and regional organisations in the prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes. 7

14 south africa s second tenure in the un security council The country s efforts aimed at bringing greater alignment to the work of both Councils and are an intensification of the work South Africa had already undertaken in conflict prevention, resolution, management and post-conflict reconstruction and peace building in African countries such as Sudan, Côte d Ivoire, Burundi, the DRC and elsewhere. In this regard, the South African delegation convened a high-level debate on 12 January 2012 on strengthening the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, in the maintenance of international peace and security. The debate was presided over by President Jacob Zuma and included participation by the UN Secretary-General, representatives of the AU and other members of the UNSC. At the conclusion of the debate, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2033 (2012). Amongst others, this resolution reiterated the importance of establishing a more effective relationship between the AU and UNSC, including in the areas of conflict prevention, resolution and management, electoral assistance and regional conflict prevention offices. The resolution also encourages the improvement of regular interaction, consultation and coordination between the two bodies on matters of mutual interest. Due to the collective work of South Africa, African members of the UNSC and like-minded countries in the UNSC, some progress has been achieved in enhancing and strengthening the partnership between the AU and UN. Currently, the AU PSC and the UNSC convene annual meetings to deliberate on issues before their respective agenda. The two organs also collaborate on key peacekeeping missions and conflict situations including in the Sudan (UNAMID) and Somalia (AMISOM). I am pleased to announce therefore that both the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat have made significant progress in terms of supporting operational deployments and long term capacity building as well as desk-to-desk co-operation. However, some challenges remain in efforts to strengthen the co-operation between the two organisations. More needs to be done to improve interaction, consultation and coordination between the two bodies on matters of mutual interest. As President Zuma argued during the UNSC debate on 12 January 2012, It is critical to build a stronger relationship in order to avoid the situation that occurred during the conflict in Libya last year. The African Union had developed a political road map that would have helped resolve that country s political conflict, but it was ignored in favour of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization s (NATO) bombing of Libya. During its remaining 12 months on the Security Council, South Africa will again endeavour to utilise its membership in a manner that will add value to the work of the Council. We will play an active role in the activities of the Security Council committees, working groups, commissions and other structures. Furthermore, 8

15 proceedings of an igd roundtable, 3 february 2012 South Africa will endeavour to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by inter alia participating in the Council s conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction agenda. Crucially, the country s strategy will also entail promoting a culture of collective responsibility and collective responses in dealing with challenges of the contemporary world. South Africa will underscore and strive for enhanced Security Council co-operation with regional bodies and other relevant institutions in the realisation of its mandate. Our country will also work with other likeminded member states towards improving the working methods of the Security Council to make it a more legitimate, representative and effective body and in order to make it more transparent and accountable. Resolution 2033 of 2012 seeks to strengthen the UNSC with the AU to promote the African agenda to achieve peace and development on the African continent because we strongly believe that we cannot achieve peace without development nor development without peace. As we celebrate the centenary of the oldest liberation movement in Africa, the African National Congress, we hope the political freedom we won will help us create a stronger AU. I hope that this address will stimulate more dialogue in search of some of the answers we need in order to strengthen our foreign policy trajectory, especially at the UN. Lets use this opportunity to engage frankly and openly on issues very closer to our hearts, no matter how thorny they may be. I am convinced that we will all leave this room refreshed, with more energy to confront the challenges that still face us. Let us gather our thoughts together in order to create a more vibrant South Africa in the UN. 9

16

17 REFLECTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE AFRICAN AGENDA The roundtable discussion on whether South Africa has sufficiently championed the African agenda in the UNSC was framed by a think piece presented by Aubrey Matshiqi. As posited by Former President Nelson Mandela, the hub of South Africa s post-apartheid foreign policy should lie in its African policy. The first post-apartheid president of South Africa emphasised the need for South Africa to assist the rest of Africa in addressing the woes facing the continent without overriding the will of African states in its actions. Nelson Mandela articulated that five central pillars should guide South Africa s future foreign policy. These were a respect for human rights, the promotion of democracy, respect for justice and international law, the need to strive for peace, promoting the African agenda and lastly, achieving economic development through international cooperation. Reflecting on a post-cold War global order where the balance of power was shifting from the West, these issues were deemed to become key in South Africa s new foreign policy. From Mandela s conception of Africa s centrality within South Africa s postapartheid foreign policy, as well as the current complexities of African politics, two questions surface. Firstly, can South Africa s conception of the African agenda transcend apparent intra-african divisions? Secondly, is South Africa s African agenda Africa s agenda? Democracy in South Africa came about through peaceful negotiations and compromise. As a result, finding peaceful solutions is South Africa s approach to foreign policy. The foreign policy of post-apartheid South Africa must navigate the tension between the foreign policy expectations of what former president, Thabo Mbeki, referred to as two nations one belonging to the Western, and the other to the African and so-called Third World spheres of influence. Also, the fact that the numerical minority of South Africa has become the cultural majority is an important component of the foreign policy discourse. The interests and world view of the cultural majority shape, and sometimes even distort the content of 11

18 south africa s second tenure in the un security council the intellectual, political, social, cultural, language, legal, moral and economic discourse in a manner that belies its size. Despite South Africa s isolation during apartheid, she was in the Western corner. South Africa s foreign policy is often still expected to be an extension of Western policy. There is the general belief that Western policy is ethical and moral. However, the decision to vote according to Western or non-western inclinations may either be viewed as villainous or angelic, depending on the vantage point of the observer. This ignores the fact that in the foreign policy arena, there are often angels with horns and demons with halos. Such an anomaly applies to a greater or lesser extent to the Permanent Five. It is simplistic to view a particular sphere of influence as moral or ethical. Although the South Africa espoused by Nelson Mandela set high standards, the reality of today is that implementation of those foreign policy principles is tasking. What should inform the foreign policy content of the ANC government? South Africa s DIRCO argues in its foreign policy principles that foreign policy is a multidimensional set of policies, objectives, principles, strategies and plans which cannot easily be packaged into a neatly described formula. It is also not always practical to distinguish between aspirations, general objectives and underlying philosophy (Department of Foreign Affairs 2008). This statement reflects the reality of today s foreign policy environment. Idealists conception of international relations rarely leaves the textbooks. The reality is that in much of the world, national interests reign supreme. The moral high ground remains a vacant plot in the realm of international relations. Due to this, any agenda, including the African one, should not be analysed in isolation from the competing agendas. With regard to this, can South Africa s African agenda transcend the divides of Africa? South Africa s complex foreign policy identity has come to the fore. It has been described by some observers as being coherent and by others as being confusing. Its positions concerning the situations in Libya and Ivory Coast have fuelled these views. South Africa s actions in Côte d Ivoire were driven by a commitment to multilateralism. It was, however, said that its actions were contradictory to the will of the people. South Africa sought the AU s counsel concerning the issue; therefore, the fact that the result was a divided AU was not South Africa s fault. Both this instance and that of Libya have been said to create divisions between South Africa and Nigeria as well as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). School-yard bullying is a term that has been used by critics to describe South Africa s interactions with the rest of the continent under President Jacob Zuma, suggesting that South Africa imposes its agenda on the rest of the continent. South 12

19 proceedings of an igd roundtable, 3 february 2012 Africa s decision concerning the Libyan situation stemmed from an aversion to regime change conducted by the international community. What is unpredictable is the extent to which specific policy choices are consistent with South Africa s core values. For instance, South Africa s vote in the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was allegedly to redeem itself from the inglorious performance during its first UNSC term as non-permanent member. Decisions such as those made concerning the Myanmar and Zimbabwean crises were widely criticised by civil society groups and audiences at large. There have been speculations that President Zuma was duped by US President Barak Obama into adopting UN Resolution 1973 in exchange for support for South Africa s candidacy as permanent UNSC member. This claim is untrue because it firstly does not take into account the fact that an expansion of the UNSC is not yet definite or the fact that South Africa s foreign policy decision-making is guided by its core values. Although South Africa s foreign policy implementation has challenges, its efforts should be recognised. South Africa s position has taken into consideration the need to avoid mandate creep. One challenge South Africa faces is that of communicating its foreign policy issues effectively. South Africa s African agenda is a work in progress. South Africa is at risk of misreading the balance of forces as in the vote for the Chairperson of the AU Commission. In response to Matshiqi s think piece, Ncumisa Notutela commented on the broad framework of South African foreign policy and how it is implemented practically. She suggested that the foundations of South Africa s foreign policy have not changed, since they were adopted after apartheid. South Africa had to fall in line with global occurrences and discern the role it was to play given its Aubrey Matshiqi and Siphamandla Zondi at the roundtable 13

20 south africa s second tenure in the un security council history. South Africa s aspirations were firmly based on these values. South Africa found itself in the complex arena of the UNSC, wherein it had to participate. It participated actively but was faced with a learning curve. South Africa found itself faced with realpolitik, not just ideology. This reality was further complicated by the major imbalance of power confronting non-permanent members and the agenda-setting initiatives by former colonial masters who sought to determine outcomes. Within this sphere, which is known for being polarised, South Africa needed to constantly assert itself, both on issues relating to Africa and non-african issues as well. As such, the part played by the former colonisers in the UNSC should not be ignored or under-estimated when assessing South Africa s foreign policy actions. These played a role in influencing South Africa s position. Otherwise, South Africa s concerns were that it needed to make itself felt, make a mark while focusing on Africa. Other dynamics that tend to come into play reflect the question of state interests. Such considerations raise tough questions about how non-permanent members should navigate these dynamics in promoting and/or defending AU positions and decisions. This was depicted as a real struggle in as much as the interests of outside powers and the dominance of the P5 can contribute to a polarising environment. Different considerations informed the division of views on South Africa s foreign policy positions during its second tenure in the UNSC including its pursuit of an African agenda. These include views on whether foreign policy choices should be influenced by the core values of democracy and human rights. While others are vexed by the question, how can non-permanent members of the UNSC balance these values and the need to navigate the complexity of interests in the Security Council? South Africa s commitment to the African agenda is reflected by its support for the AU in spite of divisions in the organisation. It was noted that during , there were two key diplomatic blocs in the Security Council. The first comprised Brazil Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and the other consisted of the Permanent Three, i.e. the US, France and the United Kingdom. According to critics, during its first tenure, South Africa s decision-making was seen as reflecting support for China and Russia (also members of the P5). In reality, while South Africa disagreed with the West on a number of issues, it also agreed with them on many more matters where these coincided with South Africa s agenda. There was a need to try and unpack South Africa-Sino-Russia relations within the UNSC as part of answering the question: what drives South Africa in the UNSC? Some observers thought that given the difficulties it encountered during its first tenure and the difficulty encountered by other non-permanent members, South Africa should not have gone for another stint in the Security Council. The answer was that South Africa believed that the challenges were manageable. Maintaining 14

21 proceedings of an igd roundtable, 3 february 2012 the core values of South Africa is difficult, but these must be adhered to. If Africa is not taken as priority by Africans, who should be expected to take it as such? The tensions between the UNSC and the African Union also came up for discussion. Given Africa s challenges, there was a need for a much closer UN-AU relationship. This, South Africa has already been able to advance as reflected in its January 2012 presidency of the Council with a special session on the AU- UN relationship. Within this context, misunderstandings on the African agenda between South Africa and the rest of the continent were downplayed. Indeed, it was noted that alongside South Africa s raising the issue of the UN-AU (Peace and Security Council) relationship in the UNSC, this initiative reflected mutual complementarity with a report released by AUC chairman Jean Ping on Toward Greater Strategic Clearance addressing the following themes that would have a bearing on the UN-AU relationship going forward: Peacekeeping (i.e. AMISOM), raising doctrinal issues between the UN and the AU; Peace-making with regard to Darfur and the abortive Libyan peace effort where it was suggested the UNSC cut us off at the knees ; and The AU being a Chapter 8 regional organisation with respect to outstanding issues: who takes decisions, when, on what issues pertaining to conflicts and crisis situations, and on what basis? These are questions that introduce the concept of subsidiarity as a visionary issue with relevance for operationalising the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), except that it was pointed out that there is a dearth of resources for operationalising the APSA. In each of these areas, the key question is whether or not South Africa has what it take to lead the African agenda, which it clearly shares with the rest of the continent, on the basis of this report. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that one of the difficulties encountered by South Africa in the UNSC this time around was that the three non-permanent African members (Nigeria and Gabon as well as South Africa) did not work as a unit. Getting support from like-minded African countries is key to achieving the African agenda. While South Africa is not a bully in Africa, it has tried to get likeminded countries that want to see Africa prosper. Here, reference was made to the New Partnership for Africa s Development (NEPAD). When former President Thabo Mbeki wanted to launch NEPAD, he went about it by trying to identify key African states to strengthen NEPAD. In trying to address the problems facing the continent, South Africa must engender a relationship with the UN. In the larger scheme of things, South Africa s core values and the continent of Africa will continue to inform South Africa s interaction. 15

22 south africa s second tenure in the un security council Reflecting on the same questions, Professor Anthoni van Nieuwkerk of the University of the Witwatersrand suggested that given South Africa s relatively developed status, observers are of the impression that South Africa is obliged to assist other African states in recovering from the effects of civil, political, economic and other ills. The ANC has expressed this opinion on several occasions. Patrick Bond describes Thabo Mbeki s Africa Policy as stabilising the continent for foreign investment. This suggests that the ruling party s African agenda is driven by its economic interests. The ruling party s African agenda is also, however, driven by values obtained during the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles. South Africa s African agenda came to the fore in its bid for Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to become chair of the AU Commission. South Africa felt the need to lobby its way to this position. This strategy reflected the overarching fact that South Africa views itself as continental leader. South Africa also perceives that it is the natural alliance partner of BRICS and, therefore, has a right to permanent membership on the UNSC. The actions perpetuated by these views have placed South Africa on opposing sides with Kenya, Nigeria and Egypt. They are also claimants to permanent UNSC membership representing Africa. This is the reason Dlamini-Zuma failed to achieve the AU vote and requires further introspection about the foreign policy approach with the continent. On the other hand, the very fact that the AU was forced for the first time to vote on the AUC chairmanship was touted as an advance in the continental decision-making process, given the need for greater accountability in inter-african affairs. This was seen as applying to the regional economic communities as well: to whom are heads-of-state, as decision-makers, accountable? If South Africans agree that it has the continental calling to address Africa s woes, the question of whether South Africa has the capacity to address the mass of these problems surfaces. Having the capacity to fulfil this role mandates a combination of the appropriate leadership, a skilled human resource base and an economic foundation. While South Africa dominates the SADC region and has a relatively strong economy, with advanced infrastructure and industries, it faces challenges such as poverty, inequality, a fragile democracy and corruption. Capacitating South Africans in order to reduce their dependence on the state should be South Africa s approach and main priority. South Africa should get its house in order for it to be regarded seriously. Only then will it be able to formulate a good policy for Africa. 16

23 INTERACTIVE DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FLOOR A cross-section of participants at the roundtable During the interactive discussion that followed, it was noted that in the UNSC and elsewhere, South Africa has been treated as the new kid on the block. Despite this, South Africa has engaged in a number of partnerships, which are necessary for survival in the multilateral sphere. Partnership with the African community is necessary for promoting the African agenda. This agenda was formulated after deliberate engagement to determine the course that South Africa s foreign policy should follow. It was further noted that the multilateral sphere is polarised. South Africa and other developing states will continue to operate in a polarised UNSC as long as developing states are tied to developed states by aid. Dependence on foreign assistance means that the continent will continue to be subjected to blackmail and interference from the West. It was emphasised that South Africa s foreign policy was not based on past occurrences and that foreign policy in general cannot be operated on the basis of the past. 17

24 south africa s second tenure in the un security council It was thought that fundamental issues of orientation and who sets the narrative parameters in the South African foreign policy discourse impinge on the outcomes of the debate about South Africa s UNSC role. Here, the notion of a numerical minority but cultural majority that links to expectations in the West that South Africa will or should tilt toward the West in general, in the UNSC in particular, proved provocative. This triggered reflections on the meaning of the public discourse if it is dominated by a minority. This also raised questions about what we might make of the perspective of the silent majority and whether we can be certain about public opinion in the absence of this voice. There were warnings also about the danger of racialising the discourse. It was suggested that part of the problem revolving around the UNSC debate is that some have ignored the history of this country which, in fact, is not a new kid on the block, which is a mistaken notion. This was argued to be especially the case in terms of the intellectual history of black South African identification with the rest of Africa. Here, the memory of Pixley ka Seme and his Regeneration of Africa speech was evoked as not only re-dating the ANC but as having laid the foundation for much that has emanated in South African foreign policy thinking post-apartheid. This history reflected the fact that there were different diplomatic cultural strands in South African foreign policy: the diplomacy of the apartheid ancien regime (to which might have been added the foreign policy perspectives of English-speaking capital with its continuity in the country s contemporary business community); ANC diplomacy developed during the protracted liberation struggle; and civil society tendencies which place a strong accent on human rights. Here, however, a challenging rhetorical question was posed: Give me one country that operates purely on what we define as human rights? In follow-up, Why are we so unrealistic in how we engage the real world when it comes to South Africa? And here, it was noted how, with regard to Myanmar, UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari s recommendations on the repressive situation in that country had been largely ignored during South Africa s first tenure on the Council when South Africa joined with Russia and China in vetoing a condemnatory resolution that had been tabled by the US. With regard to What happened in Addis? (referring to the vote on the AU Commission Chair), this was all about the need to change the way the AUC works based on comments that had been made by President Zuma on dealings with the AU. In backing up these observations, another senior former official noted that South African foreign policy in terms of the UNSC and the AU, did not start yesterday, but has its antecedents in the liberation struggle. This observation related back to the anti-imperialist groundings of South African foreign policy which, when applied to how the AU is run, challenge the fact that so many member states on the continent are insolvent when it comes to paying their dues, a situation which opens the continent to being influenced by those 18

25 proceedings of an igd roundtable, 3 february 2012 who underwrite participation in this body. Yet, as an AU member, if you are in arrears, you are not supposed to participate in AU decision-making (a point raising questions about those voting for the AU Commission chair?). This point merged into another concerning the AU s culture of dependency; the fact that one of the problems with the African Peace and Security Architecture is that the architects were European. EU experts drafted the APSA, whereas there is a need to invoke the Try Africa First principle. This point was re-emphasised by one of the discussants who ventured that, at a more general level, the governing structure of African institutions is largely Western and European inspired. And this has, apparently, little to do with how appropriate or inappropriate they may be in the African setting. Here, the example of the Continental Early Warning System was cited. It has proved unworkable but was promoted by the EU. The point being stressed was that a more selective approach of Africanising what is possible needs to be employed by Africa, Africans and the AU while discarding external approaches that are not workable for Africa. Furthermore, Africa, including South Africa, needs to rethink its global relations in this regard. These and other observations, wide-ranging as they were beyond a purely UNSCcentred focus, were amplified by a number of other key points that emerged from the discussions. What follows is a sampling: There was a need to unpack the observation that in South Africa the numerical minority is the cultural majority. It has been provocatively asserted that the hegemonic world view in South Africa is that of the numerical minority. Whites (the numerical minority), post-apartheid, constituted a cultural majority. This cultural majority possesses the economic power. This does not mean that all blacks views fall within the cultural minority, even if this is generally the case. Despite intense lobbying, South Africa was not given the AU Commission chair. What does this say about South Africa s ability to muster support from Africa? Perhaps this suggested that South Africa needs to adopt a more humble and less assuming foreign policy posture with Africa and with the rest of the world. (But then, this would beg more questions; whether, for example, South Africa should revert back to the very antihegemony impulses which it has yet to even overcome, a tendency that has bedevilled South Africa s ambivalence about assuming leadership from the very beginning of its post-apartheid reinvention as a nation.) There was a concern voiced that academics in South Africa might not have an informed understanding of how the UN works, a tendency that included the media as well, as South Africa s foreign policy tended to be analysed on very superficial bases. A telling point was made by one non-african diplomat pertained to sectioning out the African agenda from a more global agenda, that it was 19

26 south africa s second tenure in the un security council difficult to see the point of issues relating to the UN focusing only on an African agenda when the UN is about humanity s agenda in terms of the UN Charter. This point was amplified by an observation that among the diplomatic missions in Iraq, there was none by a non-arab African country. Both academics and government must exercise a measure of humility when it comes to dealing with these issues. Even if no research is done by academics, it is the responsibility of government to answer questions posed to it. Should South Africa refrain from promoting its African agenda because of its domestic problems? There is a need to find a balance between addressing domestic concerns and addressing continental problems. Dlamini-Zuma reminded people that South Africa s foreign policy positions flow from its domestic position. This suggests that we should not be too adventurous about our agenda. It would be unwise to promise to run the African agenda if our economy does not allow it. In wrapping up the discussion, the cultural majority-minority issue was reemphasised as a useful, if uncomfortable, paradigm in which the contested discourse over South Africa s UNSC performance might be located while being applicable on a much broader basis in terms of trying to understand South African foreign policy. The dominant hegemonic world view in South Africa remains that of the numerically minority cultural majority while that of the numerically dominant but cultural minority tended to be aligned with the non-west. Furthermore, this dynamic was amplified by the cultural majority s control of the South African economy which aligned them to the Western sphere of influence. It was cautioned, however, that one must not use such concepts mechanically as there were apt to be, especially in class terms, ample cross-racial exceptions to be made. Finally, a closing observation was offered that one of the inadequacies of the UNSC discussion pertaining to South Africa s performance was that it did not get at covert operations and intelligence activities that may influence the terrain of crises on the ground which may affect strategies among members of the Security Council, especially amongst the P5, the P3 in particular. Here, reference was made to the unfolding dynamics in Syria while being informed by some of the experiences pertaining to Libya. The dialogue concluded with official insights from Fadl Nacerodien of DIRCO, who in his closing remarks added that there was no guarantee that a reconfigured world would deliver expected outcomes. He reiterated Matshiqi s assertion that the moral high ground was a vacant plot and pointed out that the UN Charter espouses idealistic statements. On the basis that the UN has not achieved its 20

27 proceedings of an igd roundtable, 3 february 2012 ideals, should it be said that the UN has failed? It is still central to multilateralism in the world as we know it, warts and all. He went further to posit that South Africa defaults towards political solutions and always tries to factor in the human rights and democracy dimensions in its diplomacy. But it is a difficult balance between justice and human rights on the one hand and actual life, which is the stuff of diplomacy, on the other hand. South Africa tries to err on the side of human rights and democracy. As part of a response to this, he said, DIRCO engages with civil society to promote a discourse on the joint beliefs that are held surrounding policy and values and how they may or may not come together in practice in the cut and thrust of the real world of diplomacy. In terms of biases that are held on defence spending, states and their citizens may wish to refrain from such spending, but this does not change the fact that conflicts remain a challenge, the UNSC being one of the venues for resolving them. To be sure the struggle in the Security Council remains influenced by residual East-West as well as North-South dynamics. As would be expected, such discussions as took place at this roundtable will always raise more questions than can be answered. Close to home, does South Africa have the capacity to rise to the challenges that have been aired? Must we ignore the politics of the UNSC in the name of striving for consistency which is always elusive when foreign policy is applied to diplomacy? Can we afford to ignore lessons learned and precedents set? These are questions that can be applied to other powers as well except that South Africa is in Africa where many of these challenges are to be found. Hence, the centrality for South Africa of the African agenda. In terms of this, South Africa s leadership prioritises the agendas of Africa and the global South such as reflected in the Non- Aligned Movement. As such, it is guided by its commitment to multilateralism and preventive diplomacy. 21

28

29 CONCLUSION South Africa s second appearance in the UN Security Council as a non-permanent African representative was met with expressions of different expectations and concerns from a variety of foreign policy observers and stakeholders. Most of these expectations were informed mainly by assessments of its past experience in the Council, but also by inferences from the projected geopolitical representation in the Council during the period of its residency. Advocates of the so-called human rights-friendly foreign policy, for example, expressed hope that Pretoria would use this second opportunity to atone for what they considered to be gross foreign policy blunders in the wake of the UNSC votes on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe and Myanmar. Similarly, proponents of a more just and equitable global order considered the full representation in the Council of major alliances from the global South, including BRICS and IBSA, as a golden opportunity for South Africa to push forward its agenda of reforming global institutions for political and security governance. This, as sympathisers of the African agenda thrust of South Africa s foreign policy wondered whether this strategic focus would be able to compete squarely in the Council with Pretoria s other interests, as reflected in its multiple alliances and strategic partnerships. The debates at this roundtable, just like those in the first roundtable that deliberated on the emerging powers dimension of South Africa s UNSC membership, have been instructive in contextualising these expectations and concerns, while also enriching our understanding of the extent to which they have found expression in South Africa s unfolding stay in the UNSC. But more than this, the discussion also revealed that the expectations and concerns relating to South Africa s return to the UNSC for the period concealed deeper questions about the country s foreign policy and international relations, which have only been unmasked by the geopolitical nature of the crises with which the Security Council has concerned itself so far. South Africa s positions and actions within and outside the UNSC in regard to the crises in Côte d Ivoire and Libya, as well as the evolving conflict in Syria, provoked debates which exposed lingering unease around some key features of the country s foreign policy, including the African agenda and South Africa s diplomacy in Africa generally; the direction of South Africa s foreign policy under President Jacob Zuma; as well as the cultural underpinnings of the foreign policy thinking and discourse in South Africa. It is not the purpose of this conclusion to rehearse the different perspectives around these contestations, as these have been 23

30 south africa s second tenure in the un security council succinctly captured, both in the preceding debates as well as in the research report that the IGD has released to accompany this report. It suffices here to underscore the predominant lesson embedded in this observation as it relates to the evolution of South Africa s foreign policy. In a complex domestic and regional environment like South Africa s, it should not be taken for granted that any given foreign policy decision or stance adopted by Pretoria would automatically be in the interest of South Africa and Africa just because it resonates with one or two shared values and principles. The process through which values and principles, even shared ones, are translated into vision, goals and actions is often mediated by a set of specific cultural, historical, economic and political realities that may vary from one country to another or among different groups in the same country. What this means is that for South Africa s foreign policy to truly reflect the aspirations of its people and those of the African continent, there must be a commitment to genuine, open and sustained dialogue within South Africa and between South Africa and other African countries on major international or African issues. 24

31 ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL DIALOGUE The IGD is an independent foreign policy and international diplomacy think tank dedicated to the analysis of and dialogue on the evolving international political and economic environment, and the role of Africa and South Africa. It advances a balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa s role in international relations and diplomacy. The IGD was initially established in 1995 as the Foundation for Global Dialogue after several years of effort led by the former South African president, Nelson Mandela, in his capacity as the president of the African National Congress. He and his team of leaders saw a need for a research organization that would facilitate the new South Africa s engagement with the changing global order after This was a period in which three vectors of change coincided: the tectonic shift in global power politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the wave of democratization that hit Africa and South America; and the near miraculous transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. The initial funding came from the German government and went towards establishing the Foundation s competitive edge, a combination of policy-oriented research, catalytic dialogue, tailor-made publications and grant-making for NGOs interested in international relations. The IGD s research agenda has three broad programmatic focus areas: foreign policy analysis with special reference to the making and management of foreign policy and diplomatic tools like economic, developmental, and public diplomacy; African studies focusing on the role of regional and continental integration in African politics and development as well as the study of peace diplomacy; and international diplomacy, analysing dynamics in international diplomacy that have a bearing on African peace and prosperity. Mission: The IGD strives for a prosperous and peaceful Africa in a progressive global order through cutting edge policy research and analysis, catalytic dialogue and stakeholder interface on global dynamics that have an impact on South Africa and Africa. 25

32 south africa s second tenure in the un security council 3rd Floor UNISA Building 263 Skinner Street Pretoria South Africa PO Box The Tramshed, 0126 Pretoria South Africa info@igd.org.za All rights reserved. The material in this publication may not be reproduced, stored or transmitted without the prior permission of the copyright holder. Short extracts may be quoted, provided the source is acknowledged. 26

33 ISBN