The crisis in the Sahel time for a new drumbeat? 31 October 2012, 15:00-17:00 Public Event, London

Transcription

1 The crisis in the Sahel time for a new drumbeat? 31 October 2012, 15:00-17:00 Public Event, London Chair: Mike Wooldridge BBC World Affairs Correspondent Speakers in London: Paul Melly Journalist and Associate Fellow, Africa programme, Chatham House Simon Levine Research Fellow, Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI Nick Martlew Senior Conflict and Humanitarian Advisor, Save the Children UK Camilla Knox-Peebles Head of Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods Oxfam GB Speaker in Dakar: David Gressly UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel Speaker in Niamey: Jean-Nicolas Marti Head of the ICRC delegation for Mali and Niger This year s response Mike Wooldridge began the event by recalling EU Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva's visit to London last December during which she called for a faster and larger international response in order to avert a serious crisis. Her statements prompted his visit to cover the emerging Sahel crisis on behalf of the BBC. In addition, Mike recalled discussions with Brian O Neill of the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European Commission (ECHO) in Niger, during which Brian argued that the 2012 Sahel crisis represented an opportunity to apply lessons learned during past crises. Brian stated that in order to demonstrate improvement in crisis response, the 2012 crisis needed to be contained much more effectively. Brian and others also questioned why high levels of chronic malnutrition and undernutrition in the Sahel, especially among children, l, appears to be tolerated. This acceptance, and associated lack of response, makes it difficult for families and communities to cope with shocks such as drought, erratic rainfall, crop pests, surging food prices all factors seen in the region this year. Mike then introduced David Gressly and asked him to provide an update on the region. David Gressly pointed out that there are three crises in the Sahel: 1. the acute food and nutrition crisis 2. the chronic, underlying structural issues that lead to a perpetual crisis in the region 3. the conflict in Mali and its repercussions across much of the region He noted that Niger and Chad have had a longer history of humanitarian work while the other countries in the region have not, so a critical challenge for agencies was in attempting to scale up humanitarian interventions. Although the number of deaths is not yet known, David believes this year s humanitarian response to be relatively effective and early enough to contain some of most catastrophic impacts of the crisis. This assessment was based on performance-related data available across the region which indicates that, amongst other achievements, there was a significant increase in the number of malnourished children that agencies were able to reach. This data allowed David to project that the response has had a positive impact. Jean-Nicolas Marti agreed with much of David s observations, and also pointed out that the situations in Mali and Niger are quite different. Public services and private economic activity have stopped in Northern Mali and food, water and health care have become more difficult to access. The ICRC is working to help 1

2 people cope, but it is too early to seek to build resilience in Mali where security concerns continue to loom large. Military intervention in Mali David Gressly explained that there are two tracks for addressing the situation in Mali: political dialogue and negotiation or a military approach. David expressed his preference for political negotiations over military intervention, and argued that the negotiation process should be given the appropriate time and space to take place. He noted that the possibility of a military intervention could not be ignored but significantly, the humanitarian consequences must be considered and minimised through political dialogue. Ultimately however, the situation is complex and even inaction has consequences. A nuanced understanding of the country is required and the circumstances could change at a moment s notice. Any changes could have regional implications and people have even begun to move following indications of military intervention. While having no inside information, David confirmed that detailed plans for a military intervention were under discussion (including training the Malian army, deploying troops and sending military support to Mali) in Bamako and cited press reports that noted that the 2 nd quarter of 2013 would be the earliest point at which mounting such an intervention would be feasible. Jean-Nicolas Marti highlighted the consequences of intervention, explaining that people may be displaced and take refuge in a neighbouring country or another part of Mali and, in the process, go without food, water or access to medical care. Additionally, the ICRC s continued work in Northern Mali is premised upon the situation remaining relatively stable and military intervention could jeopardise that stability. Paul Melly also noted that military intervention would inevitably have serious humanitarian impacts on the region. He reported that security in parts of Mali has actually improved because of the strength of the Islamist groups rule. However, long-term stability in West Africa is a common priority for governments in the region so ECOWAS is likely to consider largely foreign-led insurgencies in Northern Mali a threat to the legitimacy of the West African state and regional stability. That is why, despite the risks, ECOWAS may believe military intervention is necessary. Early warning Camilla Knox-Peebles stated that acting on early warning is key, as is, recognizing the chronic nature of the crisis in the Horn and Sahel regions. She explained that it is critical for early warning response systems to be established and coordinated, and that a system, the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié (similar to the IPC in Somalia), has recently begun in West Africa. FEWS NET and others coordinated in February 2012 to present an agreed assessment of food security in the Sahel, yet FEWS NET ultimately published maps with different data. Coordination must improve further as while discrepancies did not have a major impact this year they could in the future and consensus is essential to give a clear message to decision-makers on the type and scale of response required. Nick Marlew noted that anecdotal accounts suggested that competing reports about the severity of the crisis lead to some delays amongst smaller donors, but that the overall consensus was that early warning systems are improving. Nick noted that many donors are still risk-averse, particularly in terms of being the first to respond, and the least democratic donors such as the UN, CERF, etc. were actually the earliest to respond. Nick expressed a hope that donors would begin to become less risk-averse and more proactive if there is electoral or popular support for early response. However, Nick further argued that it is not enough to only try to respond early enough as food insecurity in the region occurs every year - severe malnutrition is pervasive even in non-crisis years, and yet appears to be tolerated. Solutions for these chronic problems, such as building in social protection systems, are 2

3 necessary to help people cope with the every day emergency as well as more severe shocks and fluctuations. Lessons learned David Gressly believed two important lessons had been learned from previous crises in the Sahel and the Horn which have been applied during the 2012 crisis: 1. There was a very good response from governments, in particular the government of Niger, which provided early indications that there was likely to be a food and nutrition crisis. Niger s statements were followed by calls from other governments in the region which helped to facilitate an international response early on. 2. International leadership, played a critical role, through Kristalina Georgieva, Valerie Amos at OCHA and others at senior levels, in quickly mobilizing a humanitarian response reasonably early. However, David also believed that a wider range of resources could have been provided to support agriculture, health, water and education. Nick Martlew agreed with David and outlined two different ways in which lessons have been learned from past crises: 1. The government response, particularly in Niger, was quicker and more open in 2012 and was key to mobilizing international support more rapidly. 2. International donors responded more quickly this time compared to the Sahel response in 2005 and East Africa in Major funding came in March, which was 3 months earlier than before. However, Nick emphasised that systemic change is still needed so that response is not just faster this time but every time. Donors continue to focus on response rather than prevention despite the predictable nature of structural and seasonal crises in the region. Individual agencies and the whole aid system must begin to think about how we work, and reassess how humanitarian and development work together, in particular looking at how development programmes such as social protection, agriculture support, or education can be made more flexible to be able to adapt to the seasonal and structural fluctuations in needs. Camilla Knox-Peebles noted that there has been a marked improvement in the use of market analysis in the Sahel where 60-80% of food needs are met by purchases from the market. Success has required an integrated approach, leveraging existing markets, as well as providing the means to generate sufficient demand and collaborate with local traders to boost food supplies. Recognition of the local context is also important: For example, unlike in Niger and Mali where people have been able to access food through markets, an Emergency Market Mapping Assessment (EMMA) conducted in Chad revealed that providing imported food aid would be more appropriate than cash transfers in some areas as local markets would not be able to meet demand. Simon Levine felt that lessons were elusive. Optimism is warranted because there is now a greater willingness to think about different systems and to consider the longer-term issues. However, too little reflection has occurred in the past. There has been progress in understanding markets, using cash, and addressing the speed of response. Yet, this progress fails to help us understand the wider, bigger picture and how things work at a macro level: while successful social protection interventions can now be achieved at an individual or community level, we do not understand the collective impact of such interventions. Paul Melly stressed that the crisis in the Sahel actually depends upon a number of specific local factors that vary from state to state. Both Mali and Niger were perceived to have strong records in grassroots development. Mali had a reputation for focusing on rural issues, building up food stocks, etc. However, it 3

4 also had weaknesses in administration, large-scale corruption and weak political leadership which undermined development work. In contrast, while Niger is arguably the poorer country, the local administration is stronger. In the past political circumstances discouraged government response, as the Nigerien President Tandja wished not to acknowledge the problems with food security. Thus, the response was considerably improved when President Tandja finally left office and the relatively effective civil service was no longer restrained by political considerations. Resilience David Gressly pointed out that this year s events are actually an amplification of that which occurs annually in the Sahel, as a ¼ million children still die across the region in a good year. This is the impetus for promoting a resilience agenda among the humanitarian and development communities. David stressed that collaboration is necessary so that households can emerge from crisis. Households facing drought or spikes in commodity prices must take certain measures to survive the crisis, whether by reducing the quality of food purchased, selling-off livestock, redirecting investment intended for agriculture, taking on more debt or pulling children out of school all measures which have negative consequences over the long-term. A government response is needed to mitigate against such drastic measures. David also stressed the importance of engagement between the humanitarian and development communities to help build resilience; humanitarian agencies can help target households and provide immediate support, but development programs could, over a number of years, help vulnerable communities become more resilient. The EU s work in the Sahel provides the foundations for further work. David further stated that impending demographic pressure in the region necessitates short, medium, and long-term action. In the short term, humanitarian work could address the immediate food crisis, over the medium term, development actors could seek to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable households, and over the long term, a larger transformation of local economies is needed to support the expanding population. Camilla Knox-Peebles also noted that debates over resilience offer an opportunity for humanitarian and development workers to collaborate in meeting short term needs, reducing vulnerability and building and protecting livelihoods in the long-term. The EC s Agir Sahel initiative and discussions within USAID are examples of shifts in the way funds are disbursed so that they can provide for longer term programmes that are flexible enough to adapt when crisis hits. She also touched on the current political momentum surrounding resilience, the constructive dialogue between humanitarian and development actors in the response to crisis in the Sahel, and Oxfam s work with pastoralists and women in the region as evidence of positive work to build upon. Simon Levine shared some criticisms and concerns about the use of the term resilience. He explained that on the one hand he is optimistic about resilience, in that it can mean a shift away from the false dichotomy between macro-oriented economic development and micro-level humanitarian work, in that it may represent an acknowledgement among significant development actors that the livelihoods of the most vulnerable people are a concern equal in importance to that of the country s GDP or the middle class. However, Simon stressed that he is also pessimistic because the current resilience approach is out of touch with reality in its disregard of current trends such as urbanisation, rural production for urban markets or the declining prevalence of farming among rural poor. Simon also noted that, despite a constant reflection upon the practical concerns of the aid community, the theoretical links between the earlier food security agenda and the present resilience agenda are rarely acknowledged and wondered why there was not more of an effort to confront the failings of past 4

5 initiatives. Simon also highlighted that the use of technocentric language fails to acknowledge the importance of politics. Focusing upon the lessons learnt can neglect external factors such as a critical change in government. Simon stressed that we must confront the political reality in the countries we work in and pursue a plan that prioritises local concerns and envisions a modest, positive and considered role for the international community. Paul Melly felt that it is critical to establish consensus around a minimum level of resilience and incorporate this consensus into long-term donor policies. Paul drew parallels to the intractable disagreement over the Jubilee debt crisis in the late 1990s and felt that a similar concession is needed from the international community. In the same way that debt relief required the prioritization of the needs of debtor countries, the needs of vulnerable people must be prioritised before pursuing a resilience agenda. He also stressed that stakeholders (national governments, donors and NGOs) need to have a common and ft realistic understanding of the long-term costs of social protection programmes and the implications for funding. For example, the current World Bank programme targeting 1/3 of the population in Niger will cost $70 million over 2 years. Recent Save the Children research indicates that current cash transfer levels in this programme are too low; if they were raised to the overall cost of each two year cycle of the programme could amount to $ million. Nick Martlew recognised that education is an essential part of both life-saving response and resilience work, and it should be better funded and integrated. He also listed David Gressly, Valerie Amos and Helen Clark as leaders in promoting a resilience agenda, but noted that the approaches within the big development agencies in particular have yet to be transformed. Resilience must begin to become a practical reality in DFID are not investing new funds in the Sahel, so Nick asked how they will use their leadership in the Political Champions for Resilience to ensure there is a systemic change in the approach to resilience, putting the responsibility for managing risk and chronic malnutrition with development actors. 5