In Search of Visions: Japan s Foreign Policy since 1989

Transcription

1 In Search of Visions: Japan s Foreign Policy since 1989 Mutsumi Hirano Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association (BISA), Manchester Conference Centre, United Kingdom, April 2011 For the panel International Cooperation and Conflict in East Asia (Session 1: , 27 April 2011) Please do not cite or circulate without the author s permission. The full version of the argument put forward in the paper is to be found in the forthcoming Japanese Foreign Policy Since 1989 published by I.B.Tauris. 1

2 Abstract Mutsumi Hirano 2011 This paper aims to identify and analyse Japan s foreign policy thinking since Sweeping changes since the end of the Cold War have compelled many countries a rethink of their foreign policy goals and the instruments needed to achieve them as well as their national identities. Yet what has become increasingly evident in the case of Japan is its inability to define its foreign policy course and to present its perspectives to the world in tangible ways. Therefore, the paper sheds light on this persistent conundrum and challenges to examine the fundamental tenets driving Tokyo s foreign policy. In so doing, it brings politics back into focus; it looks primarily at politics, where political, economic and other dimensions are entangled. The paper provides empirical explanations of evolving Japan s foreign policy ideas over the past two decades for theoretical analyses of these gradually transforming foreign policy concepts. In terms of the geographical scope, this work explores not only Japan s relations with China and the United States but also Central Asia, Eastern/Central Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and addresses much broader implications of Tokyo s foreign policy for the world than usually considered. * * * The primary aim of this paper is to grasp major trends of Japan s foreign policy thinking since 1989 and background factors affecting it. It is placed in a broader attempt to establish the extent to which visions and principles are emerging or being formulated. If we look at the global picture, the so-called end of the Cold War obviously had an immense impact on the foreign policies of many countries across the continents, forcing them to reposition themselves in regional and international relations. 1 Sweeping changes in the political landscape have compelled a rethink of their foreign policy goals, the instruments needed to achieve them and national identities. Furthermore, such a political transformation on this scale cannot be regarded as a one-off event; over the past two decades, many countries including small states like Mongolia and Benin and current hot spots like Afghanistan have struggled with its consequences and domestic adjustments, though to varying degrees. Japan is no exception. 1 While phrases like the end of the Cold War and the post-cold War period have been in political parlance for nearly two decades by now, some, including Japanese leaders, argue that a Cold-War type structure still exists in East Asia and the Cold War has not completely ended. See, for example, Foreign Minister Taro Aso s speech Japan and NATO in a New Security Environment at the NAC (North Atlantic Council) Meeting in Brussels, Belgium (May 4, 2006). 2

3 If we look at what is going on the ground, there are innumerable examples of dubious foreign policy behaviour and crude realism in international politics, falling far short of announced policies and diplomatic postures. In a world freed from the old ideological confines of the Cold War, countries are tested by major wars over where they stand in relation to the fundamental norms sustaining the states system: norms established and codified over the centuries in diplomatic practices and more recently in the UN Charter and resolutions. For example, the prolonged wars which the United States started in Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 have apparently put its allies and even the United States itself to a crucial test regarding the legitimacy of intervention. And we may be put to the same test again over North Korea, Iran and failing or failed states in the future. Of course, this is just one of many daunting challenges now facing the international community. 2 Yet what has become increasingly evident in the case of Japan is its inability to define its foreign policy course based on independent reasoning and thinking and to present its perspective to the world in tangible ways. Certainly, the Japanese government has borne in mind the country s economic strength and the expectations of the international community, and so has made efforts to adapt to the post-cold War environment and to make Japan s international role more visible. However, Japan s foreign policy now seems to be almost in limbo, 3 and it is still questionable whether Tokyo has made some progress in defining its foreign policy and getting its messages across to the world. In fact, various commentators have addressed the uncertainty of Japan s foreign policy direction in the post-cold War period, including some who have analysed how the country responded to the Gulf Crisis of and to 9/11. 4 Some may argue that it is clear that Japan has followed the Yoshida Doctrine throughout the postwar years and this remains intact today. However, few have examined whether or not there are visions and 2 Chris Brown, Ethics, Interests and Foreign Policy, in Karen E. Smith and Margot Light eds., Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp About Japan s strategic deficit, see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2007, pp.1-2 and Mark Beeson, Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power, Review of International Studies, vol. 35, no.1, January 2009, p See Yutaka Kawashima, Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty- First Century (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Kevin Cooney, Japan s Foreign Policy since 1945 (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006); Yoshihide Soeya, The Misconstrued Shift in Japan s Foreign Policy, Japan Echo, vol. 33, no. 3 (June 2006), pp ; and Yuichi Hosoya, Koizumi Shusho wa Gaiko Tetsugaku o Katare (Talk about Foreign Policy Philosophy, Prime Minister Koizumi!), Ronza (January 2006), pp

4 principles which may indicate the direction of Japan s foreign policy and its evolution. 5 This is precisely the starting point of this research to comprehend Japan s foreign policy thinking since 1989 and this is where the paper seeks to offer some fresh perspectives on the study of Japan s foreign policy. 6 First, this work takes up the challenge of identifying and analysing the fundamental tenets driving Tokyo s foreign policy. Thus this work is intrinsically concerned with foreign policies rather than how they were formulated. This approach is based on an empirical investigation of the Japanese government s policy documents and other crucial statements made by Prime Minsters, Foreign Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) from the late 1980s up to Second, in order to illuminate the evolution and maturation of Japan s foreign policy over the last two decades, this study concentrates on Japan s thinking as reflected in foreign policies which are outputs of all the decisions taken domestically. In this sense, it contrasts with certain approaches to domestic sources of foreign policy that emphasise multi-layered rivalries between and among political parties, factions, bureaucracies and government officials. 8 Also, as indicated above, the research does not investigate particular situations or issues concerning Japan s external relations. Another important emphasis of this work is to bring politics back into focus. It looks primarily at politics, where political, economic and other dimensions are entangled or where there is a trade-off between politics and economics. There are three reasons here for emphasising political dimensions of Japan s international relations. First, in comparison with the worldwide public and academic attention given to Japan s postwar economic achievements and its influence on world markets and economy, it cannot be denied that only nominal attention has been paid to its political initiatives in the international community. It seems that research on the latter perspective has been in general rather limited and nebulous, aside from that defined in the context of US- Japanese relations or in the area of arms control and nuclear disarmament. Second, and related to the first point, it is arguable that the discourse on Japan s postwar international 5 For one of the earlier works which focused on foreign policy ideas, see Bert Edström, Japan s Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa (New York: St. Martin s Press, 1999). 6 James Cable, Foreign Policy-making: Planning or Reflex, in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, The Two World of International Relations: Academics, Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p.108. Cable notes Henry Kissinger s comment on an understanding of the philosophical conception on which specific actions were based. 7 In the text and notes, DB is used for Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan, which is published annually, followed by the year of publication (e.g. DB1989). The Diplomatic Bluebook usually covers the previous year of publication (e.g. DB1989 covers from January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1988.). Below, PM means Prime Minister and FM Foreign Minister. 8 See Cooney, Japan s Foreign Policy since

5 relations has been shaped to a considerable extent by the framework of International Political Economy. When commentators talk about Japan s foreign policy, they often mean its foreign economic policy or they mean something to do with trade, financial investment, economic assistance or cooperation, but not particularly political intentions or consequences. Third, given the gloomy outlook for government finance, the changing socio-economic conditions in Japanese society and a still uncertain impact of 3/11, 9 Tokyo s diplomatic manoeuvring using economic instruments for political ends is likely to be limited in scope for the foreseeable future. Obviously, the Japanese government can no longer rely on its financial muscle in the same manner as it did in the 1980s and the 1990s. 10 Japan is still an economic power, but in the event of the Japanese government employing economic measures, it will need to place under much stricter scrutiny the consequences, both intended and inadvertent, of economic assistance or cooperation. Government decisions about economic tools will have to be more strategic or at least more selective than in the past. Japan s Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy is a case in point. 11 Finally, when Japan watchers look at the country s regional and international relations, many seem to pay attention to its security or defence policy. However, the current work by contrast scrutinises Japan s foreign policy as a whole. This has at least three implications. First, the study of foreign policy intrinsically takes on board a much broader range of issues between states and peoples than those of security policy, although the meaning of security has been expanding in recent years. Second, when it comes to Japan s security policy, the discourse tends to be skewed towards the United States or China. 12 However, it must be stressed that this paper offers a wider geographical scope, shedding light not only on East and Southeast Asia but also on other parts of the world including Eurasia (Central Asia, Eastern and Central Europe and the 9 The earthquake and tsunami which hit the northeast region of Japan (Tohoku area) on 11 March, 2011 and a series of nuclear plant crises in Fukushima following these natural disasters. 10 Since its peak in 1997, Japan s ODA decreased by 42% on a budgetary base ( 11,687 million in FY1997 and 6,722 million in FY2009). See ODA s White Paper 2009, p.120. In terms of net disbursements, Japan was in the fifth place behind the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France amongst the OECD-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) member countries. Ibid., p.26. In 2006, it ranked third, the first time in 24 years since 1982 (DB2008). 11 See Revision of Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter, p.i. Japan s Official Assistance Development Charter was revised in August 2003, with the aim of enhancing the strategic value, flexibility, transparency, and efficiency of ODA. See also Juichi Inada, Japan s Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic, Millennium, vol.18, no.3, 1989, pp See Richard Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2007). 5

6 Middle East) and Africa. 13 Third, in the absence of functioning regional security organisations, studies on security policy (aside from those dealing with specific issues such as military technology and logistical/operational support) seem to direct our attention to superficial structures of bilateral relations between the US, China or Japan. 14 Thus such studies sometimes seem to slip into a rather simplified analysis of power relations and regional/international order. And their arguments are quite often presented in a similar fashion; this is particularly so when it comes to ambivalent US- Japanese relations and somewhat prickly relations between Beijing and Tokyo. 15 Therefore, this paper attempts to make a departure by removing the old shackles of security policy discourse and by addressing Japan s foreign policy visions and principles in a wider context. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section gives an overview of major chronological trends and the second section explains background factors of the emergence of foreign policy ideas. The paper draws conclusions based on these empirical findings and briefly comments on their implications for the new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Conclusion The major trends in Japan s foreign policy thinking after 1989 and the background factors influencing developments can be summarised as follows: In the early post-cold War years, there was an acute sense of the need for Japan to clarify its foreign policy stance, objectives and instruments. However, the Japanese government has begun to label its foreign policy only since the turn of the century, with the announcement of specific visions and principles. Domestic factors (such as the interruption of the LDP s rule in ) may have facilitated the creation of an environment for shaping mid-to-long term foreign policy goals and values. 13 Michael J. Green, Japan s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001). He also mentions Japan s Eurasia diplomacy. 14 See, for example, David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda eds., International Relations of Asia (New York and Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) and David C. Kang, Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations, International Security, vol.28, no.3 (Winter 2003/04), pp Akiyoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato, Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration (New York: Palgrave, 2001) and Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama eds., Japan in International Politics: the Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007). 6

7 Mutsumi Hirano 2011 There was a strong aspiration on the part of the Japanese government to make contributions to building a new peace order but with no specific initiatives were formulated. In the early 1990s, the Foreign Ministry indicated four foreign policy objectives: 1) to expend diplomatic efforts in political affairs; 2) to clarify Japan s stance in relation to universal values such as democracy and fundamental human rights; 3) to give importance to the issues that concern humanity as a whole; and 4) to expand further Japan s responsibilities and its role in the international economy. In the late 1990s, Japan gradually began to figure out some directions to participate more proactively in international cooperation, but within the limits of its capacities. With increasing international expectations and responsibilities on it, Japan has sought to achieve its foreign policy goals and make international contributions and at the same time, by working with the United Nations. In the process, Japan has become more aware of the need to articulate its visions and principles. The Gulf Crisis was a wake-up call for Japan in two ways. It demonstrated that Japan needs to contribute to international peace and stability through human resources contributions, rather than just through offering financial assistance. Further, it showed that Japan needed a stronger foreign policy identity; that is, foreign policy-making needed to incorporate and reflect Japan s expertise more fully. The US-Japan alliance is now more frequently considered in the global context than before. The 9/11 and the consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq forced Japan to formulate more concrete plans for international cooperation, in tandem with concern for its own peace and security. As this bilateral relationship matures, deeper strategic and innovative thinking is required to coordinate foreign policies of the two allies in the international arena. At the same time, the UN has also occupied a special place in Japan s foreign policy, and it may be of increasing weight in Japan s foreign policy at the more profound levels of universal values and principles. In this setting, Japanese leaders pondered how to balance support for the United States with the United Nations, and Japan s foreign policy swung back and forth from one to the other. It became increasingly important for Japan to rebuild relationships and coordinate policy with the Asia-Pacific region. It was of paramount importance for Japan and other Asian countries to have political dialogue on a regular basis; that is, to explain foreign policy objectives and the reasons for various activities, so as to avoid misunderstanding. But this exercise appears to be essentially functional in 7

8 Mutsumi Hirano 2011 maintaining communication, with little discussion of the real agenda of political dialogue. Having implemented a wide range of projects on the ground for international cooperation, many of which aimed to improve living conditions and environments, Japan has increasingly come to adopt specifically human-centred approaches in its foreign policy thinking. With this perspective, the concept of human security has also become crucial; in addition to its more human-centred socio-economic sense, human security had gradually evolved a political meaning with broader implications for community-building and nation-building. In the process of broadening its diplomatic reach in recent years (Eurasia, Africa and NATO), Japan has begun, although gradually, to generate and project new ideas, such as a corridor for peace and prosperity in the Middle East and in the context of Africa, concepts such as ownership and partnership, the consolidation of peace, poverty reduction through economic growth and human-centred development. With NATO, Japan seeks to share values and knowledge. The Foreign Ministry began to encourage public participation and to cooperate with NGOs, acknowledging the growing importance of partnerships between governments and civil society. At the same time, the government is now trying to use the capacity of NGOs strategically, for example, to enhance the visibility of Japan s contributions in conflict/disaster-stricken areas through NGOs activities. Over the past several years, there has been much debate and speculation about the next prime minister in Japanese society. While Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was in office, Japan s foreign policy certainly needed mending and repositioning in the face of strained relations with Asian neighbours and the transformation of US presence in the world. Since then Japan's relations with China and South Korea have improved gradually under different prime ministers leadership. Its relations with regional countries are at least likely to be calm for the time being, despite remaining issues such as North Korea and territorial disputes. Nonetheless, uncertainties still surround Japan s foreign policy. Consolidating the foundation of foreign policy and developing innovative concepts require mid-to-long term commitment, and such a goal cannot be achieved in one prime minister s term of office, in particular when a term of office is as short as is the case with Japan. Further, the arrival of a new government led by the DPJ in September 2009, with its own foreign policy yet to be formulated and implemented, has complicated this process further. It is arguable that, on the whole, the DPJ is likely to try to maintain the status quo while enhancing the liberal foreign policy elements which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 8

9 pursued after the Cold War, and indeed which the LDP has identified with since the end of the postwar American Occupation. However, the new DPJ-led governments will need at least another few years of test driving until its foreign policy stance is firmly established. And a lot remains to be seen as to the competence of the DPJ-led government. In fact Japan s foreign policy depends on it in many ways. 16 On the other hand, as indicated above, what can be regarded as visions and principles has been clearly emerging and is being formulated. In particular, humancentered approaches, which had been developed by the past LDP or LDP-led governments in combination with the concepts of human security and conflict prevention, will continue to be the main pillar in Japan s foreign policy under the DJP government, given its progressive political attitudes towards the issues of poverty and the disadvantaged and vulnerable in society. In addition, as DPJ s basic policies clearly indicate, the party is likely to promote public participation and cooperation with NGOs and non-profitmaking organisations (NPOs) further. In non-military contributions, they will support participation in international politics by civil society actors such as citizens, NGOs, corporations, and think tanks. 17 Certainly this must be balanced with Japan s relations with the United States. At the same time, the expansion of the geographical scope beyond Asia as well as the extent and quality of Japan s cooperation with the United Nations would continue to affect Japan s foreign policy ideas at profound levels, especially those relating to universal values like democracy, freedom and human rights. 16 As to the recent strategic discourse in Japanese political circles, see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: The Current Discourse, Journal of Japanese Studies, vol.33, no.1, 2007, pp See DPJ s Our Basic Philosophy: Building a Free and Secure Society (April 1988). The quote is from the section of non-military contributions. 9