Christine B. Avenarius Social Networks, Wealth Accumulation, and Dispute Resolution in Rural China

Transcription

1 Christine B. Avenarius Social Networks, Wealth Accumulation, and Dispute Resolution in Rural China Over the course of the last three decades China has been immersed in a dramatic social and economic transition in which both wealth and inequality have increased (McKinley 1996; Vermeer et al. 1998; Oi, Walder 1999). Historically, inequality had been based on the embeddedness of individuals in webs of kinship relations. Those who belonged to particular powerful lineages had more influence than others (Ruf 1998). In the early 1950s the Chinese Communist Party started a land reform and the collectivization of all forms of production. Party officials also abolished the existing social classes with a call for an ongoing class struggle against former landlords and other bad elements, e.g. business owners (Chan et al. 1984). Then in 1978 the Chinese government reversed their previous policies and initiated economic reforms that enabled both private business initiatives and the return of economic responsibilities to the household level. These reforms have made it possible for household members to expand their social relationships beyond kinship obligations and to engage in various business activities in addition to agricultural production (McKinley 1996; Oi 1999). As a consequence of increased wealth and inequality the number of disputes over land use rights and access to financial capital has increased. In rural China disputes have traditionally been resolved through mediation by a third party rather than adjudication as found in most western legal systems. In fact, only after opening China s national economy to the world markets has the Chinese government made the rule of law and adjudication at court available to all citizens (Wang 2000). However, the Chinese government also recommended that both informal and formal mediation at the village level and formal mediation at court at the county level should be exhausted before resorting to adjudication (Tanner 1999; Potter 2001). Informal mediation refers to the personal selection of a family member, friend or neighbor by one or both disputing parties to serve as a moderator. Formal mediation takes place when two people in disagreement have reached no resolution with the help of a trusted individual and turn to the official village mediator

2 10 Christine B. Avenarius installed by the village level committee of the Communist party. Procedures and outcomes are then documented. While these documents are not made public, taking a dispute to the official village mediator creates public awareness of the dispute, which most villagers traditionally prefer to avoid. 1 If no conflict resolution is possible, the case goes to a formal mediator at the township court and then a mediator at the county level court, before being recommended for adjudication by a judge (Zhao 2003). Dispute resolution by mediation is oriented fundamentally on the principles of reciprocity with the goal to reestablish harmony and peace in the social order (Zhao 2003). Any mediation at the village level is both the product of social relationships and an instrument to manage these relationships. Typical incidents that upset the balance in relationships between family members, neighbors, fellow villagers or business partners include disagreements about family division after a son s marriage, distribution of inheritance, the repayment of borrowed money, or land use rights such as the inattention to borders between land plots or the compensation for land that has been rented from a fellow villager and converted to industrial use. Some disagreements lead to personal insults and injuries that amplify a conflict. In the majority of instances an intervention by related people is sufficient to rectify problems and restore the existing relationships. However, the number of disputes that need the assistance of the official village mediator has grown in recent years. This article attempts to explain the likelihood of taking a dispute to the official village mediator, in particular among residents of Li village in Hebei province, 2 given the ongoing changes in mainland China in terms of access to resources and to knowledge about the changing legal system. This investigation is part of a larger research project on the effects of the recently introduced rule of law in China on beliefs and perceptions of Chinese citizens regarding notions of justice, fairness and the role of social relationships in various conflict resolution strategies. Data collection and analysis of this research segment were conducted with the assumption that structural positions of villagers in the whole village network, configurations of personal networks, and the availability of resources influence the likelihood of involvement in an officially recognized dispute. 1 Most disputes are public at the production team level, i.e. within a particular neighborhood. Official mediation by the village mediator makes a dispute more widely known despite efforts to conceal its existence from neighbors and the larger village community. See also footnote 7 that informs about the likelihood of adjudication at court. 2 Li village is a pseudonym.

3 Social Networks, Wealth Accumulation, and Dispute Resolution in Rural China 11 The Rule of Relationships The traditional social order in rural China is characterized by the hierarchical nesting of relationships and membership in kinship groups, namely clans and lineages. Fei Xiaotong (1939), the most widely known anthropologist in China, wrote that a member of Chinese culture sees him- or herself as an individual embedded in concentric circles of society. In the core of all circles is the person, surrounded by his or her family members, followed by lineage members, the special interest groups or association he or she is a member of, and lastly the larger society. In reference to Confucian teachings, the traditional Chinese social system is not individual-based or society-based, but relationship-based. Man is defined as a social and interactive being, not an isolated, separate entity. The social philosophy of relationships is founded on the Confucian principles of lun, which means differentiated order, and li, the rules of proper conduct. The concept of lun stresses differentiation between people, specifically fathers and sons, husbands and wives, seniors and juniors, superiors and subordinates and so forth (King 1994). It is a system of complimentary social roles with distinct status differences. As a result, a Chinese person sees the world as a reflection of his or her relations to others and the particular circumstances that unite them. The indigenous Chinese category for such a particularistic tie is guanxi, a significant relationship. The notion of having a guanxi tie expresses the fact that two individuals are engaged in social exchange with each other (Jacobs 1982). The building of guanxi always entails the recognition of a hierarchical relationship, either in the very subtle sense of older and younger brother or the person seeking the guanxi relation and the person granting the guanxi relation. The recognition of seeker and giver is very conscious and therefore intentional in Chinese culture. Following the principles of Confucius, guanxi arises from the obligation of subordinates to fulfill obligations to those of supposedly greater power and influence (Yang 1957; King 1994; Kipnis 1997). Different viewpoints exist among scholars regarding the future role of guanxi ties. Some predict that the role of guanxi relationships will decline as a result of economic transformations and be replaced by the rule of law (Gold, Guthrie, Wank 2002). Others argue that the importance of guanxi will increase and create a situation quite different from western rational-legal systems (Potter 2002). To understand the potential impact of a changed legal system on the Chinese social structure it is important to learn more about the role of guanxi in legal processes. In rural areas, guanxi ties still matter. For urban areas, Potter (2002) describes an increased willingness of Chinese disputants to be involved in more formal forms of conflict resolution. However, he also reports

4 12 Christine B. Avenarius that involved parties are represented by lawyers, which allows the disputants to continue and nourish their guanxi ties independent of the outcome at court (Potter 2002: 188). In general, the use of guanxi ties in the judicial decision making process is such that decisions are often derived in response to the requirements of personal networks rather than the requirements of law. The context of Chinese social practices allows private meetings between judges and clients, banquets, and all sorts of other social encounters during the course of the investigation process (Potter 2002: 189). Guanxi relationships have always been used as a mechanism to protect individuals and groups against depredation of powerful but unresponsive officialdom and to help with adjustments in the application of formalistic law and processes (Potter 2002: 191). Learning more about the role of guanxi ties in addition to beliefs and conceptions of justice and fairness among the general public is one step towards understanding changes in Chinese society. However, it is also imperative to investigate the actual nature of social relationships Chinese people currently engage in, specifically the role of these relationships in establishing wider reaching ties to people outside their primary groups. Guanxi ties are also often understood as social capital since these ties can be accumulated and converted into economic, political, or symbolic capital (Smart 1993; Lin 2001; Bian 2002). Social network research has been mainly concerned with urban Chinese populations. A primary focus of these studies are work related interactions and the potential for social mobility (Ruan 1993; Bian 1997; Lin 1999; Bian 2002). Few studies have applied social network analysis to the study of rural China. However, many scholars recognize the importance of social relationships and the interconnectedness of network members in rural China (Yan 1996; Kipnis 1997; Vermeer et al. 1998; Liu 2000). In rural areas social networks still include a majority of kin group members (Yan 1996). Yet, economic reforms and the increasing rate of industrialization in the countryside that promoted the rise of private businesses have introduced diversity to rural networks (Vermeer et al. 1998; Oi 1999). In the present study of social change in rural China I shall focus not only on the structure or villagers personal networks, but also on the ability of rural citizens to reach a variety of types of people. For the latter, the classic approach to collect personal network data with the help of name generators is less useful (McAllister, Fischer 1983). Instead, the position generator approach advocated by Lin (2001) is more practical to understand the potential for social mobility. It records informants relations to people who hold certain positions in society or perform certain occupations. These people can be reached by knowing somebody who knows someone in

5 Social Networks, Wealth Accumulation, and Dispute Resolution in Rural China 13 a particular position, i.e., the equivalent of a guanxi tie. They can provide a person with information or access to information and the means to obtain their goals. These kinds of connections also might widen people s horizons and expose them to a different set of values (e.g., cosmopolitanisms). Knowing the range of people a person has access to through the resources of his or her network ties, informs us about their potential for change and openness with respect to the range of available conflict resolution strategies. It follows that the composition of personal networks in terms of maintaining relationships to non-kin outside the village boundaries, might have an impact on attitudes towards disputes and the likelihood to engage in publically visible disputes. In addition, relationships with members of the legal professions such as lawyers and judges might also have an impact on the decision making process regarding the settlement of disagreements. Furthermore, the level of affluence among villagers, in this study measured as visible display of wealth, might correlate with both the range of network ties and the decision to get involved in a dispute rather than to avoid conflicts. Therefore, the findings presented below address the likelihood of effects of network configurations in combination with the availability of resources (i.e., visible wealth) on the occurrence of disputes that need the services of an official village mediator. Methodology Data for this study were collected in the summer of 2004 as part of a preliminary study for a larger research project on the impact of the changing Chinese legal system on beliefs about fairness and the role of social relationships in conflict resolutions. The research design called for the selection of a fairly large village with a mixed economy based on agriculture and agricultural affiliated businesses and a low rate of out-migration, to ensure the presence of a sufficient number of dispute cases that occurred in recent memory (i.e. over the span of the last five years) within the village community. The choice for Li village in Hebei province, then, was made after establishing research collaboration with anthropologist Zhao Xudong who conducted his dissertation research on present and historic patterns of dispute resolution at this site (Zhao 2003). After an initial phase of exploratory research collecting data based on informal interviews with villagers and village leaders, we developed an instrument for structured interviews eliciting social network data and observations of visible wealth. We then assembled a team of six student researchers whom we trained for two weeks in data collection techniques and interview practices

6 14 Christine B. Avenarius (Bernard 2006, Johnson, Weller 2002). Together we spent three weeks conducting interviews in Li village. The research design called for two types of informants, a larger group of randomly selected villagers and a smaller group of purposively selected villagers as a control group. Informants in the latter group had all been involved in a dispute in recent years as identified by Dr. Zhao in his fieldwork. We made a special effort to interview heads of households since network questions were designed to elicit data on a range of social and material resources obtained through the combined ties of all household members. We used a snowball sampling strategy based on random seeds to generate the main sample of 160 villagers (Klovdahl 1989). Li village still recognizes the administrative division of eight production teams created during the era of collectivization. Each household is registered in the household registration book by the number of its respective production team. We randomly selected five households in each production team (5 x 8 = 40) as seeds for the interviews on network data. From the network contacts mentioned by each head of household we randomly selected the next informant. For each seed we completed a three step four-node random walk, meaning each seed introduced us to three additional informants in the chain (Klovdahl 1989). The rationale for this approach was to acquire information about the properties of the whole village network without interviewing all households in the village (Klovdahl 1990). In addition, we also interviewed a purposive sample of 30 households who had been involved in a dispute during the last 5 years (Johnson 1990). However, due to data collection errors and unfinished interviews we have only 183 completed interviews instead of 190. Heads of households were asked about their social relationships with relatives, non-kin group members (neighbors, fictive kin, friends, buddies [houdaoban], and partners in business activities and anyone else they know and are likely to discuss important matters. In reference to Lin s (2000) position generator approach we also elicited information about villagers ability to reach people in certain positions such as government officials (i.e. cadres) outside the village, judges, lawyers, etc. Informants were also interviewed about occurrences of past or ongoing disputes over land use or borrowed money. In addition we recorded information about the size and age of their house (i.e., the number of storeys and the presence or absence of beds in the main living room) and ownership of utility and consumer goods, including the size of TV sets, motor bikes, cars, refrigerators, etc. This allowed us to compute an indicator of visible wealth. 3

7 Social Networks, Wealth Accumulation, and Dispute Resolution in Rural China 15 Ethnographic Background 3 Li village is located within the administrative boundaries of a township within Zhao County in the Shijiazhuang prefecture of the northern Chinese province Hebei. The distance from the center of the city of Shijiazhuang is approximately 120 kilometers. The village has about 4,830 inhabitants living in 900 separate households. Most of the village inhabitants, 85 % of all villagers, share the same last name. However, not all of them are directly related. The historic records recognize four separate sublineages (Zhao 2003). Most residents under the age of 60 are unable to determine to which sublineage they belong. The remaining households belong to one of two additional lineages with their own specific last name. However, intermarriage between lineages and sublineages is very common. Li village is widely known for its pear production, which dates back to the 17 th century and brought the village a modest level of wealth during the era of collectivization between the 1950 s and 1970 s (Zhao 2003). After decollectivization in 1983 farmers converted all agricultural space to pear cultivation. Trees were allocated by using a lottery system that assigned trees located in specific areas to individual villagers. All men between the ages of 15 and 55 at the time received the same amount of trees. Women received subsidiary land that allowed conversion to tree cultivation. An adjustment of tree distribution took place in However, equal allocation of pear trees per household is elusive since the number of trees in the responsibility of a single household depends on its number of eligible members at the time of distribution. In addition, many farmers started sideline businesses. Among the randomly selected farmers of the study conducted in 2004, only 21 % of all households were not involved in any sideline activity. The majority of households had some stakeholder interest or ownership in a freezer facility (29 %). A little more than 10 % of all household engage in long-distance trade of pears, organizing the transportation of fruits and their direct marketing in cities throughout mainland China. Additional sideline businesses in the service sector include ownership of convenience stores or market stands, repair services and restaurants. Several households also own or are co-owners of factories that produce goods needed for pear production and distribution, such as paper mills, paper carton factories, fruit net factories, and soft drink factories. A few additional households have members who work in these factories as wage labors or earn a salary by teaching in the local schools or working on construction sites. 3 This method is admittedly coarse and flawed. We have since engaged in an additional research project that investigated emic evaluations of affluence (Liu, Avenarius 2008). The analysis of this data is ongoing and has not been incorporated into the present article.

8 16 Christine B. Avenarius Administratively, the village used to be organized into eight separate production teams during the time of collectivization. The whole village constituted a brigade that belonged to a commune which later was converted into a township (Guldin 2001). Although the village is now considered a single administrative unit, the division into eight production teams continues to be recognized by villagers. For example, informants specify the addresses of friends and family members as located in a particular production unit. More than 50 % of all ties link individuals to others who live in the same production team as evident in table 1. In addition, the village has a considerably high rate of village endogamy. Two thirds of all women between the ages of 25 and 40 have remained in the village after marriage rather than marry into a neighboring village community. Villagers claimed that this trend is a phenomenon that has strengthened over the last twenty years. They explain it with the consistently good results from pear harvests resulting in stable incomes compared to neighboring villages who have to rely on grain production. In addition, village out-migration has been rather low. However, this is gradually changing due to the increasing rate of young villagers who obtain a higher education and seek jobs in the county seat, provincial capital or other cities throughout China. Properties of Personal Networks Although informants were asked to represent the relationships of their entire household members, they mainly reported on their own personal ties. The mean number of these ties in the personal network of male members of Li village is 21 (std = 6.6). These relationships to others can be broken down into several distinct categories. The majority of ties, or 35 % of all relationships mentioned by informants, links villagers to immediate family members. An additional 19 % of all ties connect informants to their kin group members. Extended relatives are often identified by generation of relation to a person, i.e. as cousins or uncles, independent of actual age differences between individuals. The next largest group of network members are friends with whom people cooperate with on a general level (11 %), many of whom are members of the same production team and live nearby. Specific friendship ties such as former classmates constitute 6 % of personal network members as do fictive kin (6 %), called houdaoban, who hold very important positions in each others life. Many of these various friends and relatives fulfill additional roles for an informant. Lawyers, government officials or physicians living in the next township or as far as the cities of Shijiazhuang or Beijing, are often former classmates or fictive kin. Business partners that are not explicitly considered

9 Social Networks, Wealth Accumulation, and Dispute Resolution in Rural China 17 Average proportion in personal Types of ties networks of villagers Ties within the same production team 53 % Ties within the same village 78 % Ties outside the village 22 % (including kin) Ties outside the county 11 % (including kin) Table 1 Geographic distribution of ties to be friends make up another 5 % of network members. A similar proportion is attributed to those next door neighbors that happen to be neither labeled friends nor relatives. Relationships to members who fulfill only the singular role of legal or political advisor to an informant account for 3 % of all ties. The remaining 10 % of all ties mentioned by informants include a large range of roles and occupations and therefore cannot easily be grouped into distinct categories. As an evaluation of the geographic distribution of network ties reveals, the social world of villagers is predominantely locally bound. Table 1 displays the results of the analysis of aggregated personal network properties. On average heads of households reported that more than half of their personal relationships or 53 % connect them with people who live in the same production team and more than three quarters of their ties (78 %) span the locality of Li village. In other words, on average only 22 % of network ties provide opportunities to link a household to people outside their local perimeter. Half of these ties provide contacts with others outside Zhao county, either across Hebei province or throughout China. This limited reach of ties is somewhat surprising given the easy availability of transportation and communication technology. Most heads of household own a cell phone. 4 While motorbikes are not allowed to leave the county boundaries, buses run every hour. It is important to note that the geographic spread of ties is based on the computation of averages. There are several households that maintain larger proportions of ties to people outside the village boundaries and several households who limit their interactions exclusively to inhabitants of Li village. A significant correlation exists between 4 About every 10 th household owns a computer. However, in 2004 no household had internet access. A single internet café was open at the time that had sporadic access used by the local young men for computer games. By 2007 a few households had private internet access at home.

10 18 Christine B. Avenarius the total number of ties and the number of ties that reach outside the village (r =.304 p <.001). Similarly, the higher the proportion of network ties to people who live in the same production team, the smaller the overall network size (r = -.310, p <.001). A few additional attributes of informants and their social networks are of interest in light of the search for explanations of dispute occurrence. Many households are involved in sideline business activities either as workers, coowners or co-investors. Almost one third of informants (31 %) are involved in more than one sideline activities in various roles and capacities. Among them, 42 of the 183 informants are the actual owner of a business, manufacturing workshop or factory. Within the range of positions or occupations that network members of informants hold or have access to, the following proportions are noteworthy. Lawyers, either as friend, relative, or as an acquaintance, were known by 29 % of all informants. Some of them, a total of 19 % of informants, knew both a lawyer and a judge. All informants who reported to have greeting-relationships with judges also knew a lawyer, but not vice versa. Relationships to government officials outside the village administration were more widespread, including 43 % of all heads of households in this study. In terms of known disputes, our research team came across 47 informants who reported dispute occurrences in the last five years (26 %). Interestingly, ten of them were involved in more than one, sometimes three disputes. Naturally this directs attention towards potential areas of conflict. More than 60 % of all informants reported that they had borrowed money for various purposes, but only 27 % of informants had been in need of money specifically for business purposes. This shows that the practice of borrowing money is rather widespread, including money needed for wedding ceremonies, health care, or school fees of children. Not surprisingly, 31 % of villagers explained that they had obtained a loan from a credit union and 78 % of all informants had found themselves in the role of money lender to others in their network in the past five to ten years. Another common practice was the involvement in land renting or contracting agreements with fellow villagers (45 % of all informants). Yet only 26 % of the informants had encountered difficulties over land use rights and compensation in the recent past and not all of these cases of disagreements had come before a designated village mediator.

11 Social Networks, Wealth Accumulation, and Dispute Resolution in Rural China 19 Explaining Dispute Occurrences: Wealth Accumulation or Network Properties? The visible wealth indicator computed for this study is based on an accumulated score of possessions including such items as two storey houses, a separation between living room and bedrooms, 5 large television sets, air conditioners, cars, motorbikes, computers, and so forth. The analysis of correlations between visible wealth scores and other attributes of informants, including network descriptors, reveals that the possession of these items is first and foremost explained by the involvement in economic activities in addition to farming. Owners of manufacturing workshops or factories are most likely to display wealth followed by informants who are involved as investors, advisors or co-workers in more than one economic activity outside of farm work. While the use of a visible wealth indicator is not a reliable tool to detect the actual purchasing power or financial wealth of all villagers, it is an indicator of actual assets among informants. The acquisition of goods on credit is not an option in rural China. Although some villagers refrain from using their savings to purchase luxury goods, people who do own these items have actually paid for them. The likelihood that all the major items in a household were given as gifts or favors is rather slim. 6 Although a significant relationship exists between the absolute number of ties of a household and its wealth indicator score (r = 239, p <.001), neither the number of ties to network members outside the village nor the proportion of ties within the same production team have an effect on the level of wealth. However, the few ties that relatively affluent villagers maintain to outsiders often fulfill important functions. Villagers with a high display of visible wealth are more likely to have relations to judges and lawyers than people with lower wealth scores. This suggests that farmers engaged in economic sideline activities have attempted to gain information about legal procedures from friends, relatives, or designated professionals at some point in time. It also provides evidence that it is not the size of networks that matters but the content or rather, the reach of particular ties to specific gatekeepers of information. However, contrary to expectations households with a high wealth indicator score are not more likely to be involved in officially recognized disputes. It follows that dispute occurrences are the consequence of other influencing 5 Traditionally the main bed is located in the main room of a house, i.e. the living room. The majority of houses in Li Village still feature a large bed in the living room. Those who have separated living and sleeping spaces either live in very new houses they built accordingly or have spent money to reconfigure their houses by adding walls. 6 For further discussion of the evaluation of economic differences see Liu and Avenarius (2008).

12 20 Christine B. Avenarius factors. The search for explanations for this phenomenon was guided by the assumption that both network configurations and the availability of resources as a result of economic activities play an important role in predicting dispute involvement. To test the applicability of different sets of expectations regarding the occurrence of officially mediated disputes several multiple regressions of selected combinations of variables were conducted. Table 2 displays four different models that were tested for their explanatory power. Each model stands by itself and is based on a multiple regression of a purposefully selected combination of independent variables that are introduced below. The dependent variable for all four multiple regressions is the number of officially mediated disputes informants were involved in over the course of the last five years. We chose to use the continuous variable rather than the dummy variable representing merely an occurrence of disputes, since more than 20 % of all households that reported disputes had been involved in two or more of these incidents. A pretest of correlations between a large number of explanatory variables that either represent measures of social relationships or economic activities ruled out several variables as ingredients for the models due to problems of multicoliniarity. The relationship based factors that have the most explanatory power as independent variables include the total number of ties each informant listed, the number of ties to government officials outside the village, the number of lawyers known, and the betweeness centrality score of the informant based on the computation of the whole village network. The number of judges known was not included since all people who know a judge also know a lawyer. The aggregation would have merely increased the number of legal professionals known, but would not have introduced any new insights about an informant s attributes. Betweeness centrality was chosen instead of degree or closeness centrality, because it informs us about the reachability of informants within the whole village network and their ability to link the largest number of otherwise unrelated people (Freeman 1978; Wasserman, Faust 1994). This score also represents the existence of go-between actors or bridges in the village community that might instigate or remedy the likelihood of dispute occurrences. 7 The independent variables that indicate economic activities include the number of general money lenders that informants approach to obtain financing of various purposes, the ownership of businesses, the number of involvements in a range of economic activities, the borrowing of money specifically and exclusively for business purposes, and the existence of land contracts with fellow villagers.

13 Social Networks, Wealth Accumulation, and Dispute Resolution in Rural China 21 Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Constant Total # of ties ** ** * # of government officials known # of lawyers known ** *** Betweeness centrality * ** # of people informant borrowed money from for any purpose *.956 Owner of a business # of involvements in economic activities # of people borrowed money from for economic activities Land contract with others Wealth indicator score Adjusted R2 F-Value **** **** p < 0.1 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < **** p < Dependent variable: Number of officially mediated dispute occurences Table 2 Models explaining involvement in officially mediated disputes Overall, 7 the four computed linear regressions differ as follows. The first model features a combination of all network and economic activity variables that were chosen as regressors because they are not themselves highly intercorrelated. The other three models depict a combination of selected variables from the ingredients of model 1. Model 2 represents all network variables and the single economic activity variable that recorded a statistic significance in model 1, the number of people informants borrowed money from for any purpose. Model 3 includes only the network variables to test their combined effect on the number of disputes taken to the official mediator and model 4 shows only 7 To be sure, many villagers over the age of 40 know a large number of people on the basis of facial recognition. However, when they are in need of certain material resources, information resources, or need help in settling disagreements they rely on the help of a go-between rather than to directly approach an otherwise unrelated person.

14 22 Christine B. Avenarius the combination of variables representing important economic activities. All models include the variable wealth indicator to demonstrate the limited influence of wealth on dispute activities. The correlation coefficient for wealth does not register as statistically significant in either model based on the computation of multiple linear regressions and has a negative direction. For each of the four distinct explanatory models based on an analysis of variance computation (ANOVA), Table 2 lists the correlation coefficients for the included independent variables, the adjusted R 2 statistic and the F-value. Correlation coefficients measure the strength of the linear association between two variables. Furthermore, the multiple coefficient of determination, or R 2, measures the proportion of the dependent variable that can be attributed to the combined effects of all the independent variables acting together. An adjusted R 2 statistic considers the size of the sample and takes into account the changes created by the inclusion of large numbers of independent variables. Its value shows how much of the variation in taking a dispute to an official mediator at the village level is explained by the specific combination of independent variables. The F value represents the likelihood that two individual distributions are different. The higher the F value the more statistically significant the observation. This indicates that although model 3 explains the same level of variance, or 23.8 %, as model 2 with its specific set of influencing factors, it signifies a slightly better fit due to its higher F value. A comparison of the four models reveals that network variables play a more important role in the prediction of dispute occurrences than the combination of economic indicators. Only incidents of borrowing money for general purposes that include both economic activities and family emergencies register as slightly significant as represented in the second model. The latter provides us with some insights into the reasons for disagreements among villagers. Not surprisingly, the absolute number of ties in a network also predicts dispute incidents. More interactions provide more opportunities for disagreements. However, much more noteworthy are the effects of knowing a lawyer and the betweeness centrality score on the likelihood of dispute involvement as indicated in the third model listed in table 2. Nevertheless, the existence of ties to people who work in a legal profession is not an indicator of experience with adjudication at court among informants. While in the context of legal procedures in western cultures most individuals get to know a lawyer at the time of filing a suit at court or after a receiving a deposition, the situation is different for rural Chinese people. Those who know a lawyer often know this person as a relative, former classmate or as an acquaintance of a relative or classmate. Such a lawyer friend

15 Social Networks, Wealth Accumulation, and Dispute Resolution in Rural China 23 may provide access to information about legal procedures prior to any dispute occurrences. Ethnographic interviews with informants uncovered that the knowledge of legal rights and procedures had influenced individuals decision making process in declaring the occurrence of an injustice rather than succumbing to the cultural expectation of reestablishing harmony and peace in social relationships in case of a disagreement. Villagers who fail to yield to the advice of kin group members to keep silent about a dispute, bring the negotiation to the attention of the designated village mediator. This is often directly related to their knowledge about the rule of law. However, this initial step, while a precondition to court procedures, does not imply that a case will go to actual adjudication at court. The significance of the betweeness centrality score in explaining the likelihood of dispute occurrences provides us with another glimpse into specific Chinese cultural practices. The effect of betweeness centrality is negative, informing us that people with bridge positions in the village network are highly unlikely to get involved in publicly known disputes. In other words, only the less connected and less influential will dare to start the process of mediation that might or might not lead to more formal mediation and eventually adjudication. 8 The preferred dispute resolution strategy in rural China continues to be informal mediation at the kin group level. The rule of relationships and the maintenance of guanxi ties remain important mechanisms of social control. Discussion and Conclusion The likelihood that disputes about borrowed money or land use issues are brought before the official village mediator depends on a combination of network configurations and access to economic resources. However, the level of embeddedness in local social networks and business relations has more explanatory power than the level of affluence. Relationships to members of the legal profession that provide access to knowledge about legal rights and procedures in the event of continued disagreements, predict dispute visibility better than the accumulation of visible wealth among villagers. Rural residents who are aware of their rights yet are not part of the new economic elite in a village community, are most likely to use the newly instated legal procedures. In contrast, villagers who have accumulated financial assets based on a combination of skills and good connections to people outside the village refrain from official engagement in disputes. The same applies to rural residents who hold important positions in their overall village network as links 8 According to our data only 10 % of all known dispute cases in the village were brought to adjudication at court.

16 24 Christine B. Avenarius between otherwise not connected individuals. These practices exemplify the ongoing influence of the traditional Chinese social order and its hierarchical nesting of relationships on daily interaction patterns and activities. The majority of disagreements is solved locally rather than at court in the next township or county seat and is usually confined to the mediating efforts of an individual s circle of relatives and friends. Principles of reciprocity continue to matter and guanxi ties are important means of security and guidance. These guanxi ties provide a buffer against unwanted attention to disagreements in public showcasing the continued importance of the rule of relationships in rural China. At the same time, these particularistic ties are mainly responsible for the creation of economic inequalities between villagers. Many affluent villagers are related and protect each other. They rarely engage in disputes over borrowed money or economic investment decisions. They are more likely to know people living outside the village boundaries than less visibly wealthy villagers. However, this type of connectivity provides no indication of the number of contentions that occur in their social worlds. If anything, experiences gained in the larger society and advice from business partners have encouraged them to literally close ranks and avoid frequent engagement in mediated or adjudicated disputes. Analysis of the impact of the changing Chinese legal system on belief systems and the role of social relationships has shown that while few disputes actually find their way to court, perceptions about ideal dispute resolution strategies among rural residents are beginning to include adjudication as a viable alternative to local mediation. Further analysis is needed to explore to what extent perceptions and actual practices differ by socioeconomic background. The newly formed economic elite seems to continue to rely on the rule of relationships to settle disputes while less affluent and less well connected members of the village show an increased awareness of the legal procedures related to the rule of law. These developments reflect an overall shift towards increased legal consciousness among Chinese citizens (Gallagher 2006). The current article has merely set the stage for further presentations of findings regarding the growing awareness of legal rights and procedures among rural Chinese residents.

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