Compliance with Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act : Mohan Singh And Raghubir Dayal...

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1 Compliance with Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act : Mohan Singh And Raghubir Dayal... Compliance with Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act : Mohan Singh1 And Raghubir Dayal2 Need Reconsideration By Dr Arun Kumar Barthakur* Cite as : (2003) 8 SCC (Jour) 77 Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short â œthe Actâ ) provides for the publication of the preliminary notification for acquiring any land in three modes viz. in the Official Gazette, in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality â of which one shall be in the regional language, and at convenient places in the locality where the Collector is enjoined to publish a substance of the notification. In Mohan Singh1 Ramaswamy, J., speaking for a two-judge Bench, comprising himself and Pattanaik, J., ruled that if the appropriate Government invokes the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act, publication of the notification in two local newspapers and its substance at the convenient places in the locality is not mandatory. Ramaswamy, J., at SCC p. 147, para 27, ruled that â œthough compliance with publication of the three steps required under Section 4(1) is mandatory while exercising the power of eminent domain under Section 4(1), when the appropriate Government exercises the power under sub-section (4) of Section 17 dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A and directs the Collector to take possession of the land before making the award as the lands are needed urgently either under sub-section (1) or (2) thereof, it is not mandatory to publish the notification under Section 4(1) in the newspapers and giving of notice of the substance thereof in the localityâ. (emphasis supplied) Ramaswamy, J., premised this ruling on the following explanation at SCC pp , para 13: â œwhen the land is urgently needed under Section 17(1), notice under Section 9(1) would be given to the owner and steps would be taken to resume its possession after the expiry of 15 days. If it is needed urgently under Section 17(2), even without waiting for 15 days on issue of notice under Section 9(1) to the owner, the appropriate Government would direct the Collector to take possession of the land immediately. If the publication in the newspapers and in the locality is also insisted upon as preliminary to the exercise of power under Section 17(4) which are mandatory requirements and until last of them occurs, the immediate or urgent necessity to take possession of the land under Section 17(1) or 17(2) before making the award would be easily defeated by dereliction of duty by the subordinate officers or by skilful manoeuvre. â The publication in the newspapers and giving of notice of the substance of the notification at the convenient places in the locality are required to be done by the Collector authorized by the Government under Section 7 and his subordinate staff. If dereliction of duty is given primacy, delay deflects public justice to meet urgent situation by the acts of subordinate officers for any reason whatsoever. Until that is done and the last of the date occurs, Government would be unable to act swiftly for the public purpose to take immediate possession envisaged under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17 and they would be easily defeated or frustrated.â (emphasis supplied) The rule in Mohan Singh1, prima facie appears to be flawed when tested on the anvil of law and the long-established precedents. It is to be noted at the outset that both the provisions of Section 4 and Section 17 were substantially amended by Act 68 of The legislature in its wisdom while amending the said provisions did not make any exception to the statutory obligations of the appropriate Government under Section 4(1) in the event of the Government invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17. On the contrary, Parliament made the requirement of giving publicity to the notification under Section 4(1), more stringent than before, by inserting the additional requirement of publication of the notification in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality where the land is situated, of which at least one shall be in the regional language, in addition to the already existing requirement of the Collector causing public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. Law is, therefore, clear that whether the land is acquired under the normal procedure or under the urgency procedure, publication of the notice in the three modes provided under Section 4(1) is mandatory. It is also settled law that Section 4(1) is intended to enable the interested persons to seek immediate remedy from the courts against any proposal to acquire their lands by invoking the urgency provisions by dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A, based on any judicially recognised grounds viz. mala fide action3, complete lack of any material for acquiring the land4, non-application of mind, unsuitability or excessiveness of the land5 etc. In view of the fact that a large majority of the landowners are poor and illiterate, Parliament has enjoined upon the appropriate Government to give wide publicity to the notification in the manner laid down under Section 4(1) so that all interested persons come to know of the proposed acquisition of the land. It would therefore be contrary to the express provision of law as well as most unrealistic to hold that the obligation of the appropriate Government under Section 4(1) would be fully discharged and the interested persons would have sufficient notice of the proposed acquisition just when the appropriate

2 Government publishes the notification in the Official Gazette. It would be pertinent to note here that normally ordinary people do not subscribe to the Government Gazette, and consequently, they would not have access to a Gazette notification. It is submitted that such an interpretation would be plainly perverse and amount to rendering otiose the express mandate of Parliament. In consideration of the ground reality the Standing Committee on Urban and Rural Development of Parliament (10th Lok Sabha) has recommended the following measure to further tighten the requirement of giving adequate notice of the proposed acquisition: â œthe Committee are of the opinion that the very purpose of issuing notices to the affected person is to communicate the decision of the acquiring authority to acquire his/her land for public purpose. The need of the hour is to provide such kind of mechanism through which the affected person can have easy access to the notificationâ. The Committee, further, recommend that the affected person must also get a copy of the notification by registered post.â In fact, the rule laid down in Mohan Singh1 is also contrary to the long-established precedents. In Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan6 the Supreme Court had occasion to spell out the underlying object of Section 4(1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, which in terms is analogous to the Central Act. The Court differentiated the notice given under Section 4(1) from the notice given under Section 5(2) by observing that the object of one section is to give intimation to the person whose land is sought to be acquired, of the intention of the officer to enter his land before he does so and that of the other is to enable him to know the particulars of the land which is sought to be acquired.7 The Supreme Court, therefore, ruled that the requirement of publication of the substance of the notification in the locality of the land as provided under Section 4(1) is mandatory, and its violation will render the notification invalid. Subsequently, in Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P.8 the Supreme Court had occasion to directly interpret Section 4(1) of the Act for the first time. In this case, the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification under Section 4(1) read with sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17 of the Act dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act for acquiring certain lands. The interested persons filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court impugning the notification on the ground that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was invalid for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act; firstly, because the notification did not specify the locality where the land was situate; and secondly, because the substance of the notification was not published at convenient places in the locality. The High Court having dismissed the petition, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, where a two-judge Bench speaking through Mitter, J., allowed the appeal. His Lordship ruled that the issue of a notification under Section 4(1), including publication of the substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality, is a condition precedent to the exercise of any further powers under the Act even in extremely urgent cases like those mentioned in Section 17(2).9 He further observed that even in cases of extreme urgency, visualized under Section 17(2), like the maintenance of railway traffic by reason of any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, the legislature only thought it fit to bypass the provisions of Section 5-A but not those of Section 4(1).10 In yet another subsequent decision in Narindrajit Singh v. State of U.P.11 the Supreme Court spelled out the provision of Section 4(1) in the context of acquisition of lands by invoking the urgency provisions of Section 17(1). In this case also the Collector did not cause public notice of the substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality under Section 4(1). It was urged on behalf of the State Government that only when the persons interested had the right to file objections under Section 5-A, that is, only under the ordinary procedure, the public notice of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) by the Collector would be necessary, but not when the provisions of Section 5-A had been dispensed with under Section 17(4) of the Act. It was urged that when the interested persons were not entitled to file objections under Section 5-A it would be wholly unnecessary to give the requisite information of the acquisition initiated under Section 4(1). The Court rejected this contention relying on Khub Chand6 and State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib12. Grover, J., speaking for the Division Bench of the Court ruled that the provisions of Section 4(1) cannot be held to be mandatory under the ordinary procedure and directory under the urgency procedure contemplated under Section 17(4) of the Act. He held that Section 4(1) has to be read as an integrated provision which contains two conditions: the first is that the notification in the Official Gazette must be published and the second is that the Collector has to cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given.13 Earlier, in Abdul Razak Sahib12 a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court had reiterated the law that the publication of the notice in the locality was a mandatory requirement and that the object of giving notice of the proposed acquisition to the interested persons would be satisfied only when the substance of the notification was also published at convenient places in the locality. In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Mysore High Court quashing the notification published under Section 4(1) on the ground of non-publication of its substance in the locality even after a lapse of 10 weeks from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. In Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi14 another three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated15 the rule laid down in Narindrajit Singh11. In Deepak Pahwa14 the Court also settled the controversy arising out of Narindrajit Singh11 in which it was also stated that â œboth things have to be simultaneously done under Section 4(1)â, that is, publication of the notification in the Official

3 Gazette and its substance in the locality, which had led some High Courts to hold that simultaneity of publication of the notice in the Gazette and the public notice in the locality was a mandatory condition under Section 4(1). Chinnappa Reddy, J., clarified that a person interested in the property can be regarded as having notice of the proposed acquisition if both the requirements of Section 4(1) are complied with whether simultaneously or one after the other.16 This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in a catena of its subsequent decisions. In Collector (DM), Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal17 it was urged on behalf of the State Government that if the underlying purpose behind publication of a notice in the locality is to give an opportunity to the persons interested in the land to object to the acquisition, where this purpose is achieved with the interested persons having filed his objections under Section 5-A, the failure to publish the substance of the notification in the locality need not be treated as fatal and cannot invalidate the proceedings. Rejecting this contention, Desai, J., observed that the Court would not whittle down a mandate of the legislature recognized by a long line of decisions solely depending upon the facts of a given case.18 Then relying on Narindrajit Singh11 Desai, J., reiterated that provisions of Section 4(1) could not be held to be mandatory in one situation and directory in another.19 His Lordship observed that the expression â œsuch notificationâ in the latter part of Section 4(1) and sequence of events therein enumerated would clearly spell out that first the Government should reach a decision to acquire the land, then publish a notification under Section 4(1) and simultaneously or within a reasonable time from the date of the publication of the notification cause a notice to be published containing substance of such notification in the locality. It is, therefore, clear from these decisions that the prominent intention of the legislature in enacting the provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 4 is to give adequate notice to the interested persons, of the proposed acquisition of their lands before authorising any officer and his servants and workmen to enter upon the land under sub-section (2) to carry out the survey and other works stated therein and not merely to make requirements of Section 5-A functionally effective. However, it should be noted that these cases arose much before the Amendment Act of 1984 when there was no additional requirement to publish the notification â œin two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional languageâ. By inserting this additional requirement in Section 4(1) by Act 68 of 1984, Parliament made the requirements of giving adequate notice of the proposed acquisition to the interested persons more stringent than before, without making any distinction between acquisition under the normal procedure and under the urgency procedure. This question once again fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Nutakki Sesharatanam v. Sub-Collector, Land Acquisition, Vijayawada20 which also arose much before the Amendment Act of In that case, the notification under Section 4(1) invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) and the declaration under Section 6 were published on the same date on But the substance of the notification was not published at the convenient places in the locality within the limitation of forty days of the publication of the notification in the Government Gazette as was required by Section 4(1) as amended by the Land Acquisition (Andhra Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, The Court ruled that the timelimit of forty days for such publication in the locality has been made mandatory by Section 4(1) of the said Act as amended by the Andhra Pradesh (Amendment) Act, and hence, non-compliance thereof rendered acquisition bad in law. The Court also ordered that if the possession has been taken, the same must be returned to the appellant.21 This rule was reiterated in B. Kamalamma v. Sub-Collector, Land Acquisition, Vijayawada22. These two cases have also laid down the rule that merely because possession of the land was taken under Section 17(1), title of the land would not, ipso facto, absolutely vest in the Government free from encumbrances, if any of the mandatory provisions of the Act which are preconditions for exercising the power under Section 17(1) have not been complied with, and that in such a case the landowner would be entitled to restoration of possession of the land illegally taken by the Government. In M.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi23 the same issue once again fell for determination of the Supreme Court before a three-judge Bench comprising Kania, C.J., Thommen, J. and Dr Anand, J. (as he then was). In this case, the Collector of Mandsaur, Madhya Pradesh, issued a notification, purportedly under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of certain lands situate at Village Mandsaur, without giving any description of the lands and its exact location. The notification also further disclosed that the State Government had invoked the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Relying on Narendrajit Singh8 Dr Anand, J. (as he then was), held that the notification has to be published in the locality and particularly persons likely to be affected by the proposal have to be put on notice that such an activity is afoot. He further held that if a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is defective and does not comply with the requirements of the Act, it not only vitiates the notification, but also renders all subsequent proceedings connected with the acquisition, bad.24 In Mohan Singh1 Ramaswamy, J., at SCC p. 142, para 13, also ruled that: â œthe publication in the newspapers and giving of notice of the substance of the notification at the convenient places in the locality are required to be done by the Collector authorised by the Government under Section 7 and his subordinate staff.â (emphasis supplied) It is submitted with respect that Ramaswamy, J., appears to have made this observation in ignoratium of the express provisions of the Act for the following reasons: Section 4(1) enjoins the appropriate Government to publish the notification in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers. The section casts an obligation to complete the said

4 formalities upon the appropriate Government and not on the Collector, as erroneously stated by Ramaswamy, J. However, the obligation to publish the substance of such a notification at convenient places in the locality is cast on the Collector. The Collector is to carry out this duty upon the appropriate Government exercising the power under Section 4(1). The appropriate Government, therefore, has to ensure that the Collector discharges the statutory duty cast on him under Section 4(1). In case the urgency provisions are invoked, the Collector has to publish the substance of the notification in the convenient places in the locality urgently. The Collector is the seniormost officer of the Government in a revenue district and he is duty-bound to enforce the mandate of law without fail. Therefore, there is no jurisprudential basis whatever for the Court to dilute the law by making unwarranted allowance for dereliction of duty by the Collector in discharging his statutory duty. Indeed, this way every statute could be discredited by making undue allowance for dereliction of duty by the officer whose duty it is to implement it. There is also no question of the Collector merely relegating this responsibility to his subordinates. Of course, it is true that like any of his other functions, he would be expected to cause the publication of the substance of the notification at the convenient places in the locality through his subordinates. But, the responsibility of discharging this statutory duty by ensuring its due compliance is vested in him alone. It is submitted, with respect, that the mandatory requirement of Section 4(1) cannot be diluted by an unwarranted insinuation that the Collector or his subordinates â œby dereliction of dutyâ or â œby skilful manoeuvreâ may not discharge statutory duty. It is submitted that such a seriously adverse presumption against the custodian of law is neither contemplated by any provision of the Act nor supported by any known principle of jurisprudence, and is also bereft of any authority. It should also be noted that in the scheme of the Act the aforesaid duties cast on the Collector have to be discharged by him in accordance with the mandate of Section 4(1) alone, much before he takes order from the appropriate Government under Section 7, which comes into play at a subsequent time, only after publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. As such, Ramaswamy, J., with respect, clearly erred in observing that the publication of the notification in the newspapers and giving of notice of the substance of the notification at the convenient places in the locality are required to be done by the Collector authorised by the Government under Section 7. It is submitted that if the mandatory character of Section 4(1) could be diluted by calling into play the possibility of â œdereliction of dutyâ or â œskilful manoeuvreâ on the part of the Collector or his subordinates, such an argument could a made for diluting any of the other provisions of the statute. For example, Section 11-A lays down that the Collector must make his award within two years from the date of making the declaration under Section 6(1) failing which the entire acquisition proceedings shall lapse. It is not the case that the Collector always makes the award; in reality it is either his Deputy or any officer subordinate to him, styled as the Land Acquisition Officer, who is directed by the appropriate Government under Section 7 read with Section 3(c) of the Act, who conducts the enquiry and makes the award under Section 11. Applying the same logic it could also be argued that the provisions of Section 11-A, which have long been settled to be mandatory, are also not mandatory on the specious ground that the Land Acquisition Officer â œby dereliction of dutyâ or â œby wilful manoeuvreâ may not discharge his statutory duty by making the award within the stipulated two yea period. It is rather unfortunate, with respect, that Ramaswamy, J., had thought it expedient to render otiose the mandatory provisions of Section 4(1) by putting an undue premium on deliberate failure on the part of the Collector to discharge his statutory duty in order to whittle down a mandate of Parliament recognised by a long line of decisions. It is submitted that such an interpretation of a mandatory provisions of law cannot be supported by any known principle of interpretation. This view is fortified by the decision in Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi25. This is further fortified by the oft-quoted dictum of Lord Tenderton in Doe v. Bridges26 that â œwhere an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to be general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other mannerâ. Ramaswamy, J., has alluded to various decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his decision. However, with respect, we find them to be not apposite, as they are not on the Land Acquisition Act, which being an ad hominem legislation should be strictly construed.27 Ramaswamy, J., had also quoted from p. 381 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn. However, we are of respectful opinion that instead of the same, the observation in Maxwell at pp is more apposite on the point: â œstatutes which encroach on the rights of the subject, whether as regards persons or property, are subject to a strict construction in the same way as penal Acts. It is a recognised rule that they should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect such rights, and if there is any ambiguity the construction, which is in favour of the freedom of the individual, should be adoptedâ.â (emphasis supplied) It is also respectfully submitted that Ramaswamy, J., also erred in ruling that even though, the notification is not published in the newspapers and the substance thereof is not published at convenient places in the locality, the interested persons shall be issued notice under Section 9(1). This observation is contrary to the rule laid down in Narindrajit Singh11 discussed above. It is settled law that the object of Section 4(1) is not just to enable the interested persons to object to the acquisition under Section 5-A; it was enacted with the object of giving due notice to the interested persons of the intended entry of the government officers and servants and workmen under Section 4(2) upon the land to carry out survey and the required tests to ascertain the suitability of the land for the proposed public purpose.

5 Another object of Section 4(1) is to enable the interested persons to seek immediate remedy of the Court against acquisition of their land on any of the judicially recognised grounds. It is also submitted that just because the lands are urgently required for development work it does not mean that the mandatory provisions of the statute could be explained away by the object of reaching the end. This view is supported by the decision in Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad v. Municipal Corpn. of Ahmedabad28 where Goswami, J., speaking for a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, ruled that beneficial schemes under welfare legislation have to be executed in accordance with law which creates the schemes. His Lordship observed that the end does not always justify the means and it is no answer that the object of the scheme is such that it justifies the implementer of the law to be absolutely oblivious of the manner of enforcement even though the manner is an integral part of the scheme, imposing under the law, restrictions on the rights of individuals.29 In Mohan Singh1 at SCC p. 140, para 11, Ramaswamy, J., has also observed that the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (3-A) are not relevant for the purpose of the case. With respect, one fails to understand the reasons for making this observation. Sub-section (3) mandates that: â œin every case under either of the preceding sub-sections the Collector shall at the time of taking possession offer to the persons interested compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and for any other damage sustained by them caused by such sudden dispossessionâ.â (emphasis supplied) Similarly, sub-section (3-A) mandates that: â œ17. (3-A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall â (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and (b) pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in Section 31 subsection (2),..â (emphasis supplied) From the express and peremptory language used by the legislature in the aforesaid sub-sections it is clear that the legislature has prescribed a procedure to be mandatorily complied with before taking possession of the land either under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 17. When the legislature has spoken in a mandatory language in subsections (3) and (3-A), Ramaswamy, J., with respect, erred in making the observation that the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (3-A) are not relevant to the facts of the case without giving any cogent reason whatsoever.30 In Raghubir Dayal2 Ramaswamy, J., speaking for a two-judge Division Bench, at SCC pp , para 7, also held thus: â œ7. Therefore, the word â shallâ used in Section 4(1) should be construed to be mandatory because the requirement of Section 4(1) of the publication of the notification in the Gazette followed by their publication in the newspapers perhaps in some cases may not meet the needed purpose of notice to the owner or person claiming interest in the land proposed to be acquired. For instance, in rural areas most agriculturists may not read even the vernacular newspapers. Their fields are their world and work therein is their breadwinner. They would come to know only if the substance of the notification is published (announced) in the village by beat of drum. Therefore, publication of the substance of the notification of Section 4(1) and in the locality is mandatory but it is not the requirement of the law that it be done simultaneously with the publication in the Gazette or newspapers.â It is rather unfortunate that Ramaswamy, J., has departed from this view in Mohan Singh1 against the established precedents in this regard. However, in Raghubir Dayal2 Ramaswamy, J., at SCC p. 137, para 7, also ruled thus: â œthough there is a time gap of more than six months between the date of the notification under Section 4(1) in the State Gazette and the date of the publication of the substance of the notification in the locality, the delay by itself does not render the notification under Section 4(1) published in the State Gazette, invalid.â With respect, this observation of Ramaswamy, J., is contrary to the decision of the three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Abdul Razak Sahib12 wherein the Court upheld the decision of the High Court of Mysore quashing the notification on the ground of non-publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) even after the lapse of 10 weeks. This observation is also contrary to another three-judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Deepak Pahwa14 wherein, at SCC pp , para 3, Chinnappa Reddy, J., ruled thus: â œpublication in the Official Gazette and public notice in the locality are the essential elements of Section 4(1) and not the simultaneity or immediacy of the publication and the public notice. But since the steps contemplated by Section 4(2) cannot be undertaken unless publication is made and public notice given as contemplated by Section 4(1), it is implicit that the publication and the public notice must be contemporaneous though not simultaneous or immediately after one another. Naturally, contemporaneity may involve a gap of time and by the very nature of the things, the publication in the Official Gazette and the public notice in the locality must necessarily be separated by a gap of time. This does not mean that the publication and the public notice may be separated by a long interval of time. What is necessary, is that the continuity of action should not appear to be broken by a deep gap.â

6 (emphasis supplied) It is respectfully submitted that publication of the substance of the notification in the locality after a gap of six months from the date of the notification published under Section 4(1) in the State Gazette in Raghubir Dayal2 cannot be considered to be contemporaneous, inasmuch as such a long gap would patently break the continuity of actions contemplated by subsections (1) and (2) of Section 4. A gap of six months also does not pass the test of reasonable time prescribed by Raja Ram Jaiswal17. Moreover, this rule in Raghubir Dayal2 unwittingly serves to protract the acquisition proceedings defeating the object of the statute itself. It is therefore, respectfully submitted that the rule in Raghubir Dayal2 in this regard laid down by a two-judge Bench being contrary to the rule earlier laid down by three-judge Benches in Abdul Razak Sahib12 and Deepak Pahwa14 and a two-judge Bench in Raja Ram Jaiswal17 cannot be held to be a binding authority.31 Conclusion Parliament has prescribed the procedure under Section 4(1) for initiating compulsory acquisition of land. No exception has been made to this procedure either under Section 4 or under Section 17, when the appropriate Government decides to urgently acquire land by invoking the provisions of Sections 17(1) and (4). The decision in Mohan Singh1 lays down that in case of urgency the publication of the notification in two local newspapers and its substance at the convenient places in the locality is not mandatory. This decision is per incuriam of Narendrajit Singh8 which is the leading case on the point, and has been repeatedly followed by the Supreme Court in a line of cases. Unfortunately, the Bench deciding Mohan Singh1 was not apprised of any of the earlier decisions, discussed above, rendered by Division Benches of two and three Judges laying down the rule that Section 4(1) is mandatory irrespective of whether the land is acquired under the ordinary or the urgency procedure. Similarly, it is settled law that though the publication of the notification in the Gazette and the notice in the locality under Section 4(1) need not be simultaneous or immediately after one another, they must be contemporaneous so as not to break the continuity of actions contemplated under sub-section (1) and subsection (2) of Section 4; that is, they must follow one another within a reasonable time. The decision in Raghubir Dayal2 laying down that delay of six months for publication of the notice in the locality did not render the notification invalid is per incuriam of the decisions of the three-judge Division Benches in Abdul Razak Sahib12 and Deepak Pahwa14 and the two-judge Division Bench in Raja Ram Jaiswal17 and as such it was wrongly decided. These decisions in Mohan Singh1 and Raghubir Dayal2 are capable of doing great mischief to the procedure prescribed by law, which has been long established. There is, therefore, a strong reason for reconsideration of these decisions by the Supreme Court to straighten the law in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the long-settled rule in this regard. â â â Â - Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India, (1997) 9 SCC 132 Return to Text - State of Haryana v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133 Return to Text - Advocate, Bombay High Court. Return to Text - See State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471. Return to Text - Om Prakash v. State of U.P., (1998) 6 SCC 1 Return to Text - Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 133 Return to Text - AIR 1967 SC 1074 Return to Text - Ibid., at p. 1077, para 6 Return to Text - (1970) 1 SCC 125 Return to Text - Ibid., at p. 128, para 7 Return to Text - Ibid., at p. 129, para 11 Return to Text - Narindrajit Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 157 Return to Text - Subsequently reported in (1973) 3 SCC 196 Return to Text - Ibid., at p. 159, para 3 Return to Text - (1984) 4 SCC 308. The rule in Deepak Pahwa was followed by the Supreme Court in Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority v. Mohd. Amri Khan, (1986) 1 SCC 3 and in C.K. Narayana Chary v. Pothepalli Ashanna, (1986) 1 SCC 9. Return to Text - Deepak Pahwa, (1984) 4 SCC 308, 313 Return to Text - Ibid., at p. 314, para 6 Return to Text - (1985) 3 SCC 1 Return to Text - Ibid., at p. 12, para 13 Return to Text - In the judgment, reported in Supreme Court Cases, Desai, J., had mistakenly cited Narendra Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., (1977) 1 SCC 216, which relates to an entirely different subject. But his express reference to the relevant ratio makes it clear that His Lordship was indeed referring to Narindrajit Singh v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 157. Return to Text

7 - (1992) 1 SCC 114 Return to Text - Ibid., at p. 116, paras 5-6 Return to Text - JT (1992) 1 SC 55 Return to Text - (1992) 2 SCC 168 Return to Text - Ibid., at p. 173, para 8 Return to Text - (1975) 4 SCC 298, 301 Return to Text - (1831) 1 B&Ad 847, 859 Return to Text - Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1074, 1077 Return to Text - (1976) 3 SCC 719 Return to Text - Ibid., at p. 725 Return to Text - For a discussion on the mandatory character of sub-sections (3) and (3-A) of Section 17, please see Authorâ s article â œland Acquisition Under the Urgency Provisions: Need for Clarity in Lawâ, (2002) 4 SCC (Jour) 37 Return to Text - For the principle as to when a Supreme Court decision loses its binding authority, see Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101, ; Punjab Land Development & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, (1990) 3 SCC 682, 706; State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, ; Govt. of India v. Workmen of State Trading Corpn., (1997) 11 SCC 641; Krishena Kumar v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207, 233. Return to Text