IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE ACCRA AD 2018

Transcription

1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE ACCRA AD 2018 BETWEEN: DOMINIC AKURITINGA AYINE H/NO. 3, MULBERRY STREET EAST LEGON ACCRA SUIT NO J1/5/2018 PLAINTIFF AND 1. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL ATTORNEY-GENERAL S CHAMBERS MINISTRY OF JUSTICE MINISTERIES ACCRA 2. MARTIN ALAMISI AMIDU PLOT N.O 355 NORTH LEGON RESIDENTIAL AREA, ACCRA 1 ST DEFENDANT 2 ND DEFENDANT STATEMENT OF THE 2 ND DEFENDANT S CASE 1. Save as hereinafter expressly admitted the 2 nd Defendant denies each and every statement of fact contained in the Plaintiff s Statement of Case as if each were herein set forth and denied seriatim. 2. The 2 nd Defendant says that the Plaintiff s Writ and Statement of Case disclose in fact, in deed and in legal argument that contrary to Plaintiff s action having been commenced pursuant to Articles 2(1)(b) and 130(1)(a), and Rule 45 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (CI 16) the Plaintiff is on a fishing expedition in the hope that he may secure some favourable decision of this Court with his alternative and contradictory statements, understanding, and interpretations of Articles 190(1)(d), 199(1), 199(4) and 295 of the 1992 Constitution. 3. The 2 nd Defendant says further that the six declarations sought by the Plaintiff s Writ and Statement of Case disclose a failure or refusal by the Plaintiff to appreciate the fact that Parliament has residual power under the 1992 Constitution to enact sui generis provisions in an Act of Parliament such as Section 13 of Act 959 to deal with matters such as the intractable canker of corruption and corruption related offences expressly proscribed by

2 the Constitution and laws of Ghana by engaging such legal talents on such terms and conditions as would effectively achieve the objective of the Constitutional proscriptions. 4. The 2 nd Defendant accordingly prays this Court to dismiss the Plaintiff s Writ and Statement of Case as being without any merit whatsoever under the 1992 Constitution and Rule 45 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (CI 16). 5. The 2 nd Defendant admits paragraph 2 of the Plaintiff s Statement of Case and adds that the Plaintiff was also the immediate past Deputy Minister for Justice in the immediate past Government that was overwhelmingly defeated in the last election on 7 th December 2016 while the 2 nd Defendant is a former Attorney General who in his later private capacity as a citizen of Ghana secured judgments and orders to refund unconstitutionally paid large sums of money in the millions from the national purse in this Court against the Attorney General and the immediate past Government in which the Plaintiff was a Deputy Minister for Justice in Amidu (No 1) v Attorney General, Waterville Holding (BVI) & Woyome (No. 1) [ ] 1 SCGLR 112; Amidu (No 2) v Attorney General, Isofoton SA & Forson (No 1) [ ] SCGLR 167; Amidu (No 3) v Attorney General, Waterville Holdings (BVI) Ltd & Woyome (No 2) SCGLR 606; and Amidu (No 4) v Attorney General, Isofoton SA & Forson (No 2) SCGL The 2 nd Defendant admits paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6, of the Plaintiff s Statement of Case and says that by a consent judgment given in Suit No. AP.159/2013 on 4 th September 2014 by His Lordship Mr. Justice K. A. Ofori-Atta at the High Court Accra, Ghana, Automated Court 2 the said Mr. Justice Ofori-Atta entered judgment in favour of the 2 nd Defendant as the Plaintiff against the immediate past Government of which the Plaintiff was the Deputy Minister for Justice showing that the termination of 2 nd Defendant s appointment by the late President Atta Mills was wrongful and compensation, damages and other awards and orders made in favour of the 2 nd Defendant with costs of Six Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHC6,000.00) to the 2 nd Defendant as the Plaintiff accordingly. 7. The 2 nd Defendant says in expatiation of paragraph 4 of the Plaintiff s Statement of Case that before the President announced the 2 nd Defendant s nomination as Special Prosecutor on 11 th January 2018 the President had invited the 2 nd Defendant for a nomination confirmation discussion at which the President and the 2 nd Defendant both former Attorneys General had considered the meaning and effect of Section 13 of Act 959 pursuant to the President s executive authority to enforce the Constitution and the laws of Ghana within the context of Chapter 14 and the letter and spirit of the Constitution as a whole and arrived at the conclusion that the President could within the meaning and effect of the 1992 Constitution accept the nomination of the 2 nd Defendant by the 1 st Defendant Attorney General in spite of the 2 nd Defendant s age of 66 years. 8. The 2 nd Defendant denies paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the Plaintiff s Statement of Case and says that Parliament has the residual authority to enact Act 959, particularly Sections 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 thereof sui generis in a manner consistent with the residual

3 legislative power apportioned to Parliament under the 1992 Constitution. 9. The 2 nd Defendant denies paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35 and 36 of the Plaintiff s Statement of Case as being the result of the refusal or failure of the Plaintiff to appreciate that Parliament has the residual authority to create sui generis public offices and officers on fixed contracts of a shorter duration which were not anticipated or were unforeseen by the framers of the 1992 Constitution and therefore will not fall under Chapter 14 of the 1992 Constitution even though the other staff/employees of the Office of the Special Prosecutor may be public officers appointed pursuant to Article 195 of the 1992 Constitution. 10. The 2 nd Defendant says in addition to the 2 nd Defendant s paragraphs 7 and 8 of this Statement of Case, supra, that a simple acquaintance with the legislative history of Act 959 by the Plaintiff as a Member of Parliament and a former Deputy Minister for Justice would have made it abundantly clear to the Plaintiff that the first draft of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Bill, 2017 dated 20 th June 2017 which was the subject of a Stakeholders Meeting from June 2017 contained Clauses 12 and 15 making provision for the appointment of the Special Prosecutor in accordance with Article 195 of the Constitution without any provision for the nomination and approval of the Special Prosecutor by Parliament but was abandoned after the stakeholders meeting, while the subsequent Bill that was laid in Parliament on 18 th July 2017, later withdrawn and later laid a second time on 2 nd August 2017 leading to the enactment of Act 959 was purposefully intended to create a sui generis office of Special Prosecutor and Deputy Special Prosecutor on a short duration contractual basis without reference to Article 195 of the Constitution. 11. The 2 nd Defendant does not admit paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Plaintiff s Statement of Case that implies that this Court follows any particular rules of interpretation slavishly: the 2 nd Defendant says in addition that this Court following the taught traditions of the law decides cases having regards to the facts and context including a balancing of the several interpretative tools at its disposal to achieve substantial justice as the highest court of the land and is at liberty to depart from any of its previous decisions when in the view of the Court it is just to do so. 12. In answer to paragraph 31 of the Plaintiff s Statement of Case the 2 nd Defendant says that Parliament acted within its legislative power under the 1992 Constitution to enact Section 13(5) of Act 959 sui generis to enable the 1 st Defendant and the President appointed an experienced, tried and tested lawyer for upwards of 39 years standing at the Bar such as the 2 nd Defendant to assist the executive authority to excise or minimize the endemic canker of corruption and corruption related offences which the President contended at the last elections had infected the body politic uncontrollably under the immediate past Government under which the Plaintiff was the Deputy Minister for Justice; and for which reason the President was overwhelming voted by the electorate to be the President of Ghana to execute his electoral promises and mandate.

4 THE 2 ND DEFENDANT S LEGAL SUBMISSIONS 13. A flimsy reading of the six reliefs endorsed on Plaintiff s Writ and Statement of Case purporting to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court leaves one in no shadow of doubt that the Plaintiff s misapprehended major premise is that the 2 nd Defendant was nominated by the 1 st Defendant for approval by Parliament and appointment by the President under Section 13 (3) of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2018 (Act 959) pursuant to Articles 190(d), 199(1), 199(4) and 295 of the 1992 Constitution and leading to the erroneous minor premise that the office of the Special Prosecutor was established under Chapter 14 of the Constitution thus making the 2 nd Defendant disqualified or ineligible for appointment under Act The fallacy of and non sequitur resulting from the Plaintiff s major and minor premise is easily demonstrable by setting forth and quoting Sections 13 (2), (3) (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Act 959 as follows: (2) In addition to the requirements specified in subsection (1), the Special Public Prosecutor shall (a) possess the relevant expertise on corruption and corruption related matters; (b) be of high moral character and proven integrity; and (c) be a lawyer of at least twelve years standing at the Bar. (3) The Attorney-General shall nominate a person qualified for appointment as Special Prosecutor by the President, subject to the approval of the majority of all members of Parliament. (4) The President may delegate the appointment of the Special Prosecutor in writing to the Attorney-General. (5) The Special Prosecutor shall hold office on the same terms and conditions of service as a Justice of the Court of Appeal except that the tenure of the office shall be a non-renewable tenure of seven years. (6) The salary of the Special Prosecutor shall not be varied to the disadvantage of the Special Prosecutor during the tenure of office. (7) The Special Prosecutor shall not while holding office, hold any other public office or engage in any commercial venture. 15. A casual reading of the whole of Chapter 14 of the Constitution and in particular Articles 190(d), 199(1), 199(4) and 295 of the 1992 Constitution upon which the Plaintiff erroneously anchors his reliefs and Statement of Case shows beyond any reasonable doubt that no public officer appointed under Chapter 14 thereof is required to meet the

5 standards and conditions precedent for nomination by the Attorney-General, approval by Parliament, and appointment by the President of the Special Prosecutor or the conditions of service and the contractual limited duration of non-renewable seven years for which he may hold office. 16. A further casual reading of Section 15 of Act 959 dealing with the removal of the Special Public Prosecutor from office shows without further effort that no public officers appointed pursuant to Article 190(d) and 195 are subject to similar procedures of nomination, approval by Parliament, appointment by the President and security of tenure as a condition for removal from office to bring the Special Prosecutor within the ambit of Chapter 14 of the Constitution. 17. It is the submission of the 2 nd Defendant that the Plaintiff has woefully failed or refused to show any evidence that the Special Prosecutor was nominated pursuant to Article 190(d), 192, 195 and 295 of the 1992 Constitution as he has consistently alleged without further proof. 18. The 2 nd Defendant further submits that it is a notorious matter of public knowledge for which judicial notice can be taken that one of the main contentious issues in the 2016 Presidential Election campaign was the unpardonable or perceived unpardonable levels of corruption and corruption related crimes that had eaten into the fabric of governance resulting in inflated contract prices, abuse of office for private gain, extortion, and allied offences to the detriment of the public purse resulting in promises by two candidates to either decouple the office of the Attorney-General from the Minister of Justice or to create by law an independent office of the Special Prosecutor to tackle the canker of corruption and corruption related offence. 19. It is a further notorious fact for which this Court can take judicial notice that the President of the Republic and the majority party in Parliament to which he belongs won both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections convincingly; the electorate giving the President for the first time under the 1992 Constitution over one million votes over his nearest rival, the former President John Dramani Mahama, to enable the President to redeem his promise of eradicating or reducing corruption and allied offence and dealing with the unpunished breaches of the Constitution s preamble of a solemn declaration and affirmation of the nation s commitment to. Probity and Accountability through his promised Special Prosecutor. 20. It is submitted that Articles 35(8), 36(1), and 41(f), of the Directive Principles of State Policy and the Code of Conduct for Public Officer in Article 284 of the 1992 Constitution and several Sections of the Criminal Offence Act, 1960 (Act 29) dealing with corruption and corruption related offences by public officers and political office holders white wash and adorn the Constitution and the laws of Ghana without enforcement leading to the unconstitutional looting of the public purse with impunity.

6 21. The overwhelming majority representative democratic outcry arising from the 2016 election for the new Government to deal with all forms of corruption and related offences and the demand for the President to fulfill his electoral promise by appointing his promised independent Special Prosecutor led to the tabling of the Office of Special Prosecutor Bill by the 1 st Defendant in Parliament on 2 nd August 2017 which subsequently was enacted as Act Parliament working in a bi-partisan spirit and in collaboration with civil society and other anti-corruption groups decided to exercise its residual legislative authority to create the office of the Special Prosecutor by an Act of Parliament with the standards, requirements, conditions of service, non-renewable limited contractual durations of service, and other conditions set forth in Section 13 of Act 959 to work under the authority of the 1 st Defendant under Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution because the framers of the Constitution had not averted their minds to or foreseen the difficulties likely to be posed to the body politic by the pandemic canker of corruption necessitating the establishment of a special vehicle to fight the canker before it subverts the Constitution. 23. Sections 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of Act 959 accordingly created a special species of public office not anticipated by the framers of the Constitution to meet the representative democratic demands of the majority of the electorate for an independent investigation and prosecution of corruption and other related offences while ensuring that the Special Prosecutor and the Deputy Special Prosecutor s tenure of office will be for a limited fixed contractual duration to prevent likely abuse of office likely to result from long service under Chapter 14 of the 1992 Constitution. 24. The 2 nd Defendant submits that the qualifications and conditions of service provided for the Special Prosecutor with a contractual non-renewable short duration of seven years at the maximum in Section 13 of Act 959 is not amendable to the provisions of Article 199 of the 1992 Constitution (as amended) dealing with the retiring age of public servants because the Special Prosecutor and the Deputy Special Prosecutor are not appointed under Chapter 14 of the Constitution: they are a unique creation under the residual legislative power of Parliament to take care of circumstances unforeseen by the framers of the Constitution and they are consistent with the letter and spirit of the 1992 Constitution. 25. The 2 nd Defendant submits further that the uncertainty, confusion, contradictory, and alternative interpretations put on the meaning and effect of Article 199 in the Plaintiff s paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19 20, 21, 22, 25 and 26 of the Plaintiffs submission of law are highlighted when the Plaintiff submits the alternative possibility that even a public officer appointed under Chapter 14 of the Constitution could upon a plausible interpretation of Article 199 thereof be recalled and appointed on contract anytime after attaining 60 years to work in the public service, depending on the exigencies.

7 26. The Plaintiff appears to come back to his senses when he realizes that the 2 nd Defendant has never been a public officer under Chapter 14 of the Constitution to which Article 199(1) and (4) could be applicable by the Plaintiff s alternative arguments in paragraph 29 and consequently makes the unsupportable submission that the 2 nd Defendant must of necessity leave office at the age of 73 years as though Section 13 of Act 959 prescribes a contract of servitude between the parties. 27. Because the Plaintiff by his Writ and Statement of Case is fishing for any evidential straw on which to hang his uncertain case or uncertain cause of action for the disqualification of the 2 nd Defendant as Special Prosecutor he refused or failed to accept the fact that Parliament acted under its residual legislative power in enacting Section 13 of Act 959 to create a special vehicle to combat corruption and allied offences and argues in his paragraphs 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Plaintiff s Statement of Case as though public service office holders including Justices of the Court of Appeal are subject to the approval of the majority of all members of Parliament as stipulated in Section 13 (3) of Act The 2 nd Defendant submits that a simple acquaintance with the legislative history of Act 959 by the Plaintiff as a Member of Parliament and a former Deputy Minister for Justice would have made it abundantly clear to the Plaintiff that the first draft of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Bill, 2017 dated 20 th June 2017 which was the subject of a Stakeholders Meeting from June 2017 whose Clauses 12 and 15 contained provisions for the appointment of the Special Prosecutor in accordance with Article 195 of the Constitution without any provision for the nomination and approval of the Special Prosecutor by Parliament was abandoned after the stakeholders meeting, while the subsequent Bill that was laid in Parliament on 18 th July 2017, later withdrawn and later laid a second time on 2 nd August 2017 leading to the enactment of Act 959 was purposefully intended to create a sui generis office of Special Prosecutor and Deputy Special Prosecutor on a short duration contractual basis without reference to Article 195 of the Constitution. 29. It is also submitted that the only reason why Parliament would have enacted that the Special Prosecutor who is to be engaged for a limited contractual period and shall hold office on the same terms and conditions of service as Justice of the Court of Appeal is to enable any lawyer meeting the experience and qualifications stipulated Section 13(2) to hold office until the Court of Appeal Justice s retirement age of 70 years or for seven years. 30. The 2 nd Defendant further submits that before the President announced the 2 nd Defendant s nomination as Special Prosecutor on 11 th January 2018 the President had invited the 2 nd Defendant for a nomination confirmation discussion at which the President and the 2 nd Defendant both former Attorneys General had considered the meaning and effect of Section 13 of Act 959 pursuant to the President s executive authority to enforce the Constitution and the laws of Ghana within the context of Chapter 14 of the

8 Constitution and the letter and spirit of the Constitution as a whole and arrived at the conclusion that the President could within the meaning and effect of the 1992 Constitution accept the nomination of the 2 nd Defendant by the 1 st Defendant Attorney General in spite of the 2 nd Defendant s age of 66 years. 31. In consequence of the foregoing the 2 nd Defendant contends that the case of Appiah Ofori v Attorney General [2010] SCGLR 484 referred to by the Plaintiff in paragraph 34 of the Plaintiff s Statement of Case is inapplicable to the specific facts or circumstances of this action as in the Appiah Ofori case Article 187(1) of the 1992 Constitution which was in issue specifically stipulated that: 187(1) There shall be an Auditor General of Ghana whose office shall be a public office and Section 10 (4) of the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act 584) set the Auditor General s retiring age at sixty years: the argument that there was a casus omissus or gap in the Constitution which needed to be filled by statutory interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution to allow the Auditor General the same retirement age as a Justice of the Court of Appeal so as to nullify Section 10(4) of Act 584 was rejected by the majority of the Court. 32. In the Plaintiff s action before this Court the Plaintiff has been unable to point to a single provision in the Constitution or Act 959 that states that the Special Public Prosecutor s office shall be a public office and shall retire at the age of 60 years as was the case in Appiah Ofori s case. 33. The 2 nd Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has woefully refused or failed to appreciate what a binding precedent in law means and erroneously submits the Appiah Ofori case whose facts and circumstance as opposite to the issues at stake in this action as precedent binding on this Court. 34. The 2 nd Defendant submits that the ad nauseam quoted dicta of the late Mr. Justice Sowah JSC (as he then was) on constitutional interpretation contained in the unanimous decision of this Court in Tuffour v Attorney General [1980] GLR 637at pages 647 paragraph 4 to page 648 paragraph 2 still remains the locus classicus to guide the interpretation of the issues raised in this action by considering the constitution as a whole before arriving at what preferred mode of construction by this Court will provide the appropriate justiciable solution to the controversy in this action that enables the will of the people as embodied in the 1992 Constitution to prevail. 35. The 2 nd Defendant submits also that the particularly lucid reasoning of Professor Kludzie, JSC (as he then was) at page 846 paragraph 2 thereof in Asare v The Attorney General [ ] SCGLR 823 reinforces the Tuffour case, supra, when he stated that: I agree that we must adopt a purposive construction of constitutional provisions. That means that we do not construe words in the abstract but within the context in which they are used. Language is a tool for expressing the wishes of

9 the speaker, author or writer. Therefore, regardless of theoretical classification of the methodology of construction, the fundamental rule is for the court to construe every enactment with the purpose of effectuating the true intent of the law maker, in this case the framers of the 1992 Constitution. All other cannons of interpretation have the ultimate purpose of achieving this goal (Emphasis supplied). 36. In the premises the 2 nd Defendant says that the Plaintiff Writ and Statement of Case miserably and pathetically fails to demonstrate any contravention or inconsistency between Section 13 of Act 959 and Chapter 14 or any provision of the 1992 Constitution to entitle the Plaintiff to any of the reliefs endorsed or claimed thereon or at all. 37. The 2 nd Defendant will at the hearing of this action rely on the following statutes, cases and documents: (1) The 1992 Constitution (2) The Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I 16) (3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2018 (Act 959) (4) Appiah Ofori v Attorney General [2010] SCGLR 484 (5) Tuffour v Attorney General [1980] GLR 637 (6) Asare v Attorney General [ ] SCGLR 823 DATED AT ACCRA THIS 1 ST DAY OF MARCH 2018 THE REGISTRAR SUPREME COURT ACCRA MARTIN ALAMISI AMIDU (2 ND DEFENDANT) AND FOR SERVICE ON: 1. THE PLAINTIFF HEREIN OR HIS SOLICITORS, LITHUR BREW & COMPANY, No OFF KANDA AVENUE, KANDA ESTATE, BOX CT 3865, ACCRA 2. THE 1 ST DEFENDANT, THE HONOURABLE ATTORNEY GENERAL, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MINISTRIES, ACCRA

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11 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE ACCRA AD 2018 BETWEEN: DOMINIC AKURITINGA AYINE H/NO. 3, MULBERRY STREET EAST LEGON ACCRA SUIT NO J1/5/2018 PLAINTIFF AND 1. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL ATTORNEY-GENERAL S CHAMBERS MINISTRY OF JUSTICE MINISTERIES ACCRA 2. MARTIN ALAMISI AMIDU PLOT N.O 355 NORTH LEGON RESIDENTIAL AREA, ACCRA 1 ST DEFENDANT 2 ND DEFENDANT AFFIDAVIT OF THE 2 ND DEFENDANT VERIFYING FACTS AND PARTICULARS RULE 48(2) OF SUPREME COURT RULES, 1996 (CI 16) I, Martin Alamisi Amidu, of Plot No 355, North Legon Residential Area, Accra, make oath and say as follows: 1. I am the 2 nd Defendant and deponent herein. 2. The averments contained in my Statement of the 2 nd Defendant s Case accompanying this affidavit are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 3. The Plaintiff was also the immediate past Deputy Minister for Justice for less than four years in the immediate past Government that was overwhelmingly defeated in the last elections on 7 th December To the best of my knowledge and information the legal firm of Lithur Brew and Company now representing the Plaintiff are also the lawyers for former President, John Dramani Mahama: the immediate past Attorney General, Marrita Opong Brew-Appiah was and is a member of the law firm as well as Tonny Lithur who was also appointed by the former President as Chairman of the lucrative Ghana Airport Company Limited during his tenure of office and also holds himself out as the personal lawyer of the former President. A photocopy of the names and particulars of lawyers covered by Chamber Registration: Pp /18 for

12 Lithur Brew & Company (GLC FORM 4 Renewal Of Law Chambers/Legal Department Registration Form) is annexed herewith and marked Exhibit MAA1 for ease of reference: A photocopy of a publication dated 17 th September 2013 by Myjoyonline.com entitled Tony Lithur Chairs reconstituted Ghana Airports Company Board is also annexed and marked Exhibit MAA2 for ease of reference. 5. To the best of my knowledge, information and belief the Plaintiff is a surrogate for the defeated Government at the 2016 elections and fronting for most of its political officeholders who fear the experience, expertise, and capabilities of the 2 nd Defendant which was demonstrated successfully in declarations of unconstitutionality granted in favour of the 2 nd Defendant by this Court against that Government in the actions set forth in paragraph 5 of the 2 nd Defendant s Statement of Case verified herein, the enforcement of which are still outstanding, being deployed in the 2 nd Defendant s investigatory and prosecutorial capabilities to discover and unearth suspected offences under Act 959 without the possibility of being compromised. 6. To the best of my knowledge, information and belief the Plaintiff brought this action in his name fronting for the immediate past Government to set at naught the popular wishes of the majority of the Ghanaian electorate who see the President s acceptance of the nomination of the 2 nd Defendant as Special Prosecutor as being in the national interest to attack the canker of corruption in the body politic and thereby defeat the results of almost eight hours of vetting of the nominee by Parliament culminating in his approval for appointment without any relief for perpetual injunction or an interim application for injunction by the Plaintiff to prevent the said vetting which was simultaneously watched by millions of Ghanaians nation-wide taking place at enormous expense to the public purse. 7. It is my belief that the contradictory and alternative reliefs and submissions contained in the Plaintiff s Writ and Statement of Case demonstrates an absolute lack of good faith and an abuse of the process of this court on the part of the Plaintiff in bringing this action with an ambiguous cause of action or without even raising some of the ambiguous issues he now contends in Parliament during the consideration of the Bill giving rise to Act I believe that the Plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs sought or at all. WHEREFORE I swear to this affidavit in verification and support of my Statement of Case as the 2 nd Defendant therein. SWORN at Accra this day of March, (DEPONENT) BEFORE ME COMMISSIONER FOR OATHS

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