IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

Transcription

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) vs. ) CASE NO. SC ) L.T. CASE NO. 4D WILLIAM J. SUTTON, ) ) Respondent. ) ) RESPONDENT S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION CAREY HAUGHWOUT Public Defender 15 th Judicial Circuit MARGARET GOOD-EARNEST Assistant Public Defender Florida Bar No Attorney for William J. Sutton Criminal Justice Building RD Street/6 TH Floor West Palm Beach, Florida (561) appeals@pd15.state.fl.us

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTENTS PAGE TABLE OF CONTENTS... i AUTHORITIES CITED... ii STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS... 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT... 5 ARGUMENT WHETHER THIS COURT HAS CONFLICT OR CERTIFIED QUESTION DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN RESPONDENT S CASE CONCLUSION... 9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE... 9 CERTIFICATE OF FONT SIZE...10 i

3 CASES AUTHORITIES CITED PAGE(S) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1995)... 7 Dade County Property Appraiser v. Lisboa, 737 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1999)... 8 David v. Meadows, 881 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2004)... 5 Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation, 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995)... 6 Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1999)... 7 Rivera v. Singletary, 707 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1998)... 5 State v. Sowell, 734 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1999)... 8 Sutton v. Florida Parole Commission, 975 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 4 th DCA 2008)... 1 Trushin v State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1982)... 6 ii

4 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS Petitioner, the Florida Parole Commission (FPC) bases its statement of the case and facts on its own records and omits references to the decision on which it seeks review. Sutton v. Florida Parole Commission, 975 So. 2d 1256, 1259 (Fla. 4 th DCA 2008) addresses the facts of Sutton s continuous confinement by the State of Florida for 15 years for a second degree felony: The prisoner in this case is one of those given early release and simultaneously brought into proceedings under JRA.[Jimmy Ryce Act] He had begun serving his 15-year sentence in July On account of accumulated gain time, by April 2000 he was entitled to early release under CRPA.[Conditional Release Program Act] Acting together, the two separate state authorities coordinated both an early conditional release under CRPA and also started JRA proceedings against him. The trial court found probable cause under JRA and committed him to civil confinement pending a final JRA determination. Instead of being released from confinement, he was thereupon simply transferred from his prison to a JRA facility operated by the State of Florida. The record given us at this point does not contain a full account of events in the JRA case. It does show that on three occasions he was brought from the JRA confinement facility in Martin County into the circuit court in Palm Beach County for a hearing. There is no indication as to what happened in any of these hearings. It is nonetheless clear that, after confining him in a JRA facility for more than four years, in June 2004-again in coordinated proceedings-the State Attorney filed a voluntary dismissal of the JRA case while the Commission moved to revoke his conditional release. When the State dropped the JRA case it merely moved him back to his prison without counting 1

5 against his sentence the four-year long JRA hold. In spite of being given early release as a result of the JRA proceedings he has been uninterruptedly imprisoned from the time sentence was imposed. Obviously the dismissal of the JRA case is a functional concession that the State has no legal basis to confine him beyond the 15-year sentence. The Fourth District s decision addressed the issue of law presented: In claiming credit for the JRA time, the prisoner stands on Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1987). There...[t]he court agreed that there is no meaningful distinction... between incarceration before trial in a county jail, and state enforced confinement in a mental hospital in preparation for trial. 515 So. 2d at 740. The court further noted that: [defendant] was not free on bail, had no control over his place of custody and was never free to leave the hospitals. For all practical intents and purposes, he was still in jail. The court takes judicial notice that the state mental hospitals have the facilities to enforce confinement of their patients, which brings them within the dictionary definition of a jail. Id. The court went on to hold that it could not agree that credit against a sentence was strictly limited to institutions formally designated as jail. Sutton argues there is no meaningful factual distinction between Tal-Mason and the facts of his case. He had no choice when, under JRA, he was confined like a prisoner but in a state mental institution. He entered into no agreement with the State to obtain early release or from any other punishment less restrictive than jail time. Rather than increasing his liberty, his confinement was in the strictest sense a complete deprivation of liberty. He was in the total custody and control of the state at all times. His coercive commitment to a state institution cannot be distinguished 2

6 from detention in a jail or a prison. He was not free on bail, had no control over his place of custody, and was never free to leave the facility in which he was detained under JRA. For all practical intents and purposes, he was still being held in prison under the JRA law.... The interplay between JRA and CRPA was the subject of David v. Meadows, 881 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2004). The issue there was whether the State could, as here, use CRPA to release a prisoner into a JRA proceeding. The court held that there was nothing in either Act barring the State from doing so. In so holding, however, the court made explicit that [i]n the event that Meadows is found unable to comply with his release program because of his civil confinement, he should not be found in violation and should receive credit for the time during commitment. [e.s.] 881 So. 2d at 655. David v. Meadows explicitly relied on Tal-Mason to reach that conclusion. We agree with David v. Meadows. Sutton is entitled to have the JRA confinement counted against his 15-year sentence. On the other hand, early release under CRPA is no longer applicable because he did not seek timely review of the revocation and denial of JRA credit. Instead he now makes clear that with the JRA time counted against his sentence (along with the 469 days for jail credit awarded by the sentencing judge) on 25 March 2008 he will have actually served the entire 15-year term day for day, as he puts it. The district court concluded that, having explained the law, it presumed the Department of Corrections would comply with the law and release Sutton when his term finally expired on March 25 th. Further litigation followed, both in the district court, where Sutton filed for an extraordinary writ and in the Circuit Court of the 3

7 locale where Sutton was incarcerated, where he filed for habeas corpus against the Department of Corrections (DOC) to force his release from DOC as he had completely served his sole sentence. FPC (but not DOC) sought discretionary review and filed a jurisdictional brief. Respondent s brief on jurisdiction follows. 4

8 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT There is no certified question on which to base this Court s review of legal issues. Neither the March 12, 2008, decision sought to be reviewed nor the April 7, 2008, order amending the April 1, 2008 denial of rehearing to certify this Court s March 12, 2008, decision as passing of a question of great public importance articulates any question of law. This Court should not exercise its discretionary review jurisdiction where no question of law is asked by the district court s decision. Requiring this Court to compose the legal question sought to be review show be rejected. Declining jurisdiction in the present case would discourage district courts from requesting approval of the manner in which the district court has reached its decision. Nor does conflict of decisions appear expressly and directly with the decisions in David v. Meadows, 881 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2004) or Rivera v. Singletary, 707 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1998). The commission s concern is with the extent of its broad discretion but that is not the most important legal issue that was addressed or decided by the Fourth District in the instant case. Moreover, review of the narrow legal issue on which the commission seeks review should not change Sutton s release from incarceration. DOC released Sutton as a result of additional litigation after this decision. 5

9 ARGUMENT WHETHER THIS COURT HAS CONFLICT OR CERTIFIED QUESTION DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN RESPONDENT S CASE. FPC seeks review of a decision certified as passing on a question of great public importance, but no where in the decision of March 12 or the April 7 order on Sutton s extraordinary writ (where that order also served as the mandate) did the district court articulate what important question of law it intended for review. Under this constitutional basis for jurisdiction, the district court should at least identify what legal question the district court finds worthy of this Court s appraisal. Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation, 656 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1995). Central to this Court s jurisdiction on a certified question is its determination that the actual legal question is important enough as phrased to merit this Court s review. State v. Sowell, 734 So. 2d 421(Fla. 1999). Which of the several points of law addressed in the district court s decision is presented for this Court s review should at least be declared by the district court, as in Trushin v State, 425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1982). There the district court did not actually state its inquiry in the form of a question but identified the legal issue to be reviewed as one involving issues of great public importance concerning the validity and interpretation of s (2). The purpose of certified question review is not to see if the district court correctly decided 6

10 the case but to answer an important question of law. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1999) (review of certified question accepted but footnote 3 discourages certified question which appears to be more of a request for our approval of the conclusion reached by the court below. ) The deficiency of the certification to state an actual question in essence allows the petitioner to decide what should be reviewed here. Yet, this Court has said that it does not have jurisdiction to review cases that a party deems to present an issue of great public importance without a district court s determination and certification of the question. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 93 n.1 (Fla. 1995). In its jurisdictional brief, FPC suggests the certified question involves an affront to the Commission s broad discretion. Respondent does not agree that is the legal issue the district court intended for review. 1 What Petitioner proposes as the question is a narrow legal issue not of much importance to the final decision of the district court. 1 FPC continues to misstate the issue as Sutton seeking credit for time served on controlled release. He did no such thing; he sought credit for time actually served from the State of Florida, the prosecuting authority that was responsible for his being locked up in a mental ward, detained, and incarcerated for 4 years before his sole sentence of 15 years incarceration had expired. He argued below that the state may not extend his incarceration beyond 15 years through failed JRA proceedings and the 4 th district agreed. Sutton chose to file his action in the Circuit Court, 15 th Judicial Circuit, as that court was responsible for his change of place of incarceration and possessed the records necessary to adjudicate his claim. His claim did not involve FPC and he objected in both the 15 th Circuit and the district court to FPC s appearance as respondent at the request of (and in lieu of) the State Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. 7

11 Other central and important issues of law are present in Sutton s case, but Respondent is not permitted to formulate them or request review on a case where he was the prevailing party in the lower court. This Court has previously declined to exercise its certified question jurisdiction to review narrow legal issues with very unique facts, State v. Sowell, 734 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1999); Dade County Property Appraiser v. Lisboa, 737 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1999). Similarly, this Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction in this case. Plainly, on the face of the decision there is nothing directly and expressly conflicting with the decisions in Rivera or David v Meadows, as the district court relied on David v. Meadows as supporting its conclusion in this case. Further, granting review and settling the proposed narrow question of law to the Commission s satisfaction should not affect Sutton s release from incarceration; he was released based on further litigation in other extraordinary writ proceedings, including habeas corpus in the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit against DOC. FPC did not have custody of Sutton and was not responsible for his release. Since FPC in this case wants to argue over an issue of law that is of no real consequence to the parties, this Court should decline in its discretion to review in the decision below. 8

12 CONCLUSION This court should decline to accept jurisdiction. Respectfully submitted, CAREY HAUGHWOUT Public Defender 15 th Judicial Circuit of Florida MARGARET GOOD-EARNEST Assistant Public Defender Florida Bar No RD Street/6 TH Floor West Palm Beach, Florida (561) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of Respondent s Brief on Jurisdiction has been furnished to: KIM M. FLUHARTY, Assistant Attorney General, Florida Parole Commission, 2601 Blair Stone Road, Building C, Tallahassee, Florida , by First-Class U.S. Mail this day of June, Counsel for William J. Sutton 9

13 CERTIFICATE OF FONT SIZE Counsel for Petitioner hereby certifies that the instant brief has been prepared with 14 point Times New Roman. Attorney for William J. Sutton 10