Court of Appeal No. A COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FOUR

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1 Court of Appeal No. A COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FOUR MICHAEL CHRISTOPH KREUTZER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant and Appellant. San Francisco Superior Court Case No The Honorable Ernest H. Goldsmith AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF ANN MILLER RAVEL, County Counsel #62139 KATHRYN J. ZOGLIN, Deputy County Counsel # OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL SANTA CLARA COUNTY 70 West Hedding Street, East Wing, Ninth Floor San Jose, CA (408) Attorneys on behalf of Amicus Curiae California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities

2 I. INTRODUCTION Amicus curiae California State Association of Counties ( CSAC ) and the League of California Cities ( League ) file this brief in support of defendant and appellant City and County of San Francisco in Michael Christoph Kreutzer v. City and County of San Francisco in light of the significant public policy implications if the trial court s decision remains in place. CSAC and the League represent counties and cities throughout California that have merit-based civil service systems similar to that in San Francisco. These civil service systems provide rules governing the hiring, classification, promotion, and termination of public employees. One underlying purpose of a civil service system is to promote merit-based hiring in an open, competitive selection process. However, the trial court judgment is inconsistent with these principles and established law. As such, it should be reversed. More specifically, even though San Francisco employed Kreutzer as an exempt at-will employee, the trial court determined that Kreutzer was really a non-exempt employee because he performed the duties of a non-exempt position. It reasoned that Kreutzer had a property interest in his employment as a result of performing these duties. The trial court promoted Michael Kreutzer to a position to which he never applied and 1

3 which was never open for a competitive exam. This determination undermines the very concept of a merit-based system. In addition, the trial court erred when it concluded that the City and County of San Francisco violated Kreutzer s liberty interests. The impact of that ruling is to elevate essentially any termination into a constitutional violation, which is a notion that courts have uniformly rejected. II. STATEMENT OF INTEREST CSAC is a non-profit corporation. Its membership consists of the 58 California counties. CSAC sponsors a Litigation Coordination Program, which is administered by the County Counsels Association of California and is overseen by the Association s Litigation Overview Committee, comprised of county counsels throughout California. The Litigation Overview Committee monitors litigation of statewide concern to counties and has determined that the issues presented are matters affecting all counties. The League is an association of 478 California cities united in promoting the general welfare of cities and their citizens. The League is advised by its Legal Advocacy Committee, which is comprised of 24 city attorneys representing all 16 divisions of the League from all parts of California. The Committee monitors appellate litigation affecting 2

4 municipalities and identifies those that are of statewide significance. The Committee has identified this case as posing issues of statewide significance. CSAC and the League have a substantial interest in the outcome of this case. CSAC member counties and League member cities have a strong interest in the consistent, fair, and uniform application of their respective civil service rules. Furthermore, the public has an interest in maintaining merit-based systems with transparent rules, regulations, and testing procedures. CSAC and the League submit that the trial court judgment should be reversed because it is inconsistent with these principles and settled law. III. BACKGROUND A. Procedural Context Michael Christoph Kreutzer is a physician who was hired by the City and County of San Francisco in 1994 to an exempt position. He was later promoted to another exempt position. Kreutzer never competed in a civil service examination, his name was never certified on an eligibility list, and he never served a probationary period. Kreutzer was never appointed to a non-exempt position. In 2002, Kreutzer was released from employment, without an explanation and without a hearing. His union apparently filed a 3

5 grievance on his behalf and an arbitration was held. On January 28, 2003, the arbitrator held that Kreutzer was not entitled to a hearing. On March 4, 2003, Kreutzer first filed a government tort claim with the City and County of San Francisco. He then filed an action in San Francisco Superior Court, which he subsequently amended to include alleged violations of his due process and liberty interests under Article 1, Section 7, of the California Constitution. In 2006, the Honorable Ernest Goldsmith heard testimony on the matter. On December 1, 2006, the trial court issued its judgment. San Francisco appealed the trial court judgment. B. Trial Court Ruling In its ruling issued on December 1, 2006, the Superior Court recognized that San Francisco had classified Kreutzer as an exempt employee but believed that Kreutzer was performing the duties of a nonexempt position; it cited San Francisco Charter section , paragraph 13, in support of its conclusion. (AA ) The trial court held that Kreutzer had property interests (1) as a nonexempt employee and (2) based on his medical privileges as set forth in the San Francisco Hospital by-laws. It concluded that Kreutzer s property interests had been violated. (AA ) The trial court ordered that Kreutzer be appointed to a permanent, non-exempt position rather than to 4

6 his previous at-will exempt position. (AA ) It reasoned that Kreutzer would not have been terminated without a hearing if San Francisco had properly classified him as a permanent non-exempt employee. (AA ) The Court rejected San Francisco s argument that Kreutzer should not be placed in a higher position without complying with civil service procedures. (AA ) The Court reasoned that it appointed Dr. Kreutzer to a higher position so as to make him whole. (AA ) The Court explained it had made findings that Dr. Kreutzer performed significant administrative and supervisory duties that, under the City s charter, made Dr. Kreutzer a non-exempt employee, but the City never appropriately classified him. (AA ) The trial court also concluded: the allegation that Plaintiff was a racist was paramount in his termination and therefore the allegation deserved full investigation and a full hearing. (AA ) It consequently held that that Kreutzer s liberty interest was also violated: In light of the Court s finding s [sic] regarding the adverse impact of the termination on Plaintiff s professional reputation, he also had a liberty interest which entitled him to notice and hearing. (AA ) / / / / / / 5

7 IV. DISCUSSION A. The Trial Court Ruling Should Be Reversed Because It Is Contrary To San Francisco s Civil Service System 1. Civil Service Rules Govern Employment and Promotion The trial court erred when it decided to disregard San Francisco s Charter and civil service rules as a whole by appointing Kreutzer to a higher position with permanent status but without having to participate in an open competitive application process. More specifically, the terms and condition of public employment are governed by statute. California s Constitution provides that a county s governing body shall provide for the number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of employees. (Cal. Const. Art. 11(1)(b).) 1 In addition, counties are granted the authority to adopt civil service systems pursuant to Government Code section The City and County of San Francisco, as well as numerous charter cities and counties throughout California, have instituted their own civil service systems. 2 These systems include positions that are subject to civil 1 Article 11(3) of the California Constitution provides: The provisions of a charter are the law of the State and have the force and effect of legislative enactments. 2 Charter counties include Santa Clara, San Bernardino, Los Angeles, Butte, Tehama, Alameda, San Francisco, Fresno, Sacramento, San Diego, San Mateo, and Placer Counties. Charter cities include San Francisco, Santa Barbara, Bakersfield, Los Angeles, Monterey, Napa, Redwood City, Sacramento, Long Beach, San Jose, and many others. 6

8 service requirements (often described as permanent or non-exempt positions) as well as some that are exempt from civil service requirements ( exempt or at-will positions). Non-exempt employees often undergo a probationary period before earning permanent civil service status. By contrast, employees in exempt positions do not start off with probationary status and serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority throughout their appointment to a position. A significant underlying purpose of a civil service system is to provide a fair and equitable framework for the hiring, promotion, and termination of public employees. Opportunities to work in government as permanent employees thus are governed by open, merit-based competitive procedures. (See Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 201 [appointment and promotion of permanent employees are based on merit, thus replacing the spoils system]; Ferdig v. State Personnel Board (1969) 71 Cal.2d 96, [state civil service system is grounded upon the constitutional mandate that permanent appointments and promotion in the state civil service shall be based upon merit, efficiency and fitness as ascertained by competitive examination ].) Critical to this merit-based system is the adherence to rules and regulations that have been promulgated in the particular jurisdiction. (Ligon v. State Personnel Board (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 583,

9 [ Paramount to a fair, equitable and complete scheme is an advancement and promotion plan based upon compliance with the statutes and applicable regulations ].) As such, a court must look to the applicable laws and regulations to determine whether an employee had permanent status and has property rights in employment. (See Bishop v. Wood (1976) 426 U.S. 341 [a court must examine state law to see if the employee has a property interest in employment].) In addition, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that the relevant provisions (such as Charter provisions and civil service rules) must be read together as a whole rather than in isolation. (See generally Briggs v. Eden (1999) 19 Cal.4 th 1106, 1118 [legislative intent is gleaned from the statute as a whole ].) 2. Changes In An Employee s Civil Service Status Must Be Carried Out In A Manner That Is Consistent With Existing Merit System Rules Courts have long held that an employee has no right to be appointed to a different or higher classification simply because he or she is performing duties of that classification. Rather, civil service positions are to be filled through the same open, competitive process. In addition, the civil service rules provide procedures to promote or to re-classify employees so as to provide consistency in the system. (See Pinion v. State Personnel Board (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 314, [ the entire fabric of the civil service system would fail if the appointing power could 8

10 circumvent civil service competitive examination by assigning higher duties to an employee and then give the employee permanent civil service status].) For example, in Otto v. Reardon (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 260, a senior stenographer clerk claimed that she should be automatically reclassified to a supervisory position because she was actually performing those higher supervisory duties. The Court reviewed the state Civil Service Act, which sets forth the rules for appointments and reclassification of employees, including when their duties have changed over time and the classifications no longer accurately reflect the work being performed. The Court explained that even though the stenographer clerk performed those supervisory duties, the rules required that all applicants take an examination and their names be certified on an eligibility list before she could be considered. It consequently rejected her reclassification request, since she had not undergone an examination for that position and her name was not on an eligibility list. The Court in Snow v. Board of Administration (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 484, reached a similar conclusion. In that case, the Court rejected Snow s argument that he should be appointed to a higher position by virtue of the fact that he had already assumed the duties of that higher position. The Court explained that to do so would circumvent the 9

11 constitutional and statutory hiring scheme. (Id. at 489.) It further noted: The California Supreme Court has recognized that the only position an employee may lawfully hold is that for which he has been examined and to which he has been certified and appointed in the manner provided by law. (Id. at 591.) In addition, in Ligon v. State Personnel Board, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 583, an employee asked that her out-of-class work experience be considered as experience in applying for a promotion. The Court rejected that notion, explaining that [p]aramount to a fair, equitable and complete scheme is an advancement and promotion plan based upon compliance with the statutes and applicable regulations. (Id. at ) It continued that under the rule so established, the mere assumption and performance of the duties of a higher classification cannot require that the employee be appointed to it. (Id. at 591.) The only case Kreutzer cites in support of his position is Haas v. City of Los Angeles (1942) 21 Cal.2d 393, a decision concerning pension benefits for retirees. (Brief of Respondent Michael Christoph Kreutzer [ Kreutzer ] at 20.) Kreutzer claims that Haas stands for the general proposition that a court should look to the duties rather than the actual classification of an employee in determining his or her rights. However, courts typically apply a different, more liberal, standard when they interpret 10

12 ambiguous pension-related regulations than in other contexts. (See Newhouser v. Board of Trustees (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 322, 327 [ It is a general and well recognized rule that pension provisions shall be liberally construed in favor of the applicant ]; 56 Op.Atty Gen. Cal. 369, *7 [ This so-called liberal construction principle has been applied by the courts in retirement benefits cases to determine the class to which an employee belongs ].) Because this case does not concern the interpretation of pension provisions, Haas does not apply. Moreover, as set forth above, a court must read all the relevant provisions together rather than choosing to examine one provision in isolation, as Kreutzer proposes here. As these cases consistently demonstrate, the trial court erred when it ordered that San Francisco appoint Kreutzer to a higher, permanent position based on an assessment that Kreutzer actually performed duties of a nonexempt civil service position. A reading of San Francisco s Charter together with the relevant civil servant rules demonstrates that Kreutzer was an exempt employee who was not covered by civil service rules. Even if Kreutzer had been misclassified or was performing the same duties as a non-exempt civil service employee, Kreutzer remained an exempt, at-will employee, as was the situation in case in Otto and Snow, as set forth above. To change his status, Kreutzer would have to follow the rules set forth by / / / 11

13 San Francisco, including testing and certification of an eligibility list of candidates. Instead, the trial court ignored San Francisco s civil service rules that require testing and certification of an eligibility list as prerequisites for hiring employees to non-exempt civil service positions. No other candidates were permitted to compete for the position. (See San Francisco s Opening Brief at 4-8 for a discussion of the relevant Charter provisions, rules, and regulations.) Nor was Kreutzer required to undergo a probationary period under the Court s ruling. Many counties throughout California have similar procedures, in which applicants must undergo testing and their names must appear on a certified list before being considered for employment. The current decision undermines these systems that are based on open competitive testing and merit-based hiring and promotion. B. Kreutzer Was Not Entitled To A Pre-Termination Hearing Because He Had No Property Interest In Employment The California Supreme Court held in Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, that a permanent civil service employee has a property interest in continued employment. To have a property interest in employment, the employee must have more than a mere expectation of employment; instead, he must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. 12

14 (Id., 15 Cal.3d. at ) The existence of that property right is based on state law. (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at , 212. See Bishop v. Wood, supra, 426 U.S. 341 [must examine state law to see if a property interest in employment exists]; Williams v. Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 677, 681 ( Williams ) [employment rights were determined by the Los Angeles City Charter and civil service rules].) Under Skelly, a public employee is entitled to a pretermination hearing if he or she has an employment-related property interest. As discussed above, the laws of the government entity (such as charters, rules, and regulations) determine when an employee has a property interest in public employment. For example, in Williams, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d 677, a non-civil service employee of thirteen years was terminated. Williams contended that she was entitled to a pre-termination procedure pursuant to Skelly. The Court examined the Los Angeles City Charter and the civil service rules. It concluded that Williams was not entitled to a pre-termination hearing because she was not a permanent civil service employee with a property right to continued employment under the city s statutory scheme. (Williams, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at ) To require a hearing regardless of an employee s status would lose sight of the entire philosophy of civil service in government and destroy the 13

15 distinction between the various classifications. (Id. at 683, quoting Globe v. County of Los Angeles (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 595, 601.) The Shepherd v. Jones (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 1049, decision supports San Francisco s position, although Kreutzer cites for a different proposition. (Kreutzer at ) In Shepherd, the executive director of a housing authority sued the Board of Commissions when he was terminated without a hearing or notice. He claimed that his procedural due process right had been violated. The Court pointed to the personnel policy, which provided that the executive director serves at the pleasure of the Board and consequently may be discharged without cause, without notice, and without hearing. (Id. at 1058.) The Shepherd Court explained that it refused to create property rights where none existed. (Id.) It explained that the appellant s interpretation was not consistent with the plain language of the personnel policy. (Id. at 1059.) Here, Kreutzer was terminated from an exempt, at-will position. That exempt position did not endow him with any property interest in his employment. As set forth above, an employee does not automatically acquire property rights by virtue of performing the duties of a different position if he fails to meet the civil service requirements of applying for the position as part of an open, merit-based selection process. / / / 14

16 C. Kreutzer s Liberty Interests Were Not Violated 1. No Liberty Interest Is Implicated Because No Stigmatizing Reason Was Made Public It is well-established that not every termination implicates a liberty interest. The fact of dismissal alone does not constitute a violation of a liberty interest. Nor would a termination based on incompetence or failure to work well with others trigger a violation of a constitutional liberty interest. (Williams, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 677, 685.) A liberty interest may be at stake when an employee is terminated for a reason that stigmatizes him or her and thus impairs the individual s reputation and ability to find other employment. (See Bollow v. Federal Reserve (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 1093, 1100 [when the government dismisses an individual for reasons that might seriously damage his standing in the community, he is entitled to notice and a hearing to clear his name]; Gray v. City of Gustine (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 621, 629 [ A public employee s right to a hearing may arise where a termination or demotion is based on charges of misconduct which causes stigma to one s reputation or which impair one s ability to earn a living ].) At the same time, there is no violation of a liberty interest when an employee is terminated for a stigmatizing reason if the employer does not make the reason for the termination public. (Bishop v. Wood, supra, 426 U.S. at 348.) 15

17 In Bishop v. Wood (1976) 426 U.S. 341, a police officer s employment was terminated without a hearing based on his purported failure to follow orders, poor attendance, and conduct unbecoming an officer. According to a city ordinance, permanent employees could be discharged for poor performance, negligence, and fitness to perform duties. While the Court recognized that the officer would be somewhat less attractive to other employers if he lost his job, it concluded that the termination did not rise to the level of a violation of liberty interest because the officer was still free to find another job. (Id. at 348.) Furthermore, there is no liberty interest violation if an at-will employee is terminated when there is no public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge. (Bishop, supra, 426 U.S. at 348.) The Supreme Court described the policy interest underlying this rule is the forthright and truthful communication between employer and employee. (Id. at ) It concluded that because the communications had not been made public, the officer s reputation and integrity had not been impaired. (Id. at 348.) The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Hayes v. Phoenix- Talent School Dist. No. 4 (9th Cir. 1990) 893 F.2d 235, where a school board dismissed a principal. In that case, the school board advised the principal of the reasons that his contract was not renewed but it did not make them public. The Court concluded that the mere fact of the 16

18 principal s dismissal did not implicate his liberty interests, even if the dismissal had the impact of making it more difficult for him to find a job. (Id. at 237.) Furthermore, if the reasons for termination involve moral turpitude and were stigmatizing, liberty interests might be implicated only if the District had disclosed the reasons to the public. (Id.) In Shepherd v. Jones (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 1049 (1982), the Court concluded that there was no violation of a liberty interest. Appellant claimed that his standing in the community was damaged and his termination had impaired his ability to find a job. The Court explained that not every defamatory statement or termination alone was sufficient to implicate a liberty interest. However, the mere fact that a termination might make an individual a less attractive job candidate did not rise to level of protected liberty interest. (Accord Williams, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 677, 684 [the mere fact of discharge from public employment does not constitute a constitutional violation of a liberty interest].) By contrast, the trial court here concluded that Kreutzer was entitled to a hearing because his discharge was based on serious accusations of alleged misconduct which require a hearing to answer the accusations and question his accusers to allow his constitutional right to due process. (AA ) Assuming arguendo that the reasons for his dismissal were sufficiently stigmatizing to rise to the level of a constitution violation, 17

19 Kreutzer himself acknowledges that the purported allegations were not made public. (Kreutzer at 31.) As such, his liberty interest claim fails as a matter of law. 2. Even If Kreutzer s Liberty Interest Had Been Violated, He Is Entitled Only To A Post-Termination Hearing To Clear His Name Even if San Francisco had terminated Kreutzer for some stigmatizing reason and had publicized it, Kreutzer s only remedy would be a post-termination name-clearing hearing. He would not be entitled to reinstatement or to promotion to a non-exempt position to which he never applied or tested. Courts have consistently upheld the limited remedy of a nameclearing hearing for violations of liberty interests. For example, in Gray v. City of Gustine (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 621, the Court held that the remedy for a liberty interest is a name-clearing hearing: Deprivation of a liberty interest entitles the employee to an opportunity to refute the charge and to clear his or her name. (Id. at 629 [citation omitted].) A name-clearing hearing provides the individual the right to establish record regarding his termination. The Court of Appeal specifically noted: However, it does not mean that he must be reinstated, even if he was fired for no reason. (Gray, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at 630 [citations omitted].) / / / 18

20 In fact, in Katzberg v. Regents of the University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th 300, the California Supreme Court examined what, if any, damages might be available as a remedy for due process liberty interest violations under the state Constitution. In that case, a doctor held the position of department chair, an at-will position. He was removed from that position, although he remained in his position as a tenured professor. After an exhaustive review and analysis of the due process provision of the State Constitution, the Supreme Court concluded that it could discern no evidence from which to infer within article I, section 7(a), an intent to afford a right to seek damages to remedy the asserted violation of the due process liberty interest at issue. (Katzberg, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 329.) Kreutzer cites Murden v. County of Sacramento (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 302, 309, for the proposition that he was at least entitled to a hearing to refute charges and to clear his name. (Kreutzer at 30.) In Murden, a temporary deputy sheriff was terminated based on allegations of misconduct, including sexual conversations with colleagues. The Court concluded that a liberty interest was implicated and Murden was entitled to a name-clearing hearing. However, the Court specifically pointed out that Murden was not entitled to re-instatement: Even if he had cleared his name of the charges of improper behavior at a prerelease hearing, his supervisors would have remained free to release him for the other reasons 19

21 set forth or for no articulated reason whatsoever. (Murden, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at 310 [citation omitted].). Kreutzer cites Brown v. Trustees of Boston University (1st Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 337, 360, in support of the trial court s broad authority to fashion a remedy. (Kreutzer at 39.) There, the plaintiff alleged a Title VII violation based on disparate treatment based on sex when she was denied tenure. The First Circuit looked to the legislative history of Title VII to evaluate the types of remedies Congress intended when it enacted that law and the remedies specifically provided for under Title VII. But no Title VII claim is at issue in this case. Moreover, Brown does not concern civil service employment in California. As such, that decision is inapposite. In sum, Kreutzer is not entitled to a post-termination hearing because San Francisco never publicized the reason for his dismissal. Even if San Francisco had done so, Kreutzer would only be entitled to a hearing so that he would have the opportunity to clear his name. A violation of a liberty interest does not entitle an employee, even if wrongly stigmatized or terminated, to reinstatement. V. CONCLUSION Pursuant to Rule 13(c) of the California Rules of Court, the California State Association of Counties ( CSAC ) and the League of 20

22 California Cities ( League ) respectfully request that this Court consider this amicus curiae brief in support of defendant and respondent City and County of San Francisco in Michael Christoph Kreutzer v. City and County of San Francisco. CSAC and the League respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court decision that Kreutzer be appointed to a nonexempt position with permanent status. If allowed to stand, the trial court decision would undermine the equitable application of civil service rules and the open, competitive nature of the merit-based systems of public employment. It would also elevate all terminations to constitutional violations. Date: March 4, 2008 Respectfully submitted, ANN MILLER RAVEL County Counsel By: KATHRYN J. ZOGLIN Deputy County Counsel Attorneys on behalf of Amicus Curiae, California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities 21

23 CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT Pursuant to Rule 8.204(c)(1) of the California Rules of Court, counsels on behalf of Amicus California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities certify that the Amicus Curiae Brief is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 13 points or more contains 4,488 words as counted by the Corel WordPerfect version 12 word-processing program used to generate this brief. Dated: March 4, 2008 KATHRYN J. ZOGLIN 22

24 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION... 1 II. STATEMENT OF INTEREST... 2 III. BACKGROUND... 3 A. Procedural Context... 3 B. Trial Court Ruling... 4 IV. DISCUSSION... 6 A. The Trial Court Ruling Should Be Reversed Because It Is Contrary To San Francisco s Civil Service System Civil Service Rules Govern Employment and Promotion 6 2. Changes In An Employee s Civil Service Status Must Be Carried Out In A Manner That Is Consistent With Existing Merit System Rules..8 B. Kreutzer Was Not Entitled To A Pre-Termination Hearing Because He Had No Property Interest In Employment.12 C. Kreutzer s Liberty Interests Were Not Violated No Liberty Interest Is Implicated Because No Stigmatizing Reason Was Made Public Even If Kreutzer s Liberty Interest Had Been Violated, He Is Entitled Only To A Post-Termination Hearing To Clear His Name V. CONCLUSION CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT i

25 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Bishop v. Wood (1976) 426 U.S , 13, 15, 16 Bollow v. Federal Reserve (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d Briggs v. Eden (1999) 19 Cal.4th Brown v. Trustees of Boston University (1st Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d Ferdig v. State Personnel Board (1969) 71 Cal.2d Globe v. County of Los Angeles (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d Gray v. City of Gustine (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d , 18 Haas v. City of Los Angeles (1942) 21 Cal.2d , 11 Hayes v. Phoenix-Talent School Dist. No. 4 (9th Cir. 1990) 893 F.2d Katzberg v. Regents of the University of California (2002) 29 Cal.4th Ligon v. State Personnel Board (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d , 10 Murden v. County of Sacramento (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d ii

26 Newhouser v. Board of Trustees (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d Otto v. Reardon (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d , 11 Pinion v. State Personnel Board (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d Shepherd v. Jones (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d Shepherd v. Jones (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d , 12 Snow v. Board of Administration (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d , 11 Williams v. Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d , 15, 17 STATUTES STATE California Rules of Court Rule 13(c) California Constitution Article 11(1)(b)... 6 Article 11(3)... 6 Article I, section 7(a) iii

27 Government Code Section OTHER Attorney General Opinion 56 Op.Atty Gen. Cal iv