Settlement Apportionment and Setoff in Illinois

Transcription

1 Feature Article Quinn P. Donnelly and Brian T. Henry Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, Chicago Settlement Apportionment and Setoff in Illinois During the course of a lawsuit, counsel for each party evaluates his or her respective client s potential exposure, the benefits of settling the case, and the likely range of a jury verdict. The uncertainty surrounding jury verdicts creates an incentive for both plaintiff s counsel and defendant s counsel to consider and sometimes engage in settlement negotiations. Where there are multiple defendants, any eventual settlement between the plaintiff and a single defendant creates the possibility that the remaining defendants may be left holding the bag for more than their pro rata share of liability, or have their client exposed to a greater risk of an excess verdict. In Illinois, the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act entitles the non-settling defendant to a setoff or reduction of the jury verdict in the amount the plaintiff has already received for that specific claim. 740 ILCS 100/2(c). However, it is vitally important that counsel understand what steps to take to ensure that clients receive the setoff they are entitled to under Illinois law. As a threshold matter, it is important to distinguish between the two ways the term setoff is used in Illinois. The first, which is not the subject of this article, involves the situation where a defendant has asserted by way of counterclaim a cause of action against the plaintiff in the same lawsuit. See, e.g., Thornton v. Garcini, 237 Ill. 2d 100, 113 (2009). In order to properly pursue a counterclaim, the defendant must raise the claim in the pleadings. Id. The second type of setoff, which this article addresses, refers to a non-settling defendant s request for a reduction of the damage award because a co-defendant has settled with the plaintiff providing compensation for the same injury. Thornton, 237 Ill. 2d at 113. This type of setoff can be sought after an adverse verdict by the non-settling defendant, but is limited to the amount of the settlement that was allocated or apportioned to each specific claim. Generally, the nonsettling defendant bears the burden of proving what portion of the prior settlement was allocated to the claim for which the non-settling defendant is liable. Id. at 116; Pasquale v. Speed Prods. Eng g, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 369 (1995); Babikian v. Mruz, 2011 IL App (1st) , 22; Kipnis v. Meltzer, 253 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71 (1st Dist. 1993). Where a settlement is not properly allocated, the non-settling defendant can be denied a setoff except where certain exceptions apply. Muro v. Abel Freight Lines, 283 Ill. App. 3d 416, 419 (1st Dist. 1996); Dolan v. Gawlicki, 256 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156 (3d Dist. 1993). As a result, the non-settling defendant must ensure that any settlements entered into are appropriately apportioned by party and claim. I. The Right to a Setoff At common law, a defendant in Illinois was entitled to a setoff. Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 419 (citing N.Y.C., Chic. & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Am. Transit Lines, Inc., 408 Ill. 336 (1951)). This right was codified by the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Act) which provides in relevant part: IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 3 ( ) Page 1

2 (c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater. 740 ILCS 100/2(c). The Act was designed to prevent plaintiffs from receiving a dual recovery for a single injury, while at the same time safeguarding the financial interests of the non-settling defendants. Patton v. Carbondale Clinic, S.C., 161 Ill. 2d 357, 370 (1994); Foster v. Kanuri, 241 Ill. App. 3d 677, 681 (1st Dist. 1992) (citing Dial v. O Fallon, 81 Ill. 2d 548, 558 (1980)). II. Common Setoff Circumstances The need for setoff can arise in the context of cases involving one or more plaintiffs bringing multiple claims against multiple defendants. In this context, settlements between fewer than all of the parties are common, and the non-settling defendants are entitled to setoffs from the settlements that do occur. These circumstances arise frequently in medical negligence actions where the defendants generally include the hospital or treatment facility, a number of physicians, and other medical staff who assisted with the underlying treatment of a plaintiff. When there are multiple plaintiffs in this context, the lawsuit usually includes the patient and a spouse. See, e.g., Johnson v. Belleville Radiologists, Ltd., 221 Ill. App. 3d 100, 102 (5th Dist. 1991). In cases involving the death of a patient and allegations of medical negligence, the plaintiffs will generally assert claims pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1), the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6), and the Family Expense Statute (750 ILCS 65/15). Readel v. Towne, 302 Ill. App. 3d 714, 716 (2d Dist. 1999). In this situation, there are multiple causes of action rather than multiple plaintiffs. While there may be multiple heirs claiming a loss of society, the estate is the sole plaintiff. Illinois courts have consistently held that when a lawsuit involves claims under both the survival and the wrongful death statutes, the allocations should be made according to the claim. Readel, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 719; Foster, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 681. More specifically, expenses for conspicuous pain and suffering, expenses and loss of earnings of the decedent up to his or her date of death should be allocated to the survival action and the loss of benefits of the survivors should be allocated to the action for the wrongful death. Patch v. Glover, 248 Ill. App. 3d 562, 574 (1st Dist. 1993) (citing Foster, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 681). Regardless of whether there are multiple plaintiffs or multiple causes of action, the non-settling defendants must be aware of and must seek to properly allocate any settlements and to allocate those settlements in a way that best serves the interests of the non-settling defendants. IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 3 ( ) Page 2

3 III. Good Faith Findings and the Apportionment of Settlements A. Good Faith Findings In evaluating the validity of a proposed settlement, courts look to both the good faith nature of the settlement as well as the reasonableness of the allocation of the settlement to particular claims. Readel, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 719. In order to constitute a valid settlement in Illinois, pursuant to the Act, the settlement must be entered into in good faith. Belleville Radiologists, Ltd., 221 Ill. App. 3d at 103. While the Act does not define good faith, Illinois courts have explained that in determining whether a settlement agreement was made in good faith, the trial court should not consider any one factor but must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the settlement. Readel, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 719. When assessing the good faith nature of a settlement, Illinois courts can rely upon the arguments of counsel; affidavits, depositions, and other discovery materials of record; or an evidentiary hearing. Belleville Radiologists, Ltd., 221 Ill. App. 3d at 103. The parties should not rely exclusively on a comparison of the settlement to the eventual verdict, but this may be considered as one factor in assessing the good faith nature of the settlement. Id. at 104. Courts can also consider the manipulation of an allocation as evidence of bad faith, but it is not per se bad faith to engage in such manipulation. Id. at 109. Courts have considered a settlement to be in bad faith where the parties to the settlement engage in wrongful conduct, collusion, or fraud; misrepresent the terms of the agreement, ignore established procedural rules or fail to notify potential defendants of the existence of the settlement. Johnson v. United Airlines, 203 Ill. 2d 121, 134 (2003); Babb v. City of Champaign, 162 Ill. 2d 153, (1994). As a general rule, an agreement that conflicts with terms and/or policies underlying the Contribution Act does not satisfy the good faith requirement. Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 170; Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 185, (2001). A trial court s finding that a settlement was made in good faith is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. The appellate court will reverse such a finding only where the trial court has abused its discretion. Readel, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 718 (citing Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 162). B. Fair and Reasonable Allocation of Settlement Proceeds In addition to the good faith nature of the settlement, when reviewing a proposed settlement, the trial court should evaluate the fairness and reasonableness of the percentage allocated to each claim. Readel, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 719; Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 420. This inquiry is a separate question from the good faith nature of the settlement and the trial court is required conduct a hearing to evaluate both the good faith nature of the settlement and the apportionment of the settlement. Readel, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 720. The scope of this hearing is left to the discretion of the trial court. Id. Like the good faith nature of the settlement, the reasonableness of the apportionment is committed the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed unless it is clear that the court abused its discretion. Id. at 719. However, it is at this stage that the defense counsel must be assertive in providing the court with persuasive arguments in favor of an apportionment which is fair to the non-settling defendant. In Barkei v Delnor Hospital, 207 Ill. App. 3d 255 (2d Dist. 1990), the Illinois Appellate Court Second District commented that the non-settling defendant could have called the attorneys for the settling defendants before the court in an evidentiary hearing to testify as to how much of the settlement was being allocated to each of the causes of action in the complaint. Barkei, 207 Ill. App. 3d at However, in Readel, the same appellate court also noted that the defendant was not necessarily entitled to call the plaintiff IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 3 ( ) Page 3

4 as a witness at an evidentiary hearing as that would be left to the discretion of the trial court. Readel, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 721. It is clear from some of the appellate decisions that defense counsel may need to vigorously argue for what he or she contends is an appropriate and reasonable allocation. In Johnson v. Belleville Radiologists, the trial court approved the allocation from a $340,000 settlement of $300,000 for the loss of consortium count and only $40,000 for the spouse who suffered a post-operative infection from retained sponges which left her infertile. Belleville Radiologists, Ltd., 221 Ill. App. 3d at 102. The appellate court rejected the non-settling defendant s argument that the allocation was not in good faith. The appellate court stated that manipulation of an allocation can be evidence of bad faith in a settlement negotiation but it is not per se bad faith to engage in such a manipulation. Id. at 107. Given that appellate decisions repeatedly indicate that whether an apportionment is reasonable is left to the discretion of the trial judge, it is clear that the best opportunity to advocate for a reasonable apportionment is with the trial judge. Except in extreme situations, it is unlikely that an appellate court will overturn the apportionment decided upon by the trial judge if the trial judge makes its determination after an evidentiary hearing. C. Burden of Proving the Portion Allocated by Settlement As discussed briefly above, the general rule under Illinois law is that the non-settling defendant the party who would benefit from a setoff bears the burden of proving what portion of a prior settlement was allocated or attributable to that defendant s share of liability. Thornton, 237 Ill. 2d at 116. If the non-settling defendant cannot carry this burden they will generally be precluded from receiving any setoff. Muro, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 419; Dolan, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 156. Courts have explained that in precluding any setoff, they are not allowing for double recovery by the plaintiff because where the amount is not allocated, the defendant has no way of arriving at the amount that is attributable to a specific claim or party that should be set off against the verdict. Kipnis, 253 Ill. App. 3d at Illinois courts have recognized two narrow exceptions when the non-settling defendant should not bear the burden of proving what portion of a previous settlement should be set off. First, in Patton v. Carbondale Clinic, in holding that the defendant was entitled to setoffs for prior settlements, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that where a plaintiff recovers for several injuries in a previous lawsuit and fails to apportion damages accordingly, a subsequent defendant should not bear the burden of proving what portion of the plaintiff s previous settlement should be set-off or be denied a setoff. Patton, 161 Ill. 2d at 370. In that case, the settlements at issue resulted from prior lawsuits to which the defendant seeking setoff was not a party. The court reasoned that the plaintiff who was a party to those prior settlements was in the best position to apportion the prior settlements to avoid this issue and noted that the interest of encouraging settlements must be balanced with the interest of protecting a non-settling party s financial interests and limiting the plaintiff to one recovery per injury. Id. at Most recently, in Babikian v. Mruz, in holding that the defendant was entitled to a setoff, the Illinois Appellate Court Fourth District examined a situation where the plaintiff and her husband first entered into a settlement agreement with a medical center and then later brought suit against her doctor. Babikian v. Mruz, 2011 IL App (1st) , 4. The court reasoned that since the non-settling defendant was not a party to the prior settlement and could not have requested the settlement be allocated at the time, that defendant should not bear the burden of the plaintiff s failure to properly apportion IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 3 ( ) Page 4

5 the settlement. Id. 23. These two examples are rare and both involve circumstances where the non-settling defendant was far removed from the initial settlement and could not have easily requested that the early settlements be allocated. Courts have explained that where a case involves a single plaintiff but multiple claims, allocation is not critical because the single plaintiff receives the entire settlement amount. Kipnis, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 72. In the single plaintiff, multiple claim circumstance, courts have allowed for setoff in the full amount of the settlement. Giordano v. Morgan, 197 Ill. App. 3d 543, (2d Dist. 1990). D. Denials of Setoffs In situations where there are multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants, and sometimes when there are multiple causes of action, a non-settling defendant may be denied a setoff if that defendant does not ensure that the court has determined an allocation for the settlement proceeds. A setoff has been denied when a defendant was found liable on only some but not all of the plaintiff s claims. In Thornton, the plaintiff administrator filed a complaint asserting causes of action on behalf of the estate of a stillborn infant under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act, and an individual cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress by the mother of the decedent. Thornton, 237 Ill. 2d at 104. At the first trial, the jury found in favor of all of the nurses and physician as to all causes of action. The jury found for the hospital as to the claims under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act, but found against the hospital on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at After the verdict, the plaintiff settled with the hospital for the amount of the verdict. The appellate court granted a new trial against the physician. Id. at 104. At the second trial, the jury found in favor of the physician as to the causes of action under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act, but found against the physician on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (the plaintiff amended her complaint after the evidence and submitted negligent infliction of emotional distress instruction to the jury). Id. at Since the hospital s settlement had not been allocated among the various causes of action, the defendant was denied a setoff even though the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress was not even pled at the time of the settlement. The court also noted that the settlement release of the hospital applied to all possible causes of action and not just the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at In Dolan, the plaintiff administrator filed a complaint asserting causes of action under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act. Dolan, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 154. The plaintiff settled with the primary insurance carrier and went to trial against the defendants who had excess insurance coverage. Id. The trial court did not make an allocation at the time of the settlement. Id. When a verdict was returned against the defendants, the trial court did allow a setoff and that ruling was reversed on appeal as there had not been an allocation at the time of the settlement. Id. at 155. The appellate court noted that at the time of the settlement, the plaintiff was still claiming loss of society beyond the date of his remarriage, but that element of damages had been barred at the trial by the defendants, which was the court s rationale for denying the setoff. Id. at 156. Even though a claim for loss of consortium after remarriage was not recoverable under Illinois law, the appellate court seemed to indicate that some of the prior settlement by the co-defendant could have been allocated to it. Id. at 157. In Kipnis, the plaintiff alleged that there was a failure on the part of the defendants to investigate a nodule on a routine admitting chest x-ray when she was hospitalized for a ruptured hamstring. Kipnis, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 67. The plaintiff s husband also filed a loss of consortium claim. Id. Prior to trial, the co-defendant physician settled for $300,000 before IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 3 ( ) Page 5

6 the trial judge, but there was no apportionment at that time. Id. at The husband then dismissed his loss of consortium claim before opening statements. Id. at 68. The plaintiff had undergone seven thoracotomies in treating her lung cancer and was terminal at the time of trial. The jury returned a verdict of $20,000 against the remaining defendant. Id. The trial judge refused to apportion the prior settlement or to permit a setoff even though it was obvious that more than $20,000 of the $300,000 settlement should have been allocated to the plaintiff who was dying of lung cancer. Id. The appellate court affirmed, but failed to address in its opinion why the trial judge, who had heard all the evidence and who had approved the settlement only a couple of weeks earlier, could not have then determined the allocation. The second division of the Illinois Appellate Court First District decided the Kipnis appeal. However, in the same year, in Patch v. Glover, 248 Ill. App. 3d 562 (1st Dist. 1993), the fourth division of the Illinois Appellate Court First District remanded the case back to the trial court to allocate a settlement reached before trial by a co-defendant without an allocation and to then apply the setoff. Patch, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 574. That result was exactly what the defendant in Kipnis requested but the appellate court did not address in its opinion. These cases illustrate that defense counsel must demand an allocation at the time the court finds a settlement to be in good faith. Defense counsel should also make a clear record of any objections to the allocation reached by the trial judge. IV. Strategic Considerations From the outset of litigation, a defendant in a multi-party lawsuit should serve discovery requests upon the plaintiff(s) requiring the disclosure of the existence of any prior or current settlements relating to the case and the claims asserted against that specific defendant. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(i) imposes a continuing duty on the plaintiff to supplement answers when new or additional information becomes available. Ill. S. Ct. R. 213(i). By propounding this request early in the litigation, a defendant can avoid missing the opportunity to request a setoff. Even when a co-defendant has drafted a settlement release containing confidentiality provisions, the non-settling defendant should be entitled to and must insist on discovering the amount of and the terms of the settlement. While courts acknowledge that a non-settling party is not entitled to control the settlement allocation, Illinois law requires that all proposed settlements be presented to the court for a good faith finding and the evaluation of the fairness and reasonableness of the allocation. Belleville Radiologists, Ltd., 221 Ill. App. 3d at 103, 111. At the time a plaintiff presents a proposed settlement to the court, a non-settling defendant should both object to the allocation if it is unfavorable and request that the court provide a hearing on a more appropriate allocation of the settlement. A failure to object to the settlement allocation will waive the non-settling defendant s right to later argue that the settlement apportionment was unfair or unreasonable. Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 309 Ill. App. 3d 869, 887 (1st Dist. 1999). Following the entry of a verdict against a non-settling defendant, it is advisable that the defendant promptly request a setoff in the amount of any prior settlement by filing a post-trial motion. However, a request for a setoff does not need to be made within 30 days after the entry of the judgment. Star Charters v. Figueroa, 192 Ill. 2d 47, 48 (2000). In Star Charters, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that a defendant s request for setoff to reflect amounts paid by settling defendants seeks not to modify, but rather to satisfy, the judgment entered by the trial court. Star Charters, 192 Ill. 2d at 48. Therefore, the defendant can bring a supplemental enforcement proceeding to request a setoff if it was not requested at an earlier time. Id. at 49. IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 3 ( ) Page 6

7 In the event that the non-settling defendant is denied a requested setoff, that defendant should appeal. The determination of whether a defendant is entitled to a setoff is a question of law that is subject to a de novo standard of review. Thornton, 237 Ill. 2d at If on review the appellate court finds that the lower court improperly denied the defendant s request for setoff, that appellate court can, pursuant to its authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a), grant the setoff originally sought in the lower court. Babikian, 2011 IL App (1st) , 26. A non-settling defendant has the right to seek a setoff resulting from an appropriately allocated settlement. This should have the effect of reducing the overall verdict awarded to the plaintiff, and in turn, the plaintiff s overall recovery. Illinois law allows trial courts significant discretion in reviewing and approving the allocation of settlements, which has provided plaintiffs with a mechanism to increase the overall recovery in cases involving multiple defendants and claims. Since parties to a settlement are essentially given carte blanche authority to allocate or apportion a settlement between themselves, plaintiffs are able to maximize recovery sometimes in excess of the verdict awarded by the jury. In order to achieve this end, plaintiffs will first assess the separate causes of action in an attempt to determine which claim is more valuable or more easily proved. Plaintiffs then will seek to allocate a majority of any settlement to the less valuable or legally more difficult claim to prove. By allocating the settlement in this way, a plaintiff is relying on the likelihood that the jury will return a verdict in an amount that is less than the amount allocated to the claim. As discussed earlier, a significant example of this tactic can be seen in Johnson v. Belleville Radiologists, where a $340,000 settlement allocated $300,000 to the husband s loss of consortium claim and $40,000 for the wife s injuries. Belleville Radiologists, Ltd., 221 Ill. App. 3d at 102. The jury ultimately returned an award of $50,000 for the husband s loss of consortium claim and $529,600 for the wife s injuries. As a result of the unequal allocation, the non-settling defendant was only entitled to the benefit of $90,000 in setoff and the plaintiffs received $250,000 in excess of the jury award. Id. at The non-settling defendant should anticipate this strategy and should aggressively challenge allocation or apportionment on the grounds that it is aimed at achieving this end. When the plaintiff presents a proposed settlement to the court, the non-settling defendant should tender as much substantive evidence as possible, including but not limited to depositions, affidavits, medical records, and other documents, in support of an allocation that fairly and reasonably represents and closely mirrors the likely outcome at trial. By advocating for an allocation that is reflective of the eventual jury verdict, a non-settling defendant can maximize setoff and minimize the total amount of the eventual judgement entered against it. The record created may also be of assistance for any later appeal. V. Conclusion As a defendant, it is critical to be proactive from the outset of litigation in order to safeguard the right to any eventual setoff. As a general rule, any litigation involving more than one defendant creates the potential for a setoff claim. Each defendant should stay apprised of any and all settlements that the plaintiff enters into with any co-defendants in order to request that the court appropriately allocate that settlement in a fair and reasonable way by both claim and party (if there are multiple plaintiffs). Non-settling defendants should aggressively challenge any apportionment that varies from the likely jury outcome in an effort to maximize the setoff amount and minimize any windfall for the plaintiff in excess of the jury verdict. IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 3 ( ) Page 7

8 Practice Pointers 1. STAY INFORMED: In discovery request any and all information relating to current and prior settlements relating to the litigation. 2. COMMUNICATE: Confer with co-defendants if you become aware they are actively negotiating a settlement. Determine whether co-defendant s counsel will support a reasonable allocation at any evidentiary hearing and find out if the wording of any releases could be harmful or beneficial to your arguments regarding the allocation of the settlement funds. 3. ANTICIPATE: Research similar cases involving claims in the jurisdiction where the matter is pending to approximate the likely jury verdicts in order to request that the court modify any proposed allocation to closer mirror the likely jury verdicts. Defense counsel should also consider scenarios where the plaintiffs could either dismiss causes of action after a settlement or even have one plaintiff dismiss his or her claim in an effort to impact the setoff available. Any such scenario should be raised in any evidentiary hearing. For example, if the plaintiffs attempt to allocate 75% of a settlement for the spouse s loss of consortium claim, defense counsel can point out that the plaintiffs could dismiss the loss of consortium claim prior to trial so that any jury verdict would be attributable only to the damages of the injured plaintiff. 4. OBJECT: At the time that the plaintiff proposes any settlement to the court for the entry of a good faith finding and for a determination that the allocations are fair and reasonable, defense counsel should object to the plaintiff s proposed allocation. Defense counsel should then request a hearing on the issues, as is allowed and required by law, and at the hearing, provide substantive evidence that the allocation is neither fair nor reasonable and propose an alternative allocation for the settlement proceeds. A court reporter should be present for the hearing to create a record for a possible appeal. 5. REQUEST SETOFF: Make the request for a setoff in the amount of the allocated settlement proceeds promptly after a verdict and renew any objections to the original allocation. About the Authors Quinn P. Donnelly is an Associate at Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, where he is developing his practice as a trial attorney. Mr. Donnelly s practice includes commercial disputes, employment claims, insurance defense, and professional negligence claims. Mr. Donnelly earned his J.D., cum laude, from the John Marshall Law School with a certificate in Trial Advocacy and as a member of the Order of John Marshall. While in law school he served as a Staff Editor of the John Marshall Law Review, as a Judicial Extern for the Honorable Maria Valdez of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and as a Rule 711 Law Clerk for the Cook County State s Attorney s Office. IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 3 ( ) Page 8

9 Brian T. Henry is an equity partner of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, and joined the firm upon his graduation from the University of Illinois College of Law in May of He is a trial attorney specializing in civil litigation. Over the last 36 years, the majority of his trials have been on behalf of hospitals or medical professionals and during those years he has averaged five jury trials per year. He has had jury trials in state courts in Cook, McHenry, Lake, Kane, Will, DuPage, Grundy and DeKalb counties. Mr. Henry has taught for more than twenty five years at trial and deposition academies in Illinois organized by the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel. Mr. Henry was also invited to be a member of the faculty for the 2001 Trial Academy of the International Association of Defense Counsel. In October of 2002, Mr. Henry was inducted as a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers, one of the premier legal associations in North America. About the IDC The Illinois Association Defense Trial Counsel (IDC) is the premier association of attorneys in Illinois who devote a substantial portion their practice to the representation of business, corporate, insurance, professional and other individual defendants in civil litigation. For more information on the IDC, visit us on the web at or contact us at PO Box 588, Rochester, IL , , , idc@iadtc.org. IDC Quarterly Volume 26, Number 3 ( ) Page 9