IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU BEFORE THE HON BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND BYRAREDDY

Transcription

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU Between: DATED THIS THE 25 th DAY OF JANUARY, 2016 BEFORE THE HON BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND BYRAREDDY WRIT PETITION NO OF 2013 (LR - RES) AND WRIT PETITION NOs OF 2013 Tamil Chelvan, Aged 48 years, S/o Kali Muthu, R/at No.35, 3 rd Street, Bank Avenue, Babusapalay, Doddabanasawadi, Bangalore Petitioner (By Shri. S.K.Acharya, Adv.) And: 1. State of Karnataka, Represented by its Secretary, Revenue Department, M.S. Building, Bangalore The Assistant Commissioner, Kollegal Sub Division, Kollegal Chamarajnagar District

2 2 3. The Tahasildar, Chamarajanagara Respondents (By Smt. B.P.Radha, HCGP) --- These Writ Petitions are filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India praying to quash the impugned order dated passed in Appeal No.697/2008 on the file of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, vide Annexure A confirming the impugned order dated passed in LRF No.216/ by the 2 nd respondent vide Annexure B in so far as the Schedule Property is concerned and to declare the impugned order at Annexure B as Arbitrary, Unconstitutional and Illegal and etc., These Petitions coming on for Preliminary Hearing in B Group this day, the Court made the following:- O R D E R Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate. 2. The petitioner claims to be an agriculturist by profession and claims to possess lands at Sandapady village and his family members are also said to be agriculturists. It is stated that the land in question was

3 3 purchased by the petitioner for agricultural purposes and there was no prohibition to purchase the same. However, proceedings had been initiated under Section 79 A and B of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 against the petitioner in respect of such purchase and the lands stood forfeited, by virtue of such proceedings in favour of the State which was challenged before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal by way of a statutory appeal. The appeal having been rejected on a finding that the income of the petitioner was more than Rs.2 lakh, the present petition is filed. 3. During the pendency of this petition there has been a change in the law whereby Section 79A has been amended by substituting the word Rupeess two lakhs with the word Rupees twenty five lakhs w.e.f The question that arises is whether such amendment can be given effect to retrospectively. The question is no longer res integra, a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case

4 4 of Vijayakumar Shankarayya Sardar vs. State of Karnataka, 1993(3) KLJ 411 (DB), has laid down that - Whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of amendment the various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provision as though they are a part of it. The amended part of the provision having got incorporated into the Act the provision of Section 79A of the Act as such should be read. Section 79A of the Act has the opening words on and from the commencement of the amended Act. The amended act, as stated earlier, is defined to be Act 1/1974, which came into effect from From that date no one can acquire agricultural land, if his income from sources other than agricultural lands is in excess of Rs.50,000/-. If the interpretation given in Gayathri Ramaswamy vs. State of Karnataka and others, WP 16976/1986 decided on is to be adopted, then it gives rise to two sets of transactions:-

5 5 (1) those by which from the commencement of the amendment Act, i.e., from , acquired lands prior to , and (2) those by which acquired lands subsequent to This was in the context of the very section having been amended to increase the ceiling limit from Rs.12,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. Therefore, the division bench held that if the section is read as it is subsequent to amendment, it does not give scope for such construction at all. If the amended provisions were to be effective from , then the expression on and from the date of commencement of the amended act, that is , would have no meaning at all. The legislature noticing that the section itself has provided as to in respect of what transactions the restriction is applicable which are entered into from a particular date, there was no necessity to make the same retrospective at all. The division bench, therefore, held that it could not attribute either ignorance

6 6 to the legislature of the opening words of section 79A of the Act or treat the same as surplussage. The section simply states from the date of the commencement of the amended act, which is , those having annual income in excess of Rs.50,000/- from non-agricultural sources, cannot acquire agricultural lands. It is not a case where the legislature classifies transactions depending upon a particular date. On the other hand, the legislature gives rise to certain consequences that would follow if a transaction takes place after a particular date. It is only a restriction in relation to a transaction. If that is so, there is no scope for interpretation that there can be two classes of transactions. As the provision stands, the date of the commencement of the entire provision is and none other. It is in this vein that the Division Bench has interpreted the prospective or retrospective application of the amendment. By the same token of reasoning since the ceiling limit is enhanced to Rs.25 lakhs which is as was

7 7 down in the year 1991 from Rs.12,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. The same reasoning would apply and therefore the ceiling limit would have to be read as if it was present from No other interpretation can be given to the provision. Accordingly, the present writ petition would have to be allowed in that circumstance alone and it is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is quashed. ykl Sd/- JUDGE