Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 1 of 30 PAGEID #: 13692

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1 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 1 of 30 PAGEID #: IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION THE NORTHEAST OHIO COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, et al., vs. Plaintiffs, CASE NO. 2:06-cv-896; 2:12-cv-562 Judge Algenon Marbley Magistrate Judge Terrence P. Kemp JON HUSTED, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Ohio, et al., Defendants. Motion of Plaintiffs Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, Columbus Coalition for the Homeless, and Ohio Democratic Party for attorneys fees and costs related to obtaining an extension of the Consent Decree (Doc. # 383) Plaintiffs Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (NEOCH), Columbus Coalition for the Homeless (CCH), and Ohio Democratic Party (ODP) (the voting-rights advocates), as prevailing parties, respectfully move under 42 U.S.C for attorneys fees and costs. The fees and costs sought here are those incurred in obtaining, via the Court s Order (Doc. 383), an extension of the April 19, 2010 Consent Decree from its original June 30, 2013 sunset date to December 31, Fees sought total $119, Expenses sought total $1, Specifically, the voting-rights advocates seek an order of $95, in fees and $1, in expenses to The Chandra Law Firm, LLC; $19, in fees and $0.00 in expenses to McTigue & McGinnis LLC; and $4, in fees and $0.00 in expenses to Porter, Wright, Miller & Arthur LLP. The voting-rights advocates plan to supplement this motion and/or move separately for additional fees and costs incurred in recovering attorneys fees and costs, as the law permits.

2 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 2 of 30 PAGEID #: TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... i Memorandum of Law... 1 I. Introduction... 1 II. Background... 2 A. The Decree protects the rights of the voting-rights advocates members and the rights of all Ohio voters B. The voting-rights advocates moved to extend the Decree after many months of ultimately futile attempts to persuade the Secretary to agree cooperatively to continue the Decree s protections C. The voting-rights advocates request attorneys fees based on their counsel s rates and hours invested... 5 III. Law and Argument A. The voting-rights advocates are prevailing parties entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) because they obtained an extension of the Consent Decree through December The voting-rights advocates are prevailing parties No special circumstances render an award of fees and costs unjust... 7 B. The voting-rights advocates have properly computed the fee award to which they are entitled The voting-rights advocates counsel spent a reasonable number of hours and exercised appropriate billing judgment... 8 a. Counsel kept detailed time records... 9 b. The hours counsel spent allocated efficiently between attorneys reflect the complexity of the issues and case history c. Counsel removed hours in the exercise of billing judgment d. The voting-rights advocates achieved an excellent result and thus should receive a fully compensatory fee Each hourly rate is reasonable ii

3 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 3 of 30 PAGEID #: a. Counsel s rates are consistent with this Court s prior awards and those awarded in Hunter b. Counsel s rates are consistent with counsel s experience and credentials, rates awarded in other cases, their own standard billing rates, and rates of comparably experienced civil-rights practitioners i. The Chandra Law Firm, LLC ii. Porter Wright Miller & Arthur LLP iii. McTigue & McGinnis LLC C. The voting-rights advocates are entitled to recover the expenses they reasonably incurred in prosecuting this lawsuit IV. Conclusion iii

4 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 4 of 30 PAGEID #: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES ABC v. Brunner, Case No. 1:04-cv-750, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008)...9, 17 Anderson v. Wilson, 357 F. Supp. 2d 991 (E.D. Ky. 2005) B&G Mining, Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, F.3d 657 (6 th Cir. 2008) Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989) Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)...7, 15, 17 Brooks cv. Georgia State Bd. of Elec., 997 F.2d 857 (11th Cir. 1993) Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep t of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)... 6, 9 Buffington v. Baltimore Cty., 913 F.2d 113 (4 th Cir. 1990)... 6 Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. Euclid, 965 F. Supp (N.D. Ohio 1997) Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Ath. Ass n, Case No. 1:98-cv-479, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008)... 9 DiLaura v. Twp. of Ann Arbor, 471 F.3d 666 (6 th Cir. 2006)... 6 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103(1992)... 6 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 491 F.3d 649 (2007)...8, 11, 12 Geier v. Sundquist, 373 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2004) Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229 (6 th Cir. 1998) Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532 (6 th Cir. 1995)...15, 17, 20 Harmon v. McGinnis, Inc., 263 Fed. Appx. 465 (6 th Cir. 2008) Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)... passim Hunter v. Hamilton County Bd. of Elec., Case No. 1:10-cv-820, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2013)... passim i

5 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 5 of 30 PAGEID #: Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)... 7 Imwalle v. Reliance Medical Prods., 515 F.3d 531(6 th Cir. 2008)...8, 9, 10 Indep t Fed n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989)... 6 Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5 th Cir. 1979)... 7 Kelley v. Metro. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 773 F.2d 677 (6 th Cir. 1985)...15, 17, 20 Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Elec., 979 F.2d 1141 (6 th Cir. 1992) Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145 (11 th Cir. 1985)... 7 Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106 (9 th Cir. 2008)... 9 Morscott, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 936 F.2d 271 (6 th Cir. 1991)... 6 Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400 (1968)... 6 Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6 th Cir. 1979)...7, 21, 22 Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Brunner, 2006-cv-00896, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (S.D. Ohio, Nov. 30, 2010)... passim Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Brunner, 652 F. Supp.2d 871 (S.D. Ohio, July 28, 2009)... passim Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292 (8 th Cir. 1996) Price v. Pelka, 690 F.2d 98 (6 th Cir. 1982)... 6 Project Vote v. Blackwell, No. 1:06-cv-1628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2009)... 20, 21, 22 Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10 th Cir. 1983) Sigley v. Kuhn, No / , 2000 U.S. App., LEXIS 1465 (6 th Cir. Jan. 31, 2000) Smith v. District of Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2006)...10 United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v. G&M Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., 732 F.2d 495 (6 th Cir. 1984)...8 United States ex rel. Ellison v. Visiting Physicians Ass n, P.C., No. 1:04-cv-220, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85160, 2010 WL (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2010)...8, 17, 19, 21 ii

6 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 6 of 30 PAGEID #: Van Horn v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Case No. 1:08-cv-605, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ohio April 30, 2010) West AK Steel Corp. Ret. Acc. Pension Plan, 657 F. Supp. 2d 914 (S.D. Ohio 2009)...21 Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6 th Cir. 1979)...10, 22 Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707 (6 th Cir. 2005)... 9 Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169 (6 th Cir. 1990)... 9 FEDERAL STATUTES Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) U.S.C.A U.S.C.A passim LEGISLATIVE HISTORY H.R. Rep. No (1976)... 6 S. Rep. No (1976)...7, 8 iii

7 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 7 of 30 PAGEID #: I. Introduction Memorandum of Law Plaintiffs Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (NEOCH), Columbus Coalition for the Homeless (CCH), and Ohio Democratic Party (ODP) (the voting-rights advocates) successfully moved to extend the April 19, 2010 consent decree beyond its June 30, 2013 sunset date. Because they fully succeeded on that objective, they should receive, under 42 U.S.C 1988, a fully compensatory fee for the time spent litigating that motion. The hours expended are reasonable in light of the complexity of the issue and the case s history, its strongly contested nature, and hearing preparation. The voting-rights advocates counsel s rates are also reasonable, because they are consistent with the prevailing market rate for attorneys of their skill, experience, and reputation. The voting-rights advocates total request for $119, in fees and $1, in expenses is thus reasonable divided in proportion to work performed as follows among The Chandra Law Firm, LLC and Porter Wright Miller & Arthur LLP (representing the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and Columbus Coalition for the Homeless), and McTigue & McGinnis LLC (representing the Ohio Democratic Party): $$95, in fees (292.4 hours) and $1, in expenses to The Chandra Law Firm, LLC; $19, in fees (36.30 hours) and $0.00 in expenses to McTigue & McGinnis LLC; and $4, in fees (13.25 hours) and $0.00 in expenses to Porter, Wright, Miller & Arthur LLP. 1

8 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 8 of 30 PAGEID #: II. Background A. The Decree protects the rights of the voting-rights advocates members and the rights of all Ohio voters. As this Court is aware, this case has a long and winding history, with a voluminous record, but it has always been about protecting Ohio voters right to the franchise. At issue here was whether grounds existed to extend the parties April 19, 2010 Decree beyond its June 30, 2013 expiration date. The Decree which the parties entered into to resolve litigation challenging Ohio s voter-id laws mandated that the Secretary instruct Boards of Election to adhere to certain rules regarding the casting and counting of provisional ballots for persons without identification other than a social security number 1 that is, SSN-4 voters. The Decree, for example, prohibited county elections boards from rejecting SSN-4 provisional ballots on grounds that the voter did not present ID, did not provide a date of birth, did not provide an address, indicated that he or she was homeless, or cast his vote in the wrong-precinct, but right location, due to poll-worker error. 2 The Decree s injunctive-relief provisions thus implemented the Decree s purposes, which (paraphrased) included protecting SSN-4 voters fundamental right to vote, ensuring that such voters were not required to purchase ID as a condition to voting and having their vote be counted, ensuring that all 88 boards uniformly upheld SSN-4 voters right to vote, and ensuring that these voters would not be deprived of their right to vote because of poll workers failure to follow Ohio law. 1 Consent Decree at 3 (Section III.5) (Doc. #210). 2 Decree at 4 (Section III.5.b). 2

9 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 9 of 30 PAGEID #: As the Court noted in its opinion extending the Decree, these purposes were more than simply flowery language; rather, they were manifestly in the public interest, and the parties explicitly agreed to and memorialized [them]. 3 The Decree was set to expire on June 30, 2013, without as the voting-rights advocates later argued and the Court found 4 any assurance that its provisions ensuring the right to vote would continue in the Decree s absence. B. The voting-rights advocates moved to extend the Decree after many months of ultimately futile attempts to persuade the Secretary to agree cooperatively to continue the Decree s protections. While the voting-rights advocates anticipated the June 30 deadline and thus began discussion and work on their extension motion as early as January through March 2013, settlement discussions raised the possibility that the issue could be resolved. The voting-rights advocates worked diligently to persuade the Secretary to cooperatively and timely agree to extend the Decree, but those efforts proved ultimately futile. After it became clear on Friday, June 7, 2013 that the Secretary would not cooperate, the voting-rights advocates moved, on June 10, 2013, to extend the Decree. 5 The court set an expedited briefing and hearing schedule. 6 Litigating the Decree-extension motion involved considerable work. It required not only researching law and drafting the motion and reply, but also fully reviewing the original and supplemental claims and procedural history of the seven-year-old case (as well as the complex Ohio Revised Code provisions that spawned the original litigation), the voluminous record evidence, the Decree s purposes, the history of negotiations, and the trajectory of post-decree litigation (including the Defendants unsuccessful efforts in 2012 to abandon their commitments and vacate the Decree a 3 Ord. at (Doc. #383). 4 See id. at 19 (Doc. # 383); Pls. Reply Supp. Mot. Ext. Consent Decree at 11 (Doc. # 373). 5 Ord. at 3 4 (Doc. # 383); Pls. Mot. Ext at n.1 (caption page) (Doc. #362). 6 Ord. at 1. 3

10 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 10 of 30 PAGEID #: year before it was set to expire). The reasonable hours section below details the work by the voting-rights advocates attorneys. In the course of litigating the extension motion, the voting-rights advocates compiled, organized, and cited to extensive evidence in the record and gathered additional evidence showing that the Decree s dissolution would thwart the Decree s purposes. 7 The evidence included declarations from NEOCH voter coordinator Brian Davis and Ohio Democratic Party counsel Don McTigue. It also included a declaration from former Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner the named defendant at the time the Decree was entered into testifying to the parties intent and expectations when entering into the Decree. Shortly before the hearing, the voting-rights advocates also learned of changes to federal ID requirements for obtaining social-security cards, and supplemented their evidence with a declaration from Brian Davis reflecting those changes. 8 The court cited to these pieces of evidence in its opinion granting the extension. 9 Defendants ardently contested the voting-rights advocates motion, 10 requiring substantial additional work. On July 12, 2013, the Court held a hearing and oral argument, for which counsel intensively prepared. The Court ultimately agreed with the voting-rights advocates, extending the Decree until December 31, See, e.g., Pls. Mot. Ext at 4 5 & nn , & nn (Doc. #362). 8 See Not. Filing Exh. Supp. Mot. Extend & Exs. 1 3 (Doc #378, 378-1, 378-2, 378-3, 378-4). 9 Ord. at 5 6, 8 (Doc. # 383). 10 See generally Def. Opp. Consent-Decree Extension (Doc. # 371). 11 Ord. at 21 (Doc. # 383). 4

11 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 11 of 30 PAGEID #: C. The voting-rights advocates request attorneys fees based on their counsel s rates and hours invested. Based on their total hours worked multiplied by their respective requested rates, the votingrights advocates counsel s fees, broken down by attorney, are as follows: Attorney/Timekeeper Requested rate Total hours Total fee requested Subodh Chandra 12 $ $32, Sandhya Gupta 13 $ $62, Suzanne Zaranko $ $1, (senior paralegal) 14 Donald J. McTigue 15 $ $18, J. Corey Colombo 16 $ $ Caroline Gentry 17 $ $4, Daniel Miller 18 $ $ Total $119, Decl. of Subodh Chandra 10 and Chandra Law Invoice at 17, attached as Exs. 1 and 1B. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Decl. of Donald J. McTigue 3 and attached McTigue & McGinnis Billing, attached as Ex Id. 17 Decl. of Caroline Gentry 10 and Porter Wright Spreadsheet, attached as Exs. 3 and 3A. 18 Id. 5

12 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 12 of 30 PAGEID #: III. Law and Argument A. The voting-rights advocates are prevailing parties entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) because they obtained an extension of the Consent Decree through December The federal civil-rights fee-shifting statute provides for attorneys fees awards and costs to plaintiffs who prevail in civil-rights suits. 19 As courts have repeatedly recognized, awards of attorney fees are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain compliance with the civil rights laws. 20 [I]n the absence of special circumstances a district court not merely may but must award fees to the prevailing plaintiff. 21 Because the voting-rights advocates have prevailed in their claims and there are no special circumstances that would render an award unjust in this case, they are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs. 1. The voting-rights advocates are prevailing parties. NEOCH, CCH, and ODP are prevailing parties in this litigation. For attorneys fees purposes, plaintiffs are prevailing plaintiffs if they have obtained actual relief, such as an enforceable judgment or a consent decree, that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties, and directly benefits the plaintiff[s] at the time of the judgment. 22 The voting-rights advocates here moved to extend the April 19, 2010 Decree to effectuate the Decree s purposes namely, to protect the right to franchise of voters, including indigent and U.S.C. 1988(b) (providing for reasonable attorney s fee for prevailing parties in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983). 20 Price v. Pelka, 690 F.2d 98, (6 th Cir. 1982); see also H.R.Rep. No , p. 1 (1976) ( The purpose of 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances. ); Buffington v. Baltimore Cty., 913 F.2d 113, 129 (4 th Cir. 1990). 21 Morscott, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 936 F.2d 271, 272 (6 th Cir. 1991) (quoting Indep t Fed n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968))). 22 NEOCH v. Brunner, 652 F. Supp. 2d 871, 881 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, , (1992) and Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605, (2001)). See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (plaintiffs prevail if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit ); DiLaura v. Twp. of Ann Arbor, 471 F.3d 666, 670 (6 th Cir. 2006). 6

13 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 13 of 30 PAGEID #: homeless voters, who lacked the particular forms of identification that Ohio law otherwise required, and to ensure that legitimate voters provisional ballots are counted. This Court agreed with them. The Decree, once set to expire on June 30, 2013, has been extended until December 31, The voting-rights advocates have thus obtained actual relief that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties and have directly benefited from that relief. They qualify as prevailing parties entitled to a fee award. 2. No special circumstances render an award of fees and costs unjust. Defendants opposing fees have the burden to establish the existence of special circumstances that would render an award unjust. A defendant must make a strong showing to justify denial of section 1988 fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 24 Courts have rejected defenses of special circumstances based on the fact that an award would fall on the taxpayers, 25 that defendants were merely performing their duty by enforcing the statute controlling, 26 that the law was uncertain, 27 or that a defendant acted in good faith. 28 No special circumstances exist in this case that would render an award unjust. The voting-rights advocates are entitled to a complete recovery. B. The voting-rights advocates have properly computed the fee award to which they are entitled. A reasonable attorneys fee is one that, while not produc[ing] windfalls to attorneys, is adequate to attract competent counsel. 29 Prevailing parties counsel should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, for all time reasonably expended on a 23 Ord. at 21 (Doc. # 383). 24 Martin v Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1150 (11 th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted). 25 Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637 (5 th Cir. 1979). 26 Id. 27 Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 635 (6 th Cir. 1979). 28 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978). 29 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893, 897 (1984) (quoting S. Rep. No , p. 6 (1976)). 7

14 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 14 of 30 PAGEID #: matter. 30 As the Supreme Court has held, Congress intended that the amount of fees awarded... be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation... and not be reduced because the rights involved may be non-pecuniary in nature. 31 The calculation of a reasonable fee begins with the lodestar figure, calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. 32 Where, as here, a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee The voting-rights advocates counsel expended a reasonable number of hours and exercised appropriate billing judgment. Counsel s invested hours were reasonable. Documentation supporting a fee petition should be sufficiently detailed and probative to enable the court to determine that the attorney actually and reasonably expended the hours to prosecute the litigation. 34 Attorneys, further, must make a good faith effort to exclude hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. 35 The sheer number of hours, however, does not establish excessiveness; as one court held when rejecting a defendant s insistence that counsel should have been able to complete the work in fewer hours: This argument seems to suggest that great attorneys do not have work hard. In the 30 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.4 (1983) (quoting S.Rep. No (1976)). 31 Id. 32 Id. at 433; Imwalle v. Reliance Medical Products, Inc., 515 F.3d 531, (6th Cir. 2008). 33 Hensley, 461 U.S. at Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 553 (citing United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v. G&M Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., 732 F.2d 495, 502 n.2 (6 th Cir. 1984)). 35 Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Brunner, No. 2:06-cv-896, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *17 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2010) (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 661 (7 th Cir. 2007)). 8

15 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 15 of 30 PAGEID #: Court s experience, the exact opposite is true. Most great attorneys realize that to achieve a goal, much hard work and toil is necessary, especially when entering unchartered territory. 36 The Sixth Circuit, moreover, has held that in determining whether counsel s hours are reasonable, the question a court must ask is not whether. in hindsight the time expenditure was strictly necessary to obtain the relief achieved. The standard is whether a reasonable attorney would have believed the work to be reasonably expended in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was performed. 37 Counsel have met these standards here. a. Counsel kept detailed time records. Heeding Sixth Circuit precedent, Chandra, Gentry, and McTigue have all provided, for their respective firms, 38 detailed, itemized billing records that specify, for each entry, the date that the time was billed, the individual who billed the time, the fractional hours billed, and the specific task completed. 39 As the attorneys attest, 40 the records, further, have been maintained 36 Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Ath. Ass n, Case No. 1:98-cv-479, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25640, at *48 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2008). 37 Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6 th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep t of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). See also Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 723 (6 th Cir. 2005) ( Parties cannot be charged with predicting which legal argument will carry the day and only be compensated for the work needed for that winning one. ); Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9 th Cir. 2008) ( By and large, the court should defer to the winning lawyer s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case; after all, he won, and might not have, had he been more of a slacker. ). 38 See Chandra Decl. 10 and Chandra Law Invoice (Exs. 1 and 1B); Gentry Decl. 9, 13 & Porter Wright Fees Spreadsheet (Exs. 3 and 3A); McTigue Decl. 3 and attached McTigue & McGinnis Billing (Ex. 2). 39 Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 553; see also ABC v. Brunner, Case No. 1:04-cv-750, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *16 17 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008) (finding documentation of hours to be detailed, specific, and adequate to allow the Court to accurately determine which hours were reasonably expended on the litigation where the entries appear to be kept contemporaneously with the work and detail the activity performed and the general nature of the task and [m]ost of the time entries provide adequate descriptions of work performed ). 40 See Chandra Decl. 10; Gentry Decl. 7; McTigue Decl. 3. 9

16 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 16 of 30 PAGEID #: contemporaneously with the completion of the work and indicate the general nature of the tasks performed. 41 While counsel have sometimes included more than one task in a particular day, all these tasks related either to research and drafting the motion or the reply, assessing or obtaining evidence to support the motion, or conferring with other counsel about strategy or analysis. These tasks are so interrelated and their objective so common that combining them into a single day is practical and does not detract from their reasonableness. 42 Counsel spent hours as follows: b. The hours counsel spent allocated efficiently between attorneys reflect the complexity of the issues and case history. Attorney/Timekeeper Main-case hours Fee-litigation hours 43 Total Chandra Gupta Zaranko (senior paralegal) McTigue Colombo Gentry Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 554. See also Anderson v. Wilson, 357 F. Supp. 2d 991, 999 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (holding that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden to provide sufficiently detailed billing records where counsel provided the court with itemized statements describing the subject matter, the attorney, the time allotment, and the charge for all work done on Plaintiffs case ). 42 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 n.12 (1983) (counsel is not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended ); Smith v. District of Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D.D.C. 2006) ( [I]t is essential for the trial Court to be practical and realistic about how lawyers actually operate in their day-to-day practice [I]f they have to document in great detail every quarter hour or half hour of how they spend their time on civil rights cases, two undesirable results will follow: their fee petitions will be higher, and the lawyers will simply waste precious time doing menial clerical tasks. ). 43 The voting-rights advocates will submit a supplemental fee request seeking additional fees for their work litigating this fee motion. Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1979). 10

17 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 17 of 30 PAGEID #: Miller Total While sizable, the total hours spent by counsel were reasonably expended. As mentioned, moving to extend the decree required fully reviewing and analyzing the original and supplemental claims in the seven-year-old case (as well as the complex Ohio Revised Code provisions that spawned the original litigation), the voluminous record evidence, Decree s purposes, and the trajectory of post-decree litigation (including the import of Defendants efforts in 2012 to vacate the Decree a year before it was set to expire). The question of which legal standard to apply for modification of a consent decree, moreover, was not straightforward as the Court itself observed, the cases seem to present a conflict as to the appropriate standard. 44 The Secretary s opposition to the extension and the existence of adverse precedent in the form of Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Board of Education 45 further required thought, analysis, and strategizing, to effectively distinguish the case all under time pressure brought on by the expiration s looming date. (As the Court is aware, the voting-rights advocates had only four days to reply to Defendants opposition to the motion.) Particularly in light of the complexity of the issues and length of the underlying litigation, the number of hours counsel spent was reasonable. The hours, moreover, were not duplicative. Although several attorneys represented the voting-rights advocates, as this Court has previously held, the [u]se of one or more lawyers is a common practice, primarily because it often results in a more efficient distribution of work Ord. at 8 (Doc. # 383). 45 Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Elec., 979 F.2d 1141 (6 th Cir. 1992). 46 Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Brunner, No. 2:06-cv-896, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *16 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2010) (quoting Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 661 (7 th Cir. 2007)); 11

18 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 18 of 30 PAGEID #: Distributing work among multiple attorneys allows more experienced, accomplished, and expensive attorneys to handle more complicated matters and less experienced, accomplished, and expensive counsel to handle less complicated ones. 47 In this case, each lawyer undertook different tasks: Gupta. Gupta s work involved, for example, analyzing the original and supplemental complaints and the current and prior versions of the challenged statute, reviewing the voluminous record evidence regarding the counties disparate application of the provisional-ballot laws, reviewing the consent decree and harmonizing certain provisions with later rulings, reviewing the various 2012 litigation documents in both the NEOCH and the SEIU matters, coordinating with the client and others for declarations, and reviewing other new evidence, including deposition testimony of numerous witnesses. It also involved researching the law, drafting and editing the motion (and later, after analyzing the Defendants opposition brief and doing additional research, the reply). Once briefing was complete, additional work went into hearing preparation by reviewing and summarizing additional cases, including on the termination standard, and preparing a comprehensive outline with potential questions from the court. 48 Chandra. Chandra attempted negotiations with the Secretary through the mediation process in an effort to avoid the need to file a motion to extend the consent decree; supervised and provided direction and strategy during the research and brief-writing See also Sigley v. Kuhn, No / , 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1465, at *22 (6 th Cir. Jan. 31, 2000) (citing Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229, 252 (6 th Cir. 1998)). 47 Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elec., No. 1:10-cv-820, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * 65 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 30, 2013) (citing Gautreaux, 491 F.3d at 661). 48 See Chandra Decl. 10(a) (Ex. 1); see generally Chandra Law Invoice at 1 15 (Ex. 1B). 12

19 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 19 of 30 PAGEID #: process, coordinated with attorney McTigue regarding the gathering of potential evidence including vital testimony from Secretary Brunner regarding the intent surrounding the Decree, coordinated with other co-counsel, and drafted portions of, edited, and revised the motion and reply. Chandra also prepared for and argued our clients position in the hearing. 49 McTigue and Colombo. McTigue, whose practice focus is election law, consulted on strategy and various conceptual and factual matters; reviewed drafts; provided, with Colombo, research into the Ohio General Assembly s legislative enactments; and coordinated with Brunner on the drafting, editing, and receipt of her declaration. 50 Gentry and Miller. Gentry provided insight as trial counsel into earlier stages of the case, and she and Miller reviewed drafts. 51 c. Counsel removed hours in the exercise of billing judgment. Finally, Chandra, Gentry, and McTigue have each testified that they reviewed the billing records. Gentry and Chandra removed hours in the exercise of billing judgment. 52 McTigue, who had voluntarily chosen not to submit fee requests in connection with earlier motions in this case, including for time spent negotiating the Consent Decree, ensured that there was no duplication. 53 In some cases, attorneys did not record time for conferring with co-counsel and voluntarily discounted those hours, 54 even though, as Judge Dlott recently indicated, that time is compensable Chandra Decl. at 10(b) (Ex. 1); see generally Chandra Law Invoice at 1 15 (Ex. 1B). 50 See generally McTigue Decl. 3 and attached McTigue & McGinnis Billing (Ex. 2). 51 See generally Porter Wright Spreadsheet (Ex. 3A). 52 Chandra Decl. at 10, 11 (Ex. 1); Gentry Decl. 9 (Ex. 3). 53 McTigue Decl. at 4, 7 (Ex. 2). 54 See, e.g., Chandra Law Invoice at 6, 15 (Ex. 1B) (on 4/16/13, for example, Chandra noted communicating with S. Gupta, but S. Gupta did not bill; on 8/5/13, Gupta did not bill for reviewing the court s opinion and communicating with Chandra). See generally Chandra Decl. 11 (Ex. 1) (noting that the firm had eliminated or not petitioned for many hours). 13

20 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 20 of 30 PAGEID #: d. The voting-rights advocates achieved an excellent result and thus should receive a fully compensatory fee. The voting-rights advocates were fully successful in obtaining an extension and thus should receive a fully compensatory fee. 56 Although Defendants may claim that the voting-rights advocates did not achieve full success because the suggested two-election-cycle extension wound up being oneelection cycle, this difference does not make the time invested to achieve an extension unreasonable. Nor does it merit any reduction in fees. In Hunter, Judge Dlott addressed a similar argument. There, the plaintiffs had sought an order enjoining the defendants from rejecting all wrong-precinct provisional ballots, regardless of location (about 850 ballots), but the court concluded that only a portion should be counted, those in the wrong precinct but also in the correct location (about 270 ballots). 57 In determining attorneys fees, however, the court held that this difference did not mean that plaintiffs had achieved only partial success: The fact that Plaintiffs did not obtain precisely the result that they sought does not mean that they did not succeed. Plaintiffs were altogether successful in vindicating the equal protection rights of Hamilton County provisional voters in the 2010 election. 58 In the same way, the voting-rights advocates here were altogether successful in their objective to extend the Decree. 55 Hunter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * 65 ( [I]t is not the Court's job to second-guess counsel s judgment when it comes to the necessity of intra-counsel meetings and communications: There is no hard-and-fast rule as to how many lawyers can be at a meeting or how many hours lawyers can spend discussing a project. ). 56 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). 57 Hunter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * Id. 14

21 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 21 of 30 PAGEID #: Each hourly rate is reasonable. Just as counsel s hours were reasonably expended, their rates are also reasonable. [R]easonable fees under 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. 59 A rate is deemed reasonable if it is in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. 60 As this Court previously noted, the Court has the authority to consider a party s submissions, awards in analogous cases, and its own knowledge and experience from handling similar requests for fees. 61 As the Sixth Circuit has held, evidence supporting an applicant s rates may also include testimony from other practitioners 62 and, [w]here an attorney requesting fees has well-defined billing rates, normal billing rates, [which] usually provide an efficient and fair short cut for determining the market rate. 63 Counsel here presented this evidence. a. Counsel s rates are consistent with this Court s prior awards and those provided in Hunter. As the table below shows, the rates requested by attorneys Chandra and Gentry are consistent with what this Court has previously awarded adjusted only slightly for work performed 59 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). 60 Id. 61 Northeast Coalition for the Homeless v. Brunner, No. 2:06cv896, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *7 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2010) (citations omitted). See also Harmon v. McGinnis, Inc., 263 Fed. Appx. 465, 468 (6 th Cir. 2008) ( courts are permitted to, and indeed should, consider prior fee awards in determining the proper attorney s fee rate ) (citing Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91 n.5 (1989)); B&G Mining, Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 522 F.3d 657, 664 (6 th Cir. 2008) (rates from prior cases can provide inferential evidence of market rate). 62 Geier v. Sundquist, 373 F.2d 784, (6 th Cir. 2004). 63 Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (6 th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Kelley v. Metro. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 773 F.2d 677, 683 (6 th Cir. 1985) (normal billing rate is key focal point in award determinations). 15

22 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 22 of 30 PAGEID #: years later, in Most of the attorneys rates are also consistent with the rates Judge Dlott in Hunter v. Hamilton Cty Board of Elections recently awarded them and others. 64 Attorney/ Timekeeper Requested hourly rate (2013) Hunter award in 2013 for work NEOCH award in 2010 for work (aff d, 6 th Cir.) 65 NEOCH award in 2009 for work 66 Chandra $435 $410 $400 $ Gentry $350 $330 $280 and $290 $ Miller $275 $ McTigue $550 $400 Did not seek - 33 fees for services Colombo $335 $ Gupta $ Years out of law school (in 2013) Zaranko (senior paralegal) $ b. Counsel s rates are consistent with counsel s experience and credentials, rates awarded in other cases, their own standard billing rates, and rates of comparably experienced civil-rights practitioners. Counsel have presented additional evidence to show that their requested rates are the prevailing market rates in the community, that is, that they are in line with those prevailing in the 64 Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elec., No. 1:10-cv-820, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 30, 2013). 65 See Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Brunner, Case No cv-00896, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *21 22 (S.D. Ohio, Nov. 30, 2010). 66 Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Brunner, 652 F. Supp.2d 871, 885 (S.D. Ohio, July 28, 2009); 1/20/09 Decl. of Caroline Gentry 3 (Doc. No. 177) (testifying to $280/hr rate). 16

23 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 23 of 30 PAGEID #: community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. 67 i. The Chandra Law Firm, LLC Subodh Chandra - $435. Chandra is the founder and managing partner of the Chandra Law Firm, LLC. This Court previously noted Chandra s substantial experience in litigating electionlaw cases. 68 As laid out in his declaration, he has extensive experience both prosecuting and defending civil-rights cases, including as the City of Cleveland s law director, where he managed an 85-lawyer department. He is also a former federal prosecutor. Chandra graduated in 1994 from Yale Law School, where he was executive editor of the Yale Law & Policy Review. 69 Chandra s rate, like Gentry s described below, is consistent not only with Hunter and this court s prior orders, but also with Judge Dlott s award in a False Claims Act case of $425/hr and $450/hr, respectively, for attorneys admitted in 1992 and As a 1994 graduate, Chandra s requested hourly rate of $435/hr falls exactly between these two. The requested rate, furthermore, corresponds to counsel s standard billing rates, which are an efficient and fair short cut for determining the market rate. 71 Chandra s, Gupta s, and senior 67 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). 68 See Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Brunner, Case No cv-00896, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *21-22 (S.D. Ohio, Nov. 30, 2010), aff d, Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted, 695 F.3d 563, 577 (6 th Cir. 2012); NEOCH v. Brunner, 652 F. Supp.2d 871, 885 (S.D. Ohio, July 28, 2009). 69 Chandra Decl. 1-8 (Ex. 1), Chandra Law Bios, attached as Ex. 1A. 70 See Hunter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * 51 (citing U.S. ex rel. Ellison v. Visiting Physicians Ass'n, P.C., No. 1:04-cv-220, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85160, 2010 WL (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2010)). See also ABC v. Brunner, Case No. 1:04-cv-750, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *36 37 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008) (for pre-2007 work done in First-Amendment challenge to polling-location restrictions, court applied prevailing rates in Cincinnati to out-of-town counsel, including $400 for attorney with 20 years of experience and $275 to attorney with seven years of experience). 71 Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (6 th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Kelley v. Metro. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 773 F.2d 677, 683 (6 th Cir. 1985) (normal billing rate is key focal point in award determinations). 17

24 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 24 of 30 PAGEID #: paralegal Zaranko s rates are their standard rates, and fee-paying clients have paid these standard rates in Sandhya Gupta - $300. Gupta is of counsel at the Chandra Law Firm, LLC. She graduated in 2004 from Columbia Law School, where she was an Articles Editor on the Columbia Law Review. In , she clerked for the Hon. James S. Gwin, U.S. District Court Judge for the Northern District of Ohio. Her civil-rights experience includes working for the New York City-based publicinterest law firm Neufeld, Scheck & Brustin (formerly Cochran Neufeld & Scheck). She previously practiced with Arnold & Porter LLP s New York office, where her time was billed at over $300/hour. 73 Gupta s rate of $300/hr, while not previously awarded, is consistent with the 2012 Rubin Rate of $ that Judge Dlott cited in Hunter for attorneys admitted to practice for eight years. 74 And it is consistent with a N.D.Ohio-court s $300/hr award in a 2010 case to an attorney admitted to practice for eight years. 75 The requested rate, moreover, is consistent with that of other attorneys of similar experience and credentials in Columbus and Cleveland who have testified to the reasonableness of Gupta s rate. These attorneys include Edward Forman of Marshall & Morrow LLC in Columbus ($300/hr, 2003 graduate of Ohio State Moritz College of Law), 76 Jeffrey Vardaro of the Gittes Law Firm in Columbus ($275/hr, 2005 graduate of Harvard Law School), 77 David Mills of the Mills Law Office 72 See Chandra Decl (Ex. 1); Chandra Law Bios (Ex. 1A). 73 See id Hunter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * See Van Horn v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42357, 2010 WL , at *14 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2010). 76 Decl. of Edward R. Forman 1 6, attached as Ex Decl. of Jeffrey Vardaro 1 9, attached as Ex

25 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 25 of 30 PAGEID #: in Cleveland ($330/hr, 2002 graduate of University of Michigan Law School), 78 and Aparesh Paul of Levin & Associates Co., LPA in Cleveland ($300/hr, 2002 graduate of Case Western Reserve University Law School). 79 Suzanne Zaranko - $120. Chandra Law senior paralegal Zaranko s requested rate of $120/hr is in line with the $131/hr paralegal rate Judge Dlott awarded in 2010 in a False-Claims-Act case. 80 Before joining Chandra Law in 2011, Zaranko was a paralegal for fifteen years at various firms. 81 ii. Porter Wright Miller & Arthur LLP Caroline Gentry - $350. Gentry is a partner in the Cincinnati office of Porter Wright Miller and Arthur LLP ( Porter Wright ). She has been recognized as a Rising Star and a Super Lawyer by Ohio Super Lawyers. She graduated in 1995 from Yale Law School and clerked for two years for U.S. District Court Judge Walter Herbert Rice. 82 Daniel Miller - $275. Miller is a senior associate at Porter Wright and has been recognized as a Rising Star by Ohio Super Lawyers. He graduated in 2006 from Capital University Law School and then clerked for U.S. District Judge John D. Holschuh. Gentry s requested rate, like Chandra s, is consistent not only with Hunter and this Court s prior orders, but also with Judge Dlott s award in a False Claims Act case of $425/hr and $450/hr, respectively, for attorneys admitted in 1992 and Second Decl. of David E. Mills 1 5, attached as Ex. 6; First Decl. of David E. Mills 2 8, attached as Ex Decl. of Aparesh Paul 1 7, attached as Ex See U.S. ex rel. Ellison v. Visiting Physicians Ass'n, P.C., No. 1:04-cv-220, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *8 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2010). 81 See Chandra Decl. 9a (Ex. 1). 82 Gentry Decl. 12 (Ex. 3). 83 See Hunter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * 51 (citing U.S. ex rel. Ellison, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *51-52). 19

26 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 26 of 30 PAGEID #: Miller s rate, as mentioned above, is only a slight increase from that requested and awarded in Hunter for work performed in Gentry has also testified that the requested rates for herself and for Miller are their standard rates in These rates, again, are an efficient and fair short cut for determining the market rate. 86 iii. McTigue & McGinnis LLC Donald J. McTigue - $550. McTigue is the founding partner of McTigue & McGinnis LLC. A 1979 law graduate of Case Western Reserve University, he has 33 years of experience both in the private and public sectors nearly 30 of which have been devoted almost exclusively to election law, including as Chief Elections Counsel for the Ohio Secretary of State. 87 While McTigue s requested rate of $550/hr in this case exceeds his previously awarded rate of $400/hr, that rate far understates the market rate for an attorney with his level of experience and specialization. For example, McTigue requested and was awarded the same rate for work in in Hunter as he was in Project Vote v. Blackwell for work performed 2 5 years earlier in His requested rate did not increase despite the span of five years. Courts in this district have, moreover, awarded attorneys of comparable experience in comparably complex cases much higher rates. In 2010, Judge Dlott awarded an attorney with False- Claims-Act expertise a 1983 law graduate $500/hr, and in 2009, Judge Beckwith awarded 84 See Hunter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * See Gentry Decl. 12 (Ex. 3). 86 Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (6 th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Kelley v. Metro. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 773 F.2d 677, 683 (6 th Cir. 1985) (normal billing rate is key focal point in award determinations). 87 McTigue Decl. 2, 5, and attached resume (Ex. 2). 88 See Project Vote v. Blackwell, No. 1:06-CV-1628, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34571, at *45 46 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2009). 20

27 Case: 2:06-cv ALM-TPK Doc #: 388 Filed: 10/21/13 Page: 27 of 30 PAGEID #: experienced partners $497 in an ERISA case. 89 Given what S.D.-Ohio courts have recently awarded, then, in 2013, a rate of $550 for an experienced attorney such as McTigue is reasonable. Corey Colombo - $360. Colombo is an attorney at McTigue & McGinnis LLC whose work focuses on election law. He is a 2000 law graduate, magna cum laude, of Capital University School of Law, where he was on the Law Review. 90 While Colombo s requested rate, like McTigue s, exceeds his previously awarded rate, the requested rate is reasonable for the same reasons McTigue s is reasonable. The Hunter court, assessing work, awarded $315 and $335 to attorneys of similar years of experience. 91 Based on rates awarded to these comparably experienced attorneys, Colombo s rate is reasonable. C. The voting-rights advocates are entitled to recover the expenses they reasonably incurred in prosecuting this lawsuit. The voting-rights advocates are entitled to reasonable expenses. Reasonable attorneys fees recoverable under the fee-shifting statutes include reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services. 92 Items such as photocopying, travel, telephone, and postage costs, as well as filing and docket fees, have been expressly held to be compensable under the fee-shifting statutes. 93 Electronic 89 See Hunter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *51 52 (citing U.S. ex rel. Ellison v. Visiting Physicians Ass'n, P.C., No. 1:04-cv-220, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85160, 2010 WL (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2010), and West v. AK Steel Corp. Ret. Acc. Pension Plan, 657 F. Supp. 2d 914, 934 (S.D. Ohio 2009)). 90 McTigue Decl. 5 and attached resume (Ex. 2). 91 Hunter, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at * Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6 th Cir. 1979); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) ( costs other than attorneys fees should be allowed to the prevailing party ); Brooks v. Georgia State Bd. of Elec., 997 F.2d 857, 861 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1993) ( The fee statutes provide for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred as well as the award of attorney s fees ); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 559 (10 th Cir. 1983) ( [i]tems that are normally itemized and billed in addition to the hourly rate should be included in fee allowances in civil rights cases if reasonable in amount ); Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, (8 th Cir. 1996) ( reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by attorneys [ ] should have been included as part of the reasonable attorney s fees awarded ). 93 See, e.g., Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639 ( Reasonable photocopying, paralegal expenses, and travel and telephone costs are thus recoverable pursuant to the statutory authority of ); Project Vote v. 21