PRESENT Mohammad Azam Khan, C.J Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, J. Civil appeal No. 1 of 2014 (Filed on )

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1 1 SUPREME COURT OF AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR [Appellate Jurisdiction] PRESENT Mohammad Azam Khan, C.J Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, J. Civil appeal No. 1 of 2014 (Filed on ) 1. Haider Ali s/o Mubashar sarfraz r/o Plot No. 570/1, Sector B-5, Rubeena Mubashar Hospital Mirpur. 2. Muhammad Bilal s/o Mubashar Sarfaraz, r/o Plot No. 570/1, Sector B-5, Rubeena Mubashar Hospital Mirpur. VERSUS.. APPELLANTS 1. Qurat-ul-Ain Latif d/o Muhammad Latif, r/o House No. 404, Sector F/3, Part 1 Mirpur. 2. Muhammad Ali Raza s/o Muhammad Hanif Chaudhry, r/o House No. 145, Sector F/3, Part 11, Mirpur..RESPONDENTS 3. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through its Chief Secretary, having

2 2 his office at New Secretariat Complex, Lower Chatter, Muzafarabad. 4. Health Department of Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through its Secretary Health, Muzaffarabad. 5. Joint Admission Committee, Medical Colleges, Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, through Chairman Joint Admission Committee, Principal, Medical College, Muzaffarabad. 6. Chairman, Scrutiny Committee for admission M.B.B.S, Medical College, Muzaffarabad. 7. Admission, Board of admission of Candidates for M.B.B.S, Medical College, Muzaffarabad. 8. Principal, M.B.B.S in Session , through its Chairman, Secretary Health. 9. Principal, Poonch Medical College, Poonch Rawalakot. 10. Principal, Fatima Jinnah Medical College, Lahore. PROFROMA-RESPONDENTS (On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated in writ petition No.1927 of 2013) FOR THE APPELLANTS: Mr. Sadaqat Hussain Raja and Umar Mehmood Qasoori, Advocates. FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Mr. Abdul Rasheed Abbasi and Sardar Shahid Hamid Khan, Advocates.

3 3 Date of hearing: JUDGMENT: Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, J. The captioned appeal by leave of the Court is addressed against the judgment of the High Court dated whereby while accepting the writ petition filed by respondents No.1 and 2, the seats in medical college occupied by the appellants herein, have been declared vacant and it has been directed that the nomination against these seats shall be made on the basis of merit of candidates prepared for District Mirpur. 2. The gist of facts necessary for disposal of this appeal is that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Nomination Board invited the applications for admission in M.B.B.S on the basis of District wise quota. The contestant candidates applied for and appeared in the entry test against the quota reserved for District Mirpur. Respondents No.1 and 2 were placed at serial Nos. 26 and 29 of the merit list, respectively. The appellants were placed at serial Nos.10 and 16 ahead to the respondents. The appellants were nominated for

4 4 admission in M.B.B.S. Respondents No.1 and 2 challenged the nomination of appellants mainly on the ground that they are class III, State Subjects of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, hence, were not entitled to be nominated against the seats reserved for the Ist Class State Subjects. It has been further alleged that they have obtained domicile certificates of District Mirpur by practicing fraud. They further alleged that one Sana Asghar, placed at serial No. 12 of the merit list is not resident of District Mirpur rather she is residing in Chattala Jhelum whereas Zoom Mumtaz placed at serial No.5 of the merit list is resident of Hafizabad and same like Haseeb Ehsan placed at serial No. 22, is resident of District Bhimber, therefore, they are also not eligible to be nominated against the seats reserved for District Mirpur. 3. The writ petition was contested by respondents No.10 to 14 therein, whereas the other respondents were proceeded ex-parte. The High Court after necessary proceedings while accepting the wit petition filed by respondents No.1 and 2, declared the seats occupied by the appellants as vacant. The High Court also directed for nomination of the candidates

5 5 against the seats reserved for District Mirpur on merit, whereas the writ petition to the extent of other respondents therein was dismissed. The appellants have challenged the legality and correctness of the judgment of High Court dated , through the instant appeal. 4. Mr. Umar Mehmood Qasoori, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants argued the case at some length. After discussion of facts with reference to the documents he submitted that the appellants admittedly and undisputedly are state subjects. Whereas according to the provisions of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 (hereinafter to be referred as Act, 1974) all the State Subjects are equal without any classification or discrimination. The notification relating to preconstitutional era in which classes of state subjects have been created, is directly in conflict with the Constitution, especially, the part dealing with the fundamental rights, hence, is void and has no force or usage. He referred to section 3 of Act, 1974 according to which Islam is the State Religion, thus, all the laws and policies are to be interpreted according to the spirit

6 6 of Islam in which there is no discrimination or distinction among the subjects. He also referred to the provision of section 4 of Act, 1974 relating to the Fundamental Rights and section 31 (5) of Act, 1974, dealing with the legislative powers, particularly that there shall be no law repugnant to the injunctions of Qurran and Sunnah. Thus, the High Court fell in error of law and the facts while handing down the impugned judgment, hence, the same is not maintainable. He further submitted that if for the sake of arguments, according to the definition clause of Act, 1974, notification regarding classes of state subjects is deemed as law, even then according to celebrated principle of law, definition clause has no governing effect upon the other Constitutional provisions. The referred notification has no legal authenticity. He advanced another argument that if for the sake of arguments, the notification prescribing classes of the state subjects is deemed as valid law, then despite that the appellants cannot be discriminated for the simple reason that under the said notification there is no restriction or mention of any preference of any class of state subjects over the others relating to the admission

7 7 in the Educational Institutions. In the said notification only preference is mentioned for the purpose of scholarships, grant of land etc. Thus, according to celebrated principle of law of Interpretation of Statute, the Court cannot add any word in the statute which is not finding place in the Statute. In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance upon the cases reported as Syed Abbas Haider Gilani vs. Azad Kashmir University through Vice Chancellor and 6 others [1996 MLD 1377], Muhammad Ayub vs. Abdul Khaliq [1990 MLD 1293], Talha Sarfaraz vs. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and 16 others [2012 CLC 1861], Justice (Rtd) Ch. Rahim Dad Khan vs. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and 3 others [1991 MLD 930] Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary Muzaffarabad and 3 others [PLD 2000 AJK 1], Nadeem Ahmed Advocate vs. Federation of Pakistan [2013 SCMR 1062], Messrs Chitagong Juti Manufacturing Co. Ltd vs. Province of East Pakistan and another, [PLD 1966 Dacca 117], Amanullah Khan vs. Chief Secretary, Government of N.W.F.P. and 2 others,

8 8 [1995 SCMR 1856], Syed Muhammad Haider Zaidi and others vs. Abdul Hafeez and others [1991 SCMR 1699], Chaudhry Abdul Majeed and another vs. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government through Chief Secretary and 2 others [PLD 2001 AJK 24] and Walton Tobacco Company (Pvt,) Ltd. and others vs. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and others [1993 CLC 66]. He also raised serious objection regarding the judgment of the High Court reported as Syed Abbas Haider Gilani vs. Azad Kashmir University through Vice Chancellor and 6 others [1996 MLD 1377] relating to the state subject and submitted that the same is not according to the true spirit of the Constitution. The High Court fell in error of law while following the ratio decedendi of the referred judgment in the present case. 5. Mr. Sadaqat Hussain Raja Advocate, the learned counsel also adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Umar Mehmood Qasoori, Advocate. 6. Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi, Advocate, the learned counsel representing the respondents seriously opposed the appeal. He submitted that the arguments advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellants are not according to the spirit of law. He

9 9 submitted that the term State Subject is part of the clause of Constitution which refers to the notification prescribing interpretation of the classes of the State Subjects. According to the Constitutional provisions especially section 57, Constitutionality of any provision of the Constitution cannot be called in question, therefore, the whole arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants are neither having any substance nor acceptable. He submitted that according to spirit of the Constitution, the classification is permissible. The only condition is that classification should be rational, reasonable and based upon intelligent reasoning. The notification regarding the classes of state subject has got Constitutional protection under section 51 of Act, 1974, therefore, unless the Constitution is amended, the term State Subject according to the Constitutional provisions, is part of the Constitution. He further submitted that admission in the Professional Colleges or Educational Institutions in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir is based upon quota system. Even, it is not open for all the state subjects of first class who seek admission on equal footing rather classification has also been made on the basis of unit-wise quota.

10 10 The appellants have not challenged the same, thus, even on this score, their appeal is not maintainable. He relied upon the cases reported as Brig (Rtd) F.B. Ali and another vs. The State [PLD 1975 SC 506], I. A Sharwani and others vs. Government of Pakistan through Chief Secretary, Finance Division Islamabad and others [1991 SCMR 1041] Government of Balochistan through Additional Chief Secretary vs. Azizullah Memon and 16 others [PLD 1993 SC 341], Muhammad Shabbir Ahmed Nasir vs. Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and another [1997 SCMR 1026], Dewan Textile Mills Ltd. Vs. Pakistan and others [PLD 1976 Karachi 1368] and Muhammad Bachal Memon vs. Government of Sind through Chief Secretary Department of Food and 2 others, [PLD 1987 Karachi 296]. He further submitted that it is universal phenomena that there is classification among citizens by birth and the citizens by choice all over the world, thus, the impugned judgment is quite in accordance with law and this appeal has no substance and is liable to be dismissed with costs. 7. We have given our earnest thought to the arguments advanced at bar and also examined the

11 11 relevant pleadings of the parties. In the light of arguments, pleadings of the parties, there are two basic legal propositions of vital importance involved in this case. The first is; whether, the question of preference among the classes of the state subjects in the light of the provisions of Act, 1974 can be looked into by the Courts?; and the second is; whether, the preference of superior classes of state subjects over the others is also applicable in the matters of admission in the Educational Institutions? 8. First of all, we have to deal with the important question of preference among the classes of State Subjects. The most heated argument advanced on behalf of the appellants is that according to the provisions of Notification No. I-L/84 dated the 20 th April, 1927, the classes of State Subjects have been created which amount to generate discrimination among the State Subjects and is directly in conflict with the provision of section 4, dealing with the fundamental rights and section 3 of Act, 1974, declaring Islam as State Religion of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. To resolve this legal proposition, we will have to take into consideration the Act, 1974 as one organ to ascertain

12 12 its real spirit in this regard. No clause or part of the Constitution can be interpreted in isolation having disregard of the other relevant provisions or part of the Constitution. Under the provisions of subsection 1 of section 2 of Act, 1974, the term State Subject has been defined as following:- State Subject means a person for the time being residing in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir or Pakistan who is a State Subject as defined in the late Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Notification No. I-L/84, dated the 20 th April, 1927 as amended from time to time; This Constitutional provision refers to the Notification dated 27 th April, It will be useful to reproduce here the Notification dated 20 th April, 1927 which reads as under:- THE STATE SUBJECT DEFINITION NOTIFICTION DATED, THE 20 TH APRIL, No. I-L/84.-The following definition of the term State Subject has been sanctioned by His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur, (vide Private Secretary s letter No.2354, dated, the 31 st January, 1927 to the Revenue Member of Council) and is hereby promulgated for general information:-

13 13 includes:- The term State Subject means and CLASS I.- All persons born and residing within the State before the commencement of the reign of His Highness the late Maharaja Gulab Singh Sahib Bahadur, and also persons who settled therein before the commencement of Samvat year 1942, and have since been permanently residing therein. CLASS II.- All persons other than those belonging to Class I who settled within the State before the close of Samwat Year 1968, and have since permanently resided and acquired immovable property therein. CLASS III.- All persons, other than those belonging to Classes I and II permanently residing within the State, who have acquired under a rayatnama any immovable property therein or who may hereafter acquire such property under an ijazatnama and may execute a rayatnama after ten years continuous residence therein. CLASS IV.- Companies which have been registered as such within the State and which, being companies in which the Government are financially interested or as to the economic benefit to the State or to the financial stability of which the Government are satisfied, have by a special order of His Highness been declared to be State Subject. NOTE I.- In matter of grants of State Scholarships, State lands for agricultural and house building purposes and recruitment to

14 14 State Service, State Subject of Class I should receive preference over other Classes and those of Class II, over class III, subject, however, to the order dated 31 st January 1927, of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur regarding employment of hereditary State Subjects in Government Service. NOTE II.- The descendants of the persons who have secured the Status of any Class of the State Subjects will be entitled to become the State Subjects of the same Class. For example if A is declared a State Subject of Class II his sons and grand-sons will ipso facto acquire the status of the same Class II and not of Class I. NOTE III.- The wife or a widow of a State Subject of any class shall acquire the status of her husband as State Subject of the same class as her husband, so long as she resides in the State and does not leave the State for permanent residence outside the State. NOTE IV.- For the purposes of the interpretation of the term State Subject either with reference to any law for the time being in force or otherwise, the definition given in this Notification as amended up to date shall be read as if such amended definition existed in this Notification as originally issued.

15 15 9. According to celebrated principle of law, interpretation clause in a Statute or Act providing definitions of the terms used in the statute is always incorporated with the purpose for prescribing scope and limits of such terms. Hence, the term State Subject wherever is used in the Act, 1974, will be capable of the meanings assigned to it in the interpretation clause unless expressly provided otherwise. 10. The importance, object and status of a definition clause in a statute has been considered by the apex Court of Pakistan in the case reported as The Punjab Co-Operative Bank Ltd. Vs. The Republic of Pakistan and 128 others, [PLD 1964 SC 616] which speaks that object of definition clause or section in a statute is generally to declare that certain words or expressions used in that statute shall mean. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:- The object of incorporating a definition clause or section in a statute is generally to declare that certain words or expressions used in that statute shall mean. The definition thus is, as a rule, of a declaratory character and normally applies to all cases which come within its ambit whatever might

16 16 have been the position before. No question of retrospective operation arises in such a case, for, it cannot be said that because the object so defined did not fall within the ambit of the definition before its enactment. It must continue to remain unaffected by that definition and its character unchanged. If this be so, then we see no reason why the same principle should not apply also in the case where an object previously covered by a definition is excluded from its scope. Same view has been adopted in another case reported as Kazi Abdul Majid vs. Province of Sindh through Secretary Excise and Taxation, Government of Sind Karachi and another, [PLD 1976 Karachi 600]. This Court has also in the President s Reference No. 3 of 1977, reported as [NLR 1980 SCJ 135], highlighted the importance of definition clause in the following words:- To appreciate the point involved in a subjective way it would be proper to know the importance of a definition clause in a statute. It has repeatedly been laid down by superior Courts in

17 17 Pakistan that definition clause in a statute has the effect of a declaratory provision and governs all cases coming within its ambit. The object of incorporating a definition clause or section in a statute is generally to declare what certain words or expressions used in that statute shall mean. The definition thus is a rule of a declaratory character and normally applies to all cases which come within its ambit whatever might have been the position before. Moreover, definition in an enactment is provided for the purpose of shortening words to be used in the enactment for the purpose of avoiding repetition. It is, therefore, lawful and legitimate to say that the words in the service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir used in Section 49 of the Constitution have the same meaning which are ascribed to these words in the definition clause of the Constitution and no other meaning can be given to the phraseology

18 18 The Act, 1974 has adopted the definition assigned to the term State Subject used in the Notification dated 20 th April, 1927 which has become part of the Constitution. 11. Now the question arises whether according to the construction of the statute, the question of contradiction among the provisions dealing with the subject arises or there is any conflict with the provisions of section 4 dealing with the fundamental rights keeping in mind the definition of the expression State Subject. According to scheme and spirit of the statute, the term State Subject wherever is used in Act, 1974, including section 4 of Act, 1974, it is used in the meanings, sense and scope assigned to it in the interpretation clause which provides classes of State Subjects. Thus, equality of the State Subjects under the provision of Right No. 15, will be considered in the light of the definition assigned to it by the Act, The golden principles of interpretation of statute are that the Courts have to interpret the statute to save it by harmonizing its provisions and avoid destruction of any word or clause as for as possible. If the term State Subject without the

19 19 meanings assigned to it is taken irrespective of classes, its logical conclusion will be destruction of the definition clause, whereas, if this term is taken into consideration in the light of its definition which includes classes of state subjects, then the Constitutional provisions i.e interpretation clause, section 4 and Right No.15 can coexist or can be saved. In our view, according to principle of harmonized interpretation, the term State Subject used in Section 4, Right No.15 of Act, 1974 has the same meanings as assigned to it in the definition provided in the interpretation clause of Act, 1974 which admits the classes of the State Subjects. 13. We have to follow the settled principles of interpretation of statute which are almost summarized in the case reported as Muhammad Ayub vs. Abdul Khaliq [1990 MLD 1293]. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- 31. Before I part with the case, I would like to narrate the general principles of Interpretation stated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a Reference by the President under the defunct Constitution of 1956 PLD 1957 SC 219. The Supreme Court stated the

20 20 general principles of interpretation and said:- (1) The first object of the Court to discover the intention of the author and that such intention is to be gathered from the words used in the statute or document. (2) The second rule is that the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute ought to be derived from a consideration of the whole enactment in order to arrive at a consistent plan. It is wrong to start with some a priori idea of that intention and to try by construction to wedge it into the words of the statute. 3. The third rule is that a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made. 4. The forth rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to

21 21 affect only the other part of the statute to which it may properly apply. 5. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction has always been to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and the people adopting it. 6. Another elementary rule of construction of constitutional instruments is that effect should be given to every part and every word of the constitution. Hence as a general rule, the Courts should avoid a construction which renders any provision meaningless or inoperative and must lean in favour of a construction which will render every word operative rather than one which may make some words idle and nugatory. 7. The next rule in construing a constitutional provision is that it is the duty of the Courts to have recourse to the whole instrument, if necessary, to ascertain the true intent and meaning of any particular provision. The best mode of ascertaining the meaning affixed to any word or sentence

22 22 by a deliberative body is by comparing it with the words and sentences with which it stands connected, and a constitutional provision or a phrase to a constitutional provision must be read in connection with the context. Nosciture a sociis is the rule of construction applied to all written instruments. Therefore, particular phrases of a constitution must be construed with regard to the remainder of the instrument and to the express intent of the constitutional convention in adopting it. 8. If there be any apparent repugnancy between different provisions, the Court should harmonize them if possible. The rule of construction of constitutional law requires that two sections be so construed, if possible, as not to create a repugnancy, but that both be allowed to stand, and that effect be given to each. It would appear that one of the cardinal principles of interpretations is that: the law should be interpreted in such manner that it should rather be saved

23 23 than destroyed. The law including the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner giving effect to all its parts and the presumption should be that no conflict or repugnancy was intended by the framers. In interpreting the word of an Act actual words used in fact throw light about the intention of the lawmakers and the other parts of the statute. In the light of the enunciated principle of law and peculiar facts of this case, the question of inconsistency of the Constitutional provisions does not arise. 14. So for as the other aspect of the case i.e the equality before law is concerned, equality is always among equals and not of different classes. As the Constitution itself admits the classes of the State Subjects, therefore, whenever the question of equality among State Subjects arises, it will be determined in the light of definition of the term State Subject and on the principle of equality among equals. In the case reported as Government of Balochistan through Additional Chief Secretary vs. Azizullah Memon and 16

24 24 others [PLD 1993 SC 341], the concept and scope of equality before law has been discussed in detail. It will be useful to reproduce here the relevant portion of the judgment which has been handed down after survey of a large number of judgments on the subject, which reads as follows:- 5.. In I.A, Sherwani s case 1991 SCMR 1041 after considering the judgments in F.B.Ali s case PLD 1975 SC 506, Abdul Wali Khan s case PLD 1976 SC 57, Aziz Begum s case PLD 1990 SC 899, Shirin Munir and others v. Government of Punjab PLD 1990 SC 295 and several judgments of the Supreme Court of India, the following principles were deduced:- (i) that equal protection of law does not envisage that every citizen is to be treated alike in all circumstances, but it contemplates that persons similarly situated or similarly placed are to be treated alike; (ii) that reasonable classification is permissible but it must be founded on reasonable distinction or reasonable basis; (iii) That different laws can validly be enacted for different sexes,

25 25 persons in different age groups, persons having different financial standings, and persons accused of heinous crimes; (iv) That no standard of universal application to rest reasonableness of a classification can be laid down as what may be reasonable classification in a particular set of circumstances, may be unreasonable in the other set of circumstances; (v) That a law applying to one person or one class of persons may be constitutionally valid if there is sufficient basis or reason for it, but a classification which is arbitrary and is not founded on any rational basis is no classification as to warrant its exclusion from the mischief of Article 25; (vi) that equal protection of law means that all persons equally placed be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed; (vii) that in order to make a classification reasonable, it should be based:-

26 26 (a) on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those who have been left out; (b) that the differentia must have rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by such classification. 15. On this point, we affirm the view taken in the case reported as Syed Abbas Haider Gilani vs. Azad Kashmir University through Vice Chancellor and 6 others [1996 MLD 1377], while rejecting the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard. As it has been observed hereinabove, that classes of State Subjects are admissible under the provisions of Act, 1974 which have got overriding effect and no other Court including this Court can call in question the validity of Act, The prohibition is expressly provided under section 57 of Act, 1974 which reads as follows:- 57. Act to over-ride other laws, etc.-(1) The provision of this Act shall over-ride and have effect notwithstanding the provisions of any law for the time being in force.

27 27 (2) No Court including the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the High Court, shall call into question or permit to be called into question, the validity of this Act or an Act to amend it The next argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that according to Act 1974, Islam is the State Religion and the provisions of Act, 1974 permitting the classes of State Subjects are against the principles of Islam as envisaged in the provision of section 31 of Act, 1974, but this aspect of the Constitutional provision cannot be deeply examined in the light of provision of section 51 of Act, 1974 which gives protection to the enforced laws. When the provision of subsection 5 of section 31 of Act, 1974 is considered in juxtaposition with the provision of this section, conclusion is the same that the provision of Act, 1974 are immuned from such examination. Even, under the provisions of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Shariat Court Act, 1993, the Act, 1974 is excluded from definition of law for exercising the Court s jurisdiction to determine whether any provision of law is repugnant to Qurran and Sunnah or not. Thus, as we

28 28 are under oath to administer justice in the light of the law enforced in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the definition of State Subject which provides classes among the State Subjects so long it remains intact, the validity of this Constitutional provision cannot be examined by this Court. In this state of affairs, it hardly requires any detailed reasons or to take into consideration the arguments advanced relating to this legal proposition and other aspects including whether such classification amounts to discrimination or not. Therefore, in the light of the provisions of Act, 1974 referred to hereinabove, arguments of learned counsel for the appellant are not tenable. 17. The other legal proposition which has been forcefully argued by the learned counsel for the appellants and also in support of which plethora of judgments has been referred, is that in Note 1 of the Notification dated 20 th April, 1927, preference of classes of State Subjects in relation to admission in the Educational Institutions is not applicable. The learned counsel for the appellants focused his argument on the point of interpretation of Note-1 of the Notification I- L/84, which speaks as following:-

29 29 "NOTE I.- In matter of grants of State Scholarships, State lands for agricultural and house building purposes and recruitment to State Service, State Subject of Class I should receive preference over other Classes and those of Class II, over class III, subject, however, to the order dated 31 st January 1927, of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur regarding employment of hereditary State Subjects in Government Service. It is argued that as in this note, which deals with preference of classes of State Subjects, the admission in the Educational Institutions is not included. The preference is provided for grant of State Scholarships, State lands for agriculture and house building purposes and recruitment to State Service. Thus, the word which is not in the statute, cannot be added, supplied or inserted by the Courts. He referred to and relied upon number of judgments on this point. 18. In our opinion, for proper perception of legal spirit, the term Scholarship is of great importance which has not been defined in the concerned statute. Therefore, according to celebrated principle of law, for determining its meanings and scope, ordinary dictionary meanings have to be adopted.

30 30 In the Oxford English Dictionary, A new dictionary on Historical Principles, Volume IX by S- Soldo, at page 211, the word Scholarship has been defined as under:- Scholarship Forms See Scholar. 1. The attainments of a scholar; learning, erudition; esp. proficiency in the Greek and Latin languages and their literature. Also, the collective attainments of scholars; the sphere of polite learning. b. Applied, by unlearned speakers, etc, to educational attainments of a more modest character. C. Literacy education (J) Obs rare. 2. The status or emoluments of a scholar at a school, college, or university. In the Chambers 20 th Century Dictionary, New Edition 1983 by E M Kirkpatrick, page 1158, the word Scholar and Scholarship has been assigned the following meanings:- Scholar Skol er, n. a pupil: a disciple: a student: (in times of less widespread education) one who could read and write, or an educated person: one

31 31 whose learning (formerly esp, in Latin and Greek) is extensive and exact, or whose approach to learning is scrupulous and critical: generally a holder of a scholarship. Adj. Schol arlike like or befitting a scholar. n. scholarliness adj schol arly of, natural to a scholar: having the learning of a scholar. Adv. (Shak) as becomes a scholar. n. schol arship scholarly learning a foundation or grant for the maintenance of a pupil or student: the status and emoluments of such a pupil or accomplished in four moves. In the Webster s New Explorer Encyclopedic Dictionary, Mehriam Webster, the term Scholar and Scholarship has been defined at page 1538 as under:- scholar ska-ler nouin Middle Engilsh scoler, from Old English Schlere & Old French excoler, from Medieval Latin scholaris, from Late Latin, of a school, from Latin schllar school before 12 th Century. 1: one who attends a school or studies under a teacher Pupil 2 a : one who has done advanced study in a special field b: a learned person 3: a holder of a scholarship

32 32 Schol.ar.ly adjective (1638) of characteristic of, or suitable to learned persons: LEARNED, ACADEMIC School.ar.ship noun (circa 1536) 1: a grant-in-aid to a student (as by college or foundation) 2: the character, qualities, activity, or attainments of a scholar: learning 3: a fund of knowledge and learning (drawing on the scholarship of the ancients) In the Chambers 21 st Century Dictionary, Revised Edition by Mairi Robinson and George Davidson, the word scholar and scholarship has been defined at page 1256, which reads as follows:- scholar noun 1 a learned person, especially an academic, 2 a person who studies: a pupil or student. 3 a person receiving a scholarship. 4 during times of less widespread education: a person who could read and write, or a learned person. 5 a person with extensive learning and knowledge, particularly in Greek and Latin or with a scrupulous and critical approach to learning. Scholarliness noun scholarly adj. Anglo Saxon scolere, from French escoler, from Latin scholaris.

33 33 Scholarship noun 1 the achievements or learning of a scholar 2 a sum of money awarded, usually to an outstanding student, for the purposes of further study. 3 the status and emoluments of such a pupil or student. In the New International Webster s Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language, 2004 Edition, the word scholar and scholarship have been defined at page 1126 as under:- Schol.ar (Skol ar) n. 1 A person eminent for learning. 2 the holder of a scholarship. 3 One who learns under a teacher; a pupil. Rhodes scholar A male student selected from a college or university of the United States or of any British dominion or colony to receive one of the scholarships established by Cecil Rhodes for attendance at Oxford University, England.Synonymous: disciple, learner, pupil, savant, student, Historically, the primary sense of a scholar is one who is being schooled: thence the word passes to designate one who is apt in school work, and finally one who is thoroughly schooled, master of what the schools can teach,

34 34 an erudite or accomplished person when used without qualification, the word is generally understood in this sense: as, He is manifestly a scholar, Pupil signifies one under the close personal supervision or instruction of a teacher or tutor. Schol.arch.. Schol.ar.ly.. Schol.ar.ship n. 1 Learning erudition. 2 Maintenance or a stipend for a student awarded by an educational institution also, the position of such a student. In the English Universal of the English Language, PKP TOPPAN, by Henry Cecil Wild, page 1062, the word Scholarship has been defined as under: Scholarship, n. scholarship; 1. Learning, rudition; specif. a(in wider sense) specialized, systematized khowledge, esp. in humane studies, characterized by a high standard of accuracy, by minuteness and thoroughness; b. (in special and narrower sense) classical learning; in particular, minute and thorough knowledge of the classical languages, and a keen sense of the refinements and niceties of their style and idiom. 2. Humane studies in general,

35 35 systematic investigation of historical, linguistic, literary, and textual problems; often specifically distinguished from research in the natural sciences. Science and scholarship. 3. a A foundation for the furtherance of education, consisting of the grant of a recognized status, and an annual payment of money, to a boy at a school, or to an undergraduate at a college or university, made by the governing bodies of these institutions, for his maintenance while pursuing his studies; b yearly grant of money for the same purpose made by a county council or other public body, tenable at a school or university; election to a scholarship is usually made on the results of a competitive examination. In the Chambers Dictionary 10 th Edition, Thumb Index, by Harry Publishers Ltd, Edinbrugh, Printed and bound in Germany by Bercker, the definition of words scholar and scholarship is provided at page 1367 as under:- scholar n. someone whose learning (formerly esp in Latin and Greek) is extensive and exact, or whose approach to learning is scrupulous and

36 36 critical; a pupil a disciple; a student; (in times of less widespread education) someone who could read and write, or an educated person; generally, a holder of a scholarship Schol arship n. scholarly learning; a foundation or grant for the maintenance of a pupil or student; the status and emoluments of such a pupil or student. In another Rabia 21 st Century Practical Dictionary, English to English and Urdu, by M. Zaman and Naveed Akhter, at page 788, the words scholar and scholarship are defined as under:- Scholar (skolar) n. 1. One who learns 2. a pupil 3. a man of letters. Scholarly (skolarlee) adj. characteristic of a scholar. Scholarship (scholarship) n. 1. Learning. 2. Literature. 3 maintenance for the scholar. It appears that from the survey of different dictionaries the term Scholarship has been assigned the first meanings i.e the attainments of scholar, learning qualities, attainments of scholars, sphere of

37 37 polite learning, scholarly learning, attainments of learning of scholar, specialized systematized knowledge in humane studies characterized by high standard of accuracy, attainment of literacy education etc. and in most of the dictionaries, grant for maintenance of pupil or stipend as second meanings. Thus, it is obviously clear that the term scholarship is capable of both the meanings, grant of knowledge, literacy, education and monitory stipend or maintenance. The expression grant of scholarship used in Note.1 of the notification referred to hereinabove thus, is capable of both meanings i.e grant of monitory stipend as well as grant of education, learning, specialized systematized knowledge in humane studies, characterized by high standard of accuracy. The grant of admission in public sector institutions established for professional higher education is also included in the process of grant of knowledge, literacy and attainment of scholarship, as well as it also includes the meanings to grant the maintenance allowance, monitory stipend to pupil for attaining knowledge, learning and scholarship.

38 It appears that the learned counsel for the appellants has kept in mind the meanings of this term only restricted to monitory stipend or grant but we are unable to agree with his opinion in the light of hereinabove reproduced dictionary meanings. In our considered view, the term Scholarship is not only restricted to obtain the monitory stipends or benefits rather this term itself includes meanings of learning, attaining knowledge and the admission in an educational institutions is one of the process of learning. Thus, the argument of learned counsel for the respondents on this point finds support from the meanings assigned to this term. Therefore, it can be safely held that the term scholarship used in Note.1 of Notification No. I-L/84, referred to hereinabove is used in broader sense of the process of learning which includes admission in the Educational Institutions. Therefore, the question of addition and insertion of any word in the statute does not arise. All the case law referred to by counsel for the appellants relating to the term casus omissus has no relevance in this case. The counsel for the appellants in this behalf has referred to the cases reported as Nadeem Ahmed

39 39 Advocate vs. Federation of Pakistan [2013 SCMR 1062], Amanullah Khan vs. Chief Secretary, Government of N.W.F.P and 2 others [1995 SCMR 1856] and Messrs Chittagong Jute Manufacturing Co., Ltd. Vs. Province of East Pakistan and another [PLD 1966 Dacca 117]. 20. Another judgment of the High Court, referred to and relied upon by counsel for the appellants, reported as Talha Sarfaraz vs. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and 16 others [2012 CLC 1861], has been set-aside in appeal by this Court. The case law reported as Syed Muhammad Haider Zaidi and others vs. Abdul Hafeez and others [1991 SCMR 1699] has no nexus with the case in hand. Same is the position of other referred citations, hence, need not to separately discussed. 21 In the light of the above conclusion drawn on vital legal proposition involved in the case, we do not feel any necessity to deliberate on the other ancillary or subsidiary arguments addressed from both sides. In view of above detailed reasons, the appellants have failed to make out any legal ground

40 40 for bringing their case out of purview of the provisions of law dealing with the classes of State Subjects. Therefore, in our considered view, the High Court has rightly interpreted the law on the subject, hence, finding no force in this appeal, the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Muzaffarabad, J U D G E CHIEF JUSTICE