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1 Published By Joaquin & Duncan, L.L.C.; A Law Firm of Federal Sentencing Attorneys May 2016 S e n t e n c i n g P a r t n e r s About Sentencing Partners: Sentencing Partners is published by Joaquin and Duncan, L.L.C., 1240 Souridge Ct. #105, Hurst, Texas 76053; telephone (817) ; facsimile (817) ; sentenceptrs@hotmail.com. Sentencing Partners is published monly and attempts to report e most recent cases at can aid you in effectively representing your clients at sentencing and in keeping you advised of e developments in e United States Sentencing Guidelines. If ere is an issue of particular interest at you would like discussed in Sentencing Partners, please feel free to contact us. About Joaquin & Duncan, LLC: Joaquin and Duncan, L.L.C. is a law firm of federal sentencing attorneys who work on a contract basis wi criminal defense attorneys assisting in pre-plea advisement; review of presentence reports; preparation of objections and motions for downward departure; preparation of motions for bond; preparation of appellate briefs; preparation of 2255 petitions; and assistance in obtaining choice of prison or drug treatment program. Note: Articles and summaries contained herein are based on information obtained rough research using a variety of sources. While every effort is made to insure accuracy, e firm of Joaquin & Duncan, L.L.C. its employees, agents, and associates cannot be held liable for any errors, omissions, or oversights contained herein. Readers are responsible for furer research of any case cited in is publication for which furer information is required. Inquiries are welcome via telephone, facsimile, , or U.S. mail New Quick Facts From Sentencing Commission The Sentencing Commission has published new Quick Facts dealing wi Immigration cases one dealing wi Alien Smuggling Offenses and e oer detailing Illegal Reentry Offenses. There were 71,003 cases reported to e Commission in fiscal year Of ose cases, 19,311 involved immigration offenses. Of ose cases, 11.8% involved alien smuggling and 81.9% involved illegal reentry. Below are highlights from bo publications: Alien Smuggling In fiscal year 2015, more an half of alien smuggling offenders were U.S. citizens (60.0%); Over one-half (56.6%) of alien smuggling offenders had little or no prior criminal history; Almost half (49.5%) of alien smuggling offenses involved e smuggling or transporting of fewer an six persons; Sentences were increased for 11.0% of offenders because one of e persons smuggled was an unaccompanied minor; Most alien smuggling cases did not involve e use of weapons (97.3%); The average sentence leng for alien smuggling offenders was 15 mons; The average sentence and e average guideline minimum for alien smuggling offenses have remained constant over e last five years Illegal Reentry In fiscal year 2015, most illegal reentry offenders were male (96.5%); The majority were Hispanic (98.7%); The average age of ese offenders at sentencing was 36 years; The most common Criminal History Category for ese offenders was Category III (26.2%); Illegal reentry sentences were increased in 69.3% of all cases because of e offender s criminal history pursuant to section 2L1.2; The average sentence leng for illegal reentry offenders was 16 mons, a decrease from 2011, when e average sentence was 19 mons; The average sentence and e average guideline minimum for illegal reentry offenders have decreased over e last five years. The Quick Facts are available at:

2 Case Summaries Sentencing Partners May 2016 Offense Conduct (Chapter 2) United States v. Martinez-Romero 2016 WL (5 Cir. 2016) Florida s kidnapping statute did not constitute crime of violence under 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) The defendant pled guilty to being in e United States illegally after having been deported. The PSR recommended a 16-level enhancement pursuant to 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), based on a prior Florida conviction for attempted kidnapping. The PSR argued at e prior conviction constituted a crime of violence. The district court agreed and imposed a sentence of 46 mons. On appeal, e defendant argued at e prior conviction was not an enumerated offense and at it did not have as an element e use of force. The first question for e Fif Circuit was wheer e Florida attempted kidnapping conviction constituted an enumerated offense of kidnapping. The court s examination involved looking at e generic, contemporary meaning of kidnapping and employing a common sense approach, en analyzing e elements of e statute of conviction raer an e specifics of e defendant s conduct, and looking at only to e particular subdivision of e statute under which e defendant was convicted. Citing United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d 310 (5 Cir. 2007), where e court had analyzed e Tennessee kidnapping statute, e court noted at for purposes of determining wheer a state s kidnapping statute constituted an enumerated offense, e generic, contemporary offense of kidnapping included e following elements: (1) knowing confinement; (2) substantial interference wi e victim s liberty; (3) use of force, reat, or fraud; and (4) a substantial risk of bodily injury. Based on is analysis, e court held at e defendant s prior Florida conviction did not have e element of substantial interference wi e victim s liberty, nor did it require at e confinement or abduction to be achieved by e use of force, reats, or fraud, us it was not an enumerated offense. In addition, e Florida statute could be violated wiout e use of force; erefore, e kidnapping conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The sentence was vacated and remanded. United States v. Henry 2016 WL (6 Cir. 2016) Rifle had sufficient nexus to morphine pills to support 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement; 2K2.1(b)(5) firearms trafficking enhancement did not apply The ATF began investigating e defendant after a tip from an informant ( CI ). The CI, who had a prior felony conviction, approached e defendant regarding buying a 9mm pistol and twenty Percocet pills. The CI and a federal agent went to e defendant s house to complete e transaction. The agent expressed interest in purchasing an AK-47 rifle from e defendant, and told him at ey bo had prior felony convictions. At at meeting, e CI purchased a pistol for $350. Two weeks later, e agent and e CI traveled back to e s residence to

3 3 Sentencing Partners May 2016 purchase morphine pills and a rifle. Ultimately, e agent bought six pills containing morphine for $180 and e rifle for $950. The defendant pled guilty to one count of selling a firearm to a convicted felon, and one count of possession wi intent to distribute and distribution of morphine. The PSR calculated a base offense level of 20, under 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), because e AK-47 was a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine. It applied a four-level increase for trafficking firearms under 2K2.1(b)(5) because e defendant transferred a firearm to e [CI] and one firearm to e undercover [agent] when he had reason to believe at bo individuals were convicted felons and eir possession of e firearms would be illegal. It also enhanced e offense level by four points under 2K2.1(b)(6) because e defendant possessed e rifle in connection wi anoer felony offense possession of morphine. The PSR calculated a sentencing range of 78 to 97 mons. The court varied downward to a sentence of 50 mons. On appeal, e defendant contended at e 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement (e In Connection Wi enhancement) did not apply because e rifle did not facilitate or have e potential to facilitate his drug offense. The Six Circuit disagreed, finding at e facts demonstrated e nexus between e rifle and e morphine pills. The sales of e gun and e drugs were negotiated, at least in part, during e same meeting, and ey occurred contemporaneously. [T]he fact at e sales of guns and drugs are negotiated as separate items does not prevent em from essentially amount[ing] to a single transaction. The defendant also argued at e 2K2.1(b)(5) trafficking enhancement did not apply because he did not sell multiple weapons to one person as e text of Application Note 13(A) contemplates: e enhancement applies to individuals who transfer multiple firearms to a single individual. The court agreed, noting at Application Note 13(A) defines trafficking, in relevant part, as transferr[ing]... two or more firearms to anoer individual. The plain language of e Note indicates at e transferring must be done to anoer individual, which strongly suggested at e transfer of one gun to two different people cannot be aggregated. Furer, is conclusion was also supported by e rule of lenity. Under e rule of lenity, [e]ven if one could conclude at ere were two rational readings of [a] Guideline[s provision], is Court would be bound to choose e less harsh reading. Even assuming [e defendant s] conduct fell wiin a plausible reading of ese provisions, e fact at anoer reasonable reading exists at would subject him to less punishment is grounds for applying e less severe interpretation. Accordingly, e district court erred in applying e 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement. United States v. Jesurum nd 2016 WL (2 Cir. 2016) Enhancement for 250 or more victims was warranted On March 26, 2014, e defendant pled guilty to wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity eft. The offense involved a cell phone cloning fraud where e defendant and his co-defendants fraudulently obtained information from Sprint customers and loaded at information onto oer phones. Charges for calls made on e cloned phones appeared on e customer s phone. The defendant and his coconspirators obtained and used information from tens of ousands of Sprint customers accounts. At sentencing, e district court applied a six-level enhancement pursuant 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) because e offense involved 250 or more victims. On appeal, e defendant

4 4 Sentencing Partners May 2016 argued at because ere was no evidence of any financial harm to Sprint customers whose cell phone identifiers were used, e only victim of e scheme was Sprint itself and e six-level enhancement was erefore inappropriate. The Second Circuit disagreed, noting at e cases relied upon by e defendant were all decided before e definition of victim was expanded by e Sentencing Commission in Here, e evidence demonstrated at more an 250 Sprint customers means of identification were used wiout auority. Pursuant to Application Note 4, victim includes any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or wiout auority. The fact at e customers suffered no financial loss was irrelevant. See also United States v. Harris, 791 F.3d 772 (7 Cir. 2015); United States v. Maxwell, 778 F.3d 719 (8 Cir. 2015). United States v. Scott 2016 WL (5 Cir. 2016) Record insufficient as to wheer defendant knowingly used peer-to-peer software The defendant pled guilty to one count of receiving child pornography and was sentenced to 235 mons. That sentence was vacated after e defendant filed a 28 U.S.C motion alleging, among oer ings, at he pled guilty because his counsel assured him at e district judge had told a mutual friend at he would get hammered if he went to trial, but at e judge would take it easy on him by sentencing him to only five years if he pled guilty. The defendant again pled guilty, is time to e single count of possessing child pornography. The PSR explained at e defendant used LimeWire, a file-sharing program, to download and possess images of child pornography. Furer, e PSR stated at agents were able to download ree illicit videos from e shared file folder on e defendant s computer, and it was confirmed at ose videos had been downloaded from e internet. The PSR applied a five-level enhancement under 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) for [d]istribution [of child pornography] for e receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a ing of value, but not for pecuniary gain. Citing United States v. Groce, 784 F.3d 291 (5 Cir. 2015), e district court adopted e PSR and imposed a sentence of 108 mons. On appeal, e defendant argued at ere was no evidence at he knowingly made child pornography available to oers; us, ere was no support for e 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) enhancement. The Fif Circuit agreed, explaining: we cannot ascertain wheer e district court made e requisite finding at [e defendant] knowingly used LimeWire to download and distribute child pornography wiin e meaning of 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). The only facts mentioned merely established how LimeWire worked and at e defendant used it to download child pornography - but say noing about [his] knowledge. Thus, e district court made no express finding at [e defendant] knowingly used LimeWire to exchange child pornography. Furer, ere was no evidence at e defendant knew at oers could download his files and knowingly let some users download from him... and e district court pointed to no circumstantial evidence supporting a finding at [e defendant] knew he was distributing child pornography in exchange for more of e same. The sentence was vacated and remanded for e district court to determine wheer e Government has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of e evidence at [e defendant] knowingly used LimeWire in e kind of exchange contemplated by 2G2.2(b)(3)(B).

5 5 Sentencing Partners May 2016 United States v. Bernado 2016 WL (9 Cir. 2016) Strapping person inside vehicle dashboard warranted enhancement under 2L1.1(b)(6) While e defendant was waiting in line at e San Ysidro Port of Entry, a dog alerted to his Ford Windstar van. An officer conducted an inspection of e vehicle and found a woman hidden in a compartment behind e dashboard. A heavy-duty cargo strap around e midsection of e woman s body strapped her in and held her up in e compartment. After getting out of e van, e woman appeared unharmed. Upon questioning, she told e officer at she was a citizen of Mexico and at e defendant had agreed to smuggle her into e United States illegally. The defendant pled guilty to bringing an unlawful alien into e United States and aiding and abetting an offense against e United States. The PSR recommended an offense level of 18, under 2L1.1(b)(6), stating at e offense involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of dea or serious bodily injury to anoer person. The district court adopted e PSR, en varied downward and sentenced e defendant to 16 mons. On appeal, e defendant claimed at 2L1.1(b)(6) did not apply because strapping e woman in e van in e manner used did not create a substantial risk of dea or serious bodily injury. The Nin Circuit disagreed, finding at strapping e woman in e van amounted to reckless conduct, as set out in Note 5 of e Application Notes. The court noted at it had affirmed a higher sentence where aliens were transported in overcrowded vehicles, where e aliens lacked seats or seatbelts, where transportation was over a more dangerous route, a dangerous manner of driving, an unsafe vehicle, insufficient ventilation, and a risk of injury from moving mechanical parts. While e dashboard compartment did not raise certain specific dangers (such as e risk of being suffocated or cut), it does not undermine any of e district court s findings regarding e risks of transporting a person in e dashboard of a vehicle. Because e offense conduct here meets e criteria of Note 5, we conclude at e district court did not err in determining at e conduct created a substantial risk of dea or serious harm and erefore did not err in applying e six-level enhancement to [e defendant s] base offense level. United States v. Sotso 2016 WL (5 Cir. 2016) Three-level attempt reduction under 2X1.1(b)(1) was warranted The defendant, a convicted felon, was pulled over for a traffic violation. The defendant told e officer at he was on his way home after seeing his moer. The police officer detected e smell of marijuana and e defendant consented to a search of e car, but no narcotics were located. However, e officer discovered twenty-ree boxes (460 rounds) of 7.62 x 39mm ammunition in e trunk of e car. The defendant admitted at he had been paid by someone named Compadre to purchase e ammunition and at it was to be smuggled into Mexico. The defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. Because e defendant possessed e ammunition in connection wi anoer offense, namely, attempted exportation of ammunition wiout an export license, e PSR applied e cross reference in 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), which resulted in a higher offense level under 2X1.1. The defendant argued at he was entitled to a ree-level attempt reduction under 2X1.1(b)(1), which would make e crossreference inapplicable. The district court adopted e PSR and sentenced e defendant to

6 6 Sentencing Partners May mons. On appeal, e defendant argued at e cross-reference did not apply because ere was no evidence at he had completed or was about to complete all acts required to export e ammunition to Mexico, and if e 2X1.1(b)(1) reduction was applied, e crossreference would not apply. The Fif Circuit agreed at ere was no evidence to support e district court s finding at e defendant was on e verge of delivering e ammunition to Compadre. The PSR did not address e timing of e expected delivery or even wheer any delivery had been arranged. The government concedes at [e defendant] bought e ammunition ree days before he was stopped, and points to no evidence at [he] had arranged to meet wi Compadre on e day of his arrest or even at any arrangements whatsoever had been made for delivering e ammunition. Furer, ere was no evidence in e record as to when e defendant planned to deliver e ammunition, nor any evidence disputing his statement at he was on his way home from his moer s house. The court also disagreed wi e government s argument at purchasing e ammunition was e most significant step in exporting it and e only remaining step was to give it to Compadre. Here, all e defendant had done was buy ammunition and put it in his car. Applying our precedent, on is record [e defendant] was entitled to e ree-level reduction under 2X1.1(b)(1). After e ree-level reduction, e offense level under 2X1.1 for attempted exportation of ammunition is not greater an e offense level under 2K2.1 for being a felon in possession of ammunition, and e district court erefore erred in applying e cross reference in 2K2.1(c)(1)(A). The sentence was reversed and remanded. Plea Agreements ( 6B) United States v. Warner 2016 WL (4 Cir. 2016) Government breached plea agreement; breach was material The defendant pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of aiding and abetting e eft of a firearm after he and an accomplice broke into 19 motor vehicles and stole a.40 caliber pistol from one. In e plea agreement, e government agreed to advise e district court at e 4-level enhancement under 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (increasing e offense level for use or possession of a firearm in connection wi anoer felony offense) did not apply. The government s agreement was based, at least in part, on its view at a Nor Carolina conviction for breaking and entering a motor vehicle did not constitute a felony offense. The PSR calculated a sentencing range of 51 to 63 mons, but noted at if 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) did not apply, e range would instead be 33 to 41 mons. At sentencing, e government advised e court at it had changed its position and concluded at e enhancement did apply. Noneeless, e government asked e court to honor e plea agreement and not apply e enhancement. The court, however, chose to apply e enhancement and imposed a sentence of 48 mons. On appeal, e defendant argued at e government s stance at sentencing amounted to a breach of e agreement. The Four Circuit reviewed e language of e agreement and found at e substance of e promise at e government made is clear: The government agreed to advise e court of its position at 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) does not apply in is case. Furer, e government s plea agreement obligation was more an simply recommending at e court not impose e

7 7 Sentencing Partners May 2016 enhancement; it had promised to advise e court of its position at e enhancement does not apply. And us, even ough e government did recommend to e district court at it should not apply e enhancement, e government breached its promise to tell e court at e enhancement did not apply. We conclude at e government, alough acting in good fai, breached its undertaking in e plea agreement by stating at e enhancement did apply, we vacate [e defendant s] sentence and remand for resentencing before a different district judge. Probation/Supervised Release (Chapter 7) United States v. Scott 2016 WL (5 Cir. 2016) Special conditions of supervised release vacated The defendant pled guilty to one count of receiving child pornography and was sentenced to 235 mons. That sentence was vacated after e defendant filed a 28 U.S.C motion alleging, among oer ings, at he pled guilty because his counsel assured him at e district judge had told a mutual friend at he would get hammered if he went to trial, but at e judge would take it easy on him by sentencing him to only five years if he pled guilty. The defendant again pled guilty, is time to e single count of possessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 108 mons. The district court also imposed a lifetime term of supervised release wi special conditions including absolute bans on (1) having access to any computer at is capable of internet access or (2) having unsupervised contact wi anyone under e age of 18. Reviewing for plain error, e Fif Circuit explained at conditions of supervised release must be reasonably related to one of four statutory factors: (1) e nature and characteristics of e offense and e history and characteristics of e defendant; (2) e need for deterrence of criminal conduct; (3) e need to protect e public from furer crimes of e defendant; and (4) e need to provide e defendant wi vocational training, medical care, or oer correctional treatment. In addition, e condition must be narrowly tailored such at it does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty an is reasonably necessary to fulfill e purposes set for in 3553(a). The court reversed e two conditions, noting at [n]o circuit court of appeals has ever upheld a lifetime ban on using any computer wi internet access. Furer, computer bans must be narrowly tailored eier by scope or by duration because, among oer reasons, e ubiquity and importance of e Internet to e modern world makes an unconditional, lifetime ban unreasonable. We similarly reasoned at association bans, such as e condition prohibiting all unsupervised contact wi minors, must be narrowly tailored to achieve some balance between protecting e defendant s liberty interest and e government s interest in protecting e public. Accordingly, we vacate e district court s impositions of lifetime bans on accessing any computer wi internet capability and having any unsupervised contact wi minors. If e district court decides to impose similar conditions on remand, it may modify em by, among oer ings, reducing eir duration or conditioning computer usage or contact wi minors on court or probation-officer approval.

8 8 Sentencing Partners May 2016 Restitution United States v. Fowler 2016 WL (6 Cir. 2016) Restitution order based on clearly erroneous fact findings The defendant, a physician, and a codefendant, Thoran, were convicted for eir part in a prescription-drug fraud scheme. The defendant wrote fraudulent prescriptions and marketers such as Thoran filled ose fraudulent prescriptions and sold em on e street. The defendant would write e prescriptions and have em filled by a local pharmacy at paid him a kickback. The PSR calculated a loss amount of $1,752,957. The defendant objected, claiming at e evidence showed at only 20% of e prescriptions written were illegitimate. The government responded at e loss amount was a conservative estimate of e value of e medication he billed rough e pharmacy. The district court ordered restitution in e amount of $1,752,957. On appeal, e defendant asserted at e restitution order was erroneous because e testimony supported his position at only 20% of e prescriptions were illegitimate, and at e restitution amount was based on a conspiracy lasting from November 2009 until August 2011, but e government s witness testified at e defendant s participation did not begin until e middle of The Six Circuit agreed wi e defendant on bo arguments. The government s own witness testified at only 20% of e prescriptions e defendant wrote, including ose from marketers patients, were illegitimate. Furer, e government s evidence showed at while e conspiracy started in 2009, e defendant did not join e conspiracy until sometime in Thus, e evidence also indicates at [e defendant] was held responsible for prescriptions written before he became involved in e conspiracy. Based on e record, ese two issues alone lead us to conclude at e district court s restitution order was based on clearly erroneous findings. The evidence supporting e restitution calculation is not sufficiently reliable, so we conclude at e district court abused its discretion. Armed Career Criminal United States v. Linney 2016 WL (4 Cir. 2016) Prior burglary were committed on different occasions for ACCA The defendant and two companions engaged in a crime spree at started wi a pair of burglaries and ended wi a high-speed chase. During e chase, e defendant drove e getaway car and instructed one of his companions to row a 9-mm handgun out of e car window. Upon capture, police found a 9-mm magazine clip in e defendant s pocket. The defendant pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The PSR classified Linney as an armed career criminal under e ACCA, wi a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence, based on ree prior Nor Carolina burglary convictions. The PSR recommended a sentencing range of 188 to 235 mons and e district court imposed a sentence of 235 mons. On appeal, e defendant argued at two of e ree burglaries occurred on e same occasion and us bo could not be used to support e ACCA enhancement. The government responded by contending at, alough e two burglaries occurred on e same night and in close proximity, ey were in fact separate

9 9 Sentencing Partners May 2016 criminal episodes. The Four Circuit relied on five factors to determine wheer predicate ACCA offenses were committed on different occasions: (1) wheer e offenses arose in different geographic locations ; (2) wheer e nature of each offense was substantively different ; (3) wheer each offense involved different victims ; (4) wheer each offense involved different criminal objectives ; and (5) wheer e defendant had e opportunity after committing e first-in-time offense to make a conscious and knowing decision to engage in e next-in-time offense. Furer, e strong presence of any one factor can dispositively segregate an extended criminal episode into a series of separate and distinct episodes. Here, alough e two houses were close in proximity, e evidence showed at ere were two distinct street addresses, which means at ey occurred at different geographic locations. In addition, e burglaries involved two separate victims. Alough e restitution order imposed joint and several liability on e defendant and an accomplice, e indictments and e judgment show at e defendant was charged alone and convicted alone. The district court was wiin bounds to rely on ese documents to find at [e defendant] committed e two burglaries alone. The sentence was affirmed. Reasonableness Review United States v. Fowler 2016 WL (6 Cir. 2016) Sentence of 108 mons was procedurally unreasonable The defendant, a physician, and a codefendant, Thoran, were convicted for eir part in a prescription-drug fraud scheme. The defendant wrote fraudulent prescriptions and marketers such as Thoran filled ose fraudulent prescriptions and sold em on e street. At first, e primary prescribed drug was Oxycontin, but when it was reformulated in a way at discouraged users from snorting or injecting it, e defendant started prescribing Opana, which could still be abused as e earlier version of Oxycontin. The defendant would write e prescriptions and have em filled by a local pharmacy at paid him a kickback. The PSR calculated a loss amount of $1,752,957, and recommended a sentencing range of mons. The defendant objected, claiming at e evidence showed at only 20% of e prescriptions written were illegitimate. The government responded at e loss amount was a conservative estimate of e value of e medication billed rough e pharmacy. At sentencing, e district court attempted to determine a sentence at would be acceptable to everyone and not be appealed. To is end, e court randomly selected 108 mons as a starting point, en ultimately sentenced e defendant to 72 mons. On appeal, e defendant asserted at his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because e district court failed to calculate e guidelines range or make factual findings in imposing his sentence. The Six Circuit explained at [i]f e district court fails to consider e applicable Guidelines range, but instead simply selects what e judge deems an appropriate sentence wiout such required consideration, e sentence may be unreasonable if it does not allow for meaningful appellate review. The district court gave no reason for its selection of 108 mons oer an to apparently prevent e parties from appealing. Because e sentence imposed did not allow for meaningful appellate review, it was vacated as unreasonable.

10 10 Sentencing Partners May 2016 Cases In This Issue United States v. Bernado, 2016 WL (9 Cir. 2016) United States v. Fowler, 2016 WL (6 Cir. 2016) United States v. Henry, 2016 WL (6 Cir. 2016) nd United States v. Jesurum, 2016 WL (2 Cir. 2016) United States v. Linney, 2016 WL (4 Cir. 2016) United States v. Martinez-Romero, 2016 WL (5 Cir. 2016) United States v. Scott, 2016 WL (5 Cir. 2016) United States v. Sotso, 2016 WL (5 Cir. 2016) United States v. Warner, 2016 WL (4 Cir. 2016)