FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/09/ :39 PM INDEX NO /2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 44 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/09/2016

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1 FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/09/ :39 PM INDEX NO /2016 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 44 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/09/2016 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK JFURTI, LLC, -against- Plaintiff, FIRST CAPITAL REAL ESTATE TRUST INCORPORATED and SUNEET SINGAL, Index No /2016 Hon. O. Peter Sherwood Part 49 Motion Seq. No. 1 Defendants. ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP Ronald G. Blum Kimo S. Peluso Benjamin J. Wolfert 7 Times Square New York, New York (212) Attorneys for Defendants First Capital Real Estate Trust Incorporated and Suneet Singal 1 of 15

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) PRELIMINARY STATEMENT... 1 ARGUMENT... 3 I. THIS ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE COURT ALREADY HELD THAT NO EVENT OF DEFAULT HAS OCCURRED... 3 II. FRYDMAN ENGAGED IN IMPERMISSIBLE CLAIM SPLITTING... 4 III. EACH OF FRYDMAN S CAUSES OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM... 7 A. Frydman Is Not Entitled to Declaratory Judgments (Counts 1, 4 & 5)... 8 B. Frydman Fails to State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment (Counts 2 & 6)... 9 C. Frydman Admits The Parties Never Agreed to Advisor Receivables as a Remedy for Default (Counts 4, 5, 6 & 7)... 9 D. Frydman Fails to State a Claim for Breach of Contract (Count 8) E. Frydman Is Not Entitled to Injunctive Relief (Counts 3 & 7) CONCLUSION i 2 of 15

3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page(s) A&J Enter. Sols., Inc. v. Bus. Applications Outsourcing Tech., Inc., 11 Misc. 3d. 173 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2005)...7 n.8 APF 286 Mad LLC v. Chittur & Assocs., 132 A.D.3d 610 (1st Dep t 2015)...6 n.7 Apple Records, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 137 A.D.2d 50 (1st Dep t 1988)...8 Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382 (1987)...9 Corsello v. Verizon New York, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777 (2012)...9 n.10 Fugnitto v. Fugnitto, 113 Misc. 2d 666 (2d Dep t 1982)...6 n.7 Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Zerbe Constr. Co., 269 N.Y n.8 Goodman v. Reisch, 220 A.D.2d 383 (2d Dep t 1995)...8 Group Health Sols. Inc. v. Smith, 32 Misc. 3d 1244(A), 2011 WL (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2011) (Opp. )...11 Hauptman v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1982)...6 Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig LLP, 135 A.D.3d 547 (1st Dep t 2016)...5 n.5 Murray, Hollander, Sullivan & Bass v. HEM Research, Inc., 111 A.D.2d 63 (1st Dep t 1985)...5 n.5 Pinnn Inc. v. Commerce Bank N.A., 39 Misc. 3d 1202(A), 2013 WL (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Mar. 11, 2013)...4 Pursuit Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P., 134 A.D.3d 502 (1st Dep t 2015)...5 Solow v. Avon Prods., Inc., 56 A.D.2d 785 (1st Dep t 1977)...5 n.5 Weinreb. v. 37 Apartments Corp., 97 A.D.3d 54 (1st Dep t 2012)...10 STATUTES NY UCC 9-601(a)...3 NY UCC 9-607(1)...3, 4 ii 3 of 15

4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) Page(s) RULES N.Y. C.P.L.R N.Y. C.P.L.R iii 4 of 15

5 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Court recently granted summary judgment against Frydman 1 in three of his lawsuits premised on the same purported default at issue here, illustrating why this motion be granted and why Frydman should never have brought this case in the first place. The Court s decision rejecting Frydman s allegations of default as a matter of law is dispositive here. Here, Frydman s eight so-called causes of action, in reality are requests for remedies for an alleged default under the Settlement Agreement and accompanying Promissory Note. While Frydman crafted the instant Complaint as if the supposed default was not even in dispute, in fact, Frydman s allegations of default were rejected by this Court in its November 2 Decisions and Orders. In the Settlement Agreement Action, the Court held that Frydman s depositing of the Undertaking with the Clerk of Court did not constitute an indemnifiable loss pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement: The event triggering defendants obligations pursuant to the Settlement Agreement has not yet occurred. * * * [T]he undertaking does not qualify as paid... with respect to the Canada Judgment (Settlement Agreement, 11), and the defendants do not yet have an obligation to indemnify JFURTI. Accordingly, pursuant to CPLR 3212(b), summary judgment is granted to defendants and plaintiff s claim is DISMISSED. (Index. No /2016, 11/2/16 Decision & Order, Dkt. No. 61 at 3-4 (emphasis added).) The Court also disposed of Frydman s alternative argument that he was entitled to indemnification because his Goldman Account was served with a restraining notice, finding that the restraint 1 Capitalized terms, unless defined herein, have the same meaning as in the Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 16) ( Def. Mem. ). 5 of 15

6 had already been lifted and, in any event, Frydman did not seek indemnification on these grounds prior to filing his lawsuits. (Id. at 4.) Because the Court held that First Capital did not have any indemnification obligations to Frydman, the Court also held that the claimed Event of Default under the Promissory Note did not occur, and the $16 million balance of the Promissory Note was not accelerated: As discussed in the [11/2 Decision and Order] e-filed today in the Settlement Agreement Action... the Settlement Agreement Action defendants did not have an obligation to indemnify JFURTI for the undertaking. Accordingly, there has not been an event of default pursuant to section 2.1 of the [Promissory] Note. As there was no event of default under the Note, JFURTI is not entitled to acceleration of the Note payments, and cannot invoke the Advisor Guaranty based on a failure to pay the accelerated Note payments. (Index. No /2016, 11/2/16 Order, Dkt. No. 60.) The Court, for the same reason, dismissed Frydman s identical lawsuit for the accelerated loan payments under the FC Guarantee. (Index. No /2016, 11/2/16 Order, Dkt. No. 67.) These same findings also compel that this action be dismissed, as Frydman s allegations of default, and by implication his attendant assertions of UCC remedies, all fail as a matter of law. Aside from that, Frydman has not offered any persuasive responses to the patent issues of claim splitting and failure to state a cause of action that Frist Capital has raised. For these reasons too, the instant action should be dismissed. 2 6 of 15

7 ARGUMENT I. THIS ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE COURT ALREADY HELD THAT NO EVENT OF DEFAULT HAS OCCURRED 2 Frydman claims that he is entitled to the Advisor Receivables and the REIT Receivables as sources of payment for $16 million in allegedly accelerated loan payments, all of which is premised on his theory that [t]he loan, which is in default, has been accelerated.... (Compl. 4; see also Compl. 8, 30, 38, 51.). But, the Court already held that the Promissory Note, in fact, is not in default, and no First Capital party, therefore, is indebted to JFURTI for the Promissory Note payments. (Index. No /2016, 11/2 Order, Dkt. No. 61 at 4 ( [d]efendants do not yet have an obligation to indemnify JFURTI. ); Index. No /2016, Dkt. No. 60 & Index No /2016, Dkt. No. 67, 11/2/16 Order ( As there was no event of default under the Note, JFURTI is not entitled to acceleration of the Note payments. ).) Frydman had attempted to defeat Defendants motion by arguing he is entitled to rights as a secured party with a perfected security interest pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code (the UCC ). (See Opp. at 4-5.) The cited UCC provisions, however, apply only in the event of default under the agreement at issue. Section 9-601(a) provides, After default, a secured party has the rights provided in this part and... those provided by agreement of the parties. NY UCC 9-601(a) (emphasis added). Similarly, Section 9-607(1) provides, If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may notify an account debtor... to make payment or otherwise render performance to or for the benefit of the secured party. NY UCC 9-607(1) 2 Frydman states that [s]ince the filing of the [Indemnification Actions], the Borrower Parties have failed to make any loan payments, resulting in a notice from JFURTI of a second default and reacceleration. (Opp. at 9.) Frydman s after-the-fact allegations of default made purely based on facts purportedly occurring months after filing this lawsuit, and which are not alleged in the Complaint are not before the Court. 3 7 of 15

8 (emphasis added). The only case cited by Frydman, Pinnn Inc. v. Commerce Bank N.A., 39 Misc. 3d 1202(A), 2013 WL (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Mar. 11, 2013) (Opp. at 4), proves the point, as in that case the defendants received title to collateral where by their own admission, plaintiffs defaulted[.] Id. at *5. Here, Frydman did not even attempt to properly plead any facts in support of a default in the Complaint. Nor has he pleaded any facts that after default, he notif[ied] an account debtor... to make payment or otherwise render performance. NY UCC 9-607(1). As to the alleged non-payments at issue in the related Indemnification Actions, the Court has already held that no Event of Default occurred. Frydman s house of cards, thus, cannot stand, and he is not entitled to any of the relief he seeks here. On this basis alone, First Capital s motion to dismiss should be granted. II. FRYDMAN ENGAGED IN IMPERMISSIBLE CLAIM SPLITTING The Court s dismissal of the three Indemnification Actions shows exactly why this case was never proper to begin with, and constituted impermissible claim splitting. The Court should, therefore, dismiss the Complaint with prejudice. When Defendants first moved, Frydman had filed five lawsuits involving the same alleged Event of Default under the Settlement Agreement. (Def. Mem. at 8-9, 10.) Since then, he has withdrawn one of those actions in favor of a federal lawsuit, 3 and has filed a third-party complaint in the Canada Action seeking the same relief he seeks in the Settlement Agreement Action (See Index. No /2014, Dkt. No. 235). Here, Frydman is seeking nothing more than remedies for the same breach. Now that the Court has held that the claimed Event of Default, in fact, was no such thing, this Action has no merit or purpose. By any measure, 3 See JFURTI, LLC and Jacob Frydman v. Forum Partners Investment Management, LLC, et al., No. 1:16-CV (S.D.N.Y.) (Filed, Nov. 7, 2016) (the Federal Action ). 4 8 of 15

9 therefore, Frydman impermissibly split his claims for the same liability on the same contract, arising out of the same course of dealing and involving the same elements of proof and evidence. Pursuit Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P., 134 A.D.3d 502, 503 (1st Dep t 2015). Even though this Action should be dismissed for the sole reason that the Court has already held definitively that no Event of Default occurred, Frydman s Opposition utterly fails to defeat dismissal under the claim splitting doctrine. First, Frydman ignores the reality of his various lawsuits and the express terms of the relevant agreements when he argues this action arises from different contracts or agreements. (Opp. at 5-6.) Each case rises and falls based on the terms of one agreement: the Settlement Agreement. 4 Moreover, the Promissory Note, the Security Agreement, the Advisor Guarantee, and the FC Agreement which Frydman argues are separate agreements each warranting its own lawsuit (Opp. at 7) in fact were all attached to, and incorporated by reference in, the Settlement Agreement (Peluso Aff. Ex. 6). The Settlement Agreement, in fact, required the execution of these agreements as a condition precedent. (Id.) 5 4 Frydman, in his affidavit, admits that Mr. Singal s supposed contractual duties at issue in this Action flow, not from the Master Agreement itself, but rather through individual provisions that were incorporated by reference into the Settlement Agreement. (Frydman Aff ) 5 In Murray, Hollander, Sullivan & Bass v. HEM Research, Inc., 111 A.D.2d 63, 67 (1st Dep t 1985) (Opp. at 5), cited by Frydman, the court held claim splitting was not applicable to claims brought under separate agreements because the two actions involved proof of different services. Here, this Action was always dependent upon the same purported events and whether they amounted to a breach of the Settlement Agreement, which the Court has answered in the negative. Further, Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig LLP, 135 A.D.3d 547, 553 (1st Dep t 2016) involved a subsequent cause of action that did not arise until after plaintiff filed the first lawsuit and thus did not arise from the same nucleus of facts. Here, Frydman s previously filed actions, filed within weeks of each other, arise from the same alleged default. Solow v. Avon Prods., Inc., 56 A.D.2d 785, 787 (1st Dep t 1977) (Opp. at 5) is inapposite, as the court held the record did not even contain a copy of pleadings in the prior action and it was thus impossible to ascertain whether the underlying claims in the two nonpayment proceedings are the same or different. 5 9 of 15

10 Second, Frydman is wrong when he argues that his lawsuits are asserted against different defendants. (Opp. at 6.) Frydman sued Suneet Singal here after he had already sued him as a defendant in the now dismissed Settlement Agreement Action, and in the now discontinued /2016 action. (Def. Mem. at 8-9; Index No /2016, Doc. No. 3; Index. No /2016, Doc. No. 1.) 6 The only other defendant here, FC RIET, is a party to the Settlement Agreement (Peluso Aff. Ex. E at 1), and Frydman s claims here could have been asserted as part of the claim in the original suit. Hauptman v. Helena Rubinstein, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1982). 7 Third, Frydman s argument that his multiple actions do not arise out of the same wrong (Opp. at 6), conflates wrong with remedy. All of Mr. Frydman s actions involve First Capital s purported breach of the Settlement Agreement, in this case his demands pursuant to the UCC following that purported breach. The Court has already held no such breach occurred. Frydman s bullet-points purporting to distinguish his many lawsuits (Opp. at 7), in 6 Mr. Singal is also a named defendant in the Federal Action. 7 Again, Frydman s cases on this issue illuminate why his conduct constitutes impermissible claim splitting. In APF 286 Mad LLC v. Chittur & Assocs., 132 A.D.3d 610, 610 (1st Dep t 2015) (Opp. at 6), the court permitted plaintiff to file a lawsuit against the personal guarantor on his lease pursuant to an unconditional guarantee, despite a separate holdover proceeding brought against the tenant under the lease. Here, the Settlement Agreement was not an unconditional; and in APF there is no indication the personal guarantor was also a party to the lease in the same way that both Singal and FC REIT are also parties to the Settlement Agreement. Moreover, Fugnitto v. Fugnitto, 113 Misc. 2d 666, 669 (2d Dep t 1982) involved the election of remedies pursuant to CPLR 3002 in a personal injury action. But, the Practice Commentary makes clear that CPLR 3002 is not a statutory exception to the rule against claim splitting, particularly for claims alleging financial, rather than bodily, harm: While the election rule generally deals with a claim having different theoretical foundations or counts, splitting is usually concerned with a money claim sued in on spurts, instead of at one time.... [A]n entire claim, arising either upon a contract or from a wrong, cannot be divided and made the subject of several suits[.] N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3002, Pract. Cmt. C3002:15 (McKinney) of 15

11 fact point only to different remedies, precisely the sort of claim splitting that serves no legitimate purpose and rightly results in dismissal. 8 Finally, Despite his unexplained assertion that he had no ability to do so (Opp. at 7), nothing prevented Frydman from filing one omnibus complaint for breach of the Settlement Agreement. In fact, a party who obtains a judgment can always seek relief in the form of a restraining notice. See N.Y. C.P.L.R Indeed, the separate briefing on this Action has proven an unnecessary detour, and resulted in the inevitable waste of judicial resources that occurs when a party files an ill-fated lawsuit, and then piles on with additional proceedings before the court can address the merits. Frydman had the ability to file a single action on his tenuous theory of default. Because he characteristically chose to split it into multiple, duplicative lawsuits, dismissal is appropriate. III. EACH OF FRYDMAN S CAUSES OF ACTION FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM As previously discussed, all of Frydman s eight causes of action, in fact are pleas for remedies for First Capital s purported breach of the Settlement Agreement. For that reason alone, this Action was never proper. And, in any event, because the Court has held that the alleged breach did not occur, all of Plaintiff s claims are futile, and should be dismissed with 8 In Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Zerbe Constr. Co., 269 N.Y. 227 (Opp. at 6), an employee received an award under Connecticut workers compensation from General Assurance Corporation. Later, the employee and General Assurance brought a New York lawsuit for the same injury against a contractor, each demanding full relief. Id. at 233. The court held the complaint was improper, because two parties could not split up a claim for an indivisible injury. However, the court held defendant was not prejudiced because a person equitably entitled to a portion of a recovery may be joined as a party plaintiff in an action at law upon an indivisible cause of action. Id. at 233. Here, Frydman is not claiming to be one of multiple parties equitably entitled to a portion of compensation for an indivisible injury. He is seeking different remedies for the same breach of contract. The court in A&J Enter. Sols., Inc. v. Bus. Applications Outsourcing Techs., Inc., 11 Misc. 3d. 173 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2005) (Opp. at 6) permitted plaintiff to split causes of action to satisfy the jurisdictional limit in small claims court, particularly where the parties contract expressly stated that each claim may be sued upon individually of 15

12 prejudice. A. Frydman Is Not Entitled to Declaratory Judgments (Counts 1, 4 & 5) There no longer is any controversy as to whether Frydman is entitled to the RIET and Advisor Receivables as a remedy for breach of the Settlement Agreement, because the Court has held there was no breach of the Settlement Agreement. Regardless, Frydman never should have filed these declaratory judgment claims separately here, because he always had an adequate, alternative remedy in another form of action, such as breach of contract, Apple Records, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 137 A.D.2d 50, 54 (1st Dep t 1988). The case Goodman v. Reisch, 220 A.D.2d 383 (2d Dep t 1995), cited by Frydman (Opp. at 17), comports only with Frydman s fantasy that he had already obtained a judgment against First Capital for breach of the Settlement Agreement in his other actions prior to initiating this unnecessary lawsuit. In that case, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to enforce a judgment which was already rendered in a separate lawsuit. Goodman, 220 A.D.2d at 384. Frydman has not obtained any judgment against First Capital, and in fact the Court now has denied him such relief. Even stranger, Frydman argues that he never filed a breach of contract action for the REIT Receivables or Advisor Receivables because no valid contract confers such a cause of action as against Defendants (Opp. at 17), which misses the point. It is undisputed that Frydman has no independent cause of action creating a path to those assets, aside from his underlying breach of contract claims. 9 Thus, even his UCC rights depend on some default followed by a demand to the assets in question, as noted above. Declaratory relief has no place 9 For the same reason, Frydman s caselaw is again inapposite. (See Opp. at 18.) All hold declarations are appropriate because plaintiff presented an actual justiciable controversy for the court to resolve here, it was always premature for the Court to issue a declaration concerning remedies to a breach of contract issue that was being litigated in separate actions of 15

13 here because the asserted remedies flow more naturally as part of Frydman s now-debunked breach of contract claims. B. Frydman Fails to State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment (Counts 2 & 6) Frydman sheepishly argues his claims for unjust enrichment likely withstands Defendants motion to dismiss. (Opp. at 18 (emphasis added).) They do not. Frydman attempts to evade the black-letter law that a valid written agreement precludes claims for unjust enrichment, but he walks into it head first. He argues that the rule should not apply to his claims for the REIT or Advisor Receivables because there is no contract between Plaintiff and FC REIT or Suneet Singal for the REIT or Advisor Receivables. (Opp. at 19.) That is the end of this lawsuit. Parties to a written agreement are limited to recovery of damages on the contract[.] Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389 (1987). Frydman cannot promise to accept one set of rights as a matter of contract, and then seek to assert new, additional rights through quasi-contract. 10 C. Frydman Admits The Parties Never Agreed to Advisor Receivables as a Remedy for Default (Counts 4, 5, 6 & 7) Even if Frydman were entitled to any relief for an event of default (he is not), Frydman would still not be entitled to the Advisor Receivables. Frydman proudly exclaims that there is no contract between Plaintiff and FC REIT or Suneet Singal for the REIT or Advisor Receivables. (Opp. 19.) Frydman, thus, concedes that the parties never expressly agreed upon Advisor Receivables as a remedy for default. That is because the parties explicitly excluded the FC REIT from the remedies available under the Promissory Note. (See Def. Mem. at ) Frydman s incomprehensible arguments that he is an intended beneficiary of the Advisory 10 More broadly, the Court of Appeals had made clear in recent years that unjust enrichment is not a catchall cause of action to be used when others fail. Corsello v. Verizon New York, Inc., 18 N.Y.3d 777, (2012) (internal citations omitted) of 15

14 Agreement (see Compl. 56; Opp. at 20-21) are not sufficient to augment the parties agreed upon remedies, and certainly not sufficient to overcome his admission that the parties did not agree upon Advisor Receivables as a remedy for default. D. Frydman Fails to State a Claim for Breach of Contract (Count 8) Frydman s Breach of Contract claim against Mr. Singal no longer serves any purpose and should be dismissed. (Count 8, Compl ) First, Frydman sues Mr. Singal for failing to provide remedies to compensate Frydman for purported breach of the Settlement Agreement. (Count 8, Compl ; see also Peluso Aff. Ex. B, Master Agmt. 7.10; id. Ex. E, Settlement Agmt. 8.).) As discussed above, the Court has already held there has been no breach of the Settlement Agreement, and the breach of contract claim is plainly subject to dismissal. Second, Frydman never explains why he can resort to the Master Agreement s amorphous non-interference provisions, in light of specific contractual provisions that clearly define collection remedies (if any) Frydman is entitled to invoke upon default. (See Def. Mem. at 24.) The act of not paying damages on a breach of contract claim, of course, is not itself a new, independent breach of contract. E. Frydman Is Not Entitled to Injunctive Relief (Counts 3 & 7) Frydman s causes of action for injunctive relief with respect to the REIT Receivables (Count 3, Compl ), and Advisor Receivables (Count 7, 86-88) should be dismissed. Frydman does not dispute that injunctive relief is not available absent a substantive cause of action to support it. See Weinreb. v. 37 Apartments Corp., 97 A.D.3d 54, (1st Dep t 2012). Here, the Indemnification Actions have been dismissed, and thus the supposed breach entitling Frydman to injunctive relief simply did not occur, as a matter of law. Moreover, the of 15

15 only purported substantive claims actually pleaded in this action (breach of contract and unjust enrichment) should be dismissed for the reasons addressed in this motion. The cases cited by Frydman are inapposite, because they all apply to claims for money damages (Opp. at. 23), and none of them suggest the Court may impose remedies without finding liability. Even Frydman s own case law shows he must plead facts... from which damages can be properly inferred. Group Health Sols. Inc. v. Smith, 32 Misc. 3d 1244(A), 2011 WL , at *7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2011) (Opp. at 23). Frydman cannot possibly meet this threshold. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in their opening Memorandum of Law, Defendants respectfully request this Court grant their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. Dated: New York, New York November 9, 2016 MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP By: /s/ Kimo S. Peluso Ronald G. Blum Kimo S. Peluso Benjamin J. Wolfert 7 Times Square New York, New York (212) rblum@manatt.com kpeluso@manatt.com bwolfert@manatt.com Attorneys for Defendants First Capital Real Estate Trust Incorporated and Suneet Singal of 15