IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL DIVISION

Transcription

1 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL DIVISION ROBERT FENSTERMACHER, : NO: CV : Plaintiff, : v. : : SANDS BETHLEHEM RETAIL, LLC, : And SANDS BETHLEHEM GAMING, : LLC d/b/a SANDS BETHLEHEM : EVENT CENTER, VISION BAR and : KLWR, INC. d/b/a COX BUILDING : SERVICES, : : Defendants. : ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 7th day of December, 2016, upon consideration of the Preliminary Objections and Brief in Support of the same filed by Defendant, KLWR, Inc. d/b/a Cox Building Services ( Moving Defendant ), and Plaintiff s, Robert Fenstermacher s ( Plaintiff ), Complaint, Answer to the Preliminary Objections, and Brief in Opposition to the Preliminary Objections, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: STATEMENT OF REASONS I. Factual and Procedural History Plaintiff avers that on June 22, 2016, at approximately 1:00 a.m., he went to a restroom in close proximity to the Vision Bar, which is near the Sands Event Center and is located on the Sands complex. Compl. 9. Plaintiff further avers that he slipped and fell, landing on a hard concrete or tiled surface that was covered with a wet, soapy substance. Id. Plaintiff

2 avers that he subsequently observed an individual at the opposite end of the restroom with what appeared to be floor cleaning equipment. Id. at 11. As a result of this incident, Plaintiff avers that he sustained the following injuries: multiple fractures to his right ankle involving ORIF surgery and surgery to remove hardware; chronic neuropathic pain; aggravation of Complex Regional Pain Syndrome involving all four extremities; traumatic injuries to the right arm, torso, hip, leg, and ankle; anxiety and depression; and extreme scarring and deformity of the right ankle. Id. at 15. Plaintiff maintains that the aforementioned injuries required medical treatment, medications, physical therapy, and similar miscellaneous expenses and will continue to require similar expenses in the future. Id. at Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 21, 2016, wherein Plaintiff brings claims sounding in negligence. Count I claims that Moving Defendant, which is identified as a commercial janitorial supplier, was negligent for failing to maintain the floor surface in and around the bathroom, for allowing the slippery substance to remain on the floor, and similar allegations regarding the state of the floor on which Plaintiff purportedly fell. Id. at 4, 14. Count II is brought against the balance of the above-captioned defendants and is rooted in the doctrines of respondeat superior and agency. Id. at In short, Plaintiff asserts that the balance of the defendants possessed, maintained, and controlled the premises, bathroom and property contiguous thereto where Plaintiff was injured, and therefore, 2

3 these remaining defendants are vicariously liable for Moving Defendant s purported negligence. Id. at 24. This matter was placed on the September 20, 2016, Argument List and was submitted on brief. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review A court may properly grant preliminary objections when the pleadings are legally insufficient for one or more of the reasons enumerated in Rule 1028 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pa.R.C.P In ruling on preliminary objections, we will consider as true all well-pleaded facts and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, but not conclusions of law, argumentative allegations or opinions. Erie Cty. League of Women Voters v. Com., Dep't of Envtl. Res., 525 A.2d 1290, 1291 (Pa. Commw. 1987). A. Preliminary Objection to Dangerous Condition(s) Moving Defendant s first Preliminary Objection contends that Plaintiff s use of the phrase dangerous condition(s) should be dismissed for failure to conform to law or rule or court and for insufficient specificity in a pleading. See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2)-(3). Rule 1019(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form. Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a). Pennsylvania is 3

4 a fact-pleading state. McShea v. City of Philadelphia, 995 A.2d 334, 339 (Pa. 2010). As a minimum, a pleader must set forth concisely the facts upon which his cause of action is based. Line Lexington Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Corp., 301 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa. 1973). The complaint must not only apprise the defendant of the claim being asserted, but it must also summarize the essential facts to support the claim. McShea, 995 A.2d at 339. Relatedly, pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(3), which requires a level of specificity in a pleading, a party may preliminarily object to the pleading and move to strike a portion of the pleading or seek a more definite statement. See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(3). The pertinent question under Rule 1028(a)(3) is whether the complaint is sufficiently clear to enable the defendant to prepare his defense, or whether the plaintiff's complaint informs the defendant with accuracy and completeness of the specific basis on which recovery is sought so that he may know without question upon what grounds to make his defense. Ammlung v. City of Chester, 491, 498 n. 36 (Pa. Super. 1973). Moving Defendants object to Plaintiff s use of the phrase dangerous condition(s). For example, Plaintiff avers that Moving Defendant was negligent for [f]ailing to inspect the hallway/entrance/bathroom floor for dangerous conditions, including but not limited to, slippery surfaces and [f]ailing to understand, appreciate and consider that a dangerous condition 4

5 existed... Compl. 14(d). Moving Defendants contend that the phrase dangerous condition(s) is a catch-all allegation that could effectively include any other apparent danger present at the time of Plaintiff s slip and fall. We find that Plaintiff s use of the phrase dangerous condition(s) in conjunction with averments regarding the slippery substance on which Plaintiff purportedly slipped must be stricken pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(2) and (a)(3). Although Plaintiff s Complaint alleges facts that clearly aver that Plaintiff slipped on a slippery substance, it is not clear that Plaintiff s use of the phrase dangerous condition(s) is limited to a slippery substance. Moreover, Plaintiff s inclusion of the phrase including but not limited to strengthens Moving Defendant s argument. Such a phrase plainly contemplates that an additional dangerous condition could have caused Plaintiff s purported injuries. Accordingly, we strike Plaintiff s use of the phrases dangerous condition(s) and including but not limited to. Plaintiff may, however, use the phrases dangerous condition or danger if Plaintiff clearly identifies the specific dangerous condition or danger (i.e. a wet soapy substance). B. Preliminary Objection to Purported Catch-all Allegations Moving Defendants object to the following subparagraphs on the basis that they fail to conform to law or rule or court and are insufficiently specific insofar as they are overly broad and/or catch-all allegations: 14(d), (g), (h), 5

6 and (i). See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2)-(3). Moving Defendant contends that Subparagraphs (d) and (g) should be stricken based upon the use of the phrases dangerous conditions and including but not limited to. Because we struck these phrases above, we move to the balance of the contested subparagraphs. Subparagraphs (h) and (i) state the following: (h) Failing to provide safe egress into the bathrooms; and (i) Failing to exercise reasonable care to protect the Plaintiff from danger Compl. 14(h)-(i). These subparagraphs follow seven allegations, containing specific allegations of negligence, such as failing to install a nonslip floor, failing to warn Plaintiff about the slippery floor, and failing to properly maintain the bathroom area. See Compl. 14(c), (e), (g). To the contrary, this Court finds that Subparagraphs (h) and (i) act as mere catchall allegations that do not set forth any specific allegations of negligence. Thus, we strike these subparagraphs from Plaintiff s Complaint. Likewise, Moving Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff s claim for similar miscellaneous expenses also serves as a catch-all allegation. We note that averments of damages may also be scrutinized under the specificity requirements of Rule 1019(a). Com., Dep't of Transp. v. Shipley Humble Oil Co., 370 A.2d 438, 441 (Pa. Commw. 1977). Like Subparagraphs 14(h) and (i), Plaintiff s claim for similar miscellaneous expenses is preceded by a list of more specific allegations. Plaintiff avers 6

7 that as a result of his purported injuries, he was forced to incur liability for medical treatment, medications, [and] physical therapy. Compl. 16. Plaintiff s claim for similar miscellaneous expenses, when read together with Plaintiff s list of specific expenses, is overly broad. That is, while Plaintiff need not itemize his medical expenses for example, Moving Defendant does not challenge the specificity of Plaintiff s claim for medications the claim for similar medical expenses leaves open the possibility of other, non-specified expenses, and Moving Defendant cannot be left to imagine those expenses. Accordingly, we also strike the phrase similar miscellaneous expenses from Plaintiff s Complaint. B. Preliminary Objection to Claimed Scandalous and Impertinent Material In describing his claimed slip and fall, Plaintiff avers, On June 22, 2016, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Plaintiff Robert Fenstermacher, went to use the restroom... when suddenly, without warning he slipped and was viciously hurled down to the hard concrete surface/ceramic tile... Compl. 9. Moving Defendant objects to Plaintiff s use of the word viciously on the pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(2), which allows a preliminary objection to a pleading that contains scandalous and impertinent matter. See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2). It is a long-held practice that scandalous and impertinent matters may be stricken from a complaint. See Adams v. Adams, 74 Pa. Super. 502, 504 (1920) (In addressing scandalous and impertinent matters: the court will 7

8 only order the parts that offend to be stricken from the record ). To be scandalous and impertinent, a complaint's allegations must be immaterial and inappropriate to the proof of the cause of action. Com., Dep't of Envtl. Res. v. Peggs Run Coal Co., 423 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Commw. 1980). The instant Preliminary Objection is limited to the word viciously. Moving Defendant maintains that the use of the word viciously is legally inconsequential to Plaintiff s claims and places Moving Defendant in a negative light. Prelim. Objections We agree. Plaintiff s use of the word viciously to characterize his purported fall has no legal significance. More, the word viciously connotes violence and suggests further wrongdoing by Moving Defendant. In a slip and fall case where Plaintiff alleges Moving Defendant, a janitorial company, failed to properly maintain the floor on which Plaintiff allegedly fell, we find that Plaintiff s use of the word viciously is scandalous and impertinent. Therefore, we strike the word viciously from Plaintiff s Complaint. BY THE COURT: /s/ Samuel P. Murray SAMUEL P. MURRAY, J. 8