Human Rights in Europe

Transcription

1 Human Rights in Europe Legal Bulletin Issue 40 Apri 2003

2 AIRE Centre London Editors: Nuala Mole Biljana Braithwaite Printout (Serbian/Bosnian/Croatian):7600 Printout (Albanian):1200 Printout (Polish):600 Printout (Moldavian): 500 The production of this publication is supported by The Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the Council of Europe and the UK Lord Chancellor's Department This publication is protected by international copyright law. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the editors.

3 Decision of the European Court in the high profile case of the former PKK leader JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF ÖCALAN v. TURKEY 1 (application no /99) 12 March Principal facts Abdullah Öcalan, a Turkish national born in 1949 and former leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), is currently incarcerated in İmralı Prison in Turkey. At the time of the events in question, the Turkish courts had issued seven warrants for Mr. Öcalan s arrest and a wanted notice (red notice) had been circulated by Interpol. He was accused of founding an armed gang in order to destroy the integrity of the Turkish State and of instigating terrorist acts resulting in loss of life. On 9 October 1998, he was expelled from Syria, where he had been living for many years. From there he went to Greece, Russia, Italy and then again Russia and Greece before going to Kenya, where, on the evening of 15 February 1999, in disputed circumstances he was taken on board an aircraft at Nairobi airport and arrested by Turkish officials. He was then flown to Turkey, being kept blindfolded for most of the flight. On arrival in Turkey, a hood was placed over his head while he was taken to İmralı Prison, where he was held in police custody from 16 to 23 February 1999 and questioned by the security forces. He received no legal assistance during that period and made several self-incriminating statements which contributed to his conviction. His lawyer in Turkey was prevented from travelling to visit him by members of the security forces. 16 other lawyers were also refused permission to visit on 23 February On 23 February 1999, the applicant appeared before an Ankara State Security Court judge, who ordered him to be placed in pre-trial detention. The first visit from his lawyers was restricted to 20 minutes and took place with members of the security forces and a judge present in the same room. Subsequent meetings between the applicant and his lawyers took place within the hearing of members of the security forces. After the first two visits from his lawyers, the applicant s contact with them was restricted to two one-hour visits a week. The prison authorities did not authorise the applicant s lawyers to provide him with a copy of the documents in the case file, other than the indictment. It was not until the hearing on 2 June 1999 that the State Security Court gave the applicant permission to consult the case file under the supervision of two registrars and his lawyers permission to provide him with a copy of certain documents. In an indictment filed on 24 April 1999, the Public Prosecutor at Ankara State Security Court accused the applicant of carrying out actions calculated to bring about the separation of a part of Turkish territory and of forming and leading an armed gang to achieve that end. The Public Prosecutor asked the court to sentence the applicant to death under Article 125 of the Criminal 1 This judgment is not final. Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months of the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17- member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.

4 Code. On 29 June 1999, the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death under Article 125. The Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. On 30 November 1999, the European Court of Human Rights, applying Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (interim measures), requested the Turkish authorities "to take all necessary steps to ensure that the death penalty [was] not carried out so as to enable the Court to proceed effectively with the examination of the admissibility and merits of the applicant s complaints under the Convention". In October 2001, Article 38 of the Turkish Constitution was amended, abolishing the death penalty except in time of war or of imminent threat of war or for acts of terrorism. Under Law no. 4771, published on 9 August 2002, the Turkish Assembly resolved to abolish the death penalty in peacetime. On 3 October 2002, Ankara State Security Court commuted the applicant s death sentence to life imprisonment. An application to set aside the provision abolishing the death penalty in peacetime for persons convicted of terrorist offences was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 27 December On 9 October 2002, two trade unions which had intervened in the criminal proceedings lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision to commute Mr. Öcalan s death sentence to life imprisonment. These proceedings are still pending. 2. Decision of the Court The applicant complained, in particular, that: The imposition and/or execution of the death penalty was or would be in violation of Articles 2, 3 and 14 of the Convention; and that the conditions in which he was transferred from Kenya to Turkey and detained on the island of İmralı amounted to inhuman treatment in breach of Article 3; He was deprived of his liberty unlawfully; that he was not brought promptly before a judge; and that he did not have access to proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of his detention, in breach of Article 5 1, 3 and 4; He did not have a fair trial because he was not tried by an independent and impartial tribunal, given the presence of a military judge on the bench of the State Security Court; that the judges were influenced by hostile media reports; and that his lawyers were not given sufficient access to the court file to enable them to prepare his defence properly, in breach of Article 6 1; His legal representatives in Amsterdam were prevented from contacting him after his arrest and/or that the Turkish Government failed to reply to the European Court of Human Right s request for them to supply information, in violation of Article 34. He also relied on Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 18 of the Convention. Article 5 of the Convention Article 5 4 of the Convention (right to have lawfulness of detention decided speedily by a court) The Court observed that, despite a 1997 amendment to the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure which clearly established a right under Turkish law to challenge in the courts decisions to hold a suspect in police custody, the Government had not furnished any example of a judicial decision in which an order by the public prosecutor s office at a State Security Court for a suspect to be held in police custody had been quashed before the end of the fourth day (the statutory maximum period for which the public prosecutor s office may order suspects to be held). The Court determined that, in any event, the special circumstances of the case, notably the fact that he had been kept in isolation and that his lawyers had been obstructed by the police, made it impossible for the applicant to have effective recourse to this remedy. The Court therefore held that there had been a violation of that provision.

5 Article 5 1 of the Convention (no unlawful deprivation of liberty) The Court found that the applicant s arrest and detention had complied with orders that had been issued by the Turkish courts "for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence" within the meaning of Article 5 1 (c). Moreover, it had not been established beyond all reasonable doubt that the operation carried out in the instant case partly by Turkish officials and partly by Kenyan officials amounted to a violation by Turkey of Kenyan sovereignty and, consequently, of international law. It followed that the applicant s arrest and his detention were to be regarded as having been in accordance with "a procedure prescribed by law" for the purposes of Article 5 1 of the Convention. Consequently, there had been no violation of that provision. Article 5 3 of the Convention (right to be brought promptly before a judge) The Court noted that the total period spent by the applicant in police custody before being brought before a judge came to a minimum of seven days. It could not accept that it was necessary for the applicant to be detained for such a period without being brought before a judge. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 5 3. Article 6 of the Convention a) Whether the Ankara State Security Court, which convicted the applicant, was independent and impartial The Court had found in earlier judgments that certain aspects of the status of military judges sitting in the State Security Courts raised doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the courts concerned. The Court concluded that the Ankara State Security Court, which had convicted the applicant, had not been an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 1 of the Convention, and that there had been a violation of that provision on that point. b) Whether the proceedings before the State Security Court were fair The Court noted that the applicant had not been assisted by his lawyers when questioned in police custody, had been unable to communicate with them out of hearing of third parties and had been unable to gain direct access to the case file until a very late stage in the proceedings. Furthermore, restrictions had been imposed on the number and length of his lawyers visits and his lawyers had not been given proper access to the case file until late in the day. The overall effect of these difficulties, taken as a whole, had so restricted the rights of the defence that the principle of a fair trial, as set out in Article 6, had been contravened. There had therefore been a violation of Article 6 1, taken together with Article 6 3 (b) and (c). Articles 2, 3 and 14 of the Convention (death penalty) As regards the implementation of the death penalty The Court considered that the threat of implementation of the death sentence had been effectively removed. It could no longer be said that there were substantial grounds for fearing that the applicant would be executed, notwithstanding the appeal which was still pending. In those circumstances, the applicant s complaints under Articles 2, 3 and 14 based on the implementation of the death penalty were to be rejected. As regards the imposition of the death penalty It remained to be determined whether the imposition of the death penalty, in itself, gave rise to a breach of the Convention.

6 (i) Article 2 At the outset, the Court determined that no separate issue arose under the present head as regards Article 2 and preferred to examine this question under Article 3. (ii) Article 3 read against the background of Article 2 (a) Legal significance of the practice of the Contracting States as regards the death penalty The Court reiterated that the Convention was to be read as a whole and that Article 3 was to be construed in harmony with the provisions of Article 2. If Article 2 was to be read as permitting capital punishment, notwithstanding the almost universal abolition of the death penalty in Europe, Article 3 could not be interpreted as prohibiting the death penalty, since that would nullify the clear wording of Article 2 1. Accordingly, the Court had first to address the applicant s submission that the practice of the Contracting States in this area could be taken as establishing an agreement to abrogate the exception provided for in the second sentence of Article 2 1, which explicitly permitted capital punishment under certain conditions. After examining the arguments in favour of this position, however, the Court concluded that it was not necessary to reach any firm conclusion on this point since it would run counter to the Convention, even if Article 2 were to be construed as still permitting the death penalty, to implement a death sentence following an unfair trial. (b) Unfair proceedings and the death penalty Even if the death penalty were still permissible under Article 2, an arbitrary deprivation of life pursuant to capital punishment would be prohibited. This flowed from the requirement that "Everyone s right to life shall be protected by law". An arbitrary act could not be lawful under the Convention. It also followed from the requirement in Article 2 1 that the deprivation of life must be pursuant to the "execution of a sentence of a court", that the "court" which imposed the penalty must be an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of the Court s case-law and that the most rigorous standards of fairness had to be observed in the criminal proceedings both at first instance and on appeal. Since the execution of the death penalty was irreversible, it could only be through the application of such standards that an arbitrary and unlawful taking of life could be avoided. The Court had then to examine the implications for the issue under Article 3 concerning the imposition of the death penalty. In the Court s view, to impose a death sentence on a person after an unfair trial was to subject that person wrongfully to the fear that he would be executed. The fear and uncertainty as to the future generated by a sentence of death, in circumstances where there existed a real possibility that the sentence would be enforced, as was the case for the applicant in view of his high profile and the fact that he had been convicted of the most serious crimes, must give rise to a significant degree of human anguish. Such anguish could not be dissociated from the unfairness of the proceedings underlying the sentence. Having regard to the rejection by the Contracting Parties of capital punishment, which was no longer seen as having any legitimate place in a democratic society, the imposition of a capital sentence in such circumstances had to be considered, in itself, to amount to a form of inhuman treatment. The imposition of the death sentence on the applicant following an unfair trial had therefore amounted to inhuman treatment in violation of Article 3. Article 3 of the Convention (conditions of detention) a) Conditions in which the applicant was transferred from Kenya to Turkey The Court determined that it had not been established "beyond all reasonable doubt" that the applicant s arrest and the conditions in which he was transferred from Kenya to Turkey exceeded the usual degree of humiliation that was inherent in every arrest and detention or attained the

7 minimum level of severity required for Article 3 of the Convention to apply. Consequently, there had been no violation of that provision on this point. b) Conditions of detention on the island of İmralı The Court found that the general conditions in which the applicant was being detained at İmralı Prison had not reached the minimum level of severity necessary to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Therefore, there had been no violation of that provision on that account. Article 34 of the Convention (right of individual petition) As regards the applicant s inability to communicate with his lawyers in Amsterdam following his arrest, there was nothing to indicate that the exercise of the applicant s right to individual application was impeded to any significant extent. Moreover the Court found, without prejudice to its views on the binding nature of interim measures under Rule 39, that in the special circumstances of the case, the refusal of the Turkish Government to provide certain information did not amount to a violation of the applicant s right of individual application. Remaining complaints Finally, the Court determined that no separate examination of the complaints under Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 18 of the Convention, taken alone or together with the aforementioned provisions of the Convention, was necessary. Article 41 of the Convention The Court took the view that any pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage that the applicant might have sustained had been sufficiently compensated by its findings of a violation of Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention. As regards costs and expenses, the Court considered it reasonable to award the applicant a total of EUR 100,000 in respect of the claims made by all his legal representatives. 3. Comment The Court made 17 separate findings in this notable case. Lack of space prevents us from commenting on all these findings, so we have selected only those which seem of most importance and relevance to the jurisdictions where this bulletin is published. The Court found that Turkey was accountable for its actions wholly outside the territory of the CoE. This finding can be compared with the approach taken in Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 other contracting states, admissibility decision of 19 December 2001, and Iliascu and others v. Moldova and the Russian Federation, admissibility decision of 4 July 2001, where the Court argued, inter alia, that the Convention should only be applied to actions which took place in places which prima facie fell under the protection of the Convention. It found no violation of Article 5 1 in the methods used by the Turkish authorities in collaboration with the Kenyan authorities to kidnap the applicant from his Greek escorts on his way to leave Kenyan territory. In direct contrast to its finding in the earlier case of Bozano, 18 December 1986, it found that the disguised extradition did not violate Article 5. Since Kenya is not a party to the ECHR the Court was not asked to rule on the compatibility of the Kenyan authorities actions with ECHR standards. Were such an incident to occur in a Council of Europe state the finding of no violation by Turkey in the Ocalan case would not mean that a CoE state which acted as the Kenyan authorities did would be complying with its obligations under the Convention. The Court has in the past made it clear that a state which hands people over to another state (whether a party to the

8 ECHR or not) retains prima facie responsibility before the European Court for the foreseeable consequences of that action. The Court went on to find violations of Articles 5 4, 5 3, 6 1 and 3. The failure to provide an effective judicial supervision of the detention coupled with the initial refusal to permit the applicant meetings with his counsel and the subsequent monitoring and restrictions on those meetings rendered the whole process incompatible with Convention standards. The finding that the imposition of the death penalty following an unfair trial violates Article 3 is one which will doubtless be re-visited in many future cases. It remains to be seen whether the Court will in the future take the same approach to unfair trials resulting in a lengthy prison sentence.

9 Court composed in breach of relevant domestic law JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF POSOKHOV v. RUSSIA 2 (application no /00) 4 March Principal facts Mr. Posokhov was born in 1966 and lives in Russia. He worked for the Customs Board, supervising the clearance of imported goods at a seaport customs post. In 1996, criminal proceedings were brought against him for the alleged smuggling of considerable amounts of vodka. On 22 May 2000, Neklinovskiy District Court, composed of one professional judge and two lay judges, found the applicant guilty of being an accessory in the avoidance of customs duties and of abuse of office. However, the applicant was not required to serve his sentence, partly because of the expiry of a statutory limitation period and partly because of a 1997 amnesty law. In his appeal, the applicant challenged the bench that had delivered the judgment, alleging a breach of the rules on the appointment of lay assessors. In particular, he submitted that, whereas the Lay Judges Act allowed lay judges to be called once a year for a maximum period of 14 days, or for as long as a specific case lasted, two lay judges who were adjudicating in his case had been acting in this capacity in 2000 for at least 88 days prior to his trial, and that term of office of one of them had expired. The applicant s appeals were dismissed, as were his two requests for supervisory review in which he also complained that the lay judges names had not been drawn by lot as required by the Lay Judges Act. Concerning the applicant s earlier complaint concerning assessors term of office, he was informed that a Presidential Decree of 25 January 2000 had extended their terms of office pending new appointments. On 2 October 2001, the applicant was informed that the list of lay judges for the Neklinovskiy District for the period 10 to 22 May 2000 had been compiled on 4 February Following an application for a supervisory review of the case, the judgment of 22 May 2000 was quashed and the case re-examined. On 2 July 2001, Neklinovskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of the same offences but relieved him from serving the sentence under the statute of limitations. This judgment was also quashed, however, following a further application for supervisory review, on the ground that the courts were not in a position to decide on the applicant s guilt because the whole case was time-barred. On 4 October 2002, Neklinovskiy District Authority informed the applicant that there was no record of any adoption of lay assessors lists before 4 February This judgment is not final, see fn.1.

10 2. Decision of the Court The applicant alleged that he was convicted by a court composed in breach of the relevant domestic law. He relied on Article 6 1 (right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal). He initially claimed that the two lay judges had, contrary to section 9 of the Act, been acting as lay judges prior to his trial for longer than the maximum 14 days per year and that their names had not been drawn by lot, in breach of section 5 of the Act. He subsequently also complained that there was no proof that they had ever been appointed as lay judges, even before the enactment of the Lay Judges Act. Article 6 1 The European Court of Human Rights noted that it was particularly struck by the fact that Neklinovskiy District Authority the body responsible for the appointment of lay judges had confirmed that it had no list of lay judges appointed before 4 February The authority had thus failed to present any legal grounds for the participation of two lay judges in the administration of justice on the day of the applicant s trial, bearing in mind that the list adopted on 4 February 2000 only took effect on 15 June Finding that Neklinovskiy District Court could not be regarded as a "tribunal established by law", the European Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 1. Article 41 The Court awarded the applicant EUR 500 for non-pecuniary damage. 3. Comment The Court has previously held that that the object and purpose of the clause in Article 6 that a tribunal shall be established by law is that the judicial organisation in a democratic society should not depend on the discretion of the executive (Zand v. Austria, 15 DR 70). In the current case, the Court pointed out that the authority responsible for the appointment of lay judges had failed to show any legal grounds for the participation of the lay judges who had decided the applicant s case, and it was therefore clear that there had been a violation of Article 6. This case also raises the issue of supervisory review, which is a common feature in certain States legal proceedings. It takes the form of a protest of a judgment that has been delivered by a court and which is not subject to any further right of appeal. It can also be used where no appeal has been made, regardless of whether the time limit for appealing has expired or not. Requests for supervisory review can often be lodged by the parties to the proceedings, the prosecutor and presidents of courts. In the case of Brumarescu v. Romania (28 October 1999), the Procurator General had the right to apply at any time to the Supreme Court to have any judicial decision quashed on a number of grounds. The Court found that this was a violation of Article 6 and noted One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which requires inter alia that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question. The supervisory review procedure is not regarded as an effective remedy by the Court and therefore does not have to be exhausted before applying to the Court (Tumilovich v. Russia, admissibility decision 22 June 1999). However, with the supervisory review procedure being such an integral part of certain States legal system, applicants might apply for supervisory review in the belief that they would need to exhaust this remedy, and then find themselves outside the six months time limit.

11 In the current case however, Mr. Posokhov submitted his application to the European Court one month after his appeals had been dismissed, and then went on to apply for supervisory review, recognising that this was not an effective remedy as far as the European Court was concerned.

12 1. Principal facts Restitution of private property in the states of Central and Eastern Europe JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF JASIUNIENE v. LITHUANIA 3 (application no /98) 6 March 2003 The applicant, Mrs. Jasiūnienė, was born in 1923 and lives in Lithuania. Her late mother had owned a house in a tourist resort by the Baltic Sea. Following the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940, the land was nationalised and the house demolished in the 1960s. The Palanga City Council gave a decision on 25 September 1992 restituting the rights of the applicant and her sister to their late mother s land. The decision was not implemented, however, and no compensation was offered. In January 1995, the applicant brought proceedings against the local authority for recovery of the land. The District Court dismissed her action, but held that she should have been offered an alternative parcel of land in compensation. She appealed. The Regional Court quashed the District Court s judgment on 3 April 1996 and referred the case back to the local authority. The applicant refused an offer of an alternative parcel of land. She instructed bailiffs to enforce the Regional Court s judgment, but they were unable to do so. The County Governor warned her that if she did not choose an alternative parcel of land, she would be allotted one without her consent. On 31 December 1997, she complained to the Prime Minister that the alternative parcels of land on offer were located in the outskirts of Palanga and therefore of inferior value to her late mother s plot. The applicant was informed on 30 August 1999 that she had failed to prove her mother s ownership of the original plot and that no decision on compensation could be made until such proof was provided. 2. Decision of the Court The applicant alleged that the nationalisation and destruction of her late mother s property by the Soviet authorities and the failure by the Lithuanian authorities to return it or award her compensation breached Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property), taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). She complained, further, that the nonenforcement of the Regional Court s judgment of 3 April 1996 breached Articles 6 (right to a fair hearing) and 13 (right to an effective remedy). Article 6 1 The European Court of Human Rights reiterated that the right to a court enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention would be illusory if a final binding judgment were allowed to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. The Regional Court had not denied the merits of the applicant s claim to the property, but merely required the authorities to choose the form of compensation to be made to her. By failing to execute that court s judgment, the Lithuanian authorities had deprived Article 6 1 of the Convention of all useful effect. There had accordingly been a violation of that Article. It was unnecessary to rule on the complaint under Article 13 because the requirements of that provision were absorbed by those of Article This judgment is not final, see fn.1.

13 Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 The Court pointed out that it had no power to examine the applicant s complaint about the nationalisation of her late mother s land and the destruction of her house because it related to events prior to the date of entry into force of the Convention and Protocol No. 1 with regard to Lithuania. There had therefore been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, in that respect. In respect of the applicant s complaint that she could not recover the land in kind following the reestablishment of the Lithuanian State, the Court reiterated that the Convention did not guarantee, as such, the right to restitution of property. The hope that a long-extinguished property right might be revived could not be regarded as a "possession" for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It was clear that the applicant had no legitimate expectation of recovering the land under the applicable domestic legislation and that the authorities were only required to afford her compensation in the form of land or money. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was therefore inapplicable to this complaint. As Article 14 could not be relied on in isolation, it did not apply either. There had therefore been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14. Regarding the authorities failure to enforce the Regional Court s judgment, the Court reiterated that a claim could amount to a possession for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 if it was sufficiently established to be enforceable. The Regional Court s judgment had provided the applicant with an enforceable claim amounting to a possession. Her inability to enforce that judgment constituted an interference with her right to peaceful enjoyment of her possession. The national authorities had prevented the applicant from obtaining the compensation she could reasonably have expected to receive and the Government had advanced no plausible justification for that interference. The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to the non-enforcement of the Regional Court s judgment. Article 41 The Court awarded the applicant 9,000 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage. 3. Comment This important judgment summarizes succinctly many of the contentious issues which arise in connection with restitution of private property in the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. There is no right under the ECHR to revive a property right which was extinct for many years under the socialist system. Nor is there any right to compensation for property which was confiscated under the old system. Where states have set up a system for the restitution of confiscated property or for compensation for property which had been either lost or confiscated, and this right has been duly confirmed by the competent national authority, the confirmed right to restitution or to compensation is a possession for the purposes of Article 1 Protocol 1. A failure by the national authorities to execute a judgement which has ordered either the return of the property (or compensation if return is inappropriate) will, in addition to Article 1 Protocol 1, also violate Article 6 of the Convention. The right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 includes the right to prompt execution of the judgement. Unjustifiable delay in the payment of compensation may violate Article 6 in the same way as delays in the adjudication of any dispute as to the property right or the amount of compensation to be awarded. It is only when the property has actually been

14 returned or the compensation has actually been paid that the requirements of both Article 6 and Article 1 Protocol 1 will have been satisfied.

15 OTHER JUDGMENTS 4 Article 3 Özkur and Göksungur v. Turkey (prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, right to liberty and security) Friendly settlement Article 6 Dactylidi v. Greece (length of civil proceedings, right to an effective remedy) Violation Article 6 1 Violation Article 13 Popovici and Others v. Romania (right to a fair trial, protection of property) Violation Article 6 1 No violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Stoicescu v. Romania (right to a fair trial) Violations Article 6 1 A.B. v. Slovakia (right to a fair trial) Violation Article 6 1 Ipsilanti v. Greece (length of criminal proceedings) Violation Article 6 1 Ferretti v. Italy (length of civil proceedings, protection of property) Friendly settlement Article 10 C.S.Y. v. Turkey (freedom of expression) Violation Article 10 Yaşar Kemal Gökçeli v. Turkey (freedom of expression, no punishment without law) Violation Article 10 Non-violation Articles 6 2 and 7 Lešník v. Slovakia (freedom of expression) No violation Article 10 Article 1 Protocol No.1 Satka and Others v. Greece (protection of property, length of civil proceedings) Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Violation Article 6 1 Chiriacescu v. Romania (protection of property) Violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Jantner v. Slovakia (protection of property, prohibition of discrimination) No violation Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 No violation Article 14 4 Some of these judgments are not final.