IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF EVIDENCE CASE NO.: SC 13-

Transcription

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF EVIDENCE CASE NO.: SC 13- THREE-YEAR CYCLE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FLORIDA BAR CODE AND RULES OF EVIDENCE COMMITTEE Thomas D. Shults, Chair, Code and Rules of Evidence Committee (CREC), and John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, file this three-year cycle report pursuant to Fla. R. Jud. Admin (b). Table of Contents I. Introduction... 2 II. 3 Year Cycle Recommendations... 3 A. The Fiduciary Lawyer-Client Privilege, F.S B. Hearsay Exception: Wrongfully Causing Declarant s Unavailability, F.S (2)(f)... 4 C. Medical Negligence Expert Witness Certificate F.S (12)... 5 III. Background and Purpose of 3 Year Cycle Review of Evidentiary Statutes... 6 IV. The 2000 and 2002 Supreme Court Opinions... 8 V. Criteria from the 2000 and 2002 Opinions... 9 VI. Conclusion... 9 Appendices A. Proposed amendments B. Notice of Publication, The Florida Bar News, July 2012 C. Public, Committee, and Section Comments D. Statement of Position of The Florida Bar Board of Governors E. Notice of Publication, The Florida Bar News December 2012 F. Ch G. Ch H. Ch

2 I. Introduction CREC is proposing that sections , (2)(f), and (12), Florida Statutes, be adopted as rules of evidence to the extent that they are procedural. (See Appendix A.) As required by Rule 2.140(b)(2), CREC s proposal was published in The Florida Bar News and posted on The Florida Bar s website. (See Appendix B.) CREC s original proposal included sections and (2)(f), Florida Statutes, and sections , , , and (12), Florida Statutes, regarding the requirement that an out-of-state expert witness obtain a certificate from the Department of Health before testifying in a malpractice case. No comments were received. Also as required by Rule 2.140(b), the proposals were submitted to The Florida Bar Board of Governors (BOG). CREC s proposals were considered at the BOG s May 18, 2012, meeting. Concerns were expressed by board members about the new requirements for out of state experts and the BOG tabled the issue. The committee again presented its report at the July 27, 2012, BOG meeting. The BOG voted 33-0 to approve adoption of sections and (2)(f), Florida Statutes, as rules of procedure to the extent they are procedural. The BOG voted to recommend rejection of the adoption of the medical malpractice expert statutes as rules of procedure ( , , , and (12), Fla. Stat.). The committee was asked to solicit further comments from sections and committees regarding the expert witness provisions and to report back to the BOG at a subsequent meeting. CREC sought comments from all sections and committees of The Florida Bar. A number of public comments were received, primarily in opposition of the adoption of the medical malpractice expert statutes as rules of procedure. (See Appendix C.) At its September 21, 2012, meeting, CREC voted 26-0 to withdraw its recommendation that sections , , and , Florida Statutes, be adopted as rules of evidence. CREC also voted to retain its recommendation that section (12), Florida Statutes, be adopted as a rule of evidence to the extent that it is procedural. CREC appeared before the Board of Governors again at its December 7, 2012, meeting and reported on its new recommendation. The BOG approved by a vote of 36-5 a motion to recommend that the Supreme Court reject adoption of section (12), Florida Statutes, as a rule of evidence on the grounds that it is 2

3 unconstitutional, will have a chilling effect on the ability to obtain expert witnesses, and is prejudicial to the administration of justice. The BOG directed that a report be written outlining its objections and submitted to the Supreme Court. See Appendix D. As required by Rule 2.140(b)(2), CREC published notice of its revised recommendations in the December 1, 2012, Florida Bar News. (See Appendix E.) As provided by the rule, any written comments were directed to be provided to the Court. II. Three-year Cycle Recommendations. A. Section , Florida Statutes. The fiduciary lawyer-client privilege enacted in 2011 by Chapter , Laws of Florida (see Appendix F), and codified at section , Florida Statutes, should be adopted as a rule of procedure to the extent it is procedural. This recommendation was approved by CREC by a 30-1 vote. The Board of Governors concurred in this recommendation by a 33-0 vote. The statute reads as follows: Fiduciary lawyer-client privilege. (1) For the purpose of this section, a client acts as a fiduciary when serving as a personal representative or a trustee as defined in ss and , an administrator ad litem as described in s , a curator as described in s , a guardian or guardian ad litem as defined in s , a conservator as defined in s , or an attorney in fact as described in chapter 709. (2) A communication between a lawyer and a client acting as a fiduciary is privileged and protected from disclosure under s to the same extent as if the client were not acting as a fiduciary. In applying s to a communication under this section, only the person or entity acting as a fiduciary is considered a client of the lawyer. (3) This section does not affect the crime or fraud exception to the lawyer-client privilege provided in s (4)(a). Whether a fiduciary is entitled to the lawyer-client privilege when the fiduciary employs an attorney in connection with his or her fiduciary duties has been an issue in 3

4 several cases. In Jacob v. Barton, 877 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), a trustee was sued by a beneficiary alleging mismanagement of a trust. The beneficiary sought production of the trustee s attorney s billing records, which the trustee claimed contained privileged information. On certiorari review, the district court quashed the lower court s order requiring the production of the records and directed the lower court to determine whether the beneficiary was the person who would ultimately benefit from the legal work performed by the trustee s attorney. If that were the case, the beneficiary would be considered the real client and he, rather than the trustee, would be the holder of the lawyer-client privilege. Id. at 937. The Second District engaged in a similar analysis in the context of a guardianship in Tripp v. Salkovitz, 919 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The new fiduciary lawyer-client privilege codified at section , Florida Statutes, permits a fiduciary to maintain the lawyer-client privilege to the same extent as if he or she were not acting as a fiduciary. Under subsection (2), only the person acting as the fiduciary is considered a client of the lawyer, rather than the beneficiary or ward, thereby rendering the analysis in Jacob and Tripp irrelevant. B. Section (2)(f), Florida Statutes. CREC also recommends that the new hearsay exception enacted in 2012 by Chapter , Laws of Florida (see Appendix G) and codified at section (2)(f), Florida Statutes, be adopted as a rule of procedure to the extent it is procedural. This recommendation was approved by CREC by a 28-3 vote. The BOG concurred in this recommendation by a 33-0 vote. The statute reads as follows: Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.... (2)(f) Statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused the declarant s unavailability. A statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, the declarant s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result. Section (2)(f), Florida Statutes, is essentially the same exception set forth in Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) and is a codification of the common law rule that one who wrongfully procures the absence of a witness from court cannot complain of the admission of the hearsay statement of the witness. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, , 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878). Section (2)(f), Florida Statutes, has 4

5 been found to be procedural in nature and has been applied by the lower courts with the presumption that this Court will adopt it as a rule. See Mortimer v. State, 100 So. 3d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). C. Section (12), Florida Statutes. CREC recommends that the medical malpractice expert witness provision enacted in 2011 by Chapter , Laws of Florida (see Appendix H), and codified at section (12), Florida Statutes, should be adopted as a rule of procedure to the extent that it is procedural. The original proposal also included sections , , and , Florida Statutes, and was approved by CREC on January 26, 2012, by a vote of CREC later withdrew sections , , and , Florida Statutes, from its recommendations by a vote of 26-0 as these statutes appeared to be substantive rather than procedural in nature. CREC reapproved its recommendation regarding section (12), Florida Statutes, by a vote. The statute reads as follows: Medical negligence; standards of recovery; expert witness. (12) If a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 or a dentist licensed under chapter 466 is the party against whom, or on whose behalf, expert testimony about the prevailing professional standard of care is offered, the expert witness must be licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, or chapter 466 or possess a valid expert witness certificate issued under s , s , or s The Committee shares many of the concerns expressed in the comments received regarding section (12), Florida Statutes (see Appendix B). These concerns include the possibility that the statute might limit the field of available experts or discourage some out of state experts from testifying in Florida. 1 The recommendation regarding section (12), Florida Statutes, is made in the context of the background and purpose of the three-year review process and the criteria that has emerged from that process (see discussion below). The recommendation is not and should not be viewed as an endorsement of this law or an opinion on whether the law may or may not be subject to a successful challenge when applied to a specific case. The Supreme Court has held in previous three-year cycle opinions that it will not 1 The Department of Health reports that 995 out of state experts have obtained their expert witness certificate as of January 29, See 5

6 consider extraneous arguments concerning the validity of statutes during the three-year cycle process but rather will wait for an actual case or controversy in which opposing sides have the opportunity to fully litigate and brief the issues under real, as opposed to hypothetical, circumstances. III. Background and Purpose of Three-Year Cycle Review of Evidentiary Statutes Under Art. V, 2 of the Florida Constitution [t]he supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts. This amendment has been construed to prohibit the legislature from enacting laws that would govern a practice or procedure in court. When the Florida legislature passed the Florida Evidence Code in 1976, the Supreme Court recognized that many provisions of the Code might violate Article V, because they governed or touched upon practice and procedure. To avoid disputes concerning the constitutionality of the Code under Article V, the Supreme Court by per curiam opinion in 1979 adopted the entire Evidence Code as a rule of procedure to the extent it was procedural. The court s rationale for this action was [t]o avoid multiple appeals and confusion in the operation of the court caused by assertions that portions of the evidence code are procedural and, therefore, unconstitutional because they had not been adopted by this Court under its rule-making authority. In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979). In 1981 the Supreme Court adopted Fla. R. Jud. Admin (now 2.140) and ordered The Florida Bar to create the Code & Rules of Evidence Committee. The court directed that CREC report to the court every four years (now three) with recommendations regarding whether changes to the Code should be adopted as rules of procedure to avoid conflict with Article V. Although under Rule The Florida Bar Board of Governors is required to vote on the CREC recommendations, CREC may amend its recommendations to coincide with the recommendation [of the BOG] or may decline to do so or may amend its recommendations in another manner. Rule 2.140(b)(4). From 1983 to 2000, CREC recommended that new evidentiary statutes be adopted as rules of procedure to avoid conflict with Article V and the Supreme Court did so. 6

7 When the Supreme Court adopts a new evidentiary statute as a rule of procedure, it does so via published opinion, which in most cases simply states that the new statute is hereby adopted by a rule of procedure to the extent it is procedural. No separate rule of evidence is drafted or published. In effect, these series of Supreme Court opinions, most of them brief per curiam opinions, constitute the rules of evidence. 2 In 2000, CREC for the first time recommended that a new provision of the Code, an exception to the hearsay rule, not be adopted as a rule of procedure. The BOG concurred with the recommendation. The court agreed with the CREC recommendation and did not adopt the new exception as a rule of procedure. In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 782 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2000) ( 2000 Opinion ). In 2002, CREC recommended that a new Code provision addressing similar fact evidence in child molestation cases not be adopted as a rule of procedure. The BOG concurred in the recommendation. The court rejected the recommendation and adopted the statute as a rule of procedure. In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 825 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2002) ( 2002 Opinion. ) In 2004, 2007, and 2011, CREC recommended that all new evidentiary statutes passed during these three year cycle periods be adopted as rules of procedure to avoid conflict with Article V. The BOG concurred with these recommendations. The court agreed with the recommendations and adopted the new statutes as rules of procedure. In its 2011 report, CREC also requested that a clarifying comment to sections and , Florida Statutes, be added to address inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications. The court declined to adopt the requested comment because it appears to address an issue of law we have not yet ruled on. In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 53 So. 3d 1019, 1020 (2011). 2 In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979); The Florida Bar. In re Amendment of Florida Evidence Code, 404 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1981); In re Amendment of Florida Evidence Code, 497 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1986); In re Florida Evidence Code, 638 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1993); In re Florida Evidence Code, 675 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1996); In Re: Amendment to the Florida Evidence Code, 782 So.2 d 339 (Fla. 2000); In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 825 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2002); In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code Section , 914 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2005); Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 891 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2004); In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 960 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2007); In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 53 So. 3d 1019 (Fla. 2011). 7

8 The Supreme Court has stated in several opinions that in adopting new statutes as rules of procedure to avoid conflict with Article V, it otherwise expresses no opinion on the validity or substance of the statute until a true case or controversy comes before it. (See 2002 Opinion.) IV. The 2000 and 2002 Supreme Court Opinions To date, the only guidance concerning the criteria applied by the Supreme Court in determining whether a new evidentiary statute should be adopted as a rule of procedure is contained in the 2000 and 2002 Opinions. In the 2000 Opinion, the court considered a new hearsay exception that is presently codified in section (22), Florida Statutes. This exception permits the admission of deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony without a showing of unavailability. The exception applies in both civil and criminal cases. Consistent with CREC s recommendation, the court declined to adopt this exception as a rule of procedure primarily because of grave concerns about the constitutionality of the amendment under the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause So. 2d at 342. The 2000 opinion is the only time since the adoption of the Code in 1976 that the court declined to adopt a change in the Code as a rule of procedure. In the 2002 Opinion, the court rejected the recommendation of CREC that a new similar fact evidence rule in child molestation cases ( (2)(b), Fla. Stat.) not be adopted as a rule of procedure. CREC based its 2002 recommendation upon the possible conflict between the new statute and section (1), Florida Statutes (character evidence is inadmissible to prove person acted in conformity with that character trait); section (2), Florida Statutes (similar fact evidence is inadmissible when relevant only to prove bad character or propensity); and section (2), Florida Statutes (court should permit inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury). In a 4-3 opinion, the court adopted the statute as a rule of procedure to avoid conflict with Article V. As in their other opinions, the court 3 While the court focused on the constitutionality of the law, the court also stated that its decision was also based upon many of the concerns raised by opponents. The court did not identify which of the other concerns it found significant. The other concerns, however, included direct conflict with existing rules of procedure regarding use of depositions. 8

9 declined to express an opinion on the substantive issues regarding the new statute because of the absence of a true case and controversy before the court. V. Criteria from the 2000 and 2002 Opinions The 2000 and 2002 opinions provide guidance concerning the criteria that should be employed by CREC in evaluating a new evidentiary statute and determining whether it should recommend its adoption as a rule. If the evidentiary statute is procedural in nature, these opinions appear to establish the following criteria for rejection of the statute as a rule of procedure 4 : 1. Does the evidentiary statute directly conflict with a procedural constitutional right (e.g., the fifth or sixth amendment) so that compliance with the statute would necessarily violate the constitution? (See 2000 Opinion.) 2. Does the evidentiary statute directly conflict with another procedural rule (civil, criminal, etc.) to the extent that compliance with the statute would necessarily violate the procedural rule? (See 2000 Opinion.) CREC has determined that none of the statutes contained in this recommendation directly conflict with a procedural constitutional right or another procedural rule. VI. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the Code and Rules of Evidence Committee of the Florida Bar respectfully requests this Honorable Court to adopt sections , (2)(e), and (12), Florida Statutes, as rules of procedure to the extent they are procedural. 4 An additional criteria was suggested by the 2002 dissent but not adopted by the majority, and can be stated as follows: Does the evidentiary statute directly conflict with another provision of the Evidence Code so that compliance with the new statute would necessarily violate another provision of the Code? 9

10 Respectfully submitted January 30, /s/thomas D. Shults THOMAS D. SHULTS, ESQ. Chair, Code & Rules of Evidence Committee KIRK-PINKERTON, P.A. 240 S. Pineapple Avenue, 6 th Floor Sarasota, FL (941) Florida Bar No _/s/ John F. Harkness, Jr JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR. Executive Director The Florida Bar 651 E. Jefferson Street Tallahassee, FL (850) Florida Bar No jharkness@flabar.org tshults@kirkpinkerton.com 10

11 CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE I certify that these statutes were read against Westlaw. I certify that this report was prepared was prepared in compliance with the font requirements of Fla. R. App. P (a)(2). Ellen H. Sloyer, Staff Liaison /s/ Ellen H. Sloyer Code and Rules of Evidence Committee 651 E. Jefferson Street Tallahassee, FL /