Briefing note on the situation in the South of Thailand March 2009

Transcription

1 Briefing note on the situation in the South of Thailand March 2009 Introduction The conflict in the South is one of the major challenges that Thailand faces today, a complicated question with various dimensions, political, cultural, social and religious. Its origins are deeply rooted in history, when Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, the three southern provinces were officially annexed to Thailand. While the region has known both periods of conflict escalation and relative calm, the current violence dates to January 2004, when an unknown number of assailants attacked an army outpost, stole arms from the depot and killed four soldiers. As a result the government felt that it was «necessary to respond by restoring sate authority in the area as quickly as possible». 1 Since January 2004, there have been thousands of victims in the ongoing conflict, the majority of them civilians. According to the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center, the smallest amount of deaths and injuries from 2004 to July 2008 constituted insurgents with a total of 271. The largest group, on the other hand, were civilians numbering 5,119 followed by state authorities with 2,837 deaths and injuries. 2 In April 2004, hundreds of men with machetes stormed government offices in three provinces at the same time. Five policemen and soldiers lost their lives while 106 militants died. Among them were 32 militants who had sought refuge in the Krue-ze mosque in Pattani. In October 2004, in Tak Bai district, Narathiwat, more than one thousand people gathered in front of the provincial police station demanding that the authorities grant bail to six Thai Muslims. 3 Officials used force to break up the crowd, resulting in six deaths. About 1300 persons were arrested. During transportation of those arrested to a military camp, 78 men suffocated to death from being stacked upon each other in the trucks. 4 The judiciary is currently inquiring into those deaths, however without any concrete results. In addition, six persons were shot in front of Tak Bai Police Station, and one later died from gunshot wounds in hospital. To date, there has been no proper investigation into these events; local 1 Report of the National Reconciliation Commission, p Cited in Nonviolence International Southeast Asia. Rule by the Gun: Armed Civilians and Firearms Proliferation in Southern Thailand. May 2009, p According to NGOs see State's deaf o Tak Bai victims' cry for justice, 25 October 2008, published by the Nation. The NRC stated that there were 3000 persons. 4 Report of the National reconciliation Commission, p.47. ASSOCIATION RECONNUE D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE 17, PASSAGE DE LA MAIN-D'OR, PARIS, FRANCE, TEL.:+33(0) , FAX:+33(0) fidh@fidh.org N ー SIREN CODE APE 913E

2 human rights groups demand the truth on this incident and request that the perpetrators be identified and brought to justice. 5 The impunity with which these human rights abuses are committed is a clear obstacle to the restoration of a sustainable peace in the South. Several government bodies, including the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) have attempted to raise the government's awareness on this issue. The NHRC, however, is lacking authority and can only make non-binding recommendations. 6 In the realm of civil society, the human rights community in Thailand is small, especially advocacy NGOs. Their voice regarding the situation in the South is not always heard or respected. As for journalists, few of them are following the situation in the South for the main Thai media outlets, and they themselves do not belong to the Muslim minority. As a consequence, coverage by mainstream Thai media is limited, and often carries stereotyped views of the Thai Muslim minority. There are however a few alternative media outlets which report with a more balanced approach on the conflict. The decrease in violence during the past years and the current political turmoil in Thailand have lessened concerns over the situation in the South. The conflict does not seem to be a priority for the authorities. Causes of the conflict Cultural and religious dimension: In Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, the three southern provinces in Thailand, the majority of the population is Muslim and of Malay ethnicity, while the majority of the Thai population in the rest of the country is Buddhist. There has never been recognition of the identity of the Thai Malay minority living in the three Southern provinces of Thailand. The yawi malay language is not the second official language in Thailand despite proposals, made notably by the National Reconciliation Commission, advocating such move. Teachers in public schools in the South do not belong to the Malay minority and do not speak Malay. They are often perceived by the local population as having the mission to «thaicize» the South. Many Thai buddhists left the southern provinces over the past few years as a consequence of targeted violence against them by insurgent groups. In this context, recognition of the Malay identity appears an important step to foster peace. Political dimension: There is no adequate participation by the population of the Southern provinces in decision-making processes concerning them. Natural resources have been exploited without consultation of the local communities, which has contributed to a general feeling of resentment. Increased local autonomy should be considered. Social and economic dimension: Young Malay Thai have relatively few options for employment, economic progress and integration into Thai society, and are often relegated to traditional work in small fisheries, family orchards, and rubber plantations. The perception of unequal opportunity generates frustration and resentment. 7 Improving education and work opportunities in the South is crucial to improve the situation in the region. 5 Working Group on Justice for Peace Demands the Government Reveal the Truth about Tak Bai Massacre, 2 March 2008, at 6 Working Group on Justice for Peace. Thailand's Unarmed Heroes: An Overview of the Situation of Human Rights Defenders. December P The Asia Foundation, Programs addressing violent conflict.

3 Past official initiatives to solve the conflict A National Reconciliation Commission was appointed in March 2005 by the initiative of Prime Minister Thaksin. The mandate of that body is to recommend to the government policies, measures and mechanisms conducive to reconciliation and peace in the three southern border provinces. The NRC made its conclusions public in May 2006, and identified a series of measures to put an end to violence in the Southern provinces, including: the necessity to engage in dialogue with militant groups the establishment of an unarmed peace unit to work on peace-building to fight impunity for human rights violations to increase local autonomy in regards to the management of natural resources to improve economic opportunities and address unemployment to reform and improve the administration of justice to improve the quality and diversity of education to promote cultural diversity, including declaring the Pattani Malay an additional working language in the southern border provinces to establish bodies ensuring local participation in the decision-making processes. The National Economic and Social Council also addressed recommendations to the government in October 2007 concerning the settlement of the conflict in the South. However, those various recommendations have not yet been implemented, and the approach of successive governments regarding the conflict in the South has remained unchanged: the main issue remains the security aspect. As a consequence, serious and systematic human rights violations are being perpetrated in the Southern provinces by the military as it attempts to resolve the conflict. Impunity remains the rule, and because of the strong influence of the army in Thai political life, it is difficult to scrutinize their actions and impose oversight by civil administration. The current government plans to set up a special administration for the South and it remains to be seen whether and when it will be established and what its mandate will be. Legal framework prevailing in the south of Thailand Thailand has four anti-terror laws: The amended criminal code incorporating terrorist acts into its list of offenses Martial law allowing detention for up to seven days Emergency Decree (Decree on Government Administration in Emergency Situations) of July 2005 allowing detention by security officials without charge for 30 additional days with court approval (but court approval is nearly automatic); if the person is not charged, s/he has to be freed. Under the Decree, law enforcement officials are immune from civil, criminal and disciplinary penalties. Internal Security Act, which includes re-education under military supervision for suspects in security-related cases, to be decided by the Internal Security Operations Command Director (ISOC dominated by the military) with court consent. To date, the areas where it should apply have not been announced, thus the law is not yet operational. This array of special laws creates an environment conducive to human rights violations and impunity.

4 Major human rights violations reported in the South Local military commanders have relative autonomy and each may undertake independent actions once in the field. Military commanders change every four years. Regular changes in command, combined with the essentially free hand they are given once in the field, creates an environment of impunity for the military. Indiscriminate and arbitrary arrests Arrests are often indiscriminate. Local NGOs report that since July 2005, «cordon and search operations», mass arrests of up to suspects at a time, have become a widely used method. Relatives of detainees are often not informed about their place of detention. 8 The military reportedly has blacklists of individuals, while those appearing on such lists but people may appear on those lists even if they did not commit any crime. Suspects are accused of sedition or separatism (bombing, killing policemen, burning schools, possession of lethal weapons, etc). In most cases, courts find that the public prosecution does not have enough evidence to demonstrate guilt. In these cases the accused are released, however, as bail is often denied, most spend several years in prison before their acquittal. In addition, in the last few years, cases have been reported where persons were assassinated following their release; local people believe that the law enforcement agencies are responsible for some of those killings. 9 This represents an important proportion of those released; e.g., in 2006, it was reported that out of 15 persons who were acquitted of all insurgency-related charges by the courts, 11 were later assassinated. As a consequence, the people are losing faith in the State and its institutions. Systematic use of torture and large number of enforced disappearances According to Amnesty International, Thai security forces have systematically relied on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in their effort to obtain information, to extract confessions, to compensate for poor intelligence and evidence-gathering, and to intimidate detainees and their communities in order to discourage support for the insurgents. 10 When the government acknowledges torture, the military personnel concerned is transferred to another province. This practice, denounced in the NRC report of May 2006, still prevails. Thanks to the mobilization of local human rights groups, in particular the Muslim Attorney Centre, more and more cases of torture and extra-judicial killings are being brought to courts. In March 2008, Imam Yapa Kaseng, a Narathiwat cleric, was beaten to death in front of his two sons while in the custody of a military task force. In December 2008, the Narathiwat court ruled on this case. It was the first time in a case relating to the situation in the South that a judge admitted that torture led to death. 11 The next step is to obtain compensation for the family of the victim. 8 Stop torture, enforce the laws and abide by the rule of law, submitted by Cross cultural Foundation, Muslim Attorney Centre, Working Group on Justice and Peace, Human Rights and Development Foundation, Young Muslim Association of Thailand, Campaign Committee for Human Rights and Union for Civil Liberty, February 2008, updated in November 2008, accessed at view=article&catid=10%3areport&id=32%3a &format=pdf&option=com_content&itemid=12&lang=en, para Amnesty International, Thailand: torture in the southern counter-insurgency, January

5 In another case, on 14 January 2009, the Bangkok civil court admitted a lawsuit for torture filed by two Yala students (Armeesee Manark and Issamae Tae) against the Thai Army and Ministry of Defense. They were detained in January 2008 for interrogation and claim that they were beaten and tortured during their detention. The next hearing will be on 30 March HRW has documented the practice of the Thai security forces of «disappearing» persons suspected of being or supporting militants. 13 In these cases, persons are detained by government forces or their agents who refuse to acknowledge that the person is in fact in custody and/or refuse to give information regarding their status. Emergence of extrajudicial killings The Muslim Attorney Centre (MAC) reports that there is a rising number of extra-judicial killings and, as discussed previously, assasinations of detained persons who are then released. A recent case concerns Imam Abdulkarim Usoh, of Ban Kayee Mosque, who was shot on 30 January He was released from Pattani prison on 30 October 2008, after the Pattani Provincial Court acquitted him of charges relating to possession of illegal weapons. He had spent one year in prison because bail had been denied. 14 Attacks on human rights defenders Harassment of defenders in the South is on the rise and in a time of conflict they are particularly exposed to repression. MAC was established in February 2007 and consists of human rights lawyers who provide free legal aid to the people, especially those who have been affected by special laws such as the Martial Law and the Emergency Decree which are in force in the three provinces of southern Thailand. The MAC has established a network of para-legal volunteers to assist the lawyers and provide legal education to the people living in the South (villagers at community level). This is all the more important as most lawyers are based in Bangkok, there are no lawyers in rural areas, and very few in the capital provinces. However, those para-legal volunteers are regularly threatened by the military and as a consequence have to leave the region to be housed in safer places elsewhere. Such threats may take the form of military showing a picture of the para-legal to his/her relatives, asking do you know this person? S/he is cooperating with the insurgents. In other instances the threats take the form of an invitation to come to a military base. On 8 February 2009, a group of 20 police and army officers searched the Pattani offices of the Working Group on Justice and Peace (WGJP) for roughly three hours. The Working Group on Justice for Peace is a local human rights organization headed by Ms. Angkana Neelaphaijit, whose husband, human rights lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit, disappeared on 12 March 2004 in Bangkok. 15 This event is widely considered as a governmental response to the human rights work that WGJP is carrying out in the Southern provinces See joint press release by Human Rights Lawyer Association and Cross Cultural Foundation, 14 January 2009, accessed at 13 Human Rights Watch: «It was like suddenly my son no longer existed», Enforced disappearances in Thailand's southern border provinces, March Cross Cultural Foundation, Call for independent Committee to investigate and resolve all cases of targeted killings in the Deep South, bring back transparency of Thai Judicial system for trust building, accessed at 15 See Observatory trial observation report Somchai abduction trial: justice granted or justice denied?, January 2006, accessed at 16 See AHRC, see also

6 On March 12, 2009, an eyewitness saw an insurgent fatally shoot Laila Paaitae Daoh, a prominent Muslim women s rights activist and peace advocate, in Krongpenang district, Yala province. She was rushed to Yala Hospital Center, but died of her wounds the next day. Laila and her family had long received threats and had been targets of insurgent attacks. 17 This killing confirms the fear expressed by several actors met by FIDH in Bangkok in February 2009 that human rights defenders might be increasingly caught between the military and insurgents, and victims of attacks from both sides. The search for truth regarding the enforced disappearance of human rights lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit remains a key concern. Somchai Neelaphaijit was the lawyer of victims of torture in the South. He was the victim of an enforced disappearance in On 12 January 2006, the Criminal Court convicted a senior police officer of coercion and assault but not of the enforced disappearance itself and he was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The police officer was released on bail pending his appeal, which is still outstanding. The persons who ordered the attack on Somchai Neelaphaijit have not yet been identified and the inquiry is still under way. In 2007, the Department of Special Investigation took over the case from the police but no significant progress has been made since then. Weaknesses of the judicial system Defense cannot access and assess the evidence before it is presented to the court. Although the prosecutor gives a list of evidence, it cannot be consulted by the defense before the trial. There is a lack of court interpreters, and Malay people can often not understand the proceedings; the same is true during the investigation phase by the police. There is only one medical coroner in the entire South, and forensic expertise is lacking, which affects the quality of investigations. There is a clear need to improve expertise on forensic sciences by the police and prosecution. The police often do not properly secure crime scenes. Moreover, it is the police who investigate all crimes, even those committed by police and military officers, thereby compromising the investigation' independence. 18 Another obstacle to proper investigation is reluctance by local people to ask for an autopsy, because of religious beliefs. Denial of Development assistance In May 2008 the cabinet approved 58 billion baht to implement 538 development projects in the southernmost provinces. The authorities identified so-called red zones, areas of the highest violence, which are cut off form development assistance and only military operations take place. 19 As economic grievances are seen as a main factor in the southern uprising, such a policy cannot be regarded as addressing root problems Working Group on Justice for Peace. Thailand's Unarmed Heroes: An Overview of the Situation of Human Rights Defenders. December P Nonviolence International Southeast Asia. Rule by the Gun: Armed Civilians and Firearms Proliferation in Southern Thailand. May P. 12.

7 Recommendations to the Thai authorities: Ensure effective civilian control over the army; Investigate independently and fully past human rights violations (Tak Bai and Krue Se in particular, as well as the enforced disappearance of Somchai Neelaphaijit and other attacks on human rights defenders), and bring those responsible to court; Revoke martial law and amend the emergency decree and the ISA to increase accountability of security forces, and allow detainees prompt access to lawyers and family; Criminalize torture in domestic legislation in accordance with CAT (ratified in November 2007), and take effective steps to prevent, stop and punish torture; Ratify the UN Convention on enforced disappearances, conduct prompt investigations into allegations of disappearances, prosecute those responsible and compensate the victims; Strengthen the capacity of the judiciary to deal with human rights violations in the South through increased financial means (notably for forensic sciences), and adequate interpreters for witnesses and victims; Train security forces in human rights prior to deployment; Implement the NRC recommendations; Invite the UN Special Rapporteurs on torture and on extrajudicial killings, as well as the UN working groups on arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances. ************