What about the Women? Female Headship, Poverty and Vulnerability

Transcription

1 What about the Women? Female Headship, Poverty and Vulnerability in Thailand and Vietnam Tobias Lechtenfeld with Stephan Klasen and Felix Povel January 2011 OECD Conference, Paris

2 Thailand and Vietnam Study Area

3 Female-Headed Households Thailand Vietnam Population 63 Million 85 Million 25% of population in SE Asia Female Head 29.3% 17.4% in rural areas GDP Growth 7.4% 8.1% since mid-80s, annually Poverty 40% 74% headcount 1985 Reduction 12% 22% headcount 2008 Poverty reduction by 2/3 in only 2 decades How inclusive has growth been for typically poor and vulnerable groups: Female Headed Households, incl. Single Mothers, Widows?

4 Female-Headed Households 1. Theory Why could Female Headed Households be vulnerable? 2. Methods Poverty traps and Vulnerability 3. Data Households in Thailand and Vietnam 4. Results Shocks, Poverty traps and Income sources

5 Theory Why could Female Headed Households be most vulnerable? A. Differences between men and women (Gender-related Economic Gap) limited access to markets B. Differences between Male- and Female-Headed Households work burden lack of support

6 Theory A. Differences between men and women (Gender-related Economic Gap) access to land dominated by men, if female ownership, much smaller inheritance and land titling laws direct income effect (World Bank, 2007) formal credit markets (King et al., 2007) lack of collateral (Storey, 2004; Diagne et al., 2000) hard to start own business (King et al., 2007; Blackden Bhanu, 1999) insurance markets hardly functioning for men and women alike BUT: impact stronger for women lack of pension system lack of health insurance often access only through spouses (World Bank, 2001)

7 Theory A. Differences between men and women (cont) labour market different wages differential access to wage employment (Collier, 1994) less productive in employment girls receive less schooling (World Bank, 2001) less work experience (social stigma against labour) (King et al., 2007) less productive in farming adopt new production technology less likely (Chirwa, 2005; Asfaw and Admassie, 2004)

8 Theory B. Differences between Male- and Female-Headed Households double day burden handle domestic work and the role of main earner simultaneously (Moghadam, 1997). time and mobility constraints impacts negatively households income (Buvinic and Gupta, 1997). lack of support from social networks reduced family network to draw on (Bibars, 2001; Chant, 2008)

9 Empirical Evidence Poverty situation of female headed households Quisumbing et al.(2001): 10 country analysis, comparable methods Only in 2 of 10 countries FHH more poor Buvinic and Gupta (1997): review of 61 studies on FHH In 38 studies FHH more poor In 15 studies some FHH type more poor In 8 studies no evidence of increased poverty Situation largely country specific Lampietti and Stalker (2000), Ye (1998), and Haddad et al. (1996)

10 Data Sample Size: 4361 Households, 3 Panel Waves Country Female Male Thailand Vietnam De Jure De Facto Thailand Vietnam Widow Single Absent Husband Thailand Vietnam

11 Analysis Six sets of analysis 1. Poverty 2. Exposure to shocks 3. Shock severity 4. Vulnerability to downside risk 5. Vulnerability to poverty 6. Consumption Smoothing

12 Analysis 1. Consumption Poverty Consumption Regression Outcome: Consumption per capita Adult equivalent scales: reflect different consumption needs Reduces bias in the poverty estimates Economies of Scale at household level Reduces bias in the poverty estimate

13 1. Consumption Poverty (2007) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Shock GENDER FACTO/JURE TYPE Exposure Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Female Head *** (0.0297) (0.0350) De Facto FHH 0.289*** 0.183** (0.0482) (0.0697) De Jure FHH ** (0.0335) (0.0372) FHH, absent husband 0.293*** 0.178** (0.0483) (0.0697) FHH, widow (0.0348) (0.0377) FHH, single *** (0.0744) (0.0736) Observations 2,169 2,180 2,169 2,180 2,169 2,180 Adj. R-squared *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, with village dummies Regressions include controls: dep. ratio, edu level, age, inc sources, land

14 1. Consumption Poverty (2008) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Shock GENDER FACTO/JURE TYPE Exposure Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Female Head ** (0.0345) (0.0323) De Facto FHH 0.188*** 0.203*** (0.0667) (0.0680) De Jure FHH *** (0.0384) (0.0353) FHH, absent husband 0.187*** 0.196*** (0.0667) (0.0678) FHH, widow (0.0429) (0.0390) FHH, single *** (0.0826) (0.0638) Observations 2,121 2,144 2,121 2,144 2,121 2,144 Adj. R-squared *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, with village dummies Regressions include controls: dep. ratio, edu level, age, inc sources, land

15 Analysis 2. Exposure to shocks Probit Regression - Outcome: Binary Shock Aggregate Income Shock Health Shock Social Shock Credit Problem Birth Social Obligation Price Shock Illness Migrated Hh Member Job / Business Loss Accident Crime / Law / Jail Remittance Drop Death House Damage Livestock Disease Crop Pest Storm / Rain / Cold Drought

16 Credit Problem Price Shock Job / Business Loss Remittance Drop Livestock Disease Crop Pest Storm / Rain / Cold Drought Birth Illness Accident Death Social Obligation Migrated Hh Member Crime / Law / Jail House Damage 2. Exposure to shocks: Shock Incidence (2007) Any Shock No Shock Thailand Vietnam Income Shock Health Shock Social Shock Thailand Vietnam Market Shock Agricultural Supply Shock Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam

17 Credit Problem Price Shock Job / Business Loss Remittance Drop Livestock Disease Crop Pest Storm / Rain / Cold Drought Birth Illness Accident Death Social Obligation Migrated Hh Member Crime / Law / Jail House Damage 2. Exposure to shocks: Shock Incidence (2008) Any Shock No Shock Thailand Vietnam Income Shock Health Shock Social Shock Thailand Vietnam Market Shock Agricultural Supply Shock Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam

18 2. Exposure to shocks (2007) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Any Shock GENDER FACTO/JURE TYPE Exposure Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Female Head ** (0.0267) (0.0316) De Facto FHH (0.0595) (0.0748) De Jure FHH ** (0.0283) (0.0376) FHH, absent husband (0.0597) (0.0746) FHH, widow * (0.0295) (0.0407) FHH, single (0.0658) (0.0746) Observations 2,172 2,189 2,172 2,189 2,172 2,189 Wald Chi Prob > Chi Pseudo R *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, with district dummies Regressions include controls: dep. ratio, edu level, age, remittances, inc sources, land

19 2. Exposure to shocks (2008) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Any Shock GENDER FACTO/JURE TYPE Exposure Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Female Head (0.0289) (0.0341) De Facto FHH (0.0556) (0.0509) De Jure FHH (0.0321) (0.0375) FHH, absent husband (0.0557) (0.0507) FHH, widow (0.0340) (0.0425) FHH, single (0.0780) (0.0649) Observations 2,121 2,127 2,121 2,127 2,121 2,127 Wald Chi Prob > Chi Pseudo R *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, with district dummies Regressions include controls: dep. ratio, edu level, age, remittances, inc sources, land

20 Analysis 3. Shock Severity: Asset Loss Tobit Regression Outcome: Asset Loss from Shock, in ln(usd PPP) Intuition Model - Shocks can directly destroy assets (floods, fire, theft, etc) - Shock causes income loss and increased expenditure, making it necessary to sell assets

21 3. Shock Severity: Tobit, Asset Loss (2008) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Downward GENDER FACTO/JURE TYPE Risk Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Female Head * (1.234) (0.643) De Facto FHH ** (2.346) (1.132) De Jure FHH (1.464) (0.809) FHH, absent husband ** (2.349) (1.137) FHH, widow (1.564) (0.933) FHH, single (4.390) (1.281) Observations 1,290 1,564 1,290 1,564 1,290 1,564 Pseudo R *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, with village dummies Regressions include controls: dep. ratio, edu level, age, remittances, inc sources, land

22 Analysis 4. Vulnerability to Downside Risk (Povel 2009) OLS Regression Outcome: Vulnerability measure based on future expectation Intuition Sum of expected values of all possible deprivations of future states of the world of household with probability of occurrence and a degree of risk aversion Vulnerability Index: Downside Risk

23 4. Vulnerability to Downside Risk (2008) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Downward GENDER FACTO/JURE TYPE Risk Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Female Head ( ) ( ) De Facto FHH * ( ) ( ) De Jure FHH ( ) ( ) FHH, absent husband * ( ) ( ) FHH, widow ( ) ( ) FHH, single e-05 ( ) ( ) Observations 2,121 2,144 2,121 2,144 2,121 2,144 Adj. R-squared *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, with village dummies Regressions include controls: dep. ratio, edu level, age, remittances, inc sources, land

24 Analysis 5. Vulnerability to Poverty (Calvo & Dercon 2005) OLS Regression Outcome: Vulnerability measure based on past experiences Intuition Sum of expected values of all possible deprivations defined as, and censored at the poverty line with income, of future states of the world of household with probability of occurrence and a degree of risk aversion Vulnerability Index

25 5. Vulnerability to Poverty: Calvo Dercon (2007) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Downward GENDER FACTO/JURE TYPE Risk Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Female Head * ( ) ( ) De Facto FHH *** *** ( ) ( ) De Jure FHH ( ) (0.0108) FHH, absent husband *** *** ( ) ( ) FHH, widow ( ) (0.0115) FHH, single ( ) (0.0185) Observations 2,172 2,189 2,172 2,189 2,172 2,189 Adj. R-squared *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, with village dummies Regressions include controls: dep. ratio, edu level, age, remittances, inc sources, land

26 5. Vulnerability to Poverty: Calvo Dercon (2008) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Downward GENDER FACTO/JURE TYPE Risk Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Female Head ( ) ( ) De Facto FHH *** ( ) ( ) De Jure FHH * ( ) ( ) FHH, absent husband *** ( ) ( ) FHH, widow * ( ) ( ) FHH, single ( ) (0.0108) Observations 2,121 2,144 2,121 2,144 2,121 2,144 Adj. R-squared *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses, with village dummies Regressions include controls: dep. ratio, edu level, age, remittances, inc sources, land

27 Analysis 6. Consumption Smoothing (Townsend 1994) OLS Regression Outcome Changes in consumption over time Determinants - Income changes over time - Gender of headship Intuition Coefficients show the degree of uninsured exposure to risk

28 6. Consumption Smoothing ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Female Head De Facto vs. De Jure FHH Subgroups OLS: Consumption Change Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Thailand Vietnam Income Change *** *** *** Female Head Female Head * Income Change 0.222*** * De Facto FHH De Jure FHH De Facto FHH * Income Change 0.425** De Jure FHH * Income Change 0.204** * FHH, absent husband FHH, widow FHH, single FHH, absent husb * Inc Change 0.423** FHH, widow * Income Change 0.181* * FHH, single * Income Change 0.344* Observations Adj R

29 Summary of Results Widows, Singles (de jure female headed households) more exposed to shocks less able to insure consumption against income shocks Absent Husbands (de facto female headed households) better off through remittances asset losses from shocks more severe but: counterfactual spurious: unclear why do husbands leave? Perceived vs experienced risk some difference between past shocks and future risk apparently gender related differences in risk perception

30 Conclusions 1. Welfare Generally female heads are not poorer Gender Analysis only useful when broken down in subgroups 2. Policy Headship is a useful concept for targeting Widows / Singles in need of social policy 3. Further Research Panel Analysis using 3 waves Selection process of migration decision of husband Are families able to weather through macro crises? Transmission of poverty to children (education, health)

31 Thank you! Göttingen University, Germany Development Economics Research Group

32 Covariates: Thailand (2007) Variable Male Headed Female Headed Absent Husband Widow Single Unit Consumption ln(usd PPP per adult) HH Size members Dependency Ratio ratio Children age< members Read 92.9% 79.4% 76.0% 92.4% 74.5% 83.6% % Schooling 95.5% 87.1% 85.0% 95.7% 82.9% 95.1% % Age years Land Size ln(hectar) Income Sources number Net remittances USD PPP per cap income shock 22.3% 19.1% 19.8% 16.3% 20.1% 18.0% % market shock 6.2% 5.5% 5.0% 7.6% 3.7% 11.5% % supply shock 17.7% 15.1% 15.6% 13.0% 17.1% 8.2% % health shock 9.3% 11.8% 13.4% 5.4% 13.1% 14.8% % social shock 3.8% 5.3% 5.0% 6.5% 4.7% 6.6% % Households N

33 Covariates: Thailand (2008) Variable Male Headed Female Headed Absent Husband Widow Single Unit Consumption ln(usd PPP per adult) HH Size members Dependency Ratio ratio Children age< members Read 93.1% 80.7% 77.8% 93.6% 76.8% 83.0% % Schooling 95.4% 88.1% 86.0% 97.4% 84.8% 92.5% % Age years Land Size ln(hectar) Income Sources number Net remittances USD PPP per cap income shock 47.8% 41.4% 42.4% 37.2% 42.9% 39.6% % market shock 20.1% 16.4% 16.7% 15.4% 17.3% 13.2% % supply shock 39.9% 34.3% 34.8% 32.1% 35.6% 30.2% % health shock 22.9% 26.2% 27.2% 21.8% 27.7% 24.5% % social shock 10.6% 11.9% 11.4% 14.1% 11.1% 13.2% % Households N

34 Covariates: Vietnam (2007) Variable Male Headed Female Headed Absent Husband Widow Single Unit Consumption ln(usd PPP per adult) HH Size members Dependency Ratio ratio Children age< members Read 89.6% 70.0% 64.5% 94.8% 62.9% 69.8% % Schooling 90.3% 68.7% 62.6% 96.6% 61.4% 66.7% % Age years Land Size ln(hectar) Income Sources number Net remittances USD PPP per cap income shock 44.0% 39.0% 41.1% 29.3% 43.1% 34.9% % market shock 2.9% 1.5% 0.8% 5.2% 0.5% 1.6% % supply shock 42.4% 37.8% 40.8% 24.1% 42.6% 34.9% % health shock 22.6% 26.9% 27.5% 24.1% 29.2% 22.2% % social shock 3.9% 4.3% 4.2% 5.2% 3.0% 7.9% % Households N

35 Covariates: Vietnam (2008) Variable Male Headed Female Headed Absent Husband Widow Single Unit Consumption ln(usd PPP per adult) HH Size members Dependency Ratio ratio Children age< members Read 88.0% 70.4% 66.7% 85.1% 63.2% 77.8% % Schooling 88.3% 70.1% 65.5% 88.1% 61.8% 77.8% % Age years Land Size ln(hectar) Income Sources number Net remittances USD PPP per cap income shock 62.4% 56.0% 55.8% 56.7% 57.4% 50.8% % market shock 2.8% 0.6% 0.7% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% % supply shock 61.1% 56.0% 55.8% 56.7% 57.4% 50.8% % health shock 24.1% 27.2% 29.6% 17.9% 30.4% 27.0% % social shock 8.6% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.8% 6.3% % Households N

36 Analysis Axioms of Vulnerability Measurement (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) symmetry over states continuity and differentiability scale invariance normalization probability-dependent effect of outcomes probability transfer constant relative or absolute risk sensitivity In-depth discussion available in Calvo and Dercon (2005)