Session 87. Draft please do not cite.

Transcription

1 XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki 2006 Estonian Economy under the Soviet Rule: A Historiographic Overview Martin Klesment Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre martin@ekdk.estnet.ee Session 87 Draft please do not cite. Soviet economic history has been and will be a challenging issue for historians. For years scholars have been puzzled with questions about economic growth under the Soviet rule. Typical problem, if doing original research in this field, appears to be lack of reliable sources, which also applies to Estonian case. If one considers previous accounts on this subject, another drawback appears, namely ideological determination of authors. Due to the latter, profoundly different approaches to economic history of Estonia under the Soviet rule exist, which makes the use of these materials rather complicated. This paper aims to distinguish between (ideologically) different types of writings on economic development and outline the progress of their argumentation. It is quite clear that Soviet authors writings on Estonia differ a lot from that written outside Soviet space and time. In terms of research problems it would be too ambitious a task to cover all topics here. There certainly are some issues that have received more attention, such as sovietisation in , post-war collectivisation and industrial development, but also more general problems of living standards and economic growth. This paper will summarise treatments of Estonian economic history under the Soviet rule, divided into three sections. The first group includes works by Soviet authors, the second section covers works by Estonians in exile, and the third group incorporates recent studies carried out after the fall of the Soviet Union. The history of Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) begins with the establishment of Bolshevik rule in June 1940, followed by the so-called first Soviet year, which lasted until the German occupation in the fall of The Soviet rule, or occupation, was re-established in the fall of 1944 and lasted until The periodisation of the latter era distinguishes late- Stalinism ( ), the period of territorial councils of national economy ( ), and recentralisation or stagnation period (since 1965). Because of unequal concentration of significant events over time, the present text pays more attention to interpretations of the first decades of the Soviet rule in Estonia. Publications in ESSR Although propaganda was almost always existent in ESSR s historical writing, it was much more intense during the first decades of the Soviet rule, taking forms of almost childish exaggerations about marvels of Soviet economy. During the 1970s and 1980s propaganda seems to be more concealed. Another feature of Soviet scholarship was that it rarely corrected itself, which means that even rather illogical statements, made by communist leadership with propaganda purposes, were later picked up by historians and repeated over again. Political statements about current situation became historical facts later. Transformation of Estonia to Soviet type of economic system during the first year has mostly been described as a success by Soviet authors. In order to emphasise this change, the previous period of independent republic was depicted as an anomaly in Estonian history. It 1

2 was usually stated that the period of independence discontinued the natural economic relations between Estonia and Russia, which had evolved for centuries. 1 In this sense, the events of 1940 were interpreted as a return to normality. It was common to interpret the Baltic economies as an integral part of Russia, performing their functions that had developed in relations with Russia. According to this rhetoric, the formation of independent republics discontinued normal relations that had been the foundation of the Baltic countries economic development for more than two centuries. 2 For the Soviet writing, it was important to show that changes such as land reform, nationalisation of enterprises, price and wages reforms, which took place in the first year of Soviet rule, were entirely positive developments. It was usually underscored that transition to socialist system was the result of a local initiative that occurred in revolutionary manner, being the result of workers hard situation in bourgeois Estonia. 3 Naturally, large part of this kind of interpretation was taken from the political leaders of the time. For example, a propagandistic statement made in the first year by political leaders was that during the first months of the Soviet government real wages of workers increased more than a third. 4 This statement was repeated after the war as well. 5 Similar type of argument was circulated about economic growth, stating that industrial production increased 60% during the first Soviet year More recent authors claimed that it was only in the first quarter of 1941, when Estonian industry produced 64.9% more compared to the first quarter of the previous year (which was supposed to be sufficient speed to achieve the status of an industrial country in 4-5 years), 7 but the provenance of the historical fact seems to be the same. During the postwar years, transition to socialism and the reforms of the first year were described in even more idealistic manner, in a style that could be termed Stalinist. 8 The statements were not accompanied by explanations of how was industrial production measured or how did other conditions change, which leaves the grounds of such a dramatic growth unclear. Soviet Estonian authors have later pointed out that Estonia, taking the course to socialism, was able to use the experiences and help of other Soviet republics. As a result of quick transformation, benefits such as free medical care and lowered housing rental fees improved population s well-being. 9 Another issue, constantly repeated by Soviet authors, was the increase of wages in the fall of Even in the 1980s, it was argued that workers wages experienced per cent rise in 1940, accompanied by equalisation of male and female workers wages. 10 Eduard Brandt devoted a chapter to praise the support coming from other Soviet republics to building of socialism in Estonia. 11 Unfortunately, facts about practical experiences of socialism building coming from older Soviet republics are not easy to find and the latest research speaks against this argument. Also, often-repeated statement 1 E. Brandt. Sotsialismi ülesehitamise mõningaid iseärasusi Nõukogude Eestis. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1955, pp A. Ansberg, V. Tarmisto. Eesti NSV: majandus ja kultuur. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1960, p See V. Krinal, O. Karma, H. Ligi, F. Sauks. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu. Tallinn: Valgus, 1979, p O. Sepre. Kergetööstus enne ja nüüd in: A. Vaarandi (ed.). Eesti minevikus ja nüüd. Tallinn: Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1941, lk See for example, J. Vares, Mida tõi nõukogude võim Eesti rahvale in: Viis aastat Nõukogude Eestit Tallinn: Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1945, lk ; O. Sepre, Eesti NSV 1944./45. aasta rahvamajanduslikud saavutused in: Viis aastat Nõukogude Eestit Tallinn: Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1945, lk A. Veimer. Eesti NSV majandusprobleeme. Tallinn: Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1945, p V. Krinal, O. Karma, H. Ligi, F. Sauks. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu. Tallinn: Valgus, 1979, p See, for example, E. Brandt. Sotsialismi ülesehitamise mõningaid iseärasusi Nõukogude Eestis. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1955, pp R. Juursoo, R. Pullat. A Brief History of the Estonian Working Class. Tallinn: Perioodika, 1981, pp See J. Kahk, K. Siilivask. Eesti NSV ajalugu. Tallinn: Perioodika, 1984, p See E. Brandt. Vennasrahvaste abi Eesti töötajaile sotsialismi ülesehitamisel in: Materjale Baltimaade rahvamajanduse ajaloost. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1956, pp

3 about wage increase was not correctly explained in the context of increasing prices. It was, nevertheless, clear that economic life changed dramatically during the first year and some later publications implied that changes were not always well designed. Vilmar Ruus described how in August 1940 Estonian economy was run by eight peoples' commissariats (other name for ministry), including 22 departments and dozens of subdepartments, 12 thus referring to vastly increasing bureaucracy. As shown below, dramatic bureaucratisation in economic management was later mentioned by foreign Estonians as an extremely inefficient feature of sovietisation. The German occupation in Estonia, following the withdrawal of the Soviets in the fall of 1941, has been much less treated by Soviet Estonian authors. As a rule, the German occupation was treated as a deliberate destruction of the achievements of the first Soviet year. A quite monumental volume on the German occupation begins with a statement about Estonian people having fought German invaders over 700 years since 13 th century. 13 The total sum of damages caused by German occupation to Soviet Estonia was declared to be 16.1 billion roubles in 1941 prices. This number was included in publications probably without any critical consideration. 14 Later it was stated that Estonia was the most damaged Soviet republic, if losses were calculated per capita. 15 Another claim of Soviet authors was that the German occupation government cancelled the Soviet land reform and nationalisations, which meant returning the land to kulaks. 16 In short, the German occupation was presented as something completely different from the first Soviet year, something that reversed the previous success and was impedance to rapid advancement of socialist economy in Estonia. Thus, a comfortable explanation to anything that failed during the first Soviet year. Publications of the immediate post-war years were highly ideological, mostly used as carriers of propaganda. It seems that during the first decade after the war, historians and researchers of economy dealt primarily with explaining decisions made by government and justifying these decisions. It served propaganda aims, because several issues (collectivisation through deportations, declared industrial growth but no goods to buy) probably raised questions among local population. As a result works were published explaining that transition from capitalism to socialism in Estonia occurred in circumstances which determined, for example, preferred development of oil-shale industry, collectivisation, etc. The nature of economic history research of these years has been outlined in a compilation composed of presentations at a conference in Tallinn in The issues addressed were, for example, support from friendly Soviet republics to Estonia during sovietisation, the importance of oilshale industry, collectivisation of agriculture in Estonia, agricultural situation in Estonia before sovietisation. 17 Agriculture was rather a problematic issue. The five-year plan prescribed that pre-war production level was to be exceeded in many agricultural fields already by 1947, 18 an aim which later turned out to be unattainable. In a similar vein, Endel Vint, whose research had specialised on grain production, wrote in 1948 that grain production was supposed to exceed the pre-war level in 1950 (an assertion which was, of course, in accordance with the official 12 V. Ruus. Sotsialistlikud ümberkorraldused Eestis Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1980, pp H. Kruus. Eesti rahva võitlusest saksa okupantidega minevikus in: M. Laosson, E. Päll, J. Saat (ed.-s). Saksa fašistlik okupatsioon Eestis aastail Tallinn, Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1947, p See A. Jõeäär, Kui suurt kahju tegid Saksa okupandid Eesti rahvamajandusele. in: M. Laosson, E. Päll, J. Saat (ed.-s). Saksa fašistlik okupatsioon Eestis aastail Tallinn, Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1947, pp. 182, V. Krinal, O. Karma, H. Ligi, F. Sauks. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu, p R. Juursoo, R. Pullat. A Brief History of the Estonian Working Class. Tallinn: Perioodika, 1981, pp See Materjale Baltimaade rahvamajanduse ajaloost. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, See A. Veimer. Uuest stalinlikust rahvamajanduse taastamise ja arendamise viie aasta plaanist. Tallinn: Poliitiline Kirjandus, 1946, pp

4 five-year plan). 19 Later, Vint corrected his optimistic statements, showing that in the 1940s and even in the 1950s grain production per hectare yielded much lower results than was necessary to reach the 1939 level. 20 Such corrections were rare. For obvious reasons, Soviet writing was not interested in publishing actual yields per hectare or real production. Ideological dictate required authors to deal with success of collectivisation. If one is looking for spectacular examples of Stalinist style of writing, it is worth considering Eduard Brandt's publications of the time. Brandt stated that collectivisation in Estonia was carried out with ultimate success, collective farms achieved better results already in the first years and poor peasants moved massively towards establishing collective farms. 21 Brandt, without any ground, claimed that overall grain production in 1950 was higher than that of (Later, even Soviet Estonian statistical yearbooks figures showed it considerably lower). In a similar vein, N. Buzulukov, analysing collectivisation in Estonia, argued that collectivisation was initiated by peasant farmers, who were convinced that small farms could not achieve increasing work productivity. 23 Such works may have left an impression that it really was peasantry who initiated collectivisation. Some more light on the issue was shed in a book by V. Matin and M. Bronštein, which mentioned that intensification of agricultural co-operation was decided at the plenary session of Estonian Communist Party Central Committee in April Since collective farm was considered the highest form of agricultural co-operation, it referred to collectivisation. This so-called intensification targeted mostly kulaks, bringing about higher taxes, compulsory deliveries, and other repressive measures. 24 The deportation of kulaks, which coincided with the collectivisation campaign, was not concealed in Soviet literature, but quite clearly expressed in some publications as a necessary part of collectivisation. 25 Several academic dissertations were dedicated to collectivisation, including those by Evald Laasi and Ants Ruusmann. Laasi in his works pointed out some interesting facts. He argued that in the post-war years Estonian open agricultural fields received much less fertilisers compared to It was only in 1947 when fields began to be more fertilised. 26 This seemingly insignificant fact was one of the grounding arguments of Laasi's paper (which remained unpublished though) that questioned the reliability of Soviet post-war agricultural statistics. Official agricultural statistics claimed that the overall production of grain as well as yield per hectare in 1947 surpassed the average level of pre-war years. Laasi challenged this claim, arguing that besides actually receiving lesser amount of fertilisers, other possibly favourable conditions (such as climate or new agricultural techniques) were not present either. Increase of production, according to Laasi's argument, was due to the technique of how grain production was measured (in fact, estimated). Laasi presented examples of how officials at different levels deliberately increased the production estimates. This resulted in approximately 30% inflated production figures E. Vint. Teravilja tootmine Eesti NSV-s. Tartu: Teaduslik Kirjandus, pp E. Vint. Intensiivse põllumajanduse majanduslik efektiivsus Eesti NSV-s. Tallinn: Valgus, p E. Brandt, Sotsialismi ülesehitamise mõningaid iseärasusi Nõukogude Eestis. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1955, p Ibid., p N. Buzulukov, Eesti NSV talundite majanduse analüüs alates Nõukogude maareformist ( a.) kuni massilise kollektiviseerimiseni (1949. a.) in: J. Vaabel, J. Nuut, O. Sepre ja H. Lumet (ed.-s). Nõukogude teaduse arengust Eesti NSV-s Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, pp V. Matin ja M. Bronštein. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse kollektiviseerimine ning selle sotsiaalsed ja majanduslikud tulemused. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, pp , R. Murel. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse kollektiviseerimine. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1950, p E. Laasi. Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei ellu viimas V. I. Lenini kooperatsiooniplaani Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, pp E. Laasi. Mõnedest korrigeerimist vajavatest arvudest, an unpublished paper in the series of Eesti NSV TA Toimetised. Ühiskonnateadused, 1971, No. 2, pp. 157, 159,

5 Later on, descriptions of post-war agricultural success tended to be more modest. An interested reader was able to grasp that it was the Soviet regime that created the need for collectivisation (first cutting down the size of private farms, thus bringing about their weakness, as a result of which they had to be unified into collective farms). 28 It was admitted that first collective farms were rather weak, both in terms of economy and organisation. 29 Production figures became more realistic. Collectivisation in Estonia and respective reforms in other socialist countries found some comparative treatment. 30 Despite these moderate corrections, Soviet authors believed that collectivisation was the right way, proved by relative economic success of collective farms in the 1960s. 31 Regardless the fact that agricultural production figures became more realistic in statistical compilations, say in the 1970s, contradictory arguments remained. For instance, Edgar Tõnurist argued that Estonian agriculture had reached the pre-war level by the end of the first post-war five-year plan, i.e. in In 1953, according to him, agricultural gross production exceeded the pre-war level by 4 per cent. 32 Some other contributions on this issue, however, implied that the pre-war level was not reached before the 1960s, 33 and this argument could be well supported by official statistical figures. 34 A few authors to write on post-war Estonian economy were former economists of the Republic of Estonia. For example, Arkadi Rannes had published extensively during the republic. In his post-war works Rannes described the first five-year plan in Estonia as an enormous success. As usual, Soviet period was contrasted with bourgeois economy. The latter was described as wasteful, whereas Soviet years were expected to boost industrial production to unprecedented levels. 35 Unfortunately, his treatments retained the character of propaganda even in the coming decades, leaving less space for analysis. 36 Regarding the research on industrial development, it was typical that Soviet authors focused on the field that was currently the central point of government policy. During the first post-war decade the focus was mainly on energy and chemical industry, which were supposed to be the foundation of further industrialisation. 37 Also, machine-building industry was regarded as one of the main pillars of ESSR s economy, claimed to have suffered a lot during the time of bourgeois republic. Yet, it was typical to the Soviet writing that interests of research transformed according to changes in official economic policy. Therefore, if in the mid-1950s one regarded machine building and metal working industry as of primary importance, he began to acclaim the importance of electro-technical and radio equipment industry during the period of Council of National Economy. 38 In general, historical writing viewed the post-war decade as a period of massive economic growth. Economic performance was usually expressed in terms of overall growth. For example, it was insisted that industrial production increased 17 times between 1940 and 28 See Krinal, Karma et. al. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu, pp. 181, Ibid., pp. 188, J. Kahk. Mõningaid põllumajanduses sotsialistlike tootmissuhete võidulepääsemise võrdleva analüüsi küsimusi in: J. Kahk, E. Laasi, A. Ruusmann. Eesti talurahvas teel sotsialismile. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1965, pp E. Tõnurist. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse sotsialistlik rekonstrueerimine. Tallinn: Valgus, 1967, p E. Tõnurist. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse industrialiseerimine. Tallinn: Valgus, 1974, pp See E. Vint. Intensiivse põllumajanduse majanduslik efektiivsus Eesti NSV-s. Tallinn: Valgus, 1971, lk. 168; Krinal, Karma et. al. Eesti NSV majandusajalugu, pp. 188, See, for example, figures of grain production, cattle size, dairy production, etc. in Eesti NSV rahvamajandus aastal. Statistiline aastaraamat. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, A. Rannes. Tööstusökonoomika probleeme Nõukogude Eestis. Tartu: Teaduslik Kirjandus, P See, for example, A. Rannes. Industry in Soviet Estonia. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, See, for example, E. Kull. Eesti NSV tööstuse ja transpordi edusammud. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1955, p See E. Kull. Masinaehitus Eesti NSV-s. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1960, pp

6 Another author argued that in 1959 Estonian industry produced 10.3 times more than it had done in The credibility of such indexes is, of course, questionable and hardly verifiable. It can be noticed that during the Khrushchev era, a slight revision of earlier standpoints took place, which was also accompanied by a relative reduction of unreasonable propaganda. The immediate post-war years were not so much glorified any more, which was a natural result of de-stalinisation campaign. Instead, the administrative reforms carried out by Khruschcev administration (establishment of councils of national economy) were praised. As a rule, commentators provided reasons for abandonment of earlier development strategies and adoption of new policies. Veimer stated that the new territorial management, the result of administrative reforms, allowed enhanced planning and exploitation of productive capacities. 41 The earlier period was now described as having too widely disintegrated management of industry, whereas the years of the Council of National Economy were supposed to concentrate and specialise industrial production. 42 In order to contrast with the previous era, the industrial growth in the second half of the 1950s was considered to be mainly the result of administrative reforms. 43 Agricultural development during the period of the Council of National Economy received mostly positive treatment. The effects of reforms (liquidation of machine-tractor stations, transition to money wages in collective farms) were expressed in growing yields per hectare and increase of livestock. 44 Edgar Tõnurist spoke of times increase in production of collective farms between 1958 and What was usually not mentioned was very low productivity of collective farms up to mid-1950s, which set the comparison level rather low. Probably due to relative success in industry and agriculture, some authors reflected later that Estonia was experiencing the stage of developed socialism already in the second half of the 1950s. As positive aspects of socialism, they pointed out quick urbanisation, electrification of agriculture, and increasing number of industrial workers. The latter had the side effect of increasing immigration of workers from other Soviet republics, but it was assured that mixture of different nations was a characteristic of socialism. 46 Attempts were made to demonstrate ESSR s economic performance in comparative context, because nothing could exemplify the success of socialist system better than improvement over market economies. Henrik Allik concluded in 1957, using family budget data, that the average income of industrial workers was 57 percent higher in 1955 than it had been in Later, Valter Klauson developed this approach further and argued that in 1966 the real income of worker s family in ESSR was 2.5 times higher than that of a bourgeois Estonian family in Klauson also compared Soviet Estonian and Finland s wages and consumption expenditure, concluding that in 1966 in Estonia workers real wages were 34 per cent higher than in Finland. ESSR s development would have seemed even more 39 H. Linnuse. Suurte saavutuste aastad. Tallinn: ENSV Rahvamajanduse Nõukogu Tehnilise Informatsiooni Keskbüroo, 1965, p R. Renter. Nõukogude Eesti tööstus tootmistehnilise progressi teel. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1961, pp A. Veimer. Eesti NSV sotsialistlik industrialiseerimine. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1958, p R. Renter. Eesti NSV rasketööstus ja selle arenemisperspektiivid. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1964, pp R. Renter. Nõukogude Eesti tööstus tootmistehnilise progressi teel. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1961, pp See, for example, A. Karu. Põllumajanduse tootlike jõudude kasv viisaastakul. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1968, pp E. Tõnurist. Eesti NSV põllumajanduse sotsialistlik rekonstrueerimine. Tallinn: Valgus, 1967, pp Juursoo, Pullat. A Brief History of the Estonian, pp. 102, 104, H. Allik. Võrdlusi tööstustöölise elatustasemest Eestis. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1957, p V. Klauson. Rahva hüvanguks. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1967, pp

7 dramatic, if one considered that Finnish standard of living had exceeded Estonian one in Other comparisons were made on the basis of per capita production of some products. For example, it was stated that in terms of consumption of meat, eggs, butter and milk per person, ESSR exceeded the level of Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom in When the era of the Council of National Economy was brought to an end, interpretation of economic development and policy changed as well. Authors, who previously had applauded to territorial administrative system and councils of national economy, revised their statements. The new argument was that specialisation of industry and industrial co-operation were more important than territorial management and, therefore, returning to old industrial branch management system was justified. Focus on specialisation and co-operation resulted also in intensifying research on economic relationships with other Soviet republics, because more profound specialisation required more frequent contacts with suppliers and consumers. Veimer admitted in 1967 that the system of councils of national economy had become a hindrance to specialisation and co-operation. 51 Specialisation of industry was supposed to happen in parallel with concentration of industry, whereas concentration was considered an objective principle of socialist economic system that secured increasing productivity of work. 52 Recurring reforms and policy changes required relevant explanation in literature. At some points, economic policy changes were explained as logical reactions to quick industrialisation. Regarding the metal and machine-building industry, typical plot of development was as follows. It was stated that during the first post-war decade machinebuilding industrial branch served mostly for establishing general productive capacities. Next, during the Council of National Economy, concentration and specialisation of industry was started, together with the development of less raw material intensive electro-technical industry. In 1965, the third stage of ESSR s metal and machine-building industry began, namely intensification of production processes. 53 Of course, these turns were presented as results of natural development, not as something coming from political changes. The decades of 1970s and 1980s revealed gradually more criticism towards the economic management and administrative system. Kalev Kukk, focusing on Estonian exports, admitted that exports had begun to decline in 1971, mostly due to diminishing meat and dairy products exports. Overall exports declined, although more industrial products were sent to other Union republics. The author concluded that one reason for declining exports was lower quality of products. This was particularly relevant to industrial goods, as those were very much quality dependent. Decreasing product quality was, on the other hand, problem of the entire Soviet Union. 54 In another publication Kukk analysed problems of exporting machine-building industry s production. Most of the exports went to socialist states abroad. He stated again that exports had fallen due to decreasing quality of products. Factories were not interested in competing quality-wise. 55 Both publications were available only for restricted use. A brochure of this type was also issued by Uno Sepp, who stated that 49 Ibid., p V. Kaufmann. Eesti NSV majanduse arengu jooni. Tallinn: ENSV Ühing Teadus, 1964, pp A. Veimer. Eesti NSV tööstuse arenemine seitseaastakul. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1967, p A. Veimer. Tööstuse spetsialiseerimise ja koopereerimise probleemidest Eesti NSV-s üheksandal viisaastakul. Abiks lektorile. Tallinn: Ühing Teadus, 1971, pp K. Eigi. Masina- ja metallitööstus in: Eesti NSV tööstus kümnendal viisaastakul. Compiled by O. Lugus. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1978, pp K. Kukk. Eesti NSV toodangu eksport (mõningaid kvalitatiivseid momente). Tallinn: Eesti Teadus- ja Tehnikainformatsiooni ning Majandusuuringute Instituut, 1984, pp K. Kukk. Ekspordiprobleeme Eesti NSV masina- ja metallitööstuses. Tallinn: Eesti Teadus- ja Tehnikainformatsiooni ning Majandusuuringute Instituut, 1985, pp. 3 5,

8 intensification of production had relatively insignificant effect on Soviet Estonian industry and that industrial development during was primarily extensive. As a result, efficiency of industrial production decreased in So-called popular science writings on economy were quite common throughout the Soviet period. Yet, because of contradictory statements and apparent propaganda aims, it is difficult to take them seriously. For instance, while some publications boasted about one of the highest level of food production per capita, 57 others introduced the forthcoming five-yearplan s targets of securing food supplies to population. 58 Unfortunately, large part of serious research suffered from similar problems. Contribution from Exile Quite different from the above-discussed treatment of history and contemporary development in ESSR was that of foreign Estonians. Those who fled to abroad had good knowledge of previous developments in the country to contrast with later events. In the post-war years, authors in exile were restricted to limited sources such as newspapers, official statistical compilations, but also spoken word of people emigrating from ESSR. 59 Unlike Soviet authors, foreign Estonians regarded the years of the Republic of Estonia as economically successful. 60 Generally, the authors agreed that economic conditions deteriorated considerably with the beginning of Soviet rule. A general historical treatment, issued in 1946, spoke about declining living standard after the transition to rouble. 61 Sovietisation of agriculture during the first Soviet year was regarded as having almost catastrophic consequences. One of the experts of Estonian agriculture, Joosep Nõu, stated that the problem regarding agricultural production was mainly expressed in lowering yields per hectare. Reasons behind the decline were obvious. Soviet land reform liquidated larger and more profitable (30 hectares and up) farmer households. Private farms were pressed with taxes in kind and farmers became uninterested in higher yields. 62 Arthur Ekbaum even referred to modern slavery. As a proof of agricultural decline, he mentioned multiple increase in slaughtering of cattle in the winter of Cattle numbers had decreased to 400 thousand by spring of 1941, which was 1/6 th lower than before. 63 Endel Kareda provided more detailed information on sovietisation of agriculture. As a result of land reform, 56 U. Sepp. Majanduslik kasv Eesti NSV tööstuses. Tallinn: Eesti Teadus- ja Tehnikainformatsiooni ning Majandusuuringute Instituut, 1987, p According to Ansberg and Tarmisto, Estonian meat and milk production per capita was one of the highest, compared to Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. See A. Ansberg, V. Tarmisto. Eesti NSV: majandus ja kultuur. Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1960, pp See also V. Kaufmann. Eesti NSV majanduse arengu jooni. Tallinn: ENSV Ühing Teadus, 1964, pp V. Kirspuu. Rahva hüvangu nimel. Arve ja fakte. Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1981, p For instance, A. Kaelas, estimating the population size and ethnic composition of mid-1950s Estonia, relied on people who had recently emigrated from Estonia (in , they estimated population of Estonia to be 850 thousand Estonians, 300 thousand Russian civilians, and 100 thousand Soviet military personnel). He also used Soviet Estonian radio broadcast as a source. See A. Kaelas. Das Sowjetisch besetzte Estland. Stockholm: Eesti Rahvusfond, 1958, S. 19, et passim. 60 Arnold Purre noted that some 1939 per capita production figures of Estonia were a lot higher than in the Soviet Union. See A. Purre. Eesti saatuseaastad III. Ed.-s R. Maasing, H. Kauri, A. Purre, E. Ernits et. al. Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1965, p M. Ojamaa, A. Varmas, T. Varmas. Eesti ajalugu. Stockholm: Eesti Raamat, 1946, p J. Nõu. Hoop Eesti põllumajandusele in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, III. Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1956, pp A. Ekbaum. Destruction of Independent Farming in East Europe. Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre, 1949, pp. 29, 55. 8

9 cultivated acreage in 1941 was 2.77 million hectares as opposed to 3.18 million hectares in The average size of farm households decreased from 22.7 hectares to In addition to lowering production capacities, farmers were forced to sell products to the state at fixed prices that were lower than actual production cost. As a result of this and increasing prices of agricultural machinery, purchasing power of agricultural population decreased by 45% already by end of Another issue, accompanying land reform, was a differentiated taxation of private farmers. This and cultivation of collective farming (in the form of machine-tractor stations) hit agriculture hard, states Elmar Järvesoo. 66 The fact that agricultural producers had to sell their products below production cost was also emphasised by William Tomingas. 67 Although the first drawbacks were most visible in agricultural field, other aspects of economic life were claimed to suffer as well. Nationalisation of industrial and banking sector brought ca 1000 enterprises from private hands to the state sector. Management of state enterprises was not carried out in the interest local people. Kareda was convinced that large part of industrial production was exported to other Soviet republics without equivalent returns. 68 Nationalisation of enterprises was chaotic. Former owners were usually pushed out, but sometimes re-appointed as managers, because new commissars were unable to run enterprises due to lack of relevant knowledge. 69 Harald Nurk, providing an overview of the first year, stated that Estonian industry, being linked to the Soviet Union, experienced a transition to low-quality mass-production. Political decisions put main emphasis on oil-shale industry, machine-building and construction material industry. Opening of new production units and boost of production was carried out mainly in the interests of the Union market. Industrial investments program mostly ignored local needs. 70 Nurk sums up that the overall effect of the first Soviet year to Estonian economy was destructive: number of managers and entrepreneurs were deported or murdered, people s savings were wiped out, vast amount of goods were exported to the Union without getting anything comparable in return. 71 The transition of the first Soviet year has provoked many questions about the impact on living standard. Concerning the wage increases in the fall of 1940, hailed by the Soviets, observers in exile generally did not deny them. Nevertheless, it was usually pointed out that Soviet authors showed only one side of the coin, because wage increases were always accompanied by escalating commodity prices. Tomingas agrees that in August 1940 money wages were raised by 20 per cent, but he adds that prices were lifted up by 50 per cent immediately after that. In September 1940, money wages grew 40 per cent, but immediately commodity prices were doubled. 72 In terms of people s living standard, an extra negative effect was brought by currency reform in November-December Toivo Raun estimated that the exchange rate, prescribed to convert kroons to roubles, devalued the kroon approximately 8 times, which even more decreased the purchasing power of population. 64 E. Kareda. Technique of Economic Sovietisation. A Baltic Experience. London: Boreas Publishing, 1947, pp Ibid., p E. Järvesoo. Progress despite Collectivization: Agriculture in Estonia in: Problems of Mininations. Baltic Perspective. Ed.-s A. Ziedonis, R. Taagepera and M. Valgemäe. San Jose: California State University, 1973, p W. Tomingas. The Soviet Colonization of Estonia. Toronto: Kultuur, 1973, p Estonia. The Forgotten Nation. Compiled by E. Kareda. Toronto: Estonian Central Council in Canada, 1961, pp Kareda. Technique of Economic Sovietisation. A Baltic Experience. London: Boreas Publishing, 1947, pp H. Nurk. Eesti majandus punasel aastal in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, III. Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1956, pp Ibid., p Tomingas. The Soviet Colonization of Estonia. Toronto: Kultuur, 1973, p

10 Additionally, all savings accounts exceeding 1000 roubles were confiscated in January Kaelas has pointed out that during the late 1930s, the purchasing power of Estonian worker was approximately 7-10 times higher than that of a worker in the Soviet Union. Thus, in 1940 the standard of living of Estonian worker had to be gradually reduced to the level of Soviet worker. However, until the outbreak of war, Estonian worker s living standard remained higher than that of Soviet worker. 74 Social conditions deteriorated, new work legislation prohibited exchange of workplace without permission, etc. 75 The German occupation, as it was represented by foreign Estonians, did not differ much from the first Soviet year. Kareda argues that the Germans were not eager to change the structure of economy created by the Bolsheviks. The claim, that no substantial changes occurred during the German occupation, was illustrated by a fact that at the end of the occupation only 12 per cent of the land, confiscated by the Bolsheviks, was returned to previous owners. 76 Harald Nurk states that although the Soviet land reform was cancelled, confiscated farms were not returned to farmers. Enterprises, nationalised by the Bolsheviks, were taken over, not returned to private owners. Nurk s verdict was that the administration of economy under the German occupation turned out to be extremely inefficient and bureaucratic. 77 At the same time, the Germans demands, especially to Estonian agriculture, were rather high. Demand for grain was higher than agricultural producers had been able to market during the normal years. 78 Though the Germans to some degree modified the social and work legislation of the Bolsheviks, it did not bring much relief. 79 Probably most Estonian authors in exile considered both occupations equally devastating. The immediate post-war years not only re-established the situation of the first Soviet year, but implemented the Soviet system further. A brochure issued in Stockholm summed up the situation as follows: The free and flourishing Republic of Estonia, one of Europe s happiest small countries, is subjugated and enslaved by totalitarian terror, the remarkable progress it made during its independence reduced to nought and its bright hopes for the future dashed to the ground. 80 Authors in exile observed the situation as closely as possible, mostly relying on ESSR s newspapers, publications, and first-hand experience of refugees. Agricultural situation emerged as one of the most sensitive issues, because collectivisation was to change the life in the countryside profoundly. Unlike the Soviet authors, Estonians in exile considered collectivisation to be violent and economically destructive. It was observed that during the first post-war years, the Soviet rulers denied plans of collectivisation until it was officially declared by communist leaders in Before that, the pre-war compulsory deliveries and taxation system were put into effect again. 82 Land holdings of persons, suspected in co-operation with the Germans, were dramatically decreased. Together with land-redistribution, socialist farming was introduced in the form of 73 T. U. Raun. Estonia and the Estonians. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001, pp A. Kaelas. The Worker in the Soviet Paradise. London: Boreas Publishing Co., 1947, pp See A. Kaelas. Vabast töölisest riigi orjaks in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, III. Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1956, p Kareda. Technique of Economic Sovietisation, pp H. Nurk. Eesti majandus saksa okuptsiooni ajal in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, VIII. Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1959, pp Ibid., pp See A. Kaelas. Sotsiaalpoliitikast saksa okupatsiooni ajal in: Eesti riik ja rahvas teises maailmasõjas, VIII. Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1959, pp Estonia. Basic Facts on Geography, History, Economy. Compiled by E. Kareda, E. Blumfeld, A. Rei, Ed. Poom. Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre, 1948, p A. Purre. Soviet Farming Failure Hits Estonia. Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre, 1964, p See A. Ekbaum. Destruction of Independent Farming in East Europe, p

11 sovkhozes and machine-tractor stations. First kolkhozes were established in the fall of Foreign authors generally agreed that the actual reason behind farmers joining into collective farms was not the enthusiasm of farmers, but fear of being marked as kulak and deported. Taagepera s research convinced that massive establishment of collective farms began in 1949, right after the wave of deportation. He pointed out that before the deportation, approximately 40 farmer households joined collective farms every day. After the deportation in March 1949, thousands of households joined in every day. 84 Soviet authorities official statement that collective farms were organised because of their higher productivity was proved false by E. Poom s study, which compared the productivity of Estonian and Soviet agriculture in the interwar period. Poom concludes that productivity of Estonian farms was superior to that of Soviet collective farms. Thus, demonstrating that Soviet authorities justification for liquidation of independent farms in Estonia, referring to higher productivity of collective farms, was totally ungrounded. 85 Soviet authors spoke about rapid industrial growth during the immediate post-war years. Estonians in exile did not deny that certain development took place in the industrial sector, but had doubts about its success in terms of scale and quality. Industrial growth figures could have been the result of vast investment into shale oil industry, as Raun suggested. 86 Others questioned the ability of Soviet economic system to ensure quick growth, for instance, pointing out that an oil-shale worker of ESSR produced less in 1950 than had produced an Estonian worker in A. Kaelas was quite aware of the bureaucratic nature of the Soviet management system as well as of very moderate improvement in some industrial branches, e.g. food and light industry. Heavy industry was characterised by him as Moscow s colonial industry, which produced mostly in the interests of central administration. 88 Industrial capacities had been employed mostly for the benefit of Soviet Russia. Industrial products as well as foodstuffs were exported to Russia, even though there was a shortage of those products in Estonia. 89 In general, foreign Estonians were not convinced by Soviet publications boasting about increasing living standards. It was evident that although rationing of food was ended in 1947, food shortages persisted. The purchasing power of population was undermined by the currency reform of 1947, which wiped out the savings. As an unfavourable result of forced industrialisation, over 180 thousand immigrants were relocated to Estonia from other parts of the Union. 90 Kaelas argued that the average income of worker in 1941 had been 307 roubles before taxes, which according to the real exchange rate was twice as low as worker s income before occupation (30.7 kroons against 79.6 kroons). During the first post-war years, the ratio between wages and prices remained the same as it had been during the first Soviet year. However, food become rationed, black market flourished, and due to high prices workers could hardly afford anything. 91 The reforms of the mid-1950s, carried out by Khrushchev administration, were regarded by foreign Estonians as a reaction to lacking economic performance. A. Purre 83 R. Misiunas, R. Taagepera. Balti riigid: sõlteaastad Tallinn: Koolibri, 1997, pp R. Taagepera, Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase. Soviet Studies, vol. XXXII, no. 3, July 1980, p E. Poom. The Productivity of Collective and Private Enterprise in Agriculture. A Comparative Study of Soviet and Estonian Achievements. Societas Litterarum Estonica in Svecia. Stockholm, 1949, pp Raun. Estonia and the Estonians, p Misiunas, Taagepera. Balti riigid: sõlteaastad, lk A. Kaelas. Okupeeritud Eesti. Stockholm: Eesti Rahvusfond, 1956, pp The Colonial policy of the Soviet Union in occupied Estonia. Compiled by A. Kaelas. Stockholm: Estonian National Council, 1956, p Misiunas, Taagepera. Balti riigid: sõlteaastad, pp Kaelas. The Worker in the Soviet Paradise, pp. 25,

12 pointed out that Khrushchev had admitted problems with meeting the needs for food. 92 Agriculture had experienced constant decline, expressed in decreasing acreage of cultivated land, number of livestock and production figures. The downfall of agriculture was acknowledged by everyone fleeing from Estonia and the fact itself was apparent if ESSR s literature was critically observed. On the other hand, authors in exile admitted that, compared to the Stalinist period, certain improvement took place. Purre mentioned that the reorganisation of collective farms in 1955 and liquidation of machine-tractor stations in 1958 resulted in increasing agricultural production. 93 Raun points out major reforms in agriculture (money wages for collective farm workers since 1958 and liquidation of MTS-s). Yet, he acknowledges that since the mid-1960s, growth of agricultural production was relatively low. It was known that by mid-1970s shortages of food had become common. 94 As of industrial growth, it was acknowledged that gross production of industry exceeded the pre-war level in the 1960s. Yet, growth figures provided by Soviet publications were not taken at face value, but rather considered as objects of statistical manipulation. 95 It was clear that social conditions did not improve immediately. Living standards in collective farms were very different, depending on whether the farm was organised as a model or it was lagging behind. Shortage of goods persisted. Even as late as 1957 free market prices were considerably higher than official prices. Kaelas calculated that workers and officials purchasing power was much lower in 1955 than it had been in Since goods were not available for official prices, workers had to buy from black market, which further undermined their situation. 96 The period of re-centralisation since the mid-1960s, later known also as an era of stagnation, somehow caused more relaxed treatment from the part of authors in exile. Estonia was, despite of being occupied, regarded as experiencing certain positive developments. The situation appeared particularly optimistic in comparison with other Soviet republics, especially in the field of agriculture. Of course, authors in exile lacked reliable information, but it would be too naïve to assume that they looked at Soviet statistics and economic data without critical evaluation. Official Soviet statistics claimed that in 1968 overall industrial output exceeded the 1940 level more than 20 times. E. Järvesoo believed that behind such an enormous growth was a statistical trick which set the 1940 level very low, and suggested that the actual growth had been 8-10 times. 97 Growth should have had its effect on living standards. Allik s and Klauson s calculations, which compared ESSR s standard of living with Finland and bourgeois Estonia, seemed not to convince Järvesoo. 98 Increasing agricultural productivity in Estonia required explanation other than that provided by Soviet authors. Järvesoo admitted that Estonian collective farms had achieved relative success, which assured better results than in other Soviet republics. He argued that this was the result of several factors, one of which was less harmful effect of collectivisation in the Baltic States, because it was implemented later. Also, due to later collectivisation, transition to money wages in collective farms occurred much sooner, thus farmers conditions started to improve sooner. Moreover, agricultural education and knowledge of the republican period had survived to some extent. Järvesoo also believed that newer advanced and 92 A. Purre. Soviet Farming Failure Hits Estonia. Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre, 1964, pp Ibid., Raun. Estonia and the Estonians, pp A. Purre. Eesti saatuseaastad III k. Toim. R. Maasing, H. Kauri, A. Purre, Erich Ernits jt. Stockholm: Kirjastus EMP, 1965, pp A. Kaelas. Das Sowjetisch besetzte Estland. Stockholm: Eesti Rahvusfond, 1958, S. 97, E. Järvesoo. Die Wirtschaft Estlands und deren strukturelle Veränderungen. Sonderdruck aus Acta Baltica. Institutum Balticum, Ibid., S ,