Citizenship and mobility in the EU: evaluating the praxis of the voting rights granted to intra-eu migrants

Transcription

1 -24 th World Congress of Political Science, IPSA Panel on EU citizenship, Euro-crisis and European identity: recent changes, practices and dynamics of the demos-to-be Citizenship and mobility in the EU: evaluating the praxis of the voting rights granted to intra-eu migrants Daniela Vintila (University of Leicester) Very rough draft, comments would be much appreciated. Introduction Two decades after its institutionalization in the Maastricht Treaty, the citizenship of the Union remains a key topic of the political parlance vis-à-vis the democratic future of the EU. Often presented as a powerful tool for the reconfiguration of the traditional paradigm of citizenship in the new era of increasing diversity, this element of the European integration process has been analyzed mostly from a normative perspective. Hence, while some authors have tried to highlight its limitations through the conceptual triangle national citizenship-eu citizenship-supranational citizenship, others have emphasized its transformative potential as an efficient way to create the European demos. A key element of this constructive potential rests in the electoral entitlements granted to EU citizens residing in other Member States, i.e. the right to vote and stand at EP and local elections in these host countries. As it shifted the electoral activism to a supranational level, this recognition has been evaluated as a remarkable step forward towards a political Union that can encourage, through participatory mechanisms, a shared sense of belonging towards the European res publica (Pocock 1995; Vink 2005; Shaw 2007; Bellamy & Palumbo 2010). But transposing these normative debates to a more practical approach, to what extent mobile Europeans residing in the EU Member States actually make use of the voting rights arising from their status of citizens of the Union? As very few studies have focused exclusively on the behavioural dimension of the EU citizenship in the electoral field (Besch 2004; Méndez Lago 2007; Strudel 2002, 2004; Collard 2012), the answer to this question still remains uncertain. This paper aims to address this topic by closely exploring the levels of political participation of intra-eu migrants at the 1999, 2004 and 2009 EP elections held in ten EU Member States: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. 1 The paper is structured as follows. The first section briefly examines the concept of EU citizenship, emphasizing the relevance of the electoral rights granted in the Maastricht Treaty for the political project of the EU. The second section offers an overview of the general dynamics of political participation of the foreign-born electorate, whereas the third section presents the data, the cases and the methodology used 1 This paper is part of a broader research project on the political participation of intra-eu migrants and TCNs at the EP and local elections held from 1999 onwards in these ten EU countries. See Vintila (2015). 1

2 in the study. The fourth section discusses some preliminary findings on the patterns of political participation of intra-eu migrants, also pointing towards specific factors that might constrain the likelihood of Community voters of actively using their enfranchisement at EP elections. The paper concludes with some general remarks vis-à-vis the political practice of the EU citizenship in electoral politics; and it points towards further lines of research. I. The European citizenship and the electoral rights of non-national EU citizens The institutionalization of the EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty has been generally considered as the first systematic proof of the recent reconfiguration of the classic paradigm of citizenship in an era of increasing mobility (Soysal 1994; Bauböck 1999; Sassen 1999; Benhabib 2004; Kivisto & Faist 2007). According to Article 8 of the Treaty, the EU citizenship is granted based on the nationality of the Member States, and it allows its beneficiaries to: a) freely move and reside within the EU; b) vote at EP and local elections in the host Member States; c) receive diplomatic protection in third countries; and d) petition the EP and apply to the Ombudsman. Although this definition might appear, at first glance, rather simple, the EU citizenship gained a broad range of interpretations that generally subscribed to two main approaches: whereas the first one highlights its limitations and the potential problems arising from its implementation, the second one focuses more on its positive externalities for the democratic future of the EU. Those assuming a critical perspective on the EU citizenship generally question its functionality by reducing it to a bundle of basic rights that put Europeans in a position of second class citizens (Dell'Olio 2005). The main limitation guiding strong criticisms was that the EU citizenship lacks an independent status, its derived character reiterating that the Member States are still the gatekeepers of citizenship, even when the latter is defined at a supranational level (Closa 1992; Weiler 1999; Vink 2005). Secondly, it has been argued that the EU citizenship does not bring major institutional changes, as its associated rights are rather marginal when compared to what the national citizenship model brings to its beneficiaries; and, moreover, that these rights could not establish a direct link between citizens and the EU as most of them are implemented within the framework of each Member State, and not at the Community level (Closa 1995; Bellamy, Castiglione & Shaw 2006). Thirdly, the EU citizenship has also been widely contested for lacking a pre-existent European ethnos and demos, the absence of the European people thus defining it as a form of membership imposed from the above (Kostakopoulou 2001; Giesen & Eder 2001). Yet, a second part of the scholarship adopted a more optimistic perspective thus evaluating the EU citizenship as a citizenship-in-the-making that complements its national counterparts through the recognition of new entitlements and representation structures regulated at the Community level (Delanty 2000; Tambini 2001). Following this rationale, the EU citizenship is a new form of membership related to a post-national system of institutions and governance (Preuss 1996; Bellamy & Warleigh 2001; Conti, Cotta & Tavares 2010). Furthermore, it has been argued that the rights granted to EU citizens are far from being a limited input for the Community law, the novelty of their transnational dimension being reflected by the fact that they are actually granted to mobile Europeans (Lippolis 1998; Dell'Olio 2005). Finally, against the argument that the EU citizenship lacks an affective dimension, it has been noted that this new form of membership can actually contribute to the creation of a sense of collective belonging towards the European polity: 2

3 the EU citizenship per se does not require a prior collective identity, nor a unitary demos that acts as its constitutive basis as this new legal status can actually activate individuals attachment towards the EU by extrapolating the territorial model of ethnos to a new European horizon (Bruter 2005; Magnette 2007). Despite the relevant contribution of these studies on the normative implications of the EU citizenship, the extent to which Europeans actually use their rights granted at the EU level is still largely unexplored, with very limited evidence on how the EU citizenship status is assumed in the political practice. A key indicator of this political practice rests in the electoral rights granted to mobile Europeans. Given their aim to reduce the inequalities of political opportunities between EU movers and EU stayers, these entitlements represent one of the most substantial benefits of the EU citizenship and, at the same time, the first systematic evidence of the separation of voting rights from nationality (Shaw 2007; Bellamy & Palumbo 2010; Vink 2005; Olsen 2011). Following the narrative of the European institutions, these entitlements were also expected to strengthen the potentiality of the EU citizenship in affective terms: by making use of their right to have rights outside their home countries, Europeans might better perceive the substantive meaning of their EU citizenship status and this, in turn, might encourage their sense of European identity (see COM (2010) 605; Dobson 2006; Kadioglu 2009). Despite the wide consensus vis-à-vis the relevance of these electoral entitlements, most studies carried out on this topic focused either on their limited legal nature (Bauböck 1994; Closa 1995; Eder & Giesen 2001; Shaw 2007) or on the conditions under which they were transposed in the legislations of the Member States through Directives 93/109/EC and 94/80/EC (Santolaya & Díaz-Crego 2008; Lansbergen & Shaw 2010). Consequently, the body of research looking exclusively at how these rights were actually exercised in practice is rather limited; and here is it worth mentioning the work conducted by Favell (2005) in Brussels, Amsterdam and London, the research carried out by Strudel (2002; 2004) in France, Besch (2004) in Luxemburg, Collard (2012) in UK or Méndez Lago (2005; 2010) in Spain. Broadly speaking, past research pointed towards a limited level of political participation of Community voters, although these results are rather difficult to generalize as most of these studies generally focused only on local elections held in certain EU countries; or only on specific groups of intra-eu migrants, mainly those counting with a strong demographic presence across the EU. Furthermore, most of them only explored the patterns of political participation of Community voters without further analyzing the reasons for their decision to vote in elections held abroad. Nonetheless, as it shall be explained in the following section, the broader literature on political participation of immigrant-origin residents in general does provide relevant insights on the factors that might affect their decision to exercise their electoral rights. II. Different practices for equal rights? The dynamics beyond the political participation of the foreign-born electorate Previous studies focused on the political participation of immigrant-origin residents in European countries have generally pointed towards consistent participatory gaps operating under three different facets: a) between foreign-born voters and their native counterparts; b) between different immigrant groups in the same receiving society and; c) between different European host countries (De Sipio 1996; Tillie 1998; Saggar 1998; van Heelsum 2005; Hochschild & Mollenkopf 2009; Moya & Viñas 2010). Faced with this labyrinthine evidence, scholars started to explore which factors might account for these 3

4 gaps, much of the scholarship arguing that the voting inequalities between foreign-born residents and their native counterparts might be due not only to their group characteristics, but also to the opportunities for political participation offered by their host countries. Accordingly, it has been considered that systematic disadvantages in the socio-economic field might easily be translated into the political arena, thus creating participatory differentials during the election day (Fiorina 1999; Burns, Schlozman & Verba 2001; Anduiza & Bosch 2004; Evans 2004). Casting the ballot in elections might be a costly action, especially for immigrant-origin voters (Morales 2009); but it can also be more costly for some immigrant-origin groups than for others. Hence, it has been generally assumed that those who have the time and the economic resources for accessing political information show a higher propensity to vote, as the potential costs of participating in politics decrease with a more privileged socio-economic status. Additionally, migrants prior residence or demographic concentration in the host country, their language proficiency or their participatory practices in the countries of origin can also reveal as structural reasons for their decision to vote (Koopmans & Statham 2000; Strudel & Michalska 2012). Firstly, the evidence suggests that immigrants who experience language difficulties are less prone to vote (DeSipio 1996; Jones-Correa 2001; González 2011); whereas a longer period of prior residence is expected to lead to higher familiarity with the political system of the host countries, thus positively affecting migrants likelihood to vote (Chui et al. 1991; Bass & Casper 2001). Secondly, the demographic concentration is an important resource that migrants can mobilize collectively, especially since larger immigrant groups tend to have more resources that facilitate their access to the electoral arena and, implicitly (Fieldhouse & Cutts 2008; Morales, Pérez-Nievas & Vintila 2012; Saalfeld & Bischof 2013). Thirdly, the participatory patterns that migrants bring from their home countries, as well as their levels of political awareness, are also likely to account for differences in their turnout levels in the countries of settlement (Tillie 1998; Togeby 2004; Giugni 2010; Morales & Morariu 2011; Recchi 2012). As for the political opportunity structure (hereafter referred to as POS) that migrants encounter in their host countries, great leverage has been given to institutional factors that could alter the costs and benefits of voting through a wide range of indicators, ranking from the citizenship regimes (Koopmans et al. 2005); the characteristics of the electoral system (Moser 2008; Togeby 2008; Bloemraad & Schönwälder 2013); or the procedure that foreigners have to follow in order to become eligible to vote (Méndez Lago 2005). In many instances, this institutional configuration is combined with political dynamics related to the specific policies implemented by the host countries in the field of immigration and immigrant integration (Koopmans 2004; Hochschild & Mollenkoph 2009; Bird, Saalfeld & Wüst 2011; Sobolewska 2013). This study aims to test the potential impact of some of the above-mentioned factors on intra-eu migrants likelihood of exercising their electoral rights while residing in other EU Member States (see Figure 1). In doing so, the paper departs from the argument that although the legal recognition of electoral rights for intra-eu migrants was a necessary step for their political inclusion in EU host countries, this enfranchisement process is still not sufficient for ensuring their successful electoral integration. Hence, additional factors that exceed the framework under which the EU citizenship is legally designed might affect, in practice, Europeans propensity of making use of their electoral empowerment. Starting with group characteristics, I hypothesize that, despite the equal enfranchisement of all Community voters, some groups of non-national EU citizens are still more prone than others to use the electoral rights granted at the EU level (Hypothesis 1). To begin with, I expect to find that EU citizens originating from countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 are less likely to use their enfranchisement than foreigners from EU15 countries 4

5 (Hypothesis 1.1). This hypothesis was already confirmed for particular groups of EU movers residing in Southern Europe (see Strudel and Michalska 2012). These two groups which I denominate as old and new Community voters according to their experience as citizens of the Union, count with different socio-economic statuses and migration profiles. As it shall be explained in the next section, foreigners originating from EU15 countries generally have a more privileged access to socio-economic resources; in many cases, they respond to a non-economic migration pattern; and they are more socialized within the EU spirit and with a higher experience in using their EU citizenship rights. These characteristics, in turn, are expected to positively affect their likelihood of vote, especially when compared to migrants originating from countries that joined the EU with more recent enlargement waves. Figure 1: Factors expected to affect the political participation of non-national EU citizens Political participation non-national EU citizens Differences between foreign groups Differences between host countries Foreign groups characteristics Institutional & political setting Socio-demographic & migration profile old/new Community voters Demographic concentration Initial electoral potential Awareness electoral rights Participatory patterns host country Citizenship regimes Recognition political rights for foreigners Compulsory voting systems Immigrant integration policies Immigration tradition Meso level variables Macro level variables Source: Own elaboration. Secondly, I expect that EU citizens likelihood of using their enfranchisement while residing abroad is also closely associated to their demographic concentration in the host countries; their initial electoral potential; their awareness of electoral rights; and their participatory practices in the home countries. As mentioned, previous studies showed that in countries in which a higher fraction of the population- and of the potential electorate- is formed by immigrant-origin residents, their turnout levels are generally higher, as migrants tend to behave as coordinated voters forming a distinctive electoral block. Yet, this positive effect might operate differently for different groups; and it is actually expected to be stronger for larger foreign groups and those counting with higher electoral visibility at elections time (Berger, Galonska & Koopmans 2004; Fieldhouse & Cutts 2008; Bevelander & Pendakur 2008; Pérez-Nievas et al. 2014). Drawing on these arguments, it is anticipated that intra-eu migrants propensity of using the voting rights granted at the EU level is higher when the share of foreigners within the overall population is higher (Hypothesis 1.2.a); and when their own group is particularly numerous within the non-national population (Hypothesis 1.2.b). The same applies for the electoral potential, for which I hypothesize that the level of political participation of mobile Europeans is higher when the proportion of foreigners from all potential voters is higher (Hypothesis 1.3.a); or when their group is particularly well represented from all foreigners entitled to vote (Hypothesis 1.3.b). 5

6 Along with the socio-demographic profile, this paper also takes in consideration how some characteristics related to foreigners acculturation or political attitudes might affect their propensity of exercising their EU citizenship status in the electoral field. Firstly, the study looks at how the level of awareness on the electoral rights granted by the EU citizenship status might affect intra-eu migrants propensity to vote, thus helping to explain why some groups show a stronger electoral apathy than others. Hence, I hypothesize that those EU foreigners originating from countries in which the general level of citizens awareness regarding the voting rights granted by the EU citizenship status is higher are more prone to make use of these entitlements when residing in other Member States (Hypothesis 1.4). Secondly, this research aims to test the argument of the extent to which foreign-born voters tend to reproduce in the host countries the same patterns of electoral engagement that they generally show in home countries, for which it is expected that mobile Europeans originating from countries in which turnout is higher are more prone to vote in their respective host EU Member States (Hypothesis 1.5). As for the POS approach, the initial expectation is that non-national EU citizens make a differential use of their electoral rights as their host EU countries offer them different opportunities for political participation. More specifically, the paper aims to provide empirical evidence suggesting that, despite the definition of the EU citizenship as a strategy designed from the above in the attempt to encourage the creation of a European political demos (Giesen & Eder 2001), its substantive effects in terms of electoral mobilization of its beneficiaries still depends on the institutional and political game within EU Member States. On the institutional side, I firstly examine the citizenship regimes operating in EU host countries. Especially in those cases in which the voting rights are reserved for national citizens, the access to ordinary naturalization stands out as primary determinant for foreigners political participation as it opens the avenues for full political rights. The citizenship regime can have even more long-standing effects as immigrants turnout is generally lower in countries applying more restrictive naturalization processes (De Sipio 1996; Koopmans et al. 2005; de Rooij 2012); and this effect remains significant even after these countries lower the barriers for political participation by granting voting rights to foreigners (González & Morales 2012). Hence, I hypothesize that mobile Europeans show higher levels of political participation in host countries with more liberal citizenship regimes (Hypothesis 2.1). Secondly, the specific regulations that these countries adopt in the field of recognition of voting rights for foreigners have been also deemed essential for explaining the intensity of electoral engagement amongst the latter (Koopmans 2004; Martiniello 2006, Bird, Saalfeld & Wüst 2011). Even if the enfranchisement of intra-eu migrants has been uniformly adopted across the EU, the broader way in which the host countries respond to foreigners political incorporation might have an indirect effect on mobile Europeans propensity to vote as they might perceive that a country that nominates foreigners as part of the electorate is generally more open and inclusive towards their political integration (Moya & Viñas 2010; Blatter, Schmid & Blättler 2014). In these cases, intra-eu migrants might acknowledge having encountered a more favorable political environment which creates positive stimuli for their electoral engagement, for which Hypothesis 2.2 anticipates that non-national EU citizens show a higher likelihood to vote in countries granting voting rights for foreigners in general and which implement better policies for ensuring immigrants political participation. Thirdly, the paper also examines the potential impact of a compulsory voting system on intra-eu migrants propensity to vote. The fact that the mandatory voting leads to higher turnout levels is well known evidence in the field of electoral behavior (Studlar, Flickinger & Bennett 2003; Rose 2004). However, this effect might operate differently for foreigners. In those EU countries in 6

7 which a compulsory voting system is in place, non-national EU citizens are not obliged to register to vote, but those who enroll also have to comply with the compulsory voting regulations. The electoral abstention is sanctioned with progressive fines that increase the costs of electoral participation, for which it is expected that Community voters are less likely to register to vote in the Electoral Census of those host countries in which voting is a technical obligation (Hypothesis 2.3). Additionally, the policies implemented by the host countries in the field of immigration and immigrant integration might also shape the broader structure of incentives that immigrant-origin voters receive from these countries in order to participate in politics. For instance, one might reasonably assume that immigrant integration policies generally influence migrants perception of how welcome they are in their countries of settlement and how responsive the latter became towards their integration. Subsequently, migrants might perceive that those receiving contexts that advocate a higher preoccupation for their integration send out an inclusionary message also when it comes to their political participation, for which I hypothesize that non-national EU citizens are more prone to vote in countries that implement better policies in the field of immigrant integration (Hypothesis 2.4.a) and anti-discrimination (Hypothesis 2.4.b). Finally, beyond the political and institutional setting, it is also expected that intra- EU migrants show higher propensity to vote in countries counting with a longer experience in receiving migration inflows (Hypothesis 2.5). This expectation draws on the evidence from past research that countries that witnessed immigration for a longer period of time are generally more experienced in managing inflows of foreign-born residents, as well as in ensuring the integration of the latter (Kollwelter 2005a; Wihtol de Wenden 2013). At the opposite pole, in countries where the immigration phenomena is still relatively new, this issue is less likely to have been included in the political agenda (Calavita 2005; Cebolla & González 2008); and even if it did, the attention of policy-makers at an early stage is generally focused on controlling new entries rather than ensuring the political integration of newcomers (Santos 2004; Veikou & Triandafyllidou 2005). III. Data, cases and methods In order to test the above-mentioned hypotheses, this paper compares the levels of political participation of all groups of intra-eu migrants at the 1999, 2004 and 2009 EP elections held in ten countries: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The study thus draws on a large-n analysis that allows over passing the limitations of past research primarily focused on case studies of specific immigrant groups or host countries; and it takes an important step forward in the attempt to provide more generalized findings and a broader image on how mobile Europeans exercised their enfranchisement across time in different receiving countries. The ten EU countries included in the sample are ideal case studies for this research as they count with sufficient variation that allows testing the previously mentioned research hypotheses. In 2013, these countries hosted almost half of all foreigners residing in EU28 (Eurostat 2014). Some of them- France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden or Denmark- count with a longer tradition of immigration, the ethnic diversification in these cases becoming particularly visible after WWII, with substantial inflows of foreigners benefiting from the policies of recruitment of foreign labour force (Hollifield 1992; Joppke 1999). The demographic composition of their stocks of foreign-born residents was reshaped after the 70s, when the labour-driven migration started to be accompanied by non-economic inflows of refugees and foreigners coming on family reunification grounds 7

8 (Castles 2006; Messina 2007). During the decades of the 80 s and 90 s, these countries continued to be amongst the main recipients of migration inflows (Figure 2); although their share of foreigners maintained more of less stable during the last years (Figure 3). Figures 2 & 3: Inflows and stocks of foreigners in the countries included in the sample 1400 Inflows of foreigners (thousands) Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Italy Luxembourg Portugal Spain Sweden Source: Own elaboration from OECD, International Migration Database, several years % foreigners over total population Belgium Denmark Spain France Italy Luxembourg Austria Portugal Finland Sweden Source: Own elaboration from Eurostat data, Demography and Population, several years. The rest of the countries analyzed here- Spain, Italy, Portugal and Finland- were countries of emigration until quite recently; although during the last decades they also started to witness accelerated inflows of foreign arrivals, thus becoming countries of immigration (Figure 2). In these cases, the stocks of immigrants have intensified particularly from 2000 onwards, the share of non-national residents from the overall population further increasing with the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement waves to the point that in 2013, the share of foreigners was around seven times higher than in 1998 in Spain; four times higher in Italy; and two times higher in Portugal and Finland, respectively. Moreover, the migration stocks in the countries analyzed here have been not only very 8

9 intense, but also quite diverse. For instance, whereas in Belgium or Luxembourg, the majority of non-national residents originate from other EU countries, with a particular predominance of EU15 foreigners, in others- such as the three Southern European countries analyzed here- the majority of foreigners are TCNs, whereas the stocks of intra- EU migrants are more equally distributed between foreigners from EU15 countries and those originating from the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and Furthermore, these ten countries also count with substantial variation in what refers to foreigners pathways to electoral politics, be it through naturalization or the recognition of voting rights based on residence. Regarding the first aspect, these countries display a quite heterogeneous picture, from a more liberal citizenship regime in Belgium to more restrictive ones, like in Austria or Denmark. Some of these countries (Belgium, Portugal) recently eased the requirements for ordinary naturalization; whereas others increased the period of prior residence applied in this process (Luxembourg, Finland, Italy); or even introduced additional requirements such as language or integration tests (the legislative reforms adopted in 2002, 2005 and 2008 in Denmark). Currently, four of these EU Member States- France, Belgium, Sweden and Finland- impose five years of residence for foreigners applying for naturalization. This requirement is more restrictive in Portugal and Luxembourg (seven years); Denmark (nine years); and Austria, Spain and Italy (ten years). 2 As for the recognition of voting rights for foreigners, this study covers not only countries like Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg which enfranchise all foreigners at the municipal level; but also cases such as Italy, France or Austria which still put forward a more exclusionary definition of the electorate based on nationality. Spain and Portugal are somewhere in between, as they selectively recognize voting rights only for specific categories of foreigners, via reciprocity agreements with the home countries. 3 For each country included in the sample, the paper examines the patterns of political participation of all 26 groups of intra-eu migrants, further distinguishing between two main groups of comparison of old and new Community voters (foreigners originating from EU15 countries and those originating from the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007). To begin with, EU15 foreigners generally count with a more privileged position in these host countries in terms of access to socio-economic resources as, unlike new Europeans, they respond to a migration pattern that goes beyond a purely economic reasoning (Recchi et al. 2003; Favell et al. 2011; Dobson 2009; Morales, Pérez- Nievas & Vintila 2012; Janoschka & Durán 2013). Secondly, since they started to benefit from the right to free movement long before migrants from the latest EU enlargement waves, EU15 foreigners also count with a more extensive tradition of emigration and a longer length of stay in other European countries (Galgóczi & Leschke 2012; Barslund & Busse 2014; Recchi et al. 2014). Thirdly, old Community voters are also more socialized 2 In some cases, certain nationalities benefit from a fast track access to citizenship. This is the case for Sweden and Denmark in which nationals of other Nordic countries are eligible to apply for naturalization after two years (compared to five and nine years, respectively, for other nationalities); or Spain, that allow foreigners originating from former Spanish colonies to naturalize after two years of residence. 3 Spain recognizes the right to active suffrage in local elections for citizens of Norway, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay, New Zeeland, Iceland and Cape Verde. In Portugal, the reciprocity precept allowed the gradual enfranchisement of nationals of Brazil, Cape Verde, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay, Israel and Norway. 9

10 within the EU spirit, their longer tradition as citizens of the Union being implicitly translated into a wider experience in benefiting from their EU citizenship rights (Favell 2001; Recchi & Nebe 2003; Vintila, Echazarra & Mayoral 2012). For each group of intra-eu migrants, the study looks at their levels of political participation at all EP elections 4 held from 1999 onwards 5, year by which the Directive 93/109/EC regulating the exercise of the voting rights of mobile Europeans for these electoral contests was formally introduced in the national legislations of all ten countries included in the analysis. 6 This Directive was uniformly implemented across all EU Member States (see Shaw 2007 for a more in-depth analysis), except for Luxembourg that benefitted from a specific derogation according to which those countries in which non-national EU citizens represent more than 20 per cent of the population are allowed to restrict EU foreigners access to active and passive suffrage at EP elections. Accordingly, only those EU citizens who resided in Luxembourg for more than five years out the six years prior to the election date were entitled to vote, although the subsequent electoral reforms reduced this period to five years before the application for registration is submitted since 2003; to two years in 2008; and in 2013, this criterion of prior residence was finally eliminated. Additionally, since the analysis presented here covers only EP elections, it is also important to bear in mind that these electoral contests have been generally categorized as secondorder elections in which citizens have fewer incentives to vote, as they might perceive that there is less at stake than in national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Flickinger and Studlar 2007; van der Brug and van der Eijk 2007; Stockemer 2011). Hence, one might reasonably expect that the mere nature of these elections also negatively affected foreigners electoral engagement. Last but not least, the empirical analysis presented here draws on an original dataset covering more than 550 observations which are groups of mobile Europeans entitled to cast the ballot for the 1999, 2004 and 2009 EP elections in the ten countries examined. As this number of observations is quite large for a research focused on groups rather than individuals, this reveals as the first comparative database of such characteristics that exists so far in the academic scholarship on intra-eu migration. The dataset includes official registration rates of non-national EU citizens in the Electoral Census of their host countries, this information being collected after directly contacting the electoral institutions and statistical offices of each country included in the sample. In absence of the real figures of political participation of Community voters derived from the secrecy of voting, these registration rates are used as proxies for turnout. This methodological decision was already discussed in previous studies, the main justification for using the registration rate as indicator of turnout resting in the pro-active and voluntary procedure of electoral 4 For an analysis of the patterns of political participation of intra-eu migrants in local elections held in these ten countries see Vintila (2015). 5 The 2014 EP elections will be included in the next version of the paper. 6 Intra-EU migrants have been allowed to vote for EP elections for the first time in 1995 in Sweden, 1996 in Austria and 1994 in the rest of the countries analyzed here. The peculiarity of these first EP elections in which Community voters had the right to cast the ballot derived from the fact that EU Member States had a very limited period of time for ensuring the correct implementation of the voting rights of EU foreigners, which might have affected their turnout levels (see also Méndez-Lago 2005, 2010; COM 97(731) final). 10

11 enrolment for non-national EU citizens (Jacobs, Martiniello & Rea 2002; Collard 2002, 2010, 2012; Strudel 2002, 2004; Besch 2004; Méndez Lago 2003; 2007, 2010; Shaw 2007). More specifically, in order to cast the ballot for EP elections held in their EU countries of residence, EU foreigners have to previously enroll in the Electoral Census through an application personally submitted to the authorities of these countries. Hence, for the specific case of intra-eu migrants, voting becomes a two-stage process in which they firstly have to enroll for elections; and only those registered to vote are later allowed to cast the ballot. Since it is generally assumed that all those who took the effort to personally enroll are also very likely to vote, the registration rate was acknowledged as a good proxy for turnout. Moreover, given the enrolment procedure, this registration rate cannot underestimate turnout for mobile Europeans at any point. At most, it can only inflate turnout estimates since intra-eu migrants only have to register once, their electoral enrollment being automatically renewed for the following elections. IV. The political participation of non-national EU citizens in European Parliament elections held in their host EU Member States IV.1. Convergence or divergence? Mapping the political impact of the electoral rights granted by the EU citizenship status To what extent non-national EU citizens made use of their voting rights at EP elections held in their EU countries of residence? Is there a similar pattern of political participation across different groups or, on the contrary, some mobile Europeans are more prone to engage in electoral politics than others? Furthermore, do these patterns vary from one host country to another? In order to address these questions, I firstly look at the electoral potential of intra-eu migrants. Table 1 summarizes the figures of EU citizens entitled to vote (potential voters) for the 1999, 2004 and 2009 EP elections held in all ten countries analysed; their share from the overall potential electorate for these elections; and the share of foreigners originating from other EU15 countries from all intra-eu migrants entitled to cast the ballot in each case. Table 1: Non-national EU citizens entitled to vote for EP elections (Potential voters). Countries EP 1999 EP 2004 EP 2009 N (% over all potential voters) % EU15* N (% over all potential voters) % EU15* N (% over all potential voters)* France (3.0) (2.9) (2.6) 92.1 Belgium (6.8) (6.8) (7.3) 89.2 Luxembourg (33.8) (37.8) (40.7) 95.8 Spain (2.8) (3.4) (5.6) 53.0 Italy (0.3) (0.4) (2.3) 14.5 Portugal (0.6) (0.7) (0.8) 58.3 Austria (2.5) (3.9) 57.1 Sweden (2.2) (2.6) (3.1) 75.4 Denmark (1.0) (1.3) (2.2) 64.3 Finland (0.3) (0.7) (1.1) 44.6 Source: Own elaboration. The data is from SPF Intérieur (Belgium); SESOPI and OLAI (Luxembourg); Strudel (2002, 2010) and Collard (2010) for 1999 and 2004 and INSEE for 2009 (France); Spanish National Institute for Statistics- INE (Spain); Italian Institute for Statistics- ISTAT (Italy); Portuguese Immigration and Border Service- SEF (Portugal); 11 % EU15*

12 Eurostat (Austria); Statistics Sweden (Sweden); Statistics Denmark (Denmark) and Statistics Finland (Finland. The data for France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden and Denmark refers to EU foreigners of more than 18 years old. The data for Austria, Portugal (2004 and 2009) and Finland refers to foreigners of more than 19 years old. For Italy and Portugal (only 1999), the data refers to all intra-eu migrants independently of their age. For Luxembourg, the figures do not include the prior residence, as this information is not available (see Besch (2004), SESOPI (1999, 2005, 2009, 2011)). Total potential electorate = N national citizens entitled to vote for each election + N foreign residents in voting age. % from EU15 = % of foreigners originating from EU15 countries from all intra-eu migrants entitled to vote. Broadly speaking, intra-eu migrants represented a sizeable part of the overall potential electorate across all countries analysed. In some cases (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal), their electoral potential maintained more or less stable during the period considered. In others- especially in Spain and Italy- it increased in a significant manner due to the accelerated increase of the foreign-born population during the last decades. In relative terms, the electoral visibility of intra-eu migrants was substantially higher in Luxembourg, where around per cent of all potential voters for EP elections were foreigners. Yet, when looking at the data in absolute term, one can observe that, France, Spain and Italy were the countries counting with the highest aggregate numbers of potential Community voters for EP elections. By 2009, these numbers were around ten times (or even more) higher than in Luxembourg, Portugal, Denmark or Finland; and they duplicated the figure of foreigners entitled to vote for EP elections in Belgium. The breakdown of these figures by specific groups indicates that, whereas in France, Belgium or Luxembourg, the large majority of mobile Europeans entitled to vote originated from other EU15 countries, in other cases, the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement waves changed significantly the composition of the foreign electorate for EP elections. This was particularly visible in Italy, where foreigners from the new EU Member States summed up more than 85 per cent of all intra-eu migrants with voting rights for the 2009 elections; but also, to a lesser extent, in Finland and Spain where, by 2009, the potential foreign electorate was almost equally distributed between old and new Community voters. In Portugal, Austria, Sweden and Denmark, foreigners from EU15 countries still formed the majority of non-national EU citizens entitled to vote in 2009; although Eastern Europeans also represented sizeable proportions of the overall potential electorate. By nationalities, the best represented groups were Portuguese, Italians, Britons and Germans in France; Italians, Dutch, French and Spaniards in Belgium; Portuguese, Italians and French in Luxembourg; Germans, Polish and Romanians in Austria; Finish, Danish and Polish in Sweden; Polish, Germans and Britons in Denmark and Finnish, Swedish and German citizens in Finland. In all three Southern European countries, Romanians formed the largest segment of the foreign electorate in 2009, accounting for more than 30 per cent of all foreigners entitled to vote in Spain and Portugal and 70 per cent in Italy, respectively. However, Germans, French and Britons were also well represented in demographic terms in these three countries. Keeping in mind these differences, Figure 4 illustrates the shares of non-national EU citizens registered to vote for the 1999, 2004 and 2009 EP elections from all intra-eu migrants entitled to vote in each case. The data indicates that, despite their high demographic concentration, non-national EU citizens made a quite limited use of their voting rights for EP elections in the host countries. In most cases, their registration rates 12

13 were fairly low, especially when compared with general turnout levels. 7 For the 1999 EP elections, the shares of EU foreigners registered to vote was similar in almost all countries, ranking from barely 4 per cent in Italy to 9 per cent in Luxembourg, respectively. The exception was in the Nordic countries where the registration rates of intra-eu migrants were at least three times higher, reaching 27 per cent in Sweden and Finland, and 31 per cent in Denmark. In these two cases, the shares of intra-eu migrants registered to vote were quite similar to the general turnout levels. Figure 4: Registration rates of non-national EU citizens, by electoral year and host country. Source: Own elaboration. The registration data is from the French Ministry of Interior, the Belgian Electoral Service, the Luxembourgish Centre for Research and Intercultural and Social Learning (CEFIS/SESOPI), the Spanish Electoral Census for Foreign Residents (CERE), the Portuguese Electoral Service (DGAI), the Italian Ministry of Interior, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior, the Swedish Electoral Authority, the Danish Ministry of Interior and Health and the Finnish Population Register Centre. The registration shares are calculated based on the numbers of EU foreigners entitled to vote in each case (see sources for these figures in Table 1). The 2004 elections did not bring major changes to these patterns of electoral engagement. The registration rates of intra-eu migrants maintained in low levels of only 9 per cent in Italy and Luxembourg; 11 per cent in Spain; 12 per cent in Portugal, Belgium and France; and 14 per cent in Austria. Yet, in all these countries, the fraction of foreigners enrolled in the electoral register increased when compared to the previous EP elections, this being particularly noticeable in France, Spain, Italy and Portugal, where the registration rates almost duplicated from 1999 to 2004; and the figures of those enrolled for the first time in 2004 (first-time voters) almost equalled the numbers of registrations for the 1999 elections. The registration rates decreased in the Nordic countries, although they were still higher in comparative terms: 18 per cent in Finland, 27 per cent in Sweden and almost 30 per cent in Denmark. Interestingly enough, this decreasing pattern was observed despite the general increase in the numbers of EU citizens entitled to vote for EP elections in all these countries between 1999 and Turnout at EP elections was particularly low in France (47 per cent in 1999, 43 per cent in 2004 and 41 per cent in 2009), Portugal (40 per cent in 1999; 39 per cent in 2004 and 37 per cent in 2009), Austria (49 per cent in 1999, 42 per cent in 2004 and 46 per cent in 2009), Sweden (39 per cent in 1999, 38 per cent in 2004 and 46 per cent in 2009) and Finland (30 per cent in 1999, 39 per cent in 2004 and 41 per cent in 2009). Turnout was somehow higher in Spain (63 per cent in 1999 and 45 per cent in 2004 and 2009), Italy (70 per cent in 1999, 72 per cent in 2004 and 65 per cent in 2009) and Denmark (51 per cent in 1999, 48 per cent in 2004 and 60 per cent in 2009). Belgium and Luxembourg had the highest turnout levels at EP elections (Belgium: 85 per cent in 1999; 86 per cent in 2004; 85 per cent in 2009; and Luxembourg: 87 per cent in 1999; 91 per cent in 2004 and 91 per cent in 2009). 13

14 Table 2 provides further insights on the evolution of registration figures by showing their distribution between EU15 foreigners ( old Community voters) and those originating from the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 ( new Community voters). In all cases, most first-time voters for the 2004 elections originated from EU15 countries, as only few foreigners from the countries that joined the EU that year expressed their willing to vote for the first EP elections in which they were allowed to cast the ballot. In all countries, new Community voters initially counted with a lower electoral potential for the 2004 elections when compared to EU15 foreigners; and the general picture of their mobilization was quite unsatisfactory, especially in France, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal and Austria. In light of the data, their average enrolment rate was substantially lower than that of non-national EU citizens from other EU15 countries, although this participatory gap was much reduced in Italy. The situation was different in Belgium, Sweden and Denmark where more than 10 out of each 100 potential voters from the new EU Member States enrolled in the Electoral Census in In Belgium, their registration shares were even similar to the ones observed for EU15 foreigners; although in Sweden and Denmark, their enrolment rates were still two times lower than for old Community voters. Table 2: Non-national EU citizens registered to vote at EP elections (total N and registration shares) EP 1999 EP 2004 EP 2009 Countries EU15 EU15 New EU MS EU15 New EU MS France (5,8) (12,5) 376 (1,0) (20,9) (5,6) Belgium (7,7) (11,6) (10,3) (11,9) (4,7) Luxembourg (8,8) (9,0) 24 (1,3) (12,0) 151 (2,4) Spain (6,8) (12,0) (3,3) (20,6) (7,5) Italy (4,1) (10,1) (5,7) (16,2) (4,1) Portugal (7,8) (12,5) 1 (0,1) (24,2) 453 (1,5) Austria (19,8) (3,0) (15,5) (3,7) Sweden (27,0) (28,1) (13,1) (26,0) (6,3) Denmark (30,5) (32,3) (15,9) (25,9) (5,8) Finland (27,6) (26,5) (7,9) (21,9) (5,9) Source: Own elaboration, see sources in Figure 4. The 2009 EP elections further confirmed the trend of low electoral engagement of intra-eu migrants in their EU host countries. In most cases, there was a limited increase in their registration rates (even bellow the one observed five years before) despite the fact that the aggregates figures of first-time foreign voters for these elections increased in a considerable manner. By countries, the positive differential in the registration rates compared to 2004 was higher in France and, to a lower extent, in Spain. At the opposite pole, in Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, the registration rates dropped significantly compared to 2004, this being particularly visible in the Danish case. The breakdown by specific origins also indicates that, in all cases, the share of EU15 foreigners enrolled for the 2009 elections was equal or higher than the average one for all intra-eu migrants. However, citizens from the new EU Member States maintained low levels of electoral involvement, well below the general average for all Community voters. This pattern was detected even in Belgium, Sweden and Denmark where new Community voters showed higher registration levels in 2004; but also in Spain and Italy, in which this group considerably increased its electoral potential compared to the previous elections. 14

15 IV.2. Towards a better understanding of the political practice of the EU citizenship in the electoral field: between group characteristics and the political opportunity structure The analysis conducted so far indicates that mobile Europeans did not behave in the same way in the electoral field, with some groups being more prone to use their enfranchisement for EP elections than others. In this vein, a specific hypothesis was formulated in Section II, according to which foreigners from EU15 countries- old Community voters- are more prone to engage in elections held in their host countries than Europeans coming from the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement waves- new Community voters- (Hypothesis 1.1). Figure 5 compares the mean registration rates between these two groups for all EP covered, also attending to their distribution by specific countries. Figure 5: Registration rates of old and new Community voters by host country, Source: Own elaboration. The data indicates that EU15 foreigners showed indeed a higher propensity of exercising their electoral rights when compared to foreigners originating from the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, this applying for all countries examined here. Considering all elections covered, the mean registration rate for old Community voters reached 10 per cent, thus being almost double than for new Community voters. By countries, this differential was higher in Sweden and Finland (around 18 percentage points difference between these two groups); but also in Denmark or Portugal (16 and 15 percentage points, respectively). Yet, in Italy and Belgium, this gap seems much reduced, with a difference of only 3 percentage points. Figure 6 shows the breakdown of these results by specific nationalities. As observed, within the group of old Community voters, nationals of Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Italy tended to engage more in the electoral politics of their host countries. Yet, Portuguese, Swedish or Greek citizens showed registration rates generally below the average for all Community voters; whereas foreigners from the new EU Member States shared a strong electoral apathy when it comes to voting at EP elections, as the mean registration rates of almost all nationalities within this group were below 10 per cent. 15

16 Figure 6: Registration rates of non-national EU citizens, by specific group and electoral year. Source: Own elaboration. Further to this differentiation between old and new Community voters, several hypotheses have been formulated in the attempt to better understand why mobile Europeans engage differently in the political arena of their host countries. As explained, there are strong reasons to believe that foreigners demographic concentration and electoral potential in the host country positively affects intra-eu migrants propensity to vote (Hypothesis 1.2.a and 1.3.a). Yet, this effect might overate differently for certain groups, for which it was also expected that, ceteris paribus, the higher the share of intra-eu migrants from all foreigners (Hypothesis 1.2.b) and the higher the proportion of a particular group from all non-national residents entitled to vote at EP elections (Hypothesis 1.3.b), the higher their likelihood to vote. Also, it was expected that mobile Europeans propensity to vote is higher for those coming from countries in which citizens are more aware of the voting rights derived from the EU citizenship status (Hypothesis 1.4) and turnout is higher (Hypothesis 1.5). 16